Joseph Burke1
The Relationship Between Economics and Participation in PRSPs – Uganda’s
Poverty Eradication Action Plan
INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic policies across the various country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) have been remarkably similar, surprising, it is said, in light of the fact that local
involvement should reveal differing contexts, opinions and strategies:
Disappointingly, however, despite a growing interest in alternative
macroeconomic policies in both developed and middle income countries and a
commitment by the PRSP process to innovate, the macroeconomic policies the
PRSPs have been formulating have basically resulted in a continuation of policies
adopted by the majority of the PRSP countries under the Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) during the 1980’s and 1990’s (Gottschalk, 2005, p.420).
It is argued here that this anomaly reflects how orthodox economics2 places a ceiling on
the potential for participation to illuminate context and propose alternatives, thus
illustrating that proud proclamations of consensual macroeconomic strategies are
disingenuous. Pillar One (Economic Management) of Uganda’s Poverty Eradication
Action Plan provides a concrete example of this.3
PARTICIPATION
Participatory development, which can simply be understood as the involvement of those
impacted by acts or processes of development in these same acts or processes, has
burgeoned in development literature and practice: “Once a shout from the radical fringe,
the call for participation has re-surfaced as a dominant voice in development thinking”
(da Cunha and Pena, 1997, p.1). One can isolate the latest democratic wave,
1
UCD
Reference is purposefully made to orthodox economics since economics is not homogenous, though the
neoclassical version claims ‘textbook status’.
3
It must be noted that there is no attempt to make judgements on specific economic policies, in so far as
policy X would be better than policy Y. Moreover, there is no assertion as to the degrees of influence on
macroeconomic policy that technocratic and participatory inputs should stimulate respectively
2
acknowledged failings of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, needs of a neoliberal
agenda, the impact of liberation theology and the opening up of a post-development field
as some of the possible contributory factors.
Participation refers to the involvement in an event or process that has an existence
beyond oneself, that is the participant, and already involves others. As such, participation
implies a supplementation, one which reveals an act of deliberation. Meaning is always
attributed to the space to be engaged with by the participant. Participation, then, is
certainly a form of social action whereby this is understood as “whenever one social actor
(individual or organisational) acts toward another in a meaningful way” (Olsen, 1991, p.
18).
One means of attributing meaning is via language which it must be remembered “is a
labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about, you approach
the same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (Wittgenstein,
1997, p.82). This is an acknowledgement of situational factors in language’s ability to
transfer meaning. Wittgenstein (1997, p.175) states that “in saying ‘when I heard this
word, it meant…to me’ one refers to a point of time and to a way of using the words (Of
course, it is THIS combination that we fail to grasp)” [Emphasis in original]. In
temporality and usage, language is contextual. While clearly based on a set of rules,
language always moulds to meet the specificity of time and intention. There are fractures
in the pavement that language users walk where meaning vanishes to reappear but not
always as anticipated, with more cracks emerging above these tremors of
misinterpretation. Since misinterpretation is an essential element of language so too is
conflict which is an instrument of change. Therefore, the makeup of language itself acts
as a catalyst to the creation of alternatives.
Hence, participation as a form of social action, particularly based on the symbolic
interaction that is language, is a contextual dynamic that plays on the simultaneous
garnering and revealing of meaning, unpredictable in light of the inherent potential for
misinterpretation. An unpredictability, though, that allows for the emergence of new,
2
creative ideas; indispensable “where there is no mechanical (algorithmic) procedure for
generating the most promising alternatives” (Nozick, 1993, p.172).4
ECONOMICS
Orthodox economics has created for itself a self-supporting scientistic sphere which acts
to deny context and rejects alternatives whereby scientism is the belief that “the positive
methods and insights of science are valid not only for the entire sphere of human
interests, but they are the only authentic source of true knowledge” (Stent, 2002, p.215216).
Looking at Milton Friedman’s seminal essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics”,
we see how in aligning economics with the natural sciences what must follow is the
denial of contextual factors in order to attain certain universals, having the effect of
excluding particular alternatives.
The first of his three examples revolves around the fact that a ball falling in a vacuum
gives us a constant (g), essentially thirty two feet per second and as such can be
represented as s=1/2gt squared where s is the distance travelled and t is the time in
seconds. Friedman tries to show how in circumstances varying from that of a vacuum the
formula is inaccurate which confirms, not that the use of the theory as if an object fell in
a vacuum is wrong and foolish, but rather that “the important problem in connection with
the hypothesis is to specify the circumstances under which the formula works or, more
precisely, the general magnitude of the error in its predictions under various
circumstances” (Friedman, 1953, p.18). Therefore, central to economic methodology
must be the elimination of excessive context, the right of delineation becoming a matter
for Science:
Each occurrence has some features peculiarly its own, not covered by the explicit
rules. The capacity to judge that these are or are not to be disregarded, that they
should or should not affect what observable phenomena are to be identified with
what entities in the model, is something that cannot be taught; it can be learned
but only by experience and exposure in the ‘right’ scientific atmosphere, not by
rote. It is at this point that the ‘amateur’ is separated from the ‘professional’ in all
4
Bearing in mind power, the creation of alternatives is different to their adoption.
3
sciences and that the thin line is drawn which distinguishes the ‘crackpot’ from
the scientist (Friedman, 1953, p.25).
However, causality in economics is not nomic; rather its linkages are entirely reliant on
the context that bears them. As explicated by Georg Henrik von Wright (1971), causality
in the social sciences attends to the ‘how possible’ as opposed to the natural science
consideration of the ‘why necessary’. Thus while “in the case of natural phenomena, to
describe the object is to classify it. In the case of human beings, to describe behaviour is
to say what its meaning or significance is, to locate it in a particular context of
institutions and rules to understand” (Brittan, 1973, p.764) [Emphasis added]. Therefore,
in practicing a naturalistic methodology and so removing apparently superfluous
elements of context, causal linkages may be misrepresented. Meanwhile, alternatives
which reveal themselves from a contextual whole are often considered scientifically
insufficient.
THE POVERTY ERADICATION ACTION PLAN5
The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) is seen by many as a Ugandan ‘home
grown’ document (Chenga, 2004, p.29). It acts as the “country’s overall policy
framework” (NGO forum, 2005, p.3) and inspired the introduction of the World Bank
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process in 1999.
PEAP was originally unrepresentative: “Poor people, on whose behalf the PEAP was
ostensibly created, were not contacted to help inform its design” (Touray, 2002, p.32).
5
This section utilizes firsthand research carried out in Uganda between June and August 2006. This
research involved carrying out thirty six semi-structured interviews with members of the Ugandan press,
academia, politicians, ministerial staff, NGO officials, civil society organisation workers, bi-lateral and
multilateral donor representatives. Interviews incorporated a number of diverse areas within Uganda
including Kampala, Luwero, Jinja, Lira, Entebbe and Gulu. The decision was taken not to specifically name
interviewees though most had not made this request. Interviews have been randomly assigned reference
numbers which appear as follows: (Interview: 1), (I: 2), (I: 3) and so on. Additionally, I attended two
workshops for the dissemination of the Poverty Status Report (A PEAP interim participatory workshop in
which the progress or otherwise of the plan is discussed.) at Lira and Jinja. Furthermore, I was present at
the conference for the closing of the European Union Acholi programme in Gulu 21-24 June 2006 (This
included a round table discussion on civil society participation for development.). Moreover, I attended the
Seventh International Conference on Ethics and International Development which took place between 1922 July 2006 (This involved a parallel session on ‘Accountability and Empowerment’ which involved a
paper by Professor David Crocker on “Deliberative Participation in Local Development”) and the
Accelerating HIV Prevention – The Road Map towards Universal Access to HIV Prevention in Uganda
report launch in August 2006.
4
However, following extensive lobbying, civil society groups were, for the first time,
deliberately included in policy design, planning and formulation for the 1999/00 PEAP
revision process (Kapijimpanga, 2002, p.8). Indeed, it has been said that “Uganda
undoubtedly presents one of the most comprehensive and country-owned participatory
PRS processes to date” (McGee, Levene and Hughes, 2002, p.69) with the current one
being the “most robust of all the PEAPs so far” (Larok, 2005, p.4).
Nevertheless, while consultations and civil society-government interaction has been
deemed to be exponentially fruitful, there remains a particular area of the PEAP that
seems largely impervious to participation. This stubborn mass is macroeconomics:
Uganda cannot be considered a model case precisely because the macroeconomic
programme was not up for discussion. The CSOs did a great job running around
the country but their views hardly mattered to the macroeconomic programme in
the end (Boote in Abugre, 2001).
CONTEXT, ALTERNATIVES AND THE PEAP
Economics, in its scientism, appeals to generalised universalisms which require it to
undermine the specificity of time and place that participation emanates. It is this
phenomenon that is witnessed within the PEAP process.
Civil society
Good participation requires an organic civil society, the lack of which is pointed to by
one journalist:
the problem with civil society is that it is not generated from contradictions within
ourselves. Like if you had a case where we don’t have a power [supply] then
suddenly we have a lobby group that forms, that starts agitating for power and
suggesting alternatives, we don’t have something like that. What we have is
people who write beautiful proposals to foreign donors and get money and then
they set up shop and do a bit of reports [sic] every year to account for money and
that’s the civil society we have. Useless! (I:16)
A bi-lateral official engaged directly with civil society concurs:
We found amongst civil society many of them changed their vision to be able to
match with that of the money…we were giving them funds specifically for human
rights, the bigger picture of human rights, but someone would be doing something
different and they would just apply and they would say they are doing human
5
rights. They are advocating for human rights when they have never done it. But
they just want to access the funds (I:17).
Thus, as referred to by one interviewee, a “supply-driven civil society” simply looks to
“where is the current wind blowing” (I:15).
If civil society groups are organised for this purpose how effective can we hope
participation to be: “So I see the civil society organisations have not yet done much to
ensure that the population participates in the development of their communities. Some of
them actually, I’m sorry to say this, are using their organisations for political reasons or
for economic gains” (I:22). Indeed does this reliance compromise participation:
These civil society organisations become dependent on international organisations
or bodies so we are not very sure if what they put out, what they articulate, is
entirely an internal outlook or are foreign inputs which is not necessarily bad but
may not be necessarily good because an outsider may not necessarily know the
intricacies of the problems (I:8)
The contextual possibility is that civil society is unable to fulfil its role appropriately in
the participatory process, a point underlined by the presence of conflict in Uganda:
Obviously, no one will go to consult the people in these conflict areas because of
the insecurity, obviously none will want to. But the consultative process, we
would have wanted it to go beyond the current level at which it is, which is
consulting the leaders from this area [i.e. Kampala] (I:14).
Contradictory Planning
Uganda’s Rural Development Strategy (RDS) is a mechanism to establish financial
institutions in all rural areas to promote economic growth (African Development Fund,
2006, p.xviii). Increasingly amongst many actors there appears to be a divergence
between the PEAP and the RDS. One bilateral official sees a clear contradiction in that
the “Rural Development Strategy…has some aspects which are not PEAP compliant,
certainly in terms of the direction that is being taken,” therefore “there is an inherent
tension between a technocratic exercise such as the PEAP and the political realities of the
day” (I:7) This is reiterated by a member of civil society: “What the Rural Development
Strategy says and what the PEAP says is a bit different. They are talking about different
6
things and then the Rural Development Strategy is getting quite a bit of resource
allocation in the budget” (I:1) The political nature of this split is not easily concealed:
The Minister of Finance came on board at the time when the PEAP was already
…completed, he couldn’t put his ideas into this document. If he had come at a
time in 2003 when we were just beginning to revise the PEAP, probably the PEAP
would not look like [what] we are seeing at the moment. (I:1)
A number of interviewees also question the relationship between PEAP and the
Presidential Manifesto:
There is a situation in this country whereby now there is a clash between the
Presidential Manifesto and the PEAP and I think the technical people are really
confused. They don’t know what they should follow; the Presidential Manifesto
or they should follow what is in the PEAP and the Presidential Manifesto is of
course very, very, very, so many variations from what is in the PEAP…they
[technocrats] would like to look like they are paying allegiance to the Presidential
Manifesto. (I:6)
In the case of Uganda the anomalies between the PEAP and governmental decisionmaking are belittling participatory processes.
So far we can see that the context indicates that efforts to present Uganda’s
macroeconomic policy formulation as the result of an unencumbered and comparable
participatory process are misleading. Moreover, despite the variation participation
implies, we can see below how macroeconomic policy is essentially preordained.
Technical Capacity
Capacity is frequently offered as an explanation for limited participation in pillar one, as
put by a Ministry of Finance official: “The problem at the moment with the civil society
organisations that we have in Uganda is their capacity to engage us when it comes to
things like, for example, macroeconomic policy and management. Their capacity is
greatly limited” (I:14).
However, for one experienced civil society actor the issue of poor capacity in
macroeconomic issues has been somewhat abused:
7
So to a large extent the discussion around what macroeconomic policy drives an
economy is still a closed discussion. And the scapegoat always is that this is a
technical area that not everyone can just access like that. I think that has been
used to close the doors for other actors who might have a different view (I:1).
Hence it can be seen that while macroeconomic issues are beyond the scope of many
organisations, this aura of technicity is used to deny capable actors a voice. Indeed
invoking an aura of technicity creates self-censorship: “Even people who have gone to
universities, they feel that ‘ah that’s something technical, a technical area’ and they have
preferred to go into these other areas” (I:2).
Evidence and the limits of voice
There appears to be unspecified limits on what participation in pillar one could
potentially achieve. The point is made that in the end macroeconomic policy;
needs to be based on the evidence because I don’t think anyone would object or
any government would object to a decision being made on an evidence-based
paradigm that will actually begin to show fruits and it being implemented whether
it’s demanded for or not (I:7) [Emphasis added].
Here evidence precedes participatory outputs. Moreover, a certain pragmatism must be
employed:
I think government would have to be realistic and see what makes sense and what
does not make sense. I mean as you are moving towards a situation where we are
having East African integration you can’t have protectionist kind of policy. I
mean, I think government will see what makes and what does not make sense and
then move. (I:12)
Indeed, strikingly, broader change in this pillar is not seen to be a matter concerning
participation at all:
I think those are issues [macroeconomic policy] that are not going to be solved at
the country level… The World Bank is not going to make an exception of Uganda
because it [a macroeconomic alternative] came out of a participatory process. I
think those are issues that need to be tackled at like OECD, you know that kind of
level…It is not something that I think the country manager here for the World
Bank is going to go to Washington and say this came out of a participatory
process (I:20)
8
Referring to participation and macroeconomic policy, a World Bank official gradually
qualifies the level of influence it can be expected to have:
I think the technical people need to listen very attentively to participatory inputs
because every technical thing you do, every policy you implement is because you
want to improve the conditions of the people …what needs to happen is civil
society needs to improve their methods of doing things. They need to have a good
grasp of the data, a good grasp of the evidence, of what is actually happening and
what they think needs to be done and then come on the table to dialogue with
politicians with concrete evidence (I:9)
A ceiling on the prospects for participation in pillar one is alluded to: “I don’t know
whether it would be people[’s opinions] the government would follow. The government
would make a decision based on the rationale, the justification and the sense the proposal
makes rather than for me who it comes from” (I:19). Participation’s impact is predicated
on how compliant it is with the technocratic point of view: “But I guess when it comes to
the deeper analysis we may take a different stance on certain issues depending on what
economists think is viable or possible or practical” (I:6).
The parameters of the pillar seem to be effective and in a sense have been normalised: “I
think we all understand that reversing it [Uganda’s macroeconomic policy] is not really
an option… So I think we can all do what we want within certain confines” (I:16). One
bi-lateral donor dealt with parameter terminology:
I wouldn’t call them prescriptions…I would call them more a menu of choices
that a country has within the broad parameters of economic direction that you can
take which are hopefully well understood and commonly accepted as a way that a
developing country can work its way out of poverty (I:7).
The example of inflation
9
The inflation debate in Uganda consists of whether or not it is appropriate to be more
flexible around the current threshold of 5%.6 The issue shows that macroeconomic policy
is based on predetermined foundations, which are deemed irreversibly correct. Those who
argue for more flexibility are portrayed as imprudent, requiring ‘education’ to modify.
One Ministry of Finance official claims even suggesting change is a backwards step:
The one that comes for me off mind is the debate on whether or not you can relax
the macro targets as far as inflation is concerned to accommodate more foreign
aid for this business of the Millennium Project [Millennium Development Goals]
so the position of government and the Bank are that we have won in a hard way
investor confidence for our policy stability and to start adjusting our inflation
targets, and the rest, would send the wrong signal. But civil society thinks
otherwise (I:13).
Questioning the maintenance of low inflation rates is seen in itself as an illustration of a
badly informed position:
Some of their contributions may actually not be well informed because somebody
would come and say, you know, why are you targeting inflation at five per cent,
why not ten or why not fifteen but then you explain why we are targeting at five
per cent, the dangers of letting monetary policy loose, then they will understand.
But probably out there they will say government is too tight on this, too tight on
that, and I think when it comes to policy mainly they are more pronounced on
governance issues, corruption (I:14).
One does not arrive at consensus but creates it:
The output that has been used to address that [misinformed civil society positions]
has been continued education. We know the impact of increased government
expenditure on the macroeconomics, we know it better than they do so we have
comparative advantage so we can [work] diligently to educate them, inform them
and at the end of the day we generate consensus and you maintain the acceptable
targets, inflation of below five per cent… (I:13)
Yet one government official did not see consensus but rather the raising of borders on
thought and discussion:
6
According to the Civil Society Submission to the 2004 PEAP revision process entitled ‘In Search of a
New Development Plan in Uganda’ management of inflation is not seen as a goal in itself but rather “as a
principle, inflation should be managed to stimulate growth and employment” (NGO Forum, 2003, p. 107).
Its level should be open as “there is no consensus on the threshold of inflation before it hurts the poor”
(NGO Forum, 2003, p.104). In contrast, the Government of Uganda is strongly against any consideration of
modification: “Raising the inflation target from the current level 5%, either in an attempt to generate
economic growth or to accommodate a more expansionary fiscal policy is not a viable option” (MFPED,
2004, p.37).
10
If they dictate that inflation should remain single digit then they make sure that
everything that is debated must be towards single digit. But single digit also has
its weaknesses. In this budget we were pleading with [Ministry of] Finance to
negotiate with them [donor community] that let’s have just a bit for a short time…
A slight increase in prices is a motivation to the producer, you know, but they are
so obsessed about keeping it at six per cent, that’s it (I:18).
A civil society actor describes how this issue was automatically sidelined in spite of what
seems to him like issues worthy of debate:
We did quite some analysis which in our view was something worth talking about,
if you set a threshold of inflation too low…So we were saying: ok if you can
determine a lower limit for inflation why don’t you determine an upper limit as
well...But of course when we did make that submission that was the first thing
that was thrashed. They said we were not raising any evidence, it was not well
researched but we tried at least to challenge some of these assumptions that have
been there for quite a while. (I:1)7
Explaining Discrepancy
During the course of 2006 negative trends in income poverty levels emerged, rising from
thirty five to thirty nine per cent. Moreover, the proportion of farming households living
in poverty rose from thirty nine to forty nine per cent (The East African, 2006). If policies
had been sensible why were these emerging?8 In-built to all alternatives is a recognition
of the errors in the status quo. Thus in order to protect itself orthodox economics must
off-load responsibility for these errors elsewhere. Since the policies are ipso facto correct
explanation of failure must come in some other form:
They [donors] will explain that ‘No there is nothing wrong with our prescription it
is implementation, so it is you people who are not implementing very well. Yea,
you are focusing on this and this but you are not focusing on this and this. You are
7
It is worth bearing in mind here that in the civil society submission to the 2004 PEAP revision process, ‘In
Search of A New Development Path For Uganda’, sources proliferate their arguments, for instance:
“Studies have shown that the “threshold level of inflation above which inflation significantly slows down
growth is estimated at 1-3 percent for industrialized countries and 11-12 percent for developing countries”
(Bernard Gubther, Towards Poverty Reducing Macroeconomic Policies New Rules for Global Finance,
2002). If this holds for Uganda, then our target of 5% has been over-achieved. Properly managed, flexible
inflation control would induce domestic investment and productive capacity development by the poor”
(NGO Forum, 2003, p.104).
8
A justifiable question in line with the Poverty Eradication Action Plan Joint Staff Advisory Note June 23rd
2005 of IDA and IMF for Uganda which states that: “The macroeconomic performance remains sound,
harnessed by prudent fiscal and monetary policies, as well as by continued broad-ranging structural
reforms.” (p.8)
11
creating more districts…you are increasing salaries of people, money is going into
administration rather than going into infrastructural development so it is you’ (I:8)
Indeed, for the World Bank the inequality increase in Uganda is a problem resulting from
indigenous action:
By 1999 the benefits of restructuring, the benefits of bringing back things to order
are actually going down then without clear policy from the side of the government
to tackle inequality. Because now between ’87 and ’99 and even today you have
people who have come from the Bush, the rebels, they are now in government and
there is no way to stop them from doing business. They are in government, they
are doing business and some elites from the universities are joining government,
they are joining private sector. So you have a small group of people managing
things and benefiting from the growth, so I would say inequality was bound to
rise, which is actually happening. (I:9)
Within the Ministry resentment follows from the blame perennially falling at their
doorstep:
And most of these policies didn’t work and because these institutions are arrogant
you know they can’t accept that some of their policy prescriptions failed, they
have come out with another set of reforms to augment the original Washington
Consensus…We have literally done everything they have asked us to do, to
privatise but, of course, in the process we have had problems because of the
privatisations, there were no institutions…Now they are saying when you
privatise you should have institutions to regulate, to monitor… (I:14)
It would be detrimental to one’s position to acknowledge error as this would be a move
towards admitting the legitimacy of an alternative:
A donor who admits that the problems we are facing is as a result of their policies
will be shooting itself in the back, they wouldn’t accept that. But during the
12
structural adjustment era they did admit some mistakes which I think you are fully
aware of but of course the reasons they usually give are internal (I:1)
Such is the faith in scientific truths that it foregoes reference to an empirical reality:
So it’s not a case where development partners would say ‘Well poverty is
increasing yet we’ve given all this funding therefore obviously it isn’t working
therefore now we have to move away.’ You have to ask your question ‘To what
extent would poverty be if it hadn’t been for the policies that had been
implemented, would we have seen a far greater increase for example?’ (I:7)
In such a situation the autonomy of pillar one becomes ever more apparent:
So the way programmes need to be formulated that has nothing to do with the
macroeconomic, pillar one, it has to do with the other pillars. How are you
formulating your sector strategies to target the very poor? Maybe that’s where
we’re wrong (I:12)
This thinking facilitates the Minister of Finance in Uganda to comment: “It’s too early to
make any judgement, as it is only one year since we developed proposals and started to
implement them to eradicate poverty at the grassroots” (The East African, 2006). Prior to
that the concern was macrostability: a totally separate issue?
Pillar One - Ens a Se
Pillar one, with the capability to detach itself, is thus positioned well to deny context and
reject other proposals:
Poverty objectives have been subordinated to macroeconomic objectives so
poverty objectives are only feasible for as long as they are in line with preset
13
macroeconomic conditions which not everyone is actually familiar with, neither
me nor people in government (I:1)
Hence, all PRSP’s have similar macroeconomic strategies:
Given the fact that PRSP’s are being implemented by economies that are
relatively at the same level, certainly you would expect similar policies and
programmes… I would think that it shouldn’t be any surprise worldwide that the
PRSP’s may look more or less similar. We know where we are coming from and
we all know where we are going, therefore the vehicle that will take us there.
(I:13)
What we see is, in the words of Foucault, (in Nelson and Grossberg, 1988, p.281): “a
whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or
insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath
the required level of cognition or scientificity.” Or take the comment of one Ministry of
Finance official:
The attitudes some sectors have, preconceived attitudes or emotions, sharing with
them any ideas you really have to prepare yourself for a hard battle…actually
much as the approach is misguided at least there is something good in these
people, let’s appreciate it, improve on it and then move forward (I:13)
CONCLUSION
It is disingenuous to suggest that macroeconomic policy formulation has sincerely been
engaged by participatory processes. It should either be openly acknowledged that
macroeconomic policy is a technical area inappropriate for deep participation or
alternatively that the scientistic tendency of orthodox economics is debilitating
development.
14
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Author Information
Joseph Burke (BA, MSc) has received first class honours undergraduate and
postgraduate degrees from the University of Limerick in politics and sociology and
University College Dublin in development studies respectively. His main academic
interests revolve around the status and role of the social sciences, including and
especially economics. Joseph is currently resident in Syria, studying Arabic at the
University of Damascus.
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