international journal on minority and group
rights 26 (2019) 1-39
brill.com/ijgr
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary:
A Model to Be Followed or a Futile Promise?
Athanasios Yupsanis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
thayup2@gmail.com
Abstract
Hungary has been praised by international monitoring bodies and scholars specializing in minority rights for being a pioneer in establishing a sophisticated cultural autonomy regime for the safeguarding of the cultural rights of its minorities, which could
serve as a salient example for other countries too. However, after nearly twenty-five
years of implementation, during which a major amendment of the original Act lxxvii
of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (2005) took place, followed
further by the adoption of a new Act clxxix on the Rights of Nationalities (2011), there
continue to exist serious problems in the operation of the whole arrangement, putting
in question its efficacy to adequately address the cultural needs of Hungary’s minorities and to serve as a model for exportation.
Keywords
cultural autonomy – minority rights – nationalities – Hungary
1
Introduction: The Cultural Autonomy Scheme
Hungary was a pioneer in the post-Cold War era in establishing a minority
rights regime, which accords a broad range of individual and collective rights
to its minorities, including inter alia a right to cultural autonomy.1 Generally,
1 B. Vizi, ‘Minority Self-Government in Hungary – A Special Model of nta?’, in T. Malloy,
A. Osipov and B. Vizi (eds.), Managing Diversity through Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing
Advantages, Deficiencies and Risks (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) pp. 31, 38–39, 46.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/15718115-02601004
2
Yupsanis
the term is described “as the right to self-rule, by a culturally defined group,
in regard to matters which affect the maintenance and reproduction of its
culture”.2 The model was originally developed by the eminent Austro-Marxists
Karl Renner and Otto Bauer in their seminal works, State and Nation (1899)3
and The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy (1907)4 respectively.
They aimed “to manage ethno-national conflicts and prevent secession by offering national and ethnic minorities constitutionally guaranteed collective
rights, wide cultural autonomy and non-territorial self-determination”.5 The
scheme was based on the ‘personality principle’, “the idea that communities
may be autonomous and sovereign within a multinational state, regardless of
whether they have, or identify with, a particular territory”.6 In this context, the
core ­features of the idea are: (a) the right of the alleged minority members to
self-identification upon voting age, (b) the establishment of special minority
registers in which the self-proclaimed members are voluntarily enrolled and
which then are used as a basis for the election of minority cultural councils,7
(c) the setting-up and recognition of the aforementioned institutions as nonterritorial public law corporations endowed with collective rights and segmental sovereignty over the minority cultural affairs (e.g. language, religion,
2 A. Eide, in co-operation with V. Greni and M. Lundberg, ‘Cultural Autonomy: Concept, Content, History and Role in the World Order’, in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998) p. 252.
3 K. Renner, ‘State and Nation’, in E. Nimni (ed.), National-Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005) pp. 13–40.
4 See S.C. Roach, ‘Minority Rights and the Dialectics of the Nation: Otto Bauer’s Theory of the
Nation and Its Contributions to Multicultural Theory and Globalization’, 6 Human Rights
Review (2004) pp. 91–105; E. Nimni, ‘Nationalist Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as
a Critique of Contemporary Liberalism: The Case of Bauer and Renner’, 4 Journal of Political
Ideologies (1999) pp. 289–314.
5 E. Nimni, ‘Introduction: The National Cultural Autonomy Revisited’, in Nimni (ed.), supra
note 3, p. 1.
6 F. Prina, The Role of International Mechanisms in Promoting the Cultural Rights of National
Minorities in a Changing Russian Federation (2000–2011), Thesis, School of Slavonic and
East European Studies, University College London, 2012, p. 263, http://discovery.ucl
.ac.uk/1357425/1/PhD.FPrina.2012.Final%20after%20corrections.pdf, visited on 15 February
2018; Nimni, ibid., pp. 8–9.
7 There is a difference in the terminology used in existing national laws for the elected bodies
of the cultural autonomy schemes. Thus, in Hungary they are called ‘minority/nationality
self-governments’, in Slovenia ‘self-governing ethnic communities’, in Serbia and Croatia ‘national councils’, in Estonia and Russia ‘cultural autonomies’ and ‘national cultural autonomies’ respectively, see L. Salat, ‘Conclusion’, in Malloy, Osipov and Vizi (eds.), supra note 1,
p. 250.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
3
e­ ducation), (d) the endowment of the cultural autonomy bodies with legislative powers in their field of responsibility as well as with tax-raising powers
over their members for the support of the cultural institutions and services,
and (e) the provision for state funding for the sustainability of the cultural autonomies’ regimes.8 In essence, the suggestion is that by addressing the various
minority groups living in a state as corporate entities regardless of the place
of residence of their members, the struggle of control over territory could be
diminished and the different nationalities could peacefully share the same
geographical space, while at the same time they could enjoy some degree of
control over their cultural destiny.9 For several reasons the “most successful
application of the idea”10 took place in inter-war Estonia (1925–1939),11 where it
was embraced by the territorially dispersed, “numerically small, largely urban
and well educated and relatively prosperous”12 German and Jewish minorities.
After this “most significant and best-known experiment”13 in minority cultural
autonomy, the idea was nearly forgotten until its recent revival as a potential device for tackling the post-Cold War minority issues that arose in South,
­Central and East Europe.14 Today then, the term is explicitly used in several
national legislations (e.g. Hungary, Estonia, Croatia, the Russian Federation)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
See R. Léger, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy in Canada: Reply to Chouinard’, 13 Ethnopolitics
(2014) pp. 421–422; C. Decker and A. McGarry, Enhancing Minority Governance in Romania – The Romanian Draft Law on the Status of National Minorities: Issues of Definition,
ngo Status and Cultural Autonomy, ecmi Roundtable for National Minority mps and the
Council of National Minorities, Sinaia, Romania, 17–19 March 2005, ecmi Report # 54,
2005, pp. 29–31.
B. de Villiers, ‘The Protection of Dispersed Minorities: Options for Aboriginal People in
Australia’, 74 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV) (2014) p. 107.
G.O. Liber, ‘David J. Smith and John Hiden, Ethnic Diversity and the Nation State: National
Cultural Autonomy Revisited. Routledge Innovations in Political Theory. Abingdon & New
York: Routledge, 2012’, 66 Europe-Asia Studies (2014) p. 670.
See D. J. Smith, ‘Estonia: A Model for Inter-War Europe?’, 15 Ethnopolitics (2016) pp. 89–104.
D.J. Smith, ‘Minority Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy in Europe: Theoretical Perspectives and Practical Challenges’, in Z. Kantor (ed.), Autonomies in Europe: Solutions and
Challenges (l’Harmattan, Budapest, 2014) pp. 20–21.
J. Coakley, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of N
­ on-Territorial
Autonomy’, 15 International Political Science Review (1994) p. 307.
This revival has been characterized by a renowned scholar on the field as the ‘AustroMarxism’s last laugh’, see B. Bowring, ‘Austro-Marxism’s Last Laugh? The Struggle for
Recognition of National-Cultural Autonomy for Rossians and Russians’, 54 Europe-Asia
Studies (2002) pp. 229–250. For a different approach holding that this renewed interest
seems to be “rather the latest and manifestly not the last instalments in a long process of
resolving European nationality issues”, see J. Hidden, ‘The Reappearance of an Old Model:
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
4
Yupsanis
as a synonym for ethnicity based non-territorial autonomy15 and in principle
is argued to be better suited to addressing the needs of non-territorial minorities, such as the Roma, and of small minority groups dispersed over the states’
territory.16 In this vein, it is claimed that the non-territorial cultural autonomy
model is “capable of consolidating the state and promote social unity through
accommodating ethnocultural demands”17 and thus it “merits far greater attention than it has received hitherto, especially as regards the practicalities of
implementing this novel scheme”.18
On the other hand, the scheme has been heavily attacked for its alleged
inherent misconceptions. First, it is said to introduce and institutionalize
‘groupism’,
the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed … as if they were
internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes.19
The implied assumption that members of one ethno-cultural group share the
same cultural traits and/or political orientations is argued to be misleading
because it does not correspond to the current reality of multiple identities and
constant fluidity,20 while it also overlooks intra minority divisions and perpetuates the inequality between sub-groups within the minority, especially those
15
16
17
18
19
20
Cultural Autonomy’, in Venice Commission (ed.), The Participation of Minorities in Public
Life (Science and Technique of Democracy, No. 45, Council of Europe Publishing, 2011)
p. 134.
O. Protsyk and B. Harzl, ‘Introduction’, in O. Protsyk and B. Harzl (eds.), Managing Ethnic
Diversity in Russia (Routledge, London, 2013) p. 6.
F. Prina, ‘Introduction-National Cultural Autonomy in Theory and in Practice’, 12 Journal
on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2013) p. 2.
L. Aliyeva, ‘Tove H. Malloy, Alexander Osipov, and Balázs Vizi (2015) (eds.) Managing Diversity Through Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies and Risks.
Oxford: Oxford University Press’, 2 Intersections: East European Journal of Society and Politics (2016) p. 135.
D.J. Smith and K. Cordell, ‘Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Cultural Autonomy in
Central and Eastern Europe’, 6 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 342.
R. Brubaker, ‘Ethnicity without Groups’, xliii Archives Européennes de Sociologie (2002)
p. 164.
J.-M. Arraiza, ‘The Management of Linguistic Diversity through Territorial and
Non-Territorial Autonomy’, 8 Europäisches Journal für Minderheitenfragen (2015)
­
pp. 14–15.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
5
with lesser capacity to mobilize.21 Methodologically, this perceived wrong
conception is blamed for leading authors to “mostly focus on what could and
should be done rather than on analysing and describing what, in fact, exists”.22
Secondly, the criterion of self-identification on which the whole model is
based has been doubted on several grounds, being labelled as the “trap of free
identity choice”.23 To begin with, the exclusivist emphasis on individual selfdeclaration has been criticized for not being “really an option because people
tend to declare their nationality according to their own view”, a voluntarism,
however, that could lead to awkward and/or amusing situations. For example,
several tens of thousands of individuals have been self-identified as belonging
to the Jedi community in the national censuses of Australia and Great Britain,
while several citizens in the respective census in Russia have self-registered as
goblins, gnomes, elves, hobbits, Inca and Scythians!24 Additionally, identities
“are not either/or” but can be multiple and overlapping, such as in the cases of
mixed marriages, intergenerational assimilation, migration, bilingual environment, etc.25 Consequently, a compulsory declaration of ethnic allegiance constitutes on the one hand an over-simplistic understanding of cultural identity
because it forgets both that ethnic identification is but one of many dimensions of the ‘self’ and that peoples’ relationship to their culture “is often complicated, messy and at times at odds with other interests and commitments”,26
and on the other a severe constraint of individual s­ elf-determination.27 Furthermore, individuals “are like to vary in the extent to which they define themselves as belonging to one or other ethnic group, to several, or to none”.28 In this
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
D. Kuzu, ‘Ephraim Nimni, Alexander Osipov and David J. Smith (eds.), The Challenge of
Non-Territorial Autonomy. Theory and Practice (Oxford, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt
am Main, New York, Wien: Peter Lang, 2013)’, 3 European Review of International Studies
(2016) pp. 151–152.
A. Osipov, ‘National Cultural Autonomy in Russia: A Case of Symbolic Law’, 35 Review of
Central and East European Law (2010) p. 30.
Vizi, supra note 1, p. 40.
T. Rudneva, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy in Russia: Practical Implications of Theoretical
Approaches’, 7 The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (2012) pp. 33–34.
W.A. Kemp, ‘The Politics of Culture: The Limits of National Cultural Autonomy’, in Nimni
(ed.), supra note 3, p. 179.
M. Wong, ‘Reclaiming Identity: Rethinking Non-Territorial Autonomy’, 12 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues (2013) pp. 59–60.
R. Bauböck, ‘Political Autonomy or Cultural Minority Rights? A Conceptual Critique of
Renner’s Model’, in Nimni (ed.), supra note 3, p. 87.
J. Coakley, ‘Introduction: Dispersed Minorities and Non-Territorial Autonomy’, 15 Ethnopolitics (2016) p. 3.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
6
Yupsanis
context, an individual’s choices are mediated by a broad variety of incentives
ranging from the material to socio-psychological.29 For example, it is reported
that ethnic Romanians claim to be Roma in order to obtain preferential treatment in the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of Bucharest’s University.30
Moreover, voluntary membership can only function if minority members do
not fear direct and/or indirect discrimination on the grounds of their minority status.31 The direct consequence of all these reservations deriving from
the right to ethnic self-identification is the dubious democratic legitimacy
and representativeness of the minority cultural bodies, since these are set up
though elections by the self-registered members.
Thirdly, it is pointed out that the recognition of collective cultural rights,
which is a constitutive element of the idea, may threaten equality and individual rights at the within-group level.32 In this context, the model is considered
to be antithetical to liberal views of freedom and equality.
Next, the scheme is said to enhance ethnic segregation and deepen ethnic
separation, undermining the common public sphere and the capacity of the
different minority communities to communicate with each other.33 In this way
it can contribute to the creation and perpetuation of ethnic conflicts rather
than to their prevention or resolution, as its proponents claim.
Finally, it is generally agreed that none of the existing cultural autonomy
regimes operates successfully,34 since the minority councils/self-governments
29
30
31
32
33
34
D.J. Smith, ‘The Revival of Cultural Autonomy in Certain Countries of Eastern Europe:
Were Lessons Drawn from the Inter-War Period?’, in Venice Commission (ed.), supra note
14, p. 98.
D.C. Decker, ‘The Use of Cultural Autonomy to Prevent Conflict and Meet the Copenhagen Criteria: The Case of Romania’, 6 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 445.
K. Porter, ‘The Realisation of National Minority Rights’, 3 Macquarie Law Journal (2003)
p. 65.
J. Muś and M. Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, ‘Divide et Impera Principle. Minority Oriented
State Policy in the Balkans’, 13 New Balkan Policies (2013) p. 79.
E.D. Mulle, ‘Belgium and the Brussels Question: The Role of Non-Territorial Autonomy’, 15
Ethnopolitics (2016) pp. 120–121.
See W. Kymlicka, ‘National Cultural Autonomy and International Minority Rights Norms’,
6 Ethnopolitcs (2007) pp. 381, 391–392. For a convincing analysis that the cultural autonomies “as they exist in contemporary Russia have little in common with what Renner and
Bauer originally meant by this term”, see E. Fillipova and V. Filippov, ‘National-Cultural
Autonomy in Post-Soviet Russia Over Two Decades – Concept and Institution’, 13 Ethnicity (2015) pp. 50–61. For the fact that “[t]wenty years after its enactment we can state
that the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities never came to be
implemented in the way originally designed”, see M. Lagerspetz, ‘Cultural Autonomy of
­National Minorities in Estonia: The Erosion of a Promise’, 45 Journal of Baltic Studies (2014)
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
7
lack clear public status, decisive authority in their area of responsibility as well
as legislative and tax-raising powers and substantial state funding. The main
reason for this failure in materializing the idea is believed to lie in the inherent functional weakness of the proposal, meaning that it is very difficult “to
circumvent our spatial notions of politics and institutions”35 or, in different
terms, “to separate personal services from the territorial ones”.36
All these critiques have caused a leading commentator on the field to suggest that scholars can do without resorting to notions like the one under examination and use alternative terminology and research tools that are already
in place.37
Responding to the aforementioned criticisms, it is first observed, regarding
‘groupism’, that although ethnicity may be “an artifact imagined by cultural
and political leaders for instrumental reasons, the essentialist view of cultural,
religious, historical, and emotional links within communities remains strong
in East Central Europe” and politically this is what matters.38 Secondly, considering the objections to the right of minority self-identification, it is accepted
that “it may result in distortion or oversimplification of individual characteristics, may create political divisions where none existed previously, and may
eliminate less clearly defined intermediate groups that may act as a bridge in
divided societies”.39 Still, however, it is considered to be more ‘generous’ than
the typical Jacobin paradigm, which limits recognition to just one single national identity, as it is the case with most, if not all, modern nation-states.40
The Advisory Committee (acfc) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (fcnm), commenting for its part on the right to
self-identification contained in Article 3 para. 1 of the Convention, has noted
35
36
37
38
39
40
pp. 457–475. Finally, for analogous critical observations for the Croatian cultural autonomy system see A. Petričušić, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy in Croatia’, in Malloy, Osipov and
Vizi (eds.), supra note 1, pp. 53–68.
K. Duvold, ‘Ephraim Nimni, Alexander Osipov & David J. Smith (eds.), The Challenge of
Non-Territorial Autonomy: Theory and Practice, Nationalisms Across the Globe Vol. 13,
Oxford, Peter Lang, 2013’, 46 Journal of Baltic States (2015) p. 104.
M. Keeting, ‘Territory, State and Nation in the European Union. How Relevant is Renner?’,
in Nimni (ed.), supra note 3, p. 157.
A. Osipov, Changing the Angle: Does the Notion of Non-Territorial Autonomy Stand in Solid
Ground?, ecmi Brief # 23, 2013, p. 9.
R. Karklins, ‘Ethnopluralism: Panacea for East Central Europe?’, 28 Nationalities Papers
(2000) p. 225.
J. Coakley, ‘Conclusion: Patterns of Non-Territorial Autonomy’, 15 Ethnopolitics (2016)
p. 180.
Ibid.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
8
Yupsanis
that this right, which includes multiple and situational affiliations, is “the cornerstone of minority protection”.41 According to the Committee the right can
be questioned only in rare cases, such as when it is not based in good faith
but aims solely at gaining particular advantages or benefits in a way that undermines the intended rights for minority members (e.g. ethno-business) contrary to the purposes and principles of the fcnm.42 Thirdly, the proponents of
the model defend it against accusations of being in itself anti-liberal and antidemocratic on the grounds that it is based on individuals’ free choice in determining their ethnic belonging.43 Individuals are in principle totally free to associate or not associate with one group, to participate or not in the activities of
a cultural council, to make use or not of its services, etc.44 In the same line, the
fact that the model requires direct elections for the setting-up of cultural councils means that these bodies are constituted democratically.45 Lastly, the serious implementation defaults may mainly be attributed to the reluctance of the
governments to go beyond minimal standards46 and to the lack of goodwill on
their side, rather than to practical difficulties inherent in the model. In all, it is
claimed that while cultural autonomy is not a ‘panacea’ or the ‘magic bullet’ in
the management of ethnic diversity, and despite the fact that there are several
obstacles to overcome in establishing legitimate and representative minority
cultural councils, the model still offers the best option for states to maintain
their territorial integrity and prevent ethnic conflict, at the same time allowing
minorities to have control over the issues which are most important to their
cultural destiny.47 Under such an understanding cultural autonomy “is more
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
acfc, The Framework Convention: A Key Tool to Managing Diversity Through Minority
Rights, Thematic Commentary No. 4: The Scope of Application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, acfc/56doc(2016)001, Strasbourg, 27
May 2016, para. 9.
Ibid., para. 10.
E. Nimni, ‘National-Cultural Autonomy as an Alternative to Minority Territorial Nationalism’, 6 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 354.
B. de Villiers, ‘Protecting Minorities on a Non-Territorial Basis – Recent International Developments’, 3 Beijing Law Review (2012) p. 181.
T. Nieguth, ‘An Austrian Solution for Canada? Problems and Possibilities of National Cultural Autonomy’, 42 Canadian Journal of Political Science (2009) p. 12.
A. Osipov, ‘Implementation Unwanted? Symbolic vs. Instrumental Policies in the Russian
Management of Ethnic Diversity’, 13 Perspectives on European Politics and Society (2012)
p. 428.
C. Decker, ‘Contemporary Forms of Cultural Autonomy in Eastern Europe: Recurrent
Problems and Prospects for Improving the Functioning of Elected Bodies of Cultural
Autonomy’, in Venice Commission (ed.), supra note 14, pp. 102–103, 111–112. Coakley too
holds the view that non-territorial autonomy “can deliver an important measure of at
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
9
compatible with cosmopolitan visions in which overarching norms and values
encompass and embrace a plurality of cultural forms”.48
Most aspects of the aforementioned discussion are met in the case of Hungary, which was one of the first countries in the post-Cold War era to introduce
in its national legislation a minority cultural autonomy settlement, and indeed
a ‘strong’ one,49 according to a very recent categorization made by scholars
specializing in the field.50 In this context, the aim of the present article is to
test the practical contribution of Hungary’s minority cultural autonomy regime in the safeguarding of minority cultures. Based on the one hand on the
analysis of the relevant national laws and the state’s reports to the acfc of
the fcnm and to the competent un treaty bodies, and on the other on the
opinions of the acfc and the comments of the un monitoring mechanisms
and of national ngos, the advantages and deficiencies of the arrangement are
highlighted.
A first observation to be made is that the Hungarian minority regime includes several aspects of the Austro-Marxist proposal, such as the recognition of a right to self-identification for minority members as well as a
series of collective cultural rights, the establishment of special minority registers which serve as a basis for the election and the setting-up of minority
­self-governments, the delegation of some, though few and weak, powers to the
latter and the provision for state funding. However, even in its latest, improved,
version, that of 2011, the minority cultural autonomy in Hungary deviates from
the original Austro-Marxist model to the point that the minority self-governments lack general decisional powers in their field of competence and also
totally lack legislative and tax raising capabilities. Besides being less powerful
48
49
50
least symbolic recognition, substantial cultural benefits and perhaps even material gain
to minorities”, supra note 39, p. 182.
D. Conversi, ‘Cultural Autonomy, Core Values and Europe’s Legacy: A Response to Joshua
A. Fishman’, 213 International Journal of Sociology of Language (2012) p. 67.
M. Andeva, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy: European Challenges and Practices for Ethnic
Conflict Resolution’, 44 Political Thought (2013) p. 85.
Non-territorial arrangements are discerned between those having (a) voice, meaning
strong minority self-government institutions, (b) quasi-voice, that is weaker minority selfmanagement institutions, and (c) non-voice, referring to minority ‘symbolic’ institutions.
See T.H. Malloy, ‘Introduction’, in Malloy, Osipov and Vizi (eds.), supra note 1, pp. 3–4. The
Hungarian cultural autonomy model is analyzed in the first part of the volume dealing
with the stronger levels of autonomy, while the other two categories of non-territorial
settlements are examined in the second and third parts respectively, see N. Tóth, ‘A ‘Stepchild’ of Minority Rights Arrangements – An Important Piece of Contribution on NonTerritorial Autonomies’, 1 Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies (2017) pp. 164–165.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
10
Yupsanis
than the ideal model, the establishment of Hungary’s cultural autonomy arrangement, in its initial stage at least, is alleged to serve other purposes than
the protection of Hungary’s minorities, i.e. the ‘exportation’ of the model to
Hungary’s neighbouring countries, where numerous, compact and politically
conscious ethnic Hungarian minorities live.51 Furthermore, several implementation defaults and serious impediments to an adequate funding of the minority s­ elf-governments have undermined their effective function in practice.
Also, it is a fact that the arrangement did not bring substantial benefits to the
daily life of the majority of the Roma population, which constitutes the largest
and most socially excluded minority in Hungary, putting into question the efficacy of the model to respond to the specific needs and demands of the Roma.
Under such circumstances it is no surprise that until now the overall contribution of the scheme to the safeguarding of minority rights hardly meets the
expectations of its proponents.52 On the other hand, one cannot overlook the
continuous efforts of the Hungarian governments to improve the system, as
well as the increasing acceptance of the settlement both by the minority elites
and by a considerable percentage of ordinary minority members and activists,
as the growing number of minority self-governments at least implies. It seems,
then, reasonable to suggest that a further advancement of the model in the
direction recommended by the acfc would enhance the efficacy of minority
self-governments in practice, offering stronger guarantees for the protection of
minority cultural rights.53
2
Hungary and the Cultural Autonomy Model
The choice of the cultural autonomy model as a main vehicle for addressing
ethnic diversity by Hungary’s leading state elites in the early 1990s was a logical
development, as Vermeersch observes, given the prism through which policymakers perceived the ethnic composition of Hungary at the time, that is as a
relatively homogenous country with small, territorially dispersed and largely
51
52
53
Salat, supra note 7, pp. 251–252; Vizi, supra note 1, p. 32.
As Salat notes, “the overall assessment of the arrangement cannot be assessed in very
positive terms”, supra note 7, p. 264; Vizi also observes that “the experiences of the past
decades show that in Hungary important elements of the development of a fully fledged
cultural autonomy are missing in practice”, supra note 1, p. 50.
See A. Yupsanis, ‘Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in the Baltic States, Ukraine, and the
Russian Federation: A Dead Letter’, xxxvi Polish Yearbook of International Law (2016)
p. 134.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
11
assimilated minorities, due to the previous regime’s policies.54 Specifically, with
the exception of the Gypsies/Roma55 (Romungro, Vlach/Olah Gypsies, Boyash/
Beash),56 who comprise Hungary’s largest and most socially and economically
disadvantaged minority estimated to number between 500,000 and 800,000
people or between three per cent and eight per cent of the population,57 the
rest of the officially recognized minorities are considered to be numerically
small. According to the 2011 census, 8,504,492 citizens from a total population
of 9,937,628 identified themselves as ethnic Hungarians, while the minorities’ numerical strength was recorded as follows: Gypsies/Roma 315,583; Germans 185,696; Romanians 35,641; Slovaks 35,208; Croatians 26,774; Serbians
10,038; Polish 7,001; Ukrainians 7,396; Bulgarians 6.272; Greeks 4,642; Ruthenes
(Rusyns) 3,882; Armenians 3,571; and Slovenians 2,820.58 It should be noted,
however, that as the Hungarian government itself admitted in its first report to
the acfc there are wide discrepancies between the official statistics and the
estimates of the minority organizations regarding the actual number of minority citizens.59 Accordingly, the acfc opined that such discrepancies in figures
“can seriously hamper the ability of the state to target, implement and monitor measures to ensure the full and effective equality of persons belonging to
54
55
56
57
58
59
P. Vermeersch, ‘eu Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’, 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics
and Minority Issues in Europe (2003) p. 13.
Although the term ‘Gypsy’ is held to be pejorative, many Hungarian Roma find it acceptable as a designation, while several of their associations employ it in their name, Helsinki
Watch, The Gypsies of Hungary – Struggling for Ethnic Identity (New York/Washington/Los
Angeles/ London, 1993) p. 1.
The Hungarian Roma are discerned in three ethnolinguistic groups, the Romungro, who
overwhelmingly speak Hungarian, the bilingual (Hungarian and Gypsy) Vlach Gypsies/
Roma, who call themselves ‘Roma’ or ‘Rom’, and the bilingual Romanian Gypsies/Roma,
who call themselves ‘Boyash’, M. Binder, ‘Changes in the Images of ‘Gypsies’ in Slovakia
and Hungary After the Post-Communist Transition’, in K. Csaplár-Degovics, M. Mitrovits
and Cs. Zahorán (eds.), After Twenty Years…Reasons and Consequences of the Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (oez Verlag-Terra Recognita Foundation, Berlin, 2010)
p. 299.
R. Koulish, ‘Hungarian Roma Attitudes on Minority Rights: The Symbolic Violence of Ethnic Identification’, 57 Europe-Asia Studies (2005) p. 311.
T. Ágnes and V. János, ‘National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary in the Period 2001–
2011 – Ethno-Demographic Trends as Reflected in the Census Data’, Hungarian Statistical
Review, Special Number 17 (2014) p. 99.
See Report Submitted by Hungary Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, acfc/sr(1999)010, 21 May 1999,
pp. 10–11.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
12
Yupsanis
national minorities”, urging the government to identify ways and means of obtaining reliable statistical data.60 In addition to their small numbers, minority
persons in Hungary are geographically dispersed, constituting a minority even
within their own settlements.61 For example, of the 3,135 settlements in Hungary at the time of the 2001 census, the absolute majority of the local population declared Hungarian ethnicity in 3,112, Gypsy/Roma in nine, Croatian in
six, Slovenian in four, and German, Slovak, Rumanian and Serbian ethnicity
each in one settlement.62 Furthermore, a high percentage of all minorities,
with the Gypsies/Roma, Armenians, Ruthenes and Romanians being the most
characteristic cases, are linguistically assimilated to the Hungarian language63
and bear a dual identity (mostly an ethnic minority and a national Hungarian
one).64 So, the numerical and geographical patterns of the minorities in Hungary, as well as their ethnocultural identity and mentality, practically exclude
the implementation of the territorial autonomy principle alone, making the
cultural autonomy scheme the most suitable option for their case.65
60
61
62
63
64
65
acfc, Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 22 September 2000, acfc/inf/op/i(2001)4, 14
September 2001, para. 17.
J. Báthory, ‘Local and National Minority Self-Government in Hungary’, in European Commission for Democracy through Law (ed.), Local Self-Government Territorial Integrity and
Protection of Minorities (Proceedings Lausanne, 25–27 April 1996, Council of Europe Publishing, 1996) p. 213.
K. Kocsis, ‘Contributions to the Geographical Study of Minority Self-Government in Hungary’, 55 Geografický časopis (2003) p. 180. According to Dobos, minority individuals live
in 2,500 out of 3,200 settlements in Hungary, but they form local majorities only in 50
of them, B. Dobos, ‘The Role of Elections in Minority Contexts: The Hungarian Case’, in
E. Nimni, A. Osipov and D. J. Smith (eds.), The Challenge of Non-Territorial Autonomy:
Theory and Practice (Peter Lang, Oxford, 2013) p. 169.
A. Morauszki and A. Papp Z., ‘Ethnic Revival? The Methodology of the 2011 Census and the
Nationalities of Hungary’, 18 Minority Studies: Demography, Minority Education, Ethnopolitics (2015) pp. 156–158; Dobos refers for example to a rather awkward situation that took
place in 2007 at the inaugural session of the Romanian national minority self-government,
when the native Romanian speakers were outraged because most of the elected representatives took the oath in Hungarian and also made Hungarian the official language of the
session, ibid., p. 178.
According to the 2011 census almost three-quarters of those self-identified with some minority also declared to be simultaneously affiliated with another nationality, the minority identity being often paired with the Hungarian one, P. Tátrai, ‘Transformation of the
Ethnic Structure in Hungary After the End of the Millennium’, 9 Human Geographies –
Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography (2015) p. 89; Dobos, supra note 62,
p. 170.
B. Majtényi, ‘Where Are They Heading? The Situation of the Roma Minority in Hungarian
and International Law’, vii Regio-Minorities, Politics, Society (2004) p. 79; Kocsis, supra
note 62, p. 184; Dobos, supra note 62, p. 169.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
13
On the other hand, a growing number of scholars argue that the introduction of the cultural autonomy scheme in Hungary’s national legal order is
mainly, if not exclusively, to be traced, in its strategic regional considerations,
to the creation of a progressive legal precedent as a moral and political justification for its policy towards the numerically strong and territorially concentrated ethnic Hungarian minorities in its neighbouring countries (e.g. Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia)66 whose fate it wanted to influence positively;67
this suggestion, however, is nowhere to be explicitly found in the relevant instruments and stipulations. By this reasoning, when pushing for greater protection for Hungarians abroad, Hungary could point to the cultural autonomy
stipulations it provides to its thirteen officially recognized minorities, many
of which are ethnically linked to neighbouring countries in which substantial
Hungarian minorities live, and ‘legitimately’ ask for reciprocal treatment for
the Hungarian minorities.68 Other reasons inter alia referred to for the adoption of the cultural autonomy model were the attempt to prevent international
organizations and neighbours from criticizing Hungary in the field of minority
protection, and also to compensate the previously discriminated-against Gypsies/Roma by making their legal status equal to that of the other minorities.69
Finally, there is also the view that the ‘primary goal/the leading principle’ of
the legislator was to offer a chance to minorities to revive their identities, to
organize themselves and to preserve their language and culture (‘dissimilatory
policy’).70
3
The First Phase of the Cultural Autonomy Regime (1993–2005)
Amid the aforementioned considerations, Hungary’s 1949 Constitution was
amended in 1989, proclaiming on the one hand that ethnic and national
66
67
68
69
70
For a concise and comprehensive historical account of the Hungary’s policy towards the
Hungarian minorities abroad see B. Nándor, ‘Hungary and the Hungarians Living Abroad:
A Historical Outline’, vi Regio-Minorities, Politics, Society (2003) pp. 121–138.
A. Krizsán, ‘The Hungarian Minority Protection System: A Flexible Approach to the Adjudication of Ethnic Claims’, 26 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2000), pp. 249–250;
Vermeersch, supra note 54, p. 13.
N. Walsh, ‘Minority Self-Government in Hungary: Legislation and Practice’, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2000) p. 22.
B. Dobos, ‘The Minority Self-Governments in Hungary’, Online Compendium Autonomy Arrangements in the World, 2016, p. 9, <https://www.academia.edu/27804688/The
_Minority_Self-Governments_in_Hungary?auto=download>, visited on 15 February 2018;
Walsh, ibid., pp. 18–19, 22–23.
Vizi, supra note 1, p. 34.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
14
Yupsanis
­ inorities represent a “constituent part of the State” (Art. 68, para. 1) and on
m
the other recognizing inter alia their “right to form local and national bodies
for self-government” (Art. 68, para. 4).71 In realization of this constitutional
guarantee Act lxxvii of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities72
was adopted, by a remarkable parliamentary majority of 96 per cent (!),73 with
the explicit aim of establishing cultural autonomy for the minorities (Art. 36,
para. 1),74 signalling thus the first phase (1993–2005) of this model’s functioning in Hungary.
In Article 1 para. 2, the Act defined as minorities
[a]ll groups of people who have lived in the territory of the Republic of
Hungary for at least one century, who represent a numerical minority in
the country’s population, whose members are Hungarian citizens, who
are distinguished from the rest of the population by their own languages,
cultures and traditions, who demonstrate a sense of belonging together
that is aimed at preserving all of these and at expressing and protecting
the interests of their historical communities.75
The Law explicitly excluded from its scope refugees, immigrants, foreign citizens settled in Hungary and persons of no fixed abode (Art. 2). According to
the Hungarian government the reasoning for this was that it did not consider
these groups to be a constituent part of the state, and that it had different responsibilities and obligations with regard to them.76 In this context the Law
explicitly enumerated in Article 61 para. 1 thirteen “native ethnic groups” qualifying as minorities, the Gypsies, Germans, Croatians, Slovaks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Armenians, Ruthenians (Rusyns), Serbs, Slovenians and
71
72
73
74
75
76
J.G. Kellas, Nationalist Politics in Europe – The Constitutional and Electoral Dimensions
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004) p. 150; Vermeersch, supra note 54, p. 12; Krizsán,
supra note 67, p. 249.
The Law is available in English at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c3476272.html>, visited on 15 February 2018.
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Hungary, un Doc. ccpr/c/hun/2000/4, 13 March 2001, para. 423.
Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Hungary, un Doc. ccpr/c/hun/5, 10 August, 2009, para. 274.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, 3 Fact Sheets on
Hungary (2000) p. 1.
acfc/sr(1999)010, supra note 59, p. 26.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
15
Ukrainians.77 The Law also foresaw a process for the recognition of minorities
other than the thirteen listed in Article 61, para. 1 through the submission of a
petition to the Speaker of the National Assembly, provided that they met the
requirements set out in Article 1 and had secured the support of at least 1,000
voters declaring themselves members of the minority seeking recognition
(Art. 61, para. 2).78 It should be noted, however, that all the requests of groups
(Macedonians, Russians, Jewish, Chinese and Bunjevci) who have asked for official recognition as minorities have been rejected for failing to meet either the
requirement of 1,000 signatures (in the first three cases), or the positive vote of
Parliament (in the last two).79
The Law then granted ‘historical’ minorities a variety of collective cultural
rights, such as to preserve, foster, strengthen and pass on the minority identity
(Art. 15), to cultivate and develop their historical traditions and language, to
preserve and enrich their intellectual culture, and their culture as incarnated
by physical objects (Art. 16), to hold their own events and celebrate their own
feasts, to preserve and maintain their architectural, cultural and religious relics, to preserve, foster and pass on their traditions, to use their cultural symbols
(Art. 18, para. 4), to have state and municipal funded education in their mother
tongue or ‘bilingually’ (Arts. 43–44), etc.80
Next, in specific materialization of Article 68 para. 4 of the 1989 Constitution, the Law recognized to minorities the collective right to establish selfgovernments (Art. 17) at two levels, local and national (Arts. 5, para. 1 and 21,
para. 1 respectively), determining as their basic function the protection and
representation of minority interests (Arts. 5, paras. 2 and 36, para. 1). The
Law foresaw three types of local minority self-governments. The most prevalent type was the “directly formed local minority self-government” (Art. 23,
para. 1), established through direct elections, which were proclaimed if at least
77
78
79
80
It should be noted that during the deliberations of the 1993 Law the largely adapted and
assimilated Jewish community did not seek to gain official recognition as a minority
(under the motto ‘I am Jewish and I am Hungarian’) and therefore the Jews, estimated
at around 80,000–200,000, were not named in the Law, A. Horváth, Z. Vidra and J. Fox,
Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Hungary, Center for Policy Studies (cps)
Research Reports, 2011, pp. 4, 16, <https://cps.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/publications/
cps-research-report-tolerance-and-cultural-diversity-2011_0.pdf>, visited on 15 February
2018; Koulish supra note 57, pp. 320–321.
T.Z. Józse, National Report: Hungary – Transversal Study, Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity, dgiv/cult/pol/trans(2002)3, Strasbourg, 2 October 2002, p. 9.
Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Addendum, Mission to Hungary
(26 June – 3 July 2006), un Doc. a/hrc/4/9/Add.2, 4 January 2007, para. 9.
T. Doncsev, ‘The Hungarian Minorities Act’, 7 Minorities Research (2005) pp. 123, 125.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
16
Yupsanis
five members of the same minority in a settlement so requested and were
held on the same day and in the same polling stations as the elections for the
municipal councils. The fact that all minorities strongly opposed the idea of
establishing a special minority electoral register, due to memories of negative historical experiences (expulsion – ‘relocation’ of the Germans after the
Second World War, mutual Hungarian-Slovak population exchanges, discriminatory policies against Southern Slavs and Roma)81 that made them assume
that any registration may lead to discrimination and persecution, resulted in
the lack of such an electoral list. This situation, in combination with the provision of A
­ rticle 7 of the Law stating that “the admission and acknowledgement of the fact that one belongs to a national or ethnic group or minority is
the exclusive and inalienable right of the individual”, meant in practice that
every Hungarian citizen had the right to vote for, and be elected to the minority self-government.82 A second type consisted of the “minority municipal
government” (Art. 22, para. 1), which was formed via transformation of a municipal council into such a self-government in cases when more than half of
its members have been elected as representatives of one national or ethnic
minority and declared the council to be such a self-government.83 This kind
of ­self-governance was mainly introduced for those few settlements where
the members of a specific minority constituted the local majority. Next, if at
least 30 per cent of the members of a municipal council have been elected as
candidates of a particular national or ethnic minority, then these representatives could form an “indirectly formed local minority self-government” within
the framework of the overarching local government structure (Art. 22, para.
2).84 Each minority could establish only one directly or indirectly formed local
minority self-government per settlement (Art. 23, para. 5), while both forms
of minority self-governance were accorded the same scope of duties and authority (Art. 23, para. 6). Finally, if none of the above conditions were met in
81
82
83
84
B. Dobos, ‘The Development and Functioning of Cultural Autonomy in Hungary’, 6 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 457; see also Walsh, supra note 68, p. 42.
B. Vizi, ‘Hungary: A Model with Lasting Problems’, in B. Rechel (ed.), Minority Rights in
Central and Eastern Europe (Routledge, London, 2009) pp. 124–125; Dobos notes that until
2006 non-citizens also had the right to vote in the municipal elections and thus de facto
in the elections for the msgs, but they could not be elected, supra note 62, p. 170.
N. Teller, ‘Local Self-Government and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary’, in R. Pintar (ed.),
National Minorities in South-East Europe, Legal and Social Status at Local Level (Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Zagreb, 2002) p. 74.
T. Benedikter, ‘Cultural Autonomy in Hungary’, in T. Benedikter (ed.), Solving Ethnic
Conflict Through Self-Government: A Short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and South Asia
(EURAC, Bozen/Bolzano, 2009) p. 61.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
17
a particular settlement, a minority had the right to appoint a spokesperson to
represent its interests (Art. 23, para. 7).85
The minority municipal governments and the minority local selfgovernments had, regarding issues affecting their minority, the right to ask the
head of the competent public body for information, make proposals, initiate
measures and object to practices or decisions of public institutions violating
minority rights initiating their amendment or withdrawal (Art. 26, para. 1).
Also, they had the right to assume control of educational institutions from
other authorities if they could ensure the maintenance of the same standards
of education (Art. 47). Additionally, the minority local self-governments had
the right to define their organizational structure (Art 27, para. 2(a)), budget
and utilization made available to them by the municipal governments (Art. 27,
para. 1(b)), while they could inter alia establish and run institutions in the fields
of local basic education, local printed and electronic media and ­promotion of
traditions (Art. 27, para. 3).86 The strongest right granted to the minority local
self-governments regarding their relationship with the municipal authorities,
was a right of consent (‘approval’) of the latter’s decisions concerning minority
local basic education, local media, the promotion of local tradition and culture, and the collective usage of the language (Art. 29, para. 1).87
The national minority self-governments were elected by the members of
the local minority self-governments as well as from the members of the municipal minority governments and the spokespersons (Art. 31, para. 2). Every
minority could form only one national self-government (Art 33, para. 3), which
could establish institutions and co-ordinate their activities with a view to the
establishment of cultural autonomy (Art. 36, para. 1). These governments decided independently – in accordance with the relative laws – on the form of
their organization, their budget, the maintenance of theatres, the establishment and maintenance of museums, the maintenance of libraries, the maintenance of secondary and higher educational institutions, etc. (Arts. 37 and
49, para. 2). They had merely consultative rights regarding the bills ­concerning
85
86
87
K. Myntti, A Commentary to the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of
National Minorities in Public Life, Institute for Human Rights (Abo Akademi University,
Turku/Abo, 2001) pp. 43–44; see also Doncsev, supra note 80, pp. 125–126; Krizsán, supra
note 67, p. 253; Walsh, supra note 68, pp. 40–41.
Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary,
2005, p. 7, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/E.C.12.HUN.3-Annex16
.pdf>, visited on 15 February 2018.
Commission Opinion on Hungary’s Application for Membership of the European Union,
Brussels, doc/97/13, 15 July 1997, p. 19; Doncsev, supra note 80, p. 126; Walsh, supra note
68, p. 40; Teller, supra note 83, pp. 81–82.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
18
Yupsanis
the m
­ inorities, where they could “state an opinion” (Art. 38, para. 1(a)), while
in their relations with the public administrative bodies they simply had the
right to “seek information” and “make proposals to them” (Art. 38, para. 1(b)).88
They had a right of agreement only on issues regarding legislation on the
­preservation and conservation of the historical settlements and architectural
monuments of minorities (Art. 38, para. 3) and the development of the core
curriculum of minority education (Art. 38, para. 4), with the exception of higher education.89
Regarding the core issue of funding of minority self-governments, Article 58,
para. 2 stated that it came from (a) the state budget and (b) the local (county or
settlement) government contribution, as well as from other sources (e.g. donations), including inter alia from foreign organizations.90 Finally, in conformity
with Article 68, para. 3 of the then Constitution generally providing for the
representation of the minorities in the territory of the country, Article 20, para.
1 of the 1993 Law entailed a right of minority representation in the National
Assembly, stating however, that this would be determined in a separate Act.91
Under this legal framework, in the first elections for local minority selfgovernments that took place in 1994, 792 minority self-governments (msgs)
were formed, of which 733 were directly elected msgs, 46 minority municipal
governments and 13 indirectly formed.92 Also, eleven national msgs were established in 1995, as the Ruthenians and the Ukrainians formed their national
msgs only after the 1999 elections.93
88
89
90
91
92
93
P. Kovács, ‘The Legal Status of Minorities in Hungary’, 43 Acta Juridica Hungarica (2002)
pp. 214–215.
J. Kaltenbach, ‘From Paper to Practice in Hungary: The Protection and Involvement of
Minorities in Governance’, in A.-M. Bíró and P. Kovács (eds.), Diversity in Action. Local
Public Management of Multi-Ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe (lgi-osi,
Budapest, 2001) p. 182; Doncsev, supra note 80, p. 126.
T. Horváth, ‘Hungarian Case Study: The Role Played by Local Government in the Development of Municipality Programmes for Minorities and Migrants’, in Migrants and Minorities in the Community: A Challenge for Local and Regional Government and Training
Organisations (9th Seminar of the European Network of Training Organisations for Local
and Regional Authorities, Budapest, 10–12 November 1996, Council of Europe Publishing,
1997) p. 87.
C. Bîrzea, Human Rights and Minorities in the New European Democracies: Educational
and Cultural Aspects (Report on the Workshop Held at Lohusalu (Estonia), 20–23 October
1994, Council of Europe, 1996) p. 103.
acfc/sr(1999)010, supra note 59, p. 97.
Dobos, supra note 69, p. 16.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
4
19
Advancements and Deficiencies of the First Phase of the Cultural
Autonomy Regime
Initially, the response to the 1993 Law and its minority self-government system
was quite positive. The un Independent Expert on Minority Issues, for example, considered the Law as “an innovative and dedicated approach to minority
issues” and the system of minority self-governments based on it as a “promising practice” and “a valuable contribution to cultural autonomy”.94 The acfc
for its part “has studied with interest the system of minority ­self-government
introduced by the Law lxxvii of 1993” and concluded in its first opinion that
the Law was a “comprehensive piece of legislation” which enhanced the participation of minorities in public life and that the system of minority selfgovernments, broadly speaking, functioned satisfactorily.95 In the same vein,
some authors hold the view that the Law set up “a progressive and innovative
minority rights regime” and that the creation of minority self-governing bodies
constituted “a radical initiative in constitutional terms, allowing national and
ethnic minorities a degree of autonomy in cultural and educational affairs”.96
Especially as regards as the numerically bigger minorities (e.g. Germans, Slovaks, Croats), it was argued that the formation of minority self-governments
“made things move back into gear” – even though this happened on a limited
level – since their efforts “to “rehabilitate” the mother tongue and to bring it
back to public life had a certain effect.97 Under such a prism the Hungarian
government claimed in its fourth report to the acfc that the “ethnic revival”
noted in the decade between the 2001 and the 2011 censuses with the increase
of the total minority population from 442,739 persons (nearly five per cent of
94
95
96
97
un Doc. a/hrc/4/9/Add.2, supra note 79, para. 86.
acfc/inf/op/i(2001)004, supra note 60, para. 46.
I. Pogány, Legal and Economic Challenges Facing the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe,
Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No. 2/2004, p. 10, <http://www.istvanpogany.com/
files/documents/QueensPapersPogany1.pdf>, visited on 15 February 2018.
A. Paulik and J. Solymosi, ‘Language Policy in Hungary’, Noves sl. Revista de ­Sociolinguistica,
Spring-Summer 2004, p. 4, <http://www.gencat.cat/llengua/noves/noves/hm04primavera
-estiu/docs/paulik.pdf>, visited on 15 February 2018; The un Independent Expert has reported that during her visit to the German minority community in Budapest in 2006, the
community representatives have noted that the self-government system “has assisted in
maintaining key elements of minority culture and identity and proved extremely valuable to the community”, a/hrc/4/9/Add.2, supra note 79, para. 23; Kocsis, supra note 62,
p. 183, argues that the minorities have asserted through the councils their identity and
that despite their dependence on local governments they served as an efficient form of
promoting minority interests; Horvath, Vidra and Fox, supra note 77, p. 15.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
20
Yupsanis
the country’s population) to 644,524 (almost six and a half per cent) could be
inter alia attributed to the legal framework, the practical solutions and the system supporting educational as well as cultural autonomy.98
On the other hand, the Law has been heavily criticized from the very beginning of its introduction for its several alleged institutional and conceptual
shortcomings, while serious problems emerged in its implementation regarding the issues of ethnic self-identification/belonging, scope of competences
and financing of minority self-governments and minorities’ parliamentary
representation.99 First, it has been pointed out that the adoption of a homogenous legislation for all thirteen minorities, which differ considerably in size
and consequent claims and aspirations, was a monolithic approach ineffective to serve the needs of all of them and incapable of providing an effective
institutional framework to deal with the specific and robust Roma issue.100
Secondly, the selective framework of recognizing only the “historical” minorities has been criticized as “anachronistic”, “absurd” and “discriminatory”, while
the “inherent arbitrary” requirement of the 100-year presence has been seen
as legally unsound, creating issues concerning the issue of who is to verify or
question whether this precondition has been fulfilled and “when the clock is
supposed to start ticking”.101 In addition to the technical problems of calculation, the Venice Commission has challenged this criterion, recalling on the one
hand that its own proposed definition did not contain such an historical time
limit102 and suggesting on the other in a subsequent opinion on the 2011 Hungarian Act on the Rights of Nationalities that “the criterion of three ­generations
98
99
100
101
102
Fourth Report Submitted by Hungary pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, received on 6 March 2015,
acfc/sr/iv(2015)002, Strasbourg, 7 April 2015, p. 7. It should be noted that not all
authors adopt the ‘ethnic revival’ discourse, since the assumed at first glance increase of
the whole minority population between the censuses of 2001 and 2011 can be mainly attributed to methodological changes, see Morauszki and Papp, supra note 63, pp. 142, 153,
160.
B. Rechel, ‘Introduction’, in Rechel (ed.) supra note 82, p. 14.
A.L. Pap, ‘Minority Rights and Diaspora – Claims: Collision, Interdependence and Loss
of Orientation’, in O. Ieda (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational
Citizenship (Hokaido University Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, 2006) pp. 246–247. Cf.
Doncsev, supra note 80, p. 122, who argues that it would have been impossible to draft a
law that would have suited each and every claim of the thirteen minorities in Hungary.
A.L. Pap, ‘Minority Rights and Diaspora Claims’, 49 Annales Universitatis Scientarum
Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos Nominatae (2008) pp. 339, 345.
Opinion on the Hungarian Bill No 5190 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities,
approved by the Commission during its 14th meeting (Venice, 5–6 February 1993), cdlmin(93)4 Revised, Strasbourg, 9 February 1993, para. 4.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
21
has been found to be more suitable than the very restrictive criterion of 100
years”.103 The Human Rights Committee (hrc) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) also asked the Hungarian authorities to
repeal this criterion and to ensure that the conditions for state recognition of
minority groups are in line with Article 27 of the iccpr as expounded by its
General Comment No 23.104 Thirdly, as regards as the citizenship issue, the
Venice Commission has commented, in its Report on Non-Citizens and Minority Rights that “[c]citizenship should therefore not be regarded as an element
of the definition of the term ‘minority’, but it is more appropriate for the States
to regard it as a condition of access to certain minority rights”,105 while the
acfc too has stressed that a general application of the citizenship criterion
may cause problems linked to certain guarantees relating to important areas
such as non-discrimination and education and called on Hungary to adopt a
more inclusive approach on the issue.106 It should be noted that the citizenship issue had a particular relevance for the minorities since the proportion of
non-citizens within various minority groups was higher than that found within
the population as a whole,107 because a significant number of persons who
arrived in Hungary in the 1990s and belonged to minorities were born abroad
and were not Hungarian citizens.108 Fourthly, the lack of an official minority
electoral register in combination with the absolute emphasis on the right of
individual self-identification and the fact that the minority elections were held
on the same day and at the same polls as the local self-government elections,
meant in practice that every Hungarian citizen, irrespective of ethnicity, could
vote in the local minority self-government elections.109 Indeed, it has been solidly argued that a significant number of citizens having no affiliation to any
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
Opinion No. 671/2012 on the Act on the Rights of Nationalities of Hungary, adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 91st Plenary Session (Venice, 15–16 June 2012), cdl-ad(2012)011,
Strasbourg, 19 June 2012, para. 33.
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Hungary, un Doc. ccpr/
c/hun/co/5, 16 November 2010, para. 22.
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report on
Non-Citizens and Minority Rights, Study No. 294/2004, cdl-ad(2007)001, 18 January 2007,
para. 144.
acfc/inf/op/i(2001)004, supra note 60, para. 15; acfc, Second Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 9 December 2004, acfc/inf/op/ii(2004)003, Strasbourg, 14 December 2005,
paras. 20–23.
Dobos, supra note 81, p. 462.
Dobos, supra note 69, p. 26.
A. Burton, ‘Minority Self-Governance: Minority Representation in Flux for the Hungarian
Roma’, 6 Ethnopolitics (2007) p. 74.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
22
Yupsanis
minority participated in the election for the local minority self-governments.
In the first elections, for example, which were called in 1994, 1,777,299 people
cast their vote for some minority candidate, while in the second elections, held
in 1998, 2,657,722 citizens participated,110 a number far exceeding even the
highest unofficial estimates of the total numerical strength of all minorities in
Hungary.111 It has been reported, for example, that in the first local Roma selfgovernment elections in 1994, more than three-quarters of those voting were
not Roma.112 The so called ‘sympathy votes’, though cast with good intentions,
seriously distorted minority public life by undermining the very idea of minority self-government and the underlying principle of representation. As Dobos
characteristically described it:
These so-called ‘sympathy votes’ came from people who were mostly
inexperienced in minority public life and did not really know minority
organizations and candidates. They merely sympathized with certain minorities for different kinds of personal reasons. … these majority voters
tended to vote especially for those candidates who were at the top of the
list. This so called ‘alphabet preference’ proved to be quite influential and
had a further distorting effect on minorities. There have actually been
instances of careerist candidates changing their surnames in order to obtain much more favorable positions on the ballot. The real problem lay in
the fact that, on the one hand, authentic minority candidates were compelled by the system to do such things, while on the other, majority voters
could contribute to both minority victories and defeats.113
This situation also led to ‘ethno-business’/‘ethno-corruption’ and ‘cuckoo’
phenomena,114 that is, to the election to minority self-governments of p
­ ersons
110
111
112
113
114
B. Majtényi, ‘What Has Happened to Our Model Child? The Creation and Evolution of the
Hungarian Minority Act’, 5 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2005–2006) p. 400.
Krizsán, supra note 67, p. 256; Dobos, supra note 69, p. 26.
Burton, supra note 109, p. 74.
Dobos, supra note 81, p. 459; Majtényi, supra note 110, p. 401.
‘Ethno-business’ refers to any practice that seeks to take unfair advantage of the existing legal framework for the protection of national minorities in order to obtain material,
financial or political gain, while the ‘cuckoo’ phenomenon “is used to describe the cases
where political entrepreneurs not belonging to a minority stand for election to a minority
self-government”. A. Carstocea, ‘Ethno-business – The Manipulation of Minority Rights in
Romania and Hungary’, in T. Bhambry, C. Griffin, T. Hjelm, C. Nicholson and O. G. Voronina
(eds.), Perpetual Motion? Transformation and Transition in Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia (ucl ssees, 2011) pp. 16, 19. For Dobos, ‘ethno-business’ in a broader sense refers
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
23
who had no affinity with the minority concerned or even belonged to another
one. It has been documented, for example, that in some cases several candidates ran for office at the same elections in more than one minority selfgovernment(!),115 while in other instances some candidates ran as members
of one minority (e.g. ‘Gypsy’) in one election and then later as members of
another (e.g. ‘German’).116 The reason for this widespread abuse of the minority self-government system has been traced by the un Independent Expert on
Minority Issues as well as several scholars to the expectation of financial and
political gains.117 Non ethnic Germans, for example, stood as candidates for
the German minority self-governments because of the access these provided
to foreign funding and trips to Germany.118 In other cases non-ethnic German
parents sent their children to German minority schools to pick up a useful,
high-prestige foreign language at an early age.119 Other reasons were also present. One of the most extreme and well-known cases was that of Jászladány,
a village where the local council and the ethnic Hungarian majority were in
favour of segregating the Roma children in schools and inter alia for this reason
were in dispute with the local Roma politician, who was blocking the creation
of a private school for non-Roma children that would enhance segregation. In
the elections for the forming of the Roma minority self-government a majority of non-Roma voters led by the mayor’s wife voted in favour of a group of
non-Roma candidates who were thus elected and accordingly the school was
created.120 Another quite absurd example was the case of the members of a
115
116
117
118
119
120
not only to cases of elected ‘representatives’ who do not belong to the specific community, but also to instances in which msgs are controlled by one local family, supra note 62,
p. 173. Finally, another meaning of ‘ethno-business’ suggests that certain minority activists try everything possible to get themselves re-elected but as representatives do not do
much for their constituents, Dobos, supra note 81, p. 467 (note 20).
Krizsán, supra note 67, pp. 256–257.
Pap, supra note 101, p. 341.
a/hrc/4/9/Add.2, supra note 79, para. 26; Dobos, supra note 81, p. 460, notes that the
financial factors seemed to count for a lot in the calculations of speculators adding that
especially for low-income groups even small sums could appear quite significant; Walsh,
supra note 68, p. 44; Kocsis, supra note 62, p. 184; Majtényi, supra note 110, p. 401.
S. Deets and S. Stroschein, ‘Dilemmas of Autonomy and Liberal Pluralism: Examples Involving Hungarians in Europe’, 11 Nations and Nationalism (2005) p. 299.
I. Kenesei, ‘Minority Languages in Hungary’, in G. Stickel (ed.), National, Regional and
Minority Languages in Europe (Peter Lang, Frankfurt and Main, 2011) p. 69.
National Democratic Institute, The Hungarian Minority Self-Government System as a
Means of Increasing Romani Political Participation, September/October 2006, p. 11, <http://
www.osce.org/odihr/25974?download=true>, visited on 15 February 2018; Carstocea,
supra note 114, pp. 19–20; Burton, supra note 109, p. 74.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
24
Yupsanis
small village football team who registered as German minority candidates for
the elections to express their admiration for German football (!)121 There were
also cases where, while the latest census recorded no person identifying with
any minority, several individuals registered as minority candidates for the election to the minority self-government. In this context, the representatives of the
Romanian organizations declared after the elections of 1998 that they considered one third of all the members of the Romanian minority self-government
illegitimate,122 while similar concerns were expressed by the Armenians and
Poles. After the 2002 elections, the national Slovak minority self-government
also claimed that the formation of Slovak minority self-governments in Inárcs,
Jákfalva, Perkupa, Putnok and Szendrőlád, in Borsod county, seemed to be
problematic, as there was no Slovak community living there.123 The ‘ethnobusiness’ phenomenon has been mentioned by the Hungarian government
ever since its first report to the acfc,124 and for its part, in its first opinion the
Committee has attributed the situation where persons not belonging to a given
minority managed to get themselves elected as representatives of that minority, to the ‘openness’ of the electoral system, suggesting indirectly that the use
of some form of ethnic registration was needed and urging the Hungarian
authorities to actively pursue remedies in order to avoid the undermining of
the whole system’s credibility.125 Since the problem not only was not solved or
even reduced but instead was intensified, as the Hungarian government itself
admitted in its second report,126 the acfc came back with stronger language
clearly recommending the “necessary changes such as the envisaged legislative
amendments aimed at the introduction of lists of voters, together with the necessary safeguards for the protection of ethnic data”.127 Also directly connected
with the elections issue was the fact that these were held in conformity with
a majority electoral system, according to which candidates with the highest
number of votes won seats (block vote). One direct consequence of this was
that certain sub-groups within divided minorities remained ­underrepresented
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
A.L. Pap, ‘Human Rights and Ethnic Data Collection in Hungary’, 9 Human Rights Review
(2008) p. 115; Carstocea, supra note 114, p. 20.
Krizsán, supra note 67, p. 257; Carstocea, supra note 114, p. 20; Walsh, supra note 68,
pp. 42–43; Pap, supra note 101, p. 341 (note 12).
Vizi, supra note 82, p. 125.
acfc/sr(1999)010, supra note 59, p. 25.
acfc/inf/op/i(2001)004, supra note 60, para. 52.
Second Report Submitted by Hungary Pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, acfc/sr/ii(2004)003, 7 May
2004, pp. 90–91.
acfc/inf/op/ii(2004)003, supra note 106, paras. 8, 24–25, 28–30.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
25
or even excluded, especially at the level of the national msgs.128 Another serious problem was the dependency of the msgs on the municipal authorities
for their funding, which caused significant difficulties in their operation.129
As Walsh and Kaltenbach noted, the attitude of the local governments was
central to the successful functioning of the msgs as they were responsible
for the most important public services, education and health care, at the local level and also constituted the vehicle through which approximately one
third of the central budget was channelled. Thus, in practice the msgs were
subjected to the goodwill of the ‘merciful big brother’ in order to be able to
fulfil their mandate. Since this political will and sincere collaboration on the
part of the local authorities was in several cases lacking, the operation of the
msgs became problematic both financially and professionally.130 Moreover,
the fact that initially all the (local and national) msgs were entitled to equal
financing, irrespective of their size and activities, resulted in the lack of the
necessary differentiation between the needs of the various minorities, while it
also deprived the msgs of any impetus for more work in their field.131 Nor were
the competencies between the different levels and types of self-governments
clearly defined.132 Lastly, another contentious issue of the whole system was
the persistent lack of action on the part of the government for the regulation
of the minorities’ representation in the National Assembly. Despite the relative
provisions of A
­ rticles 68 para. 3 of the then Constitution, and Article 20 para.
1 of the 1993 Law, as well as of several decisions of the Constitutional Court focusing on the issue of the (lack of) parliamentary representation of minorities,
the issue remained unresolved, causing great friction.133
128
129
130
131
132
133
Dobos, supra note 69, p. 16.
Er. Kállai, ‘The Hungarian Roma Population during the Last Half-Century’, in K., Ernő
(ed.), The Gypsies/The Roma in Hungarian Society (Teleki László Foundation, Budapest,
2002) pp. 42, 45–46.
Walsh, supra note 68, pp. 44–46, 69; Kaltenbach, supra note 89, pp. 181, 185–186; Teller,
supra note 83, p. 78; National Democratic Institute, supra note 120, p. 15; Burton, supra
note 109, p. 75.
Kaltenbach, ibid., p. 186; National Democratic Institute, ibid., pp. 16, 20.
Vizi, supra note 82, p. 124.
Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, Minority Rights Group International and Serbian Institute of Budapest, Shadow Report to Hungary’s Fifth Periodic Report
Under the iccpr, Submission to the 100th session of the Human Rights Committee, 2010,
pp. 11–12, <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/HUN/INT
_CCPR_NGO_HUN_100_9003_E.pdf>, visited on 15 February 2018; Krizsán, supra note 67,
pp. 257–259; Kaltenbach, supra note 89, pp. 186–187.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
26
Yupsanis
Finally, especially as regards as the Roma population, which constitutes the
largest minority group and the most socio-economically marginalized, there
exists a general agreement that the minority self-government system did not
succeed in improving their overall disadvantaged position. This sad outcome
is mainly attributed to the fact that the specific model was primarily designed
to enable minority populations to enjoy cultural autonomy (basic education,
media, language and promotion of traditions), which may satisfy the needs of
the other twelve recognized minorities that are well integrated socially and
economically into the Hungarian polity, but is inherently inadequate to tackle
the dynamic and complex situation of the Roma, which differs significantly
from that of the other minorities and needs another system suitable to address
and reduce Roma disadvantages and establish equality of opportunity.134 As
the National Democratic Institute has reported
[w]hile other minorities are primarily concerned with protection of cultural and linguistic autonomy, the Romani population faces an almost
opposite challenge, needing more integration to combat segregated education, discrimination, unemployment, and problems with housing and
healthcare.135
In light of this, Molnár and Schafft characteristically point out that “except perhaps for small groups of Roma intellectuals, most Roma are hardly interested
in a Roma museum, theatre, monuments or whether their children are taught
Romani or Beas language. Securing stable employment with a liveable salary, attaining a better future for their children, and improving often miserable
housing situations are far more important issues”.136 It should be noted that
even the Hungarian government came quite early (1997) to the conclusion that
the situation of the Roma communities is different from that of the other minorities in Hungary in many respects and that their problems are not primarily
134
135
136
M. Kováts, ‘The Political Significance of the First National Gypsy Minority Self-Government (Országos Cigány Kisebbségi Önkormányzat)’, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority
Issues in Europe (2001) pp. 8, 18, 22; As Doncsev also observes the provisions of the Law
were not suitable for the management and even less for the solution of the minorities’
economic and social problems as this was not the purpose of the Act, supra note 80, p. 123;
Dobos, supra note 81, p. 461; Vizi, supra note 82, p. 122; Walsh, supra note 68, p. 23.
National Democratic Institute, supra note 120, p. 5.
E. Molnár and K. A. Schafft, ‘Preserving “Cultural Autonomy” or Confronting Social Crisis?
The Activities and Aims of Roma Local Minority Self-Governments 2000–2001’, 9 Review
of Sociology (2003) p. 32.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
27
linguistic or cultural,137 thus requiring the implementation of measures other
than those of ‘traditional minority policy’.138 In this context, being basically
cultural institutions, financially dependent from the local councils and with no
or at best very limited capacity to address the local social and welfare problems,
the Roma self-governments that attempted to face the pressing social needs
of their communities either by their own initiative or after transfer of social
services responsibilities by the local councils, which were trying in this way to
avoid their own obligations, were a priori bound to fail, as they lacked the necessary authority and resources.139 Moreover, besides being inadequately structured to respond to the challenges that the Roma face, it has been argued that
the promises and provisions of the Law “have been undermined, ignored and
contravened” by the Hungarian government and its officials at the national
and local levels, “through interference with Roma self-government elections,
denials of funding and refusal to cede control over educational and cultural
institutions”.140 Thus, the view that although the minority self-government system has increased participation of Roma to some extent, it has not brought – at
least in the period 1993–2005 – any “substantial improvement in Roma lives,
Roma inclusion or even broad-based participation”,141 largely because its mandate was limited to cultural autonomy, sounds quite justified.
Based on the aforementioned deficits a general consensus has arisen among
scholars that in the period 1993–2005 the msgs were self-governments in name
137
138
139
140
141
acfc/sr(1999)010, supra note 59, p. 4; Burton, supra note 109, p. 72.
P. Vermeersch, ‘Minority Policy in Central Europe: Exploring the Impact of the eu’s Enlargement Strategy’, 3 The Global Review of Ethnopolitics (2004) pp. 10–11, who notes that
“[i]n other words the ‘traditional minority policy’, in which the preservation and stimulation of cultural difference was seen as a way to integrate the minority, now become
regarded as insufficient for the Roma”; Vizi, supra note 82, p. 128.
T.W. Waters and R. Guglielmo, ‘“Two Souls to Struggle With…”: The Failing Implementation of Hungary’s New Minorities Law and Discrimination Against Gypsies’, 9 Harvard
Human Rights Journal (1996) pp. 309–310.
Ibid., p. 304.
M.H. Ram, ‘Europeanized Hypocrisy: Roma Inclusion and Exclusion in Central and Eastern Europe’, 13 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2014) p. 30; See also
Waters and Guglielmo, who come to the conclusion that the 1993 Law “has proven an
empty promise” for the Hungary’s Roma, ibid., pp. 297–298, 311–312; Molnár and Schafft
also come to the conclusion that the institution of minority self-governance as it stood in
the 1993 Law was simply not appropriate for solving Roma problems, supra note 136, p. 40;
Koulish states that the majority of Roma felt that the minority self-governments failed to
enhance the quality of life for Roma, supra note 57, p. 317.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
28
Yupsanis
only and not in reality142 and consequently that the cultural autonomy accorded was in large part ‘symbolic’.143 As the National Democratic Institute has
stated “[t]he local and national msgs fall short of the range of activities that
the title ‘self-government’ implies. They lack the authority to take action outside of a very limited scope of issues and functions more like ngos than elected governing bodies”.144 The Institute concluded that “[t]his lack of authority
leaves msgs as a ‘half-way house’ between a government institution and an
ngo, with an undefined, underfunded mandate”.145 According to a more moderate opinion the greatest virtue of the Law lay in its existence as a framework,
reference and starting point for improvement and closer compliance with
the diversity and challenges of life.146 The Hungarian government for its part
recognized in its comments to the second opinion of the acfc the need to
improve the regulations relating to the election of minority self-governments,
and the establishment of the conditions for the operation and financing of the
cultural autonomy of minorities,147 paving in this way the road for a significant amendment of the Law in 2005, a development which marked the second
phase (2005–2011) of the cultural autonomy model in the country.
5
The Second Phase of the Cultural Autonomy Arrangement
(2005–2011)
The 2005 modifications aimed at increasing transparency and facilitating the
transfer of minority cultural and educational institutions under the competence of national minority self-governments, as well as at modifying the system of minority elections. The new provisions also made possible the creation
of mid-level (county/regional) representation of minorities. The amendment
142
143
144
145
146
147
Dobos, supra note 81, p. 458, Benedikter, supra note 84, p. 61; Koulish, supra note 57,
p. 322. Cf. Kovács, supra note 88, p. 217, who argues that the appreciation for the sevenyear existence of the system was globally positive, p. 217.
A. Horváth, Z. Vidra and J. Fox, ‘Hungary’, in R. Zapata-Barrero and A. Triandafyllidou
(eds.), Addressing Tolerance and Diversity Discourse in Europe: A Comparative Overview of
16 European Countries (Fundació cidob, Barcelona, 2012) pp. 325, 328.
National Democratic Institute, supra note 120, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 22.
Doncsev, supra note 80, p. 123.
Comments of the Government of Hungary on the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National minorities in Hungary (received on 25 April 2005), gvt/com/inf/op/ii(2004)003,
Strasbourg, 14 December 2005, para. 3.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
29
provided, among other things, clear definitions of what shall be considered
as minority public affairs, minority educational and cultural institutions and
minority media; it specified the scope of authority and the duties of the midlevel minority self-governments to be established; and it regulated the relationship between the local municipal governments and the local minority
self-governments in a clearer and more definite way.148 The most important
novelty of the 2005 amendment was the introduction of a “register of minority
voters” aiming, as the Hungarian government explicitly stated, “at making the
electoral base in the election of minority self-governments unambiguous”, by
ensuring that only those belonging to a given minority take part in the election of minority self-governments. According to the new system, listing in the
minority electoral roll was obtained upon request by the citizen concerned.
The request was submitted to the local election office and the self-declaration
statement was not subjected to any examination of truthfulness. The register
was not made public; only a few persons strictly specified by the law had access
to it, and it was destroyed after the elections by the chief administrator in the
mayor’s office. The minority elections were announced by the local election
committee only if at least 30 voters were listed on the minority register on the
day of the announcement of the elections. Thus, only those Hungarian citizens
who had voting rights at the election of local self-governments, who belonged
to and identified themselves with a minority and were listed in the minority
register based on their written declaration, had both active and passive voting
rights at the elections of minority self-governments.149 Also, in the framework
of enhancing the transparency of the system, minority candidates could be
proposed only by minority associations (thus independent candidates could
not run for elections to msgs) that had existed for at least three years and
explicitly listed the representation of specific minority interests in their statutes.150 Furthermore, candidates were obliged to publicly declare their knowledge of the minority language and culture which they were to represent and
148
149
150
See D.J. Smith, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy and Political Community in Contemporary
Central and Eastern Europe’, 12 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe
(2013) pp. 35–36; Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, supra note 86, p. 4; National
Democratic Institute, supra note 120, pp. 6, 11–12; Dobos, supra note 69, pp. 17, 20.
Third Report Submitted by Hungary Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 2 of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, acfc/sr/iii(2009)007, Strasbourg,
4 June 2009, p. 55; Office for National and Ethnic Minorities, supra note 86, p. 6; Dobos,
supra note 62, p. 172.
J. Jeller, ‘The Cultural Freedom of National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary in the Context of the Minority Act’, subb Jurisprudentia (2007) p. 168.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
30
Yupsanis
whether they were candidates for a different minority in the past.151 It should
be noted, however, that although the lack of minority electoral lists was admittedly at the root of several of the failures of the msg system, the introduction of
a minority electoral register by the 2005 amendments met with the opposition
of most minority groups, especially the smaller ones (Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, Poles, Romanians, Serbs and Ukrainians) for the fear of losing their
‘sympathy votes’.152 Next, in the context of the simplification of the minority
self-government system the 2005 amendments repealed the transformed types
of local msgs, leaving only the directly elected form. Also, they introduced a
proportional electoral system in order to ensure the representation of diverse
interest groups within each minority and to help the national msgs serve as
the ‘parliaments’ of the minorities by fostering intra-ethnic dialogue.153 Finally, another significant modification regarding the funding of the msgs that
took place in 2008 as part of the ongoing struggle against ethno-business was
the split of the relative amount into two portions: each msg was entitled to 75
per cent of the same annual amount, while the allocation of the remaining 25
per cent was based on the actual performance of their key functions.154
The amendments were met with very positive comments, if not enthusiasm,
by the acfc. Specifically, besides strongly regretting that a specific mechanism for the representation of minorities in the Parliament was still lacking
and that the situation of the Roma was improving too slowly, the Committee initially welcomed the introduction of a register of minority voters, which
contributed to “a considerable reduction of the abuses identified in the past”
151
152
153
154
Gwendolyn Sasse, Gone with the Wind? Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe
Before and After eu Enlargement, Draft Paper, Workshop ‘Ethnic Mobilization in the New
Europe’, Brussels, 21–22 April 2006, p. 9, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication
/228461902_Gone_with_the_Wind_Minority_Rights_in_Central_and_Eastern_Europe
_before_and_after_EU_enlargement>, visited on 15 February 2018; Dobos, supra note 62,
pp. 172–173.
Dobos, supra note 81, pp. 462–463 ; Walsh, supra note 68, pp. 41–42, notes that the small
minorities in many cases could establish themselves as minority self-governments
through the ‘sympathy’ votes of the broader society; Majtényi, supra note 110, p. 400, states
that the leaders of the smaller minorities vindicated the so called ‘sympathy votes’ because they thought that they reflect the social recognition of minorities.
B. Dobos, ‘Between Importing and Exporting Minority Rights: The Minority Self-­
Governments in Hungary’, in L. Salat, S. Constantin, A. Osipov and I.G. Székely (eds.),
Autonomy Arrangements Around the World: A Collection of Well and Lesser Known Cases
(The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca, 2014)
pp. 287–288.
Ibid., p. 290.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
31
in the e­ lections that took place after the new legislation came into force.155
Next, the Advisory Committee welcomed the fact that the amendments offered minorities “greater autonomy in the sphere of education”, enabling several ­minority self-governments to manage new schools.156 Thirdly, the acfc
noted with pleasure that substantial improvements have been made in the
area of school funding since 2005. Particularly, it was stated that “[t]he problems encountered in the past, namely overly complex financial arrangements,
difficult relations between local authorities and minority self-governments
and cuts in funding as a result of choices made by local authorities, appear to
have been resolved thanks to the full financial autonomy now granted to selfgovernments representing minorities”.157 In all, the Committee found with satisfaction that the amendments have “considerably extended the competences
of minority self-governments” granting them genuine/true/real operational
and financial autonomy.158 Osipov, too, noted that after the 2005 amendment
the minority representative bodies were re-elected on a regular basis and were
really functional, engaging in dialogue with public authorities and establishing
and ­running cultural and educational programmes and institutions that were
funded from public budgets.159 However, despite the approving words of the
acfc and the fact that the amendments did indeed result in improvements to
the system (partial resolution of the problem of non-minorities ‘hi-jacking’ the
self-government institutions, strengthening of the transparency of the operations of minority self-governments), several problems still remained, including
lack of voter education and registration, false registrations, and false declarations for qualification as minority candidates,160 while as regards as the Roma
situation it has been argued that the amendments did not and could not address inherent problems as they “merely tinkered with a fundamentally flawed
concept [i.e. cultural autonomy] that offers the illusion of political power rather than genuine inclusion”.161 Even the Hungarian government itself admitted
that the new legal regulations could not prevent the possibility of establishing
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
acfc, Third Opinion on Hungary, adopted on 18 March 2010, acfc/op/iii(2010)001, Strasbourg, 17 September 2010, paras. 38–39.
Ibid., para. 119.
Ibid., para. 124.
Ibid., paras. 19, 142, 151.
A. Osipov, ‘Non-Territorial Autonomy During and After Communism: In the Wrong or
Right Place?’, 12 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2013) p. 10. See also
A. Kanner Arias and M. Gurses, ‘The Complexities of Minority Rights in the European
Union’, 16 The International Journal of Human Rights (2012) pp. 326–327.
National Democratic Institute, supra note 120, pp. 7, 14.
Ibid., p. 4.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
32
Yupsanis
“­ pseudo-minority self-governments” concluding that “[t]he comprehensive reform of rules of minority self-government elections in 2005 did not bring the
desired effects. The experience from the two minority self-government elections since its entry into force indicated that a completely new election system
should be developed”.162 In light of this the acfc noted that “all stakeholders
agree that it is necessary to establish a new general legal framework covering
all aspects of minority self-government in a single law” and urged the Hungarian authorities to move towards that direction.163
6
The Third Phase of the Cultural Autonomy Settlement (2011-)
The new legal framework that marked the third phase of the cultural autonomy regime in Hungary took place after the adoption of the New C
­ onstitution
of 2011, which like its predecessor recognizes in Article xxix, para. 1 the
‘nationalities’ (as the minorities were re-labelled) as “constituent parts of the
State”,164 and also grants them, in the second paragraph of the same stipulation,
the “right to establish local and national self-governments”.165 In realization,
then, of the new constitutional guarantees the Act clxxix of 2011 on the Rights
of Nationalities was adopted,166 which aims inter alia at the “implementation and preservation of the cultural autonomy of nationalities by nationality
self-governments” (Art. 2 para. 1),167defining cultural autonomy as “a collective nationality right that is embodied in the independence of the totality of
the institutions and nationality self-organisations under this Act through the
operation thereof by nationality communities by way of self-governance” (Art.
2, para. 3).168
For the most part the new Act practically leaves the previous legislation
intact,169 merely introducing some new amendments. Thus, first considering
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
acfc/sr/iv(2015)002, supra note 98, pp. 28, 39.
acfc/op/iii(2010)001, supra note 155, para. 144; cdl-ad(2012)011, supra note 103, para. 9.
M. Klemenčič, ‘The Rights of Indigenous Slovene Minorities: Re-integration and Development in Border Regions’, XIV:2 Revista Română de Geografie Politică (2012) p. 245.
E. Csaba, ‘A Problematic Part of the Renewed Hungarian Parliamentary Law: The Parliamentary Representation of Nationalities’, 1 De Iurisprudentia et Iure Publico (2013) p. 52.
See Venice Commission, Act on the Rights of Nationalities of Hungary, Opinion No.671/2012,
cdl-ref(2012)014, Strasbourg, 10 May 2012.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid.
A.L. Pap, ‘Racial, Ethnic, or National Minority? Legal Discourses and Policy Frameworks
on the Roma in Hungary and Beyond’, 3 Social Inclusion (2015) p. 42.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
33
the terminology issue, regarding the replacement of the term ‘minorities’ by
that of ‘nationalities’, the Hungarian government has stated that “there is no
content modification”.170 (In fact the definition given in Article 1 para. 1 is very
similar, except for the absence of the citizenship requirement, to that of the
1993 Law.)171 The latter was chosen in order to avoid the quantitative approach
suggested by the former as well as to mark a symbolic return to centuries-old
Hungarian tradition.172 The Croatian and Ruthenian national msgs welcomed
this change because for some reason they found the term ‘minority’ demeaning.173 Next, one may note the replacement of the term ‘Gypsy’ of the 1993
Law by that of ‘Roma’, which is certainly more acceptable in terms of political correctness, though it does not necessarily meet the self-definition of each
subgroup.174
Regarding the beneficiaries of the Act, Appendix No. 1 to it qualifies as
­‘nationalities’ the same thirteen minorities of the 1993 Law (Armenians, Bulgarians, Croatians, Germans, Greeks, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians,
Serbians, Slovaks, Slovenes and Ukrainians).175 Also, in Article 148, paras. 3 and
5 the Law accords the opportunity to nationalities other than those listed in
the Appendix to submit a relevant request for recognition provided that they
have secured at least 1000 individuals declaring that they belong to the group,
while the opinion of the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is
also required.176 Furthermore, new electoral regulations accord electoral rights
to non-Hungarian citizens belonging to minorities, including eu citizens, refugees, and immigrants residing in Hungary. In this way an old minority demand
is met. As a result of the changes, in 2014 these groups also had the right to vote
and be elected at the latest elections of nationality self-governments (nsgs).
However, this state of affairs will only last for one term, as the law will later
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
acfc/sr/iv(2015)002, supra note 98, p. 39.
“Pursuant to this Act, all ethnic groups resident in Hungary for at least one century are
nationalities which are in numerical minority amongst the population of the State, are
distinguished from the rest of the population by their own language, culture and traditions and manifest a sense of cohesion that is aimed at the preservation of these and at
the expression and protection of the interests of their historically established communities”. cdl-ref(2012)014, supra note 166, p. 2 ; Vizi, supra note 1, p. 45.
acfc/sr/iv(2015)002, supra note 98, p. 17.
Pap, supra note 169, p. 42.
Dobos, supra note 153, p. 292.
Economic and Social Council, Report of Hungary 2007–2012, e/conf.101/crp23/Rev.1, 23
July 2012, p. 5.
Dobos, supra note 69, pp. 23–24; cdl-ad(2012)011, supra note 103, para. 38.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
34
Yupsanis
cover only Hungarian citizens – on the ground that a distinction in the long
run shall be made between ‘traditional’ and migrant communities.177
Considering the issue of the establishment of the nsgs the new Act entails
a set of stipulations which aim to strengthen the transparency of the nsg elections and to enhance their legitimacy. In this regard the local self-government
elections can only be held in settlements where a nationality has a genuine
presence. Specifically, Article 56 para. 1 provides that the elections for the formation of the local nmgs can take place only if the number of individuals
forming part of the given nationality in the locality reaches 30 according to the
data provided in response to the questions of the latest census regarding nationality affiliation.178 So, the role of the census would be decisive in the electoral life of the nationalities (and also in the enjoyment of the educational and
linguistic rights accorded by the Act), though some authors have expressed
their concern for this as “the census cannot offer an overall view of the minority situation and records children and others who do not have voting rights”.179
In the same spirit of ensuring legitimacy, Article 56, para. 2 requires that elections for the establishment of regional nsgs can only be held if the number
of local elections called in a county is at least ten. Also, according to the third
paragraph of the same provision the formation of the national nsgs would be
done through direct election. To exercise active electoral rights, voters must
have the right to vote at the local elections, form part of the nationality and declare their affiliation with it (Art. 53, para. 1). Regarding the exercise of passive
electoral rights, Article 54 requires that those nominated by the ‘nationality organisations’ in conformity with Articles 58–61 as candidates for the local nsgs
must on the one hand have not been candidates of another nationality in general or by-elections and on the other be recorded on the nationality register,
be eligible at the local elections, speak the language of the nationality, and be
familiar with its culture and traditions. The Act, however, does not specify, as
the Venice Commission has critically noted “who and how shall verify whether
or not this last requirement is fulfilled” recommending accordingly that “[i]n
order to guarantee legal certainty in this respect, the Act should contain some
specific rules on the certification of the compliance with this requirement”.180
Regarding the allocation of financial support, there has also been a change
in the ratios in 2012: one third of the total amount provided by the central state
177
178
179
180
B. Dobos, ‘Insiders and Outsiders: Migrant, Non-Recognized Minority Communities and
the Minority Protection System in Hungary’, 4 Act Humana (2015) p. 21.
cdl-ad(2012)011, supra note 103, para. 47; Dobos, supra note 69, p. 28.
Dobos, ibid.
cdl-ad(2012)011, supra note 103, para. 48.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
35
budget (Art. 39, para. 6) is given for the basic functions of the nsgs (representation of the community and autonomy management at the local level), and
the other two thirds are granted on the basis of the activities of each applicant
nsg181 in an attempt to provide a motive to the nsgs to be more operative on
their field of competences.
Lastly, a new positive element in comparison to the 1993 Law is the inclusion
of the issues of “basic social services”, “local public employment programmes”
(Art. 10, para. 4) and “social inclusion” (Art. 116, para. 2) in the list of rights of
nationality self-governments,182 an addition that would be particularly helpful
for the better functioning of the Roma nsgs.
There is also another significant development introduced by Act cciii on
the Election of the Members of Parliament of 2011. A minority demand, that
of parliamentary representation, which was proclaimed in the 1993 Law but
was not realized for more than two decades, was partially satisfied on paper.
Thus, minorities are entitled to one seat if they receive at least 25 per cent of
the electoral quota necessary for the election of one mp in the proportional
component of the system. However, due to the small size of most minorities in
Hungary, it is hard even for the biggest of them (the Roma, the Germans, the
Croats and Slovaks) to attract the necessary number of (the estimated 20,000
to 25,000) voters in order to gain a seat in Parliament. In these circumstances it
came as no surprise that in the first parliamentary elections where that system
was applied (in April 2014) no minority candidate was elected as such. In the
cases where no minority list succeeds in winning a preferential seat, ­Article 18
of the Law provides that the minority interests will be represented by a parliamentary spokesperson (‘nationality advocate’), being the candidate who
ranked first on the nationality list, who does not, however, have voting rights
at sessions of the National Assembly.183 Specifically, according to Section 29,
para. 1 of the 2012 Act xxxvi on the National Assembly, a nationality advocate
may only speak at the plenary sessions of the National Assembly subject to the
requirement of the House Committee’s – that is the committee in charge of
parliamentary affairs composed of the Speaker of the Parliament, his/her deputies, and the leaders of the parliamentary factions – concurrent opinion that
the issue under discussion affects the rights or interests of nationalities. Also,
181
182
183
Dobos, supra note 69, p. 23.
acfc/sr/iv(2015)002, supra note 98, p. 80.
B. Aurescu, ‘The June 2012 Opinion of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe on
the Act on the Rights of Nationalities of Hungary. Presentation and Assessment’, 2 Lex et
Scientia International Journal (2012) p. 176; Dobos, supra note 69, pp. 24–25; Csaba, supra
note 165, pp. 59–60.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
36
Yupsanis
he/she may address questions to the government, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the Prosecutor General and the President of the State Audit
Office. Finally, he/she participates with a voting right in the work of the parliamentary committee for nationalities, which consists according to Section 22,
para. 1 of the aforementioned Law of members obtaining mandate from a nationality list and the nationality advocates and acts in favour of the rights and
interests of nationalities, putting forward initiatives, making proposals, delivering opinions and assisting in the supervision of the government’s work on
the relevant issues.184 Given then the fact that due to their weak numerical
strength most, if not all, minorities in Hungary are unlikely to gain a seat in the
National Assembly, it is expected that the institution of nationality advocate
will have an increasingly significant role to play in minority parliamentary representation, subject, however, to the House Committee’s goodwill.185
Coming to an overall assessment of Act clxxix of 2011, the Venice Commission has on the one hand commented positively on it, noting that it “is surely
the most important Act for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to
minorities” and that it “can be considered as an important piece of legislation
that guarantees internationally recognized rights” to them.186 On the other
hand, while it is still premature to attempt a general assessment of this last
phase of the msgs’/nsgs’ functioning in Hungary, one cannot but notice, as
the Venice Commission did, that the 2011 Act contains serious shortcomings,
which may undermine the effectiveness of the whole system:
The new framework for minority protection … appears … to be particularly complex and to be at times, excessively detailed and nonetheless
sometimes to lack legal clarity. This may result in difficulties in its implementation and have an adverse impact on the autonomy provided by the
act to Hungary’s nationalities. In particular, the overly-detailed regulation of nationality self-governments’ operation and supervision, as well
as the sometimes unclear provisions regulating specific areas, may lead
to undue restriction of the free exercise by the minorities of their rights
and by nationality self-governments of their competences.187
184
185
186
187
A.L. Pap, ‘Recognition, Representation and Reproach: New Institutional Arrangements
in the Hungarian Multiculturalist Model’, in B. Vizi, N. Tóth and E. Dobos (eds.), Beyond
International Conditionality: Local Variations of Minority Representation in Central and
South-Eastern Europe (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017) pp. 105–106.
Ibid., p. 104.
cdl-ad(2012)011, supra note 103, paras. 21, 23.
cdl-ad(2012)011, ibid., para. 84; Aurescu, supra note 183, p. 170.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
37
Also, commenting on the fact that the Act grants the competent authorities the
flexibility to arrange year by year the number of nationality educational institutions, the Commission remarked that this approach “may result in uncertainty with regard to the stability and continuity of minority education and have
a negative impact on the parents’ choice as to their children’s education”.188
Moreover, the Commission noted that the provisions dealing with the funding of nationality education (Arts. 26 and 30) need further clarification, in
particular as regards the resources allocated by the state to the nationality
­self-governments which are running educational establishments.189 Furthermore, it has been pointed out by scholars that in the new Act there has been a
shift from the previous right of consent (approval) to that of consultation,190 a
development that certainly constitutes a significant retreat regarding the participatory rights of Hungary’s minorities. Finally, it has been argued that by
modifying and restricting the electoral rules in the context of reducing ethnobusiness, the Law has gone to the other extreme, having a demobilizing effect,
“even discouraging voters from participating at minority elections”.191
7
Conclusions
Despite the several faults and weaknesses of the minority self-government regime it is important to note that the minority elites in Hungary as well as several minority members too, seem at first glance to embrace this model, as the
steadily growing number of the minority/nationality self-governments formed
(from 817 in 1994/1995 when the first elections took place to 1,363 in 1998, 1,841
in 2002, 2,040 in 2006 and 2,315 in 2010!) suggests.192 One can ascribe this ‘ethnic resurrection’ to other reasons than merely a pure interest in the cultural
188
189
190
191
192
Ibid., para. 59; Aurescu, ibid., pp. 173–174.
Ibid., para. 62; Aurescu, ibid., p. 174.
Dobos, supra note 69, p. 21; Pap, supra note 169, pp. 42, 43.
B. Dobos, ‘Elections in a Non-Territorial Autonomous Setting: The Minority Self­
Governments in Hungary’, xx The Journal of Ethnology and Culturology (2016) p. 91.
I.Z. Pásztor and J. Pénzes, ‘Studying the Number of the Gypsy Minority in Hungary and
Their Involvement in Local Governments on the Example of the North Great Plain Region’, XV:1 Revista Română de Geografie Politică (2013) pp. 20–22, who note however that
this rate of increase seems to several minority communities to be unjustified as they do
not consider all of the minority local self-governments as real; Smith, supra note 148,
p. 33, notes that if the numerical criterion alone would be taken as a guide, then the cultural
autonomy legislation could be seen as having been “hugely effective”, given the hundreds
local self-governments established during the decade after 1993; Dobos, supra note 69,
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
38
Yupsanis
­ reservation. For Carstocea, for example, the emerging minority elites seized
p
the opportunity and used their influence to construct identities and take advantage of the new institutions and their benefits.193 In the same vein the National Democratic Institute suggests that some candidates aimed to gain influence within the community through the creation of msgs and benefit from the
privileges and ‘prestige’ that it could provide.194 Also, minority activists, realizing that the system will remain for some time, try to use its limited tools to
improve the cultural life of their communities.195 Especially, as regards the specific case of the Roma population, several authors have expressed their doubts
whether the cultural autonomy model with its exclusivist focus on cultural issues is capable of solving their problems, which are mainly of socio-economic
nature.196 This was clearly felt, for instance, by the Hungarian government,
which in the late 1990s admitted that the establishment of a Roma culturally
self-governing community was not enough to alter economic predicaments
and adopted additional policy programmes to deal more effectively with discrimination, unemployment, lack of education, bad housing, spatial isolation,
and poverty that this population is facing.197 On the other hand, the primary
interest of the Hungarian governments in establishing a cultural autonomy regime seems to lie, according to the view of an increasing number of authors,
more in ‘exporting’ this settlement abroad in order to protect the rights of
the large ethnic Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring states than
in safeguarding the cultural rights of the country’s minorities.198 As Pap characteristically puts it, the “Hungarian minority law is a Janus-faced mixture of
sincere internal group recognition and the l­egal-political counterbalancing of
the Trianon-trauma”.199 Under such an understanding and without overlooking the positive elements that the last phase of cultural autonomy brings in the
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
p. 18, remarks that the increase in the number of the msgs/nsgs may be due to “a somewhat growing consciousness” but also to ethno-business.
Carstocea, supra note 114, pp. 16–17.
National Democratic Institute, supra note 120, p.10; Walsh, supra note 68, p. 44.
National Democratic Institute, ibid.
S. Baldin, ‘The Protection of the Romani Language and the Itinerant Lifestyle of Roma
Minorities: A Fuzzy Approach to the Comparative Analysis’, 3 Comparative Law Review
(2012) p. 20, note 67.
P. Vermeersch and M.H. Ram, ‘The Roma’, in Rechel (ed.), supra note 82, p. 65.
Kaltenbach, supra note 89, pp. 21–22; Krizsán, supra note 67, p. 249; Vizi, supra note 82,
p. 122; Pap, supra note 100, pp. 246, 248; Dobos, supra note 69, p. 8; Burton, supra note 109,
pp. 71, 73; Smith, supra note 148, pp. 33–34; Aurescu, supra note 183, p. 171.
Pap, supra note 101, p. 344. According to the 1920 Trianon Treaty between most of the ­Allies
and the Kingdom of Hungary, the successor independent Hungarian state lost two-thirds
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39
Cultural Autonomy for Minorities in Hungary
39
cultural life of Hungary’s minorities, one cannot on the one hand be very optimistic regarding the actual capabilities of the specific arrangement to effectively guarantee the preservation and reproduction of all minorities’ cultural
identities in the long run. On the other, given the fact that the arrangement
has found acceptance in several minority communities one could suggest that
a better functioning of the model in a spirit of government goodwill would enhance minority protection. In this direction the acfc has recommended that
[w]here State Parties provide for such cultural autonomy arrangements,
the corresponding constitutional and legislative provisions should c­ learly
specify the nature and scope of the autonomy system and the competencies of the autonomous bodies. In addition, their legal status, the relations between them and other relevant institutions as well as the funding
of the envisaged autonomy system, should be clarified in the respective
legislation.200
If these requirements are met, then we shall have a clearer picture of what the
cultural autonomy model can achieve in practice in the Hungarian context.
200
of its pre-war kingdoms’ territories, while also nearly 30% of its pre-war population was
left outside of post-Trianon Hungary, see Vizi, supra note 1, p. 33.
acfc, Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public Affairs, adopted on 27 February
2008, acfc/31doc(2008)001, Strasbourg 5 May 2008, para. 136.
international journal on minority and group rights 26 (2019) 1-39