Chapter 8
Niger
Anonymous
Introduction
On 18 February 2010 in Niger, a military junta overthrew the regime of
President Mamadou Tandja, who was seeking – in violation of the
constitution – to remain in power beyond his second term. The military
regime suspended the constitution, and the country entered a period of
transition whose stated purpose was to allow the drafting of a new
constitution and the organisation of free and transparent elections. The junta,
which took the name of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of
Democracy, declared that they were acting solely for the purpose of
reinstating democracy. In spite of the significant progress made in
democracy since 1990, this was the third coup d’état experienced by Niger in
the last fifteen years.
The current situation in Niger gives greater significance to any study
of the issues involved in prospective security sector reform. As important as
it is for the military transition to be successful, its political achievements will
be even more important. The question is how are political leaders going to
resolve the problem of chronic political instability and how do they intend to
‘confine’ the military to the barracks, eradicate the culture of coup d’états,
and avoid having the military constantly play the role of arbiter of political
and institutional affairs?
Niger attained independence on 3 August 1960 and experienced a
period of relative social stability until the time of the first coup d’état in
1974, which brought General Seyni Kountche to power. The military regime
then became a single party (State Party) and remained in power until 1989.
Beginning in 1989 with the wave of democratic renewal in francophone
African countries, the National Conference organised in Niger in 1991
confiscated power from the State Party, conducted a two-year civilian
transition, and organised free elections that entrenched a return to fullfledged democracy in 1993. Very quickly, however, in 1996, the elected
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president, Ousmane Mahamane, was overthrown in a coup d’état. The head
of the junta, General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara remained in power after
organising elections in 1998 whose credibility was generally questioned by
the whole of the political class. In April 1999 General Maïnassara was killed
during a coup d’état organised by the head of the presidential guard,
Squadron Leader Daouda Mallam Wanké. The army stated that it was acting
in the interest of democracy, and in the space of a short nine-month
transition, free elections were organised. The newly elected president,
Mamadou Tandja, head of the former State Party, the Mouvement National
pour la Société du Développement, remained in power at the end of his
second five-year term of office, in violation of the constitution, which limits
the number of presidential terms to two. He was overthrown less than two
months later on 18 February 2010.
In Niger, coups d’états have always taken place in a situation of such
political turmoil that they have often been welcomed, at least within the
country. Thus, in 1974, the country had just been seriously affected by a
major drought: in addition to the totalitarian shift of the First Republic, the
country was experiencing a famine. The reigning party was setting itself up
as a single party. Political parties were abolished and the main opposition
party (the Union des Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie et le Progrès)
had been persecuted and declared illegal. In 1996, the president’s party had
just lost the majority in the National Assembly. The country was therefore
experiencing a period of ‘political cohabitation’ during which the relations
between the President and the new Prime Minister, a member of the new
majority, had deteriorated to the point where the country found itself in a
political stalemate. In 1999, General Maïnassara had created a political party
following his coup d’état and wanted to hang on to power by organising
rigged elections. Finally, in 2010, President Mamadou Tandja had attempted
to remain in power beyond the constitutional limit of two terms, in spite of
the disapproval of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court.
This tradition of ‘redemptive’ coup d’états has imbued Nigerien
officers with the sense that it is the de facto mission of the military to
‘rescue’ the population when the political class fails. In fact the military sees
itself as more mature than the political class. Officers have demonstrated this
maturity by bringing an end, since 2002, to the very frequent mutinies
experienced in the 1990s. As a result, one can now expect a coup d’état
whenever the country finds itself in a political impasse or simply in a
complex political situation. This is of even greater concern as the situation is
not completely stabilised: suspicion, internal divisions, and aspirations to
stage a coup still persist within the military, while the political climate is
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marked by poor governance and mismanagement that make the situation
structurally volatile.
At the same time as the political upheavals, Niger has also
experienced a situation of chronic instability with waves of rebellions by the
Tuareg (1991 to 1996; 2007 to 2009) and Toubou (1993 to 1996; 1998 to
2001) minorities in the north and the east of the country, respectively.
Although a peace agreement has been signed with the rebels, the situation in
the northern and eastern parts of Niger remains volatile, in particular with
the establishment of various mining exploration and operating companies
since 2009. These represent targets that could lead to renewed rebellions.
The zone remains dangerous due to the presence of mines that were planted
during the last armed rebellion.
The ethnic rebellions in the north and the east of the country bring to
light the issue of latent ethnic divisions, which translate into the ‘regionalist’
configuration of political parties. The issue of ethnicity has insidiously led to
the development of a system of ‘weighing the ethnic balance’ through the
attribution of positions of responsibility in all administrative services to
avoid this reality that constantly resurges in public political debate. In Niger
it is euphemistically called ‘ethnic dosing’.1
In the vast southern and desert regions that share borders from the east
to the west with Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mali, the already unstable
domestic situation is further undermined by the resurgence of acts of armed
banditry perpetrated by former rebels who have converted to armed robbery,
the persistence of illegal emigrants crossing the desert to travel to Europe
through Algeria and Libya, and the emergence of various types of
trafficking, in particular drugs. Due to poor surveillance of the zone, it has
been dangerously easy for terrorist groups to settle in this area, especially the
Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, and more recently Al
Qaida in the Maghreb, which has had a growing number of highly intense
skirmishes with the Nigerien army.
Finally, the strong demographic concentration in the southern strip of
the country, the porous borders, and in particular the influence of the
northern Nigerian Islamic states that apply Sharia law, as well as inadequate
government means of control, pose a real threat of the development of small
groups in favour of pro-Al Qaida fundamentalist movements.
While the potential or real risks of external aggression are very low,
domestic governance for its part remains a burning issue. It is characterised
by embezzlement of public funds, illicit wealth acquisition, political
discourse that focuses on ethnic divisions, social conflicts over the scarce
arable land, rising urban and rural insecurity, inadequate public
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administration and social services, as well as poor political leadership, all of
which make Niger a fragile and unstable country. In the conclusion, a
number of recommendations are made for measures that can move beyond
these dynamics and lead to the introduction of sound security sector
governance.
The security apparatus and security environment
The security apparatus comprises four forces, broken down into two
categories: the first includes forces that have military status and are under
the authority of the minister of national defence (The Niger Armed Forces
(FAN) and the national gendarmerie). The second includes civilian security
forces that fall under the authority of the minister in charge of internal
security (the national police force and National Guard).
The armed forces
The FAN is made up of the army and the air force. It was established in 1960
and counts 12,000 members, about 2% of whom are women in
administrative and support positions.
The army is organised in eight defence zones that correspond to the
eight administrative regions. It carries out the ‘traditional’ missions of
defending the integrity of the national territory by deploying in battalions,
companies, and outposts throughout the territory, including in the desert
zones in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country.
The air force was created in 1961. Its missions include territorial
surveillance and support to army troops. It is 1,000-man strong, with no
women at all.
National gendarmerie
The gendarmerie also falls under the responsibility of the ministry of
national defence. There are 5,395 gendarmes, including about 200 women
who for the most part are confined to administrative and subordinate
positions. The gendarmerie is a force constituted to ensure law enforcement
throughout the territory and in the armed forces. In particular, it is in charge
of military police functions. Most importantly, however, it has exclusive
responsibility for day-to-day police activities in rural areas.
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Up to 1993, the head of the gendarmerie corps received orders from
the armed forces chief of staff. Today, the gendarmerie has an independent
command structure (high command), which is directly under the authority of
the minister in charge of national defence. The national gendarmerie is the
only corps that is both a defence force and a security force.
National police force
The national police force was established in 1960 and comprises 8,500
members, 5% of whom are women. Unlike women in the armed forces, they
are not restricted in any way with respect to employment and access to
positions of responsibility. The national police force is deployed within
urban and peri-urban centres, while rural areas are under the territorial
authority of gendarmerie brigades.
The National Guard
The National Guard, which was first called the republican guard, then the
national intervention and security force (FNIS), is a civilian force of 10,000
members, with 3% women. The National Guard is a substitute back-up force
that is used by the administration to provide security to authorities and
public buildings, as well as to maintain law and order. The National Guard is
a fully autonomous force, which is always under the command of a senior
army officer. According to the statute governing the National Guard, its
members also have the attributions of a criminal police force, but due to lack
of adequate training, they do not carry out these functions. Above all, the
National Guard could not carry out such functions without encroaching upon
areas of competence that are already attributed to the police and the
gendarmerie. The case of the National Guard is rather specific and atypical:
it is a civilian force whose staff have the same training as the military (same
schools and qualifications) and which have highly varied missions ranging
from protecting personalities and public buildings, to maintenance of law
and order, and including strictly military style missions of controlling certain
zones, and territorial defence.
Other arms-bearing forces
Alongside these law enforcement forces are two other uniformed corps
whose members bear arms: the customs service and the water and forestry
service.
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The national customs service is under the authority of the ministry of
finance. The customs general directorate is made up of roughly 2,500 agents.
For its part, the water and forestry department comprises about 2,000 agents.
Unlike the other forces, customs and water and forestry agents enjoy the
right to form trade unions.
Customs and forestry agents are rarely involved in dealing with
security issues. They may be called on strictly on a temporary basis and in
specific regions, generally where there is an armed rebellion and where the
region is covered by an administrative ‘caution’ measure, or following coup
d’états, when they may participate locally in security patrols. They may also
be mobilised in case of war, or to defend the national territory. In addition to
their specialised training, they are given brief military training in the army or
gendarmerie training centres, to enable them deal with armed threats such as
rebel attacks, highway bandits, armed smugglers and poachers.
General organisation and responsibilities
The breakdown of responsibilities among the defence and security forces is
clearly defined by the constitution and by law. These texts determine in
particular how security is organised according to the specific and exceptional
situations stipulated under the constitution (war, state of siege, state of
emergency, alert). In such situations, all of the defence and security forces
are placed under the control of the army.
Under normal circumstances investigative police work is subject to
the rules of the code of criminal procedure and carried out under the
authority of the public prosecutor, while law and order fall under the
responsibility of the (civilian) administrative authority. Decree n°66082/PRN of 9 March 1966 defines the rules relating to law and order, public
security, and public protection. It specifies which forces are in charge of
these missions, and which administrative authorities can call on them. This
decree is supplemented by Ministerial Instruction n°42/PRN/MDN of 27
September 1966 on the participation of the armed forces (including the
national gendarmerie) in public law and order operations. This text stipulates
that for military forces to be involved in maintaining law and order there
must be a written requisition from the administrative authority, specifically
authorising the use of force and, if necessary, of arms.
Units of the gendarmerie, the National Guard, and the national police
force often operate together in maintaining law and order. The law however
stipulates an order of intervention: the police and the National Guard are first
category forces, while the gendarmerie and the FAN are respectively the
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second and third category forces. They intervene progressively, only upon
written request and only when the lower category forces are overwhelmed.
This arrangement is aimed at avoiding ‘blunders’ by limiting the
participation of the armed forces in maintaining public order and postponing
their intervention as much as possible.
The general arrangement of defence and security forces is quite
consistent and functions well as a whole. However, the National Guard
cannot carry out its investigative police duties without encroaching on the
areas covered by the police and the gendarmerie. This could lead to conflicts
of jurisdiction and exacerbate latent rivalries between the police, the
National Guard, and the gendarmerie.
Internal oversight of defence and security forces
Oversight is the task of the inspectorate divisions of the various forces. Both
the armed forces and the police have an inspectorate division, but the
National Guard does not.
The armed forces and gendarmerie inspectorate-general is under the
direct authority of the minister in charge of national defence. The armed
forces and gendarmerie inspector-general is a general officer who ranks
above the military joint chief of staff and the gendarmerie high commander.
In addition to checking internal malfunctions, the police inspectorate
service (IGSP) is in charge of reviewing complaints lodged by people who
have been victims of police abuse.
It is worth noting that the attributions of the armed forces and the
gendarmerie’s inspection services do not include reviewing complaints by
individuals; they only deal with internal malfunctions. Although these
attributions are limited, they truly act as a deterrent.
Militia and rebel forces
In spite of the armed rebellions that have flared up sporadically over the
decades, and the self-defence militia that they have spawned, no rebel forces
have been active in the country since 2009.2 In 1995, all the rebel groups in
Niger joined hands with the aim of wielding greater influence in the
prospective peace negotiations. The agreements were signed in several
waves, and by 1998, all the Tuareg movements had signed a peace
agreement with the government of Niger.3 Peace also came to neighbouring
Mali around the same period. In both countries, the peace process was
facilitated by Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso.
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In 2007, some former leaders of the 1990s Tuareg rebellion started a
new rebellion in Niger. The return of an armed rebellion had already been
foreshadowed by attacks waged between 2003 and 2005 by small groups that
claimed to be part of the Front de libération de l’Aïr et de l’Azawagh. The
Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) engaged in an armed
struggle for two years. In June 2009, Aghaly Alambo’s MNJ was wracked
by a wave of secessions that led to the creation of the Front Patriotique
Nigérien led by Aklou Sidi Sidi, and the Front des Forces pour la
Rectification headed by Rhissa Ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska.
These three movements negotiated together in all the agreements that were
concluded under the auspices of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and especially
Libya.
The most recent Tuareg rebellion has led to grave concern about the
real causes of this armed struggle. Indeed it would appear that many
members of the MNJ who are strongly suspected to be involved in drug
trafficking have launched this rebellion simply to increase the level of
insecurity, which serves their purposes. The area has become a major transit
point for drugs and emigrants headed to Europe. The region is also highly
favoured by the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb terrorist group, which is
seeking an inaccessible region to serve as their rear base and a reservoir of
members.
The Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali include a very strong
transnational dimension: as the situations in both countries are closely
linked, the negotiations must also take into account the regional perspective.
The situation changes in tandem: each rebellion in one country leads to a
twin rebel movement in the other country. Furthermore, the Tuareg
rebellions have inspired the Toubou, a minority nomadic community found
in Niger, Chad, and Libya to also take up arms.
During the first wave of rebellions, the Nigerien government
encouraged and support the creation of ‘self-defence militia’ in the Arab
communities. The largest of these militia, the Comité de Vigilance de
Tassara (CVT) fought alongside the regular army, which provided it with
logistical support. Other Peulh militia have also been set up to the west of
Niger to combat the Toubou rebels. The multiplicity of rebel groups
combined with the establishment of these self-defence committees have
contributed to weapons proliferation in the region, and continued armed
banditry on the part of the ex-rebels.
The issue of reintegrating ex-combatants is a vital one. In spite of the
fact that a high commission on re-establishing peace has been set up for this
purpose, one of the demands of the MNJ has been precisely for the effective
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and fair implementation of the agreements signed between 1995 and 1998.
The basic problem seems to be the lack of resources to finance the
redeployment of former combatants.
Nevertheless, the question still remains as to the possible resurgence
of rebel groups in Niger. Is this a consequence of poor governance and
inequalities among Niger’s regions and ethnic groups, or is it a
demonstration of the authorities’ structural inability to create a framework
for integrating minorities? Quite obviously, where Niger is concerned, there
is a clear link between poor governance, the democratic deficit, and resorting
to armed struggle.
Security sector performance
Neither the police nor the gendarmerie has been able to set up a system that
provides an adequate response to the threats that jeopardise the security of
individuals. These threats include armed robberies, in particular on the
country’s highways; juvenile delinquency; drug consumption and
trafficking; sexual and domestic violence, etc. In particular, striving to
prevent Islamist terrorist groups from infiltrating the territory remains a
major challenge. Sporadic successes cannot hide the many deaths from
within the ranks of the armed forces caused by these confrontations.
Objectively, the Nigerien military does not have the logistical capacity
required to effectively control the vast desert areas in the north.
The existence of these armed rebellions has had a strong impact on the
capacities and objectives of the defence and security forces, especially
locally. Activities are definitely geared towards force protection rather than
providing security to individuals. Faced with attacks on their positions,
vehicle thefts, and rebels planting mines, the priority of the defence and
security forces has been to prepare and implement post facto responses to
such phenomena.
Beyond an inability to ensure the security of citizens, there are also
instances in the field where forces exceed their mandate. This very often
takes the form of wrongful or even illegal arrests carried out by the police
force, the gendarmerie, and the National Guard; of people being held in
custody beyond the legal period, and by harassment of travellers on the main
roads and in urban centres. Very often such acts stem from a desire to make
easy money. During the armed rebellions, and also during the military
operations to pacify the rebel areas, the army carried out some illegal arrests
and seizures of goods. The political excesses of unconstitutional and non
democratic regimes also lead to arbitrary and illegal arrests.
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Generally, there are only isolated cases of abuse, which are usually
sanctioned by the authorities or dealt with by the courts. The exception is
when these acts are ordered by the existing political authority. Nevertheless,
the defence and security forces do have a good knowledge of human rights
and individual freedoms, which are generally observed, but not considered a
priority. State security is indeed systematically considered to have priority
over individual and private considerations.
Security sector management and oversight in Niger
Civilian oversight of the security sector
Niger has never enjoyed a truly democratic regime. As a result, it has no
experience with the principle of ‘separation of powers’, without which it is
not possible to envisage genuine democratic oversight. The regimes that
succeeded each other up to 2010 all gave exorbitant powers and excessive
importance to the executive branch, thus undermining the separation,
balance, and mutual control of the various branches of power.
Under the First Republic (1960-1974), the presidential regime
inherited after the period of French colonisation gradually gave
predominance to the president of the republic, to the detriment of all other
institutions. The executive has always had far-reaching prerogatives with
respect to security, while the legislative and judicial powers have failed to
play their role as counter-balance, even during the various regimes that
occupied power up to the coup on 18 February 2010.
The executive power has over time developed a system of exclusive
management of the security apparatus, in order to protect itself from the
frequent coup d’états. This confirms a certain conception of power and
security that makes the armed forces the symbol and the spearhead of the
regime. Indeed the way in which public powers in the area of defence and
security are organised is quite revealing: the president of the republic is the
head of the executive branch, the guardian of territorial integrity, and also
the head of the armed forces. He appoints the main officers in the military
command, upon the proposal of the minister of defence and the high council
on national defence.
The high council on national defence is an advisory body chaired by
the president. It was established by the 18 July 1999 constitution to assist the
latter in the task of appointing officers to the military command. The council
was set up with the aim of ensuring that civilian management of the military
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institution did not become a source of conflict both between the military
chiefs and the civilian authorities, and between political parties and those in
charge of making appointments and granting promotions within the armed
forces (head of state, prime minister, and minister of defence)
The attributions of the ministers of defence and interior are clearly
defined. In the area of defence, the prime minister plays a limited role,
except with respect to decisions related to budget preparation and execution
where the minister of finance also has real power over the defence and
security forces.
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector
The oversight role of parliament in the area of defence and security was
totally inexistent until 1991, but has grown since it was enshrined in the
constitution of the Third Republic. Under the terms of this constitution,
defence agreements must be ratified by parliament, whose authorisation is
also required to declare war or dispatch troops abroad. It passes laws,
including those on defence and security, as well as authorising allocations to
the defence and security forces within the general government budget. The
national assembly’s standing committee on defence and security may launch
investigations and address written or oral questions to members of
government, including the prime minister and/or the minister of defence, on
general issues of defence and security policy, or on specific and targeted
problems related to defence and security.
However, even for parliament, security issues remain almost taboo;
there is hardly ever any debate and the government does not submit any
reports on the issue to parliament. The powers of the defence and security
committee remain limited to examining the budget when the finance law is
to be passed. Enquiry commissions do not carry out any investigations on
defence and security matters as these are the prerogative of the head of state
as commander in chief of the armed forces.
Furthermore, the parliament typically has little capacity, due to the
fact that a great number of its members are illiterate. The parliament has also
lost credibility due to the scandal that broke out following the news that
members had allocated themselves additional allowances at a time when
most citizens were grappling with the high cost of living.
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Judicial oversight
The credibility of the Nigerien justice system has been seriously tarnished by
the inequality of citizens before the law and by the grave and repeated
malfunctions within the system. The judicial system is undermined by a lack
of independence, corruption, and influence-peddling. It is not very accessible
because it is physically remote from a population that finds it difficult to
understand why its procedures are so slow and complex.
The final report of the ‘Analysis and description of the general
framework for the reform process and the programme of support to judicial
reform (PARJ) in Niger’, which was drafted in 2003, highlighted the
malfunctions in the judicial system in Niger. In particular, it condemned the
lack of accessibility; its bias and cooption by the executive power. These
points had been condemned even more severely by the 2002 annual report of
the ANDDH, while the 2004-2005 report indicated that ‘most intercommunity conflicts emerge or degenerate as a result of the nonenforcement or inadequate enforcement of court rulings’.
Written law and customary law exist side by side in Niger’s legal
system. Indeed, in 1962, the legislative power granted judges the liberty of
applying either written or customary law, and if necessary, of deciding
between different customs if ever there was a conflict, because customs are
diverse, unwritten, and sometimes changing. Rulings by judges are just as
unpredictable, due to the corruption and influence-peddling that sometimes
guides such decisions. The plurality of laws makes it possible to use both
sources of law jointly, alternatively, and/or successively and thus have the
possibility of an almost infinite quantity of choices that may be applied
according to what is at stake. Nevertheless, pre-eminence is given to written
law and customary law only applies in civil cases. Although a judge may set
aside custom, this can further enhance the feeling of confusion and the poor
perception that a population that is largely illiterate and deeply attached to
traditional values has of its judicial system. Extrajudicial methods of dispute
settlement are used so often that in practice, tradition is the leading source of
law in rural areas. This has quite significant consequences because issues
related to family law (divorce, repudiation, inheritance) and land tenure
often lead to particularly violent disputes. They are a leading source of
antagonisms that can quickly find expression not only through individuals
but, by solidarity, through communities as a whole. However, the rulings of
the customary justice system are couched in such a way that they tend to
foster a situation where religious rules are taken as customary rules. In this
sense, the traditional system of justice opposes the establishment of the rule
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of law because as long as ‘law’ and religion are seen as being the one and
the same, no one can dispute the ‘rulings of justice’, since such an attitude
would be considered an act of heresy.
The system of justice in Niger lacks resources. There are not enough
magistrates and clerks of court, and the material resources and infrastructure
are pathetic. The geographical spread of courts and tribunals on the national
territory is unsatisfactory.
As a result, there is little control over the activities of the departments
in charge of criminal investigations (police and gendarmerie). Nevertheless,
criminal police activities are carried out under the management of the public
prosecutor, under the supervision of the attorney general.4 In theory,
magistrates may visit police stations and brigades of the gendarmerie to
assess and sanction the behaviour and results achieved by officers of the
Criminal Investigation Department (OPJ). Although field visits are quite
rare, documentary reviews are carried out almost routinely. The prosecutors
do have real authority over both police and gendarmerie OPJ, and the latter
no longer dispute instructions from magistrates. In fact, magistrates are
actively involved in training the OPJ.
Police and gendarmerie units are quite clearly well spread out
geographically on the national territory. The crime rate is low but is
constantly increasing while the performance of investigative police units
remains relatively poor as a result of the insufficient numbers of criminal
investigation officers and lack of equipment (radio links, vehicles,
specialised investigation equipment, etc.). In remote areas where there are no
magistrates and few controls by supervisors, and also because lawyers are
only found in the capital city, irregularities easily occur in police stations and
brigades of the gendarmerie: non-compliance with the legal period of
custody, and physical and moral abuse.
There have however been remarkable changes in the right of detainees
in Niger: in 2003, 2004, and 2007, the reform of the code of criminal
procedure consolidated the rights of defendants by introducing significant
measures to protect people in custody, in particular the right to a lawyer
during the period of custody, and to a compulsory medical exam after an
arrest.
Inadequate defence (lawyers)
Article 17 of the 9 August 2009 constitution stipulates that ‘any individual
accused of an act or omission shall be presumed innocent until such time as
their guilt shall be legally proven in a public trial during which all the
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guarantees required to ensure their defence freely shall be provided to them’.
The law governing the code of criminal procedure also stipulates that in
Niger individuals shall be ‘free to choose their defence and their counsel’.5 It
also stipulates that persons held in custody are entitled to appoint a lawyer
from the 24th hour of custody in a police station or a gendarmerie brigade.
The right to a fair trial,6 that is, where independence and impartiality
are guaranteed, including the freedom to choose one’s counsel, is enshrined
in the constitution and in the laws of Niger. In practice, however, access to a
defence is inadequate. There are very few lawyers in Niger, and 80% of
them are found in the capital city. The majority of people do not have the
means to pay for the services of a lawyer. Furthermore, although this is
obligatory, the police and the gendarmerie do not always inform individuals
of their right to defence.
The penitentiary system
There are 37 detention centres, including a high security prison, two
vocational rehabilitation centres, and a correction centre for minors. There is
no longer any distinction between ‘civilian prisons’ (for detainees) and
‘criminal camps’ (for condemned prisoners). All categories of individuals
are held together, including minors and women, with hardly any separation
among them. The facilities are obsolete and inadequate; they are in such a
state of deterioration that for 22 of them there is no alternative but to
demolish them. Prisons are highly overpopulated, the conditions of detention
are deplorable, and detainees suffer from malnutrition and lack of health
care. There are about 7,000 detainees in Niger, for a capacity of 2,500
prisoners. Detainees frequently escape. The prisons administration falls
under the responsibility of the ministry of justice; management of prisons
represents 40% of the ministry’s budget. Prisons guards are actually
members of the National Guard who are neither specifically nor effectively
trained to guard prisons.
The ANDDH annual report for 2009 recommends the reactivation of
prisons surveillance committees in order to guarantee satisfactory conditions
of detention. Each penitentiary institution is supposed to have a surveillance
committee.7 They are made up of the mayor of the commune as chairperson,
the public prosecutor, the sector judge or deputy judge, and members of
human rights associations and charity associations. Their mission is to
supervise the facilities, the conditions of hygiene, the work of the detainees,
the records, and the conduct of the prison staff.
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The military justice system
Since 2003, the legal system in Niger includes a military code of justice to
control indiscipline and mutinies. This was prompted by a particularly
serious mutiny in 2002. The military tribunal is made up of civilian judges
and military assessors and has relatively limited jurisdiction in peacetime.
It was initially feared that the military justice system would become a
source of impunity for the military, but in fact the military justice system
was finally criticised more for the exorbitant powers that the military code of
justice confers on the minister in charge of national defence: the decision to
prosecute, the right to close a case without prosecution, reduce a sentence or
waive it, etc.
Public oversight
In Niger, issues of security sector governance are generally not discussed
publicly. Defence and security issues are sensitive matters that are so
shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality that it is commonly accepted that
these can only be discussed publicly if the aim is to undermine cohesion and
national security. Nigeriens generally still consider that it is dangerous to
talk about defence and security matters, and it is not unusual for a room to
empty when the discussion turns to security or ‘military matters’, for fear of
reprisals.
In spite of much progress in other areas, civil society has deliberately
neglected security issues, which have become a sort of intellectual niche
under government monopoly. Indeed, for civil society and political parties,
concerns related to the defence and security forces are limited to the
behaviour of their men and institutions with respect to human rights and
fundamental freedoms. In fact in Niger, the concept of ‘security sector’ is
not seen in its holistic sense. The terms used are ‘defence forces’ to describe
the military, ‘security forces’ to designate those in charge of public security
(gendarmerie, the police force, and the National Guard) and finally, more
commonly, the ‘defence and security forces’ for all the military and
paramilitary forces, including customs and forest rangers.
Associations and NGOs
Starting from the 1990s, associations and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) have developed exponentially. They are governed on the one hand
by the law on associations8 and on the other hand by a 1992 decree,9 which
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makes the distinction between associations and NGOs. The latter have all the
characteristics of an association, but in addition they are required to sign a
memorandum of understanding with government and be subject to control
by the ministry of finance, which evaluates and monitors projects
implemented by NGOs ‘whose vocation is to support development through
social and/or economic activities’.
The associations and NGOs that work specifically in the security
sector are human rights associations, grouped together in two umbrella
organisations, the Grouping of organisations for the protection of human
rights and democracy (CODDHD) and the Nigerien network of development
NGOs and human rights and democracy associations.10
The CODDHD has observer status with the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. It is also a member of the Inter-African Union
for Human Rights. The group was founded in 2000 and comprises 26
associations and NGOs, including the ANDDH, which is the most active
human rights organisation, working in partnership with many international
NGOs and external partners. The ANDDH and the CODDHD, as well as
most of the major human rights protection associations, provide legal
assistance services to the population.
Associations and NGOs have been instrumental in bringing about
progress in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, through
their sustained reporting, complaints, criticisms, and advocacy activities.
These NGOs and associations are however financially dependent on grants
from international organisations, and their inability to provide for their own
needs is a serious handicap. Although this dependence places them in a
situation of ‘neediness’ and thus makes them susceptible to be manipulated
by the organisations or persons that provide them with the required funding,
the NGOs and associations still remain relatively independent. They
demonstrate a certain lucidity in understanding political developments and
are honest in their struggle against human rights abuse and attempts to
restrict fundamental freedoms.
The media
Ever since independence, the only press in Niger has been the public press.
Private media only developed during the transition to democracy in 1991.
The government media include a national radio station, the national
television service, with two channels, and daily, weekly, and monthly
publications entitled respectively Le Sahel, Sahel Dimanche, and Nigérama.
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Private media include four television stations and 32 radio stations, of
which the most important are Anfani, R&M, Souda, Ténéré FM, Tambara
FM, and Radio Saraounia. There are roughly fifty private newspapers that
are published very sporadically. The first of these were Haské, Le Paon
Africain, Le Démocrate, and the satirical newspaper Moustique. The most
stable in terms of their publication are Alternative, Le Démocrate, Le
Républicain, Anfani, Le Citoyen, le Témoin, Le Flic, l’Enquêteur, Le
Témoin, La Roue de l’histoire, etc. Increasingly, newspapers are found on
the Internet, in particular on sites for the diaspora, and some have their own
internet sites.
Finally, there are also about one hundred community radio stations
that play a very valuable role in informing, educating, and raising awareness
among rural populations. These community radio stations, which are
organised in a network, RURANET, broadcast mainly in national languages
on development issues and topics of local interest. They are financed by
NGOs, United Nations agencies, and by various intergovernmental bodies.
For many observers of political life in Niger, freedom of expression is
demonstrated in the headlines of the private newspapers. These are tangible
proof of the country’s vibrant democracy, in spite of some obstruction by the
authorities and a few isolated cases where professionals have failed to
comply with ethics and the principles of good conduct.
Nevertheless, the media in Niger are faced with numerous problems
that undermine press freedom. During the Fifth Republic, press freedom
came under serious attack, with journalists being subjected to intimidation
and arrest, as illustrated by the increased prosecution of newspapers, radio
stations, and journalists. Many radio stations, including RFI, were suspended
on several occasions. An additional weapon used by the regime to temper the
criticisms of the free press was to subject them to tax adjustments.
Where finances are concerned, with the exception of those media that
have a partnership agreement with international radio stations or NGOs, the
majority are unable to cover all their costs. Under such circumstances, the
positions adopted by certain newspapers and radio stations are not always
innocent. Indeed, faced with their economic uncertainties, certain media
have given in to temptation and are known mockingly as the ‘bread and
butter’ press. In addition, the political leanings of both journalists and
owners of private media sometimes affect their objectivity and tarnish their
credibility.
The military junta that has been in power since February 2010 is
probably the best advocate of press freedom in Niger. After re-opening the
press centre, the military junta promoted the organisation of the Estates-
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General of the press in May 2010. The most significant achievement has
been the subsequent decriminalisation of breach of press laws, in June 2010.
The weight of religious institutions
Religious institutions wield considerable influence in Niger, in particular in
rural areas where people are often illiterate. The ideas that they relay are
generally well accepted. In broad terms, people will accept or oppose
decisions by the authorities according to the instruction of religious leaders.
Although their influence is generally limited geographically to their
respective communities and they are only interested in topics that affect their
spheres of influence, religious leaders enjoy the deep respect of the
population, and are remarkably able in mobilising the population. Because
they are well established within society, and thanks to the networks they
have built, they naturally play a significant role in raising public awareness
and in conflict prevention and management. They play a major role
informally in social and family conflicts: divorce and reconciliation, farming
disputes, intercommunity and interreligious disputes, strikes and labour
movements (workers, students), etc.
The major concern relates to the growing Islamic fundamentalism in
Niger and the physical, cultural, and religious closeness of states in the north
of Niger where Sharia law is applied. There is also some concern about the
sources of funding of Muslim associations, which are increasingly
penetrated by the generosity and extremist ideologies of Saudi Wahhabis. In
the northern part of the country, although the activities of the Al Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb group do cause concern, they do not mobilise the local
population. However, with porous borders and strong migratory flows, Niger
is highly exposed to the growing fundamentalist movements.
The Christian communities, which are mainly made up of foreigners,
are too few in number and spread out in too many different churches to make
a difference nationally.
Academies and universities
There are very few academies and universities in Niger. There is only one
major university, with branches in the hinterland, that provides two years of
university education. There are no private universities, and the courses
taught in many institutes, schools, or university-level training centres focus
on technical and specialised training. Debate on the security sector is only of
marginal interest to those in academia.
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On the other hand, the subject is of interest to students and researchers
of the Niamey Abdoul Moumouni Dioffo University and the Ecole
Nationale de l’Administration et de la Magistrature (ENAM). The
University of Niamey, through its law, sociology, management, and
philosophy faculties, and the ENAM where magistrates and civilian
administrators are trained, could show an interest in issues of security sector
governance. However they only do this piecemeal and in a limited way, as
they have no knowledge of the holistic conception of the security sector.
And yet these two entities would be the best entry point for introducing the
concept of SSR to the country’s future senior officials.
To promote the introduction of SSR in the university and the ENAM a
number of international bodies (United Nations, AU, and ECOWAS) and
NGOs could fund studies on topics of security sector governance and also
provide study grants or prizes and awards. These incentives would be even
more useful if they could also be extended to senior officials of the defence
and security forces.
The concept of security sector reform and its application in Niger
Generally speaking, people are unfamiliar with the concept of SSR in Niger.
Neither the public authorities nor security sector institutions are familiar
with the holistic nature of security sector reform. The issue of reform in
security sector institutions is seen as sector-specific and fragmented and
short term. And yet the need for reform of security sector institutions has
been clear since the Third Republic. However, changes have always been
made sector by sector and in isolation. Reform in the 1990s was mainly
related to reorganising the national gendarmerie, which at the time was
under the authority of the armed forces chief of staff. The National Guard
was then reformed in 1996, following the signing of the peace agreements
with the Tuareg rebellion. The agreements included the establishment of
special Sahara security units within which the ex-rebels were to be recruited.
In April 2010, the National Guard, which until then had been called the
FNIS, was given its current appellation. In 2003, an organisational audit of
the armed forces and the gendarmerie was carried out, with a view to
adapting the structure and mode of functioning of the military. Although the
audit revealed a number of major malfunctions, recommendations only
focused on the need to adopt a multi-annual military programming law. The
advantage of this option was at least that it allowed for some visibility,
transparency, and the possibility of control over military spending, which is
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now part of a five-year plan that is included in a single document approved
by the parliament. It is however unfortunate that this audit did not lead to
greater changes in the method of functioning of the armed forces, and in
particular that it only covered those forces that are considered a military
force (army and gendarmerie). Subsequently, the police force and the
National Guard also initiated a process to draft a five-year programming law.
Also, within the framework of the PARJ, the judicial system launched its
own ambitious reform programme, including in particular the creation in
1999 of a professional prisons administration system, which has still to be
established.
Nevertheless, far from being a handicap, the multiplicity of isolated,
sectoral reforms are rather an advantage, if a true SSR programme is ever
implemented. Indeed, although reforms have been limited in scope they have
nevertheless constituted significant progress in terms of efficiency and good
governance and have thus produced a ‘transitional mutation’ effect. In
addition, conducting the reforms has enabled these organisations to acquire
experience in bringing about change, while at the same time demonstrating
their ability to implement reform programmes. This learning experience will
be useful in ensuring the successful implementation of a more ambitious,
general reform programme.
The emergence of the concept of SSR in Niger will be facilitated by
the fact that these institutions are ready for change, and because the
principles drafted by the United Nations have been endorsed by regional and
sub regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS. This
convergence will make it easier to bring together the goodwill required
within a credible and relevant framework. Where the military is concerned,
standards can be disseminated very effectively within the general framework
preparing contingents for deployment on peacekeeping missions or as part of
establishing the standby force. They can also be disseminated through
peacekeeping operations training centres in national schools with a regional
dimension (ENVR), which have been developed within the framework of
French military cooperation. The other components of the security sector can
also be included in the training and awareness-raising sessions in the
peacekeeping training centres or in the ENVR.
The SSR concept nevertheless remains highly political and ideally
must begin at the highest institutional level before reaching the operational
level. This approach is even more political as issues of good governance, in
particular in the area of defence and security, are sensitive and tend to be
avoided. This is why there is a need to establish a forum for consultation to
define a standardised framework for SSR, based on an African perspective.
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Ideally, this could be conducted by the African Union in consultation with
the various sub-regional organisations, which would further strengthen the
process of ownership.
ECOWAS could play an important role as a forum for exchange of
experience and a platform for debate on SSR. ECOWAS has already made
significant progress in drafting democratic standards to govern the behaviour
of member states, with the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security;11
the 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which
in particular sets the standards for the responsible use of armed and security
forces, and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. Under
article 72, member states are enjoined to ‘ensure the emergence and
consolidation of, accountable, transparent, and participatory security systems
in Member States’. In other words, member states of ECOWAS have
undertaken to reform their security systems (sectors), with a view to regional
harmonisation of security policies and arrangements. In addition to
monitoring the transposition of these agreements within member states’
domestic systems, a binding surveillance mechanism needs to be put in
place, but this remains a problem.
In the domestic arena, the absence of a structured and permanent
space for dialogue on issues related to SSR represents a handicap for the
dissemination and assimilation of these standards. From time to time NGOs
and associations, in particular the ANDDH, have organised seminars on the
place and role of the military within the context of a democracy. The largest
of these was the symposium on ‘Armed forces and democracy in Niger’,
which was organised in 1999, and which led to the establishment of a
committee to monitor the implementation of its recommendations. Due to
lack of support, this monitoring committee was unable to become a
permanent and stable framework for dialogue and research on issues related
to the armed forces and democracy. It could, however, have been the most
appropriate framework since it brought together politicians, the military,
associations, and academics. Today, associations and NGOs are the only
actors likely to serve as a framework for analysis of SSR, even though they
have little knowledge of these areas.
External assistance has an undeniably important role to play in Africa
within the context of security sector governance. The experience acquired in
designing and conducting SSR processes represents a platform for exchange
and can help to save vital time. Nevertheless, situations may be different and
when assistance comes from outside, it is no doubt necessary to keep in
mind the fact that the circumstances and factors that contribute to success
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may vary. Past relations and mutual obligations between security institutions
and citizens, as well as the conception of power and the place of citizens as
individual rights-holders, are some of the key elements that can have a
decisive impact on the nature and degree of change and on reform strategies.
A very detailed analysis and assessment of the political and socio-cultural
environment is essential to ensuring the relevance of reform strategies.
Challenges of security sector governance
While it may not appear absolutely necessary to review the respective roles
of government, security sector institutions, and agents of democratic
oversight (parliament, judicial system, general public, etc.), other challenges
remain with respect to democratic security sector governance. These
challenges relate first and foremost to eradicating the culture of coup d’états
within the Nigerien armed forces; including non-state actors in the process of
SSR, and depoliticising and establishing a formal framework for security
sector reform.
Other challenges arise in the more ‘operational’ areas: indiscipline
within the armed forces, the problem of insecurity in the Northern desert
area, and capacity building to control new threats facing the country (e.g.
Moslem fundamentalism and terrorism, drug trafficking, and trafficking in
human beings).
Eradicating the culture of coup d'états
In the light of the many coup d'états that Niger has experienced and the
peculiar circumstances under which each of them took place, the
fundamental issue in security sector governance is the recurring intervention
of the armed forces on the political scene in times of serious political crisis.
How can army officers be convinced to set aside the (deep-seated)
conviction that they are invested with a mission to save the country and
democracy in times of stalemate? What is the alternative to the armed
forces? This is one of the issues that the political class must inevitably
tackle.
SSR in Niger certainly includes a political and management
dimension that goes beyond the defence and security forces and relates
closely to the efficiency of political leaders, because it appears that the
reasons for these coup d'états is not so much a question of the force of arms
as the shortcomings of the political class. Indeed, their proven inability to
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manage these political crises is a cruel reminder of the fact that Niger still
remains a deeply feudal country. In each instance, it is only by force and not
by law or political consensus that a solution has been found. At the time of
the most recent political crisis in 2009, the whole system of checks and
balances functioned correctly. Parliament, the political parties, the judicial
system, and civil society each played their role fully. They spoke out against
the violation of the constitution by the president, but they did not have any
real means to correct the situation, even with the mediation attempt by
General Abdou Salami of Nigeria. Even the condemnation of the
international community, from ECOWAS to the European Union did not
have any real effect. It was only through the force of arms and thus a coup
d'état that order was re-established. Quite obviously, in the absence of
convincing arguments, the military has assigned to itself the more or less
institutional role, if not in the minds of the Nigerien people, at least in that of
officers, of ‘guardian of democracy and institutions’.
This idea derives in large part from the fact that when full democracy
was established from 1991, it did not include a strategy to depoliticise the
army. Indeed, following the first coup d'état in 1974, the military was
established on the political scene for fifteen years of a non-constitutional
regime, marked by the domination of the ruling military junta. Then in 1988,
following the death of General Seyni Kountche, Niger initiated a timid
process of easing political tensions. The 1989 constitution in particular
established the single party and enshrined and legitimised the political role
of the national armed forces, which ‘being integrated in all sectors of public
life... may hold political office in the same way as any other members of the
national society’.12
The 26 December 1992 constitution was the fruit of protest against the
military regime that led to the national conference and the transition towards
total, pluralist democracy. It radically affirmed the principal of a total
withdrawal of the armed forces from the political scene. Indeed, all the
institutional arrangements of the Third Republic confirm this option:
according to the terms of the Charter of political parties, members of the
military and security forces are prohibited from carrying out political
activities and holding political office, while the electoral code makes them
ineligible for political office unless they resign from the forces. The military
statute included the same prohibitions and recommended political,
philosophical, and religious neutrality. Members of the military were also
prohibited from making any oral or written statement without prior
authorisation from the minister of defence. It is precisely at this time that a
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mechanism for depoliticising the army should have been designed and
established.
After the inception of democracy, the Niger Armed Forces intervened
three times in political life organising three coup d'états in fifteen years,
respectively in 1996, 1999, and most recently in February 2010.



The first coup d'état took place following a political stalemate in 1996,
only three years after the elections that had consecrated the
establishment of democracy;
The second coup d'état took place in 1999, following non-democratic
and highly disputed elections. The objective then was to re-establish
democracy by organising a short transition of nine months, followed
by free and transparent elections;
Finally, the third coup d'état, in 2010, was organised following the
autocratic shift of President Mamadou Tandja who had dissolved all
oversight institutions (parliament, constitutional court) to ensure a
third term of office for himself, beyond the two terms allowed by the
constitution.
A review of the political circumstances surrounding the coup d'états leads to
some disheartening conclusions about the democratisation process in Niger:


The apparent inability of the political class to ensure a sustainable
democratic process;
The omnipresent role of the military, which has appointed itself as the
arbiter of the political game.
It is important to note that these coup d'états have always taken place in
situations of political stalemate; the issue is not so much the force of arms as
the weakness of the executive. The political class has been incapable of
establishing a functioning conflict resolution and crisis management
mechanism. In general terms, although remarkable democratic process has
been achieved in Niger, the underlying question of democratic governance
still demands a response. It is not so much the institutional arrangements as
political practice that have caused the failure of the democratic process in
Niger. The fact that the political class has failed to preserve the advances of
the democratic process can be attributed to the inadequate political discourse
and culture, the regional and the ethnic division of political parties, and the
failure to ensure good governance within parties themselves. Under such
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conditions, the intervention of the armed forces is seen as beneficial, and
even salutary for the reestablishment of democracy. It can therefore be
assumed that as long as the political classes have not truly found a means of
managing power in such a way that crises do not necessarily lead to a
stalemate, the military and coup d'états will remain a part of Niger's political
landscape.
Developing a less politicised and ‘ethnic’ security sector
In Niger it is not possible to talk about the politicisation and ethnic
organisation of the security sector without running the risk of an implosion
of national cohesion. National debate has so far only focused on
depoliticising public administration with the adoption of ordinance n°99-87
and decree n°99-466/PCRN/MFP/T/E of 22 November 1999, which
carefully avoid the ethnic issue. But when one is familiar with the ethnic
nature of political parties in Niger, it is clear that politicisation goes hand-inhand with organisation along ethnic lines. In any case these texts, which
make a distinction between political positions and technical positions, have
never been applied. Any discussion of these or other issues such as
corruption and influence peddling in security sector institutions will certainly
be extremely delicate. Fortunately independent national commissions,
associations, and NGOs, in particular the anticorruption association of Niger,
Transparency International, and the ANDDH all publish reports on these
issues, which could serve as an entry point to start the debate and which, in
addition, are independent and credible instruments for assessing any future
reforms.
Discipline within the defence and security forces
Between 1992 and 2002, eight mutinies were recorded in Niger. The first of
these broke out on 25 February 1992 during the democratic transition that
followed the holding of the sovereign national conference. The first demand
of the mutineers was for payment of salary arrears as well as various
allowances, and improvement of their living conditions. This first mutiny,
which was called the ‘movement of the troops’, was quickly contained and
resolved peacefully, thanks to the mobilisation of society who saw this as a
strategy to destabilise the transitional authorities and the democratic process,
but mainly thanks to the commitments made by the Prime Minister, Cheffou
Amado, who organised the Estates General of the armed forces. This forum
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offered an opportunity to define the role and new status of the armed forces
within the new democratic environment.
The most serious mutiny was the one that started on 29 July 2002 in
N’Goutry, in the extreme east of the country before extending to various
garrisons. While the uprising in Niamey was quickly controlled, those in the
Eastern part of the country did not end until 7 August 2002 leaving two
dead, two injured, and 224 soldiers under arrest (224 according to
government sources, 253 according to private press agencies).
Establishing a formal framework for security sector reform
There is a need for a formal framework bringing together security sector
institutions and non-state actors (associations, NGOs, external partners, etc.)
at policy level to disseminate the concept of SSR, carry out analyses, and
make recommendations. This will make it possible to develop new relations
among the different stakeholders and thus enable dialogue since, for many
years, they have focused on their differences as a factor of opposition. This
should be an independent, permanent framework managed by members of
civil society, to guarantee its independence and sustainability because civil
society members tend to be more stable than those from the political sector
or public administration. Furthermore, NGOs and associations have amply
demonstrated their involvement and their ability to defend the progress made
in the area of human rights and individual security.
Including civil society in defence and security issues
This highly inclusive process raises the question of involving civil society in
defence and security issues that are traditionally left (exclusively) up to the
discretion of the head of state, the commander in chief of the armed forces.
By doing so, the whole conception of power would be called into question.
This approach does indeed call for a an in-depth paradigm shift with respect
to security, by giving citizens and civil society a new role in designing and
controlling the national security apparatus. Such a vision would appear
eminently subversive and even seditious in the eyes of some of the
institutional stakeholders, who are likely to resist the reform. It must be
noted, indeed, that in the final analysis, SSR redistributes the cards between
institutions and within institutions, as well as among the actors on the
ground. It is therefore a clearly political process that the existing regime
could see as having a destabilising effect, which could lead to some
resistance. Only strong political will and careful awareness-raising can help
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to improve relations over time and alleviate the tensions related to the
cultural differences between the different camps.
Conclusion
Security sector reform in Niger is not aimed fundamentally at changing
structures, but rather at resolving purely management issues. The mindsets
of the people in charge of the administration and institutions need to be
changed so that they effectively apply the laws and rules of administrative
management, rigorously implement their respective mandates, and ensure
that oversight bodies are effectively functional at all levels. There is also the
question of the means available for their operation as most institutions lack
the necessary resources to carry out their missions.
The priority issues to be addressed are as follows:






Establishing an inclusive national framework on security sector
reform;
Ensuring the independence of the judicial system;
Designing mechanisms for including citizens and civil society at all
levels in resolving security problems, and in drafting and
implementing defence and security policies;
Drafting a defence and security policy;
Drafting and implementing a national policy to control corruption and
nepotism, and depoliticise the security sector;
Drafting a multi-year law for equipping security sector institutions.
Whatever measures are planned as part of the reform process, the most
important aspect is the credibility of institutions and the confidence of
citizens. Credibility depends on the ability of institutions to overhaul
themselves and establish a transparent system of sanctions. The confidence
of citizens depends mainly on the accountability of institutions and their
members. To this end, a vast anti-corruption and anti-impunity programme is
essential.
A major refresher and training programme on institutional and
individual accountability is required. Schools and training centres have a
vital role to play and the latter could go further to develop joint (or
converging) programmes, and even create joint regional schools similar to
the national military schools with a regional dimension. With new
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communication technologies, it should be possible to design distance
learning programmes for regional training courses, in particular for senior
officials, or on specific topics such as human rights, child rights, etc.
External actors can contribute significantly to the training structure by
creating or renovating training centres, providing them with equipment, and
supplying the telecommunication infrastructure required for the distance
learning joint courses.
In implementing the recommendations related to SSR, attention must
be paid to ensuring their relevance. The risk is that they could be ‘oriented’
towards political ends or by greed, which could lead to unnecessary
expenditure, or having infrastructure established in a given site purely on the
basis of ethnic and regional considerations. Furthermore, the cost of reform
must be reviewed in the light of the country’s financial capacity and its
socio-economic difficulties, in order not to compromise investments in other
sectors. For a country like Niger, SSR must not take precedence over the
essential needs of a population that sometimes has to deploy considerable
prowess simply to survive.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
The population of Niger is estimated at 15.4 million inhabitants (Figures from the 2001
general population census), and comprises several ethnic groups: the Hausa (56%),
Djerma (22%), Peulh (8%), Tuareg (4%), and the Kanuri, Toubou, Arabs and
Gourmantche who make up between 2 and 3%. Growth rate is 3.7%. 95% of Nigeriens
are Muslim, with a minority of Christians and practitioners of local ‘animist’ religions.
The successive rebellions that occurred in Niger starting from 1992 were mainly Tuareg
movements. The Tuareg are a nomadic people spread across the northern parts of Niger
and Mali, and the south of Algeria and Libya. Tuaregs are also found in the North of
Burkina Faso. The Tuareg rebellions broke out in Mali soon after independence.
The 24 April 1995 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement; the 28 November 1997 Algiers
Protocol, and the 21 August 1998 N’Djamena Peace Agreement.
Article of the Code of criminal procedure.
Article 3 of Law no. 2004-050 of 22 July 2004.
Article 17 of the 9 August 1999 Constitution.
Article 10 of Decree no. 99-368/PCRN/MJ/DH dated 3 September 1999.
Ordinance no. 84-06 of 1 March 1984 (amended by Law no. 91-006 of 20 May 1991 and
Decree no. 84/49 of 1 March 1984).
Decree no. 92-292/PM/MF/P of 25 September 1992.
See www.roddadh.org
Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping, and Security, 10 December 1999.
Article 79 of the 24 September 1989 Constitution.