The information and views set out in this report are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the organisers, the SSNS or DCAF. Neither the SSNS nor DCAF, nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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Programme
Day 1 - 29 October
900 Keynote
930 1. Dynamics of migration
•
Asylum
•
Migration (irregular)
•
Trafficking &
Human Rights
1015 Discussion
1100 break
1130 2.
Internal Security Policy &
Legislation in the migration sector
•
Trends
•
Identification &
Repatriation
•
Counter SOC
1215 Discussion
1300 lunch
1430 3. Internal security & intelligence – Collection, Cooperation and Anti-corruption
1530 Discussion
Brigadier General László Göbölös , Director General, Constitution
Protection Office Hungary
Speakers :
UN – Montserrat Feixas Vihe , Regional Representative of UNHCR in
Central Europe
IOM – Magdalena Majkowska-Tomkin , Chief of Mission, IOM
Hungary
Serbia – Ivana Meklvejn, Chief Police Inspector, Department for
Cross Border Crime and Criminal Intelligence
Moderator: Giji Gya, Head, Asylum, Migration and counter-THB
Programme, DCAF Geneva
Speakers :
Hungary – Colonel Dr. Gizella Vas, Head of the Border Police
Switzerland – Boris Mesaric , Head, Swiss Coordination Unit against
Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (KSMM), Fedpol
Europol – Lotje van der Made , Operations Department
Serious and Organised Crime Business Area
Moderator: Dr. Philipp Fluri, Deputy Director, DCAF
Speakers :
Hungary – Gábor Zalakovics, Constitution Protection Office
Romania – Romulus Ungureanu , Director, ANITP, Romania
Poland – Agnieszka Gogolewska , Senior lecturer, EWSIE University,
Warsaw; Former Deputy Director for Analysis, National Security
Department, Prime Minister's Office, Poland
Moderator: Dr. Ian Anthony, Research Director, SIPRI, Sweden
1

DAY 2 - 30 October
900 Keynote introduction
1.
Movement and methods of migration, asylum, trafficking – current and new waves and social media.
Land, maritime, intra-Schengen
930 Roundtables – 3 parallel sessions
2.
Movement and methods of migration, asylum, trafficking detection
1100 Break interception return
OSCE – Ruth Pojman, Office of the Special Representative and
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
Introduction – Giji Gya, Head, Asylum, Migration and counter-
THB Programme, DCAF Geneva
Moderators:
Switzerland – Boris Mesaric , Head, Swiss Coordination Unit against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (KSMM),
Fedpol
Poland – Agnieszka Gogolewska Senior lecturer, EWSIE
University, Warsaw; Former Deputy Director for Analysis,
National Security Department, Prime Minister's Office, Poland
Moderators:
OSCE – Ruth Pojman, Office of the Special Representative and
Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
INTERPOL - Hakan Erdal, Coordinator, Smuggling/Trafficking,
Trafficking in Human Beings Sub-Directorate
Moderators :
Hungary - András Czakó, Head of Unit for Coercive Measures and
Return, Aliens Policing Directorate, Office for Migration and
Nationality
IOM - Magdalena Majkowska-Tomkin , Chief of Mission, IOM
Hungary
1115 Keynote conclusion
Importance of Cooperation with Third
Countries on Migration
1130 Roundtable summation
1145 Conclusions
Dr. Zoltán Lékó, Deputy Head of the Department of the Interior
Affairs and Justice and Enlargement of the EU, Office of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hungary
Major-General Tibor Kiss, SSNS Hungary
Major-General Dr. Jozsef Boda , Director, SSNS Hungary

Internal security in Europe has long considered migration dynamics. According to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), migration is part of its comprehensive security approach, as was recognized in the Helsinki Final Act (1975). “With international migration continuing to increase and more and more countries being affected by migratory movements, effective migration management and international co-operation have become ever more important.
There are security implications requiring co-operation at many levels to effectively address migration management.” 1 As such, the OSCE and ILO produced a report on “Strengthening
Migration Governance” in 2009. Giving an overview of labour and migration, the report noted also the need to fight irregular 2 migration and address its root causes.
In the EU, the 1985 Schengen agreement, now with 22 EU member states and four EFTA members -
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland - created a need for cooperation on policing of migration and the commencement of databases on migrants. The 2003 EU Dublin Regulation on asylum seekers (now also including Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) established a Europe-wide fingerprinting database for unauthorised entrants to the EU.
Tying internal security to migration, the EU only really considered an internal security framework with the adoption of the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) by the Council of the EU in 2010 after the
Lisbon Treaty. It identified seven principles - one of which touches on the migration sector, by singling out Trafficking in Human Beings (THB):
• justice, freedom and security policies which are mutually reinforcing whilst respecting fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of law and privacy.
• protection of all citizens, especially the most vulnerable, with the focus on victims of crimes such as trafficking in human beings or gender violence, including victims of terrorism who also need special attention, support and social recognition.
• transparency and accountability in security policies, so that they can be easily understood by citizens, and take account of their concerns and opinions.
• dialogue as the means of resolving differences in accordance with the principles of tolerance, respect and freedom of expression.
• integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination as key elements for EU internal security.
• solidarity between Member States in the face of challenges which cannot be met by Member
States acting alone or where concerted action is to the benefit of the EU as a whole.
• mutual trust as a key principle for successful cooperation.
The ISS thus aimed for member states to adopt a pro-active, collaborative and intelligence sharing approach to the EU’s internal security, in particular for cooperation between the agencies Europol,
Eurojust, Cepol, Sitcen and FRONTEX, to be coordinated by the Standing Committee on Operational
Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI).
1 http://www.osce.org/eea/45045
2
This is term now commonly used in Europe, to replace « illegal ».

Of the five strategic objectives laid out by the Commission Communication on the ISS, four directly address the migration sector: i) “ Disrupt international criminal networks” – these are often involved in trafficking and migrant smuggling ; ii) “Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment” – often new migrants, asylum seekers and trafficking victims are all vulnerable to insecurity and hence recruitment; iii) “ Strengthen security through border management – the EU can treat migration management and the fight against crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy .”; and iv) “Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters” – disasters and conflicts create a surge in displaced people and asylum seekers .
Hence the focus for European internal security is strongly linked to migration dynamics.
Forced and Irregular Migration Dynamics
The OSCE notes that, “ 11 per cent (or 126 million international migrants ) of the population of all of the OSCE participating States were living in the OSCE region in 2010. Among those, OSCE states host more than 2.5 million refugees and asylum-seekers . A significant number of internally displaced and stateless persons are also present in the OSCE region.... Finding solutions to migration-related concerns and displacement is indispensable for ensuring political stability and security in the OSCE region .”
3
Frontex reports that irregular migration numbers reached 62,210 in 2012.
4
The ILO report on forced labour, states that in 2012, 880,000 people were in forced labour in the European Union or 1.8 per 1000 inhabitants.
5
Despite these numbers and the commitments and frameworks of the OSCE and EU, there are still both negative and positive aspects of progress in addressing the region’s migration, security and stability.
Organised crime manifests heterogeneously across Europe and the neighbourhood. The Organised
Crime Threat Assessment of the EU notes five hubs, each demonstrating different dynamics and products - relevant to this seminar, including people smuggling, forced labour, sexual exploitation and human trafficking. Statistically, it is difficult to have clear data or trends on this phenomenon, but recent reports from Eurostat, the ILO and UNODC all show that it remains a severe problem, coupled with the vulnerability of people due to the economic crisis and corruption. The organised crime hubs are also competitive and have morphing qualities of the ‘networks’, which make intelligence gathering and a homogenous approach to combating it rather difficult. Additionally, cybercrime, the internet and social media have leapt onto the scene, creating an additional layer which methods to promote security and stability has to now address.
3 http://www.osce.org/odihr/migration
4 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map
5 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilobrussels/documents/genericdocument/wcms_184976.pdf

Regarding border management and police cooperation, here the EU is more successful. Coordination and cooperation – particularly between police, Europol and Interpol, and on information and data sharing between national authorities on DNA, vehicles and evidence under EU’s COSI - are highlighted as positive developments.
6
What is now required, is an ongoing strengthening of governance structures and cooperation mechanisms - always from a human rights and human security basis to protect victims and vulnerable people – and to ensure all key stakeholders are involved in the dialogue to assure that we include new migration trends and dynamics.
Giji Gya
Head - Asylum, Migration and counter-THB Programme
DCAF Geneva g.gya@dcaf.ch
6
Gya, Giji, “ La perspectiva de la unión europea para enfrentar el crimen organizado: declaración versus práctica ”, Revista 4: Seguridad Internacional y Crimen Organizado, Politai Asociacion Civil, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú:
Autumn 2012.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Special Service for
National Security Hungary (SSNS) co-hosted a regional conference on European Internal Security and migration dynamics: Forced and irregular migration in Schengen and the European neighbourhood.
The aim of the conference was to bring together representatives of regional, national and international actors working in the field of migration and security to discuss current migration challenges in Europe. With the current economic crisis and conflicts on the southern European borders, the number of asylum seekers and economic migrants has increased in the past years and criminal networks have been fast to react to such trends, taking advantage of vulnerable migrants.
The ‘influx’ of migrants into Europe is thus perceived by some as a threat to security, while others see the way migration policies are managed, developed and implemented as a violation of human rights. Thus, the main challenge Europe is facing today in the field of migration is to manage the increasing global movement in a secure and humane manner that keeps order and justice, while maintaining integrity, dignity and rights.
Speakers at this conference included the Regional Representative of UNHCR, IOM Hungary, Europol
Operations Serious Organised Crime, OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, INTERPOL Trafficking in Human Beings Sub-Directorate, as well as representatives from Romania – Director of the National Agency Against Trafficking in
Persons, Serbia – Chief Police inspector of the Department for Cross Border Crime and Criminal
Intelligence, Switzerland – Head of the Swiss Coordination Unit against Trafficking in Persons and
Smuggling of Migrants (KSMM) Fedpol, and the Hungarian offices of: the Director General,
Constitution Protection Office; Head of the Border Police; Office for Migration and Nationality and the Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Discussions focused on the dynamics of migration – forced and irregular - and internal security policy and legislation in the migration sector, including new trends, challenges and phenomena such as intra-Schengen and regional security cooperation, increased sophistication in forging identification/avoiding authorities, the use of the internet, the role of social media and other new facets of trafficking.
The conference engaged 40 government representatives from Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Morocco, Norway,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine, as participants in a professional exchange and roundtable dialogue on the topics.
8

There are some 230 million people migrating internationally today, of these, 72 million are in
Europe. Recent events such as the Arab Spring and global dynamics leading to poverty have increased the global flow of people. We are also facing challenges of community intolerance to migrants.
In the EU, the Directorate General for Home Affairs has developed policy frameworks to consider the current situation – looking at external borders, asylum processes and burden sharing. As part of the
EU structures, FRONTEX provides statistics on detection of irregular migration at borders, and we see great challenges mainly on our southern borders.
Since 2011, the region of North Africa and the Middle East has seen a mass movement of people towards the Schengen area. In this light, Hungary has been used as a transit country for such migration and has faced challenges of dealing with increased irregular migration and overstaying of visas.
This conference aims to discuss these challenges in depth across professional actors and to bring them together for greater synergy and cooperation in managing migration.

11

This first panel outlined the dynamics of migration from an UNHCR, an IOM and a national perspective.
It introduced the audience to the synergies and differences of migration of people in terms of asylum, irregular or forced migration and trafficking.
Globally, there are over 45 million refugees and displaced people , increasingly internally displaced. In
2012, there was a total of 479,300 asylum claims in industrialised countries – just a little more than the population of the Dabaad refugee camp in Kenya. Further, there were 355’000 asylum claims in Europe which is a 7% increase from previous years (with a 30% increase in Northern and 27% decrease in
Southern countries). When considering on a larger scale of global movement, refugees are only a small portion of the migration flow, and most refugees are not in Europe.
Of the 214 million international migrants , 10-15% are estimated to be in an irregular situation (UNDESA
2009, IOM 2010). In 2012, there were approximately 73,000 detections of illegal border-crossings along the EU’s external borders. In the first half of 2013, there was an increase in the detections of irregular border-crossing at the EU level compared to the same period in 2012, due to: firstly, better weather conditions in the Mediterranean Sea, triggering an increase of detections at the sea border and secondly, a sharp increase of detected migrants at the land border between Serbia and Hungary.
7
In terms of trafficking in human beings (THB), it is estimated that between 800,000 and 2.5 million
8 people are trafficked globally , mostly for the purpose of sexual and labour exploitation (including begging).
It was argued that it is not the numbers per se that constitute the main security challenge in Europe, but rather the mixed migration, asylum and refugee movements, leading to identification difficulties, diversity of flows, a lack of comprehensive migration policies at national and EU level, the increasing focus of security in terms of border management, and the gaps in the Common European Asylum
System with disparities in its application. Furthermore, it was stressed that figures are often misrepresented and portrayed as higher in the media and with an emphasis placed on Europe’s external borders, whereas the single biggest entry route for migrants into the EU are international airports. Most of the current irregular EU residents originally entered in possession of valid travel documents and a visa, of which the validity period they have since overstayed. Nevertheless, the link between asylum and irregular migration is a hot topic and the detection of false asylum seekers and their recruiters is key to stop abuse by criminal networks.
Migrants - especially refugees - are vulnerable to exploitation and often, due to lack of regular migration channels, the only way for them to flee is through international organised crime or smaller criminal networks. Migration is a complex issue and a large number of factors need to be taken into account.
Victimisation of migrants and their vulnerability needs to be considered and treated accordingly to effectively fight criminal networks. For instance, integration and addressing xenophobia and racism are crucial, otherwise migrants become vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist movements and criminal networks.
Thus, it was highlighted that the four objectives set by the Council of the European Union on the
Internal Security Strategy ( Disrupt international criminal networks ; Fight terrorism; Strengthen security
7
N.B: 2013 is a special case. In the last 10 years, the reported numbers have been decreasing.
8
References : UN, U.S.TIP, UNODC 2012.
12

through border management and Increase Europe’s resilience towards crisis and disaster) are important, however, proper identification and distinction between the exploiter and the exploited needs to be ensured, as well as guaranteeing the rights and human dignity of migrants. Focusing on repression alone will not lead to the desired result. It was stressed that the lack of regular migration channels would result in an increase of irregular migration, including smuggling and trafficking networks, the use of forged and fraudulent documents and possibly corruption as well. Operation Aspida
9
resulted in a dramatic drop of migrants crossing the Turkish-Greek border, at the same time it resulted in an increased use of fraudulent documents on flights from Turkey to Schengen airports and a higher number of detections at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border. Migration will continue to increase, thus it is a process that needs to be managed rather than fought and that addresses root causes, such as growing inequalities.
In addition, to effectively manage migration, strong and effective cooperation between different actors working on migration nationally, regionally and internationally is crucial, especially as the lack of human and financial resources have been raised by several institutions throughout the conference. More specifically, enhancing policy dialogue and cooperation among EU Member States and regions of transit and origin to improve preparedness and national responses for the protection of migrants, was mentioned as a priority.
THB – the case of Serbia
Serbia is an important country of origin as well as transit for migration to EU Member States. In recent years, an increased number of detected clandestine migrants from the North African region and
Afghanistan have been recorded, as well as an increased flow of asylum seekers stemming from the
Western Balkan region, although Serbian nationals consisted of the main migration group, with 15,900 applications for asylum in 2012 (followed by nationals of FRYOM, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania).
As a result, the EU and other Western European countries were considering suspending the visa waiver for Western Balkan countries including Serbia.
Amongst these migrants, cases of THB have been detected, including of children. In recent years, the fight against trafficking has gained considerable attention and importance in Serbia. In 2006, there was an important legislative change, introducing a new article in the penal code on THB (Art. 388). Paragraph
8 allows for punishing people that had knowledge of THB cases which has proved to be very useful in practice, especially when dealing with minors. The aim for Serbian authorities is not just the identification of victims, but also the prosecution of traffickers.
Cooperation between actors working on anti-trafficking in Serbia works very well. The main stakeholders are the police and its special departments, the Centre for Coordination of protection of the victims of human trafficking, labour inspectors, centres for social work, medical institutions, schools and
NGOs. On the international level, Serbia has experienced good cooperation with Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs). Further, it just started a project in cooperation with the IOM on improving the understanding and coordination in managing irregular migration flows in, from and through the Western
Balkans.
9
Operation Aspida - Deployment of 1,800 border patrol agents and the construction of a 12.5 km fence at the Greek-Turkish land border. As a consequence, irregular crossings had dropped from a couple of thousand in August 2012 to 10 per week in October 2012.
13

As for most European countries, the challenges Serbia is facing are the flexibility and ability with which criminal networks react to new migration ’trends’, such as creating new migration routes
10
, making use of the internet as a new modus operandi to facilitate information exchange and recruitment, and trafficking for use of new forms of exploitation, such as begging. With regards to identification, authorities have to bear in mind and pay particular attention to cultural particularities (forced and under-age marriage, selling of children, begging, etc), as well as the high vulnerability of children and other social groups such as Roma communities.
During discussion and question session, participants from other countries agreed that JITs are a useful tool for Member States, but they should not be the only solution, as there is a danger that they become merely a trend rather than a useful mechanism. It was also highlighted that although irregular migration and trafficking overlap, they should nevertheless be treated as two separate crimes and it is important to distinguish between criminals and victims. A crucial factor in the fight against irregular migration and trafficking is firstly the collaboration between authorities and civil society on the one hand - as the main role of the police is to identify and detect, while NGOs can assist victims of trafficking; and secondly international cooperation, not only in detection and identification of victims, but also in prevention of trafficking.
The panel and question session concluded with the understanding of the importance of clear (and actable) legislation; the need for multi-stakeholder and multi-agency cooperation in approaches – including bilaterally and regionally; to raise awareness of those fighting trafficking to the complexities of and approaches needed to combat new forms of recruiting and trafficking (social media, false job advertising); and to have a duty to monitor migration flows for potential victims of trafficking.
10
E.g. irregular migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the sub-Indian continent starting in 2009 to 2011, also an increase in migration flows from the North African region (Tunisia, Algiers, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia).
14

15

The second panel explored the different areas of migration in terms of policy and legislation by looking at trends, identification and counter serious organised crime (SOC).
One speaker noted that the international strategy to fight human trafficking takes a multi-disciplinary approach, which is based on the four pillars “prevention, prosecution, protection and partnerships”. The so-called “4P’s” are also the essential components of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, which entered into force for 40 European States as of today. Most countries have elaborated detailed National Action Plans for implementation of the Council of Europe
Convention and the Protocol against THB supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and are adapting their anti-human-trafficking policies and legislation to the provisions contained therein.
The abolishing of internal borders within the Schengen area creates challenges for policy-makers and authorities when dealing with irregular migration and organised crime. Participants from both origin and destination countries mentioned that, contrary to initial expectations, irregular migration increased considerably with the Schengen accession and that there are significant cases of abuse of the visa liberalisation and asylum procedure.
The challenge that policy-makers and authorities and especially EU external border states face, is to find a balance between the free movement of people and security (to ensure protection for those in need and identify those abusing the system). European countries of origin for migration have now become important transit countries, as migrants attempt to enter the western and northern European countries through larger and more porous borders in the east. Participants agreed that criminal organisations are often involved in terms of recruitment, transportation, safe houses, documentation and financing, but may also be linked to other forms of crimes, posing a threat to national security. For instance, recruitment may be aimed at setting up new cells, migration routes may be used for drug routes and migrants used as mules, safe houses may be transformed into locales for sexual exploitation and document forgery initially intended for migrants can be used for terrorists. According to the latest figures of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Organized Crime, Corruption and Money
Laundering (CRIM), approximately 880’000 persons are being exploited for profit in the EU member
States alone.
Criminal groups are very well organised and adapt very quickly to new trends and legislative changes, as
Hungary’s experience has shown in 2013 when its asylum legislation was changed.
11
Hungarian officials found African migrants in their territory transiting to Italy. Once they were found by the police, they did not try to escape or hide, but instead wanted to be found to then ask immediately for asylum. Thus, it is crucial to look at all aspects when passing legislation related to migration, also on what effects a legislative change might have on criminal groups’ activities.
It was repeated throughout the conference that while organised crime groups are well organised and flexible in their operations, it is fundamental that authorities tackle crime and abuse linked to migration through cooperation in terms of identification, repatriation and protection of victims of trafficking (VoT).
11 As of 1 January 2013, the lodging of an asylum application and the start of an asylum procedure constitute an explicit ban on expulsion and removal from the territory. Asylum-seekers who immediately ask for asylum upon being apprehended by the police
(before the end of their first interview), between January and June 2013, were not detained. Instead, pursuant to the modifications that entered into force in January, first-time asylum applicants were all accommodated in an open facility.
16

It is important to do so bilaterally, between origin and destination countries, but also nationally between the different stakeholders involved (police, NGOs, civil society, national coordination agencies, etc). A need for readmission agreements with countries situated on the migration routes was also stressed.
With regards to bilateral cooperation, some authorities had good experiences with Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs) as well as thematic working groups, which aim at facilitating data exchange, increase cooperation and elaborate strategies. In the field of THB, joint ‘action’ weeks have shown good results in
Switzerland for engaging with victims. If victims are approached in their national language by someone that knows their culture, their trust can be gained more easily. JITs have thus proven to be quite successful with victim identification.
Regarding the media and on a political level, the debate is too focused on migrants rather than the criminal networks, even though criminal networks facilitate irregular migration. However, indicting traffickers is very difficult and often, without victims’ testimonies, it is very hard to bring charges against them. Often, authorities are forced to prosecute offenders under other charges that can be proven more easily than THB. Thus, to successfully tackle THB, it is crucial that authorities ensure effective victim protection and assistance, both in the country of destination and origin. Such protection does not necessarily imply excessive costs, but can be very effective if all actors such as police, social services and
NGOs are involved and cooperate, and non-governmental actors offering protection and assistance services are supported by the government. Actors from destination countries have mentioned that they encounter difficulties in the return of VoTs to their country of origin, as victims often don’t trust that their protection will be ensured back home and thus do not want to be involved with authorities. It was thus argued that victim identification and protection are the first measures that need to be taken for an effective prosecution of criminal groups.
Finally, participants stressed that the huge finances generated by organised crime is a further threat to security, as they are mostly sent back to the country of origin. The finances are very hard to track and cooperation between the financial industry and law enforcement should be strengthened, as there is an information gap between the two sectors.
17

The third panel analysed migration from the intelligence angle, looking at collection of intelligence, cooperation and anti-corruption vis-à-vis migration, trafficking and border security.
Due to socio-economic instability in North Africa and the Middle East, there has been an increase of asylum seekers that in reality migrate to Europe for economic reasons, putting pressure on administrations and protection services dealing with migration. One of the main challenges that was highlighted during the panel is the identification of migrants, to distinguish between those legitimately fleeing from threats in their home country versus those seeking refuge for other reasons. It can be a significant challenge to ascertain a migrant’s background and identity, as because a priority for states is to detect potential terrorism - national security plays a significant role in this task.
It was stressed that migration can pose a threat to national security, in terms of increased burden on border authorities and protection services, but also because of the increased possibilities of criminal activities associated with greatly increased migration flows due to conflict and instability – such as THB, smuggling, document forgery, bribery and corruption, as well as the desperation of migrants to circumvent regulations and influence authorities to extend or gain refugee status. It was further argued that reception centres can be a hot-spot for tensions, internally for ethnic conflicts between migrants as well as criminal networks using the centres as stop-overs and for recruitment of their ‘clients’, as well as externally fuelling xenophobic and radical movements within the country.
Identification is also a challenge for authorities dealing with THB. Often, victims either don’t know that they are being trafficked and if they do, depending on their circumstance, they may do everything possible to avoid detection. Thus, knowledge is crucial and authorities, especially the border police, need to be trained accordingly at being aware and detecting potential victims, and the intelligence that is available to them should be used effectively. New technology (social media, internet, tracking devices, sharing of information between police of mobile phone/email trails and data) can facilitate interception
– especially if the data is made available to the use of a large amount of stakeholders – however, it needs to be used wisely, adhere to privacy regulations and people need to be trained on how to use them.
Besides the above mentioned challenges, authorities are faced with a lack of resources as well as with legislative requirements they have to follow, making procedures slow and bureaucratic. The recruitment and employment of border guards following a precise and transparent structure is another factor that needs to be considered to effectively counter crime. Officers that are asked to perform tasks for which they have not been trained for, or are frequently moved from one location to the other or have no clear vision of their career path, are more easily prone to corruption.
As in the previous panels, it was reiterated that cooperation between the different institutions dealing with crimes related to migration (police, intelligence, protection services, etc) is pivotal. Even though these institutions work on different aspects of migration, their work is strongly related and intersects. At the same time, authorities should not exclusively focus on national cooperation, as they could miss out on identifying a SOC on an international level; thus, the tools and mechanisms that are available with regards to bilateral, regional and international cooperation should be effectively implemented.
However, when looking at migration and the threat it poses to national security, the focus should remain on the smugglers and criminal networks behind them, rather than on the migrants.
18

Concerning migrants and VoTs, it was stressed that authorities need to engage more in awareness raising activities, especially in countries of origin where a large section of the population is vulnerable to risks such as trafficking. Cases were mentioned where survivors of trafficking reconsider migrating again for work, thinking that their experience was mere bad luck and that they will be luckier next time.
One of the speakers further argued that there should be a shift in the way law enforcement agencies deal with migration-related crimes, from a border-centred to a more intelligence-led one, as borders have changed over time.
Finally, with regards to the operating capacities of organised crime groups, it was reiterated that they are very flexible, well organised and in possession of intelligence that can be manipulated to facilitate their crimes.
Example: In Poland over the last 10 years, there were three abolition acts
12
offered to irregular migrants in Poland (2003, 2007 and 2012). Criminals had taken notice and Polish documents jumped in value on the black market. In 2012, authorities received 9,555 applications, it was expected that the applicants would mainly be from former Soviet Union countries, but in reality they were predominantly
Vietnamese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Armenian, as well as male rather than female (in the past, most were female domestic workers). One third of the applicants were rejected, as they were identified as
‘abolition tourists’. What needs to be noted is that although the involved criminal groups were not of
Polish nationality and do not speak the language, they nevertheless had the capacity to provide all necessary documents in Polish, to prove that the applicants were residing in Poland over the required period of time.
Several participants agreed that institutions working against organised crime are up against very organised and informed OCGs, and hence need to strengthen their cooperation, information and organisation to effectively combat crime.
12
Abolition in this context refers to a law giving the possibility for irregular foreigners to legalize their stay in Poland through an issued residence permit (of a fixed period in 2012)
19

Trafficking in human beings is a massive phenomenon and continues to grow rapidly. Yet, we do not know its real dimensions. The ILO estimates that there are 20.9 million forced labourers worldwide – which include victims of trafficking (VoTs) - mainly due to lack of economic opportunities and limited opportunities for regular migration. Trafficking in Human Beings (THB) does not necessarily need to include the crossing of borders, but a victim merely transported.
13
As an example, the US is one of the countries with the highest internal trafficking.
It is also important to differentiate between human smuggling and THB. In the first, the smuggler commits a crime against the state whereas for the latter, the trafficker commits a crime against humans.
14
It is thus important that the focus is on the crime and the criminals and not the victims.
Unfortunately, the penalties for migrant smuggling are still higher than for human trafficking. A lack of knowledge is a common problem in the fight against THB, and VoTs are still widely seen as irregular economic migrants. The consequences of deportation of trafficking victims due to lack of proper identification, leads to a new violation of rights, but this time by the state, and can too often lead to a new cycle of trafficking.
15
Traffickers look for vulnerabilities and gaps in legislations and law enforcement, thus there is a need to focus on policies and regulations to prevent trafficking and reduce those vulnerabilities.
At the same time, for anti-trafficking policies to be effective, underlying contributing factors need to be addressed, such as the demand for inexpensive, socially unprotected and often illegal labour and sexual exploitation in countries of destination. Thus, there is a need for policies and programmes that create an environment where THB is less likely to happen, including focusing on the economic costs of THB.
Another problem leading to increased risks of re-trafficking is the lack of victim protection and assistance upon return. Experience has shown over the last decade throughout the OSCE region, that where trafficked and exploited persons are assisted and have their rights protected, they are much more likely to cooperate with law enforcement and that legal proceedings are much more likely to be successful when victims report and testify, which is in turn an effective deterrent against further exploitation.
Over recent years, the modus operandi of traffickers has shifted from well-organised, mafia-like organisations to loosely structured but highly competitive networks. These groups are flexible and reactive, and are broken down into highly specialised division of labour. They rely increasingly on subtle means of control, as use of extreme violence bears more risk for the perpetrator and attracts attention from law enforcement. At the same time, criminal justice responses remain globally very weak. The US
Government Annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report stated that the total number of prosecutions for trafficking worldwide in 2012 was only 7,705 and among those, only 4,746 resulted in convictions.
16
To address impunity, the question of focusing investigations on the financial aspect of traffickers has to be stressed, thus it is necessary to increasingly follow the money trail.
13
See the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women.
15
Also note that some victims may be under threat of persecution in the country of origin and thus be eligible for asylum.
16
See http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013/210757.htm
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There is also a lack of understanding of trafficking nuances amongst the security sector, hence posing a serious challenge to the effective identification and prosecution of cases. Thus, several organisations working on anti-trafficking have begun to look at the business model of traffickers. The OSCE, together with UN.GIFT, have recently published a paper analysing the business model of traffickers.
17
It is crucial that trafficking changes from a high profit / low risk crime to a low profit / high risk one. Money laundering is an important element of THB and is often overlooked and asset recovery, used to compensate victims, still remains challenging. Thus, organisations such as the OSCE, have started to bring criminal and financial investigators – including banks – together, with the aim to increase the efficiency of anti-money laundering regimes and financial investigations.
18
This is because people working on the financial side often lack knowledge on trafficking and vice-versa.
Finally, positive cases of prosecution in the UK, where life sentences have been pronounced, show that there is finally a move towards severely punishing traffickers.
17
See: http://www.osce.org/cthb/69028
18
For example, see the OSCE-UNODC Expert Seminar on Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Regime against Human Traffickers in
October 2011: http://www.osce.org/cthb/83276
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Following the panels, three roundtables took place, providing a platform for a professional exchange on movement and methods of migration, asylum and trafficking - to go further in-depth in discussion of detection, interception and repatriation in the framework of internal security.
The challenges of detection include understanding the grey areas of identifying someone as an irregular immigrant, an asylum seeker or a victim of trafficking. The first panel discussed the definition of what elements (exploitation) are necessary to be present to identify someone as trafficked. They also looked at what the practical limitations in the field are (policy/legislation/upholding human rights – particularly as relates to internal security) that create challenges for detection.
Open sources for detection can be very useful. Although in Europe the harmonisation of asylum systems exists, there are still considerable gaps.
Challenges of detection relate to difficulties in distinguishing between irregular migrants, victims of trafficking and asylum seekers on the one hand and difficulties in identifying the source of the information leading to such detection on the other hand. Typically, asylum seekers will identify themselves but they can be confused (on process, their rights) because of the situation they are in.
Asylum is an instrument for protection, however due to differing implications, the choice of the country is important for the asylum seeker. The question remains as to who should have access to the registration of asylum seekers.
With irregular migration, classical security actions are undertaken for detection, typically through border control and police activity. The officers have to be well skilled and trained and be kept in the field to hone their skills and gain familiarity with the contexts. Often the point of detection of an irregular migrant can be when they try to reach family, friends or contacts.
When considering the categories of migration, trafficking organisations are often well informed about regulations for migration, refugees and asylum seekers in various countries and can then use such information to their advantage to traffic humans under the guise of other migration categories.
Interception of irregular migrants, asylum seekers and victims of trafficking require different approaches.
Interception also brings the question of treatment of the interceptee, particularly vis-à-vis their human rights and in regards to THB, not to further discriminate against the victim. Thus, what are the policies and legal approaches for interception and how are human rights upheld– particularly when in parallel to actions of internal security actors to combat traffickers?
Participants of this panel agreed that even though interception is related to detection from an intelligence angle, it should comprise all stakeholders, including social workers, labour inspectorates,
MFA and NGOs, as it is important to have cooperation with the labour, hospitality and agriculture sector authorities for information. The collation of information in databases by the police can assist in giving
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indicators of potential criminal activity. In practice, different approaches are used to obtain intelligence, such as a combination of open source data, sharing of information across authorities and organisations and clandestine intelligence.
One of the main challenges that were raised is that there are no set indicators for interception; they are developed on a contextual basis through intelligence sharing and increasing cooperation, but also that there is a large gap between different countries’ abilities of interception.
From a migrant’s perspective, it was stressed that their perception as well as awareness plays an important role in the interception. For example, a migrant working in a restaurant 14 hours a day on a very low salary, might still perceive his/her situation as better than in the country of origin and thus does not want to be ‘intercepted’. Similarly, a trafficked victim might not be aware of their irregular or exploited situation – one such example was a group of Yugoslav workers handing in their passports to go and work in Libya, which they assumed was ‘normal’.
The interception approach must therefore assist in informing the migrant or victim and take appropriate measures to uphold human rights. As such, the timing of interception can affect the migrant: a lack of the victim’s awareness of their exploitation may create resistance to interception. Appropriate and regular training of interception’s first responders is crucial to make them aware of various situations migrants and victims might find themselves in and to ensure that interception is conducted in a way that ensures the migrants’ human rights. Small measures such as spending time with victims during the interception to understand their situation, informing them of witness protection or return mechanisms, are important and can prevent further traumatising the victim but also make it more likely that he/she will cooperate.
In conclusion, the discussion agreed that law enforcement agencies should build social capital with communities to receive information. It is then important to understand the importance of the detected information for interception, which would also assist the modus operandi for early interception if, or when, a pattern is detected.
Many national policies require repatriation of migrants that do not arrive on valid visas, either through forced or voluntary repatriation methods. This third panel looked at how the development of cooperation between states and international organisations in this area is progressing and what the challenges are in terms of internal security and human rights.
Discussions in this third panel very quickly brought forward that there is a difference between voluntary and forced return in terms of effectiveness on cooperation and reintegration. In terms of voluntary return, cooperation between authorities and NGOs/IOs is well established. Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes, such as the one offered by IOM,
19 were presented as successful mechanisms to ensure sustainability of returns and according to IOM estimates, are more cost-effective than forced returns. It was however discussed that there is a need for monitoring returned migrants as very little is known as to what happens with them once they are back in their county of origin, and how successful the assistance programmes are on a long term. The results obtained should then be used to find new solutions. A further challenge that was mentioned in terms of cooperation between law
19
See : http://www.iom.int/cms/return-assistance-migrants-governments
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enforcement authorities and civil society is that the latter do not record the identity of migrants/victims with pictures or fingerprints when providing assistance - which is a problem for police with regards to identification, posing a potential threat to internal security (terrorists, extremists).
With regards to forced return, cooperation with countries of origin works less smoothly. There is a lack of origin countries’ embassies in Europe as well as readmission agreements with concerned governments. Participants have experienced that authorities often refuse to cooperate when confronted with a case of forced return.
It was concluded that EU Member States are starting to work more and more on looking at finding a holistic picture with regards to migration. It is crucial that all actors work together to minimise or stop pull factors of irregular migration. There is a need to work with all national and international counterparts on formulating policies and strategies to set up technical and operative capacities and improve synergies with EU and related agencies for appropriate counteraction and management on irregular migration. It was stressed that it is important not to fight migration, but to manage it. Investing in cultural facilitators was highlighted as simple but very effective means to obtain crucial inputs in the screening of the person, which is fundamental for recognising a migrant’s identity and to facilitate cooperation with consular sessions of the third country concerned as well as for identification of security threats. Existing migration liaison officer networks should further be used and expanded to recognise crucial changes in the country concerned such as political, social and economic changes that could affect migratory trends.
Finally, some participants also mentioned that for them, migration is not a national security threat but mostly a political and electoral tool.
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Within the EU, migration is a shared competence between the Member States with common policies on visas, asylum, return regulations and Schengen. However, the EU cannot manage migration in isolation; it requires dialogue and partnerships with non-EU countries.
Thus, in 2005, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the EU’s framework for dialogue and cooperation with non-EU countries of origin, transit and destination, was adopted. It has three main goals: improving the organisation of legal migration and facilitated mobility; preventing and reducing irregular migration in an efficient, yet humane way; strengthening the synergies between migration and development. Its geographical scope is the regions neighbouring the Union (eastern, south eastern and
Mediterranean regions). The 2011 Communication from the European Commission to strengthen external migration policy noted as a strategy, an overarching framework based on partnership with non-
EU countries; to address migration in a comprehensive and balanced manner, in a coherent and mutually beneficial way through policy dialogue and close practical cooperation. GAMM is jointly implemented by the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU
Delegations and EU Member States.
GAMM is migrant-centred, with respect for their rights and dignity as an essential cross-cutting dimension of this policy framework. Thematic priorities are as follows:
• organise and facilitate legal migration and mobility: to students, artists, academics, etc; enhancing consular coverage for full application of the visa code; ensure efficient recognition of certifications and encourage cross-border cooperation of higher education and training institutes; set up dedicated Migration and Mobility Resource Centres to facilitate pre-departure measures focusing on skills matching.
• prevent and reduce irregular migration and trafficking in human beings : through transfer of skills, capacity and resources between partners on prevention, return, readmission and to strengthen integrated border management; cooperate on document security; increase protection for VoTs; ensuring monitoring of implementation of the Directives on return and employer sanctions; Strategic use of FRONTEX and more comprehensive thematic exchanges of information between EU Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) and counterparts in more partner countries.
• promote international protection and enhance the external dimension of asylum policy :
Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) to strengthen the protection capacity and asylum systems of partner countries and regions; support from the EASO for building asylum capacity in non-EU countries, enhanced resettlement in the EU in cooperation with partners; stronger efforts to solve refugee situations, including targeted assistance for displaced persons.
• maximise the development impact of migration and mobility : explore diaspora investment vehicles and add EU resources to boost the development oriented initiatives in priority countries; private-public partnerships to engage migrant entrepreneurs and SMEs in trade, investment and skills transfers between EU Member States and partner countries; potential annual remittances forum and study on the feasibility of a common EU portal on remittances;
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assist partner countries to identify and monitor bona fide recruiters in order to empower migrants, notably with a view to facilitating circular migration.
GAMM is supported by a mix of mutually reinforcing financial instruments, provided by both the EU and its Member States. At EU level, these instruments include the geographical and thematic external instruments, the future Asylum and Migration Fund and the future Internal Security Fund. The High
Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum is the Council organ to steer the EU activities.
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Managing migration is a complex and challenging task and as demonstrated throughout the seminar, the focus for European internal security is also strongly linked to migration dynamics.
Disrupting international criminal networks; preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment; strengthening security through border management; and increasing Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters, are all challenges that cross not only departmental or agency mandates, but also government ones, with changing borders, increasing technology developments and shifting migration dynamics enhancing the difficulty in finding effective solutions that also uphold human rights.
The clear messages from these two working days, are that broad cooperation is key, as is a holistic approach and cultural facilitation in identification of migrants – be they regular or irregular asylum seekers, refugees or victims of trafficking. Trying to find a better life, or to escape persecution or criminals, are basic human rights and the sea of migration can be terrifying for those caught in its grey wake.
The integrity and efficiency of our security services depends on strengthening its work, organisation capacity and harmony across stakeholders, to ensure that we pursue an effective human security based strategy for our future generations and global migration trends.
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DCAF is an international foundation established in 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss Confederation, as the
'Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces'. DCAF contributes to enhancing security sector governance (SSG) through security sector reform (SSR).
The Centre’s work to support effective, efficient security sectors which are accountable to the state and its citizens is underpinned by the acknowledgement that security, development and the rule of law are essential preconditions for sustainable peace. DCAF is guided by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, gender sensitivity and local ownership as the basis for supporting legitimate, sustainable reform processes. DCAF is based in Geneva with permanent offices in Beirut,
Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah and Tunis. The Centre has over 140 staff from more than 30 countries.
Special Service for National Security (SSNS) is one of the national security services of Hungary established by the Act on National Security Services in
1996. The SSNS is a service providing organization which, with special instruments, methods and materials, provides services supporting organisations authorised by law to do secret intelligence methods. SSNS performs its duties with the fulfilment of the „rule of law” requirements with full respect to the relevant legislation, with assurance of transparency, professionalism and legality. One of the most important aims of SSNS is the continuous development by adapting scientific and independent researches, extending the expertise of its employees and improving the company’s efficiency, and raising the standard of its services.