An ‘Everything But’ Framework for Modeling Emotion
Mark Coulson
School of Health and Social Sciences
Middlesex University
Queensway
Enfield
EN3 4SF
United Kingdom
m.coulson@mdx.ac.uk
Abstract
The approach outlined here assumes that modeling and
simulating emotion should arise from a specification of the
underlying contexts which determine action, and not
emotional experiences or the labels we provide for them.
This paper is an attempt to outline these contexts, describe
the variables which each necessitates, and show how
formal models capable of predicting behavior may be
produced. As such, the approach borrows heavily from
William James’ definition of emotion as the experience of
bodily change, although it expands on this by including all
those other things whose outputs or representations
contribute to emotion. In so doing, it co-opts a range of
existing theories and findings from psychology and
neuroscience in outlining that which must be specified in
order to model an agent’s behavior. While the existence of
emotion as phenomenal experience is not questioned, it is
argued that the concept of emotion has no role to play in
the explanation or simulation of behavior.
Outline
Acknowledgement of the importance of emotions in
human behavior is as widespread within the cognitive
sciences as it has ever been, and continuing integration of
the affective with the cognitive looks set to continue.
Although this is a welcome move away from purely
cognitive models of agents, scholars remain split on the
issue of what constitutes an emotion, and, more
important, the role emotions play in the generation and
guidance of behavior. This debate hearkens back to that
originally arising between the competing theories of
William James/Carl Lange, and Walter Cannon/Phillip
Bard. Central to this was the question of whether
emotions as experiences preceded (caused) or followed
(are caused by) behavioral responses to environmental
events. The framework proposed here falls squarely in
the latter camp.
In tandem with confusions about their causal
role, the explanatory significance of emotion words has
been questioned from a variety of perspectives. Whether
this takes the form of underlying dimensions of affect
(Russell, 1999), emotion words as tokens representing
frequent but gross patterns of appraisal (Ortony, Clore &
Collins, 1988), or as an entirely inappropriate tool for
generating theory (Wierzbicka, 1992), it has become
increasingly clear that terms such as angry, sad and happy
are too coarse and ill-defined to benefit the researcher
wishing to specify either the roles emotions have in the
causation of behavior, or the emotions which arise as a
consequence of behavior. If we wish to theorise about
emotion, a good place to start is to reject the utility of the
emotional lexicon.
Despite these deep controversies, researchers
generally agree that the genesis, expression and time
course of emotion arises as the result of a multiplicity of
factors. As an alternative to debating the role of emotion,
the approach outlined here attempts to specify and
describe the factors which lead to emotion, and show how
these determine those behaviors typically thought of as
emotional.
The multiplicity of factors is conceptualized as a
series of contexts. The interrelatedness of the contexts
means that emotion arises from the collective results of a
relatively large number of processes. As such it becomes
difficult to specify when emotion arises. Indeed, under
this formulation is makes no sense to ask the question of
whether emotion is present or not. To the extent that
emotions are responses to external and internal events of
significance to the agent, emotion is always present and
all events, no matter how trivial, have some finite degree
of significance. Due to there being no role for emotion
words in this formulation, it is not necessary to identify
which emotion an agent is experiencing while at the same
time maintaining that the agent is in an emotional state.
There are many steps involved in moving from
the specification of descriptive contexts, through the
identification of the variables which specify the context,
and beyond to a formal statement concerning how
behavior arises as a function of these variables. This is
very much a work in progress. What is clear is that
effective modeling and prediction of behavior, whether it
be real or simulated, only arises when the totality of the
agent’s situation is specified. What may be less clear is
that this totality does not involve the concept of emotion
as traditionally used.
Context
Event
Agent
Embodied
Interpersonal
Topographical
Historical
Domain
What has happened
To whom it has happened
What kind of being is the Agent
Who else is involved
Where it takes place
How things unfold
Table 1. Six contexts and their associated domains.
Six contexts are proposed (see table 1), each logically
independent from the others but interacting to determine
behavior. In what follows, each context is outlined in
general terms, and its importance for any account of
emotional behavior demonstrated. Some indication is
then provided of the theoretical apparatus which describes
the context, and the descriptive variables required by this.
After the six contexts have been outlined, some key
behaviors associated with emotion are analysed in the
form of relationships between the variables specified by
the individual contexts. A concluding section addresses
some of the more significant gaps in the framework, and
outlines how further research will progress.
The Event context – what has happened
Emotion experience is experience of change which has
significance for the agent. As such, any model of emotion
must include a description of the eliciting event or
stimulus. Event contexts are most comprehensively
defined in the work of appraisal theorists, in particular
Scherer (1987; 2001) offers an analysis of emotion as
arising from the sequential and recurrent application of a
number of simple evaluative processes (stimulus novelty,
intrinsic pleasantness, goal relevance, etc.). Scherer’s
stimulus evaluation checks are a mixture of appraisals of
the stimulus or event, and its relevance and importance to
the appraiser, and therefore confound the first two
contexts outlined here. The term stimulus is also
somewhat misleading, as emotions arise for a variety of
reasons not all of which are best characterised as stimuli
(for instance, remembering that we are late for an
appointment). Here, the term event is preferred over
stimulus in order to capture the variety of causes of
emotion, which broadly speaking include internal and
external events, the actions of other agents, and responses
to objects (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988).
The Event Context is a representation of the
event itself as opposed to the event’s relevance for the
agent, and many of its variables are correspondingly
simple, such as the event’s size, suddenness of onset, and
location relative to the agent. This is intended to reflect
the very rapid primary evaluations of any occurrence in
terms of what and where it is, and whether it is something
novel or familiar (i.e. whether the perceptual experience
associated with the event involves recognition). Events
contexts are therefore produced by rapid, low level
perhaps mainly sub-cortical processes (Le Doux, 1995)
En
Eo
Ev
Es
Ep
El (x,y,z)
Ef
nature of the event (internal, external,
another agent, an object…)
onset (sudden, slow…)
valence
size
power/force/compellingness
event location
event familiarity
Table 2. Event context variables
The list provided in table 2 is not necessarily complete,
but captures the important properties of any event. While
other properties may need to be added, these are likely to
remain as the core definition.
Although the process by which an event is
appraised is internal to the appraising agent, this is an
appraisal of the event/stimulus qualities, and effects
associated with personal characteristics or idiosyncracies
of the agent are not manifest until after this initial
appraisal has been performed. Indeed, there exists some
evidence which suggests knowledge of an event,
attributions of properties to it, and appraisal of the same
event are psychologically distinct processes, with the
former only contributing indirectly to emotion via its
effects on the latter (Smith et. al., 1993).
The Agent context – enduring dispositions
and current intentions
As discussed above, appraisal theories compound aspects
of the event with those of the appraising agent. While
there is a certain parsimony to this, it blurs the distinction
between the nature of an event and its potential
significance for the agent. People react in different ways
to the same thing, and unless models are designed to
capture this they will fail to capture the idiosyncratic and
personal nature of emotional response.
It is tempting to reduce the agent to something
which has a greater or lesser propensity to experience
some emotions over others, or all emotions for longer,
more frequently, or more intensely.
Such
conceptualisations of individual differences as affective
style (e.g. Davidson, 2001) are appealing, but ultimately
somewhat simplistic in that they reduce individual
differences to the tendency to experience emotion.
Personality psychology offers a powerful set of
tools for describing how intrapersonal variables and goal
structures affect behavior. Global theories of personality
(e.g. Costa & MacCrae, 1992) allow an agent’s
underlying behavioral tendencies to be specified in a
small number of variables (for example, Neuroticism,
Extraversion,
Openness,
Conscientiousness,
and
Agreeableness, see Allbeck & Badler, 2002, for an
example of this approach), and suggest ways in which
these personality dimensions are manifest. As an
indication, individuals reporting high scores on the
Neuroticism dimension have been shown to be
hypersensitive to threat; those high in Extraversion are
likely to be more sensitive to interpersonal signals;
Conscientiousness has been shown to relate to the degree
to which peripheral feedback (from the musculature of the
face and body) affects the experience of emotional states,
and may relate to the number of goals which remain
active at any one time; Openness may reflect the degree
to which novel events are appraised as benign; and
Agreeableness indexes the extent to which other people
affect the agent’s behavior.
While a great deal of research has examined the
relationship between experienced affect and personality,
this has been largely descriptive and relatively coarse
grained. While we know that extraverts are more likely to
approach a socially demanding situation, the extent to
which extraversion contributes to socially-related
approach motivation lies beyond most models’ ability to
predict, and a certain degree of guesswork or
experimentation is required in order to identify realistic
values for the relevant parameters (realism in this
approach would be reflected in the generation of
responses which, in the contexts that define them appear
sensible, proportional, and realistic).
Personality represents a highly stable
determinant of behavior, but it is also necessary to model
more transient agent states. Achievement goal motivation
theories (Dweck, 1988) offer frameworks within which
the agent’s ongoing concerns can be modeled in
hierarchical form, and how these impact on self esteem
(Higgins, 1987; 1999). Preferences, dislikes, phobias and
philias mediate the nature of the event, and control
process theory (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Coulson & Duff,
1998) allows formal specification of the relationships
between progress towards goals, affect, and personality
dimensions.
At an even finer time frame, an agent’s position
within the environment and speed of movement need to
be known. Emotional experience is experience of things,
and as such requires an agent embodied and located in
space. The embodiment of the agent is discussed further
in section 3 below.
In addition to modeling all these aspects of the
agent, it might also be deemed appropriate to model the
agent’s emotions. There are two reasons why this is not
appropriate. First, as outlined above, emotions as labels
have no real explanatory power. Second, variables
describing personality and goals together provide a
propensity for emotional experience to occur. That
propensity is exercised through the effects of the other
contexts, and as such there is no place for the agent’s
actual emotional state.
Ap(n,e,o,c,a)
Ag(1..n)
Al (x,y,z)
Av
Ao
agent’s personality
agent’s goals (for n goals)
agent’s current location
agent’s current velocity
agent’s current orientation
Table 3. Agent context variables
There are important differences in complexity between
the variables identified in table 3. Personality, while wide
ranging in its effects, is generally thought to be
adequately described in terms of scalar values for each of
the identified dimensions. Position and velocity are also
simple enough to describe. In contrast, goal structures
require a far more complex representation, as goals exist
in hierarchical and geometric relationships to each other
(the latter are required in order to account for situations
where progress towards one goal, such as publication of
academic papers, may help another indirectly, such as
achieving tenure, and interfere with yet others, such as
spending time with friends and family and staying fit and
healthy).
The Embodied context – the agent’s physical
instantiation
Action is limited by the biomechanics of the agent as well
as its current activity and physical state. There are
physical limitations to the amount of acceleration or
deceleration, or the rate at which any part of the body can
be moved. These will change with recovery, fatigue, and
acute events. All need to be modeled if convincing
behavior is to be simulated.
Much is known about the capabilities and
limitations of the human musculo-skeletal system under
normal, elite, and degenerative conditions, and systems
which model joint torques and body segment inertial
parameters provide sufficiently detailed information such
that realistic movements can be generated. Although such
systems are biomechanically sufficient, they still lack a
psychological component, and integrating these with
more qualitative descriptions remains a significant
challenge (Chi et. al., 2000). Realistic movement is not
just that which obeys the laws of physics as instantiated in
a biological system of bone and muscle, but is something
which requires an underlying meaning captured by the
goals the movement is intended to achieve. High level
descriptions of the quality of body movement in terms of
concepts such as strength, force, direction, and shape
(Montepare, 1999) are important considerations which
require careful integration with the physics of movement.
In a similar vein to the representation of goals at
multiple time scales, the Embodied context includes both
relatively invariant and highly variable parameters.
Although the maximum rate at which we can walk, or the
maximum height to which we can reach change little over
long periods of time, these can be suddenly reduced with
fatigue or injury.
Bb
Bc
Bm(x,y,z)
Ba (x,y,z)
a baseline definition of the agent’s
biomechanics and physical capabilities
current state of Bb
limits to velocity of movement in three
planes
limits to rate of acceleration in three planes
Table 4. Embodied context variables
Again there is considerable variation in the complexity of
the data structures required to capture these different
variables. If different agents are to be simulated, it is also
important to appreciate that simply ‘scaling up’ size and
inertial parameters is insufficient, as body segments do
not bear constant relationships to each other across
individuals (Hodgkins & Pollard, 1997).
The Interpersonal context – who else is
involved
Emotions do not simply concern the individual, and are
potentially affected by any and all other parties, whether
or not they are directly concerned with the event. In
particular, behavior is fundamentally a property of who
we are with at the time of an event.
Social psychology offers a wealth of findings
which inform behavior. Relationships of kinship and
affection, duty and power have important influences on
how we behave, and determine to whom we should stay
close, from whom we should stay away, and who we
should protect or be protected by. A person’s emotional
focus, indeed their entire emotional response, may change
dramatically depending on the interpersonal context. An
encounter with an aggressive person may cause
amusement when we are surrounded by friends, fear when
we are alone, and anger when we are accompanying our
children.
Ik (1..n)
Ip (1..n)
Id (1..n)
kinship/affective relationships with n others
power relationships
duty relationships
Table 5. Interpersonal context variables
It is important to be clear about the distinction between
the Interpersonal and the Event contexts. To the extent
that another person is the cause of an emotional
experience, they are captured by the Event context. As
such, the Event context would represent the aggressive
person as a negative and compelling event.
The
Interpersonal context refers to those others whose
presence moderates, but does not ultimately cause, the
resulting behavior.
The distinction between one’s own agency and
the identification and introjection which can occur when
one feels part of a larger group somewhat blurs the
boundaries between the Agent and Interpersonal contexts.
Under certain circumstances it may be more appropriate
to model a collection of agents as a single agent when the
cohesive forces operating between them are stronger than
the tendencies to individual action. We must therefore
take into account interpersonal and social forces relating
to the formation, maintenance, and disintegration of
groups (e.g. Messick & Liebrand, 1995) as well as those
factors which determine the level at which to model
agency.
The Topographical context – where it takes
place
Emotions occur in environments with boundaries,
avenues and obstacles. The response to a threat depends
critically on whether we are out in the open or backed up
against a wall, and such considerations may dictate
whether we fight or flee. Environments have fixed
features (walls, floors), moveable objects (tables chairs),
and are themselves dynamically shifting (temperature,
illumination, vehicles).
Additionally, although the
topographical context is a representation of the physical
environment, it is modified by the interpersonal context as
other agents in the environment constitute part of the
(ever changing) topography.
T
An arbitrary level of detail arising from the
demands of the model.
Table 6. Topographical context
Describing topography is a science in itself (Stout &
Blunt, 2000), and it is difficult to specify the level of
detail at which any given environment should be
represented. Once again, the demands of the model or
application will provide some indication of what needs to
be described.
explication, and because no values are yet specified for
the relative importance of each variable in a given
function.
The Historical context – what has gone
before and what may come after
The historical context is a record of what has happened
and the responses which have been made or attempted. It
acts as a meta-context, updating and modifying the results
of all other contexts and drawing on their outputs in order
to do this. As such, it captures the essentially dynamic
nature of emotion. More than this, however, it accounts
for long term exposure and desensitization as well as
modeling the implications of actions which have yet to be
performed.
H
Ht
Hr
Hp
a record of the agent’s response to the event
persistence of the event
repetition (whether something has or has not
worked in this situation previously)
prediction of the likelihood of possible courses
of action succeeding
Table 7. Historical context variables
The subscripted variables identified in table 7 above relate
to explicitly historical and future aspects of the event and
possible responses to this. The general Historical context
(H) is simply a trace of what has happened during the
current event.
Emotions result from the detection of environmental
change which has significance for the agent. Once an
event has been detected, it must be monitored such that
appropriate actions can be generated. The frequency with
which events are monitored and alternative responses
considered depends on a number of contexts, primarily
the Event context (large unpleasant animate things which
move quickly need to be appraised regularly), the
Historical context (even dangerous things cease to be
attended to after a time), and aspects of the Agent context
(movement and orientation, goal structures, and the
agent’s neuroticism and conscientiousness levels –
conscientious neurotics spend more of their time
monitoring their environment). The Embodied context
affects temporal granularity as it determines the upper
bounds of movement – an agent approaching or
withdrawing from an event at its maximum speed may not
need to check its progress often.
f(tg) ~ {E} {Ap(n) Ap(c) Ag(1..n)} {Bm(x,y,z)}
(2)
where f(tg) is the granularity function and other variables
are as outlined above.
Approach and withdrawal behavior
Formal specification of behavior
Here some of the outcomes of any significant event are
considered, and patterns of interaction among the
different contexts specified. The intention is to provide
the foundations for a system which will be capable of
generating realistic and individual responses to given
situations.
Location and orientation
A key response to any event involves orientation –
determining where something has happened in order that
perceptual systems may engage most efficiently. This is
largely a result of the Event context, but is affected by the
degree of activity of current goals in the Agent context,
issues of mobility and inertia as specified by the Agent
and Embodied contexts, and the constant presence of the
Historical context. Roughly,
f(lo) ~ {E} {Ap(n) Ag(…) Av Ao} {Ba(x,y,z)} {Ht Hr}
Temporal granularity
These motivations constitute a basic dimension of
behavior, and specifying their cause is an important goal.
Approach and withdrawal (or avoidance) is a
neuroscientific labeling of ethologists’ fight or flight
response, although determining whether and how an agent
will approach or withdraw from an event is far from
trivial. Pleasant things encourage approach, unpleasant
things withdrawal (Event context); extraverts tend to
approach events, introverts withdraw from them (Agent
context); we may be motivated to approach or avoid
conspecifics rather than the event (Interpersonal context);
approach motivation may actually entail moving away
from the goal, and vice versa (Topographical context);
and both behaviors change with time, familiarity and
distance (Event and Historical contexts).
f(aw) ~ {Ev} {El(x,y,z) – Al(x,y,z)} {Ap(e) Ap(o) Ag(…)}
{Bc} {I} {T}
(3)
(1)
where f(lo) is the location and orientation function, E
denotes all aspects of the Event context, and the other
variables are as outlined above. It is assumed that
suitable weighting functions are applied to all variables,
but these have been omitted both for the sake of
where the second term reflects the current distance from
the agent to the event, and I and T reflect the
Interpersonal and Topographical contexts respectively.
Expressive behavior
Expression is important to model because the act of
expressing feeds back to other mechanisms. A significant
literature points to the effects expressive feedback can
have on subsequent behavior and experienced emotion
(Duclos et. al., 1989; Matsumoto, 1987; Schiff & Rump,
1995), and as Darwin observed,
He who gives way to violent gestures will
increase his rage; he who does not control the
signs of fear will experience fear in a greater
degree; and he who remains passive when
overwhelmed with grief loses his best chance of
recovering elasticity of mind. (Darwin,
1865/1998, p. 360)
Scherer (1987, 2001) argues that expression arises
directly from the results of appraisal. Expressive acts are
adaptive responses to the ongoing evaluation of an event’s
significance, and as such should be modeled in the
Embodied context. Experimental work suggests that
despite the common sense view that expressions are
expressions of emotion, participants are equally
comfortable with behavioral labels for facial expressions
(Yik & Russell, 1999), and simulation work has shown
how adaptive responses to appraisals can be used to
generate dynamic patterns of movement which appear
emotional (Wehrle et. al., 2000, Coulson, in press).
Everyday actions can also acquire emotional meaning
when performed in certain, as yet poorly understood ways
(Chi et. al., 2000; Pollick et. al., 2001) and it seems
plausible that, for all their communicative significance,
expressions are tied into the relationship between the
demands of a situation and the agent’s response to those
demands. We can therefore model expressions as arising
directly from the eliciting event, modified by aspects of
the Agent and Interpersonal contexts.
f(ex) ~ {E} {Ag(…)}{Ap(n) Ap(e)} {I}
(4)
where f(ex) is the expression, defined by the Event and
the agent’s current goals, and modified by aspects of the
agent’s personality and the Interpersonal context.
Expressions under this model are therefore changes in the
Embodied context, and feedback effects relate to
increases or decreases in the weights of tendencies such
as approach and withdrawal.
Awareness and experience
Emotion frequently results from covert causes (we feel a
certain way but are unaware of what has caused this), and
it is becoming increasingly acceptable to talk about
emotion divorced from feeling (Damasio, 2002), and even
from consciousness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). We
should not confuse the issue of conscious awareness with
that of expression outlined above. It is possible to be in
an emotional state, and to express that emotion, yet be
unaware of feeling the emotion (until, as so often
happens, it is pointed out to us that we appear tense).
In the framework proposed by Lambie & Marcel,
first order phenomenology, which is effectively emotion
experience without second order awareness, presents the
world as it is, and feelings are not perceived as
interpretations but as incontrovertible facts. As such, this
view places emotion experience at the center of the
construction of reality, and consequently as the genesis of
behavior. Furthermore, when we think of emotions we
typically think of conscious phenomenological states, and
any formulation of emotion must account for the
circumstances under which emotions become conscious.
While there are many alternative ways in which this may
be achieved, we can start by identifying the variables
which play a role.
f(ae) ~ {E} {Ap(n) Ap(o) Ag(…)} {Bc} {Ht}
(5)
where f(ae) is the awareness/experience function, and the
last two terms relate to the current state of the agent’s
body (deviation from the norm will tend to accentuate the
experience of many emotions), and the persistence of the
event (something which continues to be present may
eventually get noticed, or equally may result in
habituation).
If emotion experience is distinct from emotion
expression, yet must still be accounted for, it would seem
that the feeling of emotion has eventually entered into this
framework. The reason this is not the case rests once
again on the issue of what constitutes emotion.
Heightened awareness, or the sudden realization that one
is feeling in a way which one might describe as angry, is
not manifest in the experience of the emotion, but in the
ways in which this experience might guide the search in
internal representations or external spaces for causes,
opportunities for gain, avenues for escape, etc.
Awareness is therefore little more than a gain control for
actions already mandated by the six contexts.
Concluding remarks
The proposed framework is broad and encompassing, and
attempts to account for emotion rather than use it as a
driving force in the genesis of behavior. It is also far
from complete, and represents only a first pass at most of
the issues raised. An attempt has been made to show how
different aspects of behavior can be defined as resulting
from interactions between the six contexts outlined above,
but the underlying dynamics of the equations need much
careful investigation and modification.
In particular, the role of the agent in terms of
goal structures and the relationship between personality
and the propensity to react to events in different ways
needs mapping out in great detail. While it has been long
accepted that emotions are private and personal, those
features of the experiencing agent which affect these
experiences, and determine the ways in which different
agents respond to the same event, have been conspicuous
by their absence.
Despite these challenges, the independent nature
of the contexts means that development can proceed in an
iterative fashion. Although events and agents are
essential to model at any level, embodiment and
topography are secondary in that they represent limits to
how the propensities arising from the agent and the event
can be instantiated. Progress on each of the contexts can
therefore proceed in parallel.
What the contexts provide is a lingua franca for
discussing emotional behavior. Rather than use the
loosely defined lexicon of emotion, or general notions of
appraisal, an attempt has been made to outline everything
which gives rise to emotion. All actions are emotional,
and specifying how actions arise requires us to describe
those factors or contexts which result in emotion. The
trick may lie in appreciating that emotions are neither that
which need explaining, nor that which does the explaining
for us.
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