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COURSE OVERVIEW
• Labor Law Intertwined with Labor Movement; area is inherently historical
& overtly political
• Course goals:
1. Master legal doctrine (statutory course w/NLRB and court interpretation)
2. Appreciate how background historical and political factors influenced evolution of law administered by a
politically-appointed body (NLRB)
3. develop critical thinking abilities and policy analysis– ask what values are promoted through various
doctrines we study, what assumptions structure them.
II. THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONS
Ask these questions:
• What social problems prompted the birth of the U.S. labor
movement?
• What forms did labor unionism assume in the U.S., and what were
the goals/ideology of each?
-Knights of Labor (1800s), Wobblies/ IWW (early 1900s)
-AFL (craft unionism)
-CIO (industrial unionism)
• What accounts for the decline of unionism?
III. DECLINE OF UNIONISM
• From 35% in 1953 to 10.3% by end of 2021 (6.1% private sector, 34% public sector)
• Correlates with rise in income inequality
• Union strength varies with area of the country
• But--Overall union approval rate is up in 2023; 71% of public approves of unions
IV. MODERN UNIONS
A. Who is Organizing Now?
• Graduate students (U of CA recent strike), postdocs (Columbia, Mount Sinai) -- College athletes
(Northwestern, USC) -- Starbucks baristas -- Other retail food service– Chipotle, Trader Joe’s -- Tech workers –
Google, Apple -- Amazon workers
B. Why is Labor Organizing on the Rise?
• Role of Pandemic? --- New forms of unionism: “alt-unionism” --- Fight for $15 --- Workers’ Centers ----Social bargaining (state, city and industry level)
V. LABOR LAW
A. Initial hostility to labor unionism– Framed as criminal conspiracy b/c “unnatural” way of raising price of
work beyond its standard, taking undue advantage of the public.
Cordwainers’ Case (Commonwealth v. Pullis) –
 journeymen assn that adheres to a closed-shop policy may be criminally charged and convicted of
conspiracy.
B. Laissez-Faire approach– unions lawful, use of unlawful means punished (picketing, striking) –
Commonwealth v. Hunt p. – id. (basically)
C. Law Embraces Unions to…
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1)Achieve Labor Peace
2)Balance Power,
3)Provide Avenue for Worker Voice & Support Democracy –see section 1, statutory supp. pp. 1-2
• RLA, Clayton Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act
• NLRA (Wagner Act, 1935; Taft-Hartley Act, 1947; Landrum-Griffin Act,
1959).
III. NLRB – see https://www.nlrb.gov/
A. 5- member Board, political appointments, majority of 3 from
President’s party
B. Regional Directors, ALJs, career attorneys, field agents
C. GC prosecutes cases (ULPs)
D. Two types of cases:
• R cases (representation/elections)
• C cases (complaint/ULPs)
E. Adjudication Process for C cases:
ALJ  NLRB  Ct. of Apps. (enforces NLRB orders)  S. Ct.
IV. Coverage of the NLRA
A. NLRA Designed to Obtain Industrial Peace
• applies to all businesses engaged in commerce, producing goods that move into
commerce or receiving goods from out of state
• To conserve resources, NLRB limits exercise of jurisdiction to cases where effect on
commerce is substantial – pp. 25-27
B. Employers NOT covered: -- sec. 2(2)
• U.S. gov’t (except postal service)
• States & political subdivisions
• Rs covered by RLA – railways, airlines
• Secondary schools & universities operated by a church (1st A entanglement issues)
• Businesses operated by Native American tribes where treaty rights would be abrogated
C. Ees NOT Covered
1. Agricultural & domestic ees
2. ICs
3. Supervisors
4. Managers
5. Confidential ees
6. Those who are primarily students
Agricultural & Domestic ees –sec. 2(3)
• Agricultural ees-- Holly Farms v. NLRB – those whose duties are
performed as an integral part of pre-market, ordinary farming not
covered; once product is marketable, all ees who transport, kill,
process or refine it are covered ees (like factory ees on assembly line)
• Domestic ees – not represented by Us pressing for NLRA at time of
enactment; mostly women & people of color; overt racism surrounds
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Congressional exclusion of same groups from UI and social security
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Independent Contractors
• Originally included under Wagner Act, excluded under T/H
• Right of control test (=def)
 ask whether R retains control over manner and
means by which product/results/service is accomplished, rather than
just the final outcome of job; if so, worker is an “ee”.
• DC Circuit also askes whether worker has significant opportunity for
entrepreneurial gain or loss
• Many gig workers may be ICs
Supervisors - sec. 2(11)
Originally covered under Wagner Act, T/H added exclusion of supervisors
• Worker is a supervisor (=def):
 ee has authority to engage in one of the 12 listed supervisory functions,
 to assign other workers to work,
 or responsibility to direct them,
 where the exercise of authority is not merely routine or clerical,
 but requires the exercise of independent judgment, and the authority is exercised in the interest of the R.
• Professionals are explicitly covered by the NLRA; so tension here since many ees now work in teams and
professionals may direct less-skilled ees;
[FORK]
o are they simply exercising professional judgment, or acting in the interest of the R?
Managerial ees
• Those who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative decisions of the
R are impliedly excluded as managers
• Yeshiva University (NLRB 1980) full-time Uni faculty are managerial EE’s who are implicitly excluded from
the NLRA
• Suppose faculty obtain authority to make operative decisions via organizing and coll bargaining– could they
lose ee status?
Confidential ees
• Those who assist or act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate and make effective managementlabor policies
• NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp.
Those who are Primarily Students
• Sec. 2(3) – covered ees must be engaged in a primarily economic relation with the R
• Medical Interns & Residents –are “ees” – Boston Medical Ctr. (NLRB 1999)
• Grad students/TAs - NYU (NLRB 2000)– are “ees”
• Brown University (NLRB 2004)– are not ees
• Columbia University (NLRB 2016) –are “ees”
• Trump NLRB was planning rulemaking but lost power before it could change this rule
• Undergrad RAs? Scholar-Athletes? Prob. 3 p. 37 (Northwestern Univ)
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Timeline of Unionization (Basically this is the process that governs labor law)
U Organizing Campaign 
election petition (30% of cards req’d) 
U Election 
Objections to Conduct of Election filed 
U is certified (or not) 
Collective Bargaining occurs 
CBA is signed 
**Economic Pressure applied by both parties (U- strikes,
slowdowns, pickets, boycotts, leafletting; R – lockouts,
permanent or temporary replacement ees). Most likely to
occur during organizing campaign or
during collective bargaining)**
III. When and Where Can U Organizing Occur?
• Section 7 protects right to self-organization; section 8(a)(1) implements/enforces!!
A. Solicitation by Non-ees
• Why do non-ees have any rights to access ees?
• Babcock & Wilcox (S. Ct. 1956); Jean Country (NLRB)(balancing)
• Lechmere (S. Ct. 1991) p. 48
• What right does U seek? Why? Why does R resist so vehemently?
• Holding: “Sec. 7 does not protect non-ee U organizers except in rare case where inaccessibility of ees makes
ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-ees to communicate with them through the usual channels”. Only
after the threshold for this exception is established will the Board balance.
• Basis of dissent’s objection?
B. Applying Lechmere
• Need “unique” obstacles frustrating access
• Implications for U strategy: dumpster-diving, tagging, salting, social media/web outreach
• Discriminatory non-solicitation rules or adopting non-solicitation rules in response to U organizing campaign
may violate 8(a)(1) or provide some evidence of anti-U animus for 8(a)(3) violation
• Applies even to publicly accessible spaces owned by the R
C. Solicitation by Ees
1. Working Time is for Work – R may promulgate no-solicitation rules applicable to working time, they are
presumptively valid. But R may not restrict all working hours, e.g. lunch and other breaks, before and after
work on R property, unless it can show special circumstances that make it necessary to maintain production or
discipline – Republic Aviation (1945)
2. What is “solicitation”? - only discussion re signing cards, or any effort to encourage ee to vote for U? p. 60
3. Retail stores may ban solicitation even during nonworking time in selling areas, immediate patient care areas
to avoid customer confusion; but not in other areas (break rooms, cafeteria, hospital gift shop)
4. U buttons/insignia – R may not prohibit ees from wearing U buttons/insignia absent special circumstances re
production or safety, or risk of customer confusion (p. 61)
5. Use of company email systems –
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Purple Communications (Obama NLRB); Caesars Entertainment (Trump NLRB) - p. 62
6. Off duty ees – p. 62-63
III. Imbalance in Organizing Opportunities
• Nutone p. 63:
 lawful no-solicitation rule + captive audience speeches
= no per se violation; U has no right to use a particular means of
communication just because R is using it
• Could R conduct “captive audience meetings” and maintain nosolicitation rule barring external organizers from access to property?
IV. Remedies for 8a1 violations
• Set aside election if R prevailed
• Reinstatement & backpay/equitable remedies for ees fired or disciplined for violating rule
• Post notice
IV. When is R speech coercive? 8a1, 8c
A. R anti-U speech
• Originally, Wagner Act required R neutrality
• Va. Elec. & Power
 R speech assessed in totality of circumstances, to
respect R 1st A rights (p. 67)
• T/H added 8c to codify 1st A rights and provide defense to Rs
-- legislative history suggests speech cannot be evidence of ULP unless
speech by its own terms threatens force or economic reprisal; but see
cases N. 1 pp. 69-71
 Gissel (p. 71): threats vs. predictions; predictions must be supported
by objective fact
B. Applications
• Problems 6 & 7 pp. 76-77
• Gissel & section 8c do NOT apply to section 9 challenges to conduct
of election– N. 2 p. 76
R anti-U speech :R cannot make a threat of reprisal or force
• Gissel (p. 71): R can, however, make predictions; predictions must be
“carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an R’s
belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control,
or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the
plant in case of unionization.” pp. 73-74
• Why weren’t the R’s statements in Gissel “predictions”?
• Problems 6 & 7 pp. 76-77
B. Gissel & section 8c only apply to ULP charges; they do NOT apply to
section 9 challenges to the conduct of election– N. 2 p. 76
II. Polling & Interrogation
1. Polling to determine truth of majority claim—Blue Flash p. 78,
modified by Struksnes, n. 1 p. 82
• Per se ULP if election petition already filed
2. Non polling questioning– Bourne, n.2 p. 83
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• Casual questioning by supervisor
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III. Promises and Grants of Benefits
1. Promises- under 8(c), promises of benefit may be evidence of a ULP
2. What is a promise of benefit and why is it coercive? Exchange Parts, p.
84
3. Remedy? N. 1 p. 86
4. Grants of Benefits
• COLA increases
• Multiple plant/shop situations -- Starbucks
• Instituting open door/grievance policy in response to U organizing drive
4. Problem 10, pp. 87-88
IV. Other R Actions Implicating 8a1
1. Violence & Threats of Violence
2. Surveillance (or perception/appearance of surveillance)
3. Retaliatory Litigation -- BE & K Construction: 8a1 violation if suit is
objectively baseless and R has subjective retaliatory motivation or a
desire to impose costs of litigation on the other, regardless of
outcome
V. R Responsibility for Conduct & Speech
of Others –pp. 90-91
1. Supervisors
2. Non-supervisory ees
3. Third parties (politicians, priests, community leaders)
4. Anti-U consultants
• 81% of Rs use
• 87% of anti-U consultants are lawyers
• 84% actually run the campaign for the R
• Significant correlation exists between use of consultants and lower U win
rates
• LMRDA sec. 203(b) [p. 89 Stat. Supp.] requires those engaged in persuader
activities to file statement of fees received
I. Promises and Grants of Benefits
1. Promises- under 8(c), promises of benefit may be evidence of a ULP
2. What is a promise of benefit and why is it coercive? Exchange Parts, p.
84
3. Remedy? N. 1 p. 86
4. Grants of Benefits
• COLA increases
• Multiple plant/shop situations -- Starbucks
• Instituting open door/grievance policy in response to U organizing drive
4. Problem 10, pp. 87-88
III. R Responsibility for Conduct &
Speech of Others –pp. 90-91
1. Supervisors
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2. Non-supervisory ees
3. Third parties (politicians, priests, community leaders)
4. Anti-U consultants
IV. Employer Domination or Support—
8a2, 2(5)
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A. Rationale for prohibition
B. What is a “labor organization”? Section 2(5)
• Ees participate
• For purpose of “dealing with” R (does not include one-way input)
• Concerning traditional CBing subjects—wages, hours, working conditions (does not include efficiency,
productivity groups)
• Electromation, Dupont, Peninsula General Hospital – pp. 93-94
C. What is “domination” or “contributing support/assistance”? – 8(a)(2)
• R controls membership
• R controls discussion
• Bilateral process of interaction between R and group
• Committee charge and likely areas of discussion are traditional CBing subjects, ee morale/disaffection
• R scienter irrelevant
• Problem 11, p. 96
D. Policy Issues
• Should 8a2 be repealed to allow more voice mechanisms for
workers?
• Harper p. 95
• Alternatives– works council (EU); mandatory worker participation
statutes (Craver- p. 94)
E. Legal Issues Involving 8a2
1. Premature Grants of Exclusive Rep. Status– ILGWU v. NLRB
(Bernhard-Altmann), p. 97
2. Conditional Agreements – Majestic Weaving (n. 1 p. 101); but see Montague v. NLRB (n. 1 p. 101)
3. Neutrality agreements– Mulhall, p. 101
4. After-Acquired Store Clauses - Shaw’s Supermarkets, n. 2 p. 102
5. Exception: Pre-hire agreements in construction industry, per section 8(f)– n. 3, p. 102
II. 8(a)(3)--Proving Discriminatory Intent
• Arises in discharge, discipline, and failure to hire cases
• Burden of Proof on GC to show ee discharge or other action is b/c of anti-U animus; if discharge, must prove
not discharged for cause (to support reinstatement remedy– see 10c, which limits remedies where ee is
discharged for cause), by a preponderance of evidence
A. Methods of Proof
1. Direct Evidence (smoking gun, but speech must be tied to action- n.
4 p. 108-09)
2. Pretext Plus Cases- Edward G Budd, p. 103
3. Mixed Motive Cases - Transportation Management; Wright Line
standard, p. 107
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[GC proves that R action was based in whole or in part on anti-U animus, then burden shifts to R to show as
affirmative defense that same action would have been taken even if ee not involved in protected activities; B/P
then reverts to GC to rebut R’s defense, GC retains ultimate B/P to show violation of 8a3]
• R must have been aware of protected activities to be liable
B. Union Salts – Town & Country, n. 6 p. 109
Limits on remedies– p. 110-11:
• Salts must have genuine interest in employment
• Limits on duration of backpay
C. Scope of Judicial Review– Universal Camera, n. 7 p. 111 (“substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole”)
II. Application
• Problems 12 & 13 pp. 112-113
• Relevant factors:
-R knowledge of organizing activities
-R tolerance of similar undesirable conduct in the past
-seriousness of infraction
-timing of R action relative to U activity
-differential treatment of ees who were not U supporters
-history of R hostility toward U
I. Application of 8(a)(3) (con’t):
Discrimination to Discourage U membership
• Problem 13 pp. 112-113
• Relevant factors:
-R knowledge of organizing activities
-R tolerance of similar undesirable conduct in the past
-seriousness of infraction
-timing of R action relative to U activity
-differential treatment of ees who were not U supporters
-history of R hostility toward U
II. Discrimination to Encourage U membership – section 8a3 & proviso
A. Types of U Security Arrangements – pp. 121-22
1. Closed Shop - R agrees to hire only U members (outlawed by T/H)
2. Union Shop- Ees must join U, remain U member in good standing as condition of employment; GM case
reinterprets to make them lawful
3. Agency Shop- ees must pay dues (equivalent in fees), but not join U
4. Maintenance of Membership - WWII era – ees who are members must remain so during CBA term as
condition of employment; preserved status quo during wartime
5. Dues Check-off – collection device; authorizes R to deduct U dues from ee wages and pay directly to U
6. States can prohibit any or all of these, section 14(b) [state right to work laws not preempted by NLRA]
III. Policy Challenges
• U’s need U security arrangements to finance themselves
• Absent U security arrangement, free rider problem because once elected, U has statutory duty to represent all
ees in unit (exclusivity doctrine)
• But First Amendment issues in public sector & under RLA when membership is forced upon ees who don’t
consent; and making union membership compulsory was problematic in private sector in era when Us excluded
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blacks from membership
• NLRB v. GM (S. Ct. 1963- not assigned) : “membership” in 8a3 proviso is whittled down to its financial core.
Ees who don’t consent to membership must pay compulsory fees equivalent to dues.
• What is the difference between full membership and financial core membership, then?
IV. Financial Core Membership
A. Opt Out System: Us have duty to inform ees of GM rights to be
financial core members
B. What expenses must financial core members subsidize?
• expenses “germane to collective bargaining” –i.e. costs of
negotiating, administering CBA & adjusting grievances –but NOT
political or ideological activities
• What about expenses in between? Ellis, p. 131 (RLA case)
• Agency fees typically appx 75-85% of full U dues
C. What are core U functions, per the Court? What is the nature of a U?
Financial Core Members, con’t
D. Ellis Expanded to NLRA context by CWA v. Beck, n. 1 p. 141
• HOWEVER, ,Us may require financial core members to fund
organizing expenses relating to competitor firms of those already
organized– UFCW Local 951 (Meijer, Inc.); Teamsters Local 75, p. 142.
Why?
• Locke v. Karass – Us can use objectors’ dues on litigation re other
bargaining units IF there is reciprocal obligation to support litigation
in objectors’ bargaining unit, and litigation relates to chargeable CB
expenses
E. Full members may not refuse to finance particular U expenditures;
only financial core members can. N. 3, pp. 143-44
V. Issues for Public Sector Us
• Same free rider challenge for Us, but sharper concerns about ee rights to refuse even to a pay dues equivalent,
since 1) First Amendment rights are direct vis-à-vis the R when R is the state; 2) Court saw paying dues
equivalent as a form of speech; and 3) CB with the state involves discussion of topics which are all essentially
political.
• Abood, relied upon in Ellis, overturned in Janus v. AFSCME (2018)
• Free rider problem with a vengeance: AFSCME lost 98% of agency fee payers, SEIU lost 94%
• Are public sector Us fundamentally economic actors, or political actors? -- effect of Janus on campaign
funding for Democratic party, nonlabor groups that advance workers’ rights, U power
VI. State Right to Work legislation– sec. 14(b)
• 27 states have right to work legislation prohibiting various forms of U
security clauses (violations include fines, imprisonment)
• Most common in southern states, but Midwestern states that were
originally U strongholds have come on board (MI, WI, IN, WV)
• Arguments for and against right to work laws?
• Open Q whether cities or counties can enact right to work laws also Autoworkers Local 3047 v. Hardin County
• Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn (S. Ct. 1963) – FL right to work law
upheld under 14(b); if state law addresses an “agreement requiring
membership,” it is lawfu
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Protected Concerted Activities (PCA) - sec. 7
To be covered under section 7 (and to ground a ULP charge under 8a1 or 8a3), ee activity must be
1. Concerted (involve or seek to induce group action), and
2. For mutual aid (not a merely personal gripe, and pertaining to
wages, hours or working conditions of ees), and
3. “Protected” (not too disloyal, not unlawful means).
When is Activity Concerted & for Mutual Aid?
A. In NonU context –
• More than one ee involved (Washington Aluminum) or
• 1 ee seeking to unionize or mobilize others or
• 1 ee authorized to act on behalf of others
• AND on issue traditionally subject to CBing, e.g. wages, hours,
conditions of employment, that affects multiple ees in their capacity
as ees & is not a personal gripe
B. In U context –
• Any of above, OR 1 ee seeking to enforce rights that ee honestly and
reasonably believes are protected in CBA - City Disposal
What Forms Does PCA Take?
• U organizing
• Group meetings & emails, discussions (Alstate—Trump Board)
• Strikes, pickets, boycotts organized by U
• Informal action without a U in the picture, involving group action or one ee seeking to initiate, induce or
prepare for group action on subject of traditional mutual interest to ees as ees
• Walkouts (NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, p. 148, & similar cases)
• Problem 14 p. 153
The Special Case of Social Media Posts,
pp. 149-50
• Treated same as if they happened in person, so can be PCA–
Hispanics United (NLRB 2012)
• “liking” another’s post can suffice – Three D
• Messages containing insubordinate or profane speech subject to:
--Obama NLRB (Pier Sixty)– totality of circumstances analysis
--Trump NLRB (GM LLC & Charles Robinson)—Wright Line analysis
[would R have taken action even if PCA had not occurred?]
R Work Rules & Policies Implicating Section 7 Rights
• Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia test (Obama NLRB 2004, p. 151):
(1) does rule explicitly restrict sec. 7 protected activities? if yes, it violates 8a1.
(2) If rule does not explicitly restrict sec. 7 protected activities, it can still violate the Act if (i) ees could
reasonably construe the language to prohibit sec. 7 activity, or (ii) rule was promulgated in response to U
activity, or (iii) rule was applied to restrict sec. 7 rights.
• Under this test, rules prohibiting sharing confidential info, anti- disparagement rules, civility rules, policy
banning negativity, policy requiring ees to represent R in community in positive manner, all could violate sec. 7
• BUT rules with legitimate business justification do not violate sec. 7 (e.g.
anti-harassment, anti-bullying rules)
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R Work Rules & Policies Implicating Sec. 7 rights (con’t)
• The Boeing Co, Inc. (Trump NLRB 2017, p. 152)- altered the test: NLRB will balance impact on ee rights
from ee perspective against R’s legitimate business justifications. In an effort to bring more certainty and clarity
to the area, the NLRB created 3 categories of rules.
-Category I –rules that are lawful, e.g. general civility policies
-Category 2 – rules that warrant individualized scrutiny and balancing
(e.g., ban on ee discussion of ongoing investigations)
-Category 3 – rules that are unlawful (e.g. rule prohibiting discussion of wages and benefits)
Other Forms of Potentially Protected Concerted Activity
A. Arbitration Clauses Applicable to Individuals that Prohibit Class Claims
(NonU setting)
• Epic Systems v. Lewis, p. 155; but see Prime Healthcare (NLRA Claims, p.
156)
B. Constructive Concerted Activity
• Assertion of CBA Right by single unionized ee-- City Disposal, p. 157
• Assertion of Statutory Right by single NonU ee, pp. 163-64
C. Weingarten Rights in meeting ee reasonably believes might lead to
discipline, p. 166 (U setting)
• Available only upon ee request; R has no duty to inform ee of rights – p.
168
I. When is Activity Concerted and For Mutual Aid or Protection– NonUnion Context?
• Board struggles with which activities are concerted- e.g., single ee
complains or questions in group meeting or email (Alstate
Maintenance, p. 164)
• Board struggles to distinguish between mutual aid and “mere
personal griping”
• Board struggles to distinguish between ee activity that is for mutual
aid b/c redounds to ees’ material self-interest, and that which has
more general altruistic motives; must relate to ees’ interests as ees
--e.g. Eastex, S. Ct. held that ees who undertake activities that benefit
ees other than those employed by their R are still engaged in PCA for
mutual aid—n. 4 p. 165
II. PCA Under Section 7 – U context
A. Constructive Concerted Activity
• Assertion of CBA Right by single unionized ee-- City Disposal, p. 157
• Contrast assertion of Statutory Right by single NonU ee, pp. 163-64
B. Weingarten Rights in meeting ee reasonably believes might lead to
discipline (doesn’t apply if interview is to communicate decision already
made), p. 166
• Available only upon ee request; R has no duty to inform ee of rights – p.
168
• No rt to particular rep.; circuit split on whether ee has rt to prior
consultation with rep.
• R always has option to make decision w/out interview
• Contrast NonU setting--N. 4 pp. 168-69
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III. When Does Concerted Activity Loseits Protection?
A. Unlawful Objectives, Unlawful Means
• Actions that violate the NLRA (failure to give adequate notice of a strike in the healthcare industry– sec. 8g–
n. 5, p. 179; engaging in unlawful pickets or secondary boycotts that violate sections 8b7 or 8b4)
• Actions that violate the CBA (strikes in violation of no strike clauses)
• Actions that violate external property law (sit down strikes on R
property violate laws against trespass); but see Quietflex, WalMart
pp. 170-71 (balancing test)
• Actions that violate criminal law or tort law
B. Activity that is “too” Disloyal or Disruptive
—”indefensible” activity
• Slow downs (Elk Lumber, p. 172)
• Partial or intermittent strikes, sick-outs, work to rule (n. 1 pp. 174-75)
• Consumer boycotts absent a labor dispute that are disloyal – n. 2 p. 175
(George A. Hormel)
• Disloyal, disparaging product attacks not linked to a labor dispute– Local 1229, Jefferson Standard (pp. 17576); but see MasTec Advanced, p. 177
• Profanity- n. 3 pp. 177-78; Atlantic Steel (old standard, totality of circumstances); GM LLC and Charles
Robinson (Trump Board uses Wright Line standard)
• Efforts to impact managerial policy- n. 4 pp. 178-79
PCA Wrap -Up
• Problem 16, p. 165-66
Right to Strike– sec. 7, 13 (form of PCA)
• Three types of strikes–
1. Unfair Labor Practice Strikes– response to R ULP; strike would end if ULP is
remedied
2. Economic Strikes- strikes intended to put economic pressure on R during
organizing to persuade R to recognize and bargain with U, or during CBing to
pressure R to accept U’s proposals
3. Sympathy strikers (those from other businesses delivering goods or from a different work group in the same
business who refuse to cross the line in solidarity with the strikers) receive the same protection as if they were
economic strikers, regardless of whether the strike line they refuse to cross is an economic or ULP strike.
• However, if sympathy strikers are covered by a CBA containing a no-strike clause the Board considers them
unprotected absent extrinsic evidence supporting a narrower clause. N. 6 p. 193
A. Rights Of Economic Strikers
• R cannot discharge, but can permanently replace if R has legitimate business justification– MacKay, p. 187;
n.1 & 2 pp. 188-90
• Replaced strikers have recall rights—Laidlaw, N. 3 p. 191
• Replaced strikers eligible to vote for 1 year as “ees” – sec. 9c3
• Economic strikers not protected if strike is in violation of no-strike clause in CBA - they can be discharged
• Economic strike can be converted to ULP strike if R commits ULPs that extend duration of strike
B. Rights of ULP Strikers
• R cannot permanently replace ULP strikers – N. 4 p. 192
• Once ULP is found, R will be ordered to reinstate ULP strikers with backpay
• How to determine whether ULP has occurred? After-the-fact resolution
• ULP Strikers not bound by no-strike clauses in CBA where ULPs are serious, absent explicit language
including ULP strikes in no-strike clause
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• Conversion: If economic strike is converted to ULP strike, strikers replaced after that date are entitled to
reinstatement and backpay from date of conversion– N. 5 p. 192 [conversion can also work in reverse]
C. Which R Actions in Response to an Economic Strike violate 8a3, 8a1?
• Permanent replacement lawful if business justification exists
• R may offer inducements to strikers to cross the line and return to work, but some inducements are inherently
destructive of ee rights under sec. 7 because they create a cleavage in the plant/ workforce that continues after
strike ends, and therefore violate 8a1, 8a3
-offers of superseniority to crossovers unlawful (Erie Resistor (1963)– 20 years of superseniority, p. 194-95)
-offers of priority in job and domicile assignments lawful even though inconsistent with traditional seniority
system which based priority in job and domicile assignments on seniority (TWA, p. 195-96)
-cash bonuses to those working during strike lawful if business justification
-cash bonuses paid to crossovers after strike ends are unlawful (Suma Corp., Rubatex, p. 197)
D. Picket Line Behavior
• Clear Pine Mouldings, n. 7 pp. 193-94– protected conduct on the picket line even when it became heated,
unless conduct tended to coerce or intimidate other ees’ section 7 rights. Board applied this test generously,
protecting section 7 rights even when racist/sexist speech occurred on the picket line
• Trump Board replaced standard with Wright Line test, asking whether R discipline/discharge of picketer based
on anti-U animus was nevertheless justified because the action would have been taken even if the ee had not
been engaged in protected activity—GM LLC and Charles Robinson, p. 394
E. Proof of Motive in Cases Involving 8a3, 8a1 Violations of Group Rights
• Great Dane Trailers (1967), p. 197: Conduct that is “inherently destructive” of ee rights violates the Act even
without proof of improper motive. Conduct that has a “comparatively slight” effect on ee rights will not violate
the Act unless anti-U motive is proved.
• Court held that R refusal to pay strikers vacation benefits that had accrued under expired CBA, while
announcing intent to pay ees who had worked on particular date during strike, engaged in conduct
inherently destructive of ee rights
• Why isn’t permanent replacement of strikers inherently destructive of ee rights?
Lockouts: When do they violate 8a3?
Test: is impact inherently destructive of U membership, rt to CB, strike?
• What is a lockout?
• What is the difference between a lockout and a strike?
• What is a “whipsaw” strike?
Multi-R bargaining units
• Rs in same industry join together against a U that enjoys strong U density in the industry; common in
construction, coal mining, trucking, retail, grocery stores
• Enables small Rs to enhance power versus U by banding together; eliminates R worries re competitive
disadvantage resulting from CBA negotiations
• Facilitates development of industrywide worker benefit programs by creating pools of ees to spread costs (e.g.
health & safety in coal mining)
• Multi-R units are permitted by the NLRB if all Rs consent and U consents
• BUT withdrawal from unit is only permitted prior to start of CBA negotiations unless R can show dire
economic circumstances (bankruptcy)
OR all parties agree.
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A. “Defensive” Lockouts
Whipsaw strikes in multi-R bargaining units prompt defensive lockouts
• Buffalo Linen, p. 199 (one R is struck; others lockout & cease operating to preserve solidarity of R barg unit)
• Brown, p. 200 (one R is struck, but keeps operating w/temp nonunion replacements; other Rs lockout and hire
temp nonunion replacements to preserve parity/solidarity of R barg unit)
--was lockout inherently destructive of ees’ sec. 7 rights?
• Suppose struck R in Brown had locked out and hired permanent replacements-- Could other Rs in unit lockout
and hire permanent replacements too? FN 7 p. 204 leaves open
B. “Offensive” Lockouts
• American Shipbuilding, p. 206 (anticipates strike, lockout after impasse & cease operating)– lawful. Why?
--is this type of lockout inherently destructive of ee rights?
• Darling & Co., p. 217 (lockout pre impasse & cease operating)– lawful. Why?
• Harter Equipment, p. 218 (lockout pre impasse & temp replacements)— lawful. Why?
• Ancor Concepts, p. 219 (lockout pre impasse & perm replacements)—ULP. Why? (not enforced on appeal....
see also Int’l Paper, p. 219 – lockout pre impasse & subK out unit work, became permanent after impasse—
lawful)
C. Assessing legality of Lockouts
• Overriding question is whether lockout is inherently destructive of ee rights to Union membership, strike or to
CB (is R seeking to break the U? or just bring economic pressure to bear?)
• Offensive vs. Defensive categorization not dispositive– Evening News, p. 217
• What is R’s business justification?
• Do ees know during lockout what they could do to end it?
• Was lockout pre- or post-impasse?
• Were replacements permanent or temporary (if used)?
Plant Closings – Darlington, p. 220
• Complete Closing– lawful. Why?
• Announcing decision to close already made or “prediction” to close— lawful; Threats to close– unlawful ( FN
28; Gissel decided 4 years later)
• Partial Closings– unlawful if 1) R has interest in another business of sufficient substantiality to reap a benefit
from discouraging unionization in that business; 2) R is motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in remaining
plants & 3) R should reasonably have foreseen that effect based on relationship between businesses (p. 226 top)
• Runaway shops– unlawful where motive is U hostility; remedies can be problematic. N. 3 pp. 228-30
Remedial Problems
• NLRB has broad equitable powers– Phelps Dodge, p. 230; J.P. Stephens & Co. (Norma Rae’s company), N. 3
pp. 232-33
• Ees always have duty to mitigate damages- N. 1 p. 231
• NLRA covers undocumented workers, Sure-Tan, but no reinstatement or backpay to undocumented workers–
Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
• 10(j) injunctive relief available– N. 4 p. 233
• Joint R liability for ULPs where R has substantial direct & immediate authority over ees’ wages, hours,
working conditions.
• Successor R liability for ULPs– n. 5 p. 234
Establishing Representation Through NLRB Elections– section 9
• Regional directors have been delegated power to determine bargaining units, conduct elections (certification &
decertification)- pp. 238-39
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A. Election Bars
1. K Bar- up to 3 years; open period 90-60 days before end of CBA; insulated period 60-0 days before end of
CBA. Pp. 240-41
2. Election Bar—9c3, 1 year bar after valid election; supplemented by certification bar. N. 3 p. 242
3. Voluntary Recognition Bar—6 months (reasonable period of time) under
Lamons Gasket; but see Dana Corp rules in 2020, 45 day period for decertification election petition filing. N. 4
p. 242
4. Unresolved ULP charges no longer block election; count & vote or count & impound procedure. P. 243
B. Defining an Appropriate Unit
1. Community of interest standard, N. 1 p. 251
• Blue Man Vegas, p. 243
• Relevance of extent of organization by U (unit proposed by U)
• When is unit “truly inappropriate”? Overwhelming community of interest between included & excluded group
2. Acute care hospitals, presumptive units N. 2 p. 251
3. Micro-Units– Specialty Health Care, overturned by PCC Structurals,
C. Other Limits on Unit Composition
1. Professional ees, 9b1. N. 5 p. 254
2. Craft units, 9b2
3. Guards, 9b3
4. Multiple plant units (single plant presumption, but multi-plant units appropriate per factors and common in
some industries, e.g. public utilities, transportation industry), p. 255
5. Multi-R bargaining units, limits on withdrawal– Charles D. Bonanno, pp. 256-59
6. Joint R doctrine– N. 4 p. 253– “direct & immediate control” test
The Conduct of Representation Elections – section 9
A. Process
• NLRB sets election date
• “Quickie Election Rules”-- Obama Board established streamlined process in 2014 to minimize delay; median
time from petition to election was 24 days (down from 36-39 days under prior rules). The rules were upheld in
Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. NLRB. N. 1 p. 263-64.
• Trump Board sought to extend time in 2019 without going through APA notice and comment process; its rules
were struck down in 2020. AFL v. NLRB. N. 1 p. 264
• What is at stake here?
• Excelsior Underwear rule: R must turn over ee names and home addresses to the
Board within 7 calendar days after election has been directed. Pg. 261
• Election outcome is determined by majority of ees actually voting, not majority of ees in unit, as long as
adequate notice of election and opportunity to vote is provided. Voting is typically in person; rare exceptions for
mailed ballots. N. 8 p. 271.
• Runoff election is held if there is more than one union on the ballot and neither receives a majority. 9c3; N. 9
p. 271
• Striker eligibility to vote: Economic strikers for one year if permanently replaced; if unreplaced, they remain
eligible if jobs not eliminated and haven’t found permanent employment elsewhere. Permanent replacements
can also vote. ULP strikers and locked out ees remain eligible to vote. 9c3; N. 10 pp. 271-72
• Challenges to voter eligibility– if voter not employed on established date, vote won’t be counted
Challenges to the Conduct of the Election– Section 9
• NLRB seeks to maintain “laboratory conditions” so free and fair election can be held. Remedy is a re-run
election.
• Common challenges:
1. Election propaganda by R that doesn’t amount to a threat actionable under 8a1 (sec. 8c doesn’t apply here) –
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pp. 262-63; Dal-Tex Optical, N. 2 p. 265-66.
2. U vote-buying, NLRB v. Savair, N. 4 pp. 267-68
3. Misleading statements , N. 5 pp. 268-69– Under Midland National Life, no longer a basis for challenge
4. Inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice – p. 262; Sewell Mfg.; N. 6 pp. 269-70
5. Captive audience speeches or messages by either side within 24 hours of election– Peerless Plywood, p.263;
N. 7, pp. 270-71
6. Anything else that destroys “petri dish” of election
I. Establishing Rep. Status via ULP Proceedings
Third Way U can gain majority rep. status– “Gissel” bargaining order (BO): NLRB v. Gissel, p. 278
• Are authorization cards a reliable indicator of majority status?
• BO based on past majority at one point (usually demonstrated via authorization cards) + serious ULPs by R
that destroy opportunity for fair election
• Which types of R ULPs justify BO? [hallmark ULPs, Category II; N.2 p. 289]
• Is BO available where U never enjoyed majority status? [outrageous, pervasive ULPs-- Category I; N. 4 p.
291]
• Are Gissel BOs remedial, or punitive?
• Role of elapsed time? N. 3 p. 290
II. When may R Refuse Recognition
Demand based on majority card count?
• Are authorization cards as reliable an indicator of ee desires as election?
• Must R petition for election under 9c1B when presented with majority card count to avoid 8a5 liability, or can
it simply refuse recognition? Linden Lumber, p. 292
• What is the role of R GF? (current law versus Joy Silk doctrine) p. 282-83
• R who polls and learns that a majority of ees support the U- N. 5 p. 292
III. Duration of Duty to Bargain
• U wins election & is certified : one year irrebuttable presumption of majority status for certified U, Brooks v.
NLRB, p. 298
• Conclusive presumption of majority status during CBA, for up to 3 years. Auciello Iron Works, p. 304
• Petition bars in other circumstances:
1. U obtains voluntary recognition– election barred for reasonable period of time,
typically 6 months to one year from date of first bargaining session (Lamons Gasket);
but under Dana Corp., adopted by rulemaking per Trump NLRB, ees or rival Us have 45
days from date of recognition to file decertification petition. Biden NLRB has proposed
return to reasonable period of time standard. See N. 2.a. pp. 302-03
2. U obtains Gissel BO– election barred for reasonable period 6-12 months. N. 2.b. p.
303.
• Successor R obligated to bargain with predecessor’s U if substantial continuity in
business + successor hires a majority of its ees from predecessor’s workforce, for a
reasonable period of time. N. 4 pp. 303-04.
IV. When May R Refuse to Recognize U After Expiration of Certification Year, Reasonable Period, or
CBA term up to 3 years?
• Rebuttable presumption of majority status arises
• R can only withdraw recognition if U has actually lost majority status. Levitz Furniture, N. 1 p. 308; N. 2 pp.
308-09
• R must have reasonable basis for doubt re U’s continuing majority status, + good faith to justify conducting a
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poll to determine U’s support (the results of the poll may show actual loss of majority status, justifying
withdrawal of recognition). N. 2 p. 318.
• R may file RM election petition when it has reasonable basis for doubt + good faith uncertainty re incumbent
U’s continuing majority status, N. 1 p. 308
I. When May R Withdraw Recognition From Majority U?
A. Irrebuttable presumption of majority status (no election petition can be filed, R can’t withdraw
recognition):
1. Certified U - one year [certification bar– section 9c3, 9e2]
2. Voluntarily recognized U-- reasonable period 6-12 months (but see rule codifying Dana Corp., note 2.a. p.
303: 45 day window post- recognition for decert petitions by ees)
3. Gissel B.O. —reasonable period, 6-12 months
4. continues during CBA if signed, for up to 3 years [K bar rule]
B. A Rebuttable Presumption of Majority Status Arises Outside these Periods
- R can only withdraw recognition if U has actually lost majority status. Levitz Furniture, N. 1 p. 308; N. 2 pp.
308-09
- R can conduct poll to determine U support, but must have reasonable basis for doubt re U’s continuing
majority status, + good faith (the results of the poll may show actual loss of majority status, justifying
withdrawal of recognition). N. 2 p. 318.
- R may file RM election petition under section 9c1B when it has reasonable basis for doubt + good faith
uncertainty re incumbent U’s continuing majority status, N. 1 p. 308
Application
• Fact patterns that tend to raise doubts:
-written/oral repudiations of union support by ees
-admissions by U officials of loss of support
-schism within U, defunct U
-petition filed by ees under 9c1A(ii), 9e1
BUT NOT: mere turnover; strike + replacements
• Probs. 23 & 24, pp. 322-23
II. U Collective Action: How Us Enforce Solidarity
• Section 8(b)(1)A: U can’t restrain or coerce ees in exercise of sec. 7 rights; provided – this section does not
impair U from prescribing rules re acquisition or retention of membership
A. Does U violate 8b1A by bringing court action to collect fines levied against members
who cross U picket line during lawful strike called by the U? - NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. p. 330
• Rationale? What right is Court protecting?
• Significance of proviso to 8b1A?
• Dissent? What right is Court ignoring?
• Significance of U security clause?
• Does ruling apply to financial core members?
• Limits? Ns. 1 & 2 p. 337-38 (illegal strikes; ees who file ULP charges or decert petitions)
• NLRB v. Boeing, p. 339 (excessive fines– U fines still enforceable)
B. Discipline Directed at Members Who Resign During or in Anticipation of a Strike
Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, p. 340: League Law 13 prohibits
resignations during a strike or when a strike is imminent.
• Purpose of rule?
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• Court ruling? Rationale?
• How to harmonize with Allis-Chalmers?
• Significance of proviso?
• “Financial core” members are not subject to U discipline – N. 1, p. 351
• Dissent
-Is it relevant that other members relied on the rule and assumed that
others would conform?
-What is effect of ruling on U strength? On the power of strike weapon?
SP23-Senchak
I. Union Prohibitions of Member Resignations During or in Anticipation of a Strike
Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, p. 340: League Law 13 prohibits
resignations during a strike or when a strike is imminent.
A. Majority: violates 8b1A
-protects right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities
-rules like this expand beyond internal union governance; voluntary
unionism is key to NLRA system of majority rule & exclusivity
B. Dissent - rule should not violate 8b1A; see Allis-Chalmers, this is a
question of internal U governance
-Would protect right to strike, enhance power of U strike weapon, especially
for weak unions
-Rule cements solidarity; other members relied on the rule and assumed
that co-workers would conform
Application
• Prob. 26, pp. 352-53
II. The Regulation of Labor Picketing
A. Labor Picketing on public property has limited 1st A protection—Why?
• A form of conduct, “speech-plus,” not pure speech
• Causes targeted harm to R’s business
• Does not promote reasoned exchange of views; has “signaling” effect on labor
• Historical link between labor picketing & violence
• “mere” economic speech, not political
B. Subject to Regulation
• under State Law (police powers) – C/L tort, property claims, regulatory statutes limiting (but not
banning) picketing
• Norris LaGuardia (1932)—bars federal court injunctions restraining picketing in “labor disputes”
• NLRA sections 8b1A, 8b4C, 8b7
III. NLRA Regulation
A. 8b1A bars violent picketing
• Curtis Brothers, p. 353
B. 8b4C bars recognitional picketing by rival U where incumbent U is certified (note preference for certified U,
extra protection)
C. 8b7 prohibits “blackmail” picketing by Uncertified U with organizational or recognitional purpose under
certain conditions
• Purpose of 8b7? Who does 8b7 protect?
--Rs against blackmail picket by UNcertified U seeking to force R to bargain
--ees against indirect coercion—pressing them to accept U (top-down organizing)
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--statute embodies Gissel & Linden Lumber preference for election process as
means of selecting bargaining representative
• Remedy – injunction to stop picketing 8b7 Analysis– Blinne Construction, p. 356
1. Picketing by Uncertified labor organization?
2. With organizational or recognitional purpose?
3. A, B, or C applies
(A) R has lawfully recognized another U (by voluntary card count or Gissel order) AND Q concerning
representation can’t be raised under 9c (contract bar rule or protected period applies)
OR
(B) “valid” election was held within last 12 months
OR
(C) Picketing U does not file election petition within reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days. If U
files petition, it can keep picketing, but R has option to seek expedited election if picketing
continues beyond this period.
Publicity Proviso Escape Hatch (modifies C): UNLESS picketing is aimed at truthfully advising the
public re no CBA, nonU R, AND picket does not induce work stoppage by any ee
How 8b7C works:
• U can picket for less than 30 days (or reasonable period less than 30 days) without liability and without filing
petition for election
• U can picket for more than 30 days if it files election petition within the 30 days’ time; No 8b7C violation. R
cannot force U to expedited election it does not desire.
• U can picket for more than 30 days and not file election petition. R may file 8b7C charges and, if it wishes,
seek expedited election. If U wins 8b7 no longer applies, no violation; If U loses8b7B violation is triggered.
Understanding the Publicity Proviso to 8b7C
• Labor Pickets do receive some weak 1st A protection– Why?
--public’s interest in learning about the existence of a labor dispute
--harm from public pressure/refusal to patronize is not coercive on R
• Publicity proviso is designed to accomplish this
• Note the proviso is limited to pickets that do not interrupt deliveries or services– Why?
--ees’ withholding of labor (of this R or others, including truck drivers making deliveries) is larger harm to R,
coercive
• Publicity proviso exempts picketing that has “an” informational purpose (as well as an organizational or
recognitional purpose) and meets the test of the publicity proviso– Crown Cafeteria, p. 365
Area Standards Picketing
• Claude Everett, p. 369
• Limits of this exception? p. 371
• Hypos
• Probs. 27 & 28, pp. 372-73 Status of Starbucks Organizing
• Starbucks - generally corporate owned stores. Not franchises.
• Interestingly, efforts by the IWW in mid-2000s to organize stores in NYC. Some ULPs. Petered out.
• Union is Workers United, which is affiliated with the SEIU.
• First election in Buffalo in Dec. 2021.
• Tsunami. By July 2022, more that 200 stores had organized. Union won elections overwhelmingly.
• What do workers want?
• More staffing
• Safety
• Job protections, like just cause.
• Better pay and benefits
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• Respect
• By late 2022, pace of organizing began to slow.
• Perhaps relatedly, many ULP charges pending against the Company
• Unlawful discharges.
• Threats, interrogations, denial of benefits, etc.
• Refusals to bargain
SP23-Senchak
Labor Law Issues in Starbucks Organizing
• Elections –
• What is the appropriate unit? One store? Or multiple stores in a region?
• What is method for election? in person or by mail ballot?
• Organizing –
• Do employees have the right to wear a Black Live Matters button? How does that relate to
improving terms and conditions of employment?
• Is it unlawful for Starbucks to give non-union stores a new benefit, like tipping via credit
card, but not a recently unionized store? Under what legal theory?
• Is it unlawful for Starbucks to close a store with recent union activity? What evidence
needed?
• Can employees engage in multiple strikes at same location over time? Is that protected?
• Bargaining • Can Starbucks refuse to bargain when the Union insists that employees from stores in other
parts of the country be able to participate in bargaining by video?
• Can Starbucks in good faith say in bargaining that it will not give employees at union stores
better pay and benefits than offered employees at non-union stores?
Organizing on Store-by-Store Basis
• Starbucks operates over 15,000 stores in the United States
• Union is organizing each store as own bargaining unit. Why?
• Union’s leverage:
• Strikes – Hard to damage the company with a strike at one store
• ULPs – Cases takes years to litigate. But section 10(j)
• PR Campaign – Attack brand. Nation-wide.
• In bargaining
• Company can delay. Try to run out clock. Election bar - one year from certification
(with exceptions)
• Company can bargain hard. Say no.
• A success?
• Will union be able to secure contracts at stores?
• Pressure on Starbucks to increase wages and benefits?
Compare Fight for $15 Movement
• Union is affiliated with SEIU.
• Not focused on union elections and contracts.
• Targeted McDonalds and other fast food chains. Many stores are
franchisees.
• What do workers want?
• $15/hr
• Safety / sexual harassment protections
• Respect
• ULPs – brought charges against McDonalds parent company and
franchisees as joint employers, unlawful discharges, threats, etc.
Case dragged on for years. Ultimately, Board settled the charges
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over Union’s objections.
• A success?
• Increases in the minimum wage
• Addressing franchise business model – E.g., California AB 257 – creates a
Fast Food Council, to establish sector wide minimum standards in wages,
safety, and health.
• Developing leaders
SP23-Senchak
8b7 Analysis–
1. Picketing by Uncertified labor organization?
2. With organizational or recognitional purpose?
3. A, B, or C applies
(A) R has lawfully recognized another U (by voluntary card count or Gissel order) AND Q concerning
representation can’t be raised under 9c (contract bar rule or protected period applies)
OR
(B) “valid” election was held within last 12 months
OR
(C) Picketing U does not file election petition within reasonable time, not to exceed 30 days. If U
files petition, it can keep picketing, but R has option to seek expedited election if picketing
continues beyond this period.
Publicity Proviso Escape Hatch (modifies C): UNLESS picketing is aimed at truthfully advising the
public re no CBA, nonU R, AND picket does not induce work stoppage by any ee
How 8b7C works:
• U can picket for less than 30 days (or reasonable period less than 30
days) without liability and without filing petition for election
• U can picket for more than 30 days if it files election petition within
the 30 days’ time; No 8b7C violation. R cannot force U to expedited
election it does not desire.
• U can picket for more than 30 days and not file election petition. R
may file 8b7C charges and, if it wishes, seek expedited election. If U
wins 8b7 no longer applies, no violation; If U loses8b7B violation
is triggered.
Understanding the Publicity Proviso to
8b7C
• Labor Pickets do receive some weak 1st A protection– Why?
--public’s interest in learning about the existence of a labor dispute
--harm from public pressure/refusal to patronize is not coercive on R
• Publicity proviso is designed to accomplish this
• Note the proviso is limited to pickets that do not interrupt deliveries or
services– Why?
--ees’ withholding of labor (of this R or others, including truck drivers making
deliveries) is larger harm to R, coercive
• Publicity proviso exempts picketing that has “an” informational purpose
(as well as an organizational or recognitional purpose) and meets the test
of the publicity proviso– Crown Cafeteria, p. 365
Area Standards Picketing
• Claude Everett, p. 369
• Limits of this exception? p. 371
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• Hypos
• Probs. 27 & 28, pp. 372-73
Slides
SP23-Senchak
What is Secondary Pressure?
A. Section 8b4 –outline p. 375
-primary = R with whom U has dispute over terms & conditions of employment (U seeks to organize ees of that
R, or to pressure that R to recognize and bargain with it, or agree to contract terms at bargaining table)
Secondary = a “neutral” R or its ees that U pressures to cease doing business with primary, which places
indirect pressure on primary
B. The Primary/Secondary Distinction
• NLRB v. Int’l Rice Milling – p. 376
• Why is U picket at R1 facility that turns away R2 customer’s trucks seeking to pick up product purchases, a
primary picket?
What is Secondary Pressure?
A. Section 8b4 –outline p. 375
Primary = R with whom U has dispute over terms & conditions of
employment (U seeks to organize ees of that R, or to pressure that R to
recognize and bargain with it, or to force it to agree to contract terms
at bargaining table)
Secondary = a “neutral” R or its ees that U pressures to cease doing
business with primary, which places indirect pressure on primary
• 8b4(B) is heart of the statute, our focus
• 8b4 prohibits secondary pressure; damages available under LMRA
sec. 303
B. Rationale for 8b4?
1. Secondary pressure magnifies U power/leverage b/c R2 will accede more readily to U demands by ceasing to
do business with R1
2. NLRA goal of labor peace is inconsistent with allowing labor disruption to spread beyond the parties directly
responsible
3. Unfair to neutrals to visit harm upon them that they can’t control or stop
Structure of Statute –SS page 8; outline p. 375
ULP for labor org’n:
(i) To engage in, induce or encourage ees to strike or refuse to work, OR
(ii) To threaten, coerce or restrain [consumer or store manager]
(B) With an object of forcing any person to cease doing business with another [but primary strike or picketing
still lawful]
Provided that 1) sympathy strikes are lawful; 2) publicity other than picketing for purpose of truthfully advising
the public that products produced by R1 w/whom U has dispute, and distributed by another is permitted, as long
as no effect of inducing ees of secondaries to refuse to pick up, deliver, transport goods or refuse to perform
services at the distributing R’s establishment
C. The Primary/Secondary Distinction
• Nothing in 8b4B shall be construed to make otherwise lawful primary
strikes and picketing unlawful (stat. supp. page 8)
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• Therefore, “incidental effects” of primary picketing on secondaries
must be tolerated
• NLRB v. Rice Milling, p. 376 : U picket at R1 facility that turns away R2
customer’s trucks seeking to pick up product purchases is treated as a
primary picket; R2’s trucks being turned away is incidental effect
SP23-Senchak
D. Common Situs Problems
• Even where picketing aimed at R1’s ees takes place at R2’s site or neutral/shared site, picketing is
lawful/primary if R1’s situs is there and ees also work there, under certain conditions.
• Moore Dry Dock, p. 380 : Question is whether U’s purpose is to appeal to R1’s ees or R2’s ees, and what is
relationship of work done by R2’s ees to R1’s business
• Ask whether common situs picketing is 1) limited to times when R1’s ees are on R2’s premises, 2) at time of
picketing, R1’s ees are engaged in normal business operations at R2’s situs; 3) picketing is reasonably close to
R1’s ees’ location; 4) picket signs disclose that dispute is with R1. (p. 381)
• This is evidentiary rule; overriding question is what U’s purpose is; who is the real target, R1 or R2?
E. Construction Situs
• Denver Building, p. 384
• Who is R1? U argues it’s D&L (general contractor), so picketing entire site is primary, permissible. R argues
it’s G&P (nonU sub), so picketing is secondary, prohibited.
• With whom does U have labor dispute as to terms & conditions of employment?
• Which one is the “neutral” who cannot extricate itself from dispute?
• Irrelevant which R files charges– R1 or R2 can file
Effect of Denver Building:
• Existence of independent contractor relationship between general contractor and subs in construction means
that as a matter of law these are separate, non-allied business entities. Therefore, pressuring one R implicates
the secondary boycott restrictions where the Rs occupy a common situs.
• Dissent points out: but if an R hires a group of non-U electricians as ees , entire workforce can walk off job to
protest being forced to work alongside nonU ees and it’s still a primary strike. 8b4 is implicated in construction
context because Rs have voluntarily organized themselves into separate corporate entities.
F. Separate Gates
• GE, p. 389: where R1 establishes a separate gate for ees of its contractors to insulate its ees from labor
disputes of its contractors, U that pickets separate gate is engaged in prohibited secondary pressure. But what if
R1’s U pickets the separate gates when it has a dispute with R1?
• Does the U’s choice to picket at separate gates remove this from the usual rule that incidental secondary
effects of a primary picket are tolerated as part of permissible primary pressure?
• GE places limits on R’s ability to shield itself from secondary pressure using separate gates, though: for 8b4
liability to lie when U pickets the separate gate, 1) contractors (R2s) must be performing tasks unrelated to the
normal operations of the struck R (R1), and 2) work must be a of a kind that is consistent with normal
operations of R1 if they are ongoing. (p. 394)
I. Majority Rule
• United front philosophy: ees speak to R in a single voice; dissident ee action not protected-- Emporium
Capwell, p. 511
• Pressure on exclusivity/majority rule in the public sector cases involving 1st A challenges to union security
agreements as a constraint on ee voice– Janus v. AFSCME, N. 3 pp. 509-10
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• Pros & Cons of Exclusivity/Majority Rule doctrine--McUsic/Selmi, p. 520
--Crain/Matheny, p. 521
--SH as another illustration of dilemma- N. 2, p. 523
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II. Alternatives to Exclusivity/Majority Rule
• Members-only unions, N. 2 p. 518-19
• Workers’ centers, Alt-Labor groups, N. 3 pp. 524-26
• Exclusivity is unique to American/Canadian regimes– N. 4 p. 510
III. Duty of Fair Representation
A. Nature of the Duty:
to represent ees fairly, without hostility or discrimination; exercise discretion with good faith & honesty; avoid
arbitrary conduct
• Steele, p. 527 (RLA)
• Applies in NLRA context also – N. 1 p. 530
• Prob. 40, pp. 530-31
B. Defining the Duty
1. Grievance Handling section 8b2
• Vaca v. Sipes, p. 531
• Negligence versus perfunctory processing of a grievance, N. 2 pp. 540-41
• Hybrid LMRA sec. 301/DFR claims
• Damages for Breach, N. 3 p. 541
2. Contract-Making
• Airline Pilots v. O’Neill, p. 542
• “wide range of reasonableness”– a breach only if “wholly irrational or arbitrary”
Scope and Subjects of Good Faith Rep (Overview)
• R & U have duty to bargain in GF over “mandatory subjects,” which are wages, hours, and terms & conditions
of employment –8a5, 8b3, 8d.
• Philosophy: Law escorts parties to bargaining table and leaves them on their own to negotiate CBA. Only a
freely negotiated CBA will achieve labor peace.
There is no obligation to reach agreement, and NLRB cannot order particular concession or impose a contract
provision to remedy ULPs.
Usual remedy for ULP is order to bargain
• Economic weapons are part & parcel of CBing process, and are consistent with GF bargaining.
• Typical CBA contains no-strike agreement and arbitration/grievance machinery as quid pro quo
• CBA is code of conduct in general terms; negotiated further through grievance arbitration process
• Duty to bargain over mandatory subjects continues during CBA term– R cannot unilaterally alter mandatory
subjects
• If R commits 8a5 violation and U strikes in response, it’s a ULP strike– ees entitled to reinstatement and back
pay from date of ULP
• If parties reach impasse, R can unilaterally implement pre-impasse proposals rejected by U or “reasonably
comprehended within them” —unless doing so would impose unlimited managerial authority over wages that
would be inherently destructive of CBing
• When impasse is reached is a difficult question of fact
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The Duty to Bargain– 8a5, 8b3, 8d
A. What is Good Faith?
• Each must enter bargaining negotiations with an open mind and a sincere desire to reach agreement.
• How to ascertain GF? Evaluated on totality of circumstances
B. Subjective Aspects
1. Style of Bargaining
• Horse trading vs “blood threat and thunder” or “take it or leave it” approaches – GE & Boulwarism, pp. 591,
595
• Hard bargaining is lawful; surface bargaining is not– N. 1 p. 600
• Substantive proposals as evidence of bad faith, NNs. 2 & 3 pp. 601-02
2. Bypassing the union, N. 6 p. 603
• Prob. 45, p. 604
C. Objective Aspects
1. Refusal to meet & confer at reasonable times
• Zoom bargaining?
• Each side’s ability to select its own representatives
2. Must bargain over mandatory subjects; can insist on them, but can propose but not insist on permissive
subjects
3. No unilateral action on mandatory subjects
D. Remedies for Failure to Bargain in GF
• Conventional NLRB remedy: cease & desist from refusal to bargain; order to bargain– N. 1, p. 628
• H.K. Porter, p. 615
• Extraordinary remedies, N. 4 p. 632
--extension of certification year
--compensation for some losses, e.g. bargaining costs
--attorneys’ fees generally not permitted
Duty to Supply Information
• NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., p. 646
• Each must provide information to support claims at bargaining table
• Continues during term of agreement as U seeks to enforce CBA in grievance arbitration – N. 6 p. 655
• Claims of current inability to pay trigger duty(issue is honesty of statement) vs. claims of competitive
disadvantage, N. 2 pp. 650-52
--distinction is drawn in context, language used at table matters, but is not dispositive
• Exceptions subject to balancing test under Detroit Edison: N. 4 p. 653 (ee privacy); N. 5 p. 654 (R trade
secrets)
• Probs. 51 & 52 pp. 658-59
Subjects of Bargaining
• Mandatory versus Permissive Subjects- Wooster Div’n of Borg-Warner, p.
659
• Either side can insist to impasse on mandatory subjects
• Either can propose, but cannot insist on permissive subjects
• Mandatory subjects include wages, hours, job security, investigatory tools that could lead to
discharge/discipline, subcontracting out unit work, other issues germane to work environment, effects of
decisions at core of entrepreneurial control (e.g. severance pay), union security clauses
• Permissive issues include matters re U-ee relationship, managerial decisions at core of entrepreneurial control
(e.g. decisions to close, changes in scope & nature of business)
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Table of Contents
COURSE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
II. THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONS .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
III. DECLINE OF UNIONISM .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
IV. MODERN UNIONS............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
B. Why is Labor Organizing on the Rise? ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
V. LABOR LAW ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Cordwainers’ Case (Commonwealth v. Pullis ................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
B. Laissez-Faire approach .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
C. Law Embraces Unions to… ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
III. NLRB – see https://www.nlrb.gov/ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2
IV. Coverage of the NLRA ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
A. NLRA Designed to Obtain Industrial Peace................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
B. Employers NOT covered: -- sec. 2(2) .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
C. Ees NOT Covered............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
Agricultural & Domestic ees –sec. 2(3) ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 2
Independent Contractors...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Supervisors - sec. 2(11) ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
[FORK] ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Managerial ees....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Confidential ees ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Those who are Primarily Students ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Timeline of Unionization (Basically this is the process that governs labor law) ........................................................................................................................................ 4
III. When and Where Can U Organizing Occur? ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
B. Applying Lechmere .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
C. Solicitation by Ees ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Purple Communications (Obama NLRB); Caesars Entertainment (Trump NLRB) - p. 62 ............................................................................................................... 5
6. Off duty ees – p. 62-63....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
III. Imbalance in Organizing Opportunities ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
IV. Remedies for 8a1 violations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
IV. When is R speech coercive? 8a1, 8c ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Gissel (p. 71): ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 5
B. Applications ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
II. Polling & Interrogation .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
III. Promises and Grants of Benefits ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
IV. Other R Actions Implicating 8a1 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
V. R Responsibility for Conduct & Speech .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
I. Promises and Grants of Benefits ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
IV. Employer Domination or Support— 8a2, 2(5) ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
C. What is “domination” or “contributing support/assistance”? – 8(a)(2) ....................................................................................................................................... 7
D. Policy Issues ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
E. Legal Issues Involving 8a2 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
II. 8(a)(3)--Proving Discriminatory Intent .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
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A. Methods of Proof .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
B. Union Salts ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
C. Scope of Judicial Review .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
I. Application of 8(a)(3) (con’t): .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Discrimination to Discourage U membership ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
II. Discrimination to Encourage U membership ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
III. Policy Challenges .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
IV. Financial Core Membership .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
V. Issues for Public Sector Us...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
VI. State Right to Work legislation– sec. 14(b)............................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
When is Activity Concerted & for Mutual Aid?......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
A. In NonU context –........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
B. In U context – .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 10
R Work Rules & Policies Implicating Section 7 Rights ............................................................................................................................................................................ 10
R Work Rules & Policies Implicating Sec. 7 rights (con’t) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Other Forms of Potentially Protected Concerted Activity ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11
I. When is Activity Concerted and For Mutual Aid or Protection– NonUnion Context? ......................................................................................................................... 11
II. PCA Under Section 7 – U context......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
III. When Does Concerted Activity Loseits Protection? ............................................................................................................................................................................ 12
B. Activity that is “too” Disloyal or Disruptive ................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Right to Strike– sec. 7, 13 (form of PCA) .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
A. Rights Of Economic Strikers ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
B. Rights of ULP Strikers ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
C. Which R Actions in Response to an Economic Strike violate 8a3, 8a1? ..................................................................................................................................... 13
D. Picket Line Behavior ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
E. Proof of Motive in Cases Involving 8a3, 8a1 Violations of Group Rights .................................................................................................................................. 13
Lockouts: When do they violate 8a3? ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 13
Multi-R bargaining units ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
A. “Defensive” Lockouts ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
B. “Offensive” Lockouts ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
C. Assessing legality of Lockouts ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Plant Closings – Darlington, p. 220 .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Remedial Problems .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Establishing Representation Through NLRB Elections– section 9 .......................................................................................................................................................... 14
B. Defining an Appropriate Unit........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 15
C. Other Limits on Unit Composition ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
The Conduct of Representation Elections – section 9 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Challenges to the Conduct of the Election– Section 9 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 15
I. Establishing Rep. Status via ULP Proceedings ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
II. When may R Refuse Recognition ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
III. Duration of Duty to Bargain ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
1. U obtains voluntary recognition ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16
IV. When May R Refuse to Recognize U After Expiration of Certification Year, Reasonable Period, or CBA term up to 3 years? ...................................................... 16
I. When May R Withdraw Recognition From Majority U? ....................................................................................................................................................................... 17
B. A Rebuttable Presumption of Majority Status Arises Outside these Periods ............................................................................................................................ 17
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II. U Collective Action: How Us Enforce Solidarity.................................................................................................................................................................................. 17
B. Discipline Directed at Members Who Resign During or in Anticipation of a Strike ................................................................................................................. 17
I. Union Prohibitions of Member Resignations During or in Anticipation of a Strike ............................................................................................................................ 18
II. The Regulation of Labor Picketing ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
III. NLRA Regulation ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18
How 8b7C works: ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 19
Area Standards Picketing .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Labor Law Issues in Starbucks Organizing .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 20
8b7 Analysis– ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 21
How 8b7C works: ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
What is Secondary Pressure? .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
What is Secondary Pressure? ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
Primary ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 22
Secondary ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 22
B. Rationale for 8b4? .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
ULP for labor org’n: .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
C. The Primary/Secondary Distinction.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
D. Common Situs Problems ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
E. Construction Situs .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
Effect of Denver Building: .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
F. Separate Gates ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 23
I. Majority Rule .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
II. Alternatives to Exclusivity/Majority Rule ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 24
III. Duty of Fair Representation ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 24
B. Defining the Duty............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 24
2. Contract-Making ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
Scope and Subjects of Good Faith Rep (Overview) ................................................................................................................................................................................... 24
The Duty to Bargain– 8a5, 8b3, 8d ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 25
C. Objective Aspects ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
D. Remedies for Failure to Bargain in GF ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 25
Duty to Supply Information ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Subjects of Bargaining............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
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