Document No.
GP 76-01
Applicability
Group
Date
13 December 2005
Guidance on Practice for
HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
GP 76-01
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
13 December 2005
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Foreword
This is the first issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) BP GP 76-01.
Copyright  2005, BP Group. All rights reserved. The information contained in this
document is subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement or contract under which
the document was supplied to the recipient’s organization. None of the information
contained in this document shall be disclosed outside the recipient’s own organization
without the prior written permission of Director of Engineering, BP Group, unless the
terms of such agreement or contract expressly allow.
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GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Table of Contents
Page
1.
Scope .................................................................................................................................... 4
2.
Normative references............................................................................................................. 4
3.
Terms and definitions............................................................................................................. 4
4.
Symbols and abbreviations .................................................................................................... 4
5.
General.................................................................................................................................. 4
6.
HSSE in design...................................................................................................................... 4
6.1. Purpose ...................................................................................................................... 4
6.2. Risk management in plants and facilities .................................................................... 4
6.3. Simplicity of design and waste minimisation................................................................ 4
6.4. Inherently safer design (ISD) ...................................................................................... 4
6.5. PHSSER - HSSE reviews during projects ................................................................... 4
6.6. Safer designs using constructability VIP ..................................................................... 4
6.7. Safer designs by addressing maintainability and operability........................................ 4
6.8. Security in designs...................................................................................................... 4
6.9. Designing for environmental issues ............................................................................ 4
6.10. Designing for Compliance ........................................................................................... 4
7.
Loss prevention and risk control............................................................................................. 4
7.1. Purpose ...................................................................................................................... 4
7.2. ETPs for design .......................................................................................................... 4
7.3. Mitigation of fire related hazards ................................................................................. 4
7.4. Hazard detection and alarm signalling ........................................................................ 4
7.5. Toxic hazards and oxygen deficient atmospheres....................................................... 4
7.6. Hydrocarbon and toxic spill mitigations ....................................................................... 4
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 4
List of Tables
Table 1 - Environmental design steps ............................................................................................. 4
Table 2 - Environmental decision making process .......................................................................... 4
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Capital value process (CVP) ........................................................................................... 4
Figure 2 - Waste minimisation and management VIP during CVP................................................... 4
Figure 3 - ISD hazard management flowchart ................................................................................. 4
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1.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Scope
a.
This Guidance on Practices (GP) provides guidance on health, safety, security, and
environment (HSSE) and compliance in design.
b.
This GP is applicable to all business units and locations.
c.
This GP includes information relevant to business managers, project managers, project
engineers, and design engineers.
This GP will provide the business manager, project manager, project engineer, and
project design engineer information on what to include and where to go for further
guidance when designing a BP plant or facility to meet the of the Integrity
Management Functional Standard (IMFS), the Global or USA HSSE Compliance
Framework, and HSSE in projects.
This GP will focus on which ETP documents contribute to HSSE in Design or to an
Inherently Safer Design. Links to useful HSSE information are included in the GP.
2.
d.
The overall goal of “HSSE in Design” is to protect human life (BP employees, BP
contractors, and the general public) and the environment against possible accidents (fires,
explosions, liquid spills to ground or to water, or emissions to the air) caused by failures of
BP plants or facilities in all locations around the world.
e.
The main aim of “HSSE in Design” is to ensure that measures are used to minimize the
risk and to mitigate the consequences of accidental hazardous material releases, fires, or
explosions. These incidents could occur in BP plants and facilities and BP personnel need
to address the identified risks to minimize or eliminate them, to achieve the goal stated
above and to protect our company reputation and BP company property.
f.
This document defines what Group ETPs used to building plants and facilities will
contribute to the above goal of HSSE in Design and provide inherently safe designs.
Normative references
The following normative documents contain requirements that, through reference in this text,
constitute requirements of this technical practice. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or
revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this
technical practice are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the normative
document referred to applies.
BP
GIS 14-011
GIS 22-201
GIS 30-801
GIS 30-851
GP 04-10
GP 04-20
GP 04-30
GP 12-60
GP 14-01
GP 22-20
GP 24-03
Noise Control - Procurement.
Procurement of Flares to API 537.
SIS - Design and Engineering of Logic Solvers.
Fire and Gas Detection.
Drainage Systems and Sewers.
Civil Engineering
Design of Buildings Subject to Blast Loading.
Hazardous Area Electrical Installations
Noise Control.
Design of Flares to API 537.
Concept Selection for Inherently Safer Design.
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GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
GP 24-20
GP 24-10
GP 30-25
GP 30-75
GP 30-76
GP 30-80
GP 30-81
GP 30-85
GP 35-10
GP 44-10
GP 44-25
GP 44-60
GP 44-65
GP 44-70
GP 44-80
GP 46-01
GP 48-01
GP 48-50
GP 62-01
IMFS
VIPs
Offshore Fire & Explosion Hazard Management.
Fire Protection - Onshore.
Field Instruments - General.
SIS - Management of the SIS Lifecycle.
SIS - Process Requirements Specification.
SIS - Implementation of Process Requirements.
SIS - Operations and Maintenance.
Fire and Gas Detection.
Engineering Design for Maintainability.
Plant Layout.
Depressurisation.
Area Classification IP-15
Area Classification API-500
Over Pressure Protection Systems.
Design of Relief Disposal Systems.
New Pressure Vessels.
Project HSSE Review (PHSSER).
Major Accident Risk Process.
Valve Selection.
Integrity Management Functional Standard (BP Group Technology).
Constructability VIP (Excellence in Project Management).
Process Simplification VIP (Excellence in Project Management).
Waste Minimization and Management VIP (Excellence in Project
Management)
HSSE for Projects.
Getting HSSE Right for Projects (or “in” Projects).
Value improving practice (VIP) documents:
Process simplification.
Waste minimisation and management.
Design to capacity.
Facilities system performance.
Technology selection.
Value engineering.
Setting business priorities.
Constructability.
American Petroleum Institute (API)
STD 2218
3.
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants.
Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions apply:
Active fire protection
a.
Equipment, systems, and methods required for detection, alarming, control, and
extinguishing of fires using water, steam, dry powder, or gaseous extinguishants.
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b.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Example would be detection equipment that activates fixed extinguishing or control
systems for fire, smoke, gas, or heat.
Fire exposed envelope
a.
Space into which fire potential equipment can release combustible fluids that can cause
substantial fire damage.
b.
Unless specified otherwise, fire exposed envelope shall extend from source of liquid fuel
horizontally 6 m to 9 m (20 ft to 30 ft) and vertically 9 m to 12 m (30 ft to 40 ft).
Fire scenario envelopes
Fire scenario envelopes are three dimensional spaces into which fire potential equipment can release
flammable or combustible fluids that, if ignited, will burn for sufficient time and intensity to inflict
escalation.
Fire potential
Applicable to plant and equipment (but excluding pipe work) that contain combustible fluids (see
API 2218).
Passive fire protection (PFP)
4.
a.
Non combustible materials that, for defined period during fire, protect equipment, prevent
collapse of structural supports, or limit spread of fire.
b.
Passive fire protection incorporates basic requirements for area separation and
classification.
Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
BLEVE
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
Capex
Capital expenditures.
CPSSR
Capital project security support review.
CVP
BP’s proprietary Capital Value Process comprised of 5 stages: Appraise, Select, Define,
Execute, and Operate. More Information on CVP
DSP
Decision Support Package
ESD
Emergency shutdown.
ETPs
Engineering Technical Practices. More Information on ETPs
FEHMP
Fire and explosion hazard management plan.
FEL
Front end loading.
HAZID
Hazard identification.
HAZOP
Hazard and operability review.
HSSE
Health, safety, security, and environment.
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5.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
IMFS
Integrity management functional standard.
ISD
Inherently safer design.
JV
Joint venture (BP and partner company owning and/or operating plant or facility).
LFL
Lower flammability limit.
LNG
Liquefied natural gas.
LPG
Liquefied petroleum gas.
MAP
Major accident potential.
MAR
Major accident risk (process).
MOC
Management of change (process or system).
NGO
Non governmental organisation.
Opex
Operational expenditures.
P&ID
Piping and instrument diagram.
PEL
Permissible exposure limit.
PFD
Process flow diagram.
PFP
Passive fire protection.
PHA
Process hazard analysis.
PHSSER
Project health safety security and environmental review.
QRM
Qualitative risk matrix.
SIS
Safety instrumented systems.
STP
Site technical practice.
TLV
Threshold limit value.
TWA
Time weighted average.
VIP
Value improving practice.
General
a.
All business segments at all locations shall systematically identify hazards arising from
normal and abnormal operations and shall eliminate, control, or mitigate hazards such that
residual risks and all legal HSSE compliance requirements are managed.
This is a requirement of the IMFS.
b.
Each location shall have formal procedures that shall ensure hazards are identified, risk
assessments are made, and systems developed to manage risks and meet all legal HSSE
compliance requirements.
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c.
These activities shall be appropriate to and consistent with complexity of location and risks
present.
d.
For all projects and turnarounds, formal review of health, safety, security, and
environmental impacts shall be performed at key stages of project or activity. Each
location shall comply with Control of Work Standard.
e.
All BP locations shall apply “inherently safer design” principles during design process and
use approved Site Technical Practices (STPs). Project teams shall address full life cycle
risks.
This is a requirement of the IMFS.
6.
6.1.
f.
Assessment of Major Accident Potential (MAP) using Group Major Accident Risk Process
shall be performed for each location. (Each Segment shall confirm that it does not and will
not operate above the Group Priority Line and is focused on continuous risk reduction.)
g.
STPs
1.
All locations shall use a set of STPs that are consistent with BP Engineering
Technical Practices (ETPs).
2.
Differences shall be justified and approved by appropriate engineering authority
based on any specific local requirement.
3.
Once in operation, operating, maintenance, and inspection practices shall be
implemented and regularly reviewed against approved STPs.
4.
All engineered systems, including mechanical, electrical, control, lifting, and
structural, shall be designed, procured, constructed operated, inspected, tested, and
maintained in accordance with STP to ensure that equipment is fit for service, avoids
loss of containment, and maintains structural integrity for expected lifecycle of
facility.
5.
New plant designs shall minimise risk at source and consider best available
technology to improve integrity.
h.
Responsibility to ensure compliance with legislation and any other statutory requirements
lies with the user.
i.
A legal HSSE applicability register shall be maintained that identifies all applicable HSSE
regulatory, contractual and other requirements that pertain to the location. Risk
prioritization shall be performed as part of the HSSE management system to determine
those compliance activities which carry the most risk and therefore require attention to
mitigate and/or manage in priority order.
j.
This GP should be adapted or supplemented to ensure compliance for specific applications.
HSSE in design
Purpose
HSSE in design is most important aspect of risk management.
Risk is defined as measure of:
•
•
•
Human injury.
Environmental damage.
Economic loss.
Risk is defined in terms of:
•
Incident likelihood.
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Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
•
Magnitude of loss, injury, or damage.
Effort to reduce risk arising from operation of plants and facilities can be directed
towards:
•
•
Reducing likelihood of incidents (incident frequency).
Reducing magnitude of loss, injury, or damage should an incident occur
(incident consequences).
6.2.
Risk management in plants and facilities
6.2.1.
Risk identification
a.
b.
Business segments shall:
1.
Systematically identify hazards arising from normal and abnormal operations.
2.
Eliminate, control, or mitigate hazards such that residual risks are managed
3.
Manage legal HSSE compliance requirements in the country in which they operate.
Each location shall have formal procedures and processes in place to ensure:
1.
Hazards are identified.
2.
Risk assessments are made.
3.
Systems are developed to manage risks.
4.
Legal HSSE compliance requirements are met.
c.
Procedures shall be appropriate to and consistent with complexity of location and risks
present.
d.
Assessment of major accident potential using the MAR process shall be performed for
each project and location and shall comply with GP 48-50.
e.
Each segment shall confirm that it:
1.
Does not and will not operate above the group priority line.
2.
Is focused on continuous risk reduction.
Greatest benefit of major accident risk (MAR) process will be gained if implemented
at beginning of capital value process (CVP) define, execute, and operate stages.
f.
Hazard identification and risk assessments shall:
1.
Cover design, procurement, construction, and commissioning.
2.
Employ process hazard analyses.
3.
Be performed by teams that are competent and have comprehensive experience and
knowledge of process being evaluated and technique in use.
g.
Findings shall be communicated to workforce that may be affected by recommendations
and actions.
h.
Project teams shall address full lifecycle risks.
i.
Hazard Register shall be prepared for each.
j.
Hazard Register shall describe hazards and provide clear links from identified hazards to
measures, systems, processes, and procedures implemented to manage risks.
k.
A legal HSSE applicability register shall be maintained that identifies all applicable HSSE
regulatory, contractual and other requirements that pertain to the location. Risk
prioritization shall be performed as part of the HSSE management system to determine
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those compliance activities which carry the most risk and therefore require attention to
mitigate and/or manage in priority order.
l.
Risk assessments and process hazard analyses shall include identification of specific
hazards.
m.
Accepted recommendations from studies shall be implemented in a timely manner to
eliminate hazard or minimise risk from hazard.
6.2.2.
Risk reduction
6.2.2.1.
General
Strategy for reducing risk, whether directed towards reducing frequency or mitigating
consequence of potential accidents, can be classified into four categories, in decreasing order of
reliability and preference:
6.2.2.2.
a.
Inherent.
b.
Passive.
c.
Active.
d.
Procedural.
Inherent
Inherent strategies eliminate hazard by use of materials or process conditions that are less
hazardous (e.g., substituting water for flammable solvent).
6.2.2.3.
6.2.2.4.
Passive
a.
Passive strategies minimising hazard by process and equipment design features that reduce
either frequency or consequence of hazard without employing active functioning safety
devices.
b.
Examples of passive methods include equipment rated for higher pressure, proper selection
of materials, safety distance, adherence to good design practices and industry standards,
and consideration of human factors.
c.
For fires, passive fire protection (PFP) is normally used if equipment or structures are
located in fire exposed envelope or fire scenario envelope.
Active
a.
Active means using equipment, such as controls, safety interlocks, and emergency
shutdown (ESD) systems, to detect and correct process deviations.
b.
Active systems are commonly referred to as engineering controls.
Examples of active systems include overpressure protection and vent systems,
depressurisation systems, proper selection of redundancies in critical and other
selected control functions, process isolation and shutdown systems, and corrosion
control and monitoring program.
c.
6.2.2.5.
Active fire protection systems shall be used on fire potential process equipment for
potential of fire from leak or explosion.
Procedural
a.
Procedural strategies use operation procedures, training, administrative checks, emergency
response, and other management approaches to prevent incidents or to minimise effects of
incidents.
Example of procedural method is hot work procedures and permit.
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b.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Procedural methods are commonly referred to as administrative controls.
6.3.
Simplicity of design and waste minimisation
6.3.1.
General
Simplicity is valued tool to meet HSSE goals.
Simplicity is designing plant facilities to eliminate unnecessary complexity without
unduly restricting operating flexibility, reducing opportunities for error and
mis-operation. Also the potential for subsequent HSSE non-compliance issues will
be reduced.
Simpler plants are generally safer and more cost effective than complex ones.
6.3.2.
a.
Business and engineering project team and process design engineer should use value
improving practice (VIP) tools to help simplify processing design of plant or facility.
b.
Information on VIP tools can be found in group technology portal
http://technology.bpweb.bp.com/, under capital productivity, then excellence in project
management. Link to VIP page is http://projects.bpweb.bp.com/vip/index.htm.
c.
VIPs used to achieve simplicity of design are briefly discussed in 6.3.2 through 6.3.4.
Process simplification VIP
a.
b.
Process simplification VIP is disciplined analytical method for reducing:
1.
Process complexity and process hazards.
2.
Investment requirements.
3.
Operating costs.
Process simplification works by combining, eliminating, and/or modifying one or more
processing steps.
Process simplification VIP provides project teams with suggested steps to explore
design and operation of facility for value added opportunity.
Examples of process simplification VIP are:
•
•
•
c.
Eliminating heating followed by cooling.
Concentration followed by diluting.
Combinations of previously separate reactions.
Process simplification VIP objective is to identify plant or facility design that is:
1.
Cost effective in producing desired product.
2.
Easy, safe, and less hazardous to operate and maintain.
3.
In compliance with BP corporate standards and constraints.
4.
In compliance with all HSSE laws and regulations
5.
Improvement to overall key objectives.
d.
Process simplification VIP is applicable to and shall be used by projects of all types and
sizes.
e.
Before developing project plan, process simplification VIP should be tailored to fit project
needs.
f.
Process simplification VIP should be applied to projects in structured and consistent
approach.
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g.
Process simplification VIP requires facilitated workshop varying in time and objectives to
meet project needs.
h.
Process simplification VIP is most useful and should be applied during appraise, select,
and define stages of CVP (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Capital value process (CVP)
6.3.3.
i.
Initial process simplification VIP workshop should be held after preliminary process flow
diagrams (PFDs) are developed.
j.
Second process simplification workshop may be held after preliminary piping and
instrument diagrams (P&IDs) are developed.
Waste minimisation and management VIP
Waste minimisation and management VIP helps project teams consider
environmental impact over project lifecycle during planning stages of project.
a.
Waste minimisation and management plan shall cover construction, startup, operations,
and ultimate dismantling of production equipment or plant.
b.
Goal is to minimise total lifecycle cost for environmental protection.
c.
Project team should be alert to special situations for protecting environment in accordance
with BP corporate goals that may require more than minimal compliance with statutory
and regulatory requirements.
d.
At project beginning, waste minimisation and management VIP encourages team to:
1.
Examine overall organisational responsibilities for environmental activities from
regulatory compliance obligations to any additional requirements that might be
imposed by terms and conditions contained in legal contracts such as Production
Sharing Agreements, Host Country Agreements, Lenders Agreements etc..
2.
Define key environmental activities and responsibilities.
3.
Assess and develop best management methodology suited to environmental aspects of
project.
4.
Eliminate waste from process design.
5.
Link activities of management team to environmental responsibilities of operations,
including existing HSSE management systems.
6.
Work with outside agencies to establish environmental standards that will govern
both project management team and contractor activities.
Waste minimisation and management VIP proactively addresses environmental
issues and opportunities to reduce waste as integral part of design process.
e.
Process stream waste minimisation analysis shall be performed on process stream
primarily during select stage of CVP to develop concepts that reduce or preferably
eliminate each waste stream at source.
f.
Practice shall be applicable to all projects (except like for like equipment replacement).
g.
Minimisation and Waste Management VIP should be scaled proportional to potential for
adverse environmental impact and project size.
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h.
Waste Minimisation and Waste Management VIP should be performed during each stage
of front end loading (FEL) portion of project.
i.
Waste Minimisation and Management VIP shall perform the following steps during each
stage of CVP (Figure 2 shows at which stage each step should be considered):
1.
Align with business and BP goals.
2.
Define geographic area.
3.
Identify and categorise waste.
4.
Analyse regulations, contractual requirements and other legal issues
5.
Minimise and manage waste by looking for alternatives.
6.
Select waste management practice.
7.
Implement area waste management plan.
8.
Review and update waste management plan.
Figure 2 - Waste minimisation and management VIP during CVP
j.
6.3.4.
The following quality metrics provide indication of how well practice is used:
1.
Environmental leadership accountability is established during appraise.
2.
Proactive environmental charter, implementation plan, and specific project
environmental objectives are established during appraise or early select.
3.
Environmental compliance and permitting requirements are identified during select.
4.
Team shall document waste management hierarchy of emissions or discharges.
5.
Process stream waste minimisation analysis is completed during select or define.
6.
For each stream, waste management hierarchy options of source elimination, reuse,
and recycle are assessed, with treatment and disposal viewed as last resort.
7.
Best environmental practices are applied to manage remaining waste streams.
8.
For application enhancements phase, team conducts structured design review during
define phase for non routine operations, focused on reducing fugitive emissions and
protecting groundwater/overboard discharges.
Other VIPs
Other VIPs to be considered for mitigating risks associated with accidental incidents are:
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6.4.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
a.
Design to capacity.
b.
Facilities system performance.
c.
Technology selection.
d.
Value engineering.
e.
Setting business priorities.
Inherently safer design (ISD)
a.
Inherently safer design (ISD) guidelines provide structured approach to:
1.
Eliminating hazards at source.
2.
Minimising risks from hazards that remain.
3.
Creating effective hazard management process.
b.
ISD is mainly focused towards concept selection or FEL stages (appraise, select, and
define).
c.
Goal of ISD is to produce inherently safer processing designs for plants and facilities that
are simple to operate, more reliable, and have reduced dependence on people and safety
systems.
ISD will provide greatest reduction in risk for investment of time and capital.
d.
ISD principles and structured approach can be applied to any worldwide facilities that BP
builds and operates, including:
1.
Gasoline (petrol) stations.
2.
Bridges.
3.
Offshore platforms.
4.
Chemical plants.
5.
Producing wellheads.
6.
Radically new technology that does not yet have established rules or risk assessment
techniques.
ISD principles concentrate not only on reducing risk at source but also include
comprehensive information on residual hazard management.
ISD uses proactive structured approach to hazard management during FEL of
project, specifically in process design phase.
ISD brings together and depends on many diverse risk assessment and management
processes that are implicit in many ETPs, such as process, structural, instruments,
and electrical.
ISD processes contribute to overall picture of risk management by supporting
implementation of corporate goals in this area.
ISD concepts focus on several key areas, including:
•
•
Overall principles of ISD, similar to IMFS, but highlighting particular design
requirements.
Planning and resource
-
ISD document provides guidelines during appraise, select, and define stages
of project such that understanding and management of hazards is key input
to process design, rather than retrospective assurance process.
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-
•
•
e.
ISD document highlights several project requirements that must be in place
for ISD to flourish, such as contractual relationships that encourage ISD
and provision of correct specialised resources during concept selection.
Concept development and selection
-
ISD document encourages generation of different overall processing
concepts and their optimisation during appraise and select stages of CVP.
-
ISD offers pragmatic process for selection of development options based on
residual risk and difficulties in managing hazards that remain.
Final structured phase of ISD is residual hazard management. Residual hazard
management steps are:
-
Analysis of cause, severity, consequence, and escalation at beginning.
-
Minimisation of characteristics at source.
-
Selection of appropriate hazard management strategy for each identified and
residual risk to prevent, control, or mitigate risks.
Flowchart of ISD hazard management process is shown in Figure 3.
Implementation and assurance of ISD principles are in current BP HSSE processes,
such as project HSSE review (PHSSER).
f.
HSSE reviews performed in appraise and select stages of project should include inherent
safety review.
Inherent safety review uses process flow diagrams and layout drawings, along with
other preliminary documentation.
Largest benefit from application of inherently safer design principles can be
obtained during appraise and select stages.
g.
Hazard management review shall comply with:
1.
GP 48-01.
2.
GP 24-03.
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Figure 3 - ISD hazard management flowchart
HAZID
Cause
HAZARD UNDERSTANDING
Severity Consequence Escalation
E LIMINATE
STRATEGY
RISK
MINIMI Z E at SOURCE
PREVENT
DETECT and
CONTROL
MITIGATE
SYSTEM
EVAC U ATE
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
OPERATIONAL
EXTERNAL
STANDARDS
INTEGRITY
FUNCTION
COMPETENCE
RELATIONSHIPS
NO
IS IT
GOOD
ENOUGH?
YES
IMPLEMENT
6.5.
PHSSER - HSSE reviews during projects
6.5.1.
Project HSSE reviews
a.
HSSE reviews of major projects, small capital projects, and turnarounds shall be
performed at appropriate times during each CVP stage of project or activity. The HSSE
reviews for the projects shall follow the PHSSER requirements in GP 48-01.
b.
The PHSSER process requires that 7 HSSE reviews be conducted during the CVP five
stage project life cycle, one per stage except for execute which has three, and all projects
shall follow the PHSSER process.
6.6.
Safer designs using constructability VIP
6.6.1.
Merits of constructability VIP
a.
Safety in design includes implementation of constructability concepts of merit during
define and early execute stages of CVP.
Constructability concepts improve project performance and improve safety by
reducing risk of accidents during construction, operation, and maintenance.
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b.
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Constructability VIP concepts shall be integral part of project execution process.
Constructability is identified as one of the most beneficial VIPs.
Constructability VIP efforts have shown that owners accrue average reduction in
total project cost of 4.3% and schedule of 7.5%.
Safety records were also improved.
Savings represent 10:1 return on investment through application of constructability
VIP.
Some BP competitors have reported that they achieved up to 70:1 return on invested
time and capital.
6.6.2.
Constructability definition and activities
a.
Constructability VIP is defined as “a systematic method that enables the project team to
optimise the use of construction knowledge and experience in planning, engineering,
design, procurement, fabrication, and installation to achieve overall project and safety
objectives.”
b.
Widely accepted definition of constructability from Construction Industry Institute (CII) is
“the optimum use of construction knowledge and experience in planning, engineering,
procurement, and field operations to achieve overall project objectives.”
In practice, constructability means many different things to many different people.
Constructability VIP definition emphasises “systematic method” for optimising
construction knowledge and experience, which means that constructability is a
managed work process.
c.
Constructability activities to be accomplished, along with roles and responsibilities, are
described at “Excellence in Project Management” website:
http://projects.bpweb.bp.com/vip/construc/indexcon.htm.
6.7.
Safer designs by addressing maintainability and operability
6.7.1.
General
a.
Design engineers shall take into account safety of personnel who will eventually operate
and maintain BP plant or facility during Define and Execute stages of CVP.
b.
To ensure personnel safety, design engineers shall refer to ETPs listed in 6.7.2.
6.7.2.
Personnel safety ETPs
6.7.2.1.
Noise exposure mitigation
a.
Many worldwide governmental regulations protect operating personnel in petrochemical
industry (and the public) from high noise exposure levels generated by plant and facility
equipment and processes.
b.
Major noise contributors are:
c.
1.
Compressors, gas turbines, pumps, and motors.
2.
Other rotating or reciprocating machinery.
3.
Gas velocities in piping after pressure letdown valves or devices.
To design and procure plant and facility equipment to mitigate noise exposure, projects
shall comply with:
1.
GP 14-01.
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2.
6.7.2.2.
GIS 14-011.
Operating access to valves
Projects shall comply with GP 62-01, especially in the operability section.
6.7.2.3.
Operating and maintenance access to instrumentation
Projects shall comply with GP 30-25, especially in the maintenance access, instrumentation
installation, and location sections.
6.7.2.4.
Maintenance access to vessels, towers, and man-ways
Regarding platforms, stairways, and ladders for maintenance access to manholes and to provide
escape routing, projects shall comply with:
6.7.3.
6.8.
a.
GP 46-01.
b.
GP 04-20.
Safer designs for maintenance of equipment
a.
Projects shall have means (e.g., beams, monorails, lifting devices, hoists, cranes,
removable panels) for equipment maintenance and access.
b.
Installations shall have clear overhead pathways (sometimes after removing building or
sound enclosure walls) such that pieces of rotating equipment (e.g., compressor cylinders,
motors, compressor frames, compressor block valves, pumps, seal pots, fans) can be
removed for maintenance or replacement.
c.
Projects shall comply with GP 35-10.
Security in designs
a.
Group security policy underpins and establishes basis for how BP manages security
globally.
b.
Group security policy determines that BP fundamental mission is to provide safe and
secure working environment by protecting personnel, assets, and operations against risk of
injury, loss, or damage from criminal, hostile, or malicious acts.
c.
Security shall be taken into consideration during proposal, planning, and implementation
stages of new capital projects.
d.
Capital project security support reviews (CPSSR) shall be performed for new capital
projects.
e.
CPSSR is procedure to ensure security of new construction projects and major renovations
of existing facilities.
f.
CPSSR methodology provides for:
1.
Prior identification of potential security risks.
2.
Selection and implementation of security safeguards appropriate to identified risks.
3.
Followthrough monitoring of security safeguards that have been implemented.
g.
Beginning with appraise stage of CVP, CPSSR shall be used to identify and assess security
issues and risks in conjunction with HSSE reviews.
h.
Mitigation plans shall be implemented. Mitigations affecting overall design and
plant/facility layout shall be incorporated as soon as practical to address identified risks.
i.
Projects vary considerably. Distinctly different processes can be found in construction of
office buildings, plants, pipelines, retail stores, and extraction facilities on and offshore.
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j.
Statements in i. also apply to partial constructions and renovations. Each project will have
its own manner of operation and its own set of security risks.
k.
More guidance can be found on “Excellence in Project Management” website under
project HSSE plan and security at this link:
http://projects.bpweb.bp.com/hse/plan/plansec.htm.
6.9.
Designing for environmental issues
6.9.1.
Introduction
a.
Environmental guidelines shall apply to new developments and major modification
projects.
b.
Objectives are:
c.
1.
Consistent federal approach is achieved.
2.
Uniform public demonstration of BP environmental commitment is assured.
3.
Due environmental process has been followed in developing capital cases for sanction
approval.
After guidelines are applied, final plant and facility designs should be based on balance of
relevant economic and environmental considerations.
Purpose of designing for environmental issues is to ensure that projects and
developments strive to achieve corporate goal of no damage to environment in the
most cost effective manner. Guidelines explain process that should be followed to
establish best achievable environmental performance in project, along with key
technical and operational elements that contribute towards final performance level.
This is a generic guideline for BP and does not provide specific details or processes
to be followed. Guidelines also provide link to CVP.
d.
6.9.2.
To use guidelines, each project organisation shall develop internal processes that will lead
to optimal result, taking into account project specific conditions, such as scope of
operation, local environment, local/regional legislation, public perception, and partner
buy in.
Overview of process steps
a.
Project team should follow recommended steps to ensure that selection of final
development concept and chosen technical solutions are performed in the most cost
effective manner.
b.
Process steps for CVP stages are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 - Environmental design steps
Step
Task
CVP phase
1
Define project environmental goals, regulatory compliance requirements,
and stakeholder expectations.
Appraise
2
Identify no damage base case for final development options.
Early select
3
Justify proposed variation from goal of no damage and present project
environmental strategy in DSP. Environmental strategy shall meet
regulatory compliance requirements such as allowable permit or license
limits.
Select
4
Define minimum damage level based on chosen development concept and
final technical solutions, including considerations for remediation.
Early define
5
Ready for sanction approval including remediation recommendations in
DSP.
Late define
6
Ensure that decisions made earlier in process are implemented.
Execute
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6.9.3.
Decision making process
6.9.3.1.
Setting goals
a.
New BP projects shall strive to deliver exemplary environmental performance onsite, in
office, and wherever they have control or influence.
b.
Projects shall use zero damage as starting point of decision making process.
c.
Damage can be caused by:
1.
Emissions to air and water/sea/ground.
2.
Physical interactions or nuisance (e.g., visual impact, noise, footprint, odour, dust).
3.
Energy inefficiency.
4.
Materials use and waste generation.
5.
Interference with other users of local environment.
d.
To achieve excellent performance and move towards goal of no damage, projects should
develop specific goals that form starting point of project development process.
e.
Each project should develop its own specific list of relevant goals consistent with no
damage to environment.
f.
Typical goals are as follows:
1.
No flaring or venting.
2.
No fugitive emissions.
3.
No combustion emissions.
4.
Zero discharge of oil or hydrocarbon liquids to land or sea.
5.
Zero discharge of chemicals to land or sea.
6.
No use of ozone depleting substances.
7.
Maximise efficiency of net energy exported.
8.
No discharge of drilling fluids or cuttings.
9.
Sustainable raw material use.
10. No waste disposal.
11. Total reuse/recycle of facility components at end of lifecycle.
12. Restore habitat after removal of installation.
13. No land disturbance beyond absolute minimum necessary for operations.
14. Acquire land surrounding plant or facility to minimise future public encroachment as
protection to public.
15. No nuisance (e.g., visual impact, noise, odour, dust).
16. No interference with other users of local environment.
6.9.3.2.
Identify zero damage base case
a.
Every project should undertake process to demonstrate how specific environmental goals
should be met.
b.
Project shall identify and cost zero damage processing base case for plant or facility to be
built.
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6.9.3.3.
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c.
Project process should understand and document technical, economic, and other relevant
reasons why project final development option has deviated from zero damage base case.
d.
Remediation measures should be fully considered if damage is not eliminated.
e.
To establish zero damage case, some considerations of technical issues that should be
addressed are in 6.9.3.3. List does not represent complete list of issues to be considered.
Variations from goal of no damage
a.
Projects that propose variations from project specific goals consistent with no damage to
environment shall demonstrate justification process.
b.
Project environmental strategy should be prepared on basis of performance level
established described in Table 2.
c.
Decision making process contains recommended criteria for evaluation as follows:
1.
Technical feasibility: On case by case basis, is goal unable to be met due to technical
infeasibility? If yes, alternative technical solutions should be considered.
2.
Impact on safety: Would meeting goal have significant negative impact on safety? If
yes, proposal to vary from goal may be acceptable.
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Table 2 - Environmental decision making process
Environmental goal
No flaring or venting
Examples of issues for new projects and developments
Design to eliminate routine flaring/venting (e.g., eliminate sources, flare/vent gas recovery system,
consider gas export or gas reinjection).
Consider options to prevent occurrence of nonroutine and emergency flaring/venting (e.g., high
integrity blowdown compressors), although safety implications will be important.
Flaring of produced gas during startup should be prevented.
No fugitive emissions
Minimise potential emission sources through design (e.g., number of valves, joint types).
Select high quality valve components (i.e., low leakage specification), and ensure appropriate
maintenance programmes.
Recapture fugitives associated with tanker loading/unloading.
No combustion emissions
Technical/economic factors may prevent elimination of combustion emissions, but considerations
include:
Drawing energy from renewable sources.
Recovery and sequestration of CO2 to be evaluated.
Issues to reduce combustion emissions include:
Selection of high efficiency equipment.
Optimisation of energy efficiency at operating point.
Use of low NOx turbines.
Use of CHP such as waste heat recovery.
Variable speed drives.
Use of low sulphur diesel.
Use of low H2S gas.
Zero discharge of oil and
hydrocarbon liquids
Reinjection of produced water.
Use of collection vessels to retain drains effluent prior to reinjection and to provide for storage if
reinjection is offline.
If reinjection not feasible, consider step out technology for enhancing gravimetric separation
methods.
Zero discharge of
chemicals
Recover chemical effluent streams and dispose of through reinjection system.
Evaluate use of new materials technology to eliminate need for chemicals.
If possible, select low toxicity chemicals.
No use of ozone depleting
substances
Only select products or systems that use non ozone depleting substances.
Maximise efficiency of net
energy exported
Developing or modelling optimum energy configuration will require balancing energy demands
against other environmental considerations (e.g., reinjection of flue gases).
Consider available sources of renewable energy (currently limited, but feasible wind, wave, and solar
technologies may become available in future).
Selection of high efficiency equipment (e.g., gas turbines, motors).
Optimisation of energy efficiency at operating point.
No discharge of drilling
fluids and cuttings
Sustainable raw material
usage
No waste disposal
Consider reinjection of mud cuttings and fluids.
If reinjection not feasible, consider retainment, cleanup, and reuse (with minimal disposal onshore).
Preferentially select raw materials from sustainable sources, taking into account local economy.
Plan early to eliminate waste.
Recycle waste materials if possible.
Disposal is final option.
Total reuse of all facility
components at end of
project life
Habitat restoration after
removal
No land disturbance
beyond minimum
necessary for operations
Incorporate decommissioning into project planning.
Design for reuse and transferability wherever possible.
Plan for habitat restoration bringing impacted areas back to condition that reflects local conditions.
Reseed/replant using indigenous species.
Minimise working width for pipeline routes.
Plan pad layouts to make maximum use of space, keeping total to minimum necessary for
operational requirements.
No nuisance (e.g. visual
impact, noise, odour,
dust)
Plan working times to avoid noise impacts at sensitive times (e.g., evenings, nights).
Screen developments to minimise visual impacts.
No interference with other
users of environment
Consult with other users of environment to determine their needs and avoid potential areas of
interference.
Clad or screen to minimise noise impacts.
If appropriate and if there is some loss of economic resource value to other users, plan for financial
compensation.
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3.
Legislation: Does proposal breach current legislation or legislation anticipated within
next 5 yr? If yes, proposal may not be acceptable.
4.
BP/JV partner policy: Does proposal breach policy requirements of BP, including
goals and targets of joint venture (JV) partners policy? If yes, proposal is not
acceptable.
5.
Good engineering practice: Does proposal breach principles of good engineering
practice? If yes, proposal may not be acceptable.
6.
Environmental cost factors: How does financial “saving” (sum of reduced Capex,
reduced Opex, and increased Revex) gained from deviating from goal compare with
environmental cost factor ranges used by BP? Comparison should give good
indication of acceptability or otherwise of proposed variation.
7.
Reputation issues:
a)
Are there reputation issues involved with damage/goal in question? If yes,
proposal to vary from goal may be unacceptable.
b)
In this context, reputation issues include public, non governmental organisation
(NGO) or government interest, and impact on third parties.
c)
Expert judgment and managerial input should be used to assess whether proposal
is acceptable.
8.
Expert judgment: Most environmental issues shall be considered from local/regional
point of view. Issues shall be considered using specialist support.
9.
Remediation options: Options should be developed to achieve zero net damage (i.e.,
habitat recreations, CO2 sequestration or joint implementation in remote locations,
site restoration).
10. Optimal environmental alternative: Is proposed variation from goal optimum
environmental option short of achieving goal?
6.9.3.4.
Minimum damage level
a.
Minimum damage level shall be defined based on chosen development concept and final
technical solution.
Define phase of CVP is step that develops technical definition of chosen concept.
6.9.3.5.
b.
During changes in technical definition, proposed damage should be evaluated as in 6.9.3.3.
c.
Minimum damage level shall comply with all HSSE laws, regulations, contractual
agreements and other requirements associated with the project.
Ready for sanction
a.
Final project plans should demonstrate process that started with goal of no damage and
assessed proposed variations to achieve final technical solutions.
b.
Project soliciting funding shall present expected quantified damage levels and other levels
of impact, such as land take, visual impact, noise, and odour.
c.
This should be collated and summarised in brief report and should be included in DSP for
sanction case.
d.
Report should include potential remediation options that can be considered as part of
sanction process.
e.
Despite fact that this process allows project to vary from goal of no damage, performance
significantly better than that of existing operations shall be demonstrated.
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6.10.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
Designing for Compliance
6.10.1. Introduction
a.
BP businesses must comply with a variety of HSSE requirements including international
treaties and conventions, country/state laws and regulations, regional directives, local
ordinances, lender agreements, production sharing agreements, industry commitments and
BP standards.
b.
Failure to meet these requirements will adversely impact our business, significantly
damage our reputation and result in severe civil, administrative and criminal penalties.
Individual employees responsible for non-compliance are subject to personal fines,
probation, and house arrest and possible prison sentences.
6.10.2. How to put compliance into the design
a.
BP businesses shall follow the Global or US HSSE Compliance Framework (Framework).
To help BP businesses reduce their risk of non-compliance with HSSE requirements
and create an enhanced culture of integrity, Group Compliance & Ethics (GC&E)
established a Global and US HSSE Compliance Framework (Framework) as a
cornerstone of Project Emerald, BP’s global HSSE compliance enhancement
project.
b.
BP employees in positions of authority shall know and implement the Framework.
c.
BP engineers as part of their designs shall design for compliance and should use the tools
and Implementation Guidance documents available from GC&E.
Please refer to the GC&E HSSE Compliance web site at
http://hssecompliance.bpweb.bp.com/Default.aspx?tabid=155 for more information.
6.10.3. Basic Rules to follow
a.
b.
7.
7.1.
As stated in the BP Code of Conduct, BP employees must always:
1.
Comply with the requirements of the HSSE management system at your work
location – including the use of relevant standards, instructions and processes – and
with the golden rules of safety.
2.
Take responsibility for ensuring that our products and operations meet applicable
government and company standards, whichever are more stringent
Any deviations to following the Framework(s) must be reviewed and approved by the
GC&E HSSE Compliance Team; Engineering Authorities are not authorized to make any
changes.
Loss prevention and risk control
Purpose
Despite excellent safety record of BP petrochemical plants and facilities and even as
the principles of safety in design described above are implemented, accidents may
happen.
There is always possibility that accidental release can occur, resulting in fire or
other hazardous events during processing, storing, handling, and transferring of
flammable materials.
In addition to fire and explosion hazards, accidental release can pose health and
environmental risks.
If accident occurs, consequences can be minimised through active and passive
interventions.
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a.
b.
7.2.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
BP approach to HSSE loss prevention is to design plants and facilities that comply with:
1.
Country and local standards and regulations.
2.
Project designated codes.
3.
Good engineering practices and standards worldwide.
Good engineering practices shall be provided by STPs that are consistent with ETPs based
on worldwide recognised external industry standards, such as ISO and API.
ETPs for design
a.
Engineered systems, including mechanical, electrical, control, lifting, and structural, shall
be designed, procured, constructed, operated, inspected, tested, and maintained in
accordance with STPs to ensure that equipment is fit for service, avoids loss of
containment, and maintains structural integrity for expected lifecycle of facility.
b.
New plant designs shall minimise risk at source and consider best available technology to
improve integrity.
c.
BP locations and projects shall use STPs that are consistent with ETPs to provide inherent,
passive, active, and remediation risk reduction.
d.
Differences between STPs and ETPs shall be justified and subject to approval by
appropriate engineering authority based on specific local requirements.
BP group technology developed ETPs beginning in 2001 and ending in 2005. ETPs
were developed using heritage information from mainly BP, Amoco, and Arco and
based on external worldwide industry standards and good engineering practice.
ETPs are intended to replace heritage specification sets. ETPs allow business units
and projects sufficient flexibility to create site specific supplements to group ETPs.
Segment level ETPs and supplements are also allowed. For more information on
ETPs, read the ETP introduction document located in the ETP Library #00
category.
ETPs are divided into 45 different categories. The 420+ GPs and GISs cover design
of engineered systems, including mechanical, electrical, control, instrumentation,
lifting, and structural. ETPs provide inherent and passive safety in design for BP
plants and facilities. ETPs also provide engineering guidance on active and
remediation safety design alternatives. The Index of ETP categories and Published
ETP Documents can be found at http://etp.bpweb.bp.com/.
e.
ETPs and STP supplements used on BP projects shall mitigate risks associated with
hazards identified through HSSE reviews and mentioned specifically in 7.3 through 7.6.
7.3.
Mitigation of fire related hazards
7.3.1.
General
7.3.2.
a.
BP plant or facility shall have fire hazard management philosophy that is developed during
late select stage of CVP and finalised during define and early execute stages.
b.
Philosophy shall lead to development of fire and explosion hazard management plan
(FEHMP) that is agreed upon with plant or facility operator and fully documented. The
FEHMP is described in GP 24-10 and GP 24-20.
Fire protection ETPs to mitigate fire related hazards
For mitigation of fire related hazards:
a.
Offshore facilities shall comply with GP 24-20.
b.
Onshore plants and facilities shall comply with GP 24-10.
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GP 24-20 and GP 24-10 provide guidance to determine:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Fire hazard management philosophy.
Hazard identification.
Selection of fire hazard management strategy using design fire cases.
Hazard quantification.
Hazard minimisation and control.
Protection and mitigation methods.
The following paragraphs speak generally about different fire scenarios that
GP 24-20 and GP 24-10 address.
Hydrocarbon leak or spill can result in accumulation of flammable liquid on ground
with formation of flammable vapour. Risk is most pronounced with LNG. Ignition of
generated flammable vapour will result in pool fire. Equipment and structures
directly contacted with flame plume can be severely damaged or destroyed. If
duration of exposure is sufficiently long, equipment and personnel remote from fire
may also be damaged or injured by radiant heat emitted by flame.
If leak or spill is not immediately ignited, generated vapour will mix with
surrounding air forming flammable vapour cloud that travels downwind. If ignition
source is then encountered, vapour cloud can ignite and flame will propagate within
vapour cloud. This can cause additional fire, but in general, damage to equipment is
limited because duration of exposure to flame is relatively short.
Injury to personnel, on the other hand, can be significant, because heat intensity of
exposure can be severe despite of short duration. Given adverse conditions,
propagation of flame front can accelerate and produce blast overpressure wave,
causing damage, injury, and fatalities on wide scale. Actual consequences would
vary depending on gas composition and degree of congestion in facility.
Leaked flammable gas or vapour can migrate into buildings, shelters, or other
enclosures if they are not pressurised. Should ignition occur in such enclosures,
explosion is possible, resulting in catastrophic damage of enclosure. This is reason
for severity rank of LNG spill in enclosed areas.
If flammable liquid is released from pressurised containment, leak may form spray
of mist and vapour, as well as liquid phase. If ignited, torch fire is generated. Such
fires can also result from release of pressurised gas or vapour. Torch fires present
same type of hazards as pool fires. Direct contact with flame and exposure to
radiant heat will cause damage to equipment and structures.
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) is catastrophic failure of
pressure vessel as result of fire exposure. If pressure vessel contains flammable
liquid, BLEVE accompanies with fireball. Because energy from fireball is released
in short duration, typically 1 s to 20 s, fireball tends to be large in size with high
level of radiant heat fluxes affecting much wider area than if fuel is slowly burned in
ordinary pool fire. In addition to fireball, another potentially devastating
consequence of BLEVE is blast pressure with shell fragments of ruptured vessels
that can be blown far and wide.
Fire control of LNG spill fires can be achieved by application of high expansion
foam. High expansion foam is not expected to extinguish such fires, but by forming
insulating blanket between base of flame column and LNG pool surface, radiant and
convective interchange will be dramatically reduced. This, in turn, will reduce rate
of LNG vapourisation and size of flame column. High expansion foam is applied to
LNG spill collection basins to shield cryogenic liquid from solar radiation and wind.
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Active and passive techniques will be employed to control dispersion of vapours
evolved from liquefied gas spills or leaks and to minimise downwind distance
required for vapour clouds to attain lower flammability limit (LFL).
7.3.3.
Blast overpressure
To mitigate risks associated with blasts, location and design of temporary and permanent
occupied buildings subject to blast loading or overpressure shall comply with GP 04-30.
Ignition of flammable vapour cloud will result in flame front that will propagate
back to leak source if flammable portion of cloud is continuous. Blast overpressures
are of particular concern because damage to equipment, injury, and death can
occur at relatively low levels of blast pressure.
7.3.4.
Plant layout and spacing
a.
To reduce risks in onshore plants and facilities, spacing between fire potential equipment
and structures, buildings, and other piping and equipment shall comply with GP 44-10.
b.
GP 44-10 use shall begin in Define Stage of CVP.
Qualitative risk matrix (QRM) could be used to judge seriousness of scenario and
provide guidelines for acceptance with or without changes. QRM will allow project
team to rank perceived hazards such that most serious hazards are addressed first.
QRM will provide formal mechanism for accepting minor (low risk) hazards without
further mitigation.
c.
7.3.5.
Offshore installations shall comply with:
1.
Applicable country codes and standards.
2.
Applicable exploration and production segment ETPs.
Electrical area classification
For electrical area classification issues, projects, plants, and facilities shall comply with
GP 12-60, GP 44-60, and GP 44-65.
Electrical area classification is designed to avoid electrical based source of ignition
in area if there could be flammable vapours. Area classification serves as fire and
explosion prevention by keeping potential sources of ignition separate from
potential flammable vapours. This is passive reduction of probability of event.
If permanent sources of ignition are restricted in certain areas of process plant,
such areas should be thoroughly tested for presence of flammables before temporary
(portable) sources of ignition are brought in (e.g., during maintenance).
7.3.6.
Pressure relief and flare design
a.
Flare systems shall be designed in accordance with GP 22-20.
b.
Flare systems shall be procured in accordance with GIS 22-201.
Flare design in GP 22-20 is based on API 537.
c.
Pressure relieving and disposal systems shall comply with GP 44-80.
Pressure relieving design is based on API 520 and API 521.
7.3.7.
Overpressure protection systems
a.
Overpressure protection systems in equipment and piping shall comply with GP 44-70.
b.
Engineering design and guidance on depressurisation:
1.
Shall comply with GP 44-25.
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2.
May also use GP 44-80.
Overpressure in equipment and piping can be caused by variety of reasons.
Mechanically related ETPs are used to inherently and passively mitigate and
prevent ruptures. Rupture can cause:
•
•
•
Propelled fragments of equipment and piping.
Uncontrolled release of hazardous materials to environment.
Release of hydrocarbons causing fires and possible explosions.
Depending on conditions of fire exposure, conventional safety relief valves may not
prevent catastrophic rupture of pressure vessels.
7.3.8.
Emergency shutdown and depressuring
a.
Emergency shutdown (ESD) system shall be designed to bring entire plant or selected
sections into safe shutdown condition for process upset or other emergencies.
b.
ESD shall:
c.
7.4.
1.
Be implemented in safety instrumented system (SIS).
2.
Comply with GP 30-76 and GP 30-80.
Emergency depressuring system shall be provided and shall:
1.
Comply with GP 44-25.
2.
Have the following functions:
a)
Minimise uncontrolled release of flammable or toxic gases.
b)
Minimise fuel inventory that would otherwise sustain fire in event of ignition.
c)
Prevent catastrophic rupture of pressure vessel in event of fire exposure.
Hazard detection and alarm signalling
a.
Fire and gas detection systems as components of SIS shall comply with:
1.
GIS 30-801.
2.
GIS 30-851.
3.
GP 30-75.
4.
GP 30-76.
5.
GP 30-80.
6.
GP 30-81.
7.
GP 30-85.
To mitigate adverse effects of release, it is imperative that release be detected as
quickly as possible. Automatic hazard detection devices will be installed in plant or
facility to sense low temperature (e.g., cryogenic spill), toxic fumes (e.g., H2S),
combustible gas, smoke, heat, fire, and presence of flame radiation.
Fire and gas interlocks are initiated by automatic hazard detection devices and are
normally part of SIS. Interlocks normally initiate combination of equipment
shutdowns, firefighting activities (e.g., water deluge and foam production), and
audible and visual alarm notification devices (e.g., sirens, horns, beacons).
b.
Manual alarm stations
1.
Unless required otherwise, manual alarm pull stations shall be installed throughout
plant or facility.
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c.
7.5.
GP 76-01
Guidance on Practice for HSSE in Design and Loss Prevention
2.
Manual alarm locations shall have high visibility and accessibility without requiring
excessive travel distances.
3.
Manual alarm pull stations shall be grouped into zones for purpose of initiating ESD,
starting firewater pump, and alarm annunciation.
Audible and visual alarm devices (e.g., recorded verbal messages, sirens, horns, and strobe
lights) shall be installed throughout plant or facility to draw attention to emergency public
address announcements or to hazardous condition.
Toxic hazards and oxygen deficient atmospheres
a.
BP sites and projects shall determine risks to plants, facilities, and personnel associated
with toxic inhalation and toxic exposure to skin.
b.
Systems, processes, and physical facilities shall be implemented to manage risks associated
with unwarranted release of identified toxic gases and substances.
c.
Toxic hazards shall be managed to:
d.
1.
Preserve life.
2.
Minimise injury.
3.
Minimise personnel exposure.
4.
Protect plant equipment and systems.
5.
Limit business losses.
Special attention shall be placed on detecting and alarming oxygen deficiency of enclosed
spaces, such as small buildings or analyser houses.
Most hydrocarbons in BP plants and facilities can be classified as simple
asphyxiants. Materials, such as acids, caustics, and hypochlorites, present more
serious exposure concerns. Exposure to gaseous hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and
sulphur dioxide (SO2) can be serious, particularly if concentrations exceed threshold
limit value (TLV) - time weighted average (TWA) or permissible exposure limit
(PEL).
TLV refers to airborne concentrations that correspond to conditions where no
adverse effects are normally expected during a human lifetime. Exposure occurs
only during normal working hours, 8 hr/d and 5 d/week. Excursions above limit are
allowed if compensated by excursions below limit. TLV-TWA or PEL values refer to
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) indices.
H2S has TLV/TWA of 10 ppm (volume). H2S is irritant to moist human tissues.
Irritation of eyes and respiratory organs at concentration above 20 ppm (volume)
increases with increased concentration and the duration of exposure. Greatest
health risk associated with inhalation of H2S is acute effects. Effect is not
cumulative. H2S is of greatest concern in exploration and production segment and in
refineries.
Oxygen deficiency continues to be significant threat to BP personnel, especially if
nitrogen is used to purge equipment, piping, and instrumentation. Nitrogen gas is
not detectable by odour like H2S. A person first becomes aware of this when he has
totally lost his breath. At that moment, it may be too late.
Hypochlorites have moderate toxic hazard through skin irritation, ingestion, and
inhalation. If heated or contacted with acid or acid fumes, they will emit highly toxic
fumes of chlorine and chlorides.
Cryogenic hazards: LPG and LNG present hazards to plants and facilities due to
subzero boiling points. LNG is stored and transferred at boiling point,
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approximately -160 ºC (-256ºF). Unprotected personnel can receive severe freeze
burns should they come into contact with LPG, LNG, or liquid nitrogen. In addition,
many structural or plant materials, such as ordinary carbon steels, may fail due to
brittle fracture if exposed to liquid at cryogenic temperature. Ordinary carbon
steels, for example, behave in brittle manner rather than ductile manner at
temperatures below -40 ºC (-40ºF). Carbon steel can be protected against cryogenic
exposure by encasement in concrete or other suitable coating materials.
7.6.
Hydrocarbon and toxic spill mitigations
7.6.1.
Design spill
BP plants and facility design spills shall be determined for each potential hydrocarbon liquid or
toxic liquid hazard.
Design LNG spill drainage and containment has been established in accordance
with following codes and standards:
•
•
API STD 2510.
NFPA 59A.
Minimum design spill per each area is described below:
•
•
•
•
7.6.2.
LNG process train: Equipment that can be sources of liquid spill shall be
selected considering fluid characteristics and process conditions. Design spill
from equipment selected shall be defined as sum of:
-
Liquid volume of single accidental leakage for 10 min.
-
Liquid volume held inside equipment and/or piping blocked by shutoff
valves.
-
In calculating liquid release rate, vapourisation of liquid due to heat
absorption from atmosphere and ground shall not be taken into
consideration, although flash vapourisation due to discharge of pressurised
liquid into atmosphere can be taken into consideration.
LNG storage: For LNG tank without side penetration below liquid level, design
spill can be defined as liquid volume releasing from single discharge line in tank
pump at design flow rate for 10 min based upon demonstrable surveillance and
shutdown provisions in accordance with NFPA 59A, neglecting vapourisation.
LNG loading platform: Single LNG loading arm is considered as source of
liquid spill at loading platform. Design spill from single loading arm can be
defined same as that for LNG process train.
Refrigerant storage: According to API STD 2510, design spill can be defined as
follows: For pressurised LPG vessel, liquid volume at least 25% of largest
vessel or at least 50% of largest vessel if vapour pressure is less than 100 psi
(absolute) at 100º F.
Spill quantity minimisation
BP plants and facilities shall have appropriate emergency shutdown valves, emergency release
couplings, pump trips, and other devices to minimise potential hydrocarbon liquid and/or toxic
liquid spills.
To reduce material loss during spill, it is essential that spill is detected quickly,
equipment feeding material is shut off, and leak is isolated from material source.
Consideration should be given to having manual intervention to implement
shutdown of equipment and processes. In this case, spill detectors (e.g., combustible,
level, low temperature, or other typical detection devices) detect hazardous
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substance spill. After actuation of and alarming of detection devices, operator
determines if manual shutdown of operations is justified based on prior conceived
hazard mitigation plans.
7.6.3.
Spill drainage and containment
a.
Spills shall be contained and preferentially drained by curbs, trenches, channels, and
sumps.
b.
Fixed hazard control equipment shall be installed at spill impounding areas.
c.
Spill containment shall comply with GP 04-10 and GP 04-20.
For any given quantity of design liquid spills, hazards of spill can normally be
decreased if area over which liquid spreads is minimised. Therefore, liquid should
be contained in small area.
Although most of these methods are appropriate for refrigerated liquefied gases,
spill drainage and containment can also be applied to pressurised liquefied gases.
Some techniques are based on reducing effects of variables that influence boiloff
from refrigerated liquefied gases and vapour cloud formation. For example, spill
drainage trenches are designed consistent with design spill rates to minimise wetted
perimeter. Trenches shall also have holdup weirs to delay refrigerated liquids from
contacting warm substrate.
Low density insulating concrete or other materials in containment areas can
markedly reduce rate of heat transfer to LNG or LPG liquid spill and should be
considered. Spills are drained and contained to limit heat input from environment to
liquid spill.
d.
Plant or facility maintenance program shall ensure that sand and other debris is
periodically removed from drainage trenches and containment basins, particularly those
serving refrigerated liquefied gases.
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Bibliography
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)
[1]
Threshold Limit Values and Biological Exposure Indices.
American Petroleum Institute (API)
[2]
RP 520, Part 1, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices in Refineries.
[3]
RP 521, Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems.
[4]
STD 537, Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service.
[5]
STD 2510, Design and Construction of LPG Installations.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
[6]
59A, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
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