The rise of China as a security linchpin
By Shiping Tang, Asia Times, 21 June 2003
BEIJING - When China’s economic growth became impossible to ignore in the early 1990s, there was great
anxiety among many regional observers about how China was going to exercise its growing power. Along
with the anxiety, a “China threat” theory, predicting that China would become aggressive when it became
strong, thus unraveling the regional security setting, gained prominence in Asia.
With a decade having passed since then, now may be a better time to assess what China’s growing power
has really brought to regional security. In this article, I will try to offer an assessment from four different
angles.
Reconfiguration of regional power
While China’s growth in the past two decades has been phenomenal, East Asia as a region has also
experienced a period of robust growth, except Japan, which has been saddled by a decade-long recession.
While the 1997 Asian financial crisis shattered many regional states’ rosy projections before the crisis, it did
not erase what had been achieved.
In South Asia, India has broken out of its long-standing and often-ridiculed growth rate of 2-3 percent and
has experienced an average growth rate of 5-6 percent in the past decade.
Russia and Central Asia witnessed a precipitous drop in gross domestic product (GDP) and living standards
in the first half of the past decade, and recovery had still not come to Russia as late as 1998, with many
former Soviet Central Asian states remaining in economic hardship.
Overall, there is no doubt that China’s relative power versus its neighbors has been greatly strengthened.
Nonetheless, the reconfiguration of power in East Asia has not been as dramatic as many had perceived.
This is because even since the founding of the People’s Republic, East Asia has been a multipolar region,
and China’s rise did not transform the regional structure of multipolarity into something else (say,
unipolarity with China as a hegemon). Therefore, the reconfiguration of power in East Asia brought by
China’s rise has been quantitative rather than qualitative: it merely made that multipolarity structure a more
balanced one.
How China uses its power - and doesn’t
For Asian states, one of the most disturbing scenarios would be a China pursing an expansive strategy with
its increasing wealth and power. China has yet to adopt such an expansive strategy so far, but will China’s
moderate behavior last? For states in the region, this is the most haunting question.
While one possible explanation for China’s moderate behavior so far is that China is not powerful enough,
we argue that the real cause is the fact that China’s current security strategy is underpinned by four core
ideas, and one of them is China’s realization of the security dilemma.
Fundamentally, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have understood that an aggressive security strategy is
simply not a viable option for China no matter how powerful the country becomes: located in a geographic
environment with more than 15 neighboring countries, an expansionist policy might well lead to a
counterbalancing alliance consisting of all its neighbors along with distant powers (most likely the United
States). If, however, China were to adopt a defensive security strategy, most regional countries would be
reluctant to adopt a hardcore containment policy and China might enjoy a benign security environment.
This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasizing
moderation, self-restraint, and security cooperation.
Indeed, in the past few decades, China settled border disputes with such countries as Bhutan, Myanmar,
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Nepal and Pakistan in its early days, and more recently with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Vietnam (land), and has implemented comprehensive confidence-building measures (CBMs) with India in
line with its “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”. Moreover, China has not allowed its territorial
disputes with Japan and India to poison its relationship with the two countries. Such moves have led to a
better security environment not only for China, but also for the region.
States base their diplomacy on their self-images and images of the outside world. In the past 20 years, we
have witnessed a profound transformation of China’s image of itself and the world. No longer viewing itself
as a country on the edge of collapse, China today sees itself as a rising power, with limited but increasingly
significant capacity in shaping the environment in which it lives. At the same time, while still considering the
outside world as inherently anarchic with power remaining a yardstick in international politics, China today
also believes the world is moving toward a more civilized era in which the probability of a global war is
marginal.
China’s growing confidence in its capability of shaping its environment and that the world is getting less
dangerous will have profound implications for China’s diplomatic conduct in the coming years. Most likely,
a more self-confident China will be a responsible power with its growing strength. By that we mean that
China will continue to develop its comprehensive national power, but will exercise its power with selfrestraint.
While we cannot be absolutely sure China’s benign behavior will continue, we can say with great confidence
that this more likely than not.
Moreover, with respect for territorial integrity firmly established as an international norm and the presence
of nuclear weapons rendering the option of turning economic power into territorial expansion almost
impossible, China simply cannot flex its muscles without facing serious consequences.
Regional security: Better or worse?
For most of the Cold War and a brief period after it, regional security had been largely based on “peace
under Pax Americana”, underpinned by a US-centric alliance system.
While it is true that the regional security structure based on the US-centric alliance system has weakened
somewhat in the past 20 years, the cause of this has been regional states’ decreasing willingness to remain
US protectorates, and not the rise of China. Indeed, regional states’ choice reflects, at least partly, their
rather optimistic view of the impact of China’s rise on their security.
What is more, thanks to most regional states’ sound policy, the region’s security dilemma has not worsened
because of their reaction to China’s rise.
In Northeast Asia, Russia and China actually dramatically reduced the security dilemma between them by
choosing to cooperate on a wide range of issues. With the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in place,
Russia and China have also marginalized the possibility that the two could clash in Central Asia because of
divergent interests. Indeed, one can argue that both countries are now confident of each other’s good
intentions and goodwill, and that the bilateral relationship will remain on firm ground, barring a nationalist
extremist taking over the Kremlin.
In Southeast Asia, the competition to arm in the 1990s was largely due to Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries’ increasing wealth and their own need to balance against each other, rather
than a need to balance China jointly. Other than some squabbles with Manila on fishing rights in the South
China Sea, China has maintained a rather cordial relationship with all ASEAN states. Therefore, while
Southeast Asian states worry about China’s intentions, they have yet to adopt a policy of hard containment
versus China. Instead, they initiated the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to engage and constrain China.
After initial reluctance, China now recognizes that participating in ARF has been a very wise decision.
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By engaging each other, China and ASEAN states have been able to get a feeling for each other’s intentions,
and gradually have come to realize that cooperation rather than confrontation is the way to go. By signing
the joint declaration on the Code of Conduct over the South China Sea, ASEAN countries and China have
greatly minimized the chance of conflict, while China’s recent mediation during the squabble between
Thailand and Cambodia underscored ASEAN countries’ mutual confidence in China.
In South Asia, China has yet to reach a breakthrough in its relationship with India, with India continuing to
view China as its arch-enemy. Yet even in this aspect we have reason to be cautiously optimistic. First of all,
the Himalayas render the security dilemma between India and China less severe. Second, while China still
retains Pakistan as its traditional ally, China has not allowed Sino-Indian ties to be held hostage by SinoPakistani ties, as shown by then premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India immediately after Pakistani President
General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to China at a time of high tension between India and Pakistan. With trade
between India and China increasing rapidly in recent years, it is possible that the two countries will find
their shared interest to be substantial enough for more effort toward reaching accommodation.
Overall, regional states have gradually come to accept China’s rise as a reality that they have to live with, and
most regional states do not believe that a strong China will inevitably pose a security threat to them. In fact,
on some very important issues, regional states actually view China’s participation as a critical part of the
solution. While it is true that the rise of China poses a real economic challenge for many regional states,
China’s growth also presents regional states with a strategic opportunity if they can adjust successfully.
Many regional states have gradually come to believe that China’s growth is not a bad thing after all.
By initiating a free-trade area (FTA) with ASEAN states and pursuing regional cooperation (eventually
integration) under the “10+3” framework (for East Asia) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (for
Central Asia and Russia), China and regional states are actually moving together to control the security
dilemma.
Therefore, while China’s rise has indeed demanded certain adjustments from regional states, for the most
part the security dilemma has not worsened (at least not because of China’s rise). And if there is a sense of
uncertainty in regional security, it has not been because of the rise of China, but because of other factors,
such as the uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula, the US pursuit of a missile defense system, and the
tightening of the US-Japan alliance.
US versus China: Power shift and hegemony
A factor that will potentially have the most profound implication for the region is how the United States
views China’s rise, how it reacts, and how regional states react to US policy. This is something not only
central to China’s security calculus, but also pivotal for the region’s future.
In a nutshell, US policy toward China can be understood as a strategy underpinned by three pillars. First, to
hedge the possibility that China becomes a peer competitor (or challenger), the United States will maintain a
robust military presence in the region through its alliance system to deter China from mounting a challenge,
and if necessary to defeat that challenge. Second, as long as China does not challenge US primacy, the
United States will engage China and, if possible, integrate it into the present global system with the US at
the center. Third, the United States will supplement its alliance system with multilateral security and
economic institutions and regimes by drawing other regional states into the game, so that these states will
not become opponents of US policy even if they do not want to antagonize China.
Moderates toward China generally put more emphasis on the last two pillars, while hardliners generally pay
more attention to the first one.
Overall, China has demonstrated little resistance to the overall US strategy. As long as the United States
refrains from jeopardizing China’s core national interest, China has largely been content with remaining a
regional major power, with the US as the ultimate offshore balancer. In fact, China has affirmed that it
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welcomes the “constructive presence” of the US in the region. To put it differently, if the US behaves like a
benign hegemon, China sees no interest in balancing the US.
Unfortunately, as long as the Taiwan question is not resolved peacefully, there is a real possibility that the
United States and China could go to war. But even on this issue, there is hope for optimism. Yes, there are
voices inside Taiwan calling for independence, but most Taiwanese people do not want war and are willing
to take a “wait and see” approach toward reunification. With mainland China continuing its economic
growth and political reform, coupled with robust deterrence from both the US and the mainland, there is a
real possibility for peaceful reunification between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait.
Therefore, the United States can take a more relaxed view toward the Taiwan question if it does not
consider Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the mainland as detrimental to US interests. If so, the US and
China can indeed reach an accommodative modus vivendi.
Unfortunately, there are people inside the United States arguing that China’s reunification, and even China’s
growth, represents a threat to US interests. These offensive realists believe that China will inevitably
challenge US primacy once it becomes strong enough, thus the US has to do whatever it takes to prevent
China from becoming more powerful and achieving reunification.
For the foreseeable future, the US-China relationship will remain in the gray area between competition and
partnership. The danger is that the United States may foreclose the possibility that a reunified and
democratic China can become its partner in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.
Conclusion
China’s rise has generated a lot of attention, but the predication that China’s rise will cause havoc in regional
security has been an exaggeration of fear. While China’s rise does pose significant economic challenges (and
opportunities) for regional states, it has yet to cause any significant deterioration of regional security
environment. With China’s security strategy firmed grounded upon moderation, self-restraint, and security
cooperation, there is a great probability that China will eventually become a force for regional stability, not
instability.
In fact, most proponents of the “China threat” theory are from the United States, Japan, India, plus a few
from Russia. Obviously, these people worry about the prospect that China’s rise will either weaken their
own country’s hegemonic position (for the US) or decrease the chance that their own country becomes a
regional hegemon. Therefore, China should not pay much attention to their voices. After all, small-tomedium-sized countries should be in a better position to judge whether China’s rise will pose a threat to
regional security (because they are more vulnerable and thus more sensitive). Yet in these countries, the
“China threat” theory is losing its audience.
Shiping Tang is deputy director of Center for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He
is also co-director of the Sino-America Security Dialogue.