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ASEAN and Non-Interference Principle: Political Rhetoric and Practices
Klidtakorn Chetchaiwong
Paper for PPR: 401 of MA in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion
Lancaster University, UK
E-Mail: dogkapital@gmail.com
Introduction
A doctrine of non-interference in others' domestic affairs has become controversial in terms of
both ideology and pragmatism in recent decades. The doctrine of non-interference, derived
from the principle of the sovereignty of nation states, was established by the Treaty of
Westphalia (Osiander, 2001, p.269). The principle of non-interference is also enshrined in
contemporary international laws, treaties and the United Nations Charter (Jamnejad and Wood,
2009, p.351). However, ideology and pragmatism in international society vary and have
changed, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Some people argue that the practice of
interfering in others' internal affairs is unacceptable and forbidden; in contrast, the opposite
stance, that interference or intervention is sometimes necessary to promote peace, justice and
human rights, has also been adopted. This contention does not only occur in the field of nation
states, but in the realm of international organizations as well.
The intergovernmental organization located in Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia
nations (ASEAN), has adhered to the principle of non-interference since it was established in
1967 (Weber, 2011, p.225). Owing to global trends and situations occurring in the region, some
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members' foreign ministers have expressed their views regarding non-interference in that
ASEAN should reinterpret non-interference with a more flexible meaning (Amnesty, 1998);
however, other members believe that the abandoning of non-interference might result in the
disintegration of the association (Ramcharan, 2000, p.80). On the one hand ASEAN members
publicly and strongly respect the traditional principle of non-interference. On the other, the
historical record of ASEAN demonstrates that they frequently behave in contravention of this
doctrine-governed policy. As Goh (2003) puts it, ASEAN members obviously violate their
principle of non-interference which they consider to be a sacred tenet of their relations (p.133).
Moreover, a new objective of ASEAN aims to deepen regional economic integration (Austria,
2012, pp.142–143). This is a huge step for ASEAN integration as it is able to bind members
much closer together, to go beyond the security sphere and possibly have significant
implications for the traditional principle of non-interference. Some scholars claim that adherence
to non-interference partly results in the lack of an integrated community within ASEAN (Jones,
Katsumata and Smith, 2008, pp.185–186) and also point out that traditional respect for noninterference should be restored in order to make progress in regional integration (Guan, 2004,
p.84). Therefore, this essay attempts to investigate the implications of non-interference for
regional integration by asking the question: will the principle of non-interference affect ASEAN
integration?
To answer this, this essay is organized in the following way. The first section will explain the idea
and characteristics of ASEAN regionalism. The next section will consider both international and
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regional ideas of non-interference. The third section will focus on ASEAN’s non-interference
principle in practice. The last section will present cases of ASEAN cooperation which relate to
the implications of non-interference regarding the continuation of ASEAN integration.
Explaining the Concept and Characteristics of ASEAN Regionalism
The idea of ASEAN regionalism is divided academically into two opposite categories. This
dichotomy comprises the rationalist’s point of view and the constructivist perspective. Both of
these have made attempts to explain the formation and continuity of Southeast Asia regionalism
in abstract and concrete ways. Cockerham’s study (2010), for example, shows the ongoing
debate between rationalism and constructivism; in terms of constructivism, the integration of
Southeast Asia is based on norms and values which engender a regional identity, while the
rationalist approach perceives that the integration of Southeast Asia is grounded in the mutual
interests of member states (p.167). This section will explain the concept of ASEAN regionalism
neither by challenging rationalism nor constructivism, but by considering a compromise
between the two approaches in order to a gain more comprehensive understanding.
Since the establishment of the association in 1967, ASEAN has been an organization gathering
together nation states which have a wide range of differences, such as experiences of Western
colonisation and different types of state systems. Ruland (2000) argues that ASEAN regional
organization results from the core values of traditional Southeast Asian political culture, such as
informality, non-interference, avoidance of confrontation and little in the way of an
institutionalized style of politics (p.438). Further, the traditional principles of ASEAN states, the
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so-called the “ASEAN Way”, usually refer to consensus and consultation in the decision-making
process and non-interference in internal affairs (Cockerham, 2010, p.167). The ASEAN Way has
proved via the historical and current situation that it offers an appropriate and valuable set of
norms, because it provides a great opportunity for member states to perform and negotiate in a
flexible way (Busse, 1999, pp.46–48).
Despite the fact that the ASEAN style of regionalism has made a number of contributions to
member states, as Jayakumar (1998), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, stated when
delivering the opening statement at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, i.e. that “adherence to
these principles is one reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN
countries since the founding of ASEAN”, Leifer (1989) expresses the concern that ASEAN’s
traditional principle will limit effective cooperation because this principle is likely to support and
protect national interests rather than regional interests (p.69). This concern possibly stems from
the Western style of regional integration, because Leifer’s study implies a preference for
regional benefits as a whole, rather than the collective benefits of each state. As Haas (1961)
argues, if economic integration can produce substantial benefits for all states, they will delegate
authority and pool part of their sovereignty to a centralized institution in order to ensure those
benefits. These practices will lead to a supranational organization (pp.367–368). In contrast, the
ideas and practices of ASEAN states differ from the European pattern of regionalism. They
persistently oppose the European style of integration, which centralizes supranational entities,
but they hold on to their intergovernmental organization (Nesadurai, 2008, p.228). In fact,
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Solingen (2005), however, claims that the ASEAN institution does not necessarily result in formal
economic or political integration because the cooperative coalitional logic allows numerous
forms of institutions (p.21)
The nature of the multilateral institution in Southeast Asia is quite different from the Western
multilateral concept. That is, ASEAN puts emphasis on informality, organizational minimalism
and intensive consultations, which leads to consensus and a peaceful solution, whereas the
Western concept of multilateral style is based on majority voting and a legalistic decisionmaking process (Acharya, 2001, pp.63–64). Moreover, the institutional design of ASEAN does
not aim to exercise dominance over any member but to promote its context in ways that benefit
all members (Eaton and Stubbs, 2006, pp.139–140) and also to ensure rejection of undisputed
power-led regionalism and the avoidance of any form of supranational bureaucratic structure by
adhering to the consensus decision-making procedure (Acharya, 2009, p.69). This point
corresponds to Jong’s study (2007) which shows that the absence of an undisputed leader or
dominant state in Southeast Asia will maintain a significant role for the collective entity and also
contribute to safeguarding ASEAN principles (p.26).
The association’s charter was forced in 2008 to provide legal status and an institutional
framework for members (ASEAN Charter, 2008), but Cockerham (2010) still maintains that
“although the Charter did advance ASEAN institutionalization, overall it was a codification of
existing practices rather than leading toward a more autonomous supranational institution”
(p.180). Indeed, ASEAN regionalism is pluralistic and has no single dominant body that
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passively acts on behalf of regional integration in the manner of the European Union
(Rosamond, 2001, p.150).
At the outset of the association, member states did not take an interest in the economic sphere
at all, they did not even mention trade liberalization or economic integration. Instead, they
adopted a policy of self-reliant national economies and the cardinal principle of state
sovereignty from the Third World Movement (Palmujoki, 2001, p.10). Nonetheless, it is quite
clear that the movement towards regional economic cooperation and regional integration has
become an important issue since the end of the Cold War and the economic crisis of 1997–1998
(Jong, 2007, p.17). Therefore, when the association aspires to extend the high level of
cooperation in economic respects, there are many concerns that the existing concept and
characteristics of the association will possibly become dysfunctional and inappropriate to
economic integration. For example, Ruland (2000) argues that “ASEAN economic cooperation
has always been subordinated to the national security agenda” (p.427). Besides, ASEAN does
not develop concrete organizational mechanisms and procedures for conflict resolution, such
as sanctions; instead, it aims to formulate and work in a positive manner, such as developing
norms of collective behaviour (Acharya, 2001, p.5, p.8).
All in all, Severino’s study (2007) draws a precise conclusion about the contemporary idea and
characteristics of ASEAN integration, i.e. that the association’s members have been unwilling to
grant a high degree of authoritative role in political aspects to the regional institution, which
might result in a supranational organization. Rather, they empower the regional institution to
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push for regional economic integration (p.421), but views on ASEAN political and economic
integrations are still divided and members' policies are pursued independently of each other
(Severino, 2007, p.406). Berkofsky (2005) indicates that political value will become an
impediment to further economic and political integration, particularly the principle of noninterference in internal affairs (p.3). For this reason, there is a strong possibility that the ideology
and pragmatism of political aspects will have a negative impact on economic spheres.
Concept and origin of ASEAN non-interference
In the first place, Sir Jennings and Sir Watts (1996) defined the meaning of interference thus:
“the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the
state intervened against of control over the matter in question” (p.432). As mentioned above,
this idea of non-interference was a by-product of the Westphalian principles. Brown (1991 cited
in Osiander, 2001) interprets the obligation of states in Westphalia system as being such that
“the government of each country is unequivocally sovereign within its territorial jurisdiction, and
countries shall not interfere in each other’s domestic affairs” (p. 261). The principle of noninterference is reflected in the charter of the global organization. From the League of Nations to
the United Nations, both of them constituted the prohibition of interference and the
relinquishment of using force in others' internal affairs (Milojevic, 2000, pp.435–439). In addition,
customary international law and bilateral, multilateral and regional treaties also contain the noninterference principle in a number of areas (Jamnejad and Wood, 2009, p.351).
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In recent decades, global trends have been moving towards globalization, which erodes the
foundations of state sovereignty in both political and economic terms (Beeson, 2003, p.357). For
instance, there is new concept related to non-interference, a so-called ‘responsibility to protect’,
that is emerging within the international community. The International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) indicates that international society has a responsibility
to protect people in particular states from massive disaster if such sovereign states are unable
to do so (p.VII). This concept has an implication in terms of reconsidering the status of
citizenship, from the citizen of a nation state to the global citizen, and diluting the boundary
between internal and external state sovereignty. This point possibly corresponds to the ideas of
the post-Westphalian era. Linklater (1998) argues that post-Westphalian states universalize the
rights of citizenship, starting from regional integration, and harmonize the diversity of ethical
spheres in order to formulate a new form of political association and citizenship which
transcends state sovereignty (pp.195–198). Although rigid adherence to state sovereignty in the
global trend seems to be flexible and obsolete, Acharya (2009) claims that the members of
ASEAN do not desire to go beyond the Westphalian system and persistently oppose the
concept of post-Westphalianism (p.74).
Regarding ASEAN, the principle of non-interference can be seen in a number of unilateral
statements, mutual declarations and inter-state agreements. That is, ASEAN members have
become attached to the centrality of non-interference since the association was established in
1967. The founding Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN, 1967) states that “they are determined to
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ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form of manifestation”. The
Association’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation contains four basic principles that guide the
interactions of state members, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states, peaceful settlement of disputes and
relinquishment of the use of force (Goh, 2003, p.114). In addition, there are numerous treaties
which include the doctrine of non-interference for association members as a framework for the
relationships with one another, such as the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.
Not only did the founding documents establish the centrality of non-interference, but a regional
collective identity for Southeast Asia countries plays an important role as well. The ASEAN
collective identity, which is derived from global and regional norms, constitutes the ideational
element of the non-interference principle. In terms of global level, Katsumata (2003) argues that
the principle of non-interference, which ASEAN adheres to, is based on a doctrine inherent in
the modern state system, which can be referred to as the UN charter (p.112). Likewise,
members of the association have adopted the concept of global norms in respect of sovereignty
and non-interference and have implemented those norms as a set of basic regional principles.
In terms of a regional norm, the interests, identities and behaviours of member states were
transformed into a regional collective identity which underpins the importance of noninterference (Jones, 2010, p.480). Moreover, Acharya (2001) also points out that the regional
collective identity reflects the common historical experience of being colonised and the ASEAN
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states only won independence after the Second World War. And during the Cold War period
they suffered from the threat of communism, though now they are in the process of national
building (pp.48–57). That is why the centrality of state sovereignty and non-interference is
necessary for Southeast Asia nations.
As a result, association members have perceived a narrow and rigid understanding of noninterference. They have not only adopted the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs
of other member states, but also include other nations in the region (Leifer, 1997, p.1).
Moreover, they consider that the prohibition of criticizing others' domestic affairs must be
adopted as their principle governing interactions. Acharya (2001) provides a useful and clear
interpretation of ASEAN’s traditional principle, as follows:
Refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own people,
including violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of
states and the political styles of governments a basis for deciding their membership in
ASEAN ... Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group
seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state. (p.58)
Although the ideology of non-interference has been rooted in the mindsets of the association’s
members for a long time, there have been several attempts to reinterpret it. In July 1998, for
instance, the Thai foreign minister suggested a flexible engagement policy, allowing member
states to discuss others' domestic issues without being perceived as interfering; however, this
proposal was denied (Katsumata, 2004, p.238). In spite of the explicit and strong adherence to
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the principle of non-interference, the contemporary history of Southeast Asia shows that the
Association’s members do interfere in one another’s domestic affairs. Jones (2012) reveals that
the pragmatism around non-interference is quite selective and that violation of non-interference
can be seen on many occasions (p.30).
Practices of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia
As presented above in relation to the concept of ASEAN regionalism and non-interference, the
association appears to be strongly attached to the significance of the domestic affairs of
member states. They are concerned about about the stability of states and oppose any form of
interference in domestic affairs (Jong, 2007, p.18). However, Haacke (1999) points out that “it
would be a misunderstanding to believe that ASEAN countries have never involved themselves
in the domestic affairs of fellow member” (p.583). This idea tallies with Jones’s study (2007)
suggesting that ASEAN’s rhetorical adherence to non-interference has been repeatedly violated
by the association’s members (p.524). Despite the fact that they reiterate the principle of noninterference as the cardinal principle of the association, member states do become entangled
with others' domestic affairs and give priority to their own national interests (Khoo, 2004, p.40).
This section will show the facts of ASEAN’s non-interference in practical terms, indicating that
the departure from non-interference is performed by member states to pursue their own national
interest, and on certain issues abstaining from non-interference is welcomed in order to serve
regional interests as a whole.
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Funston (1998) demonstrates that non-interference does not only prevent ASEAN states from
interfering in others' domestic affairs but also from supporting resistance groups (p.27).
Nonetheless, the historical records are contradictory regarding the concept of non-interference.
In 1994, Thailand’s National Security Council supported the coup against the Cambodian
government under Hun Sen in order to advance the business interests of Thailand’s
communications firm held by Thaksin and his allies, but this attempt failed (Adams, 2007).
Moreover, in 1996, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim separatist group in the
Southern Philippines, was materially supported by Malaysia (Ramcharan, 2000, pp.80–81).
Malaysia, as an advocator of Islam in the region, played a mediator role in the Philippines’
internal conflict over Mindanao; at the same time, it also encouraged Malaysian businesses to
invest in Mindanao (Dalpino, 2009, p.9). Further, there is substantial evidence from the Thai
government that Malaysia is covertly involved with Muslim separatists in Pattani, in southern
Thailand, close to the northern Malaysia boundary (Funston, 2010, pp.242–243). These
practices reflect the notion that non-interference can be overlooked to pursue more valuable
outcomes, notwithstanding the serious violations of sovereignty.
In 1997, an environmental disaster from haze demonstrated that a departure from noninterference should be implemented for the sake of regional cooperation and interests. Kraft
(2001) states that the “(haze) showed the importance of reconsidering non-intervention on
issues that have trans-boundary implications” (pp.8–9). The haze, which was caused by
Indonesian forest fires, affected several neighbours; however, at first, Indonesian officers
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considered it ‘a domestic and not a regional matter’ and called for non-interference in its internal
affairs. Consequently, the haze not only generates environmental problems but also had a
detrimental impact on economic aspects. Therefore, thanks to the efforts of the association,
which negotiated and pointed out a wide range of environmental problems, Indonesia lessened
its rigid adherence to non-interference and began cooperating with fellow members
(Ramcharan, 2000, pp.68–69). The association’s states consented to cooperate on the
prevention of forest fires and established a body to implement this cooperation which was
regarded as trans-boundary pollution (Tay, 1998, p.203).
The principle of non-interference was used as a pretext to conceal domestic political turmoil and
protect domestic orders. An explicit example was the case of a bloody crackdown in Thailand
2010 which Indonesia called for at an ASEAN emergency summit. That is, Jones (2012)
provides a useful insight into the Thai government at that time which reiterated the centrality of
non-interference in domestic affairs in order to prevent ASEAN states from criticizing lethal
suppression of hundreds of protesters and in order to limit the scope of internal conflict from
Cambodia’s involvement (p.122).
Regarding the East Timor humanitarian crisis, in 1991 East Timor called for independence from
Indonesia. The Indonesian government allowed East Timor to vote for regional autonomy in a
referendum. It was not until the people of East Timor voted for independence that the
Indonesian military invaded the territory and committed serious human rights abuses. In the first
place, some of ASEAN’s members, who opposed humanitarian intervention, referred to the
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principle of non-interference in order to justify their inaction (Sebastian and Smith, 2000, pp.6879). In the wake of the UN-sponsored and Australia led operations, Habibies was forced to be
amenable to humanitarian intervention. Instead of giving a free hand to Australia-led
international force, Habibies specifically requested ASEAN ‘friendly nations’ to play a major role
in assembling the international intervention in East Timor. In addition, ASEAN joined the
International Force for East Timor (INTEFET) at the explicit invitation of Indonesia (Haacke, 2003,
p.66). As a result, there was no consensus among ASEAN members but some countries
deployed their troops to East Timor without unanimous collective interference from Burma and
Indonesia (Dupont, 2000, p.167-168). It is worth noting that the intervention, by some ASEAN
members, had to be negotiated with the Indonesia government concerning the scope of
interference (Wheeler and Dunne, 2001, p.823). East Timor represented the advance of
collective responsibility related to humanitarianism and that of a flexible peacekeeping role
operating in the region (Dupont, 2000, p.168). In addition, intervention became a defensive
policy of the association’s reputation under the eyes of international society (Jones, 2012,
p.212).
In the case of Burma, the practice of non-interference was seriously criticized by international
society. ASEAN members still abstained from any form of direct action and intervention, except
for criticism of Burma's military rulers (Solingen, 2005, p.17). In fact, ASEAN members made
efforts to resolve Burma’s human rights and political repression by political and peaceful means,
instead of complying with the Western powers which launched an isolation and sanctions policy
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(Peou, 2002, pp.131–132). The lack of collective management towards Burma's political
obsession derived from complicated issues and interests. Burma appears to be an additional
market that can expand ASEAN members' economic prosperity. For example, in 1998, Burma's
military government offered large incentives to ASEAN investors, such as 100 per cent equity
ownership and tax relief of 50 per cent (Ramcharan, 2000, p.72). Thailand is highly dependent
on access to timber and pipeline linking oilfield in Burma. Moreover Burma’s trade with ASEAN
account for 80 percent of total amount (Ruland, 2000, pp.435-436). There is a possibility that
some association members have strong economic interests in Burma.
Although Burma's military regime remains, it is a misperception to conclude that ASEAN always
adheres to the non-interference principle without making any effort to resolve Burma’s problems.
In July 1998, Thailand offered a flexible policy of engagement with military rule in Burma. This
flexible engagement authorized the association to offer criticism of fellow members’ domestic
affairs and policies which affect the region as a whole without perceiving it as interference
(Haacke, 1999, pp.582–583). But flexible engagement was denied because it was not familiar
with any prior regional tradition (Acharya, 2009, p.133). However, they ended up with an
enhanced interaction policy instead; this policy implies that individual states are eligible to
comment on other members' domestic affairs (Haacke, 2005, p.190). Katanyuu’s study (2006)
shows that the reasons behind the proposal for flexible engagement stemmed from Thailand’s
national interest. The reasons centred on drug smuggling from Burma, Burma’s minority crises
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which frequently spilled over the border, and military suppression which motivates illegal
immigrants to cross into Thailand (pp.827–829).
In terms of regionalism, Katsumata (2004) argues that the increasing concern with their
international reputation forced ASEAN countries to begin discussing human rights and
democracy and also to criticize members’ domestic matters (p.245). This point relates to Jones
(2010) who suggests that “ASEAN state managers have felt compelled to violate and even try to
revise non-interference to defend their image and reputation” (p.495). Indeed, the effort to
interfere in Burma’s affairs can be as stemming from a combination of national and regional
interests. Furthermore, abstaining from non-interference in domestic affairs was to protect
ASEAN’s reputation in 2005. The association’s members expressed their concerns about the
reputation of ASEAN if Burma became its annual chairman in 2006. As a result, the rest of the
association’s members were convinced and put collective pressure on Burma stating that it
would bring enormous tension to the association and sanctions from the West. In July 2005,
Burma officially relinquished its chairmanship (Katanyuu, 2006, pp.839–841).
Despite the fact that the doctrine of non-interference has been firmly proclaimed and
implemented, there are many situations that obviously reflect a departure from the noninterference doctrine. Even though ASEAN’s states tend to rely mainly on national interests,
certain occasions indicate that individual states also give importance to regional interests. But
the aim is to articulate both national and regional interests and to find common ground so that
national and regional benefits are able to combine properly. The advance of ASEAN
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humanitarianism can be seen from the case of East Timor, and ASEAN collective actions toward
Burma can be seen from the attempts to interfere in Burma’s affairs.
Non-Interference in Economic Cooperation
The first attempt to create economic integration was the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in
1992. AFTA represented a higher level of economic cooperation in ASEAN (Ruland, 2000,
p.427). It aimed to reduce intra-ASEAN tariff barriers to 0-5 per cent in order to expand intraregional trade and create an attractive market for foreign investors (ASEAN, 2002). However,
ASEAN traditional principles were applied not only in the political sphere but also in terms of the
regional economy. AFTA was a project to deepen economic integration but there were a
number of problems. One of the drawbacks of this economic cooperation was a withdrawal of
particular products without any penalty from the institution (Jong, 2007, p.22). That is, the
association did not establish binding rules and mechanisms to enforce the obligations of AFTA
(Nesadurai, 2008, p.230). Besides, the members signed an agreement but kept their
commitment to national economic interests rather than to the region (Stubbs, 2000, p.313). As a
result, many members requested other members not to interfere with their particular policy and
adopted measures to protect some domestic industries. For example, Malaysia implemented
protectionism for its automobile industry by putting such products on the exclusion lists. The
Philippines also temporarily withdrew petrochemicals from the AFTA process (Yoshimatsu,
2006, p.123).
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The wide discrepancies between the most and least industrialized members were a major
shortcoming for AFTA (Solingen, 2005, p.14). Stubbs (2000) argues that ASEAN’s members
agreed on the framework first and then gradually developed and revised it to address emerging
issues over a period of time (p.313). In 1995, ASEAN felt compelled to re-evaluate its traditional
cooperation in order to save AFTA; otherwise, AFTA would have collapsed. They devised a
number of protocols which related to members’ efficiency, such as the exclusion of sensitive
products lists. These additional protocols were very useful and indispensable, because they
provided a great opportunity for poor members, such as Vietnam, Laos and Burma, to maintain
their participation in and advantages derived from AFTA (Nesadurai, 2008, pp.230–231).
Moreover, the association therefore tried to remedy any difficulties by providing assistance. That
is, richer countries provided assistance to poorer members to promote economic efficiency so
that they might catch up with the rest of ASEAN. The wealthier members would reduce tariffs to
0-5% before the poorer members, such as Burma, Laos and Vietnam, which would decrease
tariffs later, by 2015 (Ahmad and Ghoshal, 1999, p.772).
Intra-ASEAN trade has increased more sharply than ASEAN trade outside the region. IntraASEAN trade rose by approximately 25 per cent in 2002 (Nesadurai, 2006, p.23). Solingen
(2005) indicates that the increasing intra-ASEAN trade was symbolic of the regional commitment
to promote economic integration (p.14). Furthermore, under the AFTA framework, ASEAN had
greater opportunities to trade with non-ASEAN partners, e.g. ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Japan,
which not only benefited individual states in gaining greater market access and lowering
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business costs but also enhancing economic and strategic cooperation as a regional body (Sen
and Srivastava, 2009, p.207).
The economic cooperation within ASEAN under AFTA seemed roughly to be central to noninterference in political terms. However, Nesadurai (2009) claims that ASEAN economic
cooperation since the 1990s has reflected the flexibility of the traditional way which favours
regional economic cooperation (p.102). The protectionist policy towards certain products of
Malaysia and the Philippines possibly resulted from domestic concerns and interests. Some
scholars suggest that economic integration will offer a much larger market for member states
and is an incentive to be more competitive than ten separate countries (Tay and Estanislao,
2003, p.19). Although it faced a wide range of difficulties, the association was able to adjust and
managed to overcome those shortcomings. The experience of AFTA shows that members could
balance the level of regional cooperation with policies that suited domestic interests. That is,
they abstained from the traditional principle and complied with regional rule to the extent that
economic growth could be disrupted. In addition, the association’s assistance to poorer
members reflected the strong intention to maintain regional economic cooperation without fear
of losing out to others.
Conclusion: Implications of Non-Interference toward Regional Integration
This essay has studied the characteristics of ASEAN regionalism and the concept and practices
of non-interference in both political and economic terms. From the study of the regional
institutions of ASEAN, it may be concluded that the association has encouraged cooperation in
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various spheres, such as the economy, the environment and security, while protecting state
sovereignty (Ganesan, 1995, p.780) In other words, the association’s members prefer common
cooperative interests with limited delegation to a supranational authority. Also, the ASEAN
institutional structure is a flexible and informal structure and not legally binding, which allows
members to act flexibly on particular issues.
The theory and practice of non-interference appear to oppose each other. On the one hand,
association members persistently reiterate a non-interference doctrine and praise it as a
cardinal principle of the region. On the other, the historical record shows that the noninterference principle is usually ignored and sometimes violated. Frequently, non-interference
was evidently used as a pretext to disguise domestic political turmoil and limit the scope of
domestic issues from others' involvement. As Jones (2010) points out, non-interference is not
about regional normative beliefs but is advocated and propelled by the interests of maintaining
domestic social and political order (p.480). Sometimes, non-interference was blamed for a lack
of cooperation, such as the lack of immediate cooperation regarding haze pollution. It is worthy
of note that Tay (2008) suggests that the relationship between agriculture business owners,
venal bureaucrats and corrupt politicians in Indonesia should be analyzed in order to find a
more comprehensive understanding about such a situation (pp.237–238). In addition, haze
pollution and East Timor also reflect that departures from non-interference were sometimes
necessary and welcomed.
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Burma is the country that poses a challenge to the association in terms of non-interference. It is
evident that ASEAN cannot directly resolve the political repression in Burma. However, ASEAN
has made attempts to engage with Burma by formulating many policies but failed. It is possible
that ASEAN members took each other’s national interest into account rather than merely
considering the principle of non-interference. Also, the large economic interests of each
member in Burma could play an important role in safeguarding Burma from members’
interference.
Respecting non-interference is generally perceived as a limitation of the association in terms of
building institutional structures which are essential to serve the challenge of further regional
integration; as presented above, about the ASEAN institution, its constitution is unquestionably
based on informality and institutional minimalism, which can be limitation on integration.
However, Anthony (2010) claims that ASEAN states have reshaped existing regional institutions
to deal with traditional non-traditional challenges, such as natural disasters, irregular migration
and the like (p.7).
With respect to economic interests, non-interference seems to be less of an impediment to
economic integration than individual economic interests. For instance, the reasons behind
calling for non-interference resulted from the concerns over domestic economies, which might
lose a number of benefits; in this case, non-interference was also used as a pretext for national
interests. Further, the non-interference doctrine is more evident in security and political terms
than in the economic sphere. Many ASEAN scholars point out that economic growth is a
22
foundation of political legitimacy in the ASEAN states (Solingen, 2005, p.4; Nesadurai, 2008,
p.230), and further regional economic integration can be an incentive for members to work
together in order to ensure more valuable outcomes. Severino (2007) argues that, in 1992, AFTA
did not only intend to cooperate in the economic sphere but also to lay the foundations for
integrating the region's economies and to transform the region into a single market and
production base (p.411). This idea corresponds to Palmujoki’s study (2001) that “AFTA is seen
as a step toward economic integration, in which market forces are already driving economic
member states to yield part of state sovereignty to a larger unit” (p.8).
ASEAN obviously intends to advance regional integration in economic aspects while reserving
political autonomy as much as possible. Thus, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is
expected to encourage members to go beyond their national interests, bring economic benefits
to members, and build regional interests as a whole. Furthermore, AEC will take measures for
the region to avoid and deal with non-interference or any other pretexts such as sovereignty in
terms of economic integration. That is, mechanisms in the AEC will be unanimously
strengthened to ensure effective implementation, including a legal unit, with consultation for
trade and investment and the ASEAN Compliance Body (Yoshimatsu, 2006, p.124). Austria
(2012) believes that a “high level of economic integration in AEC would require the willingness
of the ASEAN members to sacrifice at least a minimum of national autonomy for the sake of
pursuing the collective action or subordinate particular interests under the umbrella of a shared
agenda” (p.154).
23
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