The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
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Centre For Strategic‫ﻟﻠﺪﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ‬
Studies (KCSS)
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‫ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ‬
Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait‫ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ‬
Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The
Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
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‫( ﻭ‬21)Centre
‫ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻴﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮﻳﻦ‬
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Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
‫ﺳﺎﻣﻲ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ‬
.‫ﺩ‬
Strategic Studies (KCSS)‫ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺝ‬
The‫ﺧﺎﻟﺪ‬Kuwait
Centre
For Strategic Studies
(KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait
(2009‫ ﺩﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ‬14) ‫ﻛﻞ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻮﻕ ﻣﺤﻔﻮﻅﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺆﻟﻒ‬
Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic
Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The
Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies
(KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait
Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic
Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS)The
Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies
(KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait
Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic
Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The
Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For
Strategic Studies (KCSS) The Kuwait Centre For Strategic Studies
‫ﻓﻬﺮﺱ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺕ‬
‫ﺗﻤﻬﻴﺪ‬
‫ﺹ‪4‬‬
‫ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻲ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻔﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺹ‪5‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻄﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﺜﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ‪/‬ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻱ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
‫ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
‫ﻣﺸﺮﻭﻉ ‪ Green Salt‬ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
‫ﺹ‪7‬‬
‫ﺹ ‪12‬‬
‫ﺹ ‪19‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﻟﻌﺎﻡ ‪2008‬‬
‫ﺹ ‪24‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻹﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﻜﻲ ﺗﻄﻮﺭ ﺳﻼﺣﺎ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺎ‬
‫ﺹ ‪27‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﻼﺻﺔ‬
‫ﺹ ‪33‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﺟﻊ‬
‫ﺹ ‪37‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻼﺣﻖ‬
‫ﺹ ‪38‬‬
‫‪2‬‬
"Mr. Obama's top advisers say they no longer believe the key
finding of a much disputed National Intelligence Estimate
about Iran, published a year before President George W.
Bush left office, which said that Iranian scientists ended all
work on designing a nuclear warhead in late 2003…
After reviewing new documents that have leaked out of
Iran and debriefing defectors lured to the West, Mr. Obama's
advisers say they believe the work on weapons design is
continuing on a smaller scale"
(Source: Christopher Hitchens ",Trigger MechanismIran inches closer to acquiring
nuclear weapons., posted Monday, Jan. 4, 2010, at 11:32 AM ET, at
http://www.slate.com/id/2240460/pagenum/all/
3
‫ﺗﻤﻬﻴــــــــــﺪ‬
‫ﻳﻜﺘﺴﺐ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺃﻫﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻛﻞ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻴﻪ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻳﺤﺎﻭﻝ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﻳﺠﻴ��ﺐ ﻭﺑﺼ��ﻮﺭﺓ ﺣﺎﺳ��ﻤﺔ ﻋ��ﻦ ﺍﻟﺴ��ﺆﺍﻝ ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﻣ��ﺎ ﻳ��ﺰﺍﻝ ﻳﺜﻴ��ﺮ ﻗﻠ��ﻖ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ��ﺔ ﻭﻫ��ﻮ ﺑﺒﺴ��ﺎﻁﺔ‪ :‬ﻫ��ﻞ ﺗﺤ��ﺎﻭﻝ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻓﻌ��ﻼ ﺗﻄ��ﻮﻳﺮ‬
‫ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴ���ﺎ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ���ﺔ ﻟﻼﺳ���ﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺴ���ﻠﻤﻲ ﻓﻘ���ﻂ‪ ،‬ﺃﻡ ﺃﻧﻬ���ﺎ ﺗﺤ���ﺎﻭﻝ ﺃﻳﻀ���ﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺤﺼ��ﻮﻝ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﻗ��ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻋﺴ��ﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺃﻳﻀ��ﺎ؟ ﻭﻣﺘ��ﻰ ﺳ��ﻮﻑ ﺗﺤﻘ��ﻖ‬
‫ﺫﻟﻚ؟‬
‫ﺳﻮﻑ ﻧﻘﻮﻡ ﺑﺎﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺣﻴﺎﺩﻳ�ﺔ ﻭﻣﻮﺿ�ﻮﻋﻴﺔ‪،‬‬
‫ﻣﻌﺘﻤﺪﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﻛ�ﻞ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻫ�ﻮ ﻣﺘ�ﻮﻓﺮ ﻟﻨ�ﺎ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣ�ﺎﺕ ﻣﺪﻋﻤ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺑﺘﻘﺎﺭﻳﺮ ﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﺳﻮﺍء ﻣﻦ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺃﻭ ﻣﻨﻈﻤ�ﺎﺕ ﺩﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻣﺮﺍﻛ�ﺰ ﺩﺭﺍﺳ�ﺎﺕ‬
‫ﻣﺘﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﻴﻦ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ‪ .‬ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺪﺍﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺿﻴﺢ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﻟ��ﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎﻟ��ﻚ ﻣ��ﻦ ﺣﺎﻟ��ﺔ ﺳ��ﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻟﺪﻭﻟ��ﺔ ﻗﺎﻣ��ﺖ ﺑﺘﻄ��ﻮﻳﺮ ﻗ��ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ‬
‫ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻭﻛ�ﺎﻥ ﻫ�ﺬﺍ ﻭﺍﺿ�ﺤﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﺑﺼ�ﻮﺭﺓ ﺣﺎﺳ�ﻤﺔ ﺇﻻ‬
‫ﺑﻌ��ﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺧﺮﺟ��ﺖ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟ��ﺪﻭﻝ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﻌ��ﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﻨﺒ��ﺄ ﻗﻴﺎﻣﻬ��ﺎ ﺑﺘﻔﺠﻴ��ﺮ ﻧ��ﺎﺟﺢ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﺫﻟ��ﻚ ﺑﺴ��ﺒﺐ ﺃﻥ ﻛ��ﻞ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ ﺃﺧﻔ��ﺖ ﺍﻷﻣ��ﺮ ﻻﺗﺼ��ﺎﻟﻪ ﺑﻤﺼ��ﺎﻟﺤﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻴ��ﺎ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻨﺴ�ﻖ ﺳ��ﺎﺭﺕ ﻛ��ﻞ ﻣ��ﻦ ﺇﺳ��ﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﻭﺟﻨ��ﻮﺏ ﺇﻓﺮﻳﻘﻴ��ﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻨ��ﺪ‬
‫ﻭﺑﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺮﺍﺯﻳﻞ ﻭﻏﻴﺮﻫﺎ‪.‬‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻲ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﻔﻮﻕ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫)‪In August 1974, a U.S. special national intelligence estimate (PDF‬‬
‫‪declared that while "Iran's much publicized nuclear power intentions are‬‬
‫‪entirely in the planning stage," the ambitions of the shah could lead Iran‬‬
‫‪to pursue nuclear weapons, especially in the shadow of India's successful‬‬
‫‪nuclear test in May 1974.‬‬
‫•‬
‫ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﻮﻁﻨﻲ ﻟﻠﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺘﺮﺓ ﻣﺒﻜ�ﺮﺓ‬
‫ﺟﺪﺍ ﻭﻫﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ 1974‬ﺃﻧﻬ�ﺎ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻫ�ﻲ ﺇﻻ ﻓﺘ�ﺮﺓ ﻭﺟﻴ�ﺰﺓ ﻓﻘ�ﻂ ﻭﺗﺘﺤ�ﻮﻝ ﺃﺣ�ﻼﻡ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺸﺎﻩ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺭﺿﺎ ﺑﻬﻠﻮﻱ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺸ�ﺮﻭﻉ ﺍﻟ�ﻮﻁﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﻨ�ﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ�ﻲ ‪-‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻄ�ﻴﻂ ﺣﻴﻨﺌ�ﺬ – ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟ�ﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ�ﻜﺮﻱ‪ ،‬ﺧﺎﺻ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺑﻌﺪ ﻧﺠﺎﺡ ﺍﻟﻬﻨﺪ ﻓﻲ ﺇﻧﺠﺎﺯ ﺃﻭﻝ ﺗﻔﺠﻴﺮ ﻧﺎﺟﺢ ﻟﻘﻨﺒﻠﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ ‪1974‬‬
‫‪The withdrawal of Western support after the Islamic Revolution slowed‬‬
‫‪Iran's nuclear progress. And a confluence of factors--opposition to‬‬
‫‪nuclear technology by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exodus of‬‬
‫‪nuclear scientists, and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear facility by Israel in‬‬
‫‪1981‬‬
‫•‬
‫ﻭﻟﻘ��ﺪ ﻟﻌﺒ��ﺖ ﻋﻮﺍﻣ��ﻞ ﻋ��ﺪﺓ ﺩﻭﺭﺍ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺗ��ﺄﺧﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟ��ﻪ ﺍﻟﻨ��ﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ��ﻜﺮﻱ‬
‫ﻹﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻭﻗﻒ ﺍﻟﺪﻋﻢ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻲ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺑﻲ ﻹﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻓﻴﻤ�ﺎ ﺑﻌ�ﺪ ﺍﻟﺜ�ﻮﺭﺓ‬
‫ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺒﺮﺍﻳﺮ ‪ .1979‬ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺃﻫﻢ ﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺄﺧﻴﺮ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟ�ﻪ‬
‫ﻛ���ﺎﻥ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳ���ﺪ ﻋ���ﺰﻭﻑ ﺯﻋ���ﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺜ���ﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻹﺳ���ﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﻣ���ﺎﻡ ﺭﻭﺡ ﷲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﻤﻴﻨﻲ ﻋ�ﻦ ﻫ�ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟ�ﻪ ﻷﺳ�ﺒﺎﺏ ﺩﻳﻨﻴ�ﺔ ﺑﺤﺘ�ﺔ ﺗﺘﻌﻠ�ﻖ ﺑﻜ�ﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﺴ�ﻼﺡ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺳﻼﺡ ﺗﺪﻣﻴﺮ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻻ ﻳﻔﺮﻕ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﺭﺑﻴﻦ ﻭﻏﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﺭﺑﻴﻦ‪.‬‬
‫•‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫ﻭﻟﻜ�ﻦ ﺑﻮﺻ�ﻮﻝ ﺁﻳ�ﺔ ﷲ ﻋﻠ�ﻲ ﺧ��ﺎﻣﻨﺌﻲ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺳ�ﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﻜ�ﻢ ﻓﻴﻤ�ﺎ ﺑﻌ��ﺪ‬
‫ﻭﻓﺎﺓ ﺍﻹﻣﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺨﻤﻴﻨﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻳﻮﻧﻴ�ﻮ ‪ ،1989‬ﺣﺼ�ﻞ ﺗﺤ�ﻮﻝ ﻛﺒﻴ�ﺮ ﻓ�ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﺔ ﺇﺫ ﺃﺻﺒﺢ ﻭﺍﺿﺤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺇﻥ‬
‫ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻨﻔﻲ ﺃﻥ ﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺠﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺃﻳﺔ ﺃﻫﺪﺍﻑ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ‬
‫ﺍﻷﻫﺪﺍﻑ ﺗﺒﺪﻭ ﻭﺍﺿﺤﺔ ﻟﻌﻴﻮﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﻗﺒﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻤﺮﺳﻴﻦ‪.‬‬
‫‪Unlike his predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei held a more favorable‬‬
‫‪view of nuclear energy and military technology, and set out to rebuild‬‬
‫‪Tehran's program. Analysts also believe the discovery of Iraq's‬‬
‫‪clandestine nuclear weapons program during the 1991 Gulf War, as well‬‬
‫‪as a growing U.S. presence in the region, pushed Tehran to ramp up its‬‬
‫‪research.‬‬
‫•‬
‫• ﻭﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﻕ ﻳﺠﺐ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﻗ�ﺐ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻳ�ﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻳ�ﺮﻯ ﺇﻥ ﻛ�ﺎﻥ‬
‫ﻫ�ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﺤ�ﻮﻝ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻳﺪﻋﻤ�ﻪ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺣﻴ��ﺚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻐﻴﺮﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺃﺭﺽ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ ﺃﻋﻄ�ﺖ ﻋﻨﺎﺻ�ﺮ ﺟﺪﻳ�ﺪﺓ ﻟ�ﺪﺍﺋﺮﺓ‬
‫ﺻﻨﻊ ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻲ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻟﻜﻲ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﺑﻤﺜ�ﻞ ﻫ�ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻐﻴ�ﺮ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺠ��ﺬﺭﻱ – ﻓ��ﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﻬ��ﺪ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳ��ﺪ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻬﻮﺭﻳ��ﺔ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴ��ﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓ��ﻲ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺍﻟﻤ��ﺮﺍﻗﺒﻴﻦ ﺃﻧ��ﻪ ﻳ��ﺄﺗﻲ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺳ��ﻠﻢ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻ��ﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳ��ﺪﺓ‬
‫ﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ‪:‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ﺍﻛﺘﺸﺎﻑ ﻣﺪﻯ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻗﻲ ﻓﻴﻤ�ﺎ ﺑﻌ�ﺪ ﻫﺰﻳﻤ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻧﻈﺎﻡ ﺻﺪﺍﻡ ﺣﺴ�ﻴﻦ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺣ�ﺮﺏ ﺗﺤﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﺩﻭﻟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻳ�ﺖ ﻋ�ﺎﻡ‬
‫‪.1991‬‬
‫‪ .2‬ﺗﺰﺍﻳ��ﺪ ﺍﻟﻮﺟ��ﻮﺩ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜ��ﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻐﺮﺑ��ﻲ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ��ﻜﺮﻱ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺣﺮﺏ ‪.1991‬‬
‫• ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻬﻢ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺘﻨﺎ ﻟﻬﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺿ�ﻮﻉ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺴ�ﺎﺅﻻﺕ ﺣ�ﻮﻝ ﺣﺠ�ﻢ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧ���ﺎﻣﺞ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ���ﺪﺍﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﺮﺍﻛ���ﺰﻩ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ���ﻦ ﻳﻌﻤ���ﻞ ﺑ���ﻪ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ���ﻦ ﻳ���ﺰﻭﺩﻩ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺝ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣﻦ ﻳﺪﻳﺮﻩ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺪﺍﺧﻞ ﻭﻏﻴﺮﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺴﺎﺅﻻﺕ ﺃﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﺪﺩ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺍﻟﺴﺠﺎﻝ ﺍﻟﺪﺍﺋﺮ ﻣﻨ�ﺬ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻭﺣﺘﻰ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﻡ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫‪6‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻱ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬/‫ﺍﻟﻄﺎﺑﻊ ﺍﻟﺜﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ‬
‫ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ�ﻜﺮﻱ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧ�ﺎﻣﺞ‬/ ‫• ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺎﺑﻊ ﺛﻨ�ﺎﺋﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟ�ﻪ ﺍﻟﻤ�ﺪﻧﻲ‬
‫ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻭﺣ�ﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳ�ﺎﺕ ﻓ�ﻲ‬Paul Kerr ‫ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ�ﻲ ﻳﻘ�ﻮﻝ‬
2009 ‫ﺍﻟﻜﻮﻧﺠﺮﺱ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ ﻟﻠﻜﻮﻧﺠﺮﺱ ﻓﻲ‬
•
Paul K. Kerr of the Congressional Research Service wrote in an August
2009 report (PDF) that the principal proliferation concern is "Tehran's
construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility " at
Natanz. Experts say enrichment of uranium hexafluoride gas is of
particular concern, because producing weapons-grade fuel (HEU) is
considered the most difficult aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Kerr also
counts Iran's construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak--which
contains plutonium in its spent fuel--as another proliferation concern.
‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻠ��ﻖ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴ��ﻲ ﻫ��ﻮ ﺑﻨ��ﺎء ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﻤﻔﺎﻋ��ﻞ ﻳﻘ��ﻮﻡ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺃﺟﻬ��ﺰﺓ‬
‫ﻁﺮﺩ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﻱ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﻐﺎﺯ ﻟﻠﺘﺨﺼﻴﺐ ﻓﻲ ﻧﺎﺗ�ﺎﻧﺰ‬
‫ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺨﺒﺮﺍء ﺃﻥ ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺐ ﻏﺎﺯ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜﺴﺎﻓﻠﻮﺭﺍﻳﺪ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ‬
‫ ﻭﻫ��ﻮ ﺃﺻ��ﻌﺐ ﻣﺮﺣﻠ��ﺔ‬HEU ‫ﺇﻧﺘ��ﺎﺝ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ ﻋ��ﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ‬
‫ ﻛﻤ�ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻠ�ﻖ ﺍﻵﺧ�ﺮ ﻫ�ﻮ ﺑﻨ�ﺎء ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ‬.‫ﻓﻲ ﺩﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻮﻗ�ﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﻨ�ﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﻟﻤﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺁﺧﺮ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺎء ﺍﻟﺜﻘﻴﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺁﺭﺍﻙ ﻣﻤ�ﺎ ﻳ�ﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺇﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ‬
‫ﻣﺎﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﻮﺗﻮﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻓ�ﻲ ﻭﻗ�ﻮﺩﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺴ�ﺘﺨﺪﻡ )ﻭﻛﻼﻫﻤ�ﺎ ﻋﻨﺼ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﻓ�ﻲ‬
..(‫ﺃﻱ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻱ‬
•
the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center employs as many as three thousand
scientists and is suspected of housing Iran's weapons program, according to the
U.S.-funded nonpartisan Congressional Research Service. Isfahan is also the
location of Iran's uranium-conversion efforts, where approximately 366 tons of
uranium hexafluoride has been produced since March 2004. This so-called
feedstock is fed into centrifuge at another central site: the Natanz enrichment
facility
7
‫ﺣﻠﻘﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺘﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﻠﻮﺗﻮﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ‬
‫ﻳﺴﺘﺨﺪﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺘﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻬﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻠﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ‪235‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺼﺐ ﺑﺪﺭﺟﺔ ‪ %90‬ﻟﻠﺴﻼﺡ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺑﻠﻮﺗﻮﻧﻴﻮﻡ‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﺃﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺃﺻﻔﻬﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻲ ﻓﻴﻌﻤ�ﻞ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻳﺰﻳ�ﺪ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺛﻼﺛ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺁﻻﻑ ﻋﺎﻟﻢ ﻭﻣﺨﺘﺺ ﻭﻓﻨﻲ‪ .‬ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰ ﻳﻀ�ﻢ ﻣﺮﻛ�ﺰ ﺇﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻮﻗ��ﻮﺩ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴ��ﻲ ﺣﻴ��ﺚ ﺗ��ﻢ ﺇﻧﺘ��ﺎﺝ ‪ 366‬ﻁ��ﻦ ﻣ��ﻦ ﻫﻴﻜﺴ��ﺎﻓﻠﻮﺭﺍﻳﺪ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻣﻨﺬ ﻣﺎﺭﺱ ‪ 2004‬ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﺎ‪ .‬ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻮﻗ�ﻮﺩ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻳﺴ�ﻤﻰ‬
‫ﻣﺨﺰﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻐﺬﻳﺔ )ﻟﻠﻤﻔ�ﺎﻋﻼﺕ( ﻳﺤﻘ�ﻦ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺃﺟﻬ�ﺰﺓ ﻁ�ﺮﺩ ﻣﺮﻛ�ﺰﻱ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﻧﺎﺗﺎﻧﺰ ﻟﺘﺨﺼﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ‪.‬‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻧﺎﺗﺎﻧﺰ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﺃﺟﻬﺰﺓ ﺍﻟﻄ�ﺮﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻛ�ﺰﻱ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﻴ�ﻞ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ‬
‫ﺗﺪﻋﻰ )‪ (IR-1‬ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻹﻳﺮﺍﻥ ‪ -‬ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻢ ﺷﺮﺍءﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻥ –‬
‫ﺑﺘﺪﻭﻳﺮ ﻫﻜﺴﺎﻓﻠﻮﺭﺍﻳﺪ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﺑﺴ�ﺮﻋﺔ ﻛﺒﻴ�ﺮﺓ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺃﺟ�ﻞ ﺯﻳ�ﺎﺩﺓ‬
‫ﻧﺴ����ﺒﺔ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ����ﻮﻡ‪ uranium-235 235-‬ﻓﻴ�����ﻪ‪ .‬ﻭﻛﻤ����ﺎ ﻫ�����ﻮ‬
‫ﻣﻌ�ﺮﻭﻑ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌ�ﻲ ﻳﺤﺘ�ﻮﻱ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻧﺴ�ﺒﺘﻪ ‪%‬‬
‫‪ 0.7‬ﻣﻦ ﺃﻋﻤﺪﺓ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ‪.235-‬‬
‫ﻭﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻣﻨﺨﻔﺾ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼﻴﺐ ‪LEU‬‬
‫ﻫ��ﻮ ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﻳ��ﺘﻢ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺒﻪ ﻣ��ﺎ ﺑ��ﻴﻦ ‪ ،%3-5‬ﺃﻣ��ﺎ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ ﻋ��ﺎﻟﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼﻴﺐ ‪ HEU‬ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺒﻪ ﺑﺄﻳﺔ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺗﺰﻳ�ﺪ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ‬
‫‪ ، %20‬ﻭﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻋ�ﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ�ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻳﻤﻜ�ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﺳ��ﺘﺨﺪﺍﻣﻪ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺳ��ﻼﺡ ﻧ��ﻮﻭﻱ ﻳﺘﻄﻠ��ﺐ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜ��ﻮﻥ ﻗ �ﺪ ﺗ��ﻢ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺒﻪ‬
‫ﺑﺪﺭﺟﺔ ‪.%90‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﻘﺪﺭ ﺩﻳﻔﻴﺪ ﺃﻟﺒﺮﺍﻳﺖ )ﻭﻫ�ﻮ ﻣﻔ�ﺘﺶ ﺳ�ﺎﺑﻖ ﻋ�ﻦ ﺍﻷﺳ�ﻠﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻟ�ﺪﻯ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﺭﻳ�ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ�ﺪﻳﺮ ﻣﺆﺳﺴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻮﻡ ﻭﺍﻷﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ( ‪:‬‬
‫‪Iran is producing roughly 2.77 kg of LEU per day (PDF), a rate that has‬‬
‫‪remained consistent throughout 2009.‬‬
‫‪9‬‬
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‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳ���ﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﻨ���ﺘﺞ ﻳﻮﻣﻴ���ﺎ ‪ 2.77‬ﻛﻴﻠ���ﻮﺟﺮﺍﻡ ﻣ���ﻦ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ���ﻮﻡ ﻣ���ﻨﺨﻔﺾ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼﻴﺐ ‪.LEU‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﻔﻖ ﻣﻊ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺃﻟﺒﺮﺍﻳﺖ ﺃﻳﻀﺎ ﻣﺎﺭﻙ ﻓﻴﺘﺰﺑﺎﺗﺮﻳﻚ )ﻭﻫﻮ ﺧﺒﻴ�ﺮ ﻓ�ﻲ ﻣﻨ�ﻊ‬
‫ﺍﻧﺘﺸﺎﺭ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﺪﻯ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻬ�ﺪ ﺍﻟ�ﺪﻭﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺪﺭﺍﺳ�ﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺳ�ﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻟﻨﺪﻥ ( ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻘﻮﻝ‪:‬‬
‫‪if Iran were to stockpile sufficient LEU they would be able to produce 25‬‬
‫‪kg of weapons-grade uranium for production of a single bomb "within a‬‬
‫"‪couple of months,‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﻟﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺧﺰﻧﺖ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻣﻨﺨﻔﺾ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ�ﻴﺐ‬
‫‪ LEU‬ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ ﻟ��ﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﻓ��ﺈﻥ ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎﻧﻬ��ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻨ��ﺘﺞ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ ﻋ��ﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ‬
‫ﻟﺴﻼﺡ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﺗﻨ�ﺘﺞ ﻗﻨﺒﻠ�ﺔ ﺫﺭﻳ�ﺔ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺧ�ﻼﻝ ﺷ�ﻬﺮﻳﻦ )ﻣ�ﻦ ﺗ�ﺎﺭﻳﺦ‬
‫ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺤﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﺳﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ‪.(2009‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﺘﻔﻖ ﺩﻳﻔﻴﺪ ﺃﻟﺒﺮﺍﻳﺖ ﻣﻊ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ�ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﻨ�ﻲ )ﻓ�ﻲ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠ�ﺔ ﺗﻮﺟ�ﺪ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ‬
‫‪. (CFR.org‬‬
‫ﻭﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﺛﻨﺎء )ﺃﻱ ﻭﻗﺖ ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﺒﺮﺍء ﻫﺬﻩ( ﺃﻋﻠﻦ ﻣﺴ�ﺆﻭﻟﻮﻥ‬
‫ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻮﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ‪ 2009‬ﻋﻦ ﺍﻛﺘﺸﺎﻑ ﻣﻨﺸﺎﺓ ﻗ�ﻢ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻄﺎﻋﺘﻬﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺆﻭﻱ ‪ 3000‬ﺟﻬﺎﺯ ﻁﺮﺩ ﻣﺮﻛﺰﻱ‪.‬‬
‫‪. "Now, that's not a large enough number to make any sense from a‬‬
‫‪commercial standpoint," the official said. "But if you want to use the‬‬
‫‪facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium,‬‬
‫"‪enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size.‬‬
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‫•‬
‫ﻭﻫﻨﺎ ﻳﺆﻛﺪ ﺍﻟﺨﺒﺮﺍء "ﺃﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺩ )ﺃﻱ ‪ 300‬ﺟﻬﺎﺯ( ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ ﻣﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻈ���ﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺠ���ﺎﺭﻱ ﻟﺘﺨﺼ���ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ���ﻮﻡ )ﺃﻱ ﻣﻨﻈ���ﻮﺭ ﺍﻻﺳ���ﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤ���ﺪﻧﻲ(‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜ���ﻦ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛ���ﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻬ���ﺪﻑ ﻫ���ﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻨ���ﺘﺞ ﻛﻤﻴ���ﺔ ﺻ���ﻐﻴﺮﺓ ﻣ���ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻋﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ�ﻴﺐ ﻷﻏ�ﺮﺍﺽ ﺇﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ ﻗﻨﺒﻠ�ﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻗﻨﺒﻠﺘ�ﻴﻦ ﺳ�ﻨﻮﻳﺎ‪،‬‬
‫ﻓﻬﺬﺍ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ"‪.‬‬
‫‪(Greg Bruno', Iran's Nuclear Program,' Updated: September 29, 2009, Council on‬‬
‫‪Foreign Relations,at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/irans_nuclear_program.html‬‬
‫‪10‬‬
‫ﺍﻻﻧﺸﻄﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻻﻧﺪﻣﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﺭ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
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‫ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﻠ��ﺖ ﻭﻛﺎﻟ��ﺔ ﺭﻭﻳﺘ��ﺮﺯ ﻟﻸﻧﺒ��ﺎء ﺧﺒ��ﺮﺍ ﻣﻔ��ﺎﺩﻩ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ��ﺔ‬2009 ‫ﻓ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﺭﻳﺔ‬
•
U.N. investigators want Iran to explain an organizational chart linking
projects to process uranium, test explosives and modify a missile cone for
a nuclear payload, diplomats briefed on the matter say. [...]
‫ﻣﺤﻘﻘﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻭﻥ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺸ�ﺮﺡ ﻣﻐ�ﺰﻯ ﻣﺨﻄ�ﻂ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤ�ﻲ‬
‫)ﻷﻧﺸ�ﻄﺔ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻭﻗ�ﻊ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻳ��ﺪﻫﻢ( ﻳ�ﺮﺑﻂ ﺑ��ﻴﻦ ﺑ��ﺮﺍﻣﺞ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ‬
‫ ﻭﺗﻌ�ﺪﻳﻞ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺻ�ﺎﺭﻭﺥ‬،‫ ﺍﺧﺘﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻟﻤﻮﺍﺩ ﺷﺪﻳﺪﺓ ﺍﻹﻧﻔﺠﺎﺭ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ‬
...‫ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪﻱ ﻟﻜﻲ ﻳﺤﻤﻞ ﻋﺒﻮﺓ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ‬
•
•
"This presentation was a graphic demonstration that ... amplifies the
concerns we've had for a number for years. And we are waiting for
answers," Simon Smith, British ambassador to the IAEA, told reporters
after the February 25 briefing.
‫ﺇﻧﻪ ﻳﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﻮﺿﻮﺡ ﻣﺎ ﻛﻨﺎ ﻧﺨﺸﺎﻩ‬...‫"ﻟﻘﺪ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺽ ﻭﺍﺿﺤﺎ ﺟﺪﺍ‬
‫ ﺗﺤ����ﺪﺙ ﺍﻟﺴ����ﻔﻴﺮ‬.‫ ﻭﻧﺤ����ﻦ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻧﻨﺘﻈ����ﺮ ﺇﺟﺎﺑ����ﺎﺕ‬،‫ﻣ����ﻦ ﻣﻨ����ﺬ ﺳ����ﻨﻮﺍﺕ‬
25 ‫ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄ��ﺎﻧﻲ ﻟ��ﺪﻯ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ��ﺔ ﺳ��ﻴﻤﻮﻥ ﺳ��ﻤﻴﺚ ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺍﺳ��ﻠﻴﻦ ﺑﻌ��ﺪ ﻋ��ﺮﺽ‬
"‫ﻓﺒﺮﺍﻳﺮ‬
•
•
•
Iran says its nuclear ambitions are limited to the peaceful generation of
electricity and has dismissed the intelligence, key bits from a laptop
smuggled out of the Islamic Republic and passed to Washington, as
baseless, forged or irrelevant. [...]
‫ﺗ��ﺮﺩ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺑ��ﺄﻥ ﺃﻧﺸ��ﻄﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻫ��ﻲ ﻓﻘ��ﻂ ﻟﻺﻧﺘ��ﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻠﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ��ﺔ‬
‫ ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ���ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ���ﻲ ﺗ���ﻢ ﺟﻤﻌﻬ���ﺎ ﻣ���ﻦ ﺟﻬ���ﺎﺯ ﻛﻤﺒﻴ���ﻮﺗﺮ‬،‫ﺍﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴ���ﺔ‬
‫ﻣﺤﻤﻮﻝ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻬﺮﻳﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻭﺗﺴﻠﻴﻤﻪ ﻟﻮﺍﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺇﻣﺎ‬
•
‫ ﺃﻭ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻤﺖ ﺑﺼﻠﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ‬،‫ ﺃﻭ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺰﻳﻔﺔ‬،‫ﺃﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺃﺳﺎﺱ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﺤﺔ‬
...‫ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻉ‬
12
•
In the power-point presentation, IAEA safeguards chief Olli Heinonen
displayed an organizational diagram linking the three projects with
numbered code names -- "5" for processing nuclear fuel, "110" for
purported tests of an atomic device and "111" for a longer-range, Shahab3 missile adapted to carry it.
•
Project 111 was also known as the "Orchid Office".
•
One of dozens of slides screened by Heinonen cited a progress report on
the related projects for the period July 9, 2003-January 14, 2004. Other
files showed the warhead design project began in July 2002. [...]
‫ﺧﻼﻝ ﻋﺮﺽ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﺋﺢ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻗﺪﻣ�ﻪ ﺭﺋ�ﻴﺲ ﺷ�ﻌﺒﺔ ﺃﻧﻈﻤ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺴ�ﻼﻣﺔ ﻓ�ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﺃﻭﻟﻲ ﻫﻴﻨﻮﻧﻴﻦ ﺗﻢ ﺗﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻤ�ﻲ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻳ�ﺮﺑﻂ ﺍﻟﺒ�ﺮﺍﻣﺞ‬
‫( ﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻮﻗ�ﻮﺩ‬5) ‫ ﺭﻗ�ﻢ‬:‫ﺍﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺃﻋﻄﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺇﺳﻤﺎ ﺭﻣﺰﻳ�ﺎ‬
‫( ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠ��ﻖ ﺑﺘﺠ��ﺎﺭﺏ ﻣﺰﻋﻮﻣ��ﺔ ﻟﻌﺒ��ﻮﺓ‬110) ‫ ﻭﺭﻗ��ﻢ‬..‫ﺍﻟﻨ��ﻮﻭﻱ‬
-‫( ﻟﺘﻜﻴﻴﻒ ﺻﺎﺭﻭﺥ ﺑﻌﻴﺪ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﻯ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮﻉ ﺷ�ﻬﺎﺏ‬111) ‫ ﻭﺭﻗﻢ‬...‫ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ‬
...‫ ﻟﻜﻲ ﻳﺤﻤﻠﻬﺎ‬3
‫( ﻛ���ﺎﻥ ﻳﻄﻠ���ﻖ ﻋﻠﻴ���ﻪ ﺃﻳﻀ���ﺎ ﺇﺳ���ﻢ "ﺍﻟﻤﻜﺘ���ﺐ‬111) ‫ﻛﻤ���ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺸ���ﺮﻭﻉ‬
"‫ﺍﻟﺰﻧﺒﻘﻲ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺸﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺸ�ﺮﺍﺋﺢ ﺃﺷ�ﺎﺭ ﻫﻴﻨ�ﻮﻧﻴﻦ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺗﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﻋ�ﻦ ﺗﻘ�ﺪﻡ‬
.2004 ‫ ﻳﻨ�ﺎﻳﺮ‬14 – 2003 ‫ ﻳﻮﻟﻴ�ﻮ‬9 ‫ﺃﺣﺪ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮﻭﻋﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﻣ�ﻦ‬
‫ﻭﻓﻲ ﻣﻠﻒ ﺁﺧﺮ ﺗﺒﻴﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺼﻤﻴﻢ ﺍﻟﺮﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻗﺪ ﺑﺪﺃ‬
.2002 ‫ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ‬
•
•
•
•
The summary said Heinonen showed diagrams depicting tests with
explosives to be placed in a shaft 400 meters (1,300 feet) underground
and detonated from 10 km (6 miles) away.
13
•
Electrical bridge-wire (EBW) detonators would be used to ensure the
several fissile layers of the warhead blew up in a chain reaction within
130 nanoseconds
‫ﺑ��ﻴﻦ ﻣﻠﺨ��ﺺ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳ��ﺮ ﺭﺳ��ﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﻋ��ﻦ ﺍﺧﺘﺒ��ﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺗﻔﺠﻴ��ﺮ ﺃﺟﺮﻳ��ﺖ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ‬
10 ‫ ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﺟ�ﺮﻯ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴ�ﺮ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻣﺴ�ﺎﻓﺔ‬،‫ ﻣﺘﺮ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺍﻷﺭﺽ‬400 ‫ﻋﻤﻖ‬
(‫ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ﺃﺳﻼﻙ ﺗﻔﺠﻴﺮ ﻋﺎﺑﺮﺓ )ﺃﻭ ﺍﺗﺼ�ﺎﻟﻴﺔ‬.‫ﻛﻴﻠﻮﻣﺘﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﺿﻤﺎﻥ ﺣﺪﻭﺙ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﺗﻔﺠﻴﺮﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻄﺒﻘﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﻠﺮﺃﺱ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺤﺮﺑﻲ ﺿﻤﻦ ﻣﺪﺓ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺠﺎﻭﺯ ﻧﺎﻧﻮ ﺳﻜﻨﺪﺯ‬
•
"The high-tension firing systems and multiple EBW detonators fired
simultaneously are key components of nuclear weapons," the
summary quoted Heinonen as saying.
‫ ﺇﻥ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ ﺃﺳﻼﻙ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴ�ﺮ ﺍﻟﻌ�ﺎﺑﺮﺓ ﺫﺍﺕ‬:‫ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﻫﺎﻳﻨﻮﻧﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺟﺰ‬
‫ ﻫ��ﻲ‬،‫ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻔﺠ��ﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌ��ﺪﺩﺓ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺍﻻﻧﻔﺠ��ﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﺴ��ﻞ‬،‫ﺍﻟﺠﻬ��ﺪ ﺍﻟﻌ��ﺎﻟﻲ‬
.‫ﺃﺟﺰﺍء ﺃﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ‬
•
•
•
Heinonen cited documentation from "Project 111" showing steps,
including mathematical simulations, to design a "spherical warhead",
suitable for the Shahab-3 missile, that would explode at a height of 600
meters (2,000 feet). […]
‫( ﺗﺒ���ﻴﻦ ﺗﻤ���ﺎﺭﻳﻦ‬111) ‫ﻭﺃﺷ���ﺎﺭ ﻫ���ﺎﻳﻨﻮﻧﻴﻦ ﺇﻟ���ﻰ ﻭﺛ���ﺎﺋﻖ ﻣ���ﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧ���ﺎﻣﺞ‬
‫ﻣﺤﺎﻛ����ﺎﺓ ﺭﻳﺎﺿ����ﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﺼ����ﻤﻴﻢ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺣﺮﺑ����ﻲ ﻛ����ﺮﻭﻱ ﺍﻟﺸ����ﻜﻞ ﻣﻨﺎﺳ����ﺐ‬
...‫ ﻣﺘﺮ‬600 ‫ ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻨﻔﺠﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺭﺗﻔﺎﻉ‬3-‫ﻟﺼﺎﺭﻭﺥ ﺷﻬﺎﺏ‬
•
(Mark Heinrich and Louis Charbonneau , Reuters, posted on 3 March 2008 at
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/03/iaea-reveals-iranian-organizational-chart-linkingnuclear-work-with-missile-research.html)
14
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‫‪15‬‬
‫ﻭﺗﻮﻗﻌ��ﺎ ﻣ��ﻦ ﻫ��ﺎﻳﻨﻮﻧﻴﻦ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺳ�ﻮﻑ ﻳﻘﻮﻟ�ﻮﻥ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺸ�ﻬﺪ‬
‫ﺿ������ﺪﻫﻢ ﻣﻔﺒﺮﻛ������ﺔ ﻗ������ﺎﻡ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮﺿ��ﻴﺢ ﻟﻤﻤﺜﻠ��ﻲ ﺍﻟ��ﺪﻭﻝ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﻤﺴ�����ﺔ ﻭﺛﻼﺛ�����ﻴﻦ ﻓ�����ﻲ‬
‫ﻣﺠﻠ��ﺲ ﻣﺤ��ﺎﻓﻈﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ��ﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﺬﺭﻳ��ﺔ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﻫ�����ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ�����ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ�����ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﺣﺘﻮﺍﻫ���������ﺎ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴ���������ﻮﺗﺮ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ���������ﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤ���������ﻮﻝ‬
‫ﻣﺪﻋﻮﻣ���ﺔ ﺃﻳﻀ���ﺎ ﺑﻤ���ﺎ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﻠﺼ���ﻪ ﺧﺒ���ﺮﺍء ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ���ﺔ ﺃﻧﻔﺴ���ﻬﻢ ﺑﻨ���ﺎء ﻋﻠ���ﻰ‬
‫ﺟﻮﻻﺗﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺘﻴﺸﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﺻﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺮﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﻜﺮﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﻘﻨﺒﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﻮﺗﻮﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻧﻘﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﻮﺭﺩﺧﺎﻱ ﻓﺎﻧﻮﻧﻮ ﻟﺼﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﺻﻨﺪﻱ ﺗﺎﻳﻤﺰ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴﺔ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺜﻴﺮ ﻟﻺﻋﺠﺎﺏ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﻗﺒﻴﻦ ﻛﻴﻒ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺗﻮﺻ�ﻠﻮﺍ ﻟﻠﺘﻘﻨﻴ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ ﻳﺘﺤ�ﺪﺙ ﻋﻨﻬ�ﺎ ﺗﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺑﻴﻦ ﺟﻮﻟﻴﺎﻥ ﺑﻮﺭﺟﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﺠﺎﺭﺩﻳﺎﻥ ‪ -‬ﻓﻲ ﻟﻘﺎءﺍﺗﻪ ﻣ�ﻊ ﺧﺒ�ﺮﺍء‬
‫ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ ﻭﺧﺒﺮﺍء ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﺜﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻴﻦ – ﺃﻥ ﺇﺳﻢ ﺍﻵﻟﻴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻫﻮ "‪ "two-point implusion‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﺣﺘ�ﻰ ﻭﺟ�ﻮﺩ ﻣﺜ�ﻞ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ ﺍﻵﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﻣ�ﻦ‬
‫ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ ﺳﺮﻱ ﺟﺪﺍ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﻭﺑﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻦ‬
‫ﻁﺒﻘﺎ ﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ ﻟﻢ ﺗﻨﺸ�ﺮ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻗﺒ�ﻞ ﻓﺈﻧ�ﻪ ﻳﺒ�ﺪﻭ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤ�ﺎء ﺍﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻗ�ﺎﻣﻮﺍ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺧﺘﺒﺎﺭ ﺟﺰء ﻋﺎﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻵﻟﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻛﻤﺎ ﻭﺻﻒ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﻮﺭ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻫﺸ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺸ�ﺪﻳﺪﺓ ﻟ�ﺪﻯ ﻋﻠﻤ�ﺎء ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﻻﻛﺘﺸ�ﺎﻓﻬﻢ‬
‫ ﻣﻤ����ﺎ ﺯﺍﺩ ﻣ����ﻦ ﺍﻟﺸ����ﻌﻮﺭ‬،‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻹﻳ����ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻳﻌﺮﻓ����ﻮﻥ ﻋ����ﻦ ﻫ����ﺬﻩ ﺍﻵﻟﻴ����ﺔ‬
.‫ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﻌﺠﺎﻝ ﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺷﻲء ﻣﺎ ﻹﻳﻘﺎﻑ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
:‫ﻭﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ‬
•
•
James Acton, a British nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, said: "It's remarkable that, before
perfecting step one, they are going straight to step four or five ... To start
with more sophisticated designs speaks of level of technical ambition that
is surprising."
‫ﻛﻤ���ﺎ ﻳﻘ���ﻮﻝ ﺟ���ﻴﻤﺲ ﺃﻛﺘ���ﻮﻥ ﻭﻫ���ﻮ ﺧﺒﻴ���ﺮ ﺃﺳ���ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ���ﺔ ﻓ���ﻲ ﻣﺆﺳﺴ���ﺔ‬
‫ "ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﻫﺶ ﺣﻘﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺃﻥ‬:‫ﻛﺎﺭﻧﻴﺠﻲ ﻟﻠﺴﻼﻡ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﺃﻧﻪ‬
‫ﻳﻨﺠ��ﺰﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﺨﻄ��ﻮﺓ ﺍﻷﻭﻟ��ﻰ )ﻓ��ﻲ ﻣﺸ��ﺮﻭﻋﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﻨ��ﻮﻭﻱ( ﻳﻨﻄﻠﻘ��ﻮﻥ ﻣﺒﺎﺷ��ﺮﺓ‬
‫ ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﺒ��ﺪء ﺑﻌ��ﺪﺓ ﺗﺼ��ﺎﻣﻴﻢ ﻋﺎﻟﻴ��ﺔ‬... ‫ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﺨﻄ��ﻮﺓ ﺍﻟﺮﺍﺑﻌ��ﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﻣﺴ��ﺔ‬
."‫ﺍﻟﺘﻌﻘﻴﺪ ﻳﺒﻴﻦ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﻤﻮﺡ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺜﻴﺮ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻐﺮﺍﺏ‬
•
•
The sophisticated technology, once mastered, allows for the production of
smaller and simpler warheads than older models. It reduces the diameter
of a warhead and makes it easier to put a nuclear warhead on a missile.
‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪﺓ ﺳﻮﻑ ﺗﻤﻜﻦ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻧﺘﺎﺝ ﺭﺅﻭﺱ‬
‫ ﺇﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﻘﻠﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺍﻟﺮﺃﺱ‬.‫ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺃﺻﻐﺮ ﻭﺃﺑﺴﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺅﻭﺱ ﺍﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺤﺮﺑ�ﻲ ﻭﺗﺠﻌ��ﻞ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻬﻞ ﻭﺿ�ﻊ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟ�ﺮﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﺤﺮﺑ��ﻲ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﻣﻘﺪﻣ��ﺔ‬
.‫ﺻﺎﺭﻭﺥ‬
•
•
•
Another western specialist with extensive knowledge of the Iranian
programme said: "It raises the question of who supplied this to them. Did
AQ Khan [a Pakistani scientist who confessed in 2004 to running a
nuclear smuggling ring] have access to this, or is it another player?"
16
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﻭﻣ��ﻦ ﺟﻬ��ﺔ ﺃﺧ��ﺮﻯ ﻳﻄ��ﺮﺡ ﻋ��ﺎﻟﻢ ﻏﺮﺑ��ﻲ ﺿ��ﻠﻴﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺳﺆﺍﻝ‪ :‬ﻣ�ﻦ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﺯﻭﺩ ﺍﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺑﻬ�ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴ�ﺔ‪ .‬ﻫ�ﻞ ﻛ�ﺎﻥ ﻟﻌﺒ�ﺪ ﺍﻟﻘ�ﺎﺩﺭ‬
‫ﺧﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺍﻟﺒﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺍﻋﺘﺮﻑ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ 2004‬ﺑﺄﻧ�ﻪ ﻛ�ﺎﻥ ﻳ�ﺪﻳﺮ ﺣﻠﻘ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻟﺘﻬﺮﻳﺐ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺃﻡ ﺃﻥ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻗﺎﻡ ﺑﻪ ﺁﺧﺮﻭﻥ؟‬
‫ﻭﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﺜﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﺪﻫﺸ�ﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴ�ﺒﺔ ﻟ�ﺮﺩﺓ ﻓﻌ�ﻞ ﺍﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺗﺠ�ﺎﻩ ﺗﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻫﺬﺍ‪:‬‬
‫‪"Iran has rejected most of the IAEA material on weaponisation as‬‬
‫‪forgeries, but has admitted carrying out tests on multiple high-explosive‬‬
‫‪detonations synchronised to within a microsecond. Tehran has told the‬‬
‫‪agency that there is a civilian application for such tests, but has so far not‬‬
‫‪provided any evidence for them.‬‬
‫•‬
‫• ﺃﻥ ﺍﻹﻳ��ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺭﻓﻀ��ﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺠ��ﺰء ﺍﻷﻛﺒ��ﺮ ﻣ��ﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ��ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ ﺟ��ﺎء ﺑﻬ��ﺎ‬
‫ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻬﻢ ﺍﻋﺘﺮﻓﻮﺍ ﺑ�ﺈﺟﺮﺍﺋﻬﻢ ﺗﺠ�ﺎﺭﺏ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴ�ﺮﺍﺕ ﻣﺘﻌ�ﺪﺩﺓ‬
‫ﺗ��ﻢ ﺗﻮﻗﻴﺘﻬ��ﺎ ﻣﺠﺘﻤﻌ��ﺔ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺣ��ﺪﻭﺩ ﺃﺟ��ﺰﺍء ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﻫﻨﺎﻟ��ﻚ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘ��ﺎﺕ‬
‫ﻣﺪﻧﻴ��ﺔ – ﺃﻳﻀ��ﺎ – ﻟﻤﺜ��ﻞ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴ��ﺎﺕ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻬ��ﺎ ﺣﺘ��ﻰ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻟ��ﻢ ﺗﻘ��ﺪﻡ ﺃﻱ‬
‫ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻘﺎﺕ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ‪.‬‬
‫"‪(Julian Borger, "Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design – secret report,‬‬
‫‪guardian.co.uk, Thursday 5 November 2009 20.45 GMT‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫•‬
‫ﻭﻳ��ﺒﻦ ﺍﻟﺸ��ﻜﻞ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﻴﺴ��ﺎﺭ ﺭﺳ��ﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﻴ��ﺎ ﻟﻤ��ﺎ ﻳﻤﻜ��ﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻜ��ﻮﻥ ﻋﻠﻴ��ﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﻴ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻘ�ﻮﻝ ﺗﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻥ‬
‫ﻗﺎﻣﻮﺍ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﻭﺿﻊ ﻋﺒﻮﺓ ﻣﺘﻔﺠﺮﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺻﺎﺭﻭﺥ ﺑﻌﻴ�ﺪ ﺍﻟﻤ�ﺪﻯ ﻣﺜ�ﻞ‬
‫ ﺍﻟﻤﺒ��ﻴﻦ ﺃﺩﻧ��ﺎﻩ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻋ��ﺮﺽ ﻋﺴ��ﻜﺮﻱ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻁﻬ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺃﻣ��ﺎﻡ‬3-‫ﺻ��ﺎﺭﻭﺥ ﺷ��ﻬﺎﺏ‬
‫ ﺃﻱ ﺑﻌ�ﺪ ﺃﺷ�ﻬﺮ‬،2005 ‫ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺤﻤ�ﻮﺩ ﺃﺣﻤ�ﺪﻱ ﻧﺠ�ﺎﺩ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺳ�ﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻋ�ﺎﻡ‬
.‫ﻗﻠﻴﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﺔ‬
Salt ‫ﻣﺸ�����ﺮﻭﻉ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‬
‫• ﺗﻘ����ﻮﻝ ﻟ����ﻮﺭﺍ ﺭﻭﺯﻥ ﻓ����ﻲ‬
‫ﻣﻘ����ﺎﻝ ﻣﺘﺨﺼ����ﺺ ﻛﺘﺒﺘ����ﻪ‬
Green ‫ﻋ��ﻦ ﻣﺸ��ﺮﻭﻉ‬
:Salt
Green
•
According
and
to
American
foreign
officials
interviewed
about
the
contents of the laptop, the
information found there included descriptions of the so-called Green Salt
Project. That project, which involved uranium processing, high
explosives and a missile warhead design, demonstrated what the agency
suspected were links between Iran's military and its ostensibly peaceful
nuclear program. If that evidence were substantiated, it would undercut
Iran's claims that its program is aimed solely at producing electrical
power.
18
‫•‬
‫ﺃﻧﻪ ﻁﺒﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺆﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ﻭﺍﻷﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺗﻤ�ﺖ ﻣﻘ�ﺎﺑﻠﺘﻬﻢ ﺑﺸ�ﺄﻥ‬
‫ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻝ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ�ﻲ ﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ�ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ ﻳﺤﺘﻮﻳﻬ�ﺎ‬
‫ﺗﺼ�ﻒ ﻣﺸ�ﺮﻭﻋﺎ ﺃﻁﻠ�ﻖ ﻋﻠﻴ�ﻪ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻥ ‪،Green Salt Project‬‬
‫ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﺸ��ﺮﻭﻉ ﻳﻀ��ﻢ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ��ﻮﺍﺩ ﺷ��ﺪﻳﺪﺓ ﺍﻻﻧﻔﺠ��ﺎﺭ‪،‬‬
‫ﻭﺗﺼﺎﻣﻴﻢ ﻟﺮﺃﺱ ﺣﺮﺑﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺒ�ﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﺼ�ﻠﺔ ﺑ�ﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧ�ﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ�ﻜﺮﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ��ﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﻣ��ﺎ ﻳﻤﻜ��ﻦ ﺍﻥ ﻳﺴ��ﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﻳﺴ��ﺘﻬﺪﻑ ﺍﻻﺳ��ﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻠﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ‪ ...‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟ��ﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻣ��ﺎ ﺗ��ﻢ ﺗﻌﺰﻳ��ﺰﻩ ﻓﺴ��ﻮﻑ‬
‫ﻳﺤﻄ��ﻢ ﺇﺩﻋ��ﺎءﺍﺕ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺑ��ﺄﻥ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺠﻬ��ﺎ ﻳﺴ��ﺘﻬﺪﻑ ﻓﻘ��ﻂ ﺇﻧﺘ��ﺎﺝ ﺍﻟﻄﺎﻗ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫‪The documents on the laptop described two programs, termed L-101 and‬‬
‫•‬
‫‪L-102 by the Iranians, describing designs and computer simulations that‬‬
‫‪appeared to be related to weapons work. ...‬‬
‫•‬
‫ﺗﺼﻒ ﺍﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺤﺘﻮﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴ�ﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤ�ﻮﻝ ﺑﺮﻧ�ﺎﻣﺠﻴﻦ ﺃﺻ�ﻄﻠﺢ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺴﻤﻴﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﺑـ ‪ L-101‬ﻭ ‪ L-102‬ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ‪....‬‬
‫‪The presentation included selections from more than a thousand pages of‬‬
‫‪Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments that, according‬‬
‫‪to the American officials, showed a longstanding effort to design what‬‬
‫‪appeared to be a nuclear warhead or similar "re-entry vehicle." ..‬‬
‫•‬
‫‪19‬‬
‫•‬
‫ﺿﻢ ﻋ�ﺮﺽ ﻭﺛ�ﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴ�ﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤ�ﻮﻝ ﻣﺨﺘ�ﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺑ�ﻴﻦ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻳﺰﻳ�ﺪ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻛﺜﺮ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺃﻟ�ﻒ ﺻ�ﻔﺤﺔ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺗﻤ�ﺎﺭﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛ�ﺎﺓ ﺍﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿ�ﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻧﺘ�ﺎﺋﺞ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺠ�ﺎﺭﺏ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ ﺑﻴﻨ��ﺖ – ﻁﺒﻘ�ﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺴ�ﺆﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﺍﻷﻣ��ﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ – ﺟﻬ�ﺪ ﻣﺴ��ﺘﻤﺮ‬
‫ ﺍﻭ ﻣ���ﺎ ﻳﺸ���ﺒﻬﻪ "ﻟﻤﺮﻛﺒ���ﺔ‬،‫ﻟﻤ���ﺪﺓ ﻁﻮﻳﻠ���ﺔ ﻟﺘﺼ���ﻤﻴﻢ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺣﺮﺑﻴ���ﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ���ﺔ‬
"(‫ﻣﻌﺎﻭﺩﺓ )ﺍﺧﺘﺮﺍﻕ ﺍﻟﻔﻀﺎء ﺍﻟﺠﻮﻱ‬
(Laura Rozen, "Green Salt and Nuclear Laptop: New IAEA Report Says Iran Answers
Some Questions, Still Has Others to Answer," at
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2008/02/green-salt-and-nuclear-laptop-new-iaea-reportsays-iran-answers-some-questions-still-ha, | Fri Feb. 22, 2008 8:23 AM PST
‫ﻗﺎﻣ��ﺖ ﺻ��ﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﺗ��ﺎﻳﻤﺰ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ ﺑﻨﺸ��ﺮ ﻭﺛ��ﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳ��ﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺎﺭﺳ��ﻴﺔ‬
‫ ﻭﻫ���ﻲ ﺍﻟﺘ���ﻲ‬3‫ ﻭ‬2‫ ﻭ‬1 ‫ﻭﺗﺮﺟﻤﺘﻬ���ﺎ ﻛﻤ���ﺎ ﺗﻈﻬ���ﺮ ﺃﺩﻧ���ﺎﻩ )ﺍﻟﺼ���ﻔﺤﺎﺕ‬
‫ﺗﺘﺤ�ﺪﺙ ﻋ�ﻦ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﻜ�ﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻤ�ﻲ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻳﺒ�ﺪﻭ ﺃﻧ�ﻪ ﻳ�ﺮﺑﻂ ﺟﻬ�ﺎﺕ ﻣﺪﻧﻴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻣﻌﻨﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺑﻨﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺑﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﺍﺧﺮﻯ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺑﺎﻣﺞ‬
.‫ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﺪﺛﻨﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﺃﻋﻼﻩ‬
•
(Times On Line, 14 December 2009)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6955706.ece
20
21
22
23
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﻟﻌﺎﻡ ‪2008‬‬
‫‪"The new intelligence report is in part similar to the 2007 estimate:‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﻋﻤﻮﻣ��ﺎ ﻳﻌ��ﺪ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻱ ﻟﻠﻮﻻﻳ��ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ��ﺪﺓ ﻟﻌ��ﺎﻡ ‪2008‬‬
‫‪ National Intelligence Estimate2008‬ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻼ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ‬
‫ﺃﺻ��ﺪﺭﺗﻪ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻋ��ﺎﻡ ‪ - 2007‬ﻭﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﺍﺧﺘﻠ��ﻒ ﻣﻌ��ﻪ ﺍﻟﻌ��ﺎﻟﻢ ﻛﻠ��ﻪ ﺭﺑﻤ��ﺎ‬
‫ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎء ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ‪ -‬ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺍﺳﺘﻨﺘﺎﺟﺎﺗﻪ ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻳﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﻊ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ‬
‫)ﺃﻱ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻌﺎﻡ ‪ (2007‬ﻓﻲ ﻧﻘﺎﻁ ﻣﺘﻌﺪﺩﺓ‪.‬‬
‫ﻳﻘﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺠﻤﻴﺪ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻷﻧﺸ�ﻄﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ�ﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻧﺘﻬﻰ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺘﺼﻒ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ ،2007‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻣﻊ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻳﺘﺮﺍﺟﻊ ﻭﻳﻘ�ﻮﻝ ﺃﻧ�ﻪ‬
‫ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺩﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﺳ�ﺘﺄﻧﻔﺖ ﻣﺤﺎﻭﻻﺗﻬ�ﺎ ﻣﻨ�ﺬ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻳﺦ!‬
‫ﻭﻛﻤ�ﺎ ﻳﻼﺣ��ﻆ ﺇﻓ�ﺮﺍﻡ ﻛ��ﺎﻡ ‪) Ephraem Kam‬ﻧﺎﺋ�ﺐ ﺭﺋ��ﻴﺲ ﻣﺆﺳﺴ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺩﺭﺍﺳ�ﺎﺕ ﺍﻷﻣ��ﻦ ﺍﻟ��ﻮﻁﻨﻲ ‪ IINSS‬ﻓ��ﻲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌ�ﺔ ﺗ��ﻞ ﺃﺑﻴ��ﺐ ﺑﺈﺳ��ﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ(‬
‫ﻓ��ﺈﻥ ﻋﺒ��ﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻲ ﻟﻌ��ﺎﻡ ‪ 2008‬ﻟﻴﺴ��ﺖ ﻭﺍﺿ��ﺤﺔ ﻓ��ﻲ‬
‫ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺨﺼﻮﺹ‪:‬‬
‫‪"American intelligence does not have enough information to‬‬
‫‪determine with certainty if Iran is prepared to continue the freeze‬‬
‫"‪on its military nuclear program.‬‬
‫‪24‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫"ﺇﻥ ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻤﻠﻚ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﻛﺎﻓﻴﺔ‬
‫ﻟﻜﻲ ﺗﻘﻄﻊ ﺑﺎﻥ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪﺓ ﻟﻤﻮﺍﺻﻠﺔ ﺗﺠﻤﻴﺪ ﻧﺸﺎﻁﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨ�ﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻱ‪".‬‬
‫ﻭﻟﻜ��ﻦ ﻣ��ﺎ ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﻳﻌﻨﻴ��ﻪ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺿ��ﻮء ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳ��ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ��ﺪﺓ ﻫ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺰﻭﺩ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ�ﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﻛﺎﻟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴ�ﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺬﺭﻳ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘ��ﺔ ﺑ��ﺎﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤ��ﻮﻝ ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﺣﺼ��ﻠﺖ ﻋﻠﻴ��ﻪ ﻭﻛﺎﻟ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰﻳﺔ ‪ CIA‬ﻭﻧﻘﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ 2004‬ﻭﺍﻟﺬﻱ‬
‫ﺃﺷﺎﺭﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻧﺎﻗﺸﻨﺎﻫﺎ ﺃﻋﻼﻩ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻧﺸ�ﺎﻁ ﻧ�ﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻱ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻣﻨﺬ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪2002‬؟‬
‫ﺃﻣ�ﺎ ﻓﻴﻤ��ﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠ�ﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻮﺿ��ﻮﻉ ﺍﻷﻫ�ﻢ ﻭﻫ��ﻮ‪ :‬ﻫ�ﻞ ﺍﺗﺨ��ﺬﺕ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﻗ��ﺮﺍﺭﺍ‬
‫ﻧﻬﺎﺋﻴﺎ ﺑﺘﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺳﻼﺡ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ؟ ﻓﺈﻥ ﻛ�ﺎﻡ ﻳﻼﺣ�ﻆ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ ﻳﺼ�ﺮﺡ‬
‫ﺑﺄﻥ‪:‬‬
‫‪The new assessment also allows a measure of doubt as to whether Iran‬‬
‫‪has made a final decision on producing nuclear weapons. Thus, it‬‬
‫•‬
‫‪determines that the American intelligence community does not know if Iran‬‬
‫‪intends to produce nuclear weapons, and notes twice that "Iran could develop‬‬
‫‪nuclear‬‬
‫"‪weapons‬‬
‫‪should‬‬
‫‪it‬‬
‫‪decide‬‬
‫‪to‬‬
‫‪do‬‬
‫‪so.‬‬
‫•‬
‫‪25‬‬
‫ﻭﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻱ ﻟﻌ�ﺎﻡ ‪2007‬‬
‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ ﻳﺸﻴﺮ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﺤﺘﻔﻆ ﺑﺨﻴﺎﺭ ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ‬
‫ﺃﺳ���ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ���ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﻟ���ﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺒﻨﻴ���ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴ���ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴ���ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘ���ﻲ‬
‫ﺗﻤﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺃﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ‪.‬‬
‫‪Similar to the 2007 report, the new assessment also notes that Iran‬‬
‫‪retains the option to develop nuclear weapons, and that it possesses‬‬
‫‪the technological infrastructure that would allow it to develop‬‬
‫‪nuclear weapons.‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳ��ﺪ ﻳﺘ��ﺮﻙ ﻣﺴ��ﺎﺣﺔ ﻟﻠﺸ��ﻚ ﻓﻴﻤ��ﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧ��ﺖ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻗ��ﺪ‬
‫ﻗ����ﺮﺭﺕ ﻧﻬﺎﺋﻴ����ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻨ����ﺘﺞ ﺃﺳ����ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ����ﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻣ����ﻦ ﺛ����ﻢ ﻳﺆﻛ����ﺪ ﺑ����ﺄﻥ‬
‫ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﻠ�ﻢ ﻓﻴﻤ�ﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧ�ﺖ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﻨ�ﻮﻱ ﺇﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ‬
‫ﺃﺳ��ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻳﺸ��ﻴﺮ ﻣ��ﺮﺗﻴﻦ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﺴ��ﺘﻄﻴﻊ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻄ��ﻮﺭ‬
‫ﺃﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻣﺘﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺮﺭﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ‪.‬‬
‫‪(Ephraim Kam, America's Intelligence Assessment On The Nuclear Issue,' IINSS Insight‬‬
‫)‪No. 98, March 19, 2009.‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫‪26‬‬
‫ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎﺫﺍ ﺑﺸﺄﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺤﺼ�ﻞ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗ�ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ ﻋﺴ�ﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻴﻬ�ﺎ ﻣﺘ�ﻰ ﻣ�ﺎ ﻗ�ﺮﺭﺕ ﻧﻬﺎﺋﻴ�ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻘ�ﻮﻡ‬
‫ﺑﺬﻟﻚ؟‪.‬‬
‫ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻮﻑ ﻧﻼﺣ�ﻆ ﻓﻴﻤ�ﺎ ﻳﻠ�ﻲ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ ﻧﻘﻄ�ﺔ ﺍﻻﺧ�ﺘﻼﻑ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴ�ﺔ ﺑ�ﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻘ���ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳ���ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻱ ﻟﻠﻮﻻﻳ���ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ���ﺪﺓ ﻟﻌ���ﺎﻡ ‪ 2008‬ﻭﺗﻘ���ﺪﻳﺮﺍﺕ‬
‫ﺍﻷﺟﻬﺰﺓ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﺒﺎﻗﻲ ﺩﻭﻝ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ‪.‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺰﻣﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﻹﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﻜﻲ ﺗﻄﻮﺭ ﺳﻼﺣﺎ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺎ‬
‫•‬
‫ﻛﺘﺐ ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺭﻳﺘﺸﺎﺭﺩ ﺟ�ﺎﺭﻭﻥ ‪ Richard Garwin‬ﻓ�ﻲ‬
‫ﻧﺸ�ﺮﺓ ﻋﻠﻤ�ﺎء ﺍﻟ�ﺬﺭﺓ ‪Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists‬‬
‫ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ ‪ 2008‬ﺃﻧﻪ ﻳﺠﺐ ﺍﻥ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳ�ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ�ﺪﺓ‬
‫ﺑﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﻣﺘﻰ ﺳ�ﻮﻑ ﺗﻘ�ﻮﻡ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺈﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ ﺳ�ﻼﺡ ﻧ�ﻮﻭﻱ ﻟ�ﻴﺲ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ‬
‫ﺃﺳﺎﺱ ﻧﻮﺍﻳﺎﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻨﺔ )ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺮﻳﺪ ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺳﻼﺡ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ(‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻧﻤﺎ‬
‫ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﻘ��ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ ﻧﻌ��ﺮﻑ ﺃﻧﻬ��ﺎ ﺍﻛﺘﺴ��ﺒﺘﻬﺎ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻣﺠ��ﺎﻝ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ ﻭﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺍﺭﻳﺦ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﻴﺢ‪.‬‬
‫‪(Richard Garwin ',When could Iran deliver a nuclear weapon?," Bulletin of the Atomic‬‬
‫)‪Scientists, 17 January 2008‬‬
‫•‬
‫•‬
‫ﻭﻣ�ﻦ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻄﻠ�ﻖ ﻛ��ﺎﻥ ﻗ�ﺪ ﺻ��ﺪﺭ ﺗﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺭﻭﺳ��ﻲ ﻋ��ﺎﻡ ‪2006‬‬
‫ﺗﻮﻗﻊ ﺍﻥ ﺗﺼﻞ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﺼ�ﻨﻴﻊ ﺳ�ﻼﺡ ﻧ�ﻮﻭﻱ ﺧ�ﻼﻝ ‪ 5‬ﺃﻋ�ﻮﺍﻡ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻳﺦ‪ ،‬ﺃﻱ ﺑﺤﻠﻮﻝ ﻋﺎﻡ ‪2011‬‬
‫ﻭﻓ�ﻲ ‪19‬ﻳﻨ�ﺎﻳﺮ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻧﻔ�ﺲ ﻋ�ﺎﻡ ‪ 2006‬ﻛﺘﺒ�ﺖ ﺻ�ﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﻧﻴﻮﻳ�ﻮﺭﻙ‬
‫ﺗ��ﺎﻳﻤﺰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻷﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ ﺗﺘﻮﻗ��ﻊ ﺍﻥ ﺗﺼ��ﻞ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ‬
‫ﺳ��ﻼﺡ ﻧ��ﻮﻭﻱ ﺧ��ﻼﻝ ‪ 4-3‬ﻣﻨ��ﺬ ﺫﻟ��ﻚ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﺎﺭﻳﺦ‪ ،‬ﺃﻱ ﺑﺤﻠ��ﻮﻝ ﻳﻨ��ﺎﻳﺮ‬
‫‪.2010‬‬
‫)‪( “German spies see Iran 3-4 yrs from A-bomb”, New York Times, 19 January 2006‬‬
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‫ﻭﻓ��ﻲ ﻓﺮﻧﺴ��ﺎ ﺗﺤ��ﺪﺙ ﺍﻟ��ﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻧﺴ��ﻲ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺧﻄ��ﺎﺏ ﺩﺍﺧﻠ��ﻲ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻗﺼ��ﺮ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻟﻴﺰﻳﻪ ﻟﻤﻤﺜﻠﻲ ﺣﺰﺑ�ﻪ )‪ (UMP‬ﻓ�ﻲ ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻮﻁﻨﻴ�ﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻱ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤ�ﺎﻥ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻧﺴﻲ ﺃﻧﻪ‪:‬‬
‫‪"It is a certainty to all of our secret services. Iran is working today on‬‬
‫‪a nuclear (weapons) program,…we cannot allow Iran to acquire‬‬
‫)‪nuclear weapons" (AP, 16 September 2009‬‬
‫"ﺑﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺍﻟﻤﺆﻛﺪ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺃﺟﻬﺰﺗﻨﺎ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﻌﻤ�ﻞ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ‬
‫ﺑﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺃﺳ��ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ‪...‬ﻻ ﻧﺴ��ﺘﻄﻴﻊ ﺃﻥ ﻧﺴ��ﻤﺢ ﻹﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺑ��ﺄﻥ ﺗﺤﺼ��ﻞ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ‬
‫ﺃﺳﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ "‪.‬‬
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‫ﺃﻣ��ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴ��ﺒﺔ ﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ��ﺎ ﻓﺈﻧ��ﻪ ﻳ��ﺘﻢ ﺗﺴ��ﺮﻳﺐ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣ��ﺎﺕ ﻣ��ﻦ ﺍﻻﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪﻑ ﺍﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻱ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‪ ،‬ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ‬
‫ﺃﺻ��ﺒﺢ ﻭﺍﺿ��ﺤﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﻴ��ﺎﻥ‪ .‬ﻓﻠﻘ��ﺪ ﻧﺸ��ﺮﺕ ﺻ��ﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﺗ��ﺎﻳﻤﺰ ﺍﻟﺮﺻ��ﻴﻨﺔ ﻓ��ﻲ‬
‫ﻣﻮﻗﻌﻬ��ﺎ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧ��ﻲ ﻳ��ﻮﻡ ‪ 25‬ﺳ��ﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ‪ 2009‬ﺃﻧ��ﻪ ﻁﺒﻘ��ﺎ ﻟﻤﺼ��ﺎﺩﺭﻫﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﺍﻻﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ�ﺔ ﻟﻌﺒ�ﺖ ﺩﻭﺭﺍ ﻛﺒﻴ�ﺮﺍ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻛﺸﻒ ﻣﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﻗﻢ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺣﺪﻳﺜﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ﺃﻳ�ﺔ ﻣﻨﺸ�ﺂﺕ ﺃﺧ�ﺮﺍ‬
‫ﺗﺤ�ﺎﻭﻝ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﺇﻗﺎﻣﺘﻬ�ﺎ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺃﺟ�ﻞ ﺗﺨﺼ�ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻡ ﺑﺼ�ﻮﺭﺓ ﺳ�ﺮﻳﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻥ ﻣﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﻗﻢ ﻭﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﺮﻳﺤﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﺔ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﺓ ﻓﻘ�ﻂ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ‬
‫ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ ﺑﺪﺭﺟ��ﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺰﻳ��ﺪ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ‪ %5‬ﻭﻫ��ﻮ ﺍﻟﺤ��ﺪ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜ��ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻣﻪ ﻟﻸﻏﺮﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﺃﻋﻠﻦ‪:‬‬
‫ﺃﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺣﺠﻢ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸ�ﺄﺓ ﻭﻻ ﻧﻮﻋﻬ�ﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻘ�ﺎﻥ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﻣﻨﺸ�ﺄﺓ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ ﻟﻸﻏ�ﺮﺍﺽ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺴ�ﻠﻤﻴﺔ )‪ .(Francis Elliott, Tiimesonline, 25 Sept. 2009‬ﻭﻟﻬ�ﺬﺍ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﺍﻻﺳ�ﺘﻨﺘﺎﺝ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺼﺤﻴﺢ ﻫﻮ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﺃﻗﻴﻤﺖ ﻟﻬ�ﺪﻑ ﻋﺴ�ﻜﺮﻱ ﺳ�ﺮﻱ ﺑﻌﻴ�ﺪﺍ ﻋ�ﻦ ﺃﻧﻈ�ﺎﺭ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻟﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻓ��ﻲ ﻧﻔ��ﺲ ﺳ�ﻴﺎﻕ ﻣ��ﺪﻯ ﻣﻌﺮﻓ��ﺔ ﺍﻻﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻗ��ﻮﺓ ﺍﻷﺩﻟ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺟﻤﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺘﺸﺎﺭﻙ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣ�ﻊ ﺣﻠﻔﺎﺋﻬ�ﺎ ﺳ�ﺮﺑﺖ ﺻ�ﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﺑﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺃﺧ��ﺮﻯ ﻭﻫ��ﻲ ﺍﻟ��ﺪﻳﻠﻲ ﺇﻛﺴ��ﺒﺮﺱ ‪ Daily Express‬ﺧﺒ��ﺮﺍ ﻣﻔ��ﺎﺩﻩ ﺃﻥ ﺭﺋ��ﻴﺲ‬
‫ﺍﻻﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺟﻴ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ ‪ MI6‬ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻴﺮ ﺟ��ﻮﻥ ﺳ��ﻜﺎﺭﻟﻴﺖ ﺗ��ﺮﺃﺱ‬
‫ﺍﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎ ﺟﻤﻊ ﺑ�ﻴﻦ ﺭﺋ�ﻴﺲ ﺍﻻﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ�ﺔ ﻭﻋ�ﺪﺩﺍ ﻣ�ﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺴ�ﺆﻭﻟﻴﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻮﺩﻳﻴﻦ ﺗﺸﺎﺭﻛﻮﺍ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﻮﺍﺭ ﺣﻮﻝ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺄﺓ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴ�ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻷﺧﻴ���ﺮﺓ ﻓ���ﻲ ﻗ���ﻢ ﺑﻌ���ﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺷ���ﺎﺭﻛﺖ ﺍﻻﺳ���ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ���ﺔ ﺑﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣ���ﺎﺕ‬
‫ﻣﺼﺎﺩﺭﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺎﻫﻤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺸﻒ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸ�ﺄﺓ‪ .‬ﻭﺗﺴ�ﺘﺎﻧﻒ ﺍﻟﺼ�ﺤﻴﻔﺔ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺍﻟﻘ�ﻮﻝ‬
‫ﺃﻥ‪:‬‬
‫"‪"The site is seen as a major threat by Tel Aviv and Riyadh‬‬
‫"ﺃﻥ ﻛﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻞ ﺃﺑﻴ�ﺐ ﻭﺍﻟﺮﻳ�ﺎﺽ ﺗ�ﺮﻯ ﺃﻥ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸ�ﺄﺓ ﻣﺼ�ﺪﺭ ﺧﻄ�ﺮ ﻛﺒﻴ�ﺮ‬
‫ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ"‬
‫ﻭﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﻳ��ﺪﻝ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺩﺭﺟ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﻄ��ﻮﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ ﺗ��ﺮﻯ ﺑﻬ��ﺎ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ��ﺔ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ‪.‬‬
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‫ﻭﻓﻲ ﺇﺳ�ﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ ﺃﺣ�ﺎﻁ ﺭﺋ�ﻴﺲ ﺷ�ﻌﺒﺔ ﺍﻷﺑﺤ�ﺎﺙ ﻟﻼﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ�ﻜﺮﻳﺔ‬
‫ ﺃﻥ‬2009 ‫ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ‬1 ‫ﺍﻹﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ "ﻟﺠﻨﺔ ﺍﻟﺸﺆﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺟﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻓﺎﻉ" ﻓﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮﺭﻳ��ﺔ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴ��ﺔ "ﻫ��ﻲ ﺑﻌﻴ��ﺪﺓ ﻋ��ﻦ ﻫ��ﺪﻓﻬﺎ ﻓ��ﻲ ﺗﺼ��ﻨﻴﻊ‬
‫ ﺭﺑﻤ�ﺎ‬2009 ‫ ﻭﺃﻧ�ﻪ ﺳ�ﻮﻑ ﻳﻜ�ﻮﻥ ﻟ�ﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﺑﻨﻬﺎﻳ�ﺔ‬،"‫ﻗﻨﺒﻠﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺑﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻘﻂ‬
.‫ﻣﻮﺍﺩ ﺇﻧﺸﻄﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻛﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻊ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻘﻨﺒﻠﺔ‬
•
The head of the IDF Military Intelligence Research Division informed the
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Monday that Iran is only
one year away from obtaining enough material for a nuclear weapon..
"By the end of the year, Iran may have enough fissile material for their first
nuclear bomb," Brigadier-General Yossi Beiditz told the committee during the
briefing. He added that Iran is developing its nuclear weaponry at a faster pace
than before and that negotiations are unable to halt the process.
"Iran is extremely troubling due to its speed," he said. "It has missiles which
can reach Israel. The Iranian clock precedes the international diplomacy
clock." He added that for the time being, "The United States is determined to
pursue diplomacy" with the Islamic Republic
‫ﺃﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺣﺘ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ�ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻹﺳ�ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﺠﺪﻳ�ﺪ ﻟﻌ�ﺎﻡ‬
‫ ﻳﻈ��ﻞ ﻳﻌﻄ��ﻲ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺯﻣﻨ��ﺎ ﺃﻁ��ﻮﻝ ﻟﻠﻮﺻ��ﻮﻝ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﺗﺼ��ﻨﻴﻊ ﺳ��ﻼﺡ‬2008
.2015-2010 ‫ﺫﺭﻱ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻴﻦ‬
‫ﻭﻓﻲ ﺗﻘ�ﺪﻳﺮ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜ�ﻲ ﺁﺧ�ﺮ ﺃﻋﻄ�ﺖ ﻭﺯﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺟﻴ�ﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴ�ﺔ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ‬
2013 ‫ﻣﻮﻋﺪﺍ ﺃﻗﺮﺏ ﻟﻠﻮﺻﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺳ�ﻼﺣﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻨ�ﻮﻭﻱ ﻭﻫ�ﻮ ﻧﻬﺎﻳ�ﺔ ﻋ�ﺎﻡ‬
•
•
(NIE, 2008& Kam,19March 2009 )
30
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‫ﻭﻓ��ﻲ ﺗﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺃﻣﺮﻳﻜ��ﻲ ﺛﺎﻟ��ﺚ ﻭﻫ��ﻮ ﻟ��ﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻫﻴﺌ��ﺔ ﺍﻷﺭﻛ��ﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﺸ��ﺘﺮﻛﺔ‬
‫ﻟﻠﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﺍﻟﺠﻨﺮﺍﻝ ﻣﺎﻳﻚ ﻣﻠﻦ ‪ Mike Mullen‬ﻓﻲ ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺢ ﻟ�ﻪ‬
‫ﻣﺎﻳﻮ ‪ 2009‬ﺣﺬﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻗ�ﺪ ﺗﻜ�ﻮﻥ ﻣﺴ�ﺘﻌﺪﺓ ﻷﻥ ﺗﺸ�ﺮﻉ ﺑﺈﻧﺘ�ﺎﺝ‬
‫ﻗﻨﺒﻠﺔ ﺫﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﺃﻥ ﺗﺤﻘﻖ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﻬﺪﻑ ﺧﻼﻝ ‪ 3-2‬ﻋﺎﻡ ﻣﻨﺬ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﺎﺭﻳﺦ‪.‬‬
‫ﺃﻱ ﺇﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺘﺼﻒ ‪ 2011‬ﺃﻭ ‪ 2012‬ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ‪.‬‬
‫'‪G. Serrano ''Iran nuclear weapons within one to three years: Pentagon,‬‬
‫‪http://trendsupdates.com/iran-nuclear-weapons-within-one-to-three-years-pentagon/‬‬
‫‪Monday, May 25, 2009, 22:38‬‬
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‫ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﺭﻧﺎ ﻛﻞ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ�ﺪﻳﺮﺍﺕ‬
‫ﻟﻮﺟ����ﺪﻧﺎ ﺍﻧ����ﻪ ﺣﺘ����ﻰ ﻓ����ﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ����ﺪﻳﺮﺍﺕ‬
‫ﺍﻹﺳ������ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﻻﻳ������ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ������ﺪﺓ‬
‫ﺑﻤﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺎﺩﺭ ﺃﻋ�ﻼﻩ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﻫﻨﺎﻟ�ﻚ‬
‫ﻧ����ﻮﻉ ﻣ����ﻦ ﺍﻹﺣﺴ����ﺎﺱ ﺑﺪﺭﺟ����ﺔ ﻣ����ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻹﺳﺘﻌﺠﺎﻝ ﺃﻧ�ﻪ ﻳﺠ�ﺐ ﻋﻤ�ﻞ ﺷ�ﻲء ﻣ�ﺎ‬
‫ﻟﻮﻗ��ﻒ ﺑﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ��ﻮﻡ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺑﺄﻳﺔ ﺻﻮﺭﺓ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺭ‪.‬‬
‫ﺣﺘ��ﻰ ﺗﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳ��ﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤ��ﺪﺓ ﻟﻌ��ﺎﻡ‬
‫‪ 2008‬ﻳﺸ������ﻴﺮ ﺇﻟ������ﻰ ﺩﺭﺟ������ﺔ ﻣ������ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﻄﻮﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻄﺎﻋﻴﻦ ﻣﻬﻤﻴﻦ ﻭﻫﻤﺎ‪:‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ﺗﺨﺼﻴﺐ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴﻮﻡ‪.‬‬
‫‪ .2‬ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺍﺭﻳﺦ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﻓﺈﺫﺍ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﺭﻧﺎ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ‪ 2007‬ﻣﻊ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ‪ 2008‬ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻷﻭﻝ ﻳﺮﻛﺰ‬
‫ﻋﻠ���ﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻹﻳ���ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺃﻭﻗﻔ���ﻮﺍ ﺑﺮﻧ���ﺎﻣﺠﻬﻢ ﺍﻟﻌﺴ���ﻜﺮﻱ ﻓ���ﻲ ﻋ���ﺎﻡ ‪2003‬‬
‫ﻭﻳﺒﻨﻲ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‪ ،‬ﺑﻴﻨﻤ�ﺎ ﺍﻟﺜ�ﺎﻧﻲ ﻳﺮﻛ�ﺰ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ�ﺪﻡ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﺣﻘﻘﺘ�ﻪ‬
‫ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻄﺎﻋﻴﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﺬﻛﻮﺭﻳﻦ ﺃﻋﻼﻩ )‪.(Kam, ibid‬‬
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‫ﻭﻧﻼﺣ���ﻆ ﻧﻔ���ﺲ ﺩﺭﺟ���ﺔ ﺍﻻﺳ���ﺘﻌﺠﺎﻝ ﻓ���ﻲ ﻣ���ﺎ ﺗﻨﺴ���ﺒﻪ ﺍﻟﺼ���ﺤﻒ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴ���ﺔ ﻣ���ﻦ ﺗﻨﺴ���ﻴﻘﻬﺎ ﻻﺟﺘﻤ���ﺎﻉ ﺳ���ﺮﻱ ﺑ���ﻴﻦ ﺭﺋ���ﻴﺲ ﺟﻬ���ﺎﺯ‬
‫ﺍﻻﺳ��ﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻹﺳ��ﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺳ��ﺎﺩ‪ ،‬ﻭﺑ��ﻴﻦ ﻣﺴ��ﺆﻭﻟﻴﻦ ﺳ��ﻌﻮﺩﻳﻴﻦ‬
‫ﻟﺘﺪﺍﺭﺱ ﺧﻄﺮ ﺍﻟﺘﻄﻮﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﻛﻤﺎ ﻧﻠﻤﺲ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺩﺭﺟﺔ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪﺍﺩﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﻄﺎﺏ ﺍﻹﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻠﻲ‪:‬‬
‫‪(Hana Levi Julian ',,Military Intelligence: Countdown to Iranian Nuke Bomb," Israel‬‬
‫)‪National News, 01 June, 2009 03:29:00‬‬
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‫ﺍﻟﺨﻼﺻﺔ‬
‫ﻋﻨﺪ ﺇﺟﺎﺑﺘﻨﺎ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﺴ�ﺆﺍﻝ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻭﺿ�ﻌﻨﺎﻩ‬
‫ﻷﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻭﻝ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﻭﻫﻮ‪ :‬ﻫﻞ ﺗﺤﺎﻭﻝ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ ﻓﻌ�ﻼ ﺗﻄ�ﻮﻳﺮ‬
‫ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻤﻲ ﻓﻘﻂ‪ ،‬ﺃﻡ ﺃﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺤ�ﺎﻭﻝ ﺃﻳﻀ�ﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺤﺼ��ﻮﻝ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﻗ��ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻋﺴ��ﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺃﻳﻀ��ﺎ؟ ﻭﻣﺘ��ﻰ ﺳ��ﻮﻑ‬
‫ﺗﺤﻘ��ﻖ ﺫﻟ��ﻚ؟ ﻓ��ﺈﻥ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ ﺍﻹﺟﺎﺑ��ﺔ ﻻ ﺑ��ﺪ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺤ��ﻴﻂ ﺑﻜ��ﻞ ﺍﻟﻌﻮﺍﻣ��ﻞ‬
‫ﻭﺍﻟﻈ�ﺮﻭﻑ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺘﻐﻴ��ﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ�ﻲ ﺗﻌ��ﺮﺽ ﻟﻬ�ﺎ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳ�ﺮ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺇﻣﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﺃﻭ ﺗﻘﻨﻴﺔ‪/‬ﻓﻨﻴﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻫﻲ ﺇﻣﺎ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮﺓ ﺃﻭ ﻅﺮﻓﻴﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺍﻟ�ﺪﺍﺧﻠﻲ ﻓ�ﺈﻥ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻧ��ﺔ ﻣ��ﺎ ﺑ��ﻴﻦ ﻣﻮﻗ��ﻒ ﺻ��ﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﻟﻘ��ﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ��ﻲ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻭﺫﻟ��ﻚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺎﻩ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺁﻳﺔ ﷲ ﺍﻟﺨﻤﻴﻨﻲ ﻳﺸﻴﺮ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺁﻳ�ﺔ‬
‫ﷲ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺧﺎﻣﻨﺌﻲ ﻻ ﺷﻚ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﺆﻳ�ﺪ ﻟﺤﻴ�ﺎﺯﺓ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ‬
‫ﻟﻘﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓﻲ ﺃﻗﻞ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻘﺒﻮﻝ ﻟﻪ ﻭﻟ�ﺪﺍﺋﺮﺓ ﺻ�ﻨﻊ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻘﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﺳﺘﺮﺍﺗﻴﺠﻲ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧﻲ ﻷﻏﺮﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﺮﺩﻉ‪.‬‬
‫ﺃﻣ������ﺎ ﻋﻠ������ﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺴ������ﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳ������ﻲ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺟﻲ ﻓﻼ ﺷﻚ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺔ ﻋﺪﻭﺍﻥ ﺻﺪﺍﻡ ﺣﺴ�ﻴﻦ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺇﻳ�ﺮﺍﻥ‬
‫ﻋﺎﻡ ‪ ، 1980‬ﻭﻫﺰﻳﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﻟﻪ ﻋﺎﻣﻲ ‪ 1991‬ﻭ‬
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‫‪ 2003‬ﺃﺛﺮﺗ��ﺎ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺻ��ﺎﻧﻊ ﺍﻟﻘ��ﺮﺍﺭ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ��ﻲ ﻟﻠﺴ��ﻌﻲ ﻻﻣ��ﺘﻼﻙ‬
‫ﻗﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻷﻏﺮﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﺮﺩﻉ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻗﻞ‪.‬‬
‫ﻛﻤ����ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺳ����ﻌﻲ ﺇﻳ����ﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﻤ����ﺪ ﻧﻔﻮﺫﻫ����ﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ‪ ،‬ﻭﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺰﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﻴﺸ�ﻬﺎ ﺍﻵﻥ ﺗ�ﺬﻛﺮ ﻻ ﺑ�ﺪ ﻟﻬ�ﺎ ﺩﻭﺭ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﺎﺯﺓ ﻗﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ‪.‬‬
‫ﺃﻣ��ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴ��ﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﺴ��ﻌﻲ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ��ﻲ ﻟﻠ��ﺘﺤﻜﻢ‬
‫ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴ����ﺎ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ����ﺔ ﻓﻬﻨﺎﻟ����ﻚ ﺃﺩﻟ����ﺔ ﻛﺜﻴ����ﺮﺓ ﻋﻠ����ﻰ ﻭﺻ����ﻮﻝ‬
‫ﺍﻹﻳ��ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﻣﺮﺍﺣ��ﻞ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣ��ﺔ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻫ��ﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻌﻲ ﺧﺎﺻ��ﺔ ﻓﻴﻤ��ﺎ‬
‫ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴ�ﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺎﻗ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻜ�ﻦ ﺍﻟﻄﺮﻳ�ﻖ‬
‫ﺍﻟ��ﺬﻱ ﺍﺧﺘﺎﺭﺗ��ﻪ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﻳ��ﻊ ﺍﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴ��ﺎ ﺍﻟﺴ��ﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻷﻫ��ﺪﺍﻓﻬﺎ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻨﻤﻮﻳﺔ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺍﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﻟﻚ ﺍﻟﻔ�ﺎﺋﺾ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻡ‬
‫‪ 235‬ﻭﺑﻠﻮﺗﻮﻧﻴ�����ﻮﻡ ‪ ،239‬ﻭﻫﻤ�����ﺎ ﻣﻜﻮﻧ�����ﺎﺕ ﺃﻱ ﺭﺃﺱ ﻧ�����ﻮﻭﻱ‬
‫ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻱ‪ .‬ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻳﺪﻝ ﺑﻌﺒﺎﺭﺓ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ ﺃﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺭﻏﺒﺔ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﺗﺼﻞ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻭﻁﻨﻲ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ ﺳ�ﻠﻤﻲ ﻟﻤ�ﺎ ﺍﺧﺘ�ﺎﺭﺕ ﻁﺮﻳﻘ�ﺎ‬
‫ﺛﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺟﻪ ﻣﺪﻧﻲ‪/‬ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻱ‪.‬‬
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‫ﻭﻣ��ﻦ ﺟﻬ��ﺔ ﺃﺧ��ﺮﻯ ﻓ��ﺈﻥ ﺍﻷﺩﻟ��ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺟﻤﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ ﻭﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺇﺳﺘﺨﺒﺎﺭﻳﺔ‪ ،‬ﻭﻛ�ﺬﻟﻚ ﺁﺭﺍء ﺍﻟﻌﻠﻤ�ﺎء ﺍﻟﻤﺴ�ﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ‬
‫ﻓﻲ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ ﺍﻷﺩﻟ�ﺔ ﺗ�ﺪﻝ ﻋﻠ�ﻰ ﺳ�ﻌﻲ ﺍﻹﻳ�ﺮﺍﻧﻴﻴﻦ ﻟﻠ�ﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺗﻘﻨﻴ�ﺎﺕ‬
‫ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺍﺳﺘﺨﺪﺍﻡ ﺇﻻ ﻓ�ﻲ ﺃﺳ�ﻠﺤﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ‪ .‬ﻳﻀ�ﺎﻑ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﺠ���ﺎﺭﺏ ﻟﺘﻌ���ﺪﻳﻞ ﺭﺅﻭﺱ ﺍﻟﺼ���ﻮﺍﺭﻳﺦ ﻟﺨﻠ���ﻖ ﺫﻟ���ﻚ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﻮﻳ���ﻒ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻜﺎﻓﻲ ﻟﺤﻤﻞ ﺭﺃﺱ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺑﺎﻹﺿ���ﺎﻓﺔ ﺇﻟ���ﻰ ﺫﻟ���ﻚ ﻓﺈﻧ���ﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟ���ﺪ‬
‫ﺩﻟﻴ��ﻞ ﻭﺍﺣ��ﺪ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻧ��ﺎﻣﺞ ﺍﻟﻨ��ﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ��ﻲ ﻛﺎﻧ��ﺖ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻗ��ﺪ‬
‫ﻗﺪﻣﺘﻪ ﻁﻮﻋﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﺇﻧﻤﺎ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺟﻤﻊ ﺿﺪﻫﺎ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻗﺴ�ﺮﺍ‪ .‬ﺃﺿ�ﻒ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ‬
‫ﺫﻟ��ﻚ ﺃﻧﻬ��ﺎ ﺣﺘ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﻴ��ﻮﻡ ﻟ��ﻢ ﺗﺠ��ﺐ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺃﺳ��ﺌﻠﺔ ﻣﺤ��ﺪﺩﺓ ﻛ��ﺎﻥ ﻣ��ﻦ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻔﺴﺮ ﻣﻮﻗﻔﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺇﻣ�ﺎ ﺍﻣﺘﻨﻌ�ﺖ ﻋ�ﻦ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ ﺃﻭ‬
‫ﻣﺎﻁﻠﺖ ﺣﺘﻰ ﺍﻟﻴﻮﻡ‪.‬‬
‫ﻛﻞ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻳ�ﺄﺗﻲ ﺑﻨ�ﺎ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺍﻟﺸ�ﻄﺮ ﺍﻵﺧ�ﺮ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺴﺆﺍﻝ ﻭﻫﻮ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺇﻳﺮﺍﻥ ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻗﻨﺒﻠ�ﺔ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ ﻓﻤﺘ�ﻰ‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﻬ�ﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺤﻘ�ﻖ ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‪ .‬ﺍﻟﺠ�ﻮﺍﺏ ﻓ�ﻲ ﻧﻈﺮﻧ�ﺎ ﻫ�ﻮ‪ :‬ﺫﻟ�ﻚ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻮﻗ��ﺖ ﺍﻟﻜ��ﺎﻓﻲ ﻣ��ﻦ ﻣﻨﻈ��ﻮﺭ ﻋﻠﻤ��ﻲ ﺑﺤ��ﺖ ﻟﺰﻳ��ﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﺨﺼ��ﻴﺐ ﻣ��ﺎ‬
‫ﺗﻮﻓﺮ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻳﻮﺭﺍﻧﻴ�ﻮﻡ ﻗﻠﻴ�ﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺼ�ﻴﺐ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺩﺭﺟ�ﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺴ�ﻠﻴﺢ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺓ ﻭﻛﻢ ﺗﻄﻮﻝ ﻭﻛﻢ ﺗﻘﺼﺮ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ‬
‫‪35‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻌ��ﺎﻟﻢ ﻭﻟﻜ��ﻨﻬﻢ ﻻ ﻳﺨﺘﻠﻔ��ﻮﻥ ﻋﻠ��ﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻭﺻ��ﻠﺖ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﻫ��ﺬﻩ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻘ��ﺪﺭﺓ‪ .‬ﻭﻟﻜ��ﻦ ﺑ��ﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﺇﻟ��ﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺘ��ﻲ ﺃﺷ��ﺮﻧﺎ ﺇﻟﻴﻬ��ﺎ ﻓ��ﻲ‬
‫ﺻﻠﺐ ﺍﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﻓﺈﻧﻨﺎ ﻧﺠ�ﺪ ﺃﻧﻨ�ﺎ ﻧﻘﺘ�ﺮﺏ ﻣ�ﻦ ﻫ�ﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻨﻘﻄ�ﺔ ﻓﻬ�ﻲ ﻓ�ﻲ‬
‫ﺗﻘ��ﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻷﻗﻠﻴ��ﺔ ﺇﻣ��ﺎ ﻓ��ﻲ ﻋ��ﺎﻡ ‪ 2010‬ﺃﻭ ‪ 2011‬ﻋ��ﺎﻡ‪ ،‬ﻭﻓ��ﻲ ﺭﺃﻱ‬
‫ﺍﻷﻗﻠﻴﺔ ‪.2012‬‬
‫ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﻨ�ﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﺄﺧ�ﺬ ﺑﻌ�ﻴﻦ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺒ�ﺎﺭ ﺃﻥ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺍﻗﻒ ﺍﻟﺪﻭﻝ ﻭﻣﺪﻯ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮﻫﺎ ﻟﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺘﻬﺪﻳ�ﺪ ﺍﻟ�ﺬﻱ ﻳﻤﺜﻠ�ﻪ‬
‫ﺣﻴ��ﺎﺯﺓ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﻟﻘ��ﺪﺭﺍﺕ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﻋﺴ��ﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻷﻣﻨﻬ��ﺎ ﺍﻟ��ﻮﻁﻨﻲ‬
‫ﻣﺘﻔﺎﻭﺗﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻨﺰﻭﻳﻼ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﺓ ﺇﻟ�ﻰ ﺇﺳ�ﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ‪،‬‬
‫ﻻﺳ��ﺘﻨﺘﺠﻨﺎ ﺃﻥ ﻛ��ﻞ ﻣﻨﻬ��ﺎ ﺳ��ﻮﻑ ﻳﺘﺤ��ﺮﻙ ﻟ��ﻮﺃﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﺸ��ﺮﻭﻉ‬
‫ﺍﻟﻨ����ﻮﻭﻱ ﺍﻹﻳﺮﺍﻧ����ﻲ )ﺃﻭ ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤ����ﺮﻙ ﺑ����ﺎﻟﻤﺮﺓ( ﻁﺒﻘ����ﺎ ﻟﻬ����ﺬﺍ‬
‫ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺎﻭﺕ‪.‬‬
‫ﻭﺃﺧﻴﺮﺍ ﻓﺈﻧﻨﺎ ﺇﺫﺍ ﺃﺧﺬﻧﺎ ﺑﻌ�ﻴﻦ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﺒ�ﺎﺭ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﻻ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻹﺛﺒﺎﺕ ﺃﻥ ﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﺃﻫﺪﺍﻑ ﻧﻮﻭﻳ�ﺔ‬
‫ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺇﻻ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺃﻥ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ﻧﻮﻭﻱ ﻧﺎﺟﺢ )ﺇﺳﺮﺍﺋﻴﻞ‪،‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻬﻨﺪ‪ ،‬ﺑﺎﻛﺴﺘﺎﻥ‪ ،‬ﻛﻮﺭﻳﺎ ﺍﻟﺸ�ﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ(‪ ،‬ﻓ�ﺈﻥ ﺍﺳ�ﺘﻨﺘﺎﺟﻨﺎ ﺍﻷﺧﻴ�ﺮ‬
‫ﺃﻥ ﻣ��ﻦ ﻳﻌﺘﺒ��ﺮﻭﻥ ﺇﻳ��ﺮﺍﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳ��ﺔ ﺗﻬﺪﻳ��ﺪﺍ ﻟﻬ��ﻢ ﻟ��ﻦ ﻳﻨﺘﻈ��ﺮﻭﺍ‬
‫ﻟﻴﻘﺒﻀﻮﺍ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻠﺒﺲ‪.‬‬
‫‪36‬‬
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﺟﻊ‬
On US Intelligence Assessment of Iran's Nuclear Program
[1] Dennis Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence
Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington,
D.C.,
February
12,
2009.
[2] Michael McConnell, Annual Threat Assessment of the
Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., February 7. 2008.
[3]
www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200903/20090311gates.html
[4] “German spies see Iran 3-4 yrs from A-bomb”, New York Times,
19 January 2006
[5] AP, Staff Writers ", Russian Experts Predict Iranian Nuclear
Bomb In Five Years," Moscow,
( Mar 03, 2006)
‫ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﺟﻊ ﺍﻟﺪﺍﺋﻤﺔ ﺣﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻭﻳﺔ‬
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Glossary/Glossary1.shtml
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/technical2.asp
http://en.allexperts.com/e/p/pl/plutonium.htm
‫ﺍﻟﻤﻼﺣﻖ‬
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT
37
Qum's nuclear potential
How Iran could use the newly disclosed Qum enrichment plant to fuel a
nuclear arsenal
September 30, 2009
Iran has been building a secret uranium enrichment plant that, according to the
United States, would house 3,000 centrifuges and be capable of enriching
enough uranium for one or two bombs per year. Yet, at their present rate of
production, 3,000 of Iran’s existing IR-1 centrifuges would take two years to
fuel a bomb and ten years to produce the minimum arsenal of five weapons that
a new nuclear power can be expected to require. To achieve what the United
States projects, Iran would have to quadruple the centrifuges’ present
production rate, a feat that is theoretically within the centrifuges’ design limits,
but not one Iran appears to have achieved. (See option 1)
Iran may have been planning to install more advanced centrifuges at the plant,
such as a modified version of the P-2 machine deployed in Pakistan. These
could fuel a five-bomb arsenal in just over a year. But while Iran has tested such
machines, there is no evidence that it can manufacture them in bulk or operate
them on a production basis. (See option 3)
Or perhaps Iran intended to use the Qum plant in a diversion scenario. Lowenriched uranium stockpiled at Natanz and suitable for use in nuclear reactors
could be diverted to Qum, or a similar such facility, and processed to weapongrade. This could allow Iran to fuel one bomb in about seven months even at a
low production rate. If the rate were doubled, the plant could fuel one bomb in
about four months and three within a year. If the rate were quadrupled, which
appears technically feasible, the plant could fuel almost one bomb per month
and fuel a five-bomb arsenal in less than a year. (See option 2) This diversion
38
scenario would yield an arsenal even more quickly if the plant were outfitted
with more advanced centrifuges. (See option 4)
However, because the Natanz plant is being watched over by international
inspectors, diversion of its material would be illegal and soon detected. Iran
would also be limited by the size of its declared stockpile. Iran could still be
willing to chance diversion if production rates were high enough to confront
other countries with a nuclear deterrent before they could organize a response.
The four tables set forth data on the scenarios described above.
Option 1: Using natural uranium feed and IR-1 centrifuges
(assuming 16 kg of HEU per bomb and 200 swu per kg of HEU, one would need about 3,200
swu per bomb)
Total Bombs/year Years Years
to 1st
to
output
bomb arsenal
of 5
bombs
Number of
centrifuges
Output/machine
3,000
.5 swu (present rate achieved at
Natanz)
1,500
swu
.5
2
10
3,000
1 swu (twice present rate but still
below estimated capabity)
3,000
swu
.9
1.1
5.6
3,000
2 swu (estimated capacity of IR-1)
6,000
swu
1.9
.5
2.6
Option 2: Using 3.5% enriched uranium feed, as in Iran's stockpile, and IR-1
centrifuges
(assuming 16 kg of HEU per bomb and 52.4 swu per kg of HEU, one would need
39
about 840 swu per bomb)
Number of
centrifuges
Output/machine
3,000
.5 swu (present rate achieved at
Natanz)
1,500
swu
1.8
.6
2.8
3,000
1 swu (twice present rate but
still below estimated capabity)
3,000
swu
3.6
.3
1.4
2 swu (estimated capacity of IR- 6,000
1)
swu
7.1
.1
.7
3,000
Total Bombs/year Years Years
output
to 1st
to
bomb arsenal
of 5
bombs
Option 3: Using natural uranium feed and the more advanced centrifuges
being tested
(assuming 16 kg of HEU per bomb and 200 swu per kg of HEU, one would need
about 3,200 swu per bomb)
Number of
centrifuges
3,000
Output/machine
Total Bombs/year Years Years
output
to 1st
to
bomb arsenal
of 5
bombs
4 swu (estimated rate based on 12,000
Iran's modification of the P-2
swu
centrifuge deployed in Pakistan)
3.8
.3
1.3
Option 4: Using 3.5% enriched uranium feed, as in Iran's stockpile, and
advanced centrifuges
40
(assuming 16 kg of HEU per bomb and 52.4 swu per kg of HEU, one would need
about 840 swu per bomb)
Number of
centrifuges
3,000
Output/machine
Total Bombs/year Years Years
output
to 1st
to
bomb arsenal
of 5
bombs
4 swu (estimated rate based on 12,000
Iran's modification of the P-2
swu
centrifuge deployed in Pakistan)
14.3
.1
.4
Iran's Nuclear Timetable
Updated November 16, 2009
Iran’s bank of rapidly spinning centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
has produced a stockpile of low-enriched uranium, able to fuel nuclear reactors,
but able also to fuel nuclear weapons if further enriched by re-circulating it
through the centrifuges. The re-circulation raises the concentration of the
uranium isotope U-235, which fissions in nuclear weapons such as the one
dropped on Hiroshima.
Based on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran has stockpiled, and the
amount it is believed to be producing each month, the Wisconsin Project
estimates that by December 2008, Iran had accumulated enough U-235 to fuel
one bomb quickly. By the end of this year, the Project estimates that Iran will
have enough U-235 to a fuel a second bomb. "Quickly," in this context, means
two to three months – about the time it would take Iran to raise the level of U235 in its uranium stockpile from 3.5 percent to over 90 percent.
41
As Iran increases the number of centrifuge machines it is operating, and
increases its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, it will consolidate its status as a
"virtual" nuclear weapon state.
Iran's progress towards this status as of November 1, 2009 is estimateda
below:
•
Amount of U-235 contained in Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium:
41.7 kg b
•
Amount of this U-235 produced each month:
2 kg c
•
Amount of this U-235 required to fuel a first-generation implosion
bombd:
21.6 kg e
•
Date by which Iran probably had stockpiled the above:
December 2008 f
•
Number of additional months needed to convert this low-enriched
uranium to weapon-grade g:
Two to three h
•
Date by which Iran may have enough U-235 to fuel a second bomb:
December 2009 i
Additional estimates: Moving from reactor-grade to weapon-grade uranium
•
Amount of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) enriched to 3.5 percent U-235
now on hand:
1,763 kg j
•
Average daily production rate of this low-enriched UF6:
2.77 kg k
42
•
Amount of this low-enriched UF6 needed to produce a bomb’s worth of
weapon-grade UF6:
914 kg l
•
Number of separative work units (SWUs)m needed to accomplish the
above:
840 n
•
Number of first generation IR-1 centrifuges being fed with UF6 at the
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant:
3,936 o
•
Average number of SWUs each centrifuge now appears to be producing
per year:
.5 p
•
Average number of SWUs each centrifuge produced per year between
December 2007 and November 2008:
.5 q
•
Total number of centrifuges installed at Natanz:
8,692 r
•
Number of SWUs these 8,692 centrifuges are assumed to be capable of
producing per year:
8,600 s
•
Number of months needed for these 8,692 centrifuges operating at such a
capacity to produce 840 SWUs:
1.2 t
Comments:
43
•
Though Iran has not increased the number of centrifuges enriching
uranium at Natanz, it has made steady progress in increasing the plant’s
enrichment capacity by installing additional centrifuges. Iran is close to
having three operational units (of about 3,000 machines each) at the
plant, though as of early November 2009 it was enriching uranium in
only about half of these machines.
•
Iran appears to be operating its centrifuges well below their estimated
capacity. Iran’s monthly production rate of low-enriched uranium now
appears stable. An increase in the production rate earlier in 2009 can be
attributed to the fact that more machines are operating, not because these
machines are operating more efficiently.
•
Following start-up, centrifuge cascades must be operated for a time
without product withdrawal. The low production rate at Natanz may be,
in part, due to the fact that Iran continues to add new centrifuges.
•
The amount of low-enriched UF6 produced from November 2008
through the end of October 2009 (about 924 kg) is an estimate provided
by Iran to the IAEA. Through independent readings, the IAEA calculates
that Iran produced 814 kg of this material over roughly the same period.
Under the current inspection arrangement, the Agency only verifies Iran's
estimate once a year, when a physical inventory verification is done. The
next inventory at Natanz is planned for late November 2009, and the
results of this inventory can be expected in early 2010. It should be noted
that the results of the previous inventory revealed that Iran had
underestimated by about one third the amount of low enriched UF6
actually produced.
Additional information: Number of centrifuges deployed over time
44
Date of IAEA
inventory
Centrifuges being Other centrifuges
fed with UF6 (installed or being
installed)
2/17/2007
0
656
5/13/2007
1,312
820
8/19/2007
1,968
656
11/3/2007
2,952
0
12/12/2007
2,952
?
5/7/2008
3,280
2,624
8/30/2008
3,772
2,132
11/7/2008
3,772
2,132
2/1/2009
3,936
1,968
6/1/2009
4,920
2.296
8/12/2009
4,592
3,716
11/2/2009
3,936
4,920
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control at
http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/bulletin/wponac-bulletin-qumtable-093009.htm, 30
September, 2009.
•
45
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
*
The Alleged Studies
Iran's Position
5/26/08
18. On 14 May 2008, Iran provided in writing its overall assessment of the
documents presented to it by the Agency. Iran stated that the documents “do not
show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on [a]
nuclear weapon.” Iran also stated that the documents were not authentic, that
they were “forged” or “fabricated”. Iran did not dispute that some of the
information contained in the documents was factually accurate, but said the
events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military
applications. Iran said the documents contained numerous inconsistencies and
many were based on publicly available information. Iran stated that “the Islamic
Republic of Iran has not had and shall not have any nuclear weapon program.”
IAEA POSITION
9/15/08
18. The Agency believes that Iran could, as a matter of transparency, assist the
Agency in its assessment of the alleged studies by providing it with access to
documents, information and personnel to demonstrate, as Iran asserts, that these
activities were not nuclear related. Unfortunately, Iran has not yet provided the
requested information, or access to the requested documentation, locations or
individuals.
23. The Agency, regrettably, has not been able to make any substantive progress
on the alleged studies and other associated key remaining issues which remain
of serious concern. For the Agency to make progress, an important first step, in
connection with the alleged studies, is for Iran to clarify the extent to which
information contained in the relevant documentation is factually correct and
where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to
alternative, non-nuclear purposes. Iran needs to provide the Agency with
46
substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant
documentation and individuals in this regard.
2. Documents suggesting work on development and testing of high voltage
detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators
including, inter alia, the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators
Description of documents
Document 1: “Analysis and Review of Exploding Bridgewire (EBW)
Detonator Test Results” dated January–February 2004, comprising 11 pages in
Farsi reporting on work carried out by “Project 3.12” to design and construct an
EBW detonator and a suitable detonator firing unit, including testing of about
500 EBW detonators. [5/26/08]
Document 2: One page undated document in Farsi providing text and a
schematic diagram for an underground testing arrangement. The diagram
depicts a 400m deep shaft located 10km from a firing control point and shows
the placement of various electronic systems such as a control unit and a high
voltage power generator. [5/26/08]
Document 3: Five page document in English describing experimentation
undertaken with a complex multipoint initiation system to detonate a substantial
amount of high explosive in hemispherical geometry and to monitor the
development of the detonation wave in that high explosive using a considerable
number of diagnostic probes. [5/26/08]
3. Technical reports purportedly related to efforts to engineer a new
payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle of the sort that
might be used to accommodate a nuclear warhead.
Description of documents
Document 1: Comprised of four presentations in Farsi providing an overview
of “Project 111” from some time before December 2002 to January 2004. The
documents detail various aspects of an unidentified entity’s effort to develop
and construct a Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle capable of housing a new payload for
47
the Shahab-3 missile system. The material includes a short film clip on the
assembly of a dummy re-entry vehicle payload chamber.
Document 2: “Instructions for Assembling the Chamber Parts, Assembling the
Payload Inside the Chamber, and Assembling the Chamber to Shahab-3
Warhead”, 18 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by
Group E6 of Project 111.
Document 3: “Explosive Control System. Construction and Design Report”, 48
pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by Project 111.
Document 4: “Assembly and Operating Guidelines for Explosive Control
System”, 17 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by
the Groups E2 and E3 of Project 111.
Document 5: “Design and Construction of Explosive Control System”, 29
pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by Groups E2
and E3 of Project 111.
Document 6: “Finite Element Simulation and Transient Dynamic Analysis of
the Warhead Structure”, 39 pages in Farsi, dated February–March 2003,
produced by Group E5 of Project 111.
Document 7: “Implementation of Mass Properties Requirements of Shahab-3
Missile Warhead with New Payload, with the Use of Nonlinear Optimization
Method”, 36 pages in Farsi, dated March–April 2003, produced by Group E4 of
Project 111. more
(American Foreign Policy Project,
http://www.americanforeignpolicy.org/the-nuclear-file/uranium-metal-andalleged-studies-worksheet)
48
•
Discovery of UD3 raises fears over Iran’s nuclear intentions
One formula stands out in the documents obtained by The Times: UD3, or
uranium deuteride. Independent experts have confirmed that the only possible
use for UD3 is as a neutron source, the trigger to the chain reaction for a nuclear
explosion.
Critically, while other neutron sources have possible civilian uses, UD3 has
only one application — to be the metaphorical match that lights a nuclear bomb.
UD3, when used in a neutron initiator, emits a stream of neutrons that ignite the
core of a bomb, either weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. The stream of
neutrons is released using high explosives to compress a core of solid UD3,
creating fusion.
Foreign intelligence agencies are closely monitoring all of Iran’s weapons
activities and a test explosion would not go unnoticed, which poses a
problem to the covert development of a nuclear weapon.
* An explosion could be explained as conventional weapons testing, but not
if traces of uranium were left behind from the use of UD3. Such a discovery
would be regarded as proof of weapons testing, and as a statement of Iran’s
nuclear intent.
In the documents obtained by The Times, Iranian military scientists suggest a
way around the problem: by running surrogate tests that substitute titanium
deuteride for the uranium compound. They suggest “continuing the work of
replacement materials such as TiD2 [titanium deuteride] in order to avoid U
[Uranium] pollution in the production of UD3”.
Titanium deuteride would behave in the same way, producing a measurable
flow of neutrons, but without leaving the traces of uranium. The explosion
would also be smaller.
49
“They want to test the match without burning it,” a Western intelligence source
said. “Then they can take it to the Supreme Leader and say, ‘We know it all
works now.’ Then he has everything he needs for the moment, if it comes, that
he gives the order to build a bomb.”
* That order, according to the source, does not appear to have been made, and
there is no evidence that it will. But even without it Iran is edging closer to
nuclear latency — the immediate potential to assemble a bomb — effectively
giving it a nuclear deterrent.
The last ingredient Iran requires is enough fissile material to arm a weapon.
Estimates vary, but at present Iran’s known stockpile of low-enriched uranium
is only just enough to arm one warhead — if that material were enriched further
to weapons-grade. That stockpile of low-enriched uranium is under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision at Iran’s enrichment
plant at Natanz.
However, the recent discovery of a nuclear facility near Qom, which was due to
come online next year as a back-up enrichment plant, has renewed fears that
Iran may have other secret sites where it is enriching or preparing to enrich
uranium
(Catherine Philip ,'Discovery of UD3 Raises Fears Over Iran’s Nuclear
Intentions," The Times, London, 14 December 2009).
50
* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, recently
warned that Iran may be prepared to make a nuclear weapon within a period of
one to three years. He believes that time is running out for diplomacy. In an
interview, he said that if the assumptions with which they work are confirmed,
Iran is ‘moving in this direction clearly, and will continue to do so.’
Mullen recalled that Iran successfully conducted a very recent test with a longrange missile and continues to enhance its weapons capabilities. The Admiral
distrusts the intention of the Iranian government to produce nuclear energy for
civilian purposes. “Their intentions are very clear,” he adds.
Considering that an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would have ‘grave
consequences,’ he stressed the importance of dialogue with Iran. Mullen said
that the United States must approach Iran with ‘all options on the table’ to
achieve the ultimate goal of preventing the country from achieving a nuclear
weapon.
US President Barack Obama has been an advocate of diplomatic approach with
Iran, a country with which the United States broke diplomatic relations in 1980.
In a video broadcast to the Iranian people last March, Obama called for ‘the
search for constructive ties between the United States, Iran and the international
community’ and was willing to end thirty years of conflict if Tehran abandons
threats.
The international community has asked the Iranian president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, to stop its nuclear program but Tehran maintains that its purpose
is for civilians and is not seeking to develop a nuclear weapon.
51
Russian Experts Predict Iranian Nuclear Bomb
In Five Years
by Staff Writers
Moscow, Russia (AFP) Mar 03, 2006
Iran will have nuclear weapons within five years at
the latest and the world should from now on get
used to the idea, according to an experts' report due
to be presented to the Russian foreign and defence
policy council on Saturday.
Some experts fear that if
"Iran is seeking to equip itself with nuclear weapons Iran acquired a nuclear
weapon that could
and will succeed in doing so sooner or later,"
Interfax news agency quoted the report as saying on "encourage other
countries in the region -Friday.
Saudi Arabia or Egypt -"A minority of experts believe that will happen in
to create an Arab bomb."
the space of between six months and one or two
years. The majority think it will take several years, up to five years," said the
report to the council, which is an advisory body.
News of the report's contents emerged shortly after Iran and the European
Union announced they had failed to strike a deal that could have prevented
Tehran being sent to the United Nations Security Council over its nuclear
activities.
Iran denies it is seeking to develop a nuclear bomb as the United States has
charged, but has so far refused to promise to not develop technology that would
allow it to develop an atomic weapon.
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Russia has proposed that Iran should enrich on Russian soil the uranium it says
is needed for its civilian nuclear reactors but Tehran has refused to accept
Russian demands that it reinstate a moratorium on nuclear research.
The United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) meets Monday to consider a report which could lead to Iran being
referred to the UN Security Council and sanctions being adopted.
"In any event ... the world would do well to start now to get used to the idea of
coexisting with an Iranian nuclear power," the report advised.
The report's authors said a nuclear-armed Iran would negatively affect Russian
security but that the consequences "will not be catastrophic as long as the
Iranian regime is stable".
Tehran would not use these nuclear weapons, the experts forecast. Nor would it
pass on nuclear know-how, either to other countries or to extremist
organisations, they said.
But some of the experts feared that if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon that could
"encourage other countries in the region -- Saudi Arabia or Egypt -- to create an
Arab bomb."
They thought "there was little chance that the United States would carry out
strikes on Iranian territory in the near future."
But they were pessimistic about future developments in the region: the zone
stretching from Afghanistan to North Africa will remain a major centre of
"Islamist global terrorism" and at the same time the danger of the spread of
weapons of mass destruction would continue growing.
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"Many (states) are ready to relaunch their nuclear programme so as not to
become another Iraq," the report says.
There are also warnings on the risks of destabilisation threatening initially "the
Egypt-Sudan axis", Saudi Arabia, Iraq and above all Kurdish areas of Iraq, and
Pakistan.
The governments in the region have run their course and for their peoples
"radical Islamists appear the only alternative for change."
The authors of the report think that the more the United States pushes for
democracy and free elections, the greater the chances Islamists will win power.
"Democratisation will lead to the disappearance of the remains of governability
.. and the arrival of free elections in present conditions will inevitably bring
radical Islamists to power."
The Russian experts believe that the presence of US forces in Iraq is a
stabilising factor.
"An early departure from Iraq by the United States would risk bringing a serious
destablisation of the whole region, intensifying activities by terrorists and would
be directly opposed to Russia's interests."
Source: Agence France-Presse
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IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, who had already warned the same
committee a week earlier that he was preparing for any possibility.
"Iran continues with its plans," he told the MKs. "Its possession of nuclear
weapons could destablize the entire Middle East. There is dialogue between the
U.S. and Iran, with the prospects for success doubtful. For us as well,
[diplomacy] would be the preferred way to stop [Iran's nuclear development]
project. But as the chief of staff, I have to be prepared for any eventuality, and
so this is what we are doing,"
While Western military and intelligence officials debated whether Iran has the
capability to produce a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, the Islamic
Republic surprised the world last month by launching precisely such a weapon.
The Seji-2 missile, a two-stage missile, reached its intended target, according to
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The 2,000-kilometer range missile is
powered by solid fuel, and is reported to be a more advanced weapon than the
country’s previous Shihab missile series.
Beiditz told the committee that Hamas is continuing to successfully smuggle
arms into Gaza, adding that Palestinian Authority Chairman and Fatah leader
Mahmoud Abbas is expecting U.S. President Barack Obama to pressure Israel
into making more security concessions.
He also warned that the Hizbullah terrorist group remains a threat to Israel's
north as well. "Hizbullah has deployed north and south of the Litani with
missiles that can reach deep into Israel," he said.
Its deployment is a direct violation of United Nations Resolution 1701, the
ceasefire agreement which ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War.
The Litani River, located 12 miles from the Israel's northern border, was to be a
marker point below which Hizbullah terrorists were not allowed to re-group.
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The U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were deployed in a buffer zone
that was to be free of "any armed personnel" -- both Hizbullah terrorists and
IDF soldiers -- between the river and the U.N.-drawn Blue Line in the southern
sector of the country. The agreement also calls for "no sales or supply of arms
and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its government."
(Hana Levi Julian ',,Military Intelligence: Countdown to Iranian Nuke
Bomb," Israel National News, 01 June, 2009 03:29:00)
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GUN-TYPE NUCLEAR BOMB
1. Box tail fins2. Steel gun breech assembly
3. Detonator
4. Cordite (conventional) explosives
5. Uranium-235 "projectile", six rings (26 kg) in a thin can of steel
6. Baro sensing ports and manifold
7. Bomb casing wall
8. Arming and fusing equipment
9. Gun barrel, steel, around 10 cm diameter, 200 cm length
10. Arming wires
11. Tamper assembly, steel
12. Uranium-235 "target", two rings (38 kg)
13. Tamper/reflector assembly, tungsten carbide
14. Neutron initiator
15. Archie fuzing radar antennas
16. Recess for the boron safety plug (not shown) to be ejected into
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