Peace Review 15:3 (2003), 339–347
Making Peace with the Islamic World
Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk
Reports of a clash of civilizations between America and the Islamic world have
been greatly exaggerated. However zealously fanatics such as Osama bin Laden
may be working to foment a cultural war, America has no national interest in
accepting the assertion that the U.S. is an enemy of Islam, and vice versa. In fact,
the U.S. has an abundance of accomplished and productive Muslim citizens, and
substantial numbers of Muslim elites seeking an education at American colleges
and universities. Moreover, the allegation that Islam, as a theological doctrine,
is responsible for the deeds of a faction of Muslims who say they act in their
religion’s name is every bit as tenuous as the claim that Christianity is culpable
for the excesses of medieval Crusaders, or the insinuation that Judaism is to
blame for the Israeli government’s failure to fully implement the fourth Geneva
Convention.
Whether they identify themselves as members of the Christian right or as
prominent neoconservatives, partisans of American interests should hesitate
before embracing Osama bin Laden’s logic as their own. Bin Laden has sought
to polarize identity issues—preposterously declaring war on an entire civilization—because he does not have a policy (what good has he done for the
Palestinians or impoverished Arabs lately?) and his followers have nothing to
lose. In contrast, the vast majority of the world’s people have much to lose if
their leaders—especially American leaders—fail to transcend “culture war”
formulas and instead generate a coherent policy framework based on human
dignity, cultural inclusiveness, and democratic participation. Improving the
quality of public and policy-related discourse in the United States has thus
become a paramount task for the international peace movement.
U
nfortunately, the Bush administration’s strategy for counteracting terrorism
and building international security lacks both coherence and a credible
strategy for implementing America’s best values. As America’s leaders clumsily
fight fire with both fire and water, they rely far more on incendiary foreign policy
jingoisms than on a real understanding of the flashpoints and firebreaks in
American–Islamic relations.
While one strand of U.S. policy projects official messages of goodwill toward
Muslims and seeks to advertise American values through public diplomacy, the
Bush administration has mostly redressed problems of international terrorism
and weapons proliferation unilaterally, through intimidation and the projection
of military power. Instead of a proactive agenda to strengthen global governance
ISSN 1040-2659 print; ISSN 1469-9982 online/03/030339-09  2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1040265032000130940
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and deal with terrorism’s root causes, Bush has produced a reactive
foreign policy whose bellicosity threatens to do what al-Qa’ida could not:
convince the world’s Muslims that U.S. policy really does oppose their interests
and values.
Where many Americans see policies animated by ideological consistency and
even moral clarity, Muslims see double standards and moral bankruptcy. The
resulting perceptual gap—and the demonstrable hardships experienced by
Palestinians and sanctioned Iraqis—has fed a deep cynicism about American
politics. Insistence on the sanctity of UN Security Council resolutions vis-à-vis
Iraq is hardly convincing to an audience preoccupied with what UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan and most prominent world leaders have characterized as an
“illegal” Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nor are American
concerns about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction regarded as credible given
past U.S. indifference to the use of these weapons against Iranians and Kurds,
not to mention the way the American non-proliferation agenda seems driven
more by power politics (and a concomitant policy of “selective proliferation”)
than by any consistent set of principles. After all, allies and formidable
adversaries are permitted to maintain stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, whereas challengers to the status quo are not. The Bush
administration’s professed desire to spread democracy is viewed with similar
irony, given a historical U.S. pattern of support for Middle Eastern monarchs,
and for “99% majority” presidents whose failure to provide dynamic, progressive, and accountable leadership has greatly enhanced the appeal of radical
Islamic sentiment.
When speculating about America’s intentions, Muslims consider not only
contradictions of word and deed but also the résumés and public statements of
those who formulate contemporary U.S. policy. Although some American public
figures inspire hope and even confidence (for example, Colin Powell and a few
remaining career foreign service officers), many are viewed with distrust. For
example, the recent appointment of Elliott Abrams as the National Security
Council’s custodian of American policy toward the Middle East and the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been taken by astute Arabs and Muslims as a sure
indication that the so-called “road map” to a Palestinian state is insincere.
Remembered in the U.S. for his role in the Iran/Contra affair and in Latin
America for his indifference to human rights abuses in El Salvador, Abrams is
also well known in the Middle East for his outspoken opposition to the Oslo
process.
Reports that neoconservative policy elites at the Department of Defense are
drafting plans to reshape the political geography of the Middle East also arouse
deep concern about American intentions. The influence of figures such as
Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith—all
consistent advocates of hard-line policies toward Palestinians and the broader
Arab world—provoke considerable anxiety. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
attitude toward civil liberties has likewise been viewed suspiciously, not to
mention his negative portrayals of Islam in the press.
In light of these perceptions, Americans should not be surprised that most
Middle Easterners view the war to “liberate” Iraq as actually a campaign to
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subjugate Arabs and Muslims, within the well-established tradition of Westernimperialism. From a Muslim standpoint, official American pronouncements of
respect for Islam are much easier to explain away than policies that instead
manifest either a deliberate bias or an inability to comprehend the needs,
aspirations, and fears of others. After all, it is politically expedient for American
leaders to profess respect for Islam and for Muslim values. An official pronouncement of intolerance in the wake of September 11 would legitimize violence
against Arab and Muslim Americans, with significant consequences for American
interests.
This does not deny the wisdom of President Bush’s visits to the Islamic Center
of Washington, of his professed views about the peaceful nature of Islam, or of
his efforts (in collaboration with Colin Powell and Undersecretary of State
Charlotte Beers) to “market” America in the Muslim world. The problem is that
messages of reassurance are neither convincing nor backed by real measures that
engage Muslims in efforts to overcome common dangers. For political analysts
in Islamic countries, perfunctory statements of conciliation from American
leaders are disingenuous afterthoughts rather than authentic expressions of
intent. Real motivations can instead be found in policies that are discriminatory
or humiliating, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s mass arrests
of Muslims for immigration violations, and the differential treatment of Iraq and
North Korea.
By effectively harmonizing U.S. policy on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict with
the preferences of Ariel Sharon, moving aggressively against Iraq without
demonstrable provocation, and adopting policies that encroach on the civil rights
of Arab and Muslim Americans, the Bush administration has intensified the fears
of Muslims in the Arab world and beyond. Even as U.S. leaders call for new
forms of cooperation and new sacrifices of national sovereignty, more and more
people in the Islamic world are concluding that the “War on Terrorism” is little
more than a cover for war against Muslims.
To counteract terrorism and achieve genuine security, Americans need a
policy that inspires active cooperation for mutual gains rather than a program of
fear and compulsion. International terrorism has complex causes, and is fed by
a growing alienation between societies and the failure of existing local and global
governance to meet minimal expectations of opportunity, efficiency, and justice.
Such problems cannot be resolved solely—or even largely—through coercion. A
policy that combines a clear and nonpartisan message about terrorism with
respect for the existential realities, interests, and future hopes of Muslims might
open a new chapter of cooperative relations. But a policy that focuses on
symptoms and ignores underlying factors could easily reinforce the widespread
despair, resentment, and powerlessness that has enabled bin Laden to attract a
following.
D
eveloping an effective policy response to terrorism will happen only if we
re-examine fundamental assumptions about Islam and its relationship to the
West. Beneath the surface of reporting about the “War on Terrorism” and
political debates about the democratic deficit in predominantly Arab and Muslim
countries, a battle is being waged to define the grand narrative of Western
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relations with the Islamic world. Three stories compete to define this narrative:
one of confrontation, one of compatibility, and one of complementarity.
In the present context of conflict and insecurity, it is easy to mistake the
dominant narrative of Western–Islamic relations—a narrative that is being
recounted by Muslims and Americans alike—as the only narrative. According to
this first story, the story of confrontation, Westerners and Muslims share few
common values, and are entrapped by an intensifying “clash of civilizations”
with deep historical roots. In this “us versus them” story of conflict, opposition
between contrary civilizations can be resolved only through the political defeat
and cultural assimilation of one civilization by the other.
In both America and the Islamic world, this story is repeated by those who
argue that the most important lessons for dealing with contemporary problems
can be found in historical analogies to epic struggles against implacable foes.
Muslim militants, for example, proclaim that the U.S. and Israeli predominance
in the Middle East differs little from the Crusader occupation of the Eastern
Mediterranean between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. For their part,
Western pundits and Washington foreign policymakers often invoke the “clash”
thesis, usually settling for a World War II or Cold War analogy: that the threats
posed by extremist Islamic ideologies and terrorist networks demand responses
such as those used to “roll back” fascism and communism. Whether told by
Muslims or by Americans, such narratives of epic confrontation promote conflict
escalation as the only viable strategic response to present difficulties.
T
he second story—the story of compatibility—argues that present difficulties in
relations between Muslim and Western societies represent the tragic but not
inescapable outcome of a complex historical process. Islam shares a significant
cultural heritage with the West, and can respond to the challenges of the modern
world if given a chance to do so. Islamic civilization is not an “exceptional” case
among world cultures, uniquely predisposed to conflict or resistant to democracy.
The human common denominators that unite the Islamic historical experience
with the historical experiences of other world cultures are far more significant than
the differences, and the problems of Muslims may be understood in terms that are
similar to those used to explain challenges of political, cultural, and economic
development faced by other peoples.
According to advocates of the second story, Islam and the West are joined by
common roots within the Judeo-Christian and Hellenic cultural continuum.
Classical Islamic civilization grew to maturity in the Fertile Crescent—the
birthplace of Western civilization—and was constructed out of Arab, Biblicist,
and Hellenic cultures. This civilization also cast a wider net by integrating
Persian and Central Asian as well as Indian components within its cultural
synthesis, becoming a bridge between East and West. The fact that so much has
been integrated within Islamic cultures indicates that Islam is not only a
theological doctrine, but also a historical dynamic.
A dynamic conception of Islam allows for new and constantly emerging
syntheses. While essential theological affirmations have remained constant (for
example, doctrines concerning the unity of God, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the special nature of the Qur’an as a definitive summation of
Abrahamic monotheism), conclusions about the political consequences of belief
Making Peace with the Islamic World
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have varied widely. Today, puritanical Wahhabi tendencies compete with
progressive and reformist trends supporting democratic change, as well as with
more traditional patterns of faith and belief that have proven far more tolerant
of religious and cultural diversity than is generally acknowledged. Ironically,
those who claim to defend Islam by rejecting pluralism negate the genius of
Islamic civilization, which manifested greatness by harmonizing Islamic precepts
with diverse intellectual and cultural influences. As many scholarly accounts have
effectively demonstrated, the historical openness of Islamic culture has often
surpassed that of Christian Europe. In Spain, the centuries of Muslim rule
between the arrival of Abd al-Rahman in 711 and the fall of Granada in 1492
generated remarkable artistic and scholastic achievements through a symbiosis of
Islamic, Jewish, and Christian cultures, and provided the conduit through which
Aristotelian philosophy returned to the European intellectual milieu.
Although they sometimes resort to a simplistic “good Muslim”/“bad Muslim”
dichotomy, narrators of the second story provide useful guidance for distinguishing between Islamic “terrorism,” a destructive and anti-pluralist reaction to
perceived external threats, and Islam “renewalism,” a reformist (islahi) movement
to revitalize the community from within. Where violent Islamic movements
attribute the ills of Islamic civilization almost exclusively to foreign infiltration
and internal diversity of opinion, Islamic renewalists accept responsibility for
internal sources of malaise, and seek to adapt Islamic culture in ways that might
help Muslims meet modern problems more effectively.
According to this second story, radicalism in the Islamic world stems from
deep feelings of powerlessness fostered by governmental corruption, autocracy,
inequality, and subservience to foreign masters. Western actions that help to
restore this sense of security by collaborating to correct shared problems and
provide Muslims with a sense of political efficacy might inspire creative thought
and action.
T
he third story—a story of complementarity that has only recently begun to
emerge—seeks to create a framework for understanding how Islam and the
West might coexist peacefully without renouncing their cultural distinctiveness.
The foundation of this story renounces triumphalism on the part of any culture.
Triumphalism—the assertion by one culture of absolute superiority on all indices
of progress and enlightenment—leads not only to hubris and destructive polarization, but also to a rejection of the most vital source of cultural dynamism:
openness to what the “other” has to offer. No scope for learning remains;
“foreign” cultures must be rejected and defeated. In contrast, a relationship
between civilizations that accommodates and even values cultural differences
provides an indispensable foundation for fostering mutual respect and enduring
cooperation.
According to the third story, the “clash of civilizations” is actually a “clash of
symbols.” Complex belief systems are being reduced to politicized symbols that
can be used to reject the Muslim or non-Muslim “other,” and impose conformity
upon populations who may or may not accept “Muslim” or “Western” as an
exclusivist identity. Westerners, for example, are finding “overdressed” women,
headscarves, turbans and other symbols of Islamic religious expression repellent,
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just as fundamentalist Muslims have seen in blue jeans, “underdressed” women,
and other manifestations of Western culture explicit anti-Islamic statements.
The damage this identity-based form of politics wreaks upon rich cultural
traditions convincing advocates of the third story that the current Islamic–Western estrangement is unsustainable. Since September 11, Muslims and Westerners
have increasingly distrusted not only each other but also the more humanistic
and life-affirming values within their traditions. Simultaneously, many Westerners are finding that they cannot retain a fully “Western” way of life without
peaceful relations with Muslims, insofar as the term “Western” is intended to
evoke themes of democracy and human rights. This realization is echoed by
those in the Muslim world who seek to transcend the traditional “reflect or
reject” framework for relations with the West, and who are actively seeking
opportunities to preserve the integrity of their own convictions about human
dignity, tolerance, and inclusivity in matters of faith and belief.
This story of confrontation and rivalry—the dominant story in political and
strategic analyses—informs us about tensions that do in fact exist. Nonetheless,
it neglects the truths of the second story: common ground shared by Islamic and
Western cultures is not difficult for those who eschew stereotypes and political
opportunism to find. Acting on common interests and values, however, will
require a new approach to dealing with our differences, founded upon a vision
that will enable us to achieve fuller engagement across the boundaries of culture
and religion. By appreciating the significance of the story of complementarity, we
can transcend the most destructive idea in contemporary Islamic–Western
relations: the idea that peace cannot be achieved so long as significant cultural
differences persist.
T
o date, America’s approach to relations with the Muslim world has suffered
from deep contradictions and inconsistencies. The Bush administration’s
course of action since the tragic events of September 11 has alienated natural
allies and done much to convince ordinary, apolitical Muslims that Osama bin
Laden’s characterization of the United States may well be correct. Still, there is
no reason for fatalism about a clash of civilizations, since a vast majority of
Muslims would prefer having America as an ally rather than an enemy. By
highlighting both the cultural and political roots of the present impasse, advocates for a new foreign policy vision, predicated upon coexistence and peaceful
change, can have an important impact on public discourse. They can serve as
intercultural bridge builders, formulating a message and agenda to which both
Americans and Muslims might wish to subscribe.
The first step toward actualizing a “new story” in relations between America
and the Islamic world would be to change the root metaphors that leading
political figures and the media have used to explain September 11. Quite simply,
“war” metaphors are harmful and counterproductive. We must challenge
officials to move beyond cliché World War II and Cold War metaphors (Pearl
Harbor, containment, rollback) and beyond newer slogans that merely reinforce
the maladies they purport to describe (a “clash of civilizations”). Instead, we need
a policy framework with a different tone and tenor. This means defining the
nature and objectives of the struggle against terrorism more precisely, establish-
Making Peace with the Islamic World
345
ing non-military criteria for success, and framing direct as well as structural and
cultural violence in American–Islamic relations as shared problems.
Second, the U.S. should actively seek international support for post-war
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, working within a collaborative framework defined
by new United Nations resolutions. Thus far, the Bush administration has been
more successful at forcibly dismantling Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party regime
than at instituting a humane and workable new order. American officials have
been unnecessarily antagonistic toward the suggestion that active cooperation
might be the best formula for advancing the interests of Iraqis, Americans, and
other parties with a stake in future developments. By seeking maximum control
over reconstruction efforts, the U.S. will squander opportunities to share the
burden of rebuilding Iraq, allay fears about American intentions, and initiate a
process that will be viewed as legitimate by Iraqis and other citizens of other
states in the region. Without a share of decision-making power, most Iraqis will
view an American-controlled process suspiciously, assuming that U.S. leaders are
more intent on furthering their own geopolitical ambitions (much like Great
Britain after World War I) than on helping a predominantly Muslim nation
achieve democracy and self-determination. By taking a cooperative approach to
reconstruction, however, the U.S. can establish credibility with the Iraqi people,
and simultaneously mend rifts with states that opposed pre-emptive war.
The third crucial step would be a renewed U.S. commitment to a negotiated
resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in conformity with international
standards of legitimacy as well as with the shared needs of Israelis and
Palestinians for human security. United States leaders should actively cooperate
with its “Quartet” partners (the United Nations, the European Union, and
Russia) in the mediation process.
Fourth, the U.S. should convene an “interfaith peace team” for coordinating
religiously based peacemaking efforts in conflicts between Arabs and Israelis as
well as Westerners and Muslims. Such efforts would actively enlist civil society
leaders in track two activities that complement official diplomacy, and seek the
counsel of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in formulating policies that respond to
those aspects of contemporary conflicts that fall outside the purview of traditional
statecraft.
Fifth, new U.S. public diplomacy programs should be designed to support and
win the confidence of secular Arab democrats, and to foster dialogue with
Islamic renewalists who support life-affirming and progressive values. Hitherto,
public diplomacy has been more designed to advertise well-known American
values than to initiate a genuine dialogue, even though a broader and deeper
intercultural dialogue is essential for American security in a global age. Particular
attention could be given to themes such as “religion and democracy” and
“religion and development” as well as a “dialogue among civilizations.” Such
themes highlight common ground shared by seemingly disparate cultures, and
acknowledge the role religious currents such as Calvinism have played in
Western efforts to foster economic productivity and accountable governance. In
addition, specific feedback mechanisms could be designed to ensure that lessons
learned from public diplomacy programs are integrated within the broader U.S.
policymaking process.
Sixth, steps should be taken to market a new American message of cultural
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coexistence internally as well as abroad. A change in popular American perceptions would be immediately perceived by Arabs and Muslims overseas, who
follow Western culture and media far more closely than is generally recognized.
By acknowledging Islamic contributions to a common global civilization, and by
including “Islamic perspectives” in interfaith discussions and programs, American leaders and public figures could facilitate a process of intercultural peacemaking. Public expressions of respect for Muslim achievements would
also heighten the profile of responsible and loyal Arab American and
Muslim American leaders whose leadership on reconciliation between Islam and
the West could be valuable for fostering constructive change in the Islamic
world.
Finally, Arab and Muslim Americans should be made visible members of the
official decision-making apparatus, and engaged as full partners in efforts to
advance genuine security. For starters, a subcommittee that draws specifically on
the knowledge and expertise of Arab and Muslim Americans should be formed,
to provide in-house expertise on the Middle East and Islamic world, to share
first-hand understanding of regional complexities and local meanings, and to
offer alternative, constructive approaches for advancing U.S. national interests.
Actively including Arabs and Muslims in policymaking circles could help to
discredit the defeatist and polarizing theories about the “War on Terrorism” that
are now circulating in the Islamic world, while significantly enhancing the
effectiveness of efforts to establish cooperative, mutually beneficial relations with
Muslim societies. Through their contributions and counsel, Arab and Muslim
Americans can help ensure that the U.S. will not inadvertently trigger or escalate
a potentially catastrophic religiously based conflagration. They can also help to
increase the effectiveness of policies intended to provide Arab and Muslim
Americans with opportunities to demonstrate their patriotism.
T
hrough public dialogue and political appointments that highlight shared
goals and establish confidence in mutual commitment to the principles of
the United States, the support of Arab and Muslim Americans can be won
without coercion or exclusion. Significantly, strong-armed security approaches
have not won peace or security for any society throughout history. America’s
historical success in achieving domestic peace as an immigrant society has relied
on its spirit of liberty, tolerance, and democracy. Where strong-armed security
measures fail by alienating ethnic communities and replacing a desire to be of
service with fear of punishment, an affirmative approach based on outreach
could cement a profound and long-term relationship.
To achieve human security in a post-September-11 world, the United States
needs a policy grounded in cultural empathy, multilateralism, and broad consensus about interests, values, and hopes that are widely shared in the international
community. Even though the present administration is promoting policies that
contradict these principles, concerned world citizens can still contribute
significantly to formulating an alternative vision and agenda that eschews
fatalistic and provincial visions, and works to disestablish the political conditions
of insecurity, fear, resentment, and foreboding within which terrorism thrives. To
become viable, such a response requires a proactive engagement with Muslim
Making Peace with the Islamic World
347
communities and cultures. By calling for respectful dialogue and mutual engagement, we can help to transform a legacy of pain, producing a deeper knowledge
of what the “other” has to say, a more realistic understanding of present
opportunities and dangers, and an enduring basis for cultural peace.
Nathan Funk is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George
Washington University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations and international peace and
conflict resolution from American University. Email: mrncfunk@yahoo.com.
Abdul Aziz Said is a Mohammed Said Farsi Professor of Islamic Peace at American University. He
is the founder and director of American University’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution
Program, and Director of the Center for Global Peace. Correspondence: School of International Service,
American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016, U.S.A