BB HOLDINGS LIMITED
WHITHER GOES INVESTMENT
BANKING IN THE CARIBBEAN
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1. The Financial Crisis to date has claimed several
venerable names and may yet claim more
Investment Banks.
2. The Investment Banking Industry
Caribbean is extremely important:
in
the
- Contribution of Investment Banking Sector
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- Emp – (1000 – 2000)
- Profits – USD 200MM
- Raising Capital - USD 1.5 Billion
- Funding Projects - USD 250MM
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3. It is therefore natural to enquire and to examine
whether or not the Investment Banking Industry
in the Caribbean is exposed in the same way or
will be susceptible to contagion via transmission
mechanisms.
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HYPOTHESIS
The current Financial crisis stemmed from a
deterioration in credit quality (sub-prime Loans)
which was exacerbated by Liquidity crisis in US
Investment Banks (which typically fund their assets
with wholesale short-term Liabilities) but which
was
further
compounded
by
Mark-to-Market
(MTM) Accounting convention.
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BB HOLDINGSLIMITED
LIMITED
CAUSES AND AMPLIFIERS
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Sub-prime Lending and the Lowering of Credit
Standards
Liquidity
Mark to Market Accounting
Excessive Leverage
Exposure to Derivatives
Off Balance Sheet Financing
Inability to access Federal Reserve Funding
Lack of on-site supervision
Credit Rating Agencies
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 SUB-PRIME LENDING AND THE LOWERING OF
CREDIT STANDARDS
In a nutshell, global liquidity from China and
other current-account surplus countries was
directed towards the US and UK which then
inflated asset markets (especially housing) which
was plagued by poor regulation and dangerous
incentives.
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By contrast, Caribbean Investment Banks have little
or no exposure to US Sub-Prime Loans, very little
exposure to mortgages generally and are currently
exhibiting non-performing ratios of less than 2.5%.
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LIQUIDITY
 US Investment Banks are particularly vulnerable to
credit-market turmoil, because they rely on
funding from wholesale markets, much of it shortterm including over-night funding in repurchase
markets. This 4.5 Trillion Market became unstuck
during the crisis.
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Caribbean Investment Banks, unlike their US and
UK counterparts raise their liquidity via deposits.
Furthermore, if they ever run into difficulty, they
can go to their parents which are usually
commercial banks. Due to their lower reserve
requirements they are often more competitive than
their retail and commercial counterparts.
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
LIQUIDITY RISK
This situation is further compounded by the fact
that there is what I have described as a liquidity
trap
whereby,
due
to
poor
transmission
mechanisms. (from local to foreign currency)
local liquidity is actually trapped in the local
financial system and keeps “slushing around”
moving to where it attracts the highest internal
rates.
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REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
 Regulatory Arbitrage means that because the range of
investment opportunity is limited
for regional
institutional investors even more liquidity is trapped
in the system.
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MARK TO MARKET ACCOUNTING AND
THE PREPONDERANCE OF TRADING
ASSETS OF THE BALANCE SHEETS OF
INVESTMENT BANKS
 Fair value accounting can cause a downward
spiral in prices by encouraging institutions to sell
assets quickly and forcing them to take writedowns that do not reflect the “true” value of the
underlying assets.
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In respect of
Caribbean Investment Banks,
although MTM accounting is in effect, the
component of their balance sheet which is affected
by this convention is still relatively small when
compared to North America Investments Banks.
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EXCESSIVE LEVERAGE
 US Investment Bank were allowed to leverage their
Balance Sheet to levels unheard of in the Caribbean.
The Leverage ratio of Bear Stearns rose from 26 Times
(assets were 26 times equity) in 2005 to almost 30
times at the time of its collapse in 2008.
Under the FIA Trinidadian Merchant Banks are limited
to 12 times their capital
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EXPOSURE TO DERIVATIVES
According to the Economist Magazine (May 7,
2008) approximately half of the write-down of
banks was due to the exposure to derivatives which
contained synthetic exposures to sub-prime assets
(CDO’s) and credit default swaps.
In the case of Caribbean Investment Bank, this
exposure is almost non-existent.
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OFF BALANCE SHEET FINANCING
AND EXPOSURE TO SIV’S
US Investment Banks accounting under US GAPP,
typically allowed for SIV’s which are akin to a
“shadow banking system” in which short-term
funding was raised (at lower interest rates) and
later invested in long-term higher yielding assets.
Quite often these structures were not consolidated
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and therefore provided a false sense of security in terms of
the bank’s capital adequacy ratio. Citi had more than 83
Billion in SIV’s in September 2008.
 Caribbean Investment Banks typically use IFRS. In this
regard, IAS 39 and SIC 12 would require these enterprises
to consolidate any “SIV” or SPV once they retained an
economic interest in the enterprise.
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INABILITY TO ACCESS (IMMEDIATELY
AVAILABLE) EMERGENCY FINANCING
FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE
 Because US Investment Banks did not come under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve they did not have access
to Federal Financing.
 Investment/Merchant
Banks
in
the
Caribbean
are
regulated by the Central Bank and by virtue of this, have
access to Central Bank Financing via the repurchase
market
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REGULAR BANK SUPERVISION
Because regional banks fall under the supervision of
the Central Bank, they are subject to regular on-site
inspections by the regulators.
US Investment Banks were not subject to such routine
regulation which would have alerted the authorities to
the impeding danger.
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THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES
 The legitimacy and stamp of approval of Credit Rating
Agencies undoubtedly contributed to the crisis.
 As these assets began defaulting the Credit Rating
Agencies
downgraded
these
assets
further
exacerbating the situation on account of the MTM
accounting convention thereby forcing further sales.
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In the case of Caribbean Investment Banks and
Institutional Investors Credit Rating Agencies played
and plays no such role. Indeed, Pension Funds are
mandated as to what investments they can invest in
statutorily so that you do not have this vicious cycle
and therefore no compulsion to sell.
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CARIBBEAN INVESTMENT
BANKING MODEL
Regional Projects Requiring Financing Up to USD
250 MM
 Non-Investment Grade Projects
Projects with a pay-back period of 10-20 years
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Basic Infrastructure financing (Toll Roads,
Airports, Seaports, Hydro-plads)
Local Private Placement Issues
144 A Issues
REG: S. Issues
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 PROFILE OF INVESTORS
 LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
 LOCAL BANKS
 US INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
 CENTRAL AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
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 CARIBBEAN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
 HNW INDIVIDUALS
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WHITER GOES CARIBBEAN
INVESTMENT BANKING

Notwithstanding The remotest of nexus. To Its US
and European Counterparts The Investment
Banking Industry In The Caribbean Is At A Critical
Juncture

CLICO / CIB Bailout (US 1-2 BN)
- Not Related to US Financial Crisis
- Related Party Lending
- High Cost Resource Mobilisation Strategy
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
Collapse Of Stanford Banking
Group
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
THE MULTINATIONALISATION OF THE
REGIONAL BANKING SECTOR
In the recent past several highly profitable
indigenous financial organisations have been
targeted by Foreign Banks. At least one has
been taken over.
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Invariably, the purchasers of these bank tend to be
much more “risk averse” than their predecessors with a
propensity for “white good” financing. This is done to
the detriment of Development Financing.
Quite simply they gravitate towards Retail Banking
and tend not to be developmental or transformative in
their approach to financing.
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INABILITY/RESTRICTION ON SELLING SECURITIES
TO US INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

Due to the meltdown in the US, due to the
imposition of new and “higher “ standards
US
Institutional Investors are
likely to
purchase
regional
now
less
securities.
(Approximately
USD 150-200MM in regional
securities were
being sold into the US
before the crisis.
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 REGULATORY OVER REACH
Having seen finance wreck havoc, the temptation
would be to bind it in a regulation.
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THANK YOU.
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