Peace Review 15:3 (2003), 339–347 Making Peace with the Islamic World Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk Reports of a clash of civilizations between America and the Islamic world have been greatly exaggerated. However zealously fanatics such as Osama bin Laden may be working to foment a cultural war, America has no national interest in accepting the assertion that the U.S. is an enemy of Islam, and vice versa. In fact, the U.S. has an abundance of accomplished and productive Muslim citizens, and substantial numbers of Muslim elites seeking an education at American colleges and universities. Moreover, the allegation that Islam, as a theological doctrine, is responsible for the deeds of a faction of Muslims who say they act in their religion’s name is every bit as tenuous as the claim that Christianity is culpable for the excesses of medieval Crusaders, or the insinuation that Judaism is to blame for the Israeli government’s failure to fully implement the fourth Geneva Convention. Whether they identify themselves as members of the Christian right or as prominent neoconservatives, partisans of American interests should hesitate before embracing Osama bin Laden’s logic as their own. Bin Laden has sought to polarize identity issues—preposterously declaring war on an entire civilization—because he does not have a policy (what good has he done for the Palestinians or impoverished Arabs lately?) and his followers have nothing to lose. In contrast, the vast majority of the world’s people have much to lose if their leaders—especially American leaders—fail to transcend “culture war” formulas and instead generate a coherent policy framework based on human dignity, cultural inclusiveness, and democratic participation. Improving the quality of public and policy-related discourse in the United States has thus become a paramount task for the international peace movement. U nfortunately, the Bush administration’s strategy for counteracting terrorism and building international security lacks both coherence and a credible strategy for implementing America’s best values. As America’s leaders clumsily fight fire with both fire and water, they rely far more on incendiary foreign policy jingoisms than on a real understanding of the flashpoints and firebreaks in American–Islamic relations. While one strand of U.S. policy projects official messages of goodwill toward Muslims and seeks to advertise American values through public diplomacy, the Bush administration has mostly redressed problems of international terrorism and weapons proliferation unilaterally, through intimidation and the projection of military power. Instead of a proactive agenda to strengthen global governance ISSN 1040-2659 print; ISSN 1469-9982 online/03/030339-09 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1040265032000130940 340 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk and deal with terrorism’s root causes, Bush has produced a reactive foreign policy whose bellicosity threatens to do what al-Qa’ida could not: convince the world’s Muslims that U.S. policy really does oppose their interests and values. Where many Americans see policies animated by ideological consistency and even moral clarity, Muslims see double standards and moral bankruptcy. The resulting perceptual gap—and the demonstrable hardships experienced by Palestinians and sanctioned Iraqis—has fed a deep cynicism about American politics. Insistence on the sanctity of UN Security Council resolutions vis-à-vis Iraq is hardly convincing to an audience preoccupied with what UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and most prominent world leaders have characterized as an “illegal” Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nor are American concerns about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction regarded as credible given past U.S. indifference to the use of these weapons against Iranians and Kurds, not to mention the way the American non-proliferation agenda seems driven more by power politics (and a concomitant policy of “selective proliferation”) than by any consistent set of principles. After all, allies and formidable adversaries are permitted to maintain stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, whereas challengers to the status quo are not. The Bush administration’s professed desire to spread democracy is viewed with similar irony, given a historical U.S. pattern of support for Middle Eastern monarchs, and for “99% majority” presidents whose failure to provide dynamic, progressive, and accountable leadership has greatly enhanced the appeal of radical Islamic sentiment. When speculating about America’s intentions, Muslims consider not only contradictions of word and deed but also the résumés and public statements of those who formulate contemporary U.S. policy. Although some American public figures inspire hope and even confidence (for example, Colin Powell and a few remaining career foreign service officers), many are viewed with distrust. For example, the recent appointment of Elliott Abrams as the National Security Council’s custodian of American policy toward the Middle East and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been taken by astute Arabs and Muslims as a sure indication that the so-called “road map” to a Palestinian state is insincere. Remembered in the U.S. for his role in the Iran/Contra affair and in Latin America for his indifference to human rights abuses in El Salvador, Abrams is also well known in the Middle East for his outspoken opposition to the Oslo process. Reports that neoconservative policy elites at the Department of Defense are drafting plans to reshape the political geography of the Middle East also arouse deep concern about American intentions. The influence of figures such as Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith—all consistent advocates of hard-line policies toward Palestinians and the broader Arab world—provoke considerable anxiety. Attorney General John Ashcroft’s attitude toward civil liberties has likewise been viewed suspiciously, not to mention his negative portrayals of Islam in the press. In light of these perceptions, Americans should not be surprised that most Middle Easterners view the war to “liberate” Iraq as actually a campaign to Making Peace with the Islamic World 341 subjugate Arabs and Muslims, within the well-established tradition of Westernimperialism. From a Muslim standpoint, official American pronouncements of respect for Islam are much easier to explain away than policies that instead manifest either a deliberate bias or an inability to comprehend the needs, aspirations, and fears of others. After all, it is politically expedient for American leaders to profess respect for Islam and for Muslim values. An official pronouncement of intolerance in the wake of September 11 would legitimize violence against Arab and Muslim Americans, with significant consequences for American interests. This does not deny the wisdom of President Bush’s visits to the Islamic Center of Washington, of his professed views about the peaceful nature of Islam, or of his efforts (in collaboration with Colin Powell and Undersecretary of State Charlotte Beers) to “market” America in the Muslim world. The problem is that messages of reassurance are neither convincing nor backed by real measures that engage Muslims in efforts to overcome common dangers. For political analysts in Islamic countries, perfunctory statements of conciliation from American leaders are disingenuous afterthoughts rather than authentic expressions of intent. Real motivations can instead be found in policies that are discriminatory or humiliating, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s mass arrests of Muslims for immigration violations, and the differential treatment of Iraq and North Korea. By effectively harmonizing U.S. policy on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict with the preferences of Ariel Sharon, moving aggressively against Iraq without demonstrable provocation, and adopting policies that encroach on the civil rights of Arab and Muslim Americans, the Bush administration has intensified the fears of Muslims in the Arab world and beyond. Even as U.S. leaders call for new forms of cooperation and new sacrifices of national sovereignty, more and more people in the Islamic world are concluding that the “War on Terrorism” is little more than a cover for war against Muslims. To counteract terrorism and achieve genuine security, Americans need a policy that inspires active cooperation for mutual gains rather than a program of fear and compulsion. International terrorism has complex causes, and is fed by a growing alienation between societies and the failure of existing local and global governance to meet minimal expectations of opportunity, efficiency, and justice. Such problems cannot be resolved solely—or even largely—through coercion. A policy that combines a clear and nonpartisan message about terrorism with respect for the existential realities, interests, and future hopes of Muslims might open a new chapter of cooperative relations. But a policy that focuses on symptoms and ignores underlying factors could easily reinforce the widespread despair, resentment, and powerlessness that has enabled bin Laden to attract a following. D eveloping an effective policy response to terrorism will happen only if we re-examine fundamental assumptions about Islam and its relationship to the West. Beneath the surface of reporting about the “War on Terrorism” and political debates about the democratic deficit in predominantly Arab and Muslim countries, a battle is being waged to define the grand narrative of Western 342 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk relations with the Islamic world. Three stories compete to define this narrative: one of confrontation, one of compatibility, and one of complementarity. In the present context of conflict and insecurity, it is easy to mistake the dominant narrative of Western–Islamic relations—a narrative that is being recounted by Muslims and Americans alike—as the only narrative. According to this first story, the story of confrontation, Westerners and Muslims share few common values, and are entrapped by an intensifying “clash of civilizations” with deep historical roots. In this “us versus them” story of conflict, opposition between contrary civilizations can be resolved only through the political defeat and cultural assimilation of one civilization by the other. In both America and the Islamic world, this story is repeated by those who argue that the most important lessons for dealing with contemporary problems can be found in historical analogies to epic struggles against implacable foes. Muslim militants, for example, proclaim that the U.S. and Israeli predominance in the Middle East differs little from the Crusader occupation of the Eastern Mediterranean between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. For their part, Western pundits and Washington foreign policymakers often invoke the “clash” thesis, usually settling for a World War II or Cold War analogy: that the threats posed by extremist Islamic ideologies and terrorist networks demand responses such as those used to “roll back” fascism and communism. Whether told by Muslims or by Americans, such narratives of epic confrontation promote conflict escalation as the only viable strategic response to present difficulties. T he second story—the story of compatibility—argues that present difficulties in relations between Muslim and Western societies represent the tragic but not inescapable outcome of a complex historical process. Islam shares a significant cultural heritage with the West, and can respond to the challenges of the modern world if given a chance to do so. Islamic civilization is not an “exceptional” case among world cultures, uniquely predisposed to conflict or resistant to democracy. The human common denominators that unite the Islamic historical experience with the historical experiences of other world cultures are far more significant than the differences, and the problems of Muslims may be understood in terms that are similar to those used to explain challenges of political, cultural, and economic development faced by other peoples. According to advocates of the second story, Islam and the West are joined by common roots within the Judeo-Christian and Hellenic cultural continuum. Classical Islamic civilization grew to maturity in the Fertile Crescent—the birthplace of Western civilization—and was constructed out of Arab, Biblicist, and Hellenic cultures. This civilization also cast a wider net by integrating Persian and Central Asian as well as Indian components within its cultural synthesis, becoming a bridge between East and West. The fact that so much has been integrated within Islamic cultures indicates that Islam is not only a theological doctrine, but also a historical dynamic. A dynamic conception of Islam allows for new and constantly emerging syntheses. While essential theological affirmations have remained constant (for example, doctrines concerning the unity of God, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the special nature of the Qur’an as a definitive summation of Abrahamic monotheism), conclusions about the political consequences of belief Making Peace with the Islamic World 343 have varied widely. Today, puritanical Wahhabi tendencies compete with progressive and reformist trends supporting democratic change, as well as with more traditional patterns of faith and belief that have proven far more tolerant of religious and cultural diversity than is generally acknowledged. Ironically, those who claim to defend Islam by rejecting pluralism negate the genius of Islamic civilization, which manifested greatness by harmonizing Islamic precepts with diverse intellectual and cultural influences. As many scholarly accounts have effectively demonstrated, the historical openness of Islamic culture has often surpassed that of Christian Europe. In Spain, the centuries of Muslim rule between the arrival of Abd al-Rahman in 711 and the fall of Granada in 1492 generated remarkable artistic and scholastic achievements through a symbiosis of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian cultures, and provided the conduit through which Aristotelian philosophy returned to the European intellectual milieu. Although they sometimes resort to a simplistic “good Muslim”/“bad Muslim” dichotomy, narrators of the second story provide useful guidance for distinguishing between Islamic “terrorism,” a destructive and anti-pluralist reaction to perceived external threats, and Islam “renewalism,” a reformist (islahi) movement to revitalize the community from within. Where violent Islamic movements attribute the ills of Islamic civilization almost exclusively to foreign infiltration and internal diversity of opinion, Islamic renewalists accept responsibility for internal sources of malaise, and seek to adapt Islamic culture in ways that might help Muslims meet modern problems more effectively. According to this second story, radicalism in the Islamic world stems from deep feelings of powerlessness fostered by governmental corruption, autocracy, inequality, and subservience to foreign masters. Western actions that help to restore this sense of security by collaborating to correct shared problems and provide Muslims with a sense of political efficacy might inspire creative thought and action. T he third story—a story of complementarity that has only recently begun to emerge—seeks to create a framework for understanding how Islam and the West might coexist peacefully without renouncing their cultural distinctiveness. The foundation of this story renounces triumphalism on the part of any culture. Triumphalism—the assertion by one culture of absolute superiority on all indices of progress and enlightenment—leads not only to hubris and destructive polarization, but also to a rejection of the most vital source of cultural dynamism: openness to what the “other” has to offer. No scope for learning remains; “foreign” cultures must be rejected and defeated. In contrast, a relationship between civilizations that accommodates and even values cultural differences provides an indispensable foundation for fostering mutual respect and enduring cooperation. According to the third story, the “clash of civilizations” is actually a “clash of symbols.” Complex belief systems are being reduced to politicized symbols that can be used to reject the Muslim or non-Muslim “other,” and impose conformity upon populations who may or may not accept “Muslim” or “Western” as an exclusivist identity. Westerners, for example, are finding “overdressed” women, headscarves, turbans and other symbols of Islamic religious expression repellent, 344 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk just as fundamentalist Muslims have seen in blue jeans, “underdressed” women, and other manifestations of Western culture explicit anti-Islamic statements. The damage this identity-based form of politics wreaks upon rich cultural traditions convincing advocates of the third story that the current Islamic–Western estrangement is unsustainable. Since September 11, Muslims and Westerners have increasingly distrusted not only each other but also the more humanistic and life-affirming values within their traditions. Simultaneously, many Westerners are finding that they cannot retain a fully “Western” way of life without peaceful relations with Muslims, insofar as the term “Western” is intended to evoke themes of democracy and human rights. This realization is echoed by those in the Muslim world who seek to transcend the traditional “reflect or reject” framework for relations with the West, and who are actively seeking opportunities to preserve the integrity of their own convictions about human dignity, tolerance, and inclusivity in matters of faith and belief. This story of confrontation and rivalry—the dominant story in political and strategic analyses—informs us about tensions that do in fact exist. Nonetheless, it neglects the truths of the second story: common ground shared by Islamic and Western cultures is not difficult for those who eschew stereotypes and political opportunism to find. Acting on common interests and values, however, will require a new approach to dealing with our differences, founded upon a vision that will enable us to achieve fuller engagement across the boundaries of culture and religion. By appreciating the significance of the story of complementarity, we can transcend the most destructive idea in contemporary Islamic–Western relations: the idea that peace cannot be achieved so long as significant cultural differences persist. T o date, America’s approach to relations with the Muslim world has suffered from deep contradictions and inconsistencies. The Bush administration’s course of action since the tragic events of September 11 has alienated natural allies and done much to convince ordinary, apolitical Muslims that Osama bin Laden’s characterization of the United States may well be correct. Still, there is no reason for fatalism about a clash of civilizations, since a vast majority of Muslims would prefer having America as an ally rather than an enemy. By highlighting both the cultural and political roots of the present impasse, advocates for a new foreign policy vision, predicated upon coexistence and peaceful change, can have an important impact on public discourse. They can serve as intercultural bridge builders, formulating a message and agenda to which both Americans and Muslims might wish to subscribe. The first step toward actualizing a “new story” in relations between America and the Islamic world would be to change the root metaphors that leading political figures and the media have used to explain September 11. Quite simply, “war” metaphors are harmful and counterproductive. We must challenge officials to move beyond cliché World War II and Cold War metaphors (Pearl Harbor, containment, rollback) and beyond newer slogans that merely reinforce the maladies they purport to describe (a “clash of civilizations”). Instead, we need a policy framework with a different tone and tenor. This means defining the nature and objectives of the struggle against terrorism more precisely, establish- Making Peace with the Islamic World 345 ing non-military criteria for success, and framing direct as well as structural and cultural violence in American–Islamic relations as shared problems. Second, the U.S. should actively seek international support for post-war reconstruction efforts in Iraq, working within a collaborative framework defined by new United Nations resolutions. Thus far, the Bush administration has been more successful at forcibly dismantling Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party regime than at instituting a humane and workable new order. American officials have been unnecessarily antagonistic toward the suggestion that active cooperation might be the best formula for advancing the interests of Iraqis, Americans, and other parties with a stake in future developments. By seeking maximum control over reconstruction efforts, the U.S. will squander opportunities to share the burden of rebuilding Iraq, allay fears about American intentions, and initiate a process that will be viewed as legitimate by Iraqis and other citizens of other states in the region. Without a share of decision-making power, most Iraqis will view an American-controlled process suspiciously, assuming that U.S. leaders are more intent on furthering their own geopolitical ambitions (much like Great Britain after World War I) than on helping a predominantly Muslim nation achieve democracy and self-determination. By taking a cooperative approach to reconstruction, however, the U.S. can establish credibility with the Iraqi people, and simultaneously mend rifts with states that opposed pre-emptive war. The third crucial step would be a renewed U.S. commitment to a negotiated resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in conformity with international standards of legitimacy as well as with the shared needs of Israelis and Palestinians for human security. United States leaders should actively cooperate with its “Quartet” partners (the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia) in the mediation process. Fourth, the U.S. should convene an “interfaith peace team” for coordinating religiously based peacemaking efforts in conflicts between Arabs and Israelis as well as Westerners and Muslims. Such efforts would actively enlist civil society leaders in track two activities that complement official diplomacy, and seek the counsel of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in formulating policies that respond to those aspects of contemporary conflicts that fall outside the purview of traditional statecraft. Fifth, new U.S. public diplomacy programs should be designed to support and win the confidence of secular Arab democrats, and to foster dialogue with Islamic renewalists who support life-affirming and progressive values. Hitherto, public diplomacy has been more designed to advertise well-known American values than to initiate a genuine dialogue, even though a broader and deeper intercultural dialogue is essential for American security in a global age. Particular attention could be given to themes such as “religion and democracy” and “religion and development” as well as a “dialogue among civilizations.” Such themes highlight common ground shared by seemingly disparate cultures, and acknowledge the role religious currents such as Calvinism have played in Western efforts to foster economic productivity and accountable governance. In addition, specific feedback mechanisms could be designed to ensure that lessons learned from public diplomacy programs are integrated within the broader U.S. policymaking process. Sixth, steps should be taken to market a new American message of cultural 346 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk coexistence internally as well as abroad. A change in popular American perceptions would be immediately perceived by Arabs and Muslims overseas, who follow Western culture and media far more closely than is generally recognized. By acknowledging Islamic contributions to a common global civilization, and by including “Islamic perspectives” in interfaith discussions and programs, American leaders and public figures could facilitate a process of intercultural peacemaking. Public expressions of respect for Muslim achievements would also heighten the profile of responsible and loyal Arab American and Muslim American leaders whose leadership on reconciliation between Islam and the West could be valuable for fostering constructive change in the Islamic world. Finally, Arab and Muslim Americans should be made visible members of the official decision-making apparatus, and engaged as full partners in efforts to advance genuine security. For starters, a subcommittee that draws specifically on the knowledge and expertise of Arab and Muslim Americans should be formed, to provide in-house expertise on the Middle East and Islamic world, to share first-hand understanding of regional complexities and local meanings, and to offer alternative, constructive approaches for advancing U.S. national interests. Actively including Arabs and Muslims in policymaking circles could help to discredit the defeatist and polarizing theories about the “War on Terrorism” that are now circulating in the Islamic world, while significantly enhancing the effectiveness of efforts to establish cooperative, mutually beneficial relations with Muslim societies. Through their contributions and counsel, Arab and Muslim Americans can help ensure that the U.S. will not inadvertently trigger or escalate a potentially catastrophic religiously based conflagration. They can also help to increase the effectiveness of policies intended to provide Arab and Muslim Americans with opportunities to demonstrate their patriotism. T hrough public dialogue and political appointments that highlight shared goals and establish confidence in mutual commitment to the principles of the United States, the support of Arab and Muslim Americans can be won without coercion or exclusion. Significantly, strong-armed security approaches have not won peace or security for any society throughout history. America’s historical success in achieving domestic peace as an immigrant society has relied on its spirit of liberty, tolerance, and democracy. Where strong-armed security measures fail by alienating ethnic communities and replacing a desire to be of service with fear of punishment, an affirmative approach based on outreach could cement a profound and long-term relationship. To achieve human security in a post-September-11 world, the United States needs a policy grounded in cultural empathy, multilateralism, and broad consensus about interests, values, and hopes that are widely shared in the international community. Even though the present administration is promoting policies that contradict these principles, concerned world citizens can still contribute significantly to formulating an alternative vision and agenda that eschews fatalistic and provincial visions, and works to disestablish the political conditions of insecurity, fear, resentment, and foreboding within which terrorism thrives. To become viable, such a response requires a proactive engagement with Muslim Making Peace with the Islamic World 347 communities and cultures. By calling for respectful dialogue and mutual engagement, we can help to transform a legacy of pain, producing a deeper knowledge of what the “other” has to say, a more realistic understanding of present opportunities and dangers, and an enduring basis for cultural peace. Nathan Funk is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations and international peace and conflict resolution from American University. Email: mrncfunk@yahoo.com. Abdul Aziz Said is a Mohammed Said Farsi Professor of Islamic Peace at American University. He is the founder and director of American University’s International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program, and Director of the Center for Global Peace. Correspondence: School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016, U.S.A