UVA-F-1403
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Competition between the two major players in the industry, Home Depot and
Lowe’s, has been heating up, especially now that they are operating in more of
the same markets. Both companies are seeking new, but similar, ways to boost
both their top and bottom lines, including initiatives aimed at bettering customer
service, attracting professional customers, and creating a more favorable
merchandise mix. Still, despite the growing competition between them, over the
long term, we believe both companies are poised to benefit from additional
market share freed up in this consolidating industry.
—Carrie Galeotafiore
Value Line analyst, July 2002
Slow but positive economic growth, low interest rates, a strong housing market, rising
unemployment, uncertain consumer confidence, and concern over corporate misdeeds—such
was the economic environment in early October 2002. Carrie Galeotafiore had followed the
retail building-supply industry for nearly three years as an analyst for the investment-survey firm
Value Line Publishing. Next week, Value Line would publish her quarterly report on the
industry, including her five-year financial forecast for industry leaders Home Depot and Lowe’s.
The Retail Building-Supply Industry
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) estimated the size of the 2001 U.S. retail
building- supply industry at $175 billion. Traditionally, there were three retail formats: hardware
stores with 15% of sales, lumberyards with 34%, and the larger-format home centers with 51%.
Annual growth had declined from 7.7% in 1998 to 4.2% in 2001, yet it was arguably still high
considering the recessionary nature of the economic environment in 2001. Low interest rates and
a robust housing-construction market provided ongoing strength to the industry. The EIU
expected the industry to reach $194 billion by 2006. Exhibit 1 provides the details of the EIU’s
forecast.
This case was prepared by Professor Michael J. Schill, with research assistance from Aimee Connolly and the
cooperation of Carrie Galeotafiore of Value Line Publishing. It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than
to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright  2003 by the University of
Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to
sales@dardenbusinesspublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev. 11/07.
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UVA-F-1403
Two companies dominated the industry: Home Depot and Lowe’s. Together, the two
players captured more than a third of total industry sales. Both companies were fierce
competitors whose rapid-expansion strategies had more than doubled own-store capacity in the
past five years with the opening of 1,136 new stores. The penetration by large Lowe’s/Home
Depot warehouse-format stores had a profound impact on the industry. Independent hardware
retailers were struggling to remain competitive with some hardware stores shifting their locations
to high-rent shopping centers to attract more people or remaining open for longer hours.
Segmentations in the market between the professional market that remained loyal to the
lumberyards, and do-it-yourself customers who were attracted to the discount chains protected
some of the smaller players. Exhibit 2 provides selected company data and presents recent stock
market performances for the two companies.
Future Growth Opportunities for Home Depot and Lowe’s
Carrie Galeotafiore expected that future growth for Home Depot and Lowe’s would come
from a variety of sources.
Acquisition/consolidation
The industry had already experienced a substantial amount of consolidation. In 1999,
Lowe’s had acquired the 38-store, warehouse-format chain Eagle Hardware in a $1.3-billion
transaction. In the past few years, Home Depot had acquired the plumbing wholesale distributor
Apex Supply, the specialty-lighting company Georgia Lighting, the building-repair and
replacement-products business N-E Thing Supply Company, and the specialty-plumbing-fixtures
company Your “Other” Warehouse. Home Depot recently had announced the purchase of three
flooring companies that “when completed would instantly make Home Depot the largest turnkey
supplier of flooring to the residential construction market.”1
Professional market
Both Home Depot and Lowe’s had recently implemented important initiatives to attract
professional customers more effectively, including stocking merchandise in larger quantities,
training employees to deal with professionals, and carrying professional brands. Home Depot
had developed Home Depot Supply and the Pro Stores to reach out to the small professional
market. The company was also on track to install professional-specific desks at 950 stores by the
end of 2002.
International expansion
Home Depot had already developed some international presence with its acquisition of
the Canadian home-improvement retailer Aikenhead in 1994, and it continued to expand its
1
Press Release, Home Depot, 24 September 2002.
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UVA-F-1403
reach in that market with 11 new-store openings in 2001. More recently, the company had
targeted the $12.5 billion home-improvement market in Mexico by acquiring the Mexican chains
TotalHOME and Del Norte. By the end of 2001, 10% of Home Depot’s stores were located
outside the United States. In 2002, Lowe’s did not yet have an international presence.
Alternative retail formats
Home Depot and Lowe’s both maintained on-line stores. Lowe’s specifically targeted the
professional customer with a section of its Web site: Accent & Style offered decorating and
design tips on such subjects as kitchens and baths. Home Depot was developing new retail
formats for urban centers, showcased by its recently opened Brooklyn store, which offered
convenient shopping to densely populated markets. These urban stores provided Home Depot
products and services in a compact format. The acquisition of EXPO Design Centers provided an
additional format for Home Depot and expansion beyond the traditional hardware and buildingsupply retailer. EXPO Design Centers were a one-stop design and decorating source, with eight
showrooms in one location, highlighting kitchens, baths, carpets and rugs, lighting, patio and
grills, tile and wood, window treatments, and appliances. Lowe’s published Creative Ideas,
Garden Club, and Woodworker’s Club magazines to target customers with certain hobbies.
Alternative products
Both Home Depot and Lowe’s were expanding into installation services. The “at-home”
business for Home Depot was currently at $3 billion. Home Depot expected its at-home business
to grow at an annual rate of 30% in the near term.
Head-to-head competition
Home Depot had traditionally focused on large metropolitan areas, while Lowe’s had
concentrated on rural areas. To maintain its growth trajectory, Lowe’s had begun systematic
expansion into metropolitan markets. The investment community was becoming increasingly
concerned about the eventuality of increased price competition. Aram Rubinson, of Bank of
America Securities, had reported in August, “Since Lowe’s comps [comparable store sales] have
been outpacing Home Depot’s, we have been growing increasingly concerned that Home Depot
would fight back with increased promotions and more aggressive everyday pricing.”
Financial Forecast for Home Depot and Lowe’s
Home Depot’s new CEO Bob Nardelli had expressed his intention to focus on enhancing
store efficiency and inventory turnover through ongoing system investments. He expected to
generate margin improvement through cost declines from product reviews, purchasing
improvements, and an increase in the number of tool-rental centers. Recently, operating costs
had increased owing to higher occupancy costs for new stores and increased energy costs. Home
Depot had come under criticism for its declining customer service. Nardelli hoped to counter this
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UVA-F-1403
trend with an initiative to help employees focus on customers during store hours, restocking
shelves only after hours. Home Depot management expected revenue growth to be 15% to 18%
through 2004. Some of the growth would be by acquisition, which necessitated the company’s
maintaining higher cash levels. Home Depot stock was trading at around $25 a share, implying a
total equity capitalization of $59 billion.
Galeotafiore had been cautiously optimistic about the changes at Home Depot in her July
report:
Though the program [Service Performance Improvement] is still in the early
stages, the do-it-yourself giant has already enjoyed labor productivity benefits,
and received positive feedback from customers. . . . The Pro-Initiative program,
which is currently in place at roughly 55% of Home Depot’s stores, is aimed at
providing services that accommodate the pro customer. Stores that provide these
added services have generally outperformed strictly do-it-yourself units in
productivity, operating margins, and inventory turnover. Home Depot shares offer
compelling price-appreciation potential over the coming three-to-five-year pull.
Other analysts did not seem to share her enthusiasm for Home Depot. Dan Wewer and Lisa
Estabrooks observed:
Home Depot’s comp sales fell short of plan despite a step-up in promotional
activity. In our view, this legitimizes our concerns that Home Depot is seeing
diminishing returns from promotional efforts. . . . Our view that Lowe’s is the
most attractive investment opportunity in hard-line retailing is supported by key
mileposts achieved during 2Q’02. Highlights include superior relative EPS
momentum, robust comp sales, expanding operating margin, improving capital
efficiency, and impressive new-store productivity. Importantly, Lowe’s
outstanding performance raises the hurdle Home Depot must reach if it is to
return to favor with the investment community.2
Lowe’s management had told analysts that it expected to maintain sales growth of 18% to
19% over the next two years. Lowe’s planned to open 123 stores in 2002, 130 stores in 2003, and
140 stores in 2004, and to continue its emphasis on cities with populations greater than 500,000,
such as New York, Boston, and Los Angeles. To date, the company’s entry into metropolitan
markets appeared to be successful. Lowe’s planned to continue improving sales and margins
through new merchandising, pricing strategies, and market-share gains, especially in the
Northeast and West.3 Lowe’s stock was trading at around $37 a share, implying a total equity
capitalization of $29 billion.
Donald Trott, an analyst at Jefferies, had recently downgraded Lowe’s based on a
forecast of a deflating housing-market bubble and a view that the company’s stock price was
2
3
Dan Wewer and Lisa Estabrooks, CIBC World Markets, 20 August 2002.
Bear Stearns, 20 August 2002.
-5-
UVA-F-1403
high in price relative to that of Home Depot. Galeotafiore countered that Lowe’s had now shown
it could compete effectively with Home Depot. She justified the Lowe’s valuation with an
expectation of ongoing improvement in sales and gross margins.
Lowe’s is gaining market share in the appliance category, and its transition into
major metropolitan areas (which will likely comprise the bulk of the company’s
expansion in the next years) is yielding solid results. Alongside the positive sales
trends, the homebuilding supplier’s bottom line is also being boosted by margin
expansion, bolstered, in part, by lower inventory costs and product-mix
improvements.
Galeotafiore’s financial forecast for Home Depot and Lowe’s would go to print next
week. She based her forecasts on a review of historical performance, an analysis of trends and
ongoing changes in the industry and the macro economy, and a detailed understanding of
corporate strategy. She had completed a first-pass financial forecast for Home Depot and was in
the process of developing her forecast for Lowe’s. She estimated the cost of capital for Home
Depot and Lowe’s to be 12.3% and 11.6%, respectively (see Exhibit 3). Exhibits 4 and 5
provide historical financial statements for Home Depot and Lowe’s. Exhibit 6 details the
historical and forecast values for Value Line’s macroeconomic-indicator series. Exhibits 7 and 8
feature Galeotafiore’s first-pass historical ratio analysis and financial forecast for Home Depot.
-6-
UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 1
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Sales Figures for Retail-Building-Supply Industry
(in billions of dollars)
Sales
Hardware
Home centers
Lumber
Total market
1997
22.8
64.5
51.5
138.8
Share of Market
Home Depot, Inc.
Lowe’s Companies
TruServe Corp.
Menard, Inc.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
1998
1999
2000
149.5
159.7
168.0
2001
26.2
89.0
59.0
174.2
2001
22.9%
10.8%
2.9%
1.5%
2002E
26.2
91.9
60.1
178.2
2006E
26.0
102.0
66.0
194.0
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UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 2
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Historical Company Performance
Fiscal Year
1998
1999
1997
2000
2001
Home Depot
Number of stores*
Sq. footage (millions)
Number of transactions (millions)
Number of employees
Shares outstanding (millions)
Earnings per share
Avg. annual price-earnings ratio
624
66
550
124,400
2,196
$0.52
30.8
761
81
665
156,700
2,213
$0.71
40.1
930
100
797
201,400
2,304
$1.00
45.8
1,134
123
937
227,300
2,324
$1.10
46.6
1,333
146
1,091
256,300
2,346
$1.29
35.6
Lowe’s
Number of stores
Sq. footage (millions)
Number of transactions (millions)
Number of employees
Shares outstanding (millions)
Earnings per share
Avg. annual price-earnings ratio
477
40
231
64,070
701
$0.51
19.5
520
48
268
72,715
705
$0.68
28.2
576
57
299
86,160
765
$0.90
30.1
650
68
342
94,601
766
$1.06
22.0
744
81
395
108,317
776
$1.30
27.5
*Excludes Apex Supply, Georgia Lighting, Maintenance Warehouse, Your “Other” Warehouse, and National Blinds.
Cumulative Stock Returns Index
The Home Depot
Source: Created by case writer.
Lowe's
S&P500
Sep-02
May-02
Jan-02
Sep-01
May-01
Jan-01
Sep-00
May-00
Jan-00
Sep-99
May-99
Jan-99
Sep-98
May-98
Jan-98
Sep-97
May-97
Jan-97
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
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UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 3
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Cost of Capital Calculation
Current yield on long-term U.S. Treasuries
Historical market-risk premium
4.8%
5.5%
Home Depot
Proportion of debt capital (market value)
Cost of debt (current yields of Aaa-rated debt)
Marginal tax rate
Cost of equity (beta = 1.4)
Weighted average cost of capital
2%
6.8%
38.6%
12.5%
12.3%
Lowe’s
Proportion of debt capital (market value)
Cost of debt (current yields of Aa-rated debt)
Marginal tax rate
Cost of equity (beta = 1.4)
Weighted average cost of capital
12%
7.3%
37.0%
12.5%
11.6%
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UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 4
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Financial Statements for Home Depot
($ millions)
1997
1998
Fiscal Year
1999
2000
2001
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales
Cost of sales
Gross profit
Cash operating expenses*
Depreciation & amortization
EBIT
Nonrecurring expenses
Net interest expense
EBT
Income taxes
Net earnings
24,156
17,092
7,064
4,885
283
1,896
0
-2
1,898
738
1,160
30,219
21,241
8,978
5,935
373
2,670
0
16
2,654
1,040
1,614
38,434
26,560
11,874
7,603
463
3,808
0
4
3,804
1,484
2,320
45,738
31,456
14,282
9,490
601
4,191
0
-26
4,217
1,636
2,581
53,553
36,642
16,911
11,215
764
4,932
0
-25
4,957
1,913
3,044
BALANCE SHEET
Cash and ST investments
Accounts receivable
Merchandise inventory
Other current assets
Total current assets
Net property and equipment
Other assets
Total assets
174
556
3,602
128
4,460
6,509
260
11,229
62
469
4,293
109
4,933
8,160
372
13,465
170
587
5,489
144
6,390
10,227
464
17,081
177
835
6,556
209
7,777
13,068
540
21,385
2,546
920
6,725
170
10,361
15,375
658
26,394
1,358
312
0
8
778
2,456
1,303
78
178
116
7,098
11,229
1,586
395
0
14
862
2,857
1,566
85
208
9
8,740
13,465
1,993
541
0
29
1,093
3,656
750
87
237
10
12,341
17,081
1,976
627
0
4
1,778
4,385
1,545
195
245
11
15,004
21,385
3,436
717
0
5
2,343
6,501
1,250
189
372
0
18,082
26,394
Accounts payable
Accrued salaries and wages
Short-term borrowings
Current maturities of long-term debt
Other current liabilities
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Deferred income taxes
Other long-term liabilities
Minority interest
Shareholders’ equity
Total liab. and owner’s equity
*Includes operating-lease payments of $262 million in 1997, $321 million in 1998, $389 million in 1999, $479 million in 2000, and $522 million in 2001.
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UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 5
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Financial Statements for Lowe’s
($ millions)
1997
1998
Fiscal Year
1999
2000
2001
INCOME STATEMENT
Sales
Cost of sales
Gross profit
Cash operating expenses*
Depreciation & amortization
EBIT
Nonrecurring expenses
Net interest expense
EBT
Income taxes
Net earnings
10,137
7,447
2,690
1,825
241
624
0
66
559
201
357
12,245
8,950
3,295
2,189
272
833
0
75
758
276
482
15,906
11,525
4,381
2,870
338
1,172
24
85
1,063
390
673
18,779
13,488
5,291
3,479
410
1,402
0
121
1,281
472
810
22,111
15,743
6,368
4,036
534
1,798
0
173
1,625
601
1,024
BALANCE SHEET
Cash and ST investments
Accounts receivable
Merchandise inventory
Other current assets
Total current assets
Net property and equipment
Other assets
Total assets
211
118
1,715
65
2,110
3,005
104
5,219
243
144
2,105
94
2,586
3,637
122
6,345
569
148
2,812
164
3,693
5,177
142
9,012
469
161
3,285
243
4,157
7,035
166
11,358
853
166
3,611
291
4,920
8,653
162
13,736
969
83
98
12
286
1,449
1,046
124
0
0
2,601
5,219
1,133
113
92
99
328
1,765
1,283
160
0
0
3,136
6,345
1,567
164
92
60
503
2,386
1,727
200
4
0
4,695
9,012
1,714
166
250
42
738
2,911
2,698
251
3
0
5,495
11,358
1,715
221
100
59
922
3,017
3,734
305
6
0
6,674
13,736
Accounts payable
Accrued salaries and wages
Short-term borrowings
Current maturities of long-term debt
Other current liabilities
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Deferred income taxes
Other long-term liabilities
Minority interest
Shareholders’ equity
Total liab. and owner’s equity
*Includes operating-lease payments of $59 million in 1997, $89 million in 1998, $144 million in 1999, $162 million in 2000, and $188 million in 2001.
-11-
UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 6
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Value Line Economic Series
Annual Statistics
Gross domestic product ($ bill.)
Real GDP (1996 chained $ bill.)
Total consumption ($ bill.)
Nonresidential fixed investment ($ bill.)
1997
8318
8159
5424
1009
1998
8782
8509
5684
1136
1999
9274
8859
5965
1228
2000 2001
9825 10082
9191 9215
6224 6377
1324 1255
Industrial prod. (% change, annualized)
Housing starts (mill. units)
Unit car sales (mill. units)
Personal savings rate (%)
National unemployment rate (%)
6.9
1.47
8.3
4.2
4.9
5.1
1.62
8.1
4.7
4.5
3.7
1.65
8.7
2.7
4.2
4.5
1.57
8.9
2.8
4.0
-3.7
1.60
8.4
2.3
4.8
3.8
1.66
8.2
3.5
5.9
5.3
1.59
8.3
3.4
5.9
4.0
1.63
8.0
1.5
5.0
AAA corp. bond rate (%)
10-Year Treasury note rate (%)
3-Month Treasury bill rate (%)
7.3
6.4
5.1
6.5
5.3
4.8
7.0
5.6
4.6
7.6
6.0
5.8
7.1
5.0
3.4
6.4
4.8
1.7
6.4
5.1
2.4
7.3
6.2
4.5
Annual Rates of Change
Real GDP
GDP price index
Consumer price index
4.4
1.9
2.3
4.3
1.2
1.5
4.1
1.4
2.2
3.8
2.1
3.4
0.3
2.4
2.8
2.3
1.7
2.3
3.2
2.5
2.5
3.8
2.6
2.8
Quarterly Annualized Rates
Gross domestic product ($ bill.)
Real GDP (1996 chained $ bill.)
Total consumption ($ bill.)
Nonresidential fixed investment ($ bill.)
Industrial production (% change, annualized)
Housing starts (mill. units)
Unit car sales (mill. units)
*Estimated.
Source: Value Line Publishing.
1st
10313
9363
6514
1188
2.6
1.73
7.9
2002
2nd* 3rd*
4th*
103070 10475 10600
9388 9446 9516
6544 6608 6641
1184 1190 1199
4.6
1.66
8.1
3.0
1.65
8.4
5.0
1.60
8.2
2002*
10440
9428
6577
1190
1st*
10756
9598
6691
1222
5.5
1.57
8.2
2003*2005–2007*
10984
13255
9728
10827
6772
7457
1266
1625
2003
2nd*
3rd*
10901
11060
9681
9770
6748
6798
1249
1279
5.5
1.58
8.2
5.0
1.60
8.3
4th*
1127
9861
6849
1315
5.0
1.60
8.4
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UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 7
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Ratio Analysis for Home Depot
1997
Working capital (CA-NIBCL*)
Fixed assets
Total capital
Tax rate
NOPAT (EBIT × (1 − t))
Fiscal Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2,012
6,769
8,781
38.9%
1,158
2,090
8,532
10,622
39.2%
1,623
2,763
10,691
13,454
39.0%
2,323
3,396
13,608
17,004
38.8%
2,565
3,865
16,033
19,898
38.6%
3,028
PROFITABILITY
Return on capital (NOPAT/total capital)
Return on equity (net earnings/s. equity)
13.2%
16.3%
15.3%
18.5%
17.3%
18.8%
15.1%
17.2%
15.2%
16.8%
MARGINS
Gross margin (gross profit/sales)
Cash operating expenses/sales
Depreciation/sales
Depreciation/P&E
Operating margin (EBIT/sales)
NOPAT margin (NOPAT/sales)
29.2%
20.2%
1.2%
4.3%
7.8%
4.8%
29.7%
19.6%
1.2%
4.6%
8.8%
5.4%
30.9%
19.8%
1.2%
4.5%
9.9%
6.0%
31.2%
20.7%
1.3%
4.6%
9.2%
5.6%
31.6%
20.9%
1.4%
5.0%
9.2%
5.7%
2.8
3.7
12.0
43.4
4.7
38.7
366.0
43.9
2.8
3.7
14.5
64.4
4.9
39.7
373.1
45.4
2.9
3.8
13.9
65.5
4.8
41.3
384.3
48.2
2.7
3.5
13.5
54.8
4.8
40.3
371.9
48.8
2.7
3.5
13.9
58.2
5.4
40.2
366.8
49.1
25.1%
2.6%
22.0%
0.6%
27.2%
4.1%
22.2%
1.0%
19.0%
-2.4%
21.9%
0.9%
17.1%
-0.4%
17.5%
1.0%
1.22
1.09
1.13
1.10
TURNOVER
Total capital turnover (sales/total capital)
P&E turnover (sales/P&E)
Working-capital turnover (sales/WC)
Receivable turnover (sales/AR)
Inventory turnover (COGS/m. inventory)
Sales per store ($ millions)
Sales per sq. foot ($)
Sales per transaction ($)
GROWTH
Total sales growth
Sales growth for existing stores
Growth in new stores
Growth in sq. footage per store
LEVERAGE
Total capital/equity
*Non-interest-bearing current liabilities.
1.24
-13-
UVA-F-1403
Exhibit 8
VALUE LINE PUBLISHING,
OCTOBER 2002
Financial Forecast for Home Depot
ASSUMPTIONS
Growth in new stores
Sales growth for existing stores
Total sales growth
Gross margin
Cash operating expenses/sales
Depreciation/sales
Income-tax rate
Cash & ST inv./sales
Receivable turnover
Inventory turnover
P&E turnover
Payables/COGS
Other curr. liab./sales
FORECAST
Number of stores
Net sales
Cost of sales
Gross profit
Cash operating expenses
Depreciation & amortization
EBIT
NOPAT
Cash and ST investments
Accounts receivable
Merchandise inventory
Other current assets
Total current assets
Accounts payable
Accrued salaries and wages
Other current liabilities
Non-int.-bearing current liab.
Working capital
Net property and equipment
Other assets
Total capital
Return on capital
2001
17.5%
-0.4%
17.1%
2002E
15.0%
3.0%
18.0%
Fiscal Year
2003E
2004E
13.2%
9.0%
4.0%
8.3%
17.2%
17.3%
2005E
7.0%
8.3%
15.3%
2006E
5.5%
8.3%
13.8%
31.6%
20.9%
1.4%
38.6%
32.0%
21.0%
1.4%
37.6%
32.3%
20.7%
1.4%
37.5%
32.4%
20.8%
1.4%
37.5%
32.5%
20.5%
1.4%
37.5%
32.5%
20.5%
1.4%
37.5%
4.8%
58.2
5.4
3.5
9.4%
4.4%
5.0%
55.0
5.3
3.3
9.4%
4.4%
5.0%
53.0
5.1
3.3
9.4%
4.4%
5.1%
52.0
5.0
3.3
9.4%
4.4%
5.3%
50.0
4.7
3.3
9.4%
4.4%
5.3%
50.0
4.7
3.3
9.4%
4.4%
1,333
53,553
36,642
16,911
11,215
764
4,932
3,028
1,533
63,195
42,972
20,222
13,271
902
6,050
3,775
1,735
74,049
50,131
23,918
15,328
1,056
7,533
4,708
1,891
86,860
58,717
28,143
18,067
1,239
8,837
5,523
2,024
100,149
67,601
32,549
20,531
1,429
10,589
6,618
2,135
114,000
76,950
37,050
23,370
1,626
12,054
7,534
2,546
920
6,725
170
10,361
3,436
717
2,348
6,501
3,860
15,375
658
19,893
15.2%
3,160
1,149
8,170
170
12,648
4,030
717
2,765
7,511
5,137
19,150
658
24,945
15.1%
3,702
1,397
9,868
170
15,138
4,701
717
3,240
8,658
6,480
22,439
658
29,578
15.9%
4,430
1,670
11,743
170
18,014
5,506
717
3,800
10,023
7,990
26,321
658
34,970
15.8%
5,308
2,003
14,383
170
21,864
6,339
717
4,382
11,438
10,426
30,348
658
41,433
16.0%
6,042
2,280
16,372
170
24,864
7,216
717
4,988
12,920
11,944
34,545
658
47,147
16.0%