Journal Research in Peace, Gender and Development (JRPGD) Vol. 3(6) pp. 90-98, August, 2013
DOI: http:/dx.doi.org/10.14303/jrpgd.2013.099
Available online http://www.interesjournals.org/ JRPGD
Copyright © 2013 International Research Journals
Review
Beyond greed and grievance: the missing link
in conflict management and peace building in
Northern Ghana
Seidu M. Alidu
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 64, Accra, Ghana.
Email:seidualidu@gmail.com, smalidu@ug.edu.gh
Abstract
Majority of conflicts across the world are explained using the greed and grievance theory. Specifically,
the causes and repetitive escalation of conflicts in Northern Ghana is subsumed, albeit tacitly, into this
broader analytical frame. Using mainly secondary data, this paper seeks to interrogate the greedgrievance theory and its implication for managing conflicts in Northern Ghana. It argues that the greedgrievance theory assumes an instrumentalist view of conflict that does not only miss its expressive
dimension but tailors its resolution towards a win-lose outcome thereby making it difficult to manage
when it fails. However, focusing only on the expressive dimension of conflict limits its resolution since
it does not address the core issues at the heart of the problem but only provide practitioners the
opportunity to examine psycho-social elements of the conflict. The paper concludes that managing
conflicts in Northern Ghana requires an approach that examines both the subjective and objective
dimensions of each conflict in order to achieve peace that is sustainable.
Keywords: Conflicts in Northern Ghana, Greed and Grievance, Conflict Management, Peace building, Ethnic
Conflicts
INTRODUCTION
Except for the pocket of ethnic and chieftaincy disputes
that often manifest into destructive armed conflict, Ghana
is deemed a peaceful country partly because it has
managed (through the establishment of relatively free
and fair democratic elections; by establishing national
structures for dispute resolution including the National
Peace Council and various Houses of Chief and the
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative
Justice) “...to avoid a total war in the Clausewitzian sense
(Carl von Clausewitz explains “total war” as the complete
mobilization of an entire society against another with the
intention to annihilate the opponent). Yet, Ghana’s
success in avoiding a Clausewitzian total war has not
hide the numerous structural, direct and indirect violence
that occur daily in specific societies within the larger state
(Galtung (2000) developed the distinction between direct
violence, structural violence and cultural violence.
Whereas in direct violence people are shot to death, in
structural violence people die as a result of hunger and
preventable diseases. Cultural violence constitutes the
justification for both direct and structural violence). There
are proofs of violence built into social, cultural and
economic structures across the country, including but not
limited to cases of brutality from state security institutions
at the least opportunity; outmoded cultural practices and
the neglect of some of the fundamental rights of the
people, including the right to accessible education and
economic well-being. However, it is the elements of
negative peace, rather than the examples of a positive
peace enumerated above, that threaten the general
security and wellbeing of the citizenry. (Johan Galtung
(1996) distinguished between “negative” and “positive”
peace. Whiles the former implies the absence of direct
violence, the latter suggests re-building relationships
destroyed by conflict, building and reforming institutions
to respond to the needs of the people and resolving
Alidu 91
conflictual differences in a constructive manner).
Comprising intermittent chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts,
the Ghanaian society is manifestly negatively peaceful.
There is an estimated over one hundred chieftaincy and
ethnic disputes across the country (Seini and Tsikata,
2004) with majority of those violently expressed present
in the three Northern Regions. Fought mainly over land,
identity and traditional power (Mahama, 2003; Brukum,
2001; Kendie, 2010) ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts in
Northern Ghana are not only interrelated but also overlap
one another (Jonsson, 2007) creating multi-dimensional
consequences. Given that traditional rulers are
custodians of development in their respective
constituencies, problems inherent and/or associated to
such institutions affect both the developmental ability and
security of the people concerned.
Majority of conflicts (civil wars in particular) across the
world are explained using the “greed” and “grievance”
theory (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000, 2004; Berdal and
Malone, 2000; Keen, 2000, Keen and Berdal, 1997).
Specifically, the causes and repetitive escalation of
conflicts in Northern Ghana is subsumed, albeit tacitly,
into this broader analytical frame (see Brukum, 2001,
2007; Mahama 2003; Kendie and Akudugu, 2010).
“Using mainly secondary data source, this paper argues
that the “greed-grievance” theory assumes an
instrumentalist view (Analysis of conflicts in Northern
Ghana that tend to focus exclusively on the objective
dimension or actual causes) of conflict that does not only
miss its expressive dimension (The expressive view is
the opposite of the instrumental view and focuses on only
the psycho-emotional aspects of conflicts much to the
neglect of the actual grievance) but also tailors its
resolution toward a win-lose outcome thereby making it
difficult to manage when it fails”. On the other hand,
focusing on only the expressive dimension of conflict
limits its resolution since it does not address the core
issues at the heart of the problem but only provide
practitioners the opportunity to examine psycho-social
elements of the conflict. This paper seeks to interrogate
the “greed” and “grievance” theory and its implication for
managing conflicts in Northern Ghana. It will argue that
conflict resolution in Northern Ghana requires an
approach that examines both the root causes of the
conflict and the psycho-emotional issues associated to
the conflict in a reinforcing and interdependent manner.
Before doing this, the paper seeks to challenge two
assumptions about conflicts in Northern Ghana that
invariably affect the efforts to intervene or at least attempt
to resolve them. The first assumption is that conflicts in
Northern Ghana are characteristically tribal, ethnic or
chieftaincy-related (Mahama, 2003; Kendie, 2010). Such
labels assigned to conflicts in the North are unhelpful
for resolving them. The second assumption, generally
made by development practitioners, is that conflicts in
Northern Ghana represent a breakdown of peace and
development that necessarily mandate the restoration of
normalcy (rather than the examination of the dynamics
and the causes of the breakdown, if any). Such an
assumption conceals the economic incentives of war and
people who benefit from this anarchic situation. Having
challenged these two assumptions, the rest of the paper
will try to suggest alternative ways of examining conflicts
in Northern Ghana and the role of the attitude of the
conflicting parties in resolving them. I will argue that the
attitude of parties to a conflict, besides the perceived
economic benefits derived therein, have ramifications for
its resolution.
Conceptualizing Conflicts in Northern Ghana
Known for its ethnic, cultural and sectarian diversity,
conflicts in the three Northern regions are mostly labelled
as ethnic fought purely on “ancient hatreds.” Indeed,
ethnicity or identity politics has become a culprit of many
wars fought across the length and breadth of Africa
(Kaldor, 1999; Turton, 1997; Huntington, 1996) and
increasingly been perceived as a source of stigma and
discrimination (Castells, 1997). Ethnicity has been widely
used to refer to the human need to belong, particularly
but not exclusively, to a specific group of people,
institutions or ideology (Turton, 1997). Such desire
creates the tendency to identify and exclude others who
do not belong to one’s group. Superficially, a person’s
identity does not constitute conflictual behaviour unless it
is been exploited based on genuine grievance. The
primordialists hold the view that ethnic affiliations reflect a
non-rational sentiment, which fosters powerful emotional
attachments to collective identities. At the extreme, these
attachments are expressed as the most fundamental,
irrepressible tendency of human nature and could form
the basis for conflict (Woodward, 1995). On the other
hand, the relationalists perceive ethnicity as a reflection
of voluntary allegiances and at times manipulated by
logical, calculating individuals (including politicians that
need political power or powerful countries that need to
sell their weapons badly or exploit resources in the
troubled country) to advance their interest relative to
opportunities present in the environment. The power to
start war easily on ethnic lines is not only due to the view
that it is a natural property of a group (Eriksen, 1993) but
also to the fact that it can be sustained, relative to other
groupings, for a long period of time (Barth, 1969).
Like the proverbial egg and chicken conundrum,
conflicts are increasingly been perceived as highlighting
ethnic sentiments more than ethnicity is seen as a cause
of conflict. Ethnicity itself is not a sufficient explanation for
92 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
conflict but rather political power and economic resources
that accrue from fighting one another. Though ethnic
sentiments have the potency to motivate people to fight
those perceived as not belonging to them, it is rather
difficult to prove that such sentiments actually motivate
people to engage in acts of war. In as much as the
relationalists argument is criticized for its neglect of the
history and emotional struggles of conflicts hurriedly
labelled as ethnic, the premordialists conclusion that
conflicts are often caused by the re-emergence of
“ancient hatreds” diverts attention from the possibility that
there is something modern about ethnicity and ethnic
conflict (Keen, 2000). For example, the war in the former
Yugoslavia that catapulted the “ancient hatred”
phraseology was believed by many analysts to have
originated from the disintegration of governmental
authority and the breakdown of political and civil order in
Yugoslavia following the politics of transforming a
socialist society to a democratic market-led economy
(Woodward, 1995). According to Woodward (1995), the
failure of economic austerity measures and reforms
required by a foreign debt crisis triggered a tilt towards
political disintegration.
This analysis fits into Elbadawi and Sambani’sl (2000)
diagnosis of conflicts in Africa as owing much to poverty
and heavy dependence on resource-based primary
exports than ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Assigning
ethnicity as a cause to contemporary conflicts support the
idea that the parties involved in that conflict are moral
equals, both fighting for irrational hatred and hence
devaluing all those involved as irrational (Keen, 2000).
This in itself is not a problem, but the problem however is
that it legitimizes non-action from people outside the
conflict zone. The view that the Yugoslav conflict was a
revival of ancient ethnic hatred created an intervention
fatigue for the world’s powers that responded to the call
for help (Woodward, 1995; Keen, 2000). As Woodward
noted, major powers that initiated and backed
negotiations to end the conflict threw the ball into the
court of feuding parties to find a solution, stressing that it
was their war and of little interest to others. Increasingly,
conflicts in Northern Ghana are seen as “northern wars”
of little interest to Southerners or any part of the country
for that matter. Even when government or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) intervene, it is only
restricted to humanitarian aid which does not solve the
conflict problem. Labelling a conflict as ethnic, does not
only deflates the value of the political and economic
evaluation and processes involved (including state break
down, institutional failure, beneficiaries in conflict, conflict
as an extension of a policy) but also makes intervention
unlikely exacerbating the conflict further.
Another conception about conflicts in Northern Ghana
is that it represents a breakdown of peace and generally
retards development. Conflicts in general are perceived
as anti-developmental and the three Northern Regions
are often described as the poorest partly because of their
penchant for fighting. Much of the thinking about conflicts
during the period of the Cold War focuses on the
dichotomy between “peace” and “war” with specific
emphasis on war as a breakdown of “normal” or
“peacetime” pattern of social, economic, political, and
societal intercourse (Berdal and Malone, 2000). This
dichotomy generally leads to the understanding of conflict
as the collapse of an existing order of peace,
development and prosperity (Keen, 2000) and giving way
to chaos, backwardness and hardship (Duffield, 2000).
However, to view conflicts as no more than costly
disruption of development does not only conceal the
degree to which other factors shape violence but also
dismiss the benefits accrued from war. Certainly, both
Collier (2000) and Reno (2000) argue that economic
agenda are not only central to understanding
contemporary conflicts but also become a tool for
economic enterprise to many. Understood this way, we
will be able to rationalize why people keep fighting or
wanting to fight no matter how irrationally destructive it is.
Undoubtedly, the history of economic motives in war is as
old as warfare itself. Berdal and Malone (2000) wrote
about the vast profit made by the Imperial Army of
Wallenstein in the Thirty Years war in Germany, as well
as the celebrated personal wealth of Napoleon’s war
Generals. Recent cases in most countries across Africa
including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) prove that such economic
benefits, no matter how meagre, are not circumscribed to
ancient times (Keen, 2000). Similarly, Mahama (2003)
discusses how warriors in the Northern Region often
revel spoils stolen from their enemies (including, but not
limited to livestock), which are later sold and used to buy
more weapons. Besides these general economic
incentives, most individuals benefit at the personal level
by assuming conflict-related positions such as
spokespersons for warring factions, leaders of war
committee and even custodians of war donations and
funds. Such positions come with lucrative packages but
on condition that the conflict is sustained. To such a
category of people, transition to peace means
unemployment and loss of attention (especially from the
media) hitherto accorded to them. Keen (2000) therefore
notes that seeing conflicts as a dramatic setback to
development sends a perilous and, of course, an
erroneous impression that conflict is a disaster for almost
everyone concerned. Conflicts in Northern Ghana need
to be explained as a situation that has functions as well
as causes and effects. Just as Clausewitz (translated in
Alidu 93
1989) defines war as the continuation of politics by other
means, so should the causes of the problem of war not
be detached from its functions. The analysis of conflicts
in Northern Ghana as simply the breakdown of the
regime of peace rather than the emergence of a new
system of exploitation by a few, affects the attempt to
resolve them. Contemporary conflicts, no matter the
catastrophic dimensions they assume, serve different
purpose to different category of people.
The Greed and Grievance Debate
The greed and grievance theory is one of the most
commonly used theories to explain the causes of civil
wars. It is a combination of economic and political
science paradigms that utilise both economic
opportunism and in-group hostility that generates from
marginalization to explain the cause and perpetuation of
civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). The “greed”
theory, derived mainly from economic view point, sums a
rational choice paradigm that explains the causes of
conflict as an absence of cooperation between feuding
parties motivated to fight by financial opportunities
derived from natural resources. Such resources form the
basis for both operation-support and for personal
enrichment. Technically speaking, the “greed” theory can
be subsumed into the economic functions of war
explained in the immediate paragraph before this one.
However, unlike the case studies used in the pioneering
study by Collier and Hoeffler, conflicts in Northern Ghana
cannot be fully diagnosed as civil wars because the
Government of Ghana is neither a party to it nor regular
armies of the state been used. Further, except the limited
gains made by few within the conflict zones and
remittances sent from Northern diaspora living in
Southern Ghana and beyond, there are generally no
natural resources present in the North that could be used
to fund the war and also motivate people to fight. Yet, the
power of the few who benefit from conflicts in Northern
Ghana including politicians, businessmen and members
of royal gates, cannot be glossed over. This is therefore
worth attention in the analysis of conflicts in the Northern
Ghana.
The “grievance” theory on the other hand, is rooted in
behavioural paradigm, and reflects deeper social
divisions and inequalities along ethnic, religious and
political exclusion. The magnitude of these divisions and
the consequences resulting from it, may fuel rebellion
and violent resistance. Many of the conflicts fought in
Northern Ghana are related to access and control of land
more than ethnic and chieftaincy labels, though these two
issues overlap. The traditional social structure in Northern
Ghana is divided into chiefly tribes (such as the
Dagombas, Gonjas, Nanumbas and Mamprusis) and the
acephalous(such as the Konkombas, Nawuris, Basares
and the Nchumurus, among others) (Hizkias, 2000).
2000). Unlike the acephalous societies, often seen as
“migratory yam farmers,” the chiefly tribes have
succeeded in organizing themselves around hereditary
chieftaincy structures (Hizkias, 2000).
Traditional land tenure practices in Northern Ghana
do not recognize individual ownership of land. To a large
extent, land is vested in paramount chiefs who in turn
hold it in trust for their ethnic groups. This arrangement
restricts land ownership to only chiefly tribes, a situation
resented by most acephalous societies. Majority of the
conflicts in Northern Ghana, far from being fought on the
lines of ethnic identities, are demands by acephalous
societies for the creation of their own paramountcies that
can hold land in trust for them. This paper does not
entirely dismiss ethnicity as a possible cause of conflicts
in Northern Ghana but assumes that such labels do not
only miss the fundamental grievances on which these
conflicts are fought, but also discourage interventions
aimed at a resolution.
Notwithstanding its prominence and application, the
greed and grievance theory has been widely criticized for
reductively subsuming the cause of every civil war into
the theory. It will be impossible to have all conflicts fought
on the basis of the greed of conflicting parties given that
the causes of conflicts differ across the world. It is
therefore not only deleterious for successful conflict
management but also oversimplifies the complexities
inherent in the decision of people to go to war, if the
source of all conflicts is limited to greed. Even though the
grievance aspect of the theory is more compelling, it
nonetheless defies the universal consensus that no
single source could lead to all conflicts across the world.
Every conflict is fought based on grievance – real or
perceived – but the dynamics of the local environment,
the culture and severity of the problem make all the
difference. In a classical critique of the “greed and
grievance” theory, Keen (2000) notes that Collier and
Hoeffler in their pioneering study chose “dubious proxies”
that do not only emphasise greed as the dominant source
of conflict but indirectly gives prominence to economic
variables to economic variables as major root causes
thereby neglecting other more important disciplines
including politics, anthropology and sociology. These
critiques present a compelling case for the reexamination of the variety of dynamics across disciplines
that explain sources of conflict. In the next section, this
paper will examine the role of attitude and behaviour as a
cause and solution to conflicts in Northern Ghana.
Beyond Greed and Grievance: Peace Building in
Northern Ghana
As noted in the discussion at the beginning of this paper,
94 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
the manner a conflict is labelled has a wider implication
for efforts towards its management and resolution.
Focusing solely on the greed component of conflicts
reductively limits its resolution to the decisions of the very
few greedy ones who benefit from the war economy,
thereby resulting in a win-lose situation. This is because
when a single group controls the decision to make war
and peace, as well as the resource needed to fund the
war, other groups will be denied of everything. In the late
1960s, Galtung (1969) proposed an influential model for
analysing the causes as well as the resolution of
conflicts. Later revised in 1996, Galtung suggests that
every conflict can be construed as a triangle involving
contradictions, attitude and behaviour as its vertices.
While contradiction refers to the underlying conflict
situation between feuding parties, attitudes include
emotive, cognitive and conative elements that sustain the
conflict (Miall, et. al., 1999). Attitude includes the feuding
parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other
and of themselves (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000).
These perceptions may be positive or negative; however,
in violent conflict feuding parties tend to develop
increasingly negative stereotypes of the other and an
increasingly positive self- group identity (Miall, et. al.,
1999; Woodhouse and Duffy, 2000). Attitudes are often
influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness
and hatred. The third component of the triangle is
behaviour, which comprises of signs suggesting
conciliation or hostility of feuding parties. These actions
are undertaken by any of the conflicting parties in a
conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of
making that party abandon or change its goals (Miall, et.
al., 1999). In violent conflicts, behaviour is minimally
exemplified by threats and coercion and at worst by
destructive attacks.
Even though all three components need to be present
together in every full conflict, they may change over time
or influence one another given the dynamics of the
conflict concerned. These changes manifest into conflict
as feuding parties’ interests clash. Hostile attitudes may
lead to an intensified conflicts drawing in other parties
and generating secondary conflicts (Woodhouse and
Duffey, 2000). Such an expansive conflict may
complicate efforts aimed at resolution and peace building.
However, when it does happen, resolution will involve a
set of dynamic, multidimensional and interdependent
changes that could de-escalate the conflict behaviour,
change the people’s attitude and transform the structures
that give way to the conflict (Woodhouse and Duffey,
2000).
Except the structure/contradiction (that involves the
differences in goals or opinion) the other two vectors
concern the character of the conflicting individuals.
A conflict structure alone, (i.e., minus human traits of
attitude and behaviour), is described by Galtung (1996)
as latent or structural violence. Structural violence is
rarely destructive as direct violence or more so cultural
violence.( See footnote 3 at 1) Nonetheless, it constitutes
the objective dimension of conflict and focus largely on
the interests that are assumed to be in short supply.
These may include land, food, water, societal position,
power and recognition. Yet, neither the existence of this
difference nor nursing an interest in them may lead to
direct violence until the human components of attitude
and behaviour set in. Both attitude and behaviour
constitute the subjective dimension of conflict, which are
psychologically and emotionally-based. They include
fear, anger, anxiety, jealousy, mistrust, and other
negative feelings. The subjective dimension of conflict
usually clouds the objective one and inhibits rational
communication about the objective issues.
A comprehensive conflict resolution effort needs to
pay equal attention to both the subjective and objective
dimensions of conflicts. In the opposing greed and
grievance theory, grievance refers to the objective
dimensions of the conflict, thus, the actual issues at the
heart of the problem. This may include claims to land,
power and recognition; political and social alienation of
minority ethnic groups and to a larger extent the fight for
“freedom” and “self-rule.” In Northern Ghana, the
acephalous tribes of Konkombas, Bimobas, Nawuris, and
Nchumurus, among others have all referred to several
grievances including the need for “self-rule” through an
elevation to the status of a paramountcy and also the
perceived oppression and dehumanization associated
with been governed by another tribe.
“In general, conflicts in Northern Ghana are fought
over claims to land, traditional power and recognition
of acephalous or minority ethnic groups from their
majority or chiefly tribes. (N.J. Brukum (2001) divides
tribes in Northern Region into paramouncty-based
such as the Dagomba, Gonja, Nanumba and
Mamprusis
and
non-paramountcy-based
or
acephalous
tribes
including
the
Konkomba,
Nchumurus, Basari, Vagala, Bimoba, Nawuri,
Tampluma, Komba, Chakosi, etc. among others.
Similarly, Hizkias (2000) broadly categorize tribes in
Northern Ghana into Chiefly and Acephalous tribes.
The Chiefly tribes are Dagomba, Gonja, Mamprusi and
Nanumba, while the acephalous tribes are referred to
as “migratory yam farmers)”.
Yet, there are several challenges in developing such
an instrumentalist view of conflict in Northern Ghana
partly because it may eventually lead to a win-lose
situation or a total victory for one party over another. For
example, elevating a chief from an acephalous tribe to
Alidu 95
Structures/Contradictions
Attitudes
Behaviours
Figure 1. Galtung’s Conflict Triangle
Psychological and Emotional Issues
subjective dimension
Fear
Anger
Actual Issues
Land, Power, Recognition
Anxiety
objective dimension
Mistrust
Figure 2. Representation of the Subjective and Objective Dimensions of Conflict
the status of paramountcy implies giving away a chunk of
the land you hold for your ethnic group to that tribe since
the two go hand in hand. That will suggest a win by the
acephalous tribe and a loss by the chiefly tribe. Yet,
allowing acephalous tribes without paramountcy (and for
that matter land) signifies a win by chiefly tribes and a
loss by the acephalous tribe. The second problem in
focusing on only the objective dimension is that it
neglects the subjective component, which in actual fact is
the main driver of violence.
“Indeed, all previous attempts at resolving conflicts in
Northern Ghana (including the Inter-NGO Consortium,
the Permanent Negotiation Team, the Nairobi Peace
Initiative, the Eminent Chiefs’ Committee and several
other Commissions of Inquiries so far established)
have glossed over the subjective component.”
This paper therefore emphasises that before we can
address the actual grievances of conflicts in Northern
Ghana, we need to first of all address the subjective
elements that cloud our understanding of the actual
96 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
Figure 3. Five Approaches to Conflict
Source: Miall et. al., (1999).
issues. For example, reaching a compromise to carve
just a portion of Dagbon or Gonja lands to Konkombas for
paramountcy will not much affect the status of the former
nor will it undermine their national position as “superior”
Northern tribes. However, have acephalous tribes like the
Konkombas pursue their grievance with the right attitude
and mechanism that would warrant chiefly tribes to grant
them their wish? No matter how we examine conflicts and
efforts towards their resolution, attitude and behaviour of
conflicting parties are very essential.
In reality, both the subjective and objective dimensions
of conflict are interdependent and linked, and conflicts
are therefore best understood when both levels of
analysis are pursued and addressed in the resolution
process. Nonetheless, this paper takes the position that
addressing the subjective issues first, help improve the
ways in which parties understand and behave towards
each other. Miall et. al., (1999) argue that it is typical of
conflicting parties to give high priority to their own interest
than that of their enemies in any conflict situation. Using
five approaches, they distinguished between the concern
conflicting parties show for their interest and that of their
enemies in a low to high continuum. While conflicting
parties with high concern for their interest and low
concern for their enemies interest are seen to be
“contending” ; those with high concern for their enemies
interests and low concern for theirs are seen to be
“yielding.” An alternative approach is to avoid conflict
completely by “withdrawing” or to balance the concern for
one’s interests and that of the enemy through “problem
solving.” In conflict resolution however, assuming a high
concern for your interests and that of your enemies is the
best-case scenario. Taking such a “compromise” position
implies your strong desire to protect your interests and at
the same time that of your perceived enemy. Figure three
above represents these five conflicting approaches.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has highlighted several essential issues,
some of which are often dismissed as trivial in attempts
at resolving conflicts in Northern Ghana. The first is the
hasty prescription of all conflicts in Northern Ghana as
ethnic or chieftaincy-driven fought purely on the hatred
that people have long nurtured about themselves and of
the other. These characteristic labels are unhelpful for
resolving conflicts since it shifts the burden of intervention
and management on the feuding factions and not neutral
practitioners or experts. Also, reducing all conflicts in
Northern Ghana to these labels conceal the actual
grievance and motivation that drive people to take arms
against each other and invariably affect the opportunity to
deal with the exact causes of the conflict. Second, this
paper proposes that to be able to resolve conflicts
successfully in Northern Ghana we need to see them as
the beginning of another process of life that benefit other
people rather than a complete breakdown of the process
of life and development. Many stand to benefit from
various types of conflict situations, directly or indirectly,
Alidu 97
and may do everything to sustain such instability than
“risk” peace. Therefore viewing conflicts as purely bad
and anti-developmental hide the benefits it provide to
“peace saboteurs” who may stand on the way of peace.
Notwithstanding these two important observations, it
will be deleterious to confine the causes of conflict to a
simple economic “greed” of a few. This paper has posited
that though economic factors could form part of the
grievances for waging war, much of such decisions have
to do with the attitude of the feuding parties. Both the
decisions to fight and to make peace are driven by our
psycho-emotional attributes that at some point urge us to
co-exist or resist. To be able to resolve conflicts
successful in Northern Ghana, we first of all need to
unmask the actual issues at the centre of the conflict by
attending to the emotional and psychological issues that
shield them. In doing this, we need to aim at changing
both attitudes and behaviour so that they are no longer
violent and hostile. But above all, we need to create
disincentives for the desire to fight, and measures aimed
at doing this are suggested below. First, the government
of Ghana needs to address the issues of poverty and
unemployment in the country in general and specifically
in Northern Ghana that create the incentives for people to
fight and benefit from the crime of war. Second, conflicts
in Ghana and specifically Northern Region need to be
depoliticized in order to delegitimize the tendency of
politicians to incite wars and use it as a tool for political
benefit. Third, there is a need for a deeper analysis of the
causes, nature and dynamics of conflicts in Northern
Ghana with the few to comprehend and solve them rather
than hastily labelling them as ethnic or “tribal,” labels that
hide the root causes of violence. Fourth, there is the need
for people to build and nurture a culture of peace,
tolerance and co-existence that have the tendency to
promote peace. Lastly, there should be a critical attempt
at revisiting laws on land ownership in Ghana with the
view of either amending them or giving power to
traditional councils in the three Northern Regions to enact
new customary laws on land that could help solve these
land-dominated conflicts.
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How to cite this article: Alidu SM (2013). Beyond greed and grievance:
the missing link in conflict management and peace building in Northern
Ghana. J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev. 3(6):90-98