History and Legacies, 1804-2004
VOLUME ONE
History, Economy and Society
Edited by
H. Bobboyi
A.M. Yakubu
Arewa House
Centre for Historical Documentation and Research
Ahmadu Bello University,
Kaduna, Nigeria.
ISBN 978-135-166-7 (soft cover)
ISBN 978-139-167-5 (hard cover)
1
Contents
Foreword by His Eminence the Sultan of Sokoto
Preface by His Highness the Emir of Ilorin
Introduction
vi
vii
1
PART I: Establishment, Expansion and Consolidation
1.
The Establishment of Gombe Emirate, 1804-1882
Isa A. Abba
11
2.
Emirate of the “Yarba”: Ilorin in the Nineteenth Century
Hakeem O. Danmole
31
3.
The Effects of the Extension of the Sokoto Caliphate on the
Igala Kingdom
Mohammed S. Abdulkadir
53
4.
The Sokoto Jihad in Ebiraland, 1859-1903
Ahmad A. Okene
65
PART II: Economy and Society
5.
Aspects of Economic and Social Development in the
Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century
Mahdi Adamu
83
6.
The Establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate and its Impact
on Society and Economy: The Case of Zazzau in the nineteenth
Century
Abdulkadir Adamu
99
7.
Land Use in the Sokoto Caliphate: Policy and Practice
Ibrahim M. Jumare
108
8.
The Food Situation in the Sokoto Caliphate: A Comment
Abdullahi Labo
126
9.
The Sokoto Caliphate and Economic Advantages of Size:
Quality, Variety and Efficiency in the Textile Industry
Philip J. Shea
133
2
PART III: Socio-political Issues
10.
Dynastic Conflicts and Political Instability in Muri
Emirate, c.1833-1898
Mahmoud Hamman
149
11.
The Sokoto Caliphate and Mahdism: The Clash at Danki
Between Shaykh Hayat b. Sa’id and Lamido Zubairu, 1892
Asma’u G. Saeed
160
12.
Biographies of Enslaved Muslims from the Central Sudan in
the Nineteenth Century
Paul E. Lovejoy
187
13.
The Cattle, the Horse and the Mosquito: The Role of
217
Environment in Labour and Race Relations in the Sokoto Caliphate
Dahiru Yahya
PART IV: Trade and Diplomacy
14.
El-Kanemi’s Response to the Extension of Shaykh
c
Uthman Dan Fodio’s Jihad Against Borno
Muhammad N. Alkali
231
15.
Borno-Sokoto Relations during the Rabeh Interlude,
1893-1901
Yakubu Mukhtar and Kyari Muhammad
240
16.
Trade and Diplomatic Relations between the Sokoto
Caliphate, Ghadames, Tuat and Abzin in the Nineteenth Century
Abubakar B. Sani
253
PART V: Colonial Encounter and Transition to Independence
17.
The Ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Outlying Districts:
The O-Kun Factor in the British Conquest of Northern
Nigeria, 1897-1906
Jide Ige
271
18.
Colonial Transformation of the Caliphate: The Administration
of Justice and the Fate of the Shari’a Under Colonial
Administration in Northern Nigeria
Suleimanu Kumo
285
19.
Colonial Rule and the Extension of the Dogari System to the
Non-Emirate Areas of Northern Nigeria
Kemi Rotimi
297
3
20.
Reflections on Colonial Language Policy and its Impact on
Islamic Scholarship in the Nigerian Emirates
Ahmed Bako
311
21.
The Sokoto Caliphate as Cosmopolis: The Emirates in Transition
to Nigeria’s First Republic
Claude S. Whitaker
324
4
CHAPTER 17
The Ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Outlying Districts: The O-Kun
Factor in the British Conquest of Northern Nigeria, 1897-1906
Jide Ige
Introduction
The word “O-kun”,1 like “Aku” in Sierra Leone, is the mode of salutation
common but not exclusive to the area. Indeed, O-kun refers to the people and their
dialect and has been applied to the geographical area which they occupy. The area,
which has been variously referred to as Kabba Division,2 Kabba Yoruba,3
northeastern Yoruba,4 presently constitutes a major portion of Kogi State of
Nigeria.
A conscious attempt to study the area, with particular reference to its factor
in the conquest and eventual reshaping of the Sokoto Caliphate and its outlying
areas into one administrative unit known as Northern Nigeria has not become a
focal point in any existing work. It should be noted that this chapter is aware of the
works of Mason and Obayemi on the Jihad in O-kunland.5 Mason argued that the
Jihad manifested itself in O-kunland. Obayemi, on the other hand, insisted that the
Jihad did not take place in the area and that Islamic activities, including the
acceptance of the new faith in O-kunland, were done under British colonial rule.6
Based on this position, it is important to re-examine the ideals of the Jihad in the
outlying district of O-kunland. The point is that whether the jihad took place in Okunland or not, its role in terms of providing a comfortable base for the British
conquest of Northern Nigeria between 1897 and 1906 cannot be under-estimated.
This vital role which the area played has made it an integral part of Northern
Nigeria.
5
Shaykh cUthman Dan Fodio’s Ideals
In February 1804, Shaykh cUthman Dan Fodio (hereafter Dan Fodio)
declared a holy war (jihad) aimed at cleansing his society of non-Islamic
activities. According to R.A. Adeleye, Dan Fodio’s main purpose “...was the
establishment of Islamic law and Islamic ideals as the basis of government in the
place of systems ridden by non-Islamic laws, observances and practices ...”7 Dan
Fodio accused the Hausa rulers of polytheism. He accused the rulers from
deviating from the path of God (Allah) and “raised the flag of the kingdom of the
world above the flag of Islam and are thus unbelievers”.8 Furthermore, the Habe
rulers were accused of imposing uncannonical levies on their subjects. They were
accused of turning their land into the land of unbelievers and that the rulers
themselves were not true Muslims and as such could not make true Islam the State
religion. Therefore, Dan Fodio justified the emigration from these unbelievers as a
means of avoiding their wrong doings which were not primarily based on Islamic
law and values. The principal aim of Dan Fodio was to restore the practice of
Islam to “the classical pattern of the early rightly guided caliph”.9 It was the
conviction of Dan Fodio that if the Hausa rulers were true Muslims, they would
not have engaged in illegalities with regard to imposing uncannocal levies,
denying the “faithful” the right to practice their religion (Islam) and not basing
their administration on Islamic law and value. In other words, the concern of Dan
Fodio was to cleanse the society of unislamic activities so as to give room for
people to practice orthodox Islam.
To achieve their goals, Dan Fodio had to declare a jihad in 1804. The jihad
(Holy war) was the last instrument employed by Dan Fodio. The war was believed
to be necessary if and only meaningful results were to be achieved. It should be
stressed that the war was sanctioned by the holy Qu’ran. It must be emphasized
that the main theatre of war was the Hausaland but the consequences found
expressions not only in Hausa/Fulani territories but also in the outlying districts
6
including O-kunland. It would be recalled that O-kunland was a district under the
supervision of a Nupe agent just like Lokoja under a Nupe prince.10
The Kingdom of Nupe and the Outlying District of O-kunland
As noted above, O-kunland became a district under Nupe aristocracy. This
explains why O-kunland was regarded as constituting the southern part of Nupe
Kingdom.11 It should be acknowledged that Nupe Kingdom was an integral part of
what later became the Sokoto Caliphate. Indeed, Dendo, one of the preachers and
emissaries of the Fulani jihad to “heathen countries” was a Fulani from Kebbi. He
came to Nupe “country” first as an itinerant preacher, diviner and seller of
charms.12 Between 1804 and 1817, the Fulani had established themselves firmly in
the Hausa states. They established their hegemony over what later became known
as Northern Nigeria in a rather loosely organized but decentralized dual empire.
Nupe Kingdom fell to the Gwandu. Dendo arrival in Nupeland coincided with the
reign of Etsu Ma’azu who died in 1818. Internal strive set in after his death. There
was a succession dispute between Ma’azu’s son, Jimada the legitimate heir to the
throne and Ma’azu’s brother’s son, Majiya. Majiya gained the support of Dendo
and the Fulani group in Nupe. The Fulani who helped Majiya in ascendancy soon
became jealous of his prosperity and influence. The Fulani waged war against him
and he was defeated. Before his defeat, Majiya gave Dendo who was thought to be
the brain behind Majiya’s success influential position. Majiya went further by
putting Masaba, Dendo’s youngest son in his care in the palace. Dendo grew to
become a man of power and influence more powerful and influential than Majiya
himself. Eventually crisis erupted between Majiya and Dendo. Dendo died in
1833, the year Oldfied and Lander visited Raba13. Indeed, the history of Nupe
kingdom in the early 19th century is essentially a history of constant intrigues.
Fights, wars and rebellions: fights between Dendo’s sons, wars against other
ethnic groups and against factions in Nupe and rebellions of the old Nupe dynasty
who continued to put pressure in the hope of recovering the throne from the
7
Fulani. Let it be noted that while Dendo (1824-33) became the effective ruler of
Nupe, he did not bear the title of Etsu. This was perhaps to demonstrate his
religious zeal but his successors definitely deviated from his religious drive.
Instead they allowed economic and ethnic considerations to override the religious
zeal on which the foundation of the Caliphate was laid.
The period between 1833 and 1857 witnessed a number of internal
wrangling in Nupeland. For instance, Usman Zaki who first reigned between 1833
and 1845 was Dendo’s son. He succeeded his father whereas Masaba (Dasaba),
another younger son of Dendo established his own capital at Lade. He too reigned
in the 1840s. That is, Masaba and Zaki became rival kings. Masaba believed that
he should succeed Dendo because he (Masaba) though was the youngest son of
Dendo had a Nupe mother whereas Usman Zaki was of Fulani descent. Masaba
won the admiration of some people as well as the Gwandu Emir who was the
political head of the Eastern Sokoto Caliphate. Masaba led two revolts against
Zaki. The first attack was launched from Raba while the second was led from exile
in Lade.
Masaba defeated Zaki who fled to Gwandu. Masaba thus proclaimed
himself the king of Nupe. During this time (1840s) Nupe kingdom grew
extensively. Masaba reigned first in Lade and later in Raba. He conquered the
Kamuku in the north, the Ubari in the east, and the Kakanda in the south. He also
invaded the O-kunland and removed the influence of the other Fulani chief in the
area14. Besides, Masaba had the ambition of bringing all other Nupe territory
under his control in the process, he entered into conflict with some notables in the
kingdom. Such notables included Usman Zaki’s loyalists, Umoru Majigi and some
army generals. For instance, Umoru Bahause, a Borno general in Masaba’s army
revolted and drove Masaba from Raba. Masaba fled to Ilorin via Egbe (a town in
Okunland) where he obtained political protection15. Umoru attempted making
himself the Etsu of Nupe.
8
The period between 1850 and 1857 was one of the interregnum. This was
the period when Zaki and Masaba were in exile in Gwandu and Ilorin respectively.
For about three years, Umoru was the effective ruler of Nupe. Masaba who was
more determined to deal ruthlessly with Umoru, launched attack from Ilorin. All
other Fulani including Zaki and Umoru Majigi joined forces with Masaba against
Umoru. At last Umoru was defeated. After Umoru’s defeat Bida became the
“engine room” of the new Nupe kingdom. Usman Zaki returned from exile and
was reinstated in 1857. He became the first Etsu to reside in Bida.
One important thing to be stressed here is that the civil wars in Nupeland
compelled Nupe rulers to deviate from the pursuit of the ideals of Sokoto
Caliphate. The new emphasis was placed on socio-political and economic survival.
To achieve this noble goal the Nupe outlying districts became the targets of attack
and exploitation which explains why the O-kun-Bida relations changed from
mutual understanding to mutual suspicion and hostility.
Right from 1857, Bida Etsuship, Usman Zaki, Masaba, Umoru, Maliki and
Abubakar did carry out organized exploitation in O-kunland using various means
including wars, intimidation, coercion, and diplomacy. For instance, between 1857
and 1859, Etsu Usman Zaki decided to revamp the economy of the kingdom which
has been battered as a result of the various crises in Nupeland preceding his
accession. Moreover, he had to keep himself in the good book of Gwandu by
sending regular gaisuwa (gifts). Usman Zaki felt that he would meet his economic
and military needs by expanding into O-kunland. His chance of being successful
in the area became more plausible with regard to the politically lose and militarily
uncoordinated position of O-kunland. It should be emphasized that Usman Zaki
energized his invasion or bombardment of Okunland thinking that the area was a
reservoir of slaves and craftmen16. This human index would be used to service the
economy of the newly united Nupe kingdom. It must be acknowledged that the
imposition of Nupe hegemony in O-kunland enhanced Bida long distance trade
with Afenmai (Kukuruku) and Benin in the South, Sokoto and Kano in the north.
9
In other words, Usman Zaki like any of his contemporary imperialists attacked a
number of towns and villages in O-kunland.
Evidently, between 1857 and 1859, Usman Zaki attacked Ejuku town.
Ejuku resisted the attack before it finally collapsed leaving eight people and one
dog as survivors17.
In the reign of Masaba (1859-1873), various attempts were made to expand
Bida’s hold on O-kunland.
This was to enable him fulfill his ambition to
transform Bida from a war camp into a capital city. He needed human and
material resources to fund his ambitious projects including the building of a
palace, building of mosques, night markets and so on.18 To achieve the above,
Masaba became more aggressive and went beyond the occupation of O-kunland.
He suppressed the Gbadegi revolt as well as the Kyedye. He fought wars with
Kukuruku, Kukando and Bassa Nge in the south, Gbari and Agaje Fulani in the
east. Furthermore, he extended his kingdom to Tsaragi (Share) region. Like
Usman Zaki, Masaba’s chief concern was economic and not religious. To win the
support of the emir of Gwandu, who was the spiritual head of Nupe kingdom,
Masaba sent some slaves and gifts to him. These “gifts” were well received by the
Emir. Apparently, the Emir was in support of Masaba’s imperial policies and
operations of them which again negated the ideals on which the Sokoto Caliphate
was founded.
In his own case, Etsu Umoru who succeeded Masaba made more rapacious
demands for slaves. He launched serious attacks on Igbirra (Ebira). He did not
succeed in subduing them. Umoru’s attack on the Kyedye succeeded because he
got the support of the Royal Niger Company which sold to him gunpowder. This
was done to accelerate the company’s involvement in trade and politics in the
Niger-Benue region. The important thing to note here is that the conquest of the
Kyedye area further exposed and subjected O-kun to more plunder and
deprivation.
10
Maliki succeeded Etsu Umoru. He too carried out punitive expeditions
against any recalcitrant town or village in O-kunland. He imposed taxes at will.
At one time, he was said to have demanded about 300 slaves from Ponyan. He
invaded Igbomina and placed his ajeles (Ogbas) at Oke-Ode and Ora.19 During the
reign of Abubaka, his attention was consumed by the activities of the Royal Niger
Company which was determined to end Nupe rule in O-kunland. He only tried to
maintain Nupe hegemony in O-kunland by ensuring the loyalty of his Ogbas and
other representatives in the area. The above clearly shows that Nupe imperialism
in O-kunland did not conform with the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate which aimed
at imposing Islamic law and values on the people. As clearly stated by Obayemi,
the acceptance and practice of Islam by Okun people were a thing of post-Nupe
rule.
O-kun Resistance
The stiff resistance put up by O-kun people suffered some setback owing
largely to their uncoordinated efforts and that enabled Nupe troops to subdue the
area. This was so because of the segmentary nature of the area. It would seem that
towns and villages became political communities and were independent of one
another. In that case, any attack on one community was not seen as an attack on
other communities. This was observed by Nupe people who at first could be
regarded as spies. Having studied the weaknesses of the people, Nupe forces made
sudden attacks. Such attacks were often carried out at night when the people were
least prepared for any war. This tactic enabled Nupe forces to conquer a number
of towns and villages in O-kunland in the 19th century.
In the 1860s when Kabba was attacked, the inhabitants put up a stubborn
resistance. The Owe people organized themselves into sub-units in order to defeat
Bida forces.20 They harnessed all their war efforts – spears, axes, cutlasses and
medicines in order to resist the attack. Beyond this, the people went as far as
building walls and digging trenches to serve as defence mechanism against Bida
11
forces. Evidence of such walls can still be seen around the present day Kabba,
Ohura, Akutupa (Kirri) and odokoro.21 The attack on Amuro by Bida forces was
equally resisted. The first Amuro settlement that was attached was Agbajokun.22
The inhabitants of Agbajokun were forced to Iluorioke and Agbajokun became
one of Bida’s war camps.23 During the siege of Agbajokun, Mopa gave moral,
psychological and military support to the town. The support was necessary
because of the fear that she might be Bida’s next target of attack. Despite her war
efforts – poisoned arrows, spears, axes and guns, Amuro was defeated by Bida
forces. However, one of Bida war chiefs, Bantaki was killed by Amuro forces.
24
In some places where Bida troops were unable to break the defence of the people
they (Bida troops), apart from direct attack, embarked on harrying, kidnapping,
abducting and intimidating the O-kun people. According to Samuel Crowther, “the
mere mention of Dasaba’s (Masaba) name is odious in the ears of the natives
about the confluence”.25 Furthermore, C.K. Meek noted that:
Mamudu Majigi was unable to take the town by
assault and so adopted Fabian tactics, sitting at
Okwa (Ikowa) and harrying the people into
submission.26
Similar view was contained in the colonial annual report on Kabba Division
in 1932.
The Nupe unable to take Kabba by assault, the
Fulani (Bida) harried the countryside into
submission.27
Battles were also fought at Takete, Isanlu, Kirri, Oga and many Ijumu
towns and villages. The severity of Nupe onslaughts was so much that Okun
people had to ally with the Ekitis from whom they were able to secure guns and
ammunitions.
The Ogidi Grand Alliance epitomized the height of resistance of O-kun
people. The Ijumu people enlisted the support of Akoko, the Igbirra archers and
12
other non-Ijumu people to resist Nupe attacks.28 At a point, Okun people had to
appeal to the passing missionaries for support. The climax was the appeal made to
the Royal Niger Company by the Okun people to liberate them from the clutches
of Nupe ruthlessness.
The Royal Niger Company (RNC)
In 1870, Sir Taubman Goldie took over the headship of Holland Jacques
and company which had made an in-road into the business world on the Niger.
The appointment of Goldie was to rescue the company from serious financial
mess. Goldie therefore came to the Niger. Within a few years, Goldie had created
a trading empire on the river and based on the positive result of his enterprise, the
British gave Goldie’s company a charter which empowered him to rule the region.
Goldie’s desire to rule the region is understandable in view of the fact that
“without political power there could be no stable commerce with Europe and no
secure profit.”29
In 1871, W.H. Simpson sailed from Liverpool with instructions from the
foreign Office to negotiate with the Etsu Nupe, to secure protection for the British
subjects on the Niger. Before this time, Nupe people had been trading with several
European firms.30 The Etsu Nupe, Masaba, intended to divert British trade to his
territory so that Nupe would serve as middlemen between the north and south.
Nupe rulers were particularly interested in acquiring European arms and
ammunition with which to maintain internal security as well for expansionist
programmes in the outlying districts.
When Goldie settled down in the Niger area, he came to a conclusion that
the reason for the company’s financial loss was over competition. The only
remedy he believed was monopoly of trade. He therefore persuaded all other
companies in the area to come together. The amalgamation of these firms was
done on November 20, 1879. This gave birth to the United African Company
(UAC). The UAC went beyond commercial activities. It really engaged in political
13
expansion and that is why one can refer to it as Britain’s imperial agent on the
Niger.
In 1882, the UAC was reorganized and given a new name – the National
African Company. The objective of the reorganization was to govern the region
which the company traded with. This was to eliminate any competition. By the
time the Berlin Conference was holding the British Foreign Office had directed the
company to hoist the Union Jack at all places where they had established trading
posts. It would be recalled that both the German and French firms had also
established trading posts in the area. The hoisting of the flag was the basis upon
which the British laid claim to these places at Berlin (1884-85). In this respect, the
British had succeeded in eliminating all other European influence (through their
firms) particularly the French and German in the area. With the hoisting of the
flag, the UAC was recognized by the British to represent her authority on the
Niger. To enhance the power of the company, the British gave it a charter. The
National African company was given the Royal Charter and changed to the RNC
in July 1886. Thus, Goldie became the political administrator, taking care of all
political and administrative matters.31
Before the arrival of Goldie on the Niger, British contact had been well
made although the contact was based of trade and limited to the Niger-Benue
waterways.32 Thus, Nupe Kingdom (emirate) became the main “base of British
activities”.33 Between 1857 (the arrival of Dr. Baikie’s expeditions) and 1859,
Lokoja was made the centre of British activies.34 By 1867, the British government
had appointed a Consul at Lokoja. By 1877, the British volume of trade with
Nupe, Gwandu and Sokoto had become substantial. By 1880, European traders
had also established trading stations in Yola. In other words, the European traders
particularly the British had made an in-road into the Caliphate but the position of
Nupe as about the most powerful kingdom in central Nigeria cannot be put aside.
This partly explains why the Europeans and their companies wanted to be assured
of good relationship with Etsu. Similarly, the unknown terrain of the Caliphate
14
might be dangerous for them in case of any crisis between them and the Caliphate.
Part of the measure taken by the company was to allow false claim on the treaties
made with Etsu Maliki by saying that Etsu Maliki had “placed himself under the
protection of the English, following which all foreigners wishing to establish
themselves on the Niger would have been obliged to seek authority of the British
representative…”35 However, in June 1885, the company had entered into treaties
with Sokoto and Gwandu. This shows that the Europeans were interested in the
entire Caliphate but awaiting a better day.
From 1895, the activities of the Royal Niger Company in central Nigeria
had clearly demonstrated their aim of taking total control of the Sokoto Caliphate
and its outlying districts as part of the manifestation of European imperialism in
the last quarter of the 19th century. One great advantage the British had in the
conquest of the Caliphate was the semi-independent nature of the emirates
provided they made available to Gwandu and Sokoto regular gifts and homage.
Indeed, 1896 can be regarded as the period of gestation in the conquest of Bida
and its outlying districts of O-kunland, Shogai Lapai, Agaie, Kyede etc. What the
company did was to ally with Bida “enemies” and to pretend that they had come to
liberate them from the oppressive rule of Nupe rulers. It would be recalled that
from 1880s the O-kun people had made moves to check the excesses of Nupe
Etsuship in their area. For instance, they made contact with the passing
missionaries who advised them to contact Lagos government. Since O-kunland
was outside the jurisdiction of Lagos government, they were advised to seek the
support of the Royal Niger Company at Lokoja. It should be noted also that as part
of the measure to free themselves from Bida imperialism, the O-kun people
organized the Ogidi Grand Alliance.
It is important to note that even though the Royal Niger Company planned
to attack Bida, the strategic position of O-kunland was considered very crucial to
the success of the company’s invasion. In the first place, the company realized the
need to control not only Lokoja but also Kabba which was Bida’s headquarters
15
south of the Niger.36 It was also realized that the company should control the
Niger-Benue region to provide a solid base for their occupation of the Caliphate.
Besides, the occupation of O-kunland was considered necessary to be able to cut
off the possibility of Ilorin-Bussa intervening on the side of Bida. This is evident
in the RNC’s plan to defeat and disperse the Makun’s forces thus:
…Advance on Bida…
Dictate terms to Ilorin or smash them
…smash Iddah and settle down-river palavers…37.
In January 1897, the stage was set. The Constabulary of the RNC set out
from Lokoja to uproot Bida forces in O-kunland. Bida’s forces in O-kunland
consisted of enormous collection of thatched huts and enclosures covering over a
square mile of country.38 The approach of the RNC Constabulary near Makun’s
camp dislodged and dislocated Bida forces. By the time Goldie got to the Bida
camp, he met empty camp. Accordingly, Goldie described the situation to the
Foreign Office thus:
Nearing camp. All well
Hope attack Makun 14th. All well
Kabba 14th Makun fled.
We going Bida. All well.39
Following the dispersal or disappearance of Makun’s forces, Goldie
gathered the O-kun people at Kabba market where he read his address which was
interpreted into Yoruba and Nupe languages. There he proclaimed the liberation of
the people. The British flag was hoisted at Kabba which marked the end of Nupe
imperialism but marked the effective beginning of British imperialism in Northern
Nigeria. In other words, O-kunland provided the needed base for the British
conquest of Northern Nigeria as clearly demonstrated in the subsequent attacks,
bombardments, conquests and occupation of other parts of the Caliphate – Bida,
Ilorin, Borgu, Idah, Borno, Zaria, Gwandu, Kano, Kotangora, Katsina, Kebbi all
fell to British forces, especially between 1900 and 1906, the period which can be
16
described as the early years of British colonialism and subsequent transformation
of the Sokoto Caliphate into what later became Northern Nigeria.
Implications of O-kunland Relations with the Sokoto Caliphate
In the first place O-kunland became the first territory (whether major or
outlying) district of the Sokoto Caliphate to be invaded, and brought under the
Royal Niger Company, the agent that heralded the British rule in Northern
Nigeria. It was the base provided by the O-kun that facilitated and enhanced the
conquest of Northern Nigeria. Based on this, O-kunland was made an integral part
of the vast territory of Northern Nigeria. Indeed, as part of the transformation of
the Sokoto Caliphate, Kabba province was created along with other provinces
created by the British for administrative convenience and economic exploitation of
the entire Nigerian region.
Secondly,
Kabba
town
enjoyed
prominence
under
the
British
administration similar to what it enjoyed during the Nupe rule. The town had
served as Provincial headquarters, Divisional headquarters and District
headquarters under the British following the reorganizations carried out by the
British colonial administration. It must be well said that the prominence Kabba
and indeed the O-kun people enjoyed in the old Northern Region had its root deep
into their role during the Nupe era.
Furthermore, those who invaded and plundered O-kunland did not do so in
order to promote the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate but to explore and exploit the
human and material resources of the area. It is important to state that the nonpursuance of the ideals of the Caliphate in the area made the growth of Islam to be
an issue of the colonial era. Evidently, no single mosque or Qur’anic school was
built in the area during the Nupe era. It must, however, be acknowledged that exslaves and remnants of Nupe-Fulani propagated Islam in the area during the
British rule. Perhaps it is as a result of this non-propagation of Islam that made Okunland and its people more receptive to missionary activities, including the
17
planting of western education in their area. The point is that the Jihad did not lay
any foundation for the growth of Islam in O-kunland before the Proclamation of
the Protectorate over Northern Nigeria in 1900.
Finally, O-kunland was at the beginning a factor in the process of the
conquest of Northern Nigeria but has since become an actor in the shaping and reshaping of Northern Nigeria. This explains the northern posture of O-kun leaders
politically and economically and to some extent socially. Evidently, all attempts
made in the colonial and post-colonial Nigeria to make the people of O-kunland to
look southward instead of Northward have remained abortive. In the same vein, Okun people have remained in search of their identity as a minority group both in
the old Northern Nigeria and in their present location in Kogi State.
18
Notes
1.
See E. Krapf-Askari, “The Social Organization of the Owe”, African Notes,
Vol.2, No.3 (1965), pp. 9-12.
2.
P.T. Davies “Notes on Kabba Division” (1929).
3.
S.O. Biobaku (ed), Sources of Yoruba History, (Ibadan: University Press
Limited, 1987), p. 208
4.
Z.O. Apata, “Administrative Changes and Reorganisations in the Old
Kabba province of Northern Nigeria, 1897-1939” (PhD thesis, University
of Ife, 1985), p. viii.
5.
M. Mason, “The Jihad in the South: An Outline of the Nineteenth Century
Nupe Hegemony in North-eastern Yorubaland and Afenmai”, Journal of
the Historical Society of Nigeria (JHSN), vol. 5, No.2 (June 1970).
6.
A. Obayemi, “The Sokoto Jihad and the O-kun Yoruba: a Review”, JHSN,
vol.9, No.2 (June 1978).
7.
R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: The
Sokoto Caliphate and its Enemies (London: Longman, 1977), pp. 40-42.
8.
Ibid, p. 40.
9.
Ibid, p. 40.
10.
Ibid, p. 137.
11.
P.T. Davies, “Notes on Kabba Division”.
12.
Mason, “The Jihad in the South”.
13.
M. Mason, Foundations of the Bida Kingdom (Zaria: ABU Press, 1981),
pp. 31-32.
14.
S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, p. 80.
15.
See J.A. Dada, “Essay on the History of Egbe” (nd). This essay gives
further exposition on why Masaba during his second reign showed mercy
on Egbe. He made Egbe a base where he further launched fierce attacks on
other parts of O-kunland.
16.
P.T. Davies, “Kabba District Record Book” n.d. p.3; NAK/LOKO PROF.
354, Annual Report on Kabba Division (1932).
17.
Ibid.
18.
E.J. Ige, “Bida Imperialism in Okun-Yoruba in the Nineteenth Century”
(M.A thesis, University of Ile, Ile-Ife, 1986).
19
19.
Mason, “The Jihad in the South”, p. 200.
20.
J.F. Olorunfemi, “Cultural Institution of Kabba from the Era of Nupe Rule
to the Establishment of British Administration c1860-c1930” (BA
dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, June 1976).
21.
Obayemi, “The Sokoto Jihad and the O-kun Yoruba”, pp. 67ff. see also F.I.
Mase, Seymous Varidelour: the Story of a British Officer, (London, 1960),
pp. 99-106 and I.I Vandelour’s lecture delivered at Barlington House,
London in June 1897 in 1/2/1, “Kabba District wall as “extending a mile
from one end to the other”.
22.
Interview with Pa J.K.C Atteh, at Amuro 13th April 1985.
23.
Ibid.
24.
Ibid.
25.
S. Crowther, The Journal of Expedition of the Niger and Tshada rivers in
1854, 2nd edition, pp. 39-40.
26.
Quoted in Kabba District Record Book 1/3/1 (NAK) n.d.
27.
NAK/LOKOPROF. 354, Kabba District Record Book, 1932.
28.
Mason, Foundations of the Bida Kingdom, pp. 120-121.
29.
Z.O. Apata, “The Ajela (Tuci) System: A Study of Fulani-Nupe Overrule in
North-eastern Yorubaland 1860-1897” (Paper presented at the Department
of History seminar, University of Ilorin, Ilorin 1st July 1982).
30.
J.E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the making Nigeria (London: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p.9.
31.
Ibid.
32.
Ibid.
33.
Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, p.117
34.
Ibid.
35.
Ibid.
36.
Mason, Foundations of the Bida, p. 126.
37.
Ibid, p. 146.
38.
Ibid, p. 146.
39.
NAK/LOKOPROF. 93/1923 “Notes (Historical and Ethnological) on other
Tribes”.