David Nyaluke and Michael Seifu1
Global political economy and the developmental state in Africa
I. Introduction
In no other episode in global history had the question of African development (or
absence of) has attracted so much academic and policy interest as it has done since the
end of the bipolar system of world politics. Apart from the voluminous and largely
diagnostic as well as prescriptive studies on the political economy woes of African
countries, several practical initiatives have been launched with the objective of
poverty reduction at the forefront. The United Nations Millennium Development
Goals; the heavily indebted poor country initiative; Make Poverty History campaign
are just to name a few. Equally true is the observation that scholars are by and large at
odds when it comes to establishing as to why African performance on both economic
and political counts has on average been lacklustre over the past several decades. That
Africa’s disproportional share in terms of poorly governed states and underdeveloped
economies coupled with anecdotal cases of failed policies induced several researchers
to look for exceptionally ‘African’ factors that supposedly define the region as an
outlier to conventional scientific theories. Under the technocratic banner of the
‘African dummy,’ it effortlessly sought to provide a chronic dimension to
underdevelopment in the region by asserting that the Region’s socio-cultural factors
are inimical to economic prosperity and liberal democracy.
One prevalent notion that quite fits this latter model can be described as the
impossibility theorem of the developmental state in Africa. Accordingly, Africa,
which has already been classified as non-befitting to the neoclassical model of
political and economy development, is now considered structurally and terminally
incapable of hosting developmental states. Essentially, the developmental states
concept has mostly been used as a reference to the experiences of the East Asian
countries that achieved state-engineered drastic changes to the welfare of their people.
Its major flag posts as represented by elements of autocratic rule and a hands-on
policy of government in the economy has come in a direct collusion course to the then
dominant laissez faire paradigm of development. In this study, we set out to achieve a
1
Dublin City University
1
couple of objectives. Firstly, we highlight the shortcomings of prevalent literature on
the subject that understates the presence of developmental states in Africa. It, in
particular, underscores the narrow scope in which the concept of developmental states
has been applied. Secondly, we elaborate on how dominant modes of international
relations have adversely affected the evolution of statehood in post-independence
Africa. The paper is organised as follows. Section II provides a synopsis of the
political economy of development of post-independence Africa with emphasis on
variations among the countries. In the next section, we take a critical look into the
way the concept of developmental states has been defined and put into effect to
explain developmental trajectories of countries. Sections IV, V and VI discuss specific
situations that falsify the hypothesis that the notion of developmental states is
impractical in Africa as well as the evolution of statehood fell prey to non conducive
modus operandi of international relations. Section VII concludes.
II. The political economy of post-independence Africa: Beyond averages
The bulk of otherwise diverse research on politics and economics of African countries
can nonetheless be defined by two common characteristics; i.e. their being decidedly
negative and making sweeping generalisations. One can not be sarcastic to state that
researchers were more at pains to coin adjectives that not only describe the
‘hopelessness’ of the case for development in Africa but also assigning causality for
the ‘Africanness’ variable. As such the modern versions of Montesquieu’s (1748) The
Spirit of Laws are not hard to come by, however a sophisticated form they take. In this
regard, the African state has been handed the most severe onslaught in that it is
considered so illegitimate as to be the cause and effect of economic
underdevelopment and political instability. Dunn (2001) provides a succinct account
of terms widely used to describe the state in Africa. These include ‘failed,’ ‘lame,’
‘fictive,’ ‘weak,’ ‘collapsing,’ ‘quasi,’ ‘invented,’ ‘imposed,’ ‘shadow,’ ‘overdeveloped,’ ‘centralised,’ ‘swollen,’ ‘soft,’ ‘extractive,’ ‘parasitic,’ and ‘premodern.’
Needless to say that such states by their very nature are unable to provide the political
goods that bring about economic development.
We set aside the question of the ‘developmental’ characteristics of states in Africa for
subsequent sections while focussing here on the diverge features of African politics
and economics in the post-independence period. In lieu of the fact that the concept of
2
development is a multidimensional one, we focus here on economic growth for
expositional purposes. At the onset of political independence ushered in by that of
Ghana in l957, African governments inherited a colonial legacy of very low levels of
economic development both in absolute terms as well as when compared with that of
other countries. For instance, eight of the nine bottom ten percent countries in terms
of real GDP per capita in 1960 were African countries with the corresponding figures
as low as two-thirds of other low income countries. The stark difference in income
levels between African and other economies does not show any marked change when
we extend the income bracket in that, for the same year, African countries comprised
in about 68 percent of the group of countries in the lowest quintile of the income
ladder. As indicated in table below, African countries lagged well behind other
countries in terms of almost all factors conventionally considered to be of essence to
economic growth.
Table 1 Economic indicators for selected countries (1960)
Country
Primary school Secondary
Enrolment (%) school
Enrolment (%)
Bolivia
64
12
Botswana
42
1
Chile
109
24
Ethiopia
9
NA
Ghana
8
5
Nigeria
36
4
Tanzania
25
2
Thailand
83
13
NB. NA refers to data unavailable.
Gross domestic
savings (% of
GDP)
NA
-7.35
15.16
NA
17.13
3.48
NA
14.07
Real GDP per
capita (USD)
2353.85
958
3852.93
526.75
866.25
1032.71
381.53
1091.11
Source: World development indicators
In contrast to the views of the prevalent literature that lumps African economic
performance in to single average values, empirical evidence suggests that countries in
the region followed varied political and economic trajectories. For instance, if we
categorise cross country data of real GDP per capita based on constant prices and
chain series from the PENN World Tables African countries consist of about 90
percent of the most bottom decile at the year 2000. Additionally, as shown in figure
below, although there existed a significant spread in average levels of income among
African countries the general trend is skewed to the left. Such curvature accounts for
3
the rather abysmal economic performance of a large number of countries in the past
five decades. We group countries in quartiles for a more in-depth investigation of the
pattern of long-run cross country economic performance in the region. The variable of
interest here is the ratio by which a given country’s average income changed over the
past fifty years.
0
Y_Current/Y_Initial
5000
10000
15000
Fig 5.1. A range spike for African Economies
0
2
4
Ratio
6
8
Source: Author’s calculation
The general pattern of the spread in real GDP per capita can be characterised along
three major points. Firstly, the concentration of data points gets sparse as one moves
towards higher ratio values. In other words, the lion’s share of countries in the
continent experienced a serious contraction in their economies or at best registered
growth rates that decidedly failed to outpace growth in the size of their population.
Secondly, there exists sizeable variations in the length of the spikes which captures
corresponding imbalances in growth rates achieved among the countries. Parallel with
countries that have gone through significant economic stagnation, a number of other
countries managed to at least triple their average incomes between the years 1960 and
2000. Thirdly, there were wide variations in terms of levels of initial income among
the countries in question. A few countries were within the middle income echelon as
early as 1960 while others began their economic developments at extremely low
4
levels of average income. In studies of economic growth, the question of how such
initial disparities in income levels among countries evolved over time is a matter of
paramount concern both theoretically and empirically.

Bottom quartile: This group consists of countries whose
average levels of income has shrank quite significantly during
the period under consideration. Measured in terms of real GDP
per capita, the range within this group of regressing economies
is also very noticeable in that in the worst case the average
level of income for a citizen of the Congo (Kinshasa) is only a
quarter of what it was about five decades ago while that for the
within-group better performer, i.e. Comoros, the corresponding
figure is about eighty percent. The composition of the nine
countries in this category includes resource rich economies
such as Nigeria and Congo (Kinshasa) as well as research poor
ones as in the case of Madagascar and Mozambique.
Interestingly, this grouping comprises countries which were
initially relatively poorer and failed to make inroads in the
catch-up game of growth dynamics but more importantly it also
hosted some that were in the better-off category with regard to
initial income, notably Comoros and Mozambique. Note also
the fact that with the exception of Zambia and to a lesser degree
Madagascar, the other countries in this group have experienced
prolonged and often violent forms of political violence. It is
also worth noting that the point of analysis here is the
achievement (or lack of) for a given country over the long-term
and not current income status.

Second quartile: A characteristic feature of countries in this
group is that over the past half century their economies
remained on either edge of slightly below or above their initial
levels of average income. The range of real GDP per capita for
this group falls in between 89 percent below the initial level of
income for Senegal and about 20 percent more than initial level
of income for Ethiopia. These countries can best be described
5
as stagnating economies in that in a period where global output
expanded exponentially their economic performance remained
largely lacklustre. Save their relatively better performance as
compared to the previous group that slide back in economic
welfare, the countries in this category share a number of
features of countries in the bottom quartile. Their postindependence political reality was defined by relatively stable
autocracies as in the case of Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo.
Political instability, both in its elitist and broad forms, has
ultimately affected the economic performance of these
countries. For instance, Hartmann (1999) reports that only
between the period 1960 and 1972 Benin has gone through ten
changes in heads of state whereby six of the turnovers in chief
executives were caused by military takeovers.

Third quartile: The income distribution pattern for this group of
countries tends to be closer to the previous group thereby
providing further evidence that overall income distribution is
skewed to the left. Nevertheless, the intra-group distribution in
average levels of income is relatively more concentrated
between the 21 percent and 61 percent above initial income
levels for Cameroon and Guinea Bissau respectively. It also
includes South Africa which maintained its higher income
status of the initial years while at the same time did not
experience significant expansion. Additionally, we observe that
the relatively higher ratio in terms of growth in real GDP per
capita registered by Guinea Bissau is not that extensive when
one considers the very low initial level of average income for
this country. Other countries included in this category of
countries that added twenty-five percent or more value to their
economic status over the long-term include Burkina Faso,
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Namibia and Tanzania.
With regard to political institutions, a similar pattern exists to
the one mentioned for the previous group with the exception of
6
the particular case of South Africa and Namibia. The overall
performance of this group is somewhat better than both the first
two quartiles.

Top quartile: Apart from the case of Malawi, all countries in
this category have managed to at least double the size of their
economies over the five decades under scrutiny. It also includes
the two star performers in Africa both economically and in
relation to being long surviving democracies. However,
research on African political economy by and large overlooks
an important factor that has important implications to the study
of economy growth. While both Mauritius and Botswana
recorded significant leaps in economic growth, the respective
values for each being four-fold and eight-fold, there existed
clear dichotomies vis-à-vis initial levels of income between the
two countries. More specifically, while during the early years
Mauritius had a middle income status Botswana started from a
very low level of development. As such, economic growth in
Botswana converged not only in its conditional variant to other
African economies but also to economies outside Africa as
well. Whether their economic achievements have partially been
matched by other better governed countries in a way that allows
one to deduce causality is an issue we leave for the quantitative
analysis section. This group of countries also includes Cape
Verde, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Seychelles, Lesotho and
Zimbabwe.
On balance, political instability has been a major feature of the political map in Africa
since independence in which forty percent of the countries had gone through at least
one period of civil war before the end of the last century. Compared with other
regions, Africa have had a larger share of civil conflicts so much so that in one study,
of the twenty seven countries sampled for investigating economic causes of civil wars
twelve were from Africa (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). However, as in the case
discussed above for economic growth, such region-level figures mask the high degree
of variation in economic performance and political stability across countries in this
7
part of the developing world. As such, it is imperative to hypothesise that observed
spread in types of political institutions among countries demarcate the line between
the better and poor performers in economic growth. While a detailed profile of such
differences in political institutions is beyond the scope of this study, we handpick one
important variable in the political institution vector for expositional purposes.
Accordingly, most African countries have adopted electoral modes of political
governance particularly since the early 1990s. Notwithstanding the fact that in not few
instances such moves only reflected rational responses to a changing global political
environment, the experiences of countries in practicing this dimension of democracy
differed significantly. Bratton (1998) documents that between 1990 and 1994 there
were 54 elections that covered more than half of sub-Sahara African countries where
by the end of the decade only four countries had not conducted any national elections.
He also notes some differences between countries in that countries that undertook
founding elections late tended to have poorer elections quality-wise. We observe that
in two dimensions of electoral rules that shape economic policy, namely district size
and electoral formula, the African political landscape is quite diverse. For instance,
for countries in the region the mean district size for the lower house disperses as wide
as seventy two for Namibia, thirty six for Senegal and three for Mauritius in 2000.
Variations between countries also exist in terms of electoral rules wherein, for
example, Benin (arguably the only country to avoid big reversals from recent batch of
reformers) applies a proportional representation system to elect its legislature as in the
case for Mozambique (an emerging post-conflict democracy) while Zambia and Togo
use the plurality rule.
III. The concept of developmental state
It is fairly accurate to state that the concept of developmental states emerged as a
reaction to the inadequacy of neoclassical and structural models in explaining
economic development that has occurred in East Asia since the latter part of the
1950s. The role of the state in the economy represented the major bone of contention
for the two dominant paradigms in that the former vehemently opposed the state’s
involvement in the economy beyond that of a ‘night watchman’ while proponents of
the latter were by far in favour of a very extensive state role. Accordingly, neither
model was able to explain why extremely activist states in East Asian countries
8
followed a conventionally market-unfriendly policies to achieve rapid economic
growth. To put it more bluntly, the economic policies followed by these countries had
more dirigiste elements than that neoclassical scholars reluctantly agree to admit. In
his book ‘MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982), Chalmers Johnson (widely credited
to have coined the term ‘developmental states’) makes a trichotomy of states in terms
of regulatory, plan-ideological and the likes of Japan deemed plan-rational. However,
the jury is still out as to why, regardless of the democratic score of the polity in
question, states in some countries predate while in others enhance productive
transactions among citizens.
It is also worth noting that within the broad spectrum of export-oriented market
economy of what are widely considered ‘developmental’ states, there exists a sizeable
variation when it comes to specific modalities of politico-economic management.
While the descriptions given to these states stretch to a long-list, we follow
Mkandawire (2001) to breakdown the attributes of developmental states into two
broad categories:

Ideological: accordingly, an important issue of critical
importance relates to the degree to which a developmental
ideology has the upper hand in social relations. Not only is
the state expected to make its mission one of rapid capital
accumulation and maximisation of national wealth but
equally true is its ability in deriving legitimacy from
promoting sustained development that in turn shapes its
domestic and international relations. Note that the primacy
of the objective of structural change and robust economic
growth is not confined solely to the government in power
but should have got universal acceptance among all the
major political players in the country.

Structural:
apparently,
ideological
hegemony
of
development is not a sufficient condition to bring about
enhanced economic development. As such, it is of utmost
importance that the state has the structural capacity in
terms of institutional, technical, administrative and
9
political prerequisites to put into effect its developmental
agenda. In as much as the state should not be captured by
social interest groups at the expense of the long term
interests of the polity it is also vital to ensure that it does
not use its autonomy/power to extract rents from
economic agents.
IV. Can African states be developmental?
As mentioned above, this question is answered in the negative for a majority of
studies on African politics and economics. The neopatrimonial model widely used to
describe government-society relationships in Africa strongly upholds the view that
countries in the region lack the ideological and structural prerequisites that brings
about development in all its dimensions. Its assertions can, however, be refuted along
the following lines.
IV.1. The fallacy of state illegitimacy: International Relations theory explains that the
modern state system was born out of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the
Thirty Years War in Europe. Subsequent events that created political and economic
integration such as the industrial revolution are considered to have determined a
state’s legitimate claim over a geographically delineated territory. Nevertheless, this
dominant paradigm is incapable of accounting for different trajectories of state
building in Africa. The premise that African states lack legitimacy as a consequence
of their being objet d’art of colonial powers fails to accurately reflect both pre and
post independence state building in Africa. Before citing a number of cases on the
different approaches to state building in Africa, it is worth noting the fact that not only
did most of the developmental states in East Asia not fit into the European model of
state formation but also one needs to stress the point that countries such as Belgium
and Switzerland have also a different trajectory.
IV.2. The fallacy of socio-cultural diversity as being inimical to development: Here,
the dominant paradigm postulates that African countries are primarily made up of
heterogeneous ethnic groups which in turn inhibits their drive towards adopting
democratic forms of governance and economic development. Nevertheless, the
theoretical and empirical foundation of such propositions is rather weak. In this
respect, the experiences of the two very successful polities in the region speak
10
volumes. On the ethnic diversity score, Botswana is comparably less diverse as
compared to Mauritius. Should the theory of ethnic diversity have its way, the
political economy attributes of these countries would have diverged so much. The
case is, however, cannot be more otherwise as both managed to establish wellgoverned states with vibrant economies. Anecdotal cases that show the weak link
between ethnic diversity and observed political economy problems in Africa are
many. Suffice it to mention that contrary to popular belief, political instability in
Africa has largely not been due to ethnic and religious diversity (Elbadawi and
Sambanis 2000). In fact, diversity is a blessing as it encourages bargaining and,
hence, the formation of stable relationships among groups.
V. Patterns of state building in Africa
A thorough accounting of the evolution of states in Africa is beyond the scope of this
article. As such, we only pinpoint certain significant features of the state building
process in Africa. An oft-mentioned statement regarding states in Africa is that they
are by and large artefacts of colonialism. While there exists some grain of truth in the
assertion, it at the same time understates the adverse effects of colonialism on state
building in Africa. Long before colonisation and particularly before the enactment of
the General Act of the Berlin Conference, there used to exist several states in the
continent with clear administrative set-ups. Some of these include the Ashanti,
Samori, Yoruba, Endebele, Tswana, Zulu and Merina. The process of consolidation
towards further integration of societies was stifled by colonialism.
Needless to say that the question of statehood in post-independence Africa had to
emerge out of the not-too-conducive situation imposed by colonialism. It was about
building the state as a set of organisations, including the administrative and legislative
order, with the authority to make and implement binding rules over all people and all
action in a particular territory, using force if necessary (Migdal,1988:19,
Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985:46-47,Weber,1964:156) as pointed by Kim,
1993:229), but also more difficult a task of succeeding to establish and disseminate
an ideology which succeeds to create one nation of what Anderson, (1985) called
‘imaged communities’ out of disparate ethnic groupings cobbled together by
colonialists.
11
For most states which succeeded to maintain peaceful co-existence among the people
within the states which colonialist left- the challenge they had, given the legacies of
colonial rule was first of all to create, political, economic and social conditions which
will enhance, and maintain social unity and cohesion among the various ethnicities
within the state let alone achieving a modicum of development. As we noted, for
colonialist development and state administration meant only instrumentally
developing areas which were economic potentially and leaving economically non
productive areas un-connected to economic viable areas, basically letting them to fend
for themselves. The challenge of new African leaders and people was to correct this
anomaly and provide compensating packages first of all and then balancing equitably
development in their states. This included not only the task of building hospitals,
schools, road, and communications networks but also extending the state public
administration institutions in all parts of the countries from the national level to the
village.
We ascertain here the states which actually its leaders concentrated whatever little
economic resource for building schools, hospitals, roads and other important things
for the life and development of their states such as the communication network as
well state public administration infrastructure have to be appreciated as
developmental. For as Evans (1989) define developmental state these leaders did not
simply siphon surplus of the economy for their cronies and personal accounts but did
diligently invest in it in creating conditions for sustainable development. The fact that
they did not rise to stardom like East Asian states is largely explained by various
challenges and sometime genuine but ill-informed strategies that they adopted. The
table below highlights basic challenges states like Tanzania faced while at the same
time maintaining factors which sustain nation and elite unity and being an active
participant in regional movements particularly for independence of all African
countries.
12
The case of Tanzania: Development Challenges
Item
At independence
Hospitals
98
Rural Health Centres
22
Rural Dispensaries
975
Citizen Doctors
44
Medical Assistants
200
Rural Medical aids
380
Villages
809
Secondary school teachers 764
Per capita –education 14
spending in local currency
Source: Kilama, W et al.(1974) and Kaduma, L.M(1974)
10 years after
128
100
1,594
335
355
578
5556
1,706
25.45
Other stack initial realities at independence of Tanzania according to Msekwa and
Malyamkono(1979:24-25) were:
1. Only 14 percent of jobs requiring undergraduate and graduate education were
held by Africans. This more than 70 percent of graduates had to be found to
fill the jobs occupied by non-Africans after independence.
2. Given a population of 10 million there was no African architects, no
mechanical engineers and no African geologists. Even then the numbers of
non-African professionals was helplessly small; 11 architects, 84 civil
engineers, 52 Mechanical engineers, 94 surveyors 57 lawyers, 45
veterinarians, 41 geologists, 12 zoologists. Since most of them had to leave
after independence the government had to work out replacements.
VI. Africa and the international political economy
It is apparent that globalisation is not only about opportunities it creates in terms of
trade, capital flows or societal interactions. Equally true are the challenges it imposes
on states to effectively manage their own development in a very dynamic world. The
long-term sustainability of this phenomenon rests on the fairness of the rules and
practices that govern international relations. It is, therefore, imperative to investigate
the implications to African states of those systems and rules of international relations.
More specifically, we cite a number of factors that support our propositions that
African endeavour to build developmental states has always been frustrated by the
modus operandi of the global political economy.
13
One important variable that has long shaped African relations with the global
system is foreign aid. While the micro level benefits of foreign aid are not
difficult to discern, one can not derive same optimistic observations with
regard to effects on establishing effective states in the region. For instance,
most African countries delegated macroeconomic policy making prerogatives
to the IMF and the World Bank through structural adjustment programmes.
These coupled with a string of conditionality attached had resulted to supplant
(and not supplement) domestic technocratic capacity with that of these
institutions. Neither the hypothesised credible policy regime nor a robust
economic growth has materialised. Similarly, the growing dependence of
African countries on foreign aid eroded political accountability on the part of
governments in the region. It is no wonder that many African governments are
much responsive to donors than their own domestic constituencies to the
extent that even democratic reforms have much foreign element in it. A
related observation is that foreign aid might have contributed to making states
more fragile by providing a false pretence of viability for groups to secede.
International trade, and more broadly the flow of economic resources, is
another dimension that adversely affected African performance. Firstly, the
most prevalent model of international trade relations is bilateralism. This has
the effect of narrowing access to international markets for African countries.
Secondly, progress on those trade items that have much resonance to African
economies is minimal. Western countries continue to protect their agricultural
sector from international competition through producer subsidies and other
administrative obstacles. Thirdly, the question of free mobility of economic
resources vehemently advocated by the international community is largely
indifferent when it comes to those resources in which African economies
enjoy a comparative advantage. A case in point is the severe restriction
imposed on access to western markets by unskilled labour from Africa.
In recent times, the war on terror has altered the way state business is being
handled in Africa. As fragile and failed states are considered easy preys for
terrorist groups, the international community has taken more active interest in
domestic governance of states. Nevertheless, the specific strategies taken may
not be compatible with local efforts to build developmental states. To start
14
with, developmental agenda as a rationale to aid takes back stage as the
allocative decisions are driven more by strategic political considerations than
actual needs. Additionally, in-not-few-instances the anti-terror card has been
opportunistically played by governments to repress calls for domestic political
reform. Similarly, it is déjà vu cold war politics in the sense that in this case
countries vie for fitting into the neo-liberal model of addressing the problems
of terrorism.
VII. Concluding remarks
The overarching purpose of this study is to provide some thought-provoking insights
into the viability of the developmental state model in Africa. We took a departure
from the prevalent literature that outright dismisses the possibility of Africa in hosting
such states. The arguments put forward to falsify the impossibility thesis are quite
handful. It is showed that African political economy is a very diverse reality that
applying individual case studies or a region-level average is a less informative
approach. In so far as there existed countries that went political upheavals and,
consequently, lacklustre economic performance there also were cases of success
stories, albeit the distributional pattern is skewed to the left. It is also the case a better
understanding of the developmental character of states in Africa should take account
of the state itself is an endogenous variable. The experience of Tanzania attests to the
importance of putting in place the state machinery as part and parcel of the
developmental process. We also identified a string of features in rules that govern
international relations that ultimately harmed African countries’ efforts towards
building strong developmental states.
15
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