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The causes of the Second World War – A Model Essay?
Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to war 1933-41 – Graham Darby
Britain did not want war; France did not want war; the Soviet Union did not want war; even Mussolini did not want war
when it broke out. Of course Hitler himself did not want a major war in 1939, but it would be wrong to say he did not
want war at all - he got the wrong war, that's all. (See documentary Nazis a Warning from History – The Wrong War)
However, it would be too simple to ascribe the causes of the Second World War to just one man, since it was
obviously the result of a wide variety of factors (of which Hitler was just one, but arguably the most important one).
Undoubtedly the causes of the Second World War can be traced back to the consequences of the First. The collapse of
four empires - German, Austrian, Russian and Ottoman - created a power vacuum in central and eastern Europe.
Although Germany was beaten, she was not destroyed and undoubtedly possessed the potential power to revive and try
to reverse the verdict. The disaffection of Germany together with the isolation of the Soviet Union, and more importantly,
the isolation of what was arguably the world's most powerful nation, the United States of America, created an unstable
international system policed by two old empires in decline, and Britain and France were not really up to the job - though
ultimately they were prepared to make a stand to preserve their great power status.
The Second World War can also be traced back to the consequences of the Great Depression which brought
Hitler to power. Indeed Hitler was in fact operating in a very favourable climate. As we have indicated, the international
system was very unstable and he possessed some distinct advantages - he did not have to pay reparations and he was
confronted by a pair of pacific democracies weakened by the recent economic collapse. However, he also demonstrated
great skill in exploiting the situation, in particular with regard to Britain's ambivalence over the Treaty of Versailles and
also by exploiting the principle of national self-determination for all that it was worth. In fact he was very successful up
to 1939, at which point he started to allow his ideological obsessions of race and space to regain the upper hand in his
decision-making. But it can be argued this was what he had been aiming to do all along.
Even allowing for the context of a flawed peace agreement, unstable international system and economic
collapse, it would seem that the war arose from Hitler's expansionist aims and the willingness of the other powers to
allow this expansion to happen up to a point when it could only be stopped by war. The Germans built up an offensive
army whereas the other powers did not. Hitler was out to dominate the continent. He could not be trusted to make a deal,
therefore eventually he had to be confronted and defeated. Hitler all along adhered to his major objective of acquiring
'Lebensraum in the East,' though he was not committed to any specific policies for achieving it and throughout flexibility
characterised his approach. That is why some historians have been able to dismiss the importance of Mein Kampf. But
if Mein Kampf was not a blueprint, it certainly embodied his fundamental aims of race and space, aims he pursued with
increasing fervour. Indeed as the war progressed ideology became more and more important - in the later stages, for
instance, his racial war against the Jews seemed to take precedence over everything else as valuable rolling stock was
used to transport Jews to the death camps instead of troops or weapons to war fronts.
Moreover, if we take a sympathetic approach to Appeasement, if we try to understand and explain British and
French foreign policy; if we appreciate the difficulties their statesmen faced and their pacific intentions - then we cannot
really blame them for the war, and we automatically revert to emphasising Hitler's responsibility once again. He alone
wanted war. Of course not all historians do take a sympathetic approach to Appeasement. Some would suggest that the
appeasers were guilty of wilful blindness, allowing Hitler too much and encouraging him to ask for more. However, yet
others would argue that Hitler needed little encouragement because he had an agenda of his own. Whatever position one
adopts on the origins of the Second World War, Hitler's centrality to the process cannot be denied, though of course he
was not the only German who wanted to overthrow Versailles and reverse the verdict of the last war. The other Nazi
leaders and the old imperial elite are not without blame, nor indeed are a large proportion of the German people: his
foreign policy successes bound many of them to him. After all, he was only doing what the majority wanted him to do,
exacting revenge for the humiliation and degradation many felt Germany had suffered since 1918. Indeed ordinary
Germans came to develop a blind faith in his ability to do no wrong - to such an extent that he was able to lead them,
like some pied piper, into a war in the East that the majority did not want. So whatever you decide, it remains a fact that
Hitler attacked Poland, Hitler attacked Denmark and Norway; he attacked Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and France;
he also attacked Yugoslavia and Greece and finally he attacked Russia. No wonder the judges at the War Crimes Tribunal
at Nuremberg did not have to agonise at length about where guilt lay.
But did the real war begin in 1939 or 1941? In a geographical sense there has always been some debate about
whether it could rightfully be called a world war in 1939. Some suggest that initially it was just a European war, and that
it did not become a world war until 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union and the Japanese attacked the United
States. Against this, it can be argued that Britain and France were global powers with global concerns and allies around
the globe, which gave the conflict a 'world dimension' from the very
beginning. Moreover, the adhesion of Italy in 1940 spread the fighting to Africa and the Middle East, which was clearly
another indication of its global nature. And yet it does remain true to say that the war was clearly only a contest for
European hegemony until 1941, which was, in any event, Hitler's fundamental aim (though he felt control of the continent
would give him 'world power' status). But 1941 is an important date for another reason since it was not until Hitler
attacked Russia in that year that his true ideological purpose was fully revealed. As he himself said just prior to the pact
with Stalin on 11 August 1939 in a revealing statement to Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner in
Danzig:
Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be
compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet
Union with all my forces.
And that of course is just what he did do. It would be fair to say that counter factual speculation has little real validity in
general but it could plausibly be argued in this case that if Hitler had not existed, then the Second World War might
never have happened. But he did; and it did.