1
Jack Woosnam
Candidate Number: 7282
Assess the impact of the Mongol conquests on European society and politics during
the period between 1220 and 1300.
‘They came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered, and they departed’; so, reads
an eyewitness account describing the Mongols.1 A typical account from the time exemplifying
the fear inflicted by the Mongols. The Mongols were a race of nomadic tribesman from the
depths of Mongolia, united and led by Genghis Khan in 1206. They set about a quest of world
domination, but it was not until after Genghis’ death, in 1227, and during the rule of his son
Ögödei Khan that Europe was invaded by the Mongols in the early 1240s. To evaluate the
impact on those in Europe a distinction needs to be made between western and eastern Europe
to take account of regional variation. With Mongol rule extending from Europe to the Far East,
direct trade links, as Phillips has shown, were beneficial to those in western Europe, that is
those west of Bohemia.2 Whereas research by Rowell and Jackson shows that those in eastern
Europe, consisting of mainly Poland and Hungary in the thirteenth century, were exposed to
the horror of Mongol occupation albeit briefly. Undoubtedly the Hungarians suffered the most
from the Mongol invasions but were able to implement changes that strengthened the kingdom
in response.3 More generally it is argued by the likes of Peter Jackson,4 John Phillips5 and
Denis Sinor6 among others, that the sudden retreat in 1242 mitigated the political consequences
of the Mongol invasion. In Europe, contemporary chronicles show the Mongols were perceived
as an existential threat: they represented the judgement of God and there was a prevailing fear,
1
Ata-Malik Juvayni, History of a World Conqueror Vol 1, (Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 107.
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988).
3
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016). See also Tudor Salagean, Transylvania in the Second Half of the
Thirteenth Century: The Rise of the Congregational System, (Brill, 2016).
4
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014).
5
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988).
6
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44 The Mongols in the West (1999).
2
2
throughout the later 13th century, that Europe would succumb to Mongol conquest.7 The
reports and rumours played a crucial role in the formation of opinions on the Mongols which
are evident in the accounts of Matthew Paris8 and Thomas of Spalato.9 Then again, to the
papacy and those who looked further east towards the Holy Land, the Mongols represented
opportunity in the fight against Muslim forces. Phillips believes that European rulers and the
Papacy were naïve to think an alliance with the Mongols would have been beneficial whereas
others believe it was a missed opportunity.10 The sacking of Baghdad in 1258, for so long the
cultural centre of the Islamic world, symbolised the catastrophic impact of Mongols on the
Islamic World and yet as Peter Jackson explains the total impact the Mongols had on Europe
was surprisingly limited.11
The Mongol impact on Europe was, initially, primarily psychological mainly through
confusion and fear. Through early reports and rumours a lot of confusion arose as to who the
Mongols were. Initially there was much talk linking the Mongols to the mythical figure Prester
John. Prester John was believed to be a Christian king from central Asia and also fighting the
Muslims. The chronicler Albericus de Trois-Fontaine discusses the various aspects of the
legend including the introduction of David who at different times was either Prester John, his
son or a completely different Christian ruler.12 Also, David’s rumoured killing of thousands of
Cumans and Russians only added to the confusion.13 Letters sent by Pelagius and Pope
Honorious III also speak of similar events.14 But even the Pope, one of the most powerful men
Matthew Paris, Chronica majora Vol 1, Matthew Paris’s English History from 1235 to 1273, trans. J. A. Giles
(London, 1852).
8
Matthew Paris, Chronica majora Vol 1, Matthew Paris’s English History from 1235 to 1273, trans. J. A. Giles
(London, 1852).
9
James Ross Sweeney, Thomas of Spalato and the Mongols: A Thirteenth-Century view of Mongol Customs,
pp.156-183 (Florilegium vol.4, 1982).
10
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 82.
11
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014).
12
Prester John, The Legend and its Sources, ed. Keagan Brewer, (Routledge, 2015) p. 146
13
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44 The Mongols in the West (1999) p.5.
14
Peter Jackson, The Mongol s and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.58.
7
3
in Europe, knew little of the world further east. When Friar Julian, a missionary sent by Béla,
returned from the Rus kingdoms early, due to the Mongols invasions, he still believed in the
significance of Prester John. However, he did return with more accurate detail about the
Mongols, significantly their extraordinary mobility.15 No one knew whether the Mongols were
Christian allies or responsible for the death of Prester John. During the confusion, new
information of horror and barbarism filtered through Europe. Yet at this time it did little to
ignite any political response. Instead as Morgan writes, ‘few in western Europe were disposed
to bother their heads about the Mongols in 1238.’16 The Bishop of Winchester supposedly
rejoiced at the thought of pagans killing each other.17 Robert Marshall attributes the limited
political response to the remoteness of Russia and the strained relations between the Rus and
the Europeans.18 However, the ignorance of Europeans concerning the Mongols was ultimately
the reason for their indifference.
From the 1230s onwards European attitudes towards the Mongols rapidly changed; where
initially they saw them as potential Christians, they now feared that they were the Judgement
of God. This prompted conscious acknowledgment of the threat of invasion. The refugees
entering the eastern regions of Europe in the mid to late 1230s helped spread stories of terror.
These stories added to a prevailing fear that, due to the extreme scale and ruthlessness of the
Mongol invasion, Europeans were facing the judgement of God. This is evident in a letter
written by Henry of Lorraine, ‘The dangers foretold long ago in Holy Scripture are now.’19
15
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 107.
Matthew Paris, Chronica majora Vol 1, Matthew Paris’s English History from 1235 to 1273, trans. J. A. Giles
(London, 1852) p. 131.
17
Peter Jackson, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 22 - The Mongols and Europe pp. 701-719
(Cambridge University Press 2016) p.711.
16
18
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 107.
Count Henry of Lorraine, cited by Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p.
114.
19
4
Marshall even compares the Mongol invasion of Europe as equivalent to an alien invasion20
and Paul Cobb calls them ‘the archetypal enemies of civilization’.21 The portrayal of the
Mongols, by chroniclers, provides the common perspective on the invading force and insight
into the impact on Europe. Matthew Paris, an English chronicler based in St. Albans, describes
them as ‘the able race of Satan,’ and ‘inhuman and of the nature of beasts.’22 When Paris
claimed the Jews had sided with the Mongols against the Christians, he epitomised the anxieties
of the Christian Europeans who wanted to vent their fear by blaming it on the Jews. This is a
clear indication of the psychological impact of Mongol invasion. A lesser known impact, as
described by Paris, was the sudden drop in the price of herrings in Yarmouth, England in 1138;
fisherman based in Gothland and Friesland were scared to leave their homes vulnerable to
Mongol attack thus giving free rein to the English fishermen.23 This instance shows that
although the Mongols may have never got close to England, they were still able to affect
everyday life even if it was in the smallest ways. Paris’ account is representative of the common
perception of the Mongols at the time, by those living in western Europe, as he had neither met
a Mongol nor anyone who had. Thomas of Spalato describes the Mongols similarly to Paris,
although he was based within the then Kingdom of Hungary, on the Adriatic, and therefore
experienced Mongol occupation at first hand. Like Paris he describes their lawlessness and
thirst for blood.24 Both Paris’ and Thomas of Spalato’s gory and apocalyptic accounts were
among those that exacerbated fear in Europe. However, although noticeable effects can be
observed, they were very much temporary and did not have profound political consequences.
20
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 115.
Paul.M.Cobb, The Race for Paradise, An Islamic History of the Crusades, (Oxford University Press, Oxford
2014) p.219.
22
Matthew Paris, Chronica majora Vol 1, Matthew Paris’s English History from 1235 to 1273, trans. J. A. Giles
(London, 1852) p. 357. See also, Devin DeWeese, The Influence of the Mongols on the Religious Consciousness
of Thirteenth Century Europe; Mongolian Studies 5, 41-78. (1978) p.47 http://www.jstor.org/stable/43193054.
23
Matthew Paris, cited by Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 115.
24
James Ross Sweeney, Thomas of Spalato and the Mongols: A Thirteenth-Century view of Mongol Customs,
pp.156-183 (Florilegium vol.4, 1982).
21
5
Aside from the psychological impacts there were also notable economic and physical impacts
upon the Kingdom of Hungary and a few of its neighbours. Although the population was
greatly reduced in many areas, if anything, the invasion of Hungary was a catalyst to encourage
the country to build up strength, with political and military consolidation which resembles that
undertaken by Alfred in England.25 As a result, to ascertain the changes that took place, the
Kingdom of Hungary must be assessed before and after the invasion. Previously, Hungary had
a fractured political structure as the nobles were constantly disagreeing with the king. 26 It was
trapped between Catholic Europe and Orthodox Byzantium. 27 King Béla IV of Hungary, in an
attempt to shift the power balance, tried to empower lesser nobles in opposition to those
troubling his rule.28 Refugees entered Hungary from the Rus kingdoms and caused problems
by taking up resources and space. Around 40,000 Cumans, a nomadic people based in an area
stretching from the Hungarian border to Lake Balkhash in modern day Kazakhstan, were
accepted into Hungary by Béla to the displeasure of his nobles and to the Mongols. 29 The
Mongols explicitly expressed that the Cumans should not be given aid.30 Béla’s aid and
favouritism of the Cumans alienated his subjects, hence weakening him and preventing him
from organising Hungary’s defence as effectively as he should have been able to against the
Mongols.31 Thus, before the Mongols had even arrived, their actions were already affecting
Hungarian politics and causing difficulties for King Béla.
25
Geoffrey Barraclough, The Crucible of Europe, (California University Press, 1976)
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 759.
27
Tudor Salagean, Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century: The Rise of the Congregational
System, (Brill, 2016) p. 4.
28
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 760.
29
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 87.
30
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.60.
31
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44, The Mongols in the West (1999) p. 9.
26
6
The Mongols left a trail of destruction and this had an abrupt impact on local populations and
agricultural land. The devastation brought by the Mongols is epitomised by the battles of Mohi
and Liegnitz which were within two days of each other, in April 1241, and ended in the
decimation of the Hungarian and Polish forces. The Hungarians, now without a significant
military force or aid from further west, were vulnerable to slaughter and pillage by the
Mongols. The slaughter was so great it led one German chronicler to remark that the Kingdom
of Hungary had been destroyed.32 This is confirmed by Rogerius, an Italian prelate, who wrote,
‘Behold, during that summer they destroyed everything all the way to the borders of Austria,
Bohemia, Moravia, Poland, Silesia, and Cumania as far as the Danube.’ 33 These comments
highlight the extent of Mongol destruction and emphasise what many believed at the time. The
death toll from Mohi is thought to be close to 60,000 and that of the entire Hungarian
population to be around 20 percent, based mainly in the lower lying lands.34 The diminished
population especially in the lower regions meant that food supplies were limited as a lot of the
cultivated land was left abandoned. The Mongols went so far as to use the royal seal, taken off
the dead chancellor, to issue decrees ordering subjects to stay in their homes. The Mongols
were then able to further decimate certain areas. Unable to understand the extreme mobility of
the Mongols, the Polish chroniclers estimated the Mongol forces to be up to five times greater
than they actually were. The mobility possessed by the Mongols was a consequence of expert
communication systems and skills upon horses which allowed them to travel up 200 miles
within just three days.35 The Mongols would have carried off with them much wealth affecting
local economies, as is highlighted by John of Carprini’s account when he mentions Batu using
32
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.68.
Rogerius, cited by; Josef, Laszlovszky, Stephen Pow, Beatrix F. Romhányi, László Ferenczi, and Zsolt Pinke.
Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241–42: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives. The
Hungarian Historical Review 7, no. 3 (2018): 419-50. p. 423.
34
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 97.
35
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 69.
33
7
the magnificent tents previously owned by Béla.36 As a clear consequence of Mongol invasion,
the kingdom of Hungary suffered famine and depopulation.
The plight of the Hungarians did mean other European powers eventually became involved in
response to the Mongol threat. A threat so great that it almost brought together two bitter rivals;
the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, an indication of the impact the Mongols had. When
Béla asked for help from Pope Gregory IX, an army was formed in the summer of 1241. This
‘crusade’ was led by the Emperor’s son Conrad, but the army raised only made it fifty miles
from where it had gathered. However, this did not prevent Paris claiming the German emperor
went so far as to liberate Hungary from the Mongols.37 The reason for the ‘crusade’s’ failure
although uncertain is likely to have been due to the movement of the Mongols south-east and
away from the German border.38 Those in Europe were so afraid of the Mongol incursions that
when the Mongols suffered a minor set-back in 1241 in Austria, rumours spread to the likes of
the Near East and Armenia.39 The Europeans were desperate to believe that the Mongols could
be defeated. According to a letter from Innocent IV to Bela IV in 1247, Pope Innocent IV was
urging those in Hungary to see to the defence against Mongols and that all who took the cross
in this effort would receive the same indulgence as those who fought in the Holy Land.40 The
fact that, eventually, the Europeans did mount a response, even if it did fail, shows that there
was a conscious political effort to resist the Mongols.
Upon the unexpected Mongol withdrawal, Béla worked hard to lessen the impact of the Mongol
invasion and was able to turn a disaster into a means of strengthening Hungary. Recognising
36
Peter Jackson, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck, (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis 2009)
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.67.
38
Ibid, p.67.
39
Ibid, p.67.
40
The Seventh Crusade 1244-1254, Sources and Documents, Trans. Peter Jackson, (Routledge, 2009) p.206.
37
8
that the Mongols left the fortified towns relatively untouched Béla ordered permanent castles
to be re-built or founded, for example he founded the castles of Nagysáros and Visegrád.41
Between 1242 and 1270 fifty-five new castles were built, and thirteen reconstructed in stone.42
However, to achieve this he had to rely heavily on those nobles who had been so against him
previously. Béla was forced to cede power to the nobles in order to better prepare Hungary for
future invasions; it is thought that of the castles built in his reign, only twenty-one were of royal
patronage.43 After the invasion, which had left huge areas uninhabited and land uncultivated,
Béla encouraged many to settle in Hungary in an attempt to recover the Hungarian economy
and population. He granted special liberties to these new subjects who came from the likes of
Germany and Moravia and other neighbouring kingdoms.44 While the Mongols had still been
in Hungary little in the way of crops could be sowed and so with their departure there was
widespread famine. However, even after all this destruction Béla was still able to acquire the
resources to engage in conflicts with his neighbours in the ensuing years.45 After all the
destruction Béla reformed the kingdom of Hungary to the extent that when the Mongols
returned in force in the winter of 1285-86, they were subsequently repelled by the reigning
Hungarian king Ladislaus.46 As a consequence of the invasions, Hungary emerged, after only
a couple decades, as a stronger kingdom, mainly militarily, its prosperity over the next century
illustrating the limited impact.47
41
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44, The Mongols in the West (1999) p.17.
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 760.
43
Malcolm Barber, The Two Cities, Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (Oxford, Routledge 2004) p.339.
44
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 775.
45
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.70. See also, Josef, Laszlovszky,
Stephen Pow, Beatrix F. Romhányi, László Ferenczi, and Zsolt Pinke. Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of
Hungary in 1241–42: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives. The Hungarian Historical Review 7, no. 3 (2018):
419-50. p. 439.
46
Josef, Laszlovszky, Stephen Pow, Beatrix F. Romhányi, László Ferenczi, and Zsolt Pinke. Contextualizing the
Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241–42: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives. The Hungarian Historical
Review 7, no. 3 (2018): 419-50. p. 442.
47
Ibid, p. 442.
42
9
In some ways the limited impacts of the Mongol invasion can be attributed to the unexpected
retreat by the Mongols in 1242. The reasons for the retreat of Mongol forces in 1242 are
unclear. Some historians such as Robert Marshall48 and S.C. Rowell49 believe in the more
classical explanation as explained by John of Carprini, that the Mongols retreated upon hearing
news that the great khan, Ögödei had died.50 However contrary to this, others such as Denis
Sinor believe it was more to do with lack of resources and the climate that forced the Mongols
to retreat.51 Jackson consequently suggests the Mongol retreat is imperfectly understood and
provides an alternative theory. He believes the Mongols left simply because they had achieved
their aim in chastising the kingdom of Hungary for providing refuge for the Cumans.52
However, the reason for the retreat had less consequence upon Europe than the action itself.
By retreating when they did, the Mongols limited their occupation of Hungary to less than two
years, inhibiting the potential for change. Then again it is questionable to assume that had the
Mongols stayed longer there would have been any more major impacts. Under Mongol
occupation the Rus kingdoms experienced little change to political infrastructure, and it was
often the case that the Mongols, charged with overseeing an area, became integrated into the
respective cultures.53 Therefore, it is unlikely that under Mongol occupation Hungary would
have faced any major changes. The retreat so soon after the initial invasion avoided the
potential for serious long-term impacts.
48
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 119.
S.C. Rowell, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European Kingdoms pp.754 778 (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 760.
50
Joseph, Fletcher, The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 46,
no. 1, pp.11-50. (1986) p. 47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2719074
51
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, The Mongols in the West (1999) pp.1-44.
52
Peter Jackson, The New Cambridge Medieval History, chapter 22 - The Mongols and Europe, pp. 701-719,
(Cambridge University Press 2016) p.707.
53
Simon Franklin, The New Cambridge Medieval History, chapter 24 – Rus, pp. 796-808, (Cambridge
University Press 2016) p.796.
49
10
The presence of the Mongols also impacted European foreign policy, especially in terms of
crusading, as rulers made decisions based on Mongol advice. During the period of Mongol
dominance over Asia, the Popes in Europe were still calling for crusades to the Holy Land.
Both the Mongols and the crusading Europeans had a common enemy; fighting the Muslims
and Mamluks in the Middle East. By looking at the letter sent to the Pope written by Eudes de
Chateauroux in 1254, who was at the time a papal legate, one can definitively say there was
communication between the Mongols and the crusading Europeans.54 After a letter from
Eljigidei, leader of a contingent of Mongols in Persia, had asked for support from the
Europeans, various ambassadors were sent by both Louis IX and Pope Innocent IV to the
Mongol courts to seek an alliance in preparation for the seventh crusade.55 However, no
agreements were reached. A clear example of Mongol impact on Crusading foreign policy was
Louis IX’s invasion of Egypt at the behest of the Mongols which both Marshall56 and
Tyerman57 believe to be an example of European naivety. Louis would have been much better
off invading the Holy Land where it is thought he would have been met with considerably more
success.58 Jackson believes this may have been a ploy by the Mongols to keep the Crusaders
away from Syria and Anatolia where they had operations in place. 59 At the second council of
Lyon in 1274 there was a great stir as the leader of the Mongol representatives was publicly
baptised, but this was just another example of a failed collaboration attempt.60 There were other
chances of a Crusader-Mongol alliance, for example Edward I of England and Abaqa Khan, a
Eudes de Châteauroux, The Seventh Crusade Sources and Documents, Trans. Peter Jackson, (Farnham,
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009). p. 76.
55
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 137.
56
Ibid, p. 137.
57
Christopher Tyerman, God’s War, A New History of the Crusades, (Penguin Books: London 2006) p. 786.
58
Robert Marshall, Storm from the East (Penguin Books: London 1994) p. 138.
59
Peter Jackson, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 22 - The Mongols and Europe pp. 701-719
(Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 714.
60
Paul.M.Cobb, The Race for Paradise, An Islamic History of the Crusades, (Oxford University Press, Oxford
2014) p.232. See also, Jean Richard, The Mongols and the Franks, Journal of Asian History 3, no. 1, 45-57.
(1969) p. 54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41929939.
54
11
great grandson of Genghis in 1271.61 These, however, were never achieved. Nevertheless, it is
clear the Mongols caused Europeans such as Louis IX and Edward I to make decisions based
on their influence and presence.
The Mongol invasions were the catalyst for a wave of missionaries to be sent east to discover
more about the unknown world around them. Many of these missionaries were sent on behalf
of various popes and other Christian rulers. Not only were they sent to discover more about the
Mongols but also in an attempt to convert other peoples to Christianity. It is unlikely that
without the Mongols there would have been such a large-scale desire to explore further east.
The most notable of these missionaries were William of Rubruck and John of Carprini.
Carprini was sent by Pope Innocent IV in April 1245 and returned two and a half years later
reporting on the division between Batu and Guyuk. Carprini’s account suggested the Mongols
would return to invade Europe. Pope Innocent was not convinced about the chances of being
able to prevent an occupation.62 Rubruck’s journey in 1253 explored in detail the customs of
the Mongols providing a wealth of information.63 As Phillips explains, neither Carprini nor
Rubruck had any impact at all on Mongol policy and intentions.64 It was the information that
they gathered such as Rubruck’s description of Karakorum as being inferior to St. Denis in
France, even though it was the capital of the Mongol Empire, that helped to forge opinions and
ideas. Rubruck also describes the wealth of culture and different peoples in Karakorum,
expressing his surprise to meet a Parisian goldsmith and an Englishman.65 The use of
missionaries allowed Europe to expand its horizons in a way that, without the Mongols, would
61
Denis Sinor, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44, The Mongols in the West (1999) p.27. See also,
Jacques Paviot, England and the Mongols (c. 1260-1330). Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 10, no. 3, 30518, (2000): 305-18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25188032.
62
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014) p.93.
63
Peter Jackson, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck, (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis 2009)
64
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 79.
65
Peter Jackson, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck, (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis 2009)
12
not have been possible before. The missionaries opened up channels of communication and the
basis for future travel.
The Mongols were generally tolerant of other religions and therefore many Christians were
able to travel to Asia freely and expand European horizons as a direct consequence of Mongol
supremacy in Asia. It allowed those in Europe to conduct business with the Far East without
having to use Muslim middlemen.66 Genghis introduced a system to benefit and encourage
trading. He made traders exempt from tax and gave them special passport-like items called
Paiza which gave them immunity providing them with protection within the Mongol realm.67
The decreased transaction and protection costs across the overland trade routes resulted in an
‘unprecedented expansion of the market for the Western European cities.’68 With this
newfound ability to travel vast distances between two completely different cultures the likes of
gunpowder, silk and spices were introduced to Europe and other technologies and ideas were
spread. The cultural exchange would go on to benefit Europe more, for, as Alexander Anievas
suggests, ‘such late-developing societies did not need to start from scratch but could instead
acquire and refine the most advanced technologies and organisational forms pioneered by
earlier developers.’69 Part of Genghis’ plan was to unite the world, after conquest, with peace
and trade, the so-called Pax Mongolica, hence he placed special importance on the traders
giving them status and protection that they had previously not had. Phillips suggests that the
Pax Mongolica is misleading. He, following Tacitus’ viewpoint of ancient Rome, says the
66
Peter Jackson, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 22 - The Mongols and Europe pp. 701-719
(Cambridge University Press 2016), p. 717.
67
Ibid. p. 717.
68
Alexander, Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu. The Long Thirteenth Century: Structural Crisis, Conjunctural
Catastrophe. In How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism, 64-90, (London: Pluto
Press, 2015), p. 75.
69
Ibid, p. 67.
13
Mongols created desert and called it peace.70 However, there is actually little evidence to
suggest it was substantially safer to make journeys. From as early as the 1240s there were
disputes between Mongol rulers especially those of 1263-64 between Hülegü and Berke
rendering trade routes impassable while conflict ensued.71 Whenever a ruler died there, one
had to assume conflict could very easily arise and thus it would no longer be safe. Nevertheless
trade was still encouraged and cultural exchange was evident during the Mongol period
allowing both the West and East to make advances in science and knowledge.
Compared with the impacts experienced by the Islamic world, Europe, partly due to its
location, was scarcely affected. The Golden age of Islam, however, was brought to a halt. The
destruction of Merv and Nishapur in 1221 and the sacking of Baghdad in 1258, centres of
Muslim learning and dominance, only begin to highlight the scale of annihilation inflicted upon
the Muslim populations of Asia. Ibn al-Labbād wrote, ‘It is as if their aim were the
extermination of the species.’ Remarks of this sort were common among Muslim chroniclers
and even Rashid al-Din concedes that the Mongols had killed more people than anybody before
them since humankind began. He then lists over twenty cities and writes, ‘scarcely anyone
survived’.72 This is substantiated by Ibn al-Athir’s reports of 700,000 people being
systematically slaughtered after the capture of Merv.73 It is Jackson’s belief that the Mongol
invasions only appear so bad because of the short time period they occurred within. Also, that
atrocities of this nature were commonplace in the medieval world and consequently in the same
situation another people would have produced similar results.74 The Mongols valued skilled
70
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 82. See also Peter
Jackson, The Mongols and the Islamic World, from Conquest to Conversion, (Yale University Press, 2017) p.
210.
71
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014), p.310.
72
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the Islamic World, from Conquest to Conversion, (Yale University Press,
2017) p. 154.
73
J.R.S.Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 72.
74
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the Islamic World, from Conquest to Conversion, (Yale University Press,
2017) p. 180.
14
workmen and moved them around the empire at will, shifting the forefront of discovery and
creation. 3000 artisan households were relocated to northern China among others, consequently
inserting Muslim culture into China.75 The Mongols although remembered distinctly for their
brutality also instigated change. Timothy May states that the conquests prompted a perceivable
shift in technology, ideas, culture, religion, warfare and many other areas.76 Therefore, the
impact upon the Islamic world although more damaging also led to the introduction of Islam
to new audiences increasing its influence. The similarities provided by this comparison show
the common sense of doom. However, the differences were great as a result of the lack of both
significant occupation within Europe and interference of ruling politics.
By contrast the overall impact upon Europe in the thirteenth century was slight. Those in
Hungary and Poland experienced a brief occupation during which towns and villages were left
deserted as the population within the low-lying regions was decimated. However, upon the
Mongol retreat a quick recovery was implemented by King Béla highlighting the short-term
impact. For those further west, their primary experience of the Mongols was the fear instilled
by chroniclers such as Matthew Paris and Thomas of Spalato who expressed and helped to
exacerbate the sense of doom at the time. Their accounts typify the underlying confusion and
terror of the time providing clear examples of the psychological impact of the Mongol
invasions. However, these fears were not realised. Although European commercial interests in
the Far East survived, trade between west and east dropped off significantly with the
disintegration of the Mongol empire.77 What little negotiation there was between Louis and
Eljigidei, provided Europeans, most notably the Papacy, with a greater understanding of the
75
Peter Jackson, The Mongols and the Islamic World, from Conquest to Conversion, (Yale University Press,
2017) p. 226.
76
Timothy May, The Mongol Conquests in World History, (Reaktion Books, London, 2013) p. 22.
77
Alexander, Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu. The Long Thirteenth Century: Structural Crisis, Conjunctural
Catastrophe. In How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism, 64-90, (London: Pluto
Press, 2015), p. 76.
15
world and the need to confirm their position within it with greater precision.78 As Charles
Melville states, ‘the West alternated between hope of converting the Mongols and the view
they represented one of the signs of the apocalypse.’79 While the Mongols annexed most of
central Asia and left dynasties that ruled over many different regions of Asia for centuries to
come, their direct effects on Europe were comparatively limited.
78
79
Malcolm Barber, The Two Cities, Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (Oxford, Routledge 2004) p.461.
Charles Melville, Review of ‘The Mongols and the West’ by Peter Jackson, (Brill, 2006)
16
Bibliography:
Primary:
Ata-Malik Juvayni, History of a World Conqueror Vol 1, (Harvard University Press, 1958).
https://archive.org/details/historyoftheworl011691mbp/page/n419
Eudes de Châteauroux, The Seventh Crusade Sources and Documents, Trans. Peter Jackson,
(Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009).
Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, Vol 1, Matthew Paris’s English History from 1235 to 1273,
trans. J.A.Giles.(London, 1852).
https://archive.org/details/matthewparissen01rishgoog/page/n12
Prester John, The Legend and its Sources, ed. Keagan Brewer, (Routledge, 2015)
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Mg2yCQAAQBAJ
The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck, ed. Peter Jackson (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis
2009)
The Seventh Crusade 1244-1254, Sources and Documents, Trans. Peter Jackson, (Routledge,
2009)
Secondary:
Anievas, Alexander, and Kerem, Nişancioğlu. The Long Thirteenth Century: Structural
Crisis, Conjunctural Catastrophe. In How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of
Capitalism, 64-90, (London: Pluto Press, 2015).
Barber, Malcolm, The Two Cities, Medieval Europe 1050-1320 (Oxford, Routledge 2004)
p.339
Barraclough Geoffrey, The Crucible of Europe, (California University Press, 1976)
Cobb, Paul.M, The Race for Paradise, An Islamic History of the Crusades, (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2014) p.219.
DeWeese, Devin. The Influence of the Mongols on the Religious Consciousness of Thirteenth
Century Europe; Mongolian Studies 5, 41-78. (1978) p.47
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43193054. h
Fletcher, Joseph. The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives. Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies 46, no. 1, pp.11-50. (1986) p. 47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2719074
Franklin, Simon, The New Cambridge Medieval History, chapter 24 – Rus, pp. 796-808,
(Cambridge University Press 2016) p.796.
Jackson, Peter, The Mongols and the Islamic World, from Conquest to Conversion, (Yale
University Press, 2017) p. 154
17
Jackson Peter, The Mongols and the West (Routledge: Abingdon 2014)
Jackson, Peter, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 22 - The Mongols and Europe
(Cambridge University Press 2016)
Laszlovszky, József, Stephen Pow, Beatrix F. Romhányi, László Ferenczi, and Zsolt Pinke.
Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241–42: Short- and Long-Term
Perspectives. The Hungarian Historical Review 7, no. 3 (2018): 419-50.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26571620
Marshall, Robert, Storm from the East (Penguin Books, London 1994)
May, Timothy, The Mongol Conquests in World History, (Reaktion Books, London, 2013)
Melville, Charles. Inner Asia 8, no. 1 (2006): 139-42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615522
Sinor, Denis, Journal of Asian History vol.33, pp.1-44, The Mongols in the West (1999)
Paviot, Jacques, England and the Mongols (c. 1260-1330)." Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society 10, no. 3, 305-18, (2000): 305-18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25188032.
Phillips, J.R.S, The Medieval Expansion of Europe (Oxford University Press, 1988)
Richard, Jean, The Mongols and the Franks, Journal of Asian History 3, no. 1, 45-57. (1969)
p. 54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41929939.
Rowell, S. C, The New Cambridge Medieval History Chapter 24 – The Central European
Kingdoms p.754 -778 (Cambridge University Press 2016)
Salagean, Tudor, Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century: The Rise of the
Congregational System, (Brill, 2016)
Tyerman, Christopher, God’s War, A New History of the Crusades, (Penguin Books, London
2006)