• This is because when the positions of both
candidates are extreme, the latter will find
it important that the nominee of this party
will not win the election.
• As a result, they strategically vote for tile
candidate who is more extreme and has
less chance to win the election
• On the other hand, the party members
also realize that the more extreme
candidate has very little chance to win,
and the desire to win the election will
surpass their fondness of a candidate.
• Consequently, they vote for the moderate
• We find that the more extreme the
positions of the candidates are, the more
likely the voters will vote strategically.
Side report
• However, whether the strategic voting
behavior affects the outcome of the
primary depends upon the relative turnout
rate of party and nonparty members in the
• The welfare implication of the strategic
voting behavior will also be discussed
• The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. Section 2 gives the model. Section 3
analyzes the equilibrium outcome under various
assumptions on the voters' strategic behavior
• Section 4 discusses the welfare implications of
strategic voting.
• Section 5 derives some empirical implications of
the model. Section 6 discusses and relaxes the
assumptions made in the model, and finds that
most of the qualitative results still holds. Section
7 concludes.