On The Cost of Financing Catastrophe Insurance Presentation to the Casualty Actuarial Society Dynamic Financial Analysis Seminar By Glenn Meyers and John Kollar Insurance Services Office, Inc. July 13 &14 , 1998 Catastrophes and Insurer Capital • Two major insurers lost more than their “capital” in Hurricane Andrew • They are solvent today, because they had “rich” parents. • You need a LOT of capital to cover catastrophes. • Is holding sufficient capital to cover catastrophes efficient? Capital Substitutes • Reinsurance – Does not have the capacity to cover the really big catastrophes – Cat Limits are usually small compared to surplus • Securitization – Large potential capacity – Index trading has been slow – Recent over the counter deals are insurer specific, like reinsurance Potential Advantages of Catastrophe Indices • • • • Low transaction costs No counter-party risk Ease of entry for investors and insurers Liquidity Problems with Catastrophe Indices • Investors don’t understand the risk • Insurers don’t know how much their risk will be reduced (i.e. basis risk) • The insurer-specific deals have found investor support because they could quantify the risk using a catastrophe model on the insurer’s exposures. ISO’s Contribution • Quantify risk for investors • Quantify risk for insurers • Use a catastrophe model and underlying exposure for catastrophe indices and insurers. • Agreements with AIR and RMS • Can use GCCI or PCS options A Quick Explanation of Hurricane Models • Multiple Events • Each Event – Affects a collection of ZIP codes – Each ZIP code has a wind speed • Insurer – Has exposure for each class and ZIP code A Quick Explanation of Hurricane Models • For each event – For each ZIP • Get wind speed • For each class –Get Value of buildings –Get Damage Ratio for wind speed –Loss = Value × Damage ratio – Add up all losses for the event The Guy Carpenter Catastrophe Index (GCCI) • Consists of the combined experience of 39 insurers who report their data to ISO • Contracts on the GCCI are traded on the Bermuda Commodities Exchange (BCOE) • The underlying exposures are available, so it is possible to use a catastrophe model to quantify the risk to both investors and insurers. The GCCI Index Homeowners Wind Losses GCCI Index 10,000 Insured Value Bermuda Commodities Exchange Traded GCCI Contracts Covered Events • Aggregate Loss • Largest Event • Second Largest Event • Contracts pay $5000 if Index exceeds the posted strike price Geographic Regions • National • Southeast • Northeast • Mid/West • Florida • Gulf Strike prices traded on BCOE - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 700 The Examples Use an Illustrative Index Similar to the GCCI • Programming GCCI rules is under way • Used proxy GCCI for now. – Ran cat model through 50 insurers – Set the largest event = 100 • Industry Equivalent - 100 Billion + – Maximum event contracts for $1,000 – Strike prices at 5,10, …, 95,100 Maximum Event Catastrophe Options Probability of Excercising Option Information for Investors 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0 20 40 60 Strike Price 80 100 120 Catastrophe Options vs Other Investments One way to compare risk and cost • Moody’s - Projected 12-month default rate of speculative-grade bonds is 2.5%. • Average spread of speculative-grade bonds over risk-free bonds is 3.5% • Probability of exercising a catastrophe option with a strike price of 20 is 2.3% Insurer Objectives Using Catastrophe Options • Reduce the cost of financing insurance – Expected insurer costs – Cost of Capital – Cost of Capital Substitutes • Reinsurance • Contracts on a catastrophe index • Find the right mix of capital and capital substitutes Quantifying the Cost of Capital • Depends on the variability of the insurer’s business • Standards will depend on the insurer management • An “easy” formula Cost of Capital = K T Where: = Standard deviation of total insurer loss T = Factor reflecting risk aversion K = Rate of return needed to attract capita Quantifying Basis Risk Ran hurricane model through insurers and index. Event 1 2 3 4 5 … 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 Index Value 100.00 89.04 87.56 83.48 83.20 … 15.84 15.83 15.79 15.74 15.67 Event Probability 0.00000121 0.00000121 0.00000181 0.00000702 0.00000702 … 0.00000050 0.00002730 0.00001610 0.00015000 0.00006420 Max Event Contract Direct Reinsurance Event Loss Probability Value Insurer Loss Recovery Given Max 0.00000121 1,164,300,000 1,212,550,269 13,000,000 35,250,269 0.00000121 1,052,700,000 1,509,161,589 13,000,000 443,461,589 0.00000181 1,052,700,000 1,303,694,653 13,000,000 237,994,653 0.00000702 971,300,000 761,956,629 13,000,000 (222,343,371) 0.00000702 971,300,000 734,137,782 13,000,000 (250,162,218) … … … … … 0.00000048 142,200,000 168,534,466 13,000,000 13,334,466 0.00002630 142,200,000 137,088,005 13,000,000 (18,111,995) 0.00001551 142,200,000 191,606,795 13,000,000 36,406,795 0.00014452 142,200,000 141,627,163 13,000,000 (13,572,837) 0.00006184 142,200,000 117,419,238 13,000,000 (37,780,762) + about 9000 more • Compare variability before and after • Is the risk reduction worth the cost? Minimize Sum of Cost Elements • Insurer Capital Cost of Capital = K T (Net Losses) • Reinsurance Transaction Cost + Expected Cost • Cat index contracts Transaction Cost + Expected Cost Use cat model results to back out transaction costs. Analysis of Three Insurers • Insurer #1 - A medium national insurer Highly correlated with the index • Insurer #2 - A large national insurer Moderately correlated with the index • Insurer #3 - A small regional insurer Slightly correlated with the index Search for Best Strategy to Minimize Cost of Financing Insurance • Search for the combination of index and reinsurance purchases that minimizes total cost of providing insurance. Questions • How many index contracts at each strike price? • What layer of reinsurance? Results of Search Contract Range 5-20 25-40 45-55 60-70 75-85 90-100 Number of Index Contracts @ $1,000 Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 47,400 93,100 0 74,400 118,100 6,300 59,500 67,900 0 47,600 28,600 0 81,400 545,100 0 37,200 634,800 0 Retention Limit Reinsurance 73,000,000 457,000,000 54,000,000 13,000,000 36,000,000 105,000,000 Financing With Reinsurance and Catastrophe Options Expected Net Loss Cost of Capital Cost of Reinsurance Cost of Catastrophe Options Cost of Financing Insurance Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 16,315,629 62,086,995 1,464,410 47,905,407 143,662,761 12,914,922 2,132,070 1,848,530 1,726,342 22,252,015 42,409,101 249,427 88,605,121 250,007,387 16,355,100 Financing Without Reinsurance and Catastrophe Options Expected Net Loss Cost of Capital Cost of Reinsurance Cost of Catastrophe Options Cost of Financing Insurance Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 34,839,348 95,417,229 2,385,629 62,095,747 166,962,499 15,356,683 0 0 0 0 0 0 96,935,095 262,379,728 17,742,312 Differences in Costs Without Reins & Options With Reins & Options Difference Pct Difference Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 96,935,095 262,379,728 17,742,312 88,605,121 250,007,387 16,355,100 8,329,975 12,372,340 1,387,212 8.6% 4.7% 7.8% The Marginal Cost of Financing Catastrophe Insurance • The effect of Catastrophe Options and reinsurance in rates. • Calculate the cost of financing with and without catastrophe coverage. Marginal Cost with Reinsurance and Catastrophe Options Cost of Financing without Cats Cost of Financing with Cats Marginal Cost of Cats Marginal Cost/Expected Loss Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 43,908,324 103,258,865 10,764,807 88,605,121 250,007,387 16,355,100 44,696,797 146,748,522 5,590,293 1.283 1.538 2.343 Marginal Cost without Reinsurance and Catastrophe Options Cost of Financing without Cats Cost of Financing with Cats Marginal Cost of Cats Marginal Cost/Expected Loss Insurer #1 Insurer #2 Insurer #3 43,908,324 103,258,865 10,764,807 96,935,095 262,379,728 17,742,312 53,026,771 159,120,863 6,977,505 1.522 1.668 2.925 The Next Steps • Analyze regional and state indices • Embed catastrophe options within reinsurance contracts • Reinsurer hedges combined risk of its primary insurers • Reinsurer covers customized indices — adverse selection is not an issue.