Rethinking and Unthinking the
AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated
Economic and Industrial Policy
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated
Economic and Industrial Policy
Author: Felix Flintwood Brace
MA student in International Business (CBS International Business School, Germany)
Email: felix.flintwoodbrace@cbs-mail.de
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the editorial advisers or The Public Policy in Africa Initiative. We wish to thank the
following reviewer: Hugue Nkoutchou, PhD in Management (University of Bath, United Kingdom). Particular thanks are due to Kenneth Nsah (Aarhus University) for editing this article.
2
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
Abstract
With the introduction of the AfCFTA, African states are about to enter a new phase of global
trade. The opportunities that the countries involved can exploit to finally grow their economies, whose resources set global trade in motion, appear to be a turning point for Africa’s
economic outcome. However, many issues appear to be on the horizon. Politically, uniting 54
countries seems to be no mean feat, given the multitude of ethnicities and languages that
characterise each of the African countries. In economic terms, macroeconomic convergence
and trade diversification are the main points of analysis. Indeed, the possible introduction
of a single African currency clashes, as in the case of the CFA franc, with the different monetary structures of African countries, and the similarity of exported goods would certainly not
facilitate an African economy in a global context of high competition. Finally, the issue of the
autonomy and independence of African institutions remains an open question.
Keywords: AfCFTA, Regional Trade Agreements, Regional Economic Communities, Integration, Industrial Policy,
Macroeconomic, Africa
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
3
1) Background of the AfCFTA
On 30 May 2019, 44 African states signed the agreement on the African Continental Free
Trade Area (AfCFTA), with official entry into force on 1 January 2021. AfCFTA is an international treaty that governs the opening of borders and the creation of a free trade area among
African member countries. With the entry into force of the agreement, Africa has become the
planet’s largest free trade hub that will link 54 out of 55 African economies (except Eritrea)
with a total of 1.2 billion people and a total GDP of $2.5 trillion (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nation, 2019). The aim of the agreement is to consolidate regional and
continental integration processes by seeking to foster a solid framework for productivity
growth that can integrate Africa into international trade and acquire a unified political space
in global trade negotiations. The agreement foresees for African signatory countries the
progressive harmonisation of customs and tariff regimes, as well as the abolition of tariffs on
97% of goods by 2030 (Faleg, 2021). In addition, it was highlighted that the African infrastructure system is anchored on a functional logic of exporting raw materials outside the continent.
The infrastructure deficit is mainly reflected in the need to minimise logistical costs and in the
lack of key links between the main urban centres; and this deficit is a factor that slows down
the economic development of local communities. In this perspective, the AfCFTA can provide
an important stimulus in redefining the map of African infrastructure and, more generally,
contribute to an increase in the competitiveness of “Made in Africa” products. Phase I of the
agreement covers the intentions of the AfCFTA, the principles of the treaty, key terms, and its
institutions. Phase II deals with the investment’s procedures, investments, competitions, and
settlements. Finally, Phase III will include the guidelines, protocols, and annexes. Good intentions aside, the real focus of negotiations are the commercial and economic agreements. This
paper attempts to analyse the most critical points of this treaty, exploring the trade approach
of African countries, the intra-regional trade dynamics, problems that arise in the numerous
regional unions, and how they will be able to harmonise national industrial policies within the
continental agreement.
2) Africa’s Export and Growth Is Commodity Driven
In recent years, the focus of world economies on the role of Africa has again become paramount. With the slowdown of the world economy, starting in 2016, and the subsequent congestion of world trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the major industrialised countries are
looking for a way out of the impending paradigm shift in the world economy. In this context,
African countries are set to play a key role, since, as net exporters of raw materials needed
for this global transition, their participation in the global value chain (GVC) will be essential
(Geyer, 2019). However, it should be noted that the outward production activity of African
countries is concentrated in the upstream segment of the GVC, as these products are then
processed by other countries (Foster-McGregor, Kaulich and Stehrer, 2015).
4
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries have benefited for decades from high income gained from trade with more industrialised countries because of rising commodity prices. The vast natural resources, while representing an important economic income, are also an
obstacle for the countries that possess them, as they prevent the diversification of their trade
policy, thereby not encouraging emerging manufacturing activities that can concentrate on industrial processes with higher added value (Soderbom, 2003). Since growth is commodity-driven, the peaks of economic growth often do not flow into the real economy, and consequently
do not reduce the poverty of the population (Deaton, 1992).
In 2012, the African continent had reached a peak in outward exports totalling $625 billion (UNCTAD, 2016), driven by an increase in world commodity prices. However, this value
dropped by 57% in the following four years. In a report prepared by UNCTAD (2021) on the
growth opportunities of cashew exports in SSA, world trade in cashew has grown significantly
in recent years. Analysing the data provided by UNCTAD, Export Planning (2019) showed that
in 1995 production of cashew nuts in shell (i.e., low value-added) stood at levels below 100
thousand tonnes. Nevertheless, from 2007 onwards, trade in cashew nuts in shell increased
from 200 thousand tonnes to over 1500 thousand tonnes in 2018. During the same period,
trade in shelled cashew nuts (i.e., semi-processed), after peaking in 2007, declined steadily,
never recovering the values of the previous decade. Following the dynamics of international
trade, UNCTAD points out that the largest producers of cashew nuts in shell are found in 20
countries in West and East Africa, which supply 90% of cashew nuts traded globally, with Côte
d’Ivoire as the largest exporter. Despite a near-monopoly position in cashew nut production,
as much as 85% of cashew nuts are exported to Asia, to proceed with the shelling stage for
subsequent sale to Western countries for final processing and sale to the consumer. For instance, at this intermediate stage of value creation, where India and Vietnam imported 98% of
the world’s cashew nuts in shell between 2014-2018, once the product had been processed, it
was exported for almost four times the price paid to African producers.
Despite the prominent position of African products in the globalised world, the African continent seems to be unable to break out of the paradigm in which it has been confined in the
previous century. According to the economist Amin (1972), the African continent is divided
into three macro-areas: the eastern and southern regions as the Africa of the labour reserve,
the western region as the Africa of the colonial economy and the central region as the Africa
of the concession-owning companies. This theoretical subdivision of Africa is grounded in their
external trade approach. Analysing the data from the World Bank (2021), countries making
up the Africa of the concession-owning companies (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon) register a high percentage of total
natural reserves rents in % GDP when compared to the countries of West and Southeast Africa.
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
5
In the Africa of the colonial economy (Ghana, Nigeria, and CFA Franc zone), especially the two
blocs that made up the former French colonial empire (WAEMU and CAEMC), the link of dependency created during that period remains very tight. In the French case, during the colonial
period, France set itself the goal of creating an integrated trade area, to improve its trade balance and thus its external accounts, which by the mid-1940s were showing increasingly large
imbalances (Pigeaud and Sylla, 2018). In a “disintegration” of the international market, due to
the world wars, the great European powers had created different trade and currency areas:
Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries were the first to adopt the principle of “imperial preference” with the Ottawa agreements of 1932 (UK Parliament, 1932) establishing preferential access to their markets and discriminating against products from other economies.
France followed, strengthening trade and relations with its colonial dominions. Within these
blocs, the “dominant” countries exercised unquestioned economic leadership and promoted a
division of labour based on greater complementarity between different national economies.
The aim of establishing trade blocs with their African colonies gave rise to a kind of “imperial
autarky”, which still has significant social and economic implications (Schuerch, 2017).
In contrast, Africa’s reserve labour force has the highest unemployment rates on the continent. Even though South Africa is the most industrialised country on the continent and the
second largest in terms of GDP, the South African unemployment rate is the highest in Africa
(Bloomberg; Trading Economics). A similar trend is registered by countries whose economies
are connected or integrated with South Africa’s, leading to major social and economic inequalities, and a reduction of growth potential that could have benefited the whole region
(Mkandawire, 1986). This “population surplus” (Scully and Opokua, 2019), in a regional and
continental context undergoing rapid integration, can be an important resource for a structured and homogeneous development of the African market. For this reason, a strengthening
of intra-African relations is necessary, not only involving a harmonisation of social and political
relations between states, but also at an economic level. This will stimulate an industrial development that can integrate the various regional blocs into a free trade area that can provide an
adequate outlet market for large-scale manufacturing.
3) Unsolved Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Integration
African regionalism, which has been around since the 1960s, has always been based
on cooperation that goes beyond independence from colonialism and focused more
on the integration and economic prosperity (Mattheis, 2018). However, the failure to
realise pan-Africanist dreams has its reasons in its organisational structure. Often, in
regional contexts, the political discourse of the African leadership creates problems of
cooperation, as no state wants to give up shares of sovereignty that limit its power of
decision-making in national politics and consequently lose its popular consensus.
6
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
This peculiarity has created two different orders of problems, depending on the actors involved in each of the organisations. The first is that, very often, there is no country capable of
driving the respective regional organisation, a fact that has led to decision-making paralysis
and disinterest in the organisation’s aims. Quite different, but equally problematic, is the case
where the leadership of one country within the organisation (e.g. South Africa in the SADC)
is too strong, bordering on outright hegemony. A clear example of such imbalances is the
role of Nigeria within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), given the
country’s aims of regional hegemony and its leading role in the organisation (Hulse, 2016).
This entanglement has often caused internal confrontation among the body’s members, with
a strong tension between Nigeria, eager to use ECOWAS to pursue its own ends, and other
countries, ready to sabotage the organisation’s interventions if they seemed advantageous to
Nigerian hegemony (Adebajo, 2000). It is also no coincidence that the organisation has never
intervened in Nigeria’s many internal conflicts, which it has always encouraged other countries
to treat these events as internal affairs (Ogbonnaya et al., 2014). Another problem is evident
from a first glance at the map of regional organisations: the problem of overlap. Many African
countries are members of more than one regional organisation, with the absolute record for
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, members of 14 and 11 bodies respectively. As
can be seen in Figure 1, there are many RECs with different functions. Those recognised by the
African Union (AU) and established in 1991 by the Abuja Treaty (AU, 1991), and which have a
greater relevance for continental integration purposes are eight:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA) in North Africa
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa
East African Community (EAC) in East Africa
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Southern Africa
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in Central-East Africa
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) in Central-Northern Africa
There are also monetary and customs unions:
•
•
•
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
Central African Economic Monetary Cooperation (CAEMC)
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
7
Source: Authors’ compilation based on UNCTAD (2016).
This entanglement has weakened the organisations to the extent that some pursue different
goals in different groupings, often causing friction or forms of obstructionism depending
on their relationship with other members. There is also often a substantial divergence in the
aims of individual states from those of the organisations of which they are members, which
often leads many countries to cooperate reluctantly or to even obstruct certain activities in
their communities. A case is that of COMESA, between South Sudan and Kenya, due the internal conflicts in the former state, have caused numerous financial problems for the Kenyan
economy. In fact, during the procedures for the annexation of South Sudan into the EAC, the
member states of this region tried to hinder its entry, as the political instability of the country could have led to humanitarian and economic problems for the entire REC (Odhiambo and
Muluvi, 2014).
4) Intra-Regional Trade Patterns
The problem of overlapping Regional Economic Communities (RECs) shows all its criticality in
the shares of intra-regional trade recorded in SSA. In fact, despite a growth in regional trade
recorded over the last 30 years (Panke and Stapel, 2016), in 2016 only 15.4% of African countries’ exports were intra-continental. This was a very limited value compared to the vibrant
trade relations that European (61.7%) and North American (40.3%) countries have with each
other (UNCTAD, 2016). Looking also at the data on trade flows, while some African countries
have increased their export shares, most of it has been absorbed by Asian countries.
8
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
UNCTADstat recorded that from 2000-2016 trade between Africa and Asia increased from
20.6% to 35.8%, almost catching up the volume of trade between Africa and Europe, which
fell from 48% to 37% over the same period. This change in trade flows to countries regarded
as the “factory of the world” underlines how African countries are missing the opportunity to
transform their economies, by moving into more industrialised sectors that can contribute to a
higher added value of their goods. One of the reasons for this low propensity to intra-regional
trade is the specialisation of some countries in exporting a few products and low complementarity in trade dynamics (Keane, Calì and Kennan, 2010). For example, Goretti and Weisfeld
(2008) analysed the levels of trade complementarity within ECOWAS and SADC. They found
that while in the former region the complementarity index is substantially high and with
ample room for improvement, in the latter region the index is strongly negative among the
member countries. In the case of ECOWAS, the composition of products exported by member
states are similar but differ from products imported from other members, thus increasing the
potential for intra-regional economic development. In SADC, where South Africa generates
two-thirds of the region’s exports, the complementarity index is even negative, as the products exported are similar to the products imported by the other members. However, for the
latter the potential to increase intra-regional trade is limited by an export and import basket
that is strongly divergent.
A second factor limiting the internal management of regional organisations lies in the fact
that they are intergovernmental bodies, with their own institutions, but still dependent on
the political decisions of the member states for policy direction. This means that the various
national initiatives are not in line with the objectives pursued at regional level, thus creating
confusion on the political and economic agendas of the REC, thereby not enabling a full regional integration.
5) Unclear Continental Industrial Agenda
Often, small countries in developing regions become part of Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs) that promote their economic growth and greater regional relevance. However, the
presence of a regionally dominant country, or membership in several RTAs, clouds any scenario of continental integration. According to Viner (1950), membership of an RTA entails the creation of a greater volume of trade within it, and that, especially in developing contexts, this is
a necessary choice. However, in a context such as Africa, which has always pushed for regional
cooperation (Yang and Gupta, 2005), the absence of an explicit unified industrial policy seems
to be the biggest problem.
The various regional blocs have often pursued non-convergent industrial policies that have
slowed down the integration process. While in the post-colonial years, the policies of many
countries were directed towards an import substitution policy (Ogujiuba, Nwogwugwu and
Dike, 2011), then to market-led policies, today they are more oriented towards domestically
oriented industry policies (Behuria, 2019).
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
9
This last point, that is, focusing more on the development of the domestic market, trying to
protect local producers, has led to a situation of non-coordination between national policies
and those of the RTA to which they belong. The choice to protect certain sectors from intra-African competition is often influenced by the balance between the branches of capital in individual countries, particularly through the pressure that representatives of certain sectors put
on their politicians. The result is an incentive for political instability and too much homogeneity in the goods produced, without adequate resources being deployed in the development of
vital industrial sectors. The adoption of common tariffs to the outside world inevitably shifts
trade policy from the state to the regional level, while industrial policies remain a state prerogative. This problem of misalignment leads nation states to draw up lists of products to be
excluded from liberalization, which in the short term seem to favour national producers, but in
the long-term this runs the risk of becoming an excess tax on the final consumer, thus decreasing profitability and competitiveness for local industries.
Odijie (2018, 2020), analysing the industrial policies of ECOWAS member states after the
signing of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, confirms how the choice to
exclude certain sectors from regional competition to protect domestic production pushes other member states to pursue similar policies. As the EPA agreement entails the liberalisation of
75% of product lines (Alaba, 2006), countries that had already undertaken industrial policies in
certain sectors nominated these in the list of the remaining 25% to be excluded from liberalisation. However, this choice prompted many member countries to implement identical industrial policies a few months after the agreement was signed.
As summarised by Odijie (2020), the tendency of ECOWAS member countries to undertake the
same policies as countries that have nominated certain product lines for protection shows the
uncoordinated political and industrial policies that African countries need to reverse if they
want to achieve an integrated continental market. This not only leads to regional imbalances,
but also results in wasteful and unnecessary duplication of investments in sectors that already
exist at regional levels.
Regional cooperation should invest its resources in infrastructures and technologies that can
be shared and used at both national and regional levels, thereby stimulating the collection
and exchange of information useful in developing an integrated economy.
10
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
6) Rethinking the AfCFTA
Africa is once again at a turning point that will determine the future of its next generations.
Since Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist dreams until today, little has been done to unify the continent
and make it politically and economically autonomous. As we have seen, African countries are
still unprepared to deal with a continental unification that, while showing significant criticalities, is an opportunity to awaken the “sleeping giant”. For this reason, I believe it is necessary
to reformulate the AfCFTA from a less visionary perspective to a more concrete plan (that is
evidence-informed, targeted, effective, sustainable, and affordable), which seeks to solve Africa’s real problem, that of autonomy. Firstly, it is necessary to design a continental industrial
framework, which considers the different peculiarities of the states and their RTAs. While the
idea of using the various RECs as a strategy to harmonise the continental integration process
is a welcomed initiative, its implementation has run into the lack of coordination between
national and regional industrial policies. Since regional policies are inevitably conditioned
by those of the individual member states, it is necessary to establish an industrial path that
integrates the various national sectors, even though they are often complementary, in a division of labour that can allow some countries to specialise in sectors where they already have
the expertise and infrastructure to supply products to the entire region, without running into
harmful internal competition. By dividing the work, member states will not have to exclude
the same product lines that they want to protect from internal and external trade but will be
able to decide at the regional level how to approach the external market. Secondly, a common
regional industrial policy needs infrastructure and human capital that can stabilise the industrialisation process. Infrastructural development is a key factor for increasing productivity and
economic growth and can contribute significantly to human development. Indeed, the impact
of infrastructural development on the growth of intra-African trade, which is currently severely limited by the numerous bottlenecks in the continent’s transport network, should not be
underestimated. This development can be implemented to the extent that the various African
states also invest in their population, especially in young people under 25 years, who currently
represent over 60% of African population (Kariba, 2020). While the phenomenon of immigration of young Africans in search of work and a better future in Western, especially European,
countries is well known, other critical issues may emerge from the management of economic
inequalities that the AfCFTA could exacerbate. The growth of intra-African trade and industrial development, combined with the freedom of movement of people, may intensify internal
migration to industrial centres. This could contribute to a sharp rise in land and property market prices, with associated rent appropriation by landowners and simultaneous eviction and
impoverishment of the poorest inhabitants. This risk is highlighted as even more insidious in
view of the role that multinationals will play in land speculation, and in the face of these major
challenges, the continental project does not currently provide for adequate rules.
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
11
Finally, the issue that will really decide the fate of the AfCFTA is the economic and financial
integration. As all macro-economic transitions, such as the one involving the European countries that decided to join the European Monetary System first, formalised later with the adoption of the Euro, it involves relevant macroeconomic rearrangements. In the African scenario,
which has been experiencing balance of trade problems for decades, bringing together the
economies of 54 countries, and allowing for sustainable economic growth for all, seems to be
a complicated task. Some countries as part of the CFA Franc Zone (WAEMU and CAEMC) and
the EAC have already embarked on a process of economic integration. While for the countries
in the WAEMU and CAEMC, the CFA Franc is a legacy of the colonial period, in the EAC the goal
is a single regional market.
An option that is in the plans to accelerate economic and monetary integration among RECs
is going on between WAEMU countries and ECOWAS, leading to a regional African currency,
the “Eco” (Makonga, 2020). Formulated in the early 1980s, this project has seen many setbacks
and doubts over the years from the countries involved in the project themselves. Attempts
to speed up convergence have been made by France, with the support of the Ivory Coast, to
rename the CFA franc to “eco”, thus anticipating the ECOWAS objectives of a common currency (Keita and Gladstein, 2021). Nevertheless, Nigeria which accounts for more than 70 per
cent of ECOWAS’ GDP, has always harboured many doubts about whether its economy should
be part of a monetary union with WAEMU, which is strongly influenced by the French authorities. The introduction of a new monetary area appears to be very difficult, especially from a
macroeconomic perspective. In fact, a rapid and forced convergence of economies that are not
very diversified does not seem to be the best solution. Countries with high levels of inflation
and public debt, to the detriment of others, will be forced to adopt restrictive measures to fall
within the parameters set by the monetary authorities. The example of the Eurozone, especially that of Greece, shows how forcing a certain economy to adopt economic policies exclusively leaned to “austerity” does not necessarily give the desired effects. On the contrary, it
leads to a worsening of the financial and economic situation. Even today, despite timid signs
of economic recovery, countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy still experience high
levels of unemployment, often among the youngest. After 20 years of the single European
currency, not only has there been no real economic and fiscal convergence, but even nominal
convergence seems to have remained in the European Treaties (Kotios et al., 2011).
Given these precedents, AfCFTA needs to seriously analyse the feasibility of this process. In
this sense, African countries need to go beyond the dictates of the Washington Consensus
adopted so far and embark on monetary policies aimed at expanding the continent’s economy,
a process from which Western states have also benefited for decades in the post-war period.
However, for this process to see light, dedicated institutions are needed to govern this transition, operating in full independence (i.e., 100% financed by contributions from African countries), but pursuing the interest of all member states, especially the smaller and more fragile
economies.
12
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
A system of financial cooperation and support, such as an African Monetary Fund,
should also be set up to deal with any financial imbalances of the member countries,
implementing ‘structural adjustment’ policies that do not involve tears and blood adjustments, but which really support the socio-economic situation of the country in difficulty. If the 54 countries that make up the AfCFTA can find a balance and “free” themselves from the hegemony of international institutions, then the process of continental
unification will be able to take off.
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
13
References
Adebajo, A., (2000). Nigeria: Africa’s New Gendarme? International Peace Academy. Security
Dialogue, 31(2), 185–199. Doi:10.1177/0967010600031002005
African Union (1991). Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. Accessed January
2022: https://au.int/en/treaties/treaty-establishing-african-economic-community
Alaba, O. (2006) EU-ECOWAS EPA: Regional Integration, Trade Facilitation and Development in
West Africa. Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Accessed
January 2022: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2599.pdf
Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin. Journal
of Peace Research 9 (2): 105 120. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/002234337200900201
Behuria, P. (2019) African Development and the Marginalisation of Domestic Capitalists. ESID
Working Paper No. 115. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development Research
Centre, The University of Manchester. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3381558
Deaton, A. (1992) Commodity Prices, Stabilization, and Growth in Africa. Institute for Policy
Reform. Doi: 10.22004/ag.econ.294803
Faleg, G. (2021) Free trade, peace and prosperity. African Future 2030. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Accessed January 2022: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/EUISSFiles/CP_164.pdf
FAO and AU (2021) Framework for boosting intra-African trade in agricultural commodities and services. ISBN: 978-92-5-133914-5. Accessed January 2022: https://www.fao.org/3/
cb3172en/cb3172en.pdf
Foster-McGregor, N., and Kaulich, F., and Stehrer, R. (2015) Global Value Chains in Africa. United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and
Technology (UNU-MERIT), Maastricht. ISSN 1871-9872
Geyer. S. H. (2019). Global Value Chain Participation and Trade Barriers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Value Chains in Sub-Saharan Africa pp 13-26. Doi:10.1007/978-3-030-06206-4_2
Goretti, M. and Weisfeld, H. (2008) Trade in the WAEMU: Developments and Reform Opportunities, IMFWorking Paper WP/08.68, International Monetary Fund: Washington D.C. Accessed
January 2022: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0868.pdf
Grisanti, G. (2019) The African Challenge: Exporting Products with a higher Added Value. The
case of cashews for Ivory Coast and Benin. Export Planning. Accessed January 2022: https://
www.exportplanning.com/en/magazine/article/2019/10/14/african-challenge-export-added-value/
14
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
Hulse, M. (2016). Regional powers and leadership in regional institutions: Nigeria in ECOWAS
and South Africa in SADC. (KFG Working Paper Series, 76). Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, FB
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe”. Accessed January 2022: https://nbnresolving.
org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-48897-9
Kariba, F. (2020) The Burgeoning Africa Youth Population: Potential or Challenge? Cities Alliance. Accessed January 2022: https://www.citiesalliance.org/newsroom/news/cities-alliance-news/%C2%A0burgeoning-africa-youth-population-potential-or-challenge%C2%A0#:~:text=Almost%2060%25%20of%20Africa’s%20population,a%20challenge%20for%20the%20
continent.
Keane, J., Calè, M., and Kennan, J. (2010) Impediments to Intra-Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Commonwealth Secretariat. Accessed January 2022: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/7482.pdf
Keita, M., Gladstein, A. (2021) Macron Isn’t So Post-Colonial After All. National sovereignty is
one thing. Monetary sovereignty is another. Foreign Policy. Accessed January 2022: https://
foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/03/macron-france-cfa-franc-eco-west-central-africa-colonialism-monetary-policy-bitcoin/
Kotios, A., Pavlidis, G., & Galanos, G. (2011) Greece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected
collapse. Inter-economics 46, 263. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-011-0390-7
Makonga, E. (2020) A motionless journey. From CFA franc to eco. The reform of the currency is
mainly symbolic. AXA Investment Managers SA. Research & Strategy Insights
Mattheis, F. (2018) African Regionalism. Handbook on the Geographies of Regions and Territories. Chap. 36. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785365805
Mkandawire, T. (1986) Informal sector in the labour reserve economies of southern africa;
with special reference to Zimbabwe. Africa Development. The Council for the Development
of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). ISBN: 9221037053. Accessed January 2022:
https://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/1984/84B09_600_engl.pdf
Odhiambo, P., Muluvi, A. (2014) Impact of Prolonged South Sudan Crisis on Kenya’s Economic
and Security Interests. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative. Accessed January 2022: https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/03/12/impact-of-prolonged-south-sudan-crisis-on-kenyas-economic-and-security-interests/
Odijie, M. E. (2018). The need for industrial policy coordination in the African Continental Free
Trade Area. African Affairs, (), –. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady054
Odijie, M. E. (2020). EPA and sensitive products: the danger for industrial policy incoordination. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, pp. 1–22. Doi:10.1080/02589001.2020.1815678
Ogbonnaya, U., M., Ogujiuba, K., Stiegler, N., (2014). Terrorism in Nigeria. Implications of Boko
Haram’s movement for security and stability in the ECOWAS sub-region. African Security Review, 23(2), 145–160. Doi:10.1080/10246029.2014.903378
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy
15
Ogujiuba, K., Nwogwugwu, U., and Dike, E. Import substitution industrialization as learning process: Sub Saharan African experience as distortion of the good business model.
Business and Management Review Vol. 1(6) pp. 08. Accessed January 2022: https://www.
researchgate.net/profile/Uchechukwu-Nwogwugwu/publication/228446853_IMPORT_
SUBSTITUTION_INDUSTRIALIZATION_AS_LEARNING_PROCESS_SUB_SAHARAN_AFRICAN_EXPERIENCE_AS_DISTORTION_OF_THE_GOOD/links/0c96052835e946716a000000/
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION-INDUSTRIALIZATION-AS-LEARNING-PROCESS-SUB-SAHARAN-AFRICAN-EXPERIENCE-AS-DISTORTION-OF-THE-GOOD.pdf
Panke, D., and Stapel, S. (2016). Exploring overlapping regionalism. Journal of International
Relations and Development. Doi:10.1057/s41268-016-0081-x
Pigeaud, F., and Samba Sylla, N. (2018) L’arme invisible de la Francafrique, pp 19-41. Edition La
Découverte.
Schuerch, R. (2017) Legal Colonialism by European States. The International Criminal Court at
the Mercy of Powerful States pp 43-58. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-192-0_4
Scully, B., Britwum, A. Opokua (2019). Labour reserves and surplus populations: Northern
Ghana and the Eastern Cape of South Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change, 19(3), 407–426.
doi:10.1111/joac.12309
Soderbom, M. (2003). Are Manufacturing Exports the Key to Economic Success in Africa?. Journal of African Economics, 12(1), 1–29. doi:10.1093/jae/12.1.1
Trading Economics (2021) Unemployment in Africa. Accessed January 2022: https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/unemployment-rate?continent=africa
UK Parliament (1932) Ottawa Agreement Bill. HC Deb 26 October 1932 vol 269 cc1001-120.
Accessed January 2022: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1932/oct/26/ottawa-agreements-bill
UNCTAD (2019) Key statistics and trends in Regional Trade in Africa. United Nations, Geneva.
Accessed January 2021: Key Statistics and Trends in Regional Trade in Africa | UNCTAD
UNCTAD (2021) Cashing in on cashews: Africa must add value to its nuts. United Nations, Geneva. Accessed January 2022: https://unctad.org/news/cashing-cashews-africa-must-add-value-its-nuts
Vanek. M. (2021) South Africa’s Jobless Rate Rises to New High in Third Quarter. Bloomberg
News. Accessed January 2022: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-30/southafrica-s-jobless-rate-rises-to-new-high-in-third-quarter#:~:text=The%20jobless%20rate%20
rose%20to,of%20those%20nations%20is%20outdated
Viner, J. (1950) The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment of International
Peace.
World Bank (2021) Data Bank: World Development Indicators. Accessed January 2022: https://
databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#
Yang and Gupta (2005) Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa: Past Performance and
the Way Forward, African Development Review, Volume 19 (3): 399-431. Accessed January 2022: https://books.google.it/books?hl=it&lr=&id=ZrN1EHiHalYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=Yang+and+Gupta+(2007)+Regional+Trade+Arrangements+in+Africa&ots=U77wBLA7Ld&sig=KWYRLji-SbeyDoS4-7e6jk1-eR8#v=onepage&q&f=false
16
Rethinking and Unthinking the AfCFTA: Call for an Integrated Economic and Industrial Policy