Hurricane Katrina
LOGISTICS RESPONSE

Logistics Response

What Made Katrina Different?
 Magnitude
 Situational awareness
 Continuity of government operations
 Mass evacuation operations
 Security issues
 Hotels, cruise ships as shelter
 We had Hurricane “Pam”

The Katrina Dilemma
 In this disaster, we did more than we ever did before, and did it faster
 Truckloads of commodities
 Rescues
 Patients treated
 Travel trailers set up
 But we also had more unmet needs than in any disaster before

Truck Loads Units
 Water
 Ice
 MRE’s
 Other
 Total
9,200
7,400
2,375
3,660
22,635
166 million liters (still supporting)
297 million lbs
52 million meals
(cots, tarps and plastic sheeting, etc.)

 Generators up to 125KW
 Generators 126KW to 5.2MW
 Total Generators
252
80
332

Base Camps for
Response/Recovery Workers
 Total Camps
 Camps Closed
 Current Camps
40
(24,440 beds)
36
(20,690 beds)
4
(3,750 beds)

Location Number
JFO’s/AFO’s/Other Field Offices 15
Disaster Recovery Centers 57
Long Term Recovery Offices
Warehouses
Staging Areas
Total
18
9
4
103

 Problems
 Equipment
 People
 Shared processes

 We are stretched very thin on capable, experienced staff
 Most federal response team members are not primarily employed in response operations
 For example, in the critical early response, FEMA could not adequately sustain 24-hour ERT operations
 Policies inhibited a rapid buildup of federal personnel

Severe Logistics Staffing Shortfalls
• NDMS / US&R IMT support
• DMORT Task Force Log staffing never did get fixed
• JFO Logistics staffing critical from day one to now
• All entities competing for same scarce staffing resources

 The local governments nearly collapsed
 Need to prepare for Continuity of Government support in future disasters
(e.g., Civil Affairs specialists)
 “Pull” versus “push”. Stafford Act versus ICS
 Need to strengthen emergency management capability at the State and local level
 People
 Training
 Need buy-in
 Loans instead of grants would create more fiscal responsibility

 Fuel shortages
 Oxygen shortages
 Need pre-negotiated contracts
 Need to pre-stage commodities, even in the impact zone
 Lack of credit cards, warrant capability in the field

 Need to do better next time
• Coordinate, Coordinate, Coordinate!
• Reduce/eliminate duplication of effort and resources
• Training – need an accreditation process (ex: red cards)
• Remember that we fight as we train
•
Coordinate, Coordinate, Coordinate!

 Interagency Agreement with the Defense Logistics Agency
 National Stand-By Contracts
 Oxygen Supplier

Equipment Rental Services
 Material Handling Equipment

Forklifts
 Pallet Jacks

Propane
 Total Asset Visibility
– Phase I
 Base Camps
 Strategic Positioning
 Pre-Positioned Equipment (PEP) Program
 Training Courses – Joint Mobilization Center / Federal Operating Staging Area

 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) / Defense Supply Center
Philadelphia (DSCP) and FEMA
 Online Ordering from prime vendors
 Use of Electronic Catalog (ECAT) system for total catalog / total delivered price system
 DLA/DSCP Acquisition services
 Able to deliver to FEMA Logistics Centers or direct to field sites
 Purchase Cards
 FEMA Acquisitions Contracting Officers with single purchase limits to support MST/IST

Select NDMS Logistics Chiefs with purchase cards to support local purchases under
$2500
 Additional National Standby Contracts
 Oxygen Supplier
 Equipment Rental Services

 Total Asset Visibility Phase I for Hurricane Season
2006
 Phase I: the ability to inventory and track certain commodities with GPS satellite tracking devices, “trading partners management” and “warehouse management” software systems, in Regions IV and VI.
 A bridge contract for technical support to FEMA for the remainder of calendar year 2006.