THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THAILAND’S
BILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT POLICY
Pajnapa Pea msilpakulchorn ‡
A BSTRACT
This paper describes and explains do mestic socio-economic actors’
responses to the Thai government’s liberalisation agenda and bilateral
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) policy. Using the theoretical framework of
domestic politics and internationalisation, the theoretical supposition is
that a country’s exposure to the international market will change domestic
actors’ preferences and will prompt them to respond in such a way that
their preferences can be fulfilled. However, this process of adjusting to new
developments is subject to institutional factors, which will mediate between
actors’ preferences and their ability to organise or form coalitions to
further their agenda. This in turn will determine the pattern of do mestic
political coalitions or align ments that will emerge in response to the
challenge of liberalisation. Findings from Thai experiences both validate
and expose limitations to theories of do mestic trade politics as well as
suggesting new forces and other factors that have to be accounted for, so
that domestic politics of trade in the age of globalisation can be better
understood. It concludes that do mestic trade policy is intricately linked
with the politics of globalisation. Far-reaching impacts of trade
liberalisation in the current international context have resulted in a
political cleavage between supporters of free trade policy, arguing in
terms of econo mic interests and those opposing the policies, who have
based their preferences on the social impacts of trade policy. This political
‡
M.Sc. (International Public Policy), School of Public Policy, University College
London. Contact with questions/comments: pajnapap@yahoo.com.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW , vol. 2, no. 1 (May 2006): 74-120.
[ ISSN 1748-5207]
© 2006 by The School of Public Policy, University College London, London, United Kingdom. All rights
reserved.
64
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
65
divide is fundamental and structural both in terms of the international
setting as well as the structure of national politics and the economy.
1.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant developments in the international trade
landscape in Asia Pacific since 1998, is the proliferation of bilateral
preferential trading agreements, or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 1
Thailand is one of the countries that has been actively pursuing trade
liberalisation through these bilateral trade agreements. FTA policy in
Thailand is gaining attention for its pace, numbers, content and the
implications for the country’s international strategy, as well as its impact
on the domestic sphere.
One of the central concerns in studies of international political
economy is the interaction between international and domestic forces. On
the issue of trade, what goes on in the domestic sphere is intricately linked
with the feasibility of liberalisation in the international trading regime.2
From the opposite direction, a country’s response to international
developments is of crucial importance on the domestic political stage. In
Thailand, the interface between international and domestic forces comes
into full play and turns the FTA policy into a highly controversial issue
garnering widespread interest and provoking intense political debate.
The politicised nature of trade policy is not surprising due to its
redistributive nature. Although economic theory promises welfare gain for
the whole country, gains to some sectors always come at the expense of
others and losers are rarely compensated.3 Without adequate and fair
measures to assist losers, free trade effort by a government can result in
mass protests from disadvantaged groups lacking resources to relocate to
new industries or change occupations. Moreover, as trade liberalisation
today is part of broader and deeper globalisation and anti-globalisation
1
Christopher M. Dent, “The New Economic Bilateralism and Southeast Asia:
Region-Convergent or Region-Divergent?” Institute of Political and Economic
Governance (IPEG) Papers in Global Political Economy, No. 7 (April 2004); John
Ravenhill, “The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific, ”Third W orld Quarterly vol. 24,
no. 2 (2003): 299-317 and P.J. Lloyd, “New Regionalism and New Bilateralism in the
Asia-Pacific,” Visiting Researchers Series No. 3, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
(2002).
2
Dani Rodrik, “Feasible Globalizations,” John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University (2002) via http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Feasglob.pdf.
3
In economic theory, free trade is expected to create positive net welfare gains in the
country by allowing market forces to encourage the shift of scarce resources from
unproductive activities towards more productive ones. Gains will accrue both to
consumers and those in the already productive sectors. Losers are producers in
unproductive sectors that have been previously shielded from market forces.
66
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
processes, political complications of any government’s free trade policy
are guaranteed.
In the international arena, new trends and developments such as the
entrance of new actors, like NGOs in WTO negotiations, provide a
complex setting for domestic events. In addition, the aggressive agenda of
‘deep’ integration of the current global trading policy 4 points to a need in
understanding the new dynamics of trade politics, which extend into nontraditional space. Participation from the civil society sector generates
debate about the prospect of global governance and the emergence of a
global civil society and also challenges the political viability of economic
integration policy within a country. Concerns for negative consequences
of deeper economic liberalisation and unfair global economic governance
will have political repercussions not only on the global scene but also on
the domestic front.
The enthusiasms and intensities of the politics surrounding FTA
policy provide an interesting framework to question the dynamic and
conflicting forces in Thailand’s current international trade policy.
Moreover, in a democratic society, how a government responds to
international imperatives through appropriately engineered foreign
economic policy, which can satisfy the majority of its constituency, can
have a definitive effect on government viability. Discerning the social,
political and economic forces behind FTAs could give insights into how
domestic societal actors interact with international forces and how policy
makers can pursue FTA with the domestic political support necessary for
such an international undertaking to be successful.
2.
B ACKGROUND
In order to understand the political forces behind Thai government’s
FTA policy, this paper aims to: 1) examine and describe the domestic
politics of free trade agreement policy in Thailand; and 2) explain why
such a pattern of domestic politics emerges.
Domestic politics of trade have many facets and areas of focus.
Oatley 5 distinguishes two approaches to domestic politics of trade: the
‘state-centred approach’ and ‘society-centred approach’. The focus of
this paper is on the society-centered approach, which looks at the
preferences and political responses of societal actors or interest groups.
Therefore, the questions this paper addresses are: how do domestic
interest groups respond to the challenge of trade liberalisation through the
government’s FTA policy and what is the pattern of interest group
4
Rodrik, “Feasible Globalization”, 2.
Thomas Oatley, International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the
Global Economy (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2004).
5
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
67
constellation? How do supporting or opposing coalitions emerge and in
what patterns? And why such patterns of political cleavage emerge in
response to the liberalisation challenge.
The analysis will be explanatory but will also contain descriptive
elements. It will rely on both primary and secondary data. The primary
data include governmental documents, policy papers or position papers
from private sector organisations, both economic and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), newspaper reports etc. The secondary data will be
drawn from journal articles, academic papers, magazine articles, newspaper
articles etc. The scope of this study is not a single FTA but overall FTA
policy. However, it will mainly focus on and draw from the two most
important FTAs, which are the Thailand-US FTA and the Thailand-Japan
FTA.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section (three) discusses
the existing literature on domestic politics and its limitations in remaining
relevant to a new phenomena seen in trade politics. Also in this section,
the theoretical framework that will be used to analyse empirical evidence
will be set out. Section four will provide a basic background on Thailand’s
political economy and Thailand’s FTA policy. Section five will present
empirical evidence of the politics surrounding Thai FTA policy. Section
six will analyse how theories can be used to explain the empirical evidence.
The last section (seven) will then summarise the findings and arguments as
well as drawing some implications for further research and for
policymakers.
3.
EXISTING LITERATURE
Literature on the domestic politics of international trade policy
attempts to identify how domestic interests and institutions shape the
domestic politics of a nation’s international trade policy. The literature
can be categorised into five categories and will be discussed accordingly.
Economic Approaches to Trade Policy Preferences
Early literature, based on economic models, discusses how exposure to
trade shapes the interests and trade policy preferences of economic actors
through changes in incomes. The simple economic welfare analysis
proposes that trade involves transfer of income from previously protected
producers to consumers and it should give rise to a political contest
between producers and consumers. For a more sophisticated analysis, two
economic models are used to show the distributional consequences of trade
and how different societal groups derive trade policy preferences.
68
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
The first model is the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (factor income
model), based on the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model,6 which concludes that
returns to the owners of abundant resources will rise absolutely and
disproportionately from trade. The logic is that their factors will be used
intensively in the production of goods whose prices will rise from
increasing exports. The returns to owners of scarce resources will fall
absolutely and proportionately, since their factors will be used intensively
in the production of goods whose prices will fall from increasing imports.
Hence, a political cleavage will form between owners of abundant vs. scare
factors, or class conflict will foment between labour and capital regardless
of industry. 7
The second model is the Ricardo-Viner model (or Specific Factor
Model), which predicts sectoral conflict. Because factors cannot be
smoothly reallocated in response to trade (factor immobility
assumption), 8 return to all factors in an industry will be affected by
openness in the same way.9 Therefore, the political cleavage will be
aligned along the boundary between the export-oriented or competitive
sector (free traders) and import-oriented or uncompetitive sectors
(protectionists).
6
The Heckscher-Ohlin model begins with the assumption that factor endowment or
factor proportion will determine a country’s pattern of comparative advantage. A country
will export products that employ its abundant resource relatively intensively in
production while importing products that employ its scare resources relatively
intensively.
7
Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding International Economic
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 206-207; Jeffrey A. Frieden, and
Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of International Economy on National Policies: An
Analytical Overview” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane, and Helen V. Milner, 37 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Oatley, 89; Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic
Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 7.
8
This assumption of factor immobility is set out to contest the assumption of perfect
factor mobility in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The Ricardo-Viner model argues that, in
reality, factors are not mobile and once they are employed in a certain industry, they are
specific to that industry so that when an industry is in decline, they cannot, in the short
run, move to a more profitable industry.
9
Oatley, 91-92; Frieden and Rogowski, 38; James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, ‘The
Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and
Domestic Political Institutions’ in International Political Economy: Perspective on
Global Power and Wealth (4 th ed), ed. Jeffry A. Frieden, and David A. Lake, 327 (Boston:
Routledge, 2000).
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
69
Table 1. Two Models of Interest Group Competition over Trade
Policy
The Factor Model
(Heckscher-Ohlin)
The Principal Actors
How Mobile are
Factors of Production?
Winners and Losers
from Trade
Liberalisation
Types of Political
Cleavages
Factors of Production
or Classes
Perfectly Mobile
Across Sectors of the
Economy
Winners: Abundant
Factor
- Capital in
advanced
economies
- Labour in
developing
economies
Losers: Scarce Factor
- Labour in
advanced
economies
- Capital in
developing
economies
Class Cleavages
Advanced Economies:
Protectionist Labour
vs. Liberalising Capital
Developing
Economies:
Protectionist Capital
vs. Liberalising Labour
Source: Adapted from Oatley, 93.
The Specific Factors
Model
(Ricardo-Viner’model)
Industries or Sectors
Immobile Across
Sectors of the
Economy
Winner:
Labour and Capital
Employed in Exportoriented Industries
Loser:
Labour and Capital
Employed in Importcompeting Sectors
Sectoral Cleavages
Protectionist ImportCompeting Industries
vs. Liberalising
Export-Oriented
Industries
Complex Preference Formation and Roles of Institutions
Economic approaches provide an insightful account of political
cleavages by looking at economic benefits as a basis for predicting
different economic groups’ preferences for trade. However, it cannot
70
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
account for more complex patterns of interest configuration or preference
formation. Individuals can belong to several economic and social groups at
the same time and do not form their preferences so straightforwardly. For
example, Oatley 10 discusses how the secondary impact from trade on wider
social and economic groups can influence trade policy preference, 11 and
Jayasuriya12 notes how side payments can offset losers’ negative
preferences.13
Moreover, it has been suggested that focusing on preferences alone is
not sufficient. The way preferences are aggregated also matters in deciding
which preferences can be materialised and how well they will be
represented. The supply side of coalition formation will determine how
preferences in trade policy will be transmitted through political systems
and institutional settings. Two main factors in this transmission process
are, firstly, the problem of collective action and, secondly, the role of
political institutions.14
The collective action problem refers to “the difficulty of mobilising
or organising resources in order to secure a favourable political decision”. 15
If a collective action problem exists, coalitions based on preferences alone
may not be formed. The well-known example of the collective action
problem is how a small number of producers can have strong political
weight to protect their narrow but intense interests compared to a large
number of consumers who stand to gain from trade, but cannot organise
and mobilise support for free trade. Goldstein and Martin 16 observe that
the concentrated benefits of trade barriers and their diffuse costs
contribute to the problem of mobilising pro-free-trade coalitions. Alt and
Gilligan 17 conclude that collective action problem makes it more likely for
sectoral conflict (the Ricardo-Viner model) to form rather than the class
conflict predicted by Stolper-Samuelson model.18
10
Oatley, 127-128
Ibid.
12
Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Embedded Mercantilism and Open Regionalism: the Crisis
of Regional Political Project’.Third World Quarterly vol. 24, no. 2 (2003): 346
13
Jayasuriya (2003), 346 argues that because interests from liberalization will be
accrued to the tradable sector of the economy, the tradable sector can offset political
opposition from losers in non-tradable sectors by giving them side payments and this
pattern of compensation was evident in the Southeast Asian politics of liberalization.
14
Oatley, 94-99; Frieden and Rogowski; Alt and Gilligan, 27.
15
Alt and Gilligan, 336.
16
Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, ‘Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note’, International Organization vol. 54, no. 3
(2000): 609.
17
Alt and Gilligan.
18
This is because factor mobility has direct effects on the possibility of collective
action. Mobility disperses the benefits of trade policy across owners of a particular factor.
This leads to the problem of non-excludability and free-riding because the benefits of
11
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
71
Institutional factors also matter in trade politics because they allow
actors to resist or promote change by facilitating the organisation of
groups to advance their policy preferences. Institutions are adopted as an
intervening variable in the study of internationalisation and domestic
politics in the volume edited by Keohane and Milner. 19
Globalisation: New Actors and New Issues in Trade Politics
In the globalisation context, the landscape of trade politics has
transformed, thus rendering analyses focusing on economic issues/actors
alone as being too limited. Hocking20 demonstrates the changing nature of
trade politics due to the emergence of new issues (e.g. the environment,
labour, intellectual property, national sovereignty etc.) and new actors,
specifically NGOs, whose concerns “now firmly impinge on the trade
politics agenda”. 21 This transformation of trade politics where actors are
driven not by economic calculation but by social and political values has
not yet received much attention in the study of the domestic politics of
trade, but it is emerging elsewhere. Solingen 22 uses a coalitional perspective
to explain international behaviour at the regional level of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and points out that actors forming
the coalitions can come from a diverse range of economic and social
groups. This is because “internationalisation (or economic liberalisation)
does not merely pose threats to material interests, but also to cultures,
identities and values”.23
The growing importance of NGOs in trade politics is also gaining
more attention. The debate on the legitimacy of the WTO and the
pattern of participation by NGOs in the WTO negotiating process also
exemplifies this change at the global level. 24
lobbying can easily be enjoyed by non-participants. But if a factor is immobile, the
benefits of lobbying will accrue only to specific factors employed in that particular
industry. See Alt and Gilligan, 336-337.
19
Robert O Keohane,. and Helen V. Milner, ‘Internationalization and Domestic
Politics: An Introduction’ in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O.
Keohane, and Helen V. Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
20
Brian Hocking, ‘Trade Politics: Environments, Agendas and Processes’ in, Trade
Politics: International, Domestic and Regional Perspectives, ed. Brian Hocking and
Steven McGuire, (London: Routledge, 1999).
21
Hocking, 2.
22
Etel Solingen, ‘ASEAN, Quo Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and Regional
Cooperation’ Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 21, no. 1 (1999): pp30-53.
23
Ibid, 32.
24
see for example: Daniel C Esty, ‘The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy
Crisis’ World Trade Review vol. 1, no. 1 (2002): 7-22; David Henderson, ‘WTO 2002:
Imaginary Crisis, Real Problems’ World Trade Review vol. 1, no. 3 (2002): pp277-296;
Andrew H. Charlton and Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Common Values for the Development Round’
72
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
In parallel with new actors, new issues25 in the international trade
agenda have also contributed to the emergence of new forces in trade
politics.26 The main characteristic of these new issues is that they will
reach more deeply into national institutional arrangements and
communities than older border measures like tariffs implying large
political repercussions.27 As trade politics are rooted in the growing
integration of the global economy, 28 it is necessary to consider the sources
of the preferences of economic and social actors, not just from changing
relative prices due to exposure to trade, but also from the content and
rules of the international economic order that will affect national
regulatory regimes, national economic and social practices, as well as
cultures and values.
Historical and Regional/Country-Specific Perspectives
The treatment of preferences and institutions can be analytically
rigorous as a theoretical framework, but it should be complemented by the
political economy literature, which looks at how particular patterns of
economic interests and institutions affect the politics of trade policy in
specific national settings. In relation to the case of Thailand, literature on
the domestic politics of economic liberalisation in Southeast Asia paint a
distinctive picture of the politics of liberalisation in the region because of
its unique combination of economic interests, the political influence of
interest groups, and political systems. 29 Traditionally, studies usually
assume a unitary character of Southeast Asian states in carrying out
(2004). Via
http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/website/Common_Values_for_
the_Development_Round.htm; Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political
Economy of the World Trading System: WTO and Beyond (2 nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 69-72.
25
The new trade agenda includes the three new issues included in the Uruguay
Round which are: intellectual Property Rights (the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights -TRIPS); investment (the agreement on Trade-related
Investment Measures – TRIMS); and services (the General Agreement on Trade in Services
- GATS) as well as emerging issues such as environmental and labour standards, human
rights, competition policy etc.
26
Hocking, 8; Gilpin, 2255-231; Dani Rodrik, “Has Globalization Gone Too Far?”
(Washington D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1997), 5.
27
Hocking, 8; Rodrik, “Feasible Globalization?” and Rodrik, “ Has Globalization
Gone Too Far?”
28
Rodrik, “Feasible Globalization?”; Hocking.
29
See for example Jayasuriya; Alasdair Bowie and Danny Unger, The Politics of
Open Economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
73
government-led trade policies30 and are oriented toward the state-centred
approach to trade policy rather than the society-centred approach which
assumes high level of economic pluralism. However, recent studies suggest
that there is a significant political divide in liberalisation policy and the
competing forces of anti-liberalisation and pro-liberalisation are likely to
have a significant impact on theses countries’ liberalisation agendas in the
future. 31
Domestic Politics of Bilateral Trade Liberalisation
Literature on the domestic politics of trade discussed above is usually
discussed generally in terms of ‘free trade’ versus ‘protection’. However,
on many occasions, trade policy is specific and might vary in terms of the
content, pattern and level of economic liberalisation that could have a
distinctive impact on domestic interests and subsequent political
alignment. Studies identify different patterns of political responses specific
to bilateral free trade agreements. Ravenhill32 argues that by allowing for
liberalisation to be completed separately, sector by sector, a bilateral free
trade agreement is expected to gain business support more easily because it
inflicts minimal pain on uncompetitive sectors while allowing those
industries, which are internationally competitive, to pursue their interests
with negotiating partners. Baldwin 33 believes that preferential trading
arrangements will gain domestic support from exporters trying to alleviate
the discriminatory effects of such policies in foreign markets. Grossman
and Helpman 34 identify the political conditions necessary for FTAs to be
politically viable. These conditions are: when a negotiated deal can
generate substantial welfare gains for the average voter and adversely
affected groups fail to mobilise; or when agreement can create gains for
exporters in excess of the losses to be suffered by import-competing
groups plus the welfare harm to the average voter. In addition, if some
industries can be excluded from an FTA, the prospects of an agreement
will improve.
By looking at the case of Thailand, where the challenges are evident,
this paper aims to contribute to an understanding of the new challenges in
the politics of economic liberalisation present in the climate of
globalisation. It will do this by critically examining the utility of the
existing approaches, as well as exploring and furthering the understanding
30
Ravenhill, 303.
Ibid. 303.
32
Ibid. 303, 307.
33
Baldwin in Ravenhill, 313.
34
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “The Politics of Free Trade
Agreements,” The American Economic Review, vol. 85, no. 4 (1995): 667-690.
31
74
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
of domestic politics in areas that are still in their early development.
Selecting Thailand as a case study should contribute to a better
understanding of the domestic politics of trade in developing countries.
This will depart from the detailed discussions in the existing literature,
which have focused mainly on developed countries.
4.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above, the theoretical framework used here will be the
society-centred approach to trade policy. This approach is based on the
assumption that policy formation corresponds to a model of pluralistic
government, where social forces exert their influence during the policy
process.35 The theoretical foundation of this approach is based on
Gourevitch 36 who argues that there are international sources of domestic
politics37 and that the effects of the international system on domestic
politics can result in a range of outcomes, one of which involves coalition
patterns that incorporate social forces and the political relationships
among these coalitions. This effect is important because there is conflict
among powerful groups themselves. Gourevitch 38 observes that the need to
secure support for policy will always affect its final content. There is,
thus, a need for coalitional analysis to investigate the content of group
interests and the efforts to form alliances among them. 39
To conduct this analysis, the theoretical framework used in this paper
is based loosely on the analytical framework of internationalisation and
domestic politics advanced by Frieden and Rogowski and Garrett and
Lange40 . This begins the analysis of domestic politics of
internationalisation by looking at: 1) how internationalisation affects the
policy preferences of domestic actors and 2) how preferences are
aggregated or filtered through a political system to form political
coalitions so that political cleavages can be observed.
35
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of
Domestic Politics,” International Organization vol. 32, no. 4 (1978): 902.
36
Ibid.
37
Gourevitch attempts to forge a new conceptual linkage between domestic and
international politics beyond the traditional focus on either: 1) using the international
system to explain domestic politics or 2) using domestic politics to explain the
international system. He argues instead that the international system is not only a
consequence of domestic politics but also a cause of them.
38
Ibid, 903.
39
Ibid, 907.
40
Frieden and Rogowski; Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, “Internationalization,
Institutions, and Political Change” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed.
Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
75
Trade Policy Preferences
The theoretical framework begins with the linkage between FTA
policy, and the potential effects of economic liberalisation, which are the
source of actors’ trade policy preferences. In the case of Thailand, as in
most developing economies, the economy is characterised by relative
abundance of labour and a relative scarcity of capital. According to the
Heckscher-Ohlin model/Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 41 free trade policy in
Thailand should enable labour to reap most benefits from expanding trade
opportunities and they should rally to support FTA policy while business
or capitalists will lobby against the policy. Alternatively, according to
Ricardo-Viner model,42 FTA policy should lead to politics characterised by
export-oriented sectors supporting FTA policy while the voice of
opposition will come from import-competing sectors.
Institutional Roles
Understanding social responses by concentrating on preferences alone
rests on the implicit assumption of economic pluralism where
constellations of economic preferences will be automatically reflected and
represented in the national political arena. 43 Trade policy preferences, like
other policy preferences, are not always automatically transformed into
political demands44 and not all groups that are potentially affected by
trade will lobby the government to advance their preferences. Because
“the ability of actors sharing common interests to overcome collective
action problem is critical to their effective political capacity, and
institutions can play important roles in facilitating collective action”, 45
institutional analysis is used here to examine how institutional settings can
mediate between preferences and political activities in response to FTAs.
Institutions act as a mediating factor because they can insert a structural
effect on the process of coalition formation and the pattern of political
cleavages by “rewarding or punishing specific groups, interests, visions and
persons”,46 and “affecting the extent to which political actors can impose
its views and the possibility of realising certain policies”.47
The incorporation of the role of institutions will extend mostly to
‘socio-economic institutions’ because they are more relevant to the study
of the role of interest groups which are the unit of analysis here, while
41
Frieden and Rogowski, 38.
Ibid.
43
Garrett and Lange, 49.
44
Oatley, 94.
45
Frieden and Rogowski quoted in Garrett and Lange, 53.
46
Gourevitch, 904.
47
Ibid.
42
76
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
formal political institutions (e.g. the electoral system) will be attended to
only when it can contribute answers.
While Garrett and Lange48 examine the extent to which institutions
mediate the preferences of actors and policy outco mes, due to the scope of
this study the theoretical framework adopted here will focus on the role of
institutions as structural factors that mediate between preferences of actors
and the formation of political coalitions. That is, how institutions can
help to explain the pattern of political coalitions surrounding the politics
of FTA policy and not the influence groups have on the final negotiation
of FTA.
5.
THAILAND ’S POLITICAL ECONOMY: A H ISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Economic Transformation
Thailand’s economic development is considered a success story by
international standards. The Thai economic structure has been
transformed from a traditional agrarian-based economy to an
internationally-oriented industrialised economy in the space of fifty
years.49 Thailand’s modern political economy and industrialisation went
through two broad phases; import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and
export-oriented industrialisation (EOI).
ISI in Thailand began in the 1950s. Before this, Thailand’s economy
and its relationship with the international economy revolved around
agricultural commodity exports such as rice. Under an authoritarian
political system and with support from the US and the World Bank, 50 the
military government attempted to legitimise its rule through economic
growth by means of economic development led by the private sector and
industrialisation. 51 Following this, the ISI regime, composed of investment
incentives to foreign and domestic investors and protective barriers,52 was
initiated. During this period, manufacturing’s contribution to GDP rose
significantly. 53
Although the ISI regime was successful in setting Thailand on the path
of industrialisation, its capacity to drive long-term growth became less
48
Garrett and Lange.
Thailand is the world’s 23rd largest exporter and exports and imports account for
about half of the country’s GDP. In 2003, Thailand’s exports hit US$80.23 billion
(Bt3.33 trillion).
50
Kewin Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis” in
Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asia Crisis, ed. Richard Robinson, Mark Beeson,
Kanishka Jayasuriya and Hyuk-Rae Kim, 196 (London: Routledge, 2000).
51
Danny Unger, Building Social Capital in Thailand: Fibres, Finance, and
Infrastructure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61.
52
Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis”, 197.
53
Ibid.
49
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
77
certain by the 1970s.54 Factors such as a domestic economic slowdown,
deteriorating profitability, the exhaustion of domestic demand and
fluctuating prices of agricultural commodity exports pushed bankers,
businessmen and technocrats from the state’s planning and development
agencies to pressure the government to replace ISI with EOI. 55 However,
forces resisting liberalisation remained among protected industries and in
the Ministry of Finance, which feared a diminished ability to collect state
revenue. It was not until the 1980s that a major shift toward EOI was
made possible by series of external shocks due to high energy prices and
deteriorating prices for commodity exports. The subsequent global
recession exposed the country’s accumulated weaknesses further and
rendered the economy highly vulnerable to external shocks. Business
attempted to restore profitability by expanding export capacities56 and
kept pressing the government for more support for exports. 57 In parallel
with these developments, the devaluation of the Thai baht in 1984 and
appreciation of the Japanese yen in 1985 meant that Thai goods became
more competitive in the world market. These events triggered a major
reorientation of the Thai economy and by the mid 1980s the government
became fully committed to an EOI strategy in the pursuit of economic
reform. 58
The shift toward EOI paved way for the future boom years in the
period from 1985 until the 1997 crisis.59 Besides economic growth, there
are two real implications of the boom years. The first is the structural
transformation of the economy, which mainstreamed the manufacturing
and service sectors while the agricultural sector became marginalised60 .
The second is the deeper integration of the Thai economy in the
international economy. Moreover, a structural shift of the economy
resulted in a shift in the significance of exports in contributing to
economic growth and changing the pattern of export performance.
54
Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis”, 197;
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (2n Ed.) (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 2002), 147-156.
55
Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics,” 147, 154.
56
Unger, 67.
57
Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics,” 154.
58
Ibid.
59
The rate of real GDP growth in Thailand surged to double-digits in 1988 and this
was maintained until 1990. In the period 1987-1995, the Thai economy never experienced
real GDP growth of less than eight percent. In 1997, Thailand was the first country affected
by the Asian Financial crisis to devalue its currency. The crisis led the country into a
distressing economic recession.
60
In 1960, agriculture accounted for around 40 percent of GDP as well as being the
major contributor to exports and employment. With rapid industrialisation, manufactured
exports grew from 1 percent of total exports in 1960 to 80 percent by the mid 1990s (see
Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalist Development and the State,” 198).
78
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Thailand’s comparative advantage in early industrialisation lay in
agricultural exports and labour-intensive industrial goods such as textiles
and garments. 61 As industrial development matures, Thailand has begun to
develop competitiveness in medium-high-technology goods such as
computer accessories, electronic parts and products, and motor vehicle
parts.62 In 2004, the share of manufacturing in export was 85.8 percent
while the share of agricultural exports was 10.7 percent. Thailand’s top
export products are electrical machinery, motor vehicles, food-processing
products and garments and textiles.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was one of the engines of the boom
and one of the foundations of the structural transformation of the
economy as appreciation of the yen brought in massive flows of Japanese
FDI. 63 This was especially directed towards the auto, electronics and
electrical industries. FDI continues to be an important source of growth,
employment, technological transfer and economic upgrading.64 Japanese
investors are the largest investors in the Thai economy followed by the
United States with most of the investment concentrated in manufacturing
and service sectors. International trade, exports and FDI, therefore, are
the pillars that define the country’s international economic strategy.
Political and Social Transformation
Economic transformation also brought about a remarkable socioeconomic transformation. Thailand’s capitalist transformation gave rise
to a domestic capitalist class, which mostly had roots in the banking
sector, but continued to expand and diversify into other sectors.65 New
waves of the capitalist classes from the media, communications,
electronics, manufacturing, retailing, and finance and securities began to
emerge and gain more influence in the economy. 66 Although the Thai
economy is market-driven and highly internationalised, the distinctive
feature of it is still one of strong clientelistic links between business and
61
The Economist, “Country Briefings: Thailand,” www.economist.com (accessed
July, 2005).
62
Ibid.; Richard F. Doner and Ansil Ramsay, “The Challenges of Economic
Upgrading in Liberalizing Thailand” in States in the Global Economy: Bringing
Domestic Institutions Back In, ed. Linda Weiss, 127 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003). By 1995, the export value of medium-high-technology products was 40
percent greater than labour-intensive goods (Chalongphob, 7 in Doner and Ramsay, “The
Challenge of Economic Upgrading in Liberalising Thailand,” 127).
63
Pongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics,” 159.
64
At the end of 2003, the cumulative level of FDI in Thailand was around $31
billion.
65
Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis,” 199.
66
Ibid.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
79
politics.67 Macintyre 68 relates the clienteslistic feature of the Thai
political economy (as with other countries in Southeast Asia) to the fact
that the business community is made up of people of Chinese descent who,
due to indigenous resentment, seek to avoid high profile collective
political action and rely instead on a more covert form of political
representation provided by clientelism. The replacement of the
authoritarian regime by electoral politics also forged new alliances between
business and elected politicians.69 Nevertheless, political democratisation
has also created political space for a diverse range of social groups to take
more active roles in national politics. Organised groups among business
people were established to participate more actively in economic policymaking.70 Other social groups mobilising on issues such as community and
village livelihoods, rural movement, environmental protection, natural
resource management, alternative development, gender etc., have
increasingly penetrated and provided counterbalancing forces to
mainstream politics. These social movements represented the emergence
of civil society, which has become a significant social force in
contemporary politics in Thailand.71
6.
C HALLENGES OF TRADE/ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION: THAILAND ’S
FTA POLICY
In order to conceptualise the linkage between FTA policy and the
political responses from social groups, this section will discuss some key
features of Thailand’s FTA policy and its implications for economic and
trade liberalisation.
Since 2003, the government of Thailand under the leadership of
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, has adopted bilateral FTAs as one of
the centrepieces of Thai international economic policy and significant
progress has been made with five agreements signed and five more are
under negotiation (see table 2).
67
Andrew MacIntyre, “Business, Government and Development: Northeast and
Southeast Asian Comparisons” in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, ed.
Andrew MacIntyre (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1994); Pongpaichit and Baker,
“Thailand: Economy and Politics.”
68
Macintyre.
69
Hewison, “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis,” 200.
70
Macintyre.
71
Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics,” 385-413; Unger.
80
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Table 2. Thailand’s Free Trade Agreem ents
Thailand’s Free Trade Agreements as of June, 2005
Agreements Signed
China, India, Bahrain, Australia and New
Zealand
Agreements Under
US, Japan, Peru, BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India,
Negotiations
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Phutan, Nepal and
Thailand), and the EFTA (the European Free
Trade Association which includes Switzerland,
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein)
Source: Thai Ministry of Commerce
The Thai government’s FTA policy is often justified by three main
reasons:
• FTAs can accelerate the process of trade liberalisation, given the slow
progress of the WTO. Because FTAs are negotiated between two
partners, it can provide flexibility as well as advancing liberalisation in
the sector of strong interest for the country. 72
• FTA policy is vital in maintaining the competitiveness of Thai
exports in existing markets (US, Japan and ASEAN) and potential
markets (China, India and etc.).
• FTA policy is instrumental in attracting FDI and placing Thailand as a
regional trade and investment hub.73
While the government usually validates FTA policy on these grounds,
political motives behind FTAs are commonly recognised, especially in the
case of the Thailand-US FTA. This is of strategic significance for both
countries given that Thailand is a key military ally with the US74 and the
relationship with the US remains strategic in Thailand’s security
equation. 75
Traditional features of free trade agreements are the reduction and
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers between two negotiating
72
Thaksin Shinawatra (in Thai), “Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities for
Business,” Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, February 19th, 2004 at
the Federation of Thai Industries’ Seminar on Free Trade Agreements, UNESCAP (2004);
Dent, 5.
73
Shinawatra; Fumio Nagai, “Thailand’s Trade Policy: WTO plus FTA?” IDE
APEC Study Centre, Working Paper Series 01/02-No.6, APEC Study Centre, Institute of
Developing Economies (2002), 12.
74
Thailand provided support on the US war on terrorism and also sent troops to Iraq.
75
Richard E. Feinberg, “The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Agreements,” Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University
of California, Sandiego (2003); USTR (United States Trade Representative), ‘Letter to
House of Representatives on Intent to Negotiate FTA with Thailand’, USTR (2004) at
www.ustr.gov and USTR (United States Trade Representative), “ Letter to Senate on Intent
to Negotiate FTA with Thailand,” USTR (2004) at www.ustr.gov.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
81
partners and the major challenge it will bring to the domestic economy in
the freer flow of goods and changes in relative prices between domestic
and foreign goods. However, the current wave of ‘new age FTAs’ will take
the form of comprehensive agreements 76 expanding the scope of trade
agreements beyond trade in goods to include new trade issues such as
intellectual property rights, service liberalisation, investment,
environment and labour issues etc., and sometimes by committing
negotiating partners beyond the existing WTO regime (or being ‘WTOplus’). For comprehensive agreements, the implications of economic
liberalisation include possible changes in the domestic regulatory regime.
For example, if Thailand agrees to the US demand for more stringent
protection of intellectual property, Thailand will have to upgrade its
domestic intellectual property laws to the US standard. Overall, it can be
said that the challenge generated by FTA policy is the challenge of
wholesale economic liberalisation, change in domestic commercial
practices and deepening economic integration within the international
economy.
Although Thailand is pursuing many FTAs simultaneously, the FTAs
that would have major impacts on the country and have commanded
intense public interests are the Thailand-Japan FTA and the Thailand-US
FTA and they will be discussed briefly here.
The Thailand-Japan FTA is classified as a partnership agreement with
negotiations covering a wide range of issues from trade barrier reduction,
investment, and services as well as other areas of economic cooperation
including industrial development. 77 The main interest for Thailand is the
opening up of Japan’s highly protected agricultural sectors, e.g. rice,
chicken, sugar and fisheries,78 while Japan’s main aim is getting market
access to the Thai industrial sector, particularly the electrical, auto and
steel sectors. Thus, the major domestic impact from the Thailand-Japan
FTA is trade liberalisation in Thailand’s industrial sector.
The Thailand-US FTA is a comprehensive agreement meaning that
the agreement will specify timing and conditionalities, which are binding
for each party. 79 The main goals of the agreement identified by the United
States Trade Representatives (USTR) include open market access for US
76
J.R. Ponciano Intal, “Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Business,”
Paper prepared for ‘Business for Development’ Conference hosted by Department of Trade
and International Trade Center, 21-22 October, 2004, Philippine Trade Training Center,
Manila (2004).
77
Narongchai Akrasanee, “The FTA Architecture of Thailand,” Presentation at
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) Trade Forum Meeting 22 nd-25 th May, 2005,
Jeju Island, Korea; Narongchai Akrasanee is the Chairman of the government’s FTA
Monitoring Committee.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
82
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
agricultural producers, the protection of intellectual property rights and
upgrading Thai labour and environmental standards.80 Other issues
normally included by the United States in FTAs with other countries, such
as government procurement, competition policy, service, investment, and
custom procedures are likely to be negotiated as well. The Thailand-US
FTA is bound to be legalistic in nature as much of the US agenda, from
intellectual property rights to government procurement, would require
negotiating partners to make changes to domestic law.
Empirical Evidence: the Domestic Politics of Thailand’s FTA Policy
Examining the social and political responses to the challenge of
economic liberalisation presented by FTA policy in Thailand, there are
two main political coalitions that have emerged: an economic coalition
and a social/political coalition. Each will be discussed in turn.
7.
THE ECONOMIC COALITION
The main economic actors in Thailand’s economic policy-making are
the three main business associations consisting of the Thai Chamber of
Commerce (TCC), the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) and the
Bankers’ Association. However because financial liberalisation is beyond
the scope of this study, the opinions of the Banker’s Association, which
mostly concern the financial sector, will not be presented here. Since the
government established and incorporated these three institutions into a
regular government-business consultative system in the 1980s, these
associations have remained the voice of the business community in
national policymaking whose demands and opinions are heard by the
government, and feature prominently in the press.81
Generally, business has shown support for the reasoning behind FTAs
in line with the government. This concentrates on the benefits to Thai
exports, complementing the slow WTO process and maintaining the
competitiveness of Thai products in the world market. In a speech, the
Chairman of the FTI clearly stated that “the private sector understands
and supports the government’s move (i.e. FTA policy) to maintain Thai
competitiveness and ensure advantage over competitors for Thai products
80
USTR, “Letter to the House of Representatives on Intent to Negotiate FTA with
Thailand” and USTR, “Letter to Senate on Intent to Negotiate FTA with Thailand.”
81
Anek Laothamatas, “From Clientelism to Partnership: Business-Government
Relations in Thailand” in Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, ed. Andrew
MacIntyre (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1994); Medhi Krongkaew, “The
Economics of Institutional Change: Making Economic Policy in Thailand” in Institutions
and Economic Change in Southeast Asia: the Context of Development from the 1960s to
the 1990s, ed. Colin Barlow and Edward Elgar (UK: Cheltenham, 1999).
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
83
in key markets”.82 Moreover, he also pointed out the merits of
comprehensive FTAs, stating that “many FTAs that Thailand is
negotiating will be comprehensive and this will be a good starting point to
create and deepen mutually beneficial relationships between Thailand and
its trading partners”.83 The leading figure in the TCC showed similar
support commenting that “Dr. Somkid (Deputy Prime Minister in charge
of FTA policy) has assured us about positive results from the FTAs, so
we'll go ahead”.84 The economic coalition also includes support from other
leading economic and business figures outside formal business
representation, emphasising the benefits from the economic side of free
trade. One prominent economist in Thailand summed up that: “It’s hard
to argue against the economic benefits of FTA. But because of their social
and political impacts, FTAs will always be a controversial issue in any
country”. 85 Other economists also support the trade liberalisation policy
in principle, but still remain skeptical about the benefits from the pact in
reality, which depend on the government’s commitment and ability to
extract benefits from the negotiations.86
Although businesses tend to be supportive of the government’s overall
attempt to liberalise the economy, they also strongly opposed the FTA if
it directly threatens their interests. Strong business resistance from
import-competing sectors was evident with the Thailand-Japan FTA.
Political alignment opposing the deal was found among local steel
producers, local auto parts producers and non-Japanese carmakers.
Domestic steel producers protested that opening the domestic market to
Japanese producers would be unfair considering the fact that the Japanese
steel industry had been developed far longer than the Thai industry, with
heavy subsidies from the Japanese government 87 and demanded a longer
adjustment period than Japan had requested. The TCC and the FTI joined
forces to organise a joint press conference to criticise the government for
considering ending tariffs on Japanese hot-rolled steel imports and insisted
that protection was needed in order to avoid the Thai industry being
controlled by Japan and the whole country suffering from an increased
trade deficit caused by a flood of Japanese imports. 88
82
Speech delivered by the Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries at the ‘Free
Trade Agreements: Opportunities for Business’ seminar at Bangkok, February, 2004.
Author’s translation.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Pichaya Changsorn and Usanee Mongkolporn, “No Running Away from FTAs,”
The Nation, April 2, 2004.
86
Jeerawat Na Thalang, “Advice From Economists: Focus FTAs on Major Markets,”
The Nation, September 25, 2004.
87
Busrin Treerapongpichit, “Local Manufacturers Cry Foul over Change in Stance on
Steel,” Bangkok Post, April 4, 2005.
88
The Nation, “Furore over Steel ‘Cave-in’”, April 5, 2005.
84
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
The prospect of cutting tariffs on completely built-up (CBU)
automobiles and car components under the Thailand-Japan FTA also
raised strong concerns among domestic car component manufacturers.
The Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association has petitioned the Prime
Minister and related ministers to exclude autos and parts from the FTA
framework, fearing that removing import tariffs on CBU cars and parts
would result in lower demand for locally made products and customers
shifting to consume imported instead of locally assembled cars. This will
also reduce incentives for Japanese automakers to expand local production
facilities, which would have hurt the overall development of the industry.
Domestic auto parts producers also saw their interest in protecting the
domestic auto industry aligned with the interests of American and
European automakers. This was because opening up the car market to
Japan would give significant price competitiveness to imported Japanese
cars and, in effect, discriminate against European and American cars. One
representative from Europe quickly aligned their interests with the
domestic auto parts producers warning that, “Any action that could
minimise the significance of the auto-parts production industry, through
the import of ready-built cars needs to be very carefully considered. The
decision relates to such an important issue that it should not be rushed
into”. 89
Besides potential losers in import-competing sectors, dissatisfaction
also increased even from potential winners in the export sector when it
became likely that the negotiation would not grant benefits to possible
Thai products as much as had been hoped for. For instance, business
showed great disappointment with the Japanese market access offered to
Thai farm products, when the government caved in to
Japanese insistence on excluding rice from the talks.
8.
THE SOCIAL/POLITICAL COALITION
FTAs have become a hotly debated issue in Thailand since 2004 when
negative impacts from concluded agreements were deeply felt among
farmers. The consequences caused concern when significant progress had
been made in FTAs with the United States and Japan. Outside the business
circle, the government’s FTA policy has generated strong negative
responses from diverse social groups. Opposition to FTA policy comes
from NGOs/activists dealing with issues ranging from rural development,
AIDS and access to drugs, consumer protection, intellectual property and
sustainable farming, as well as from academics, senators, opposition
politicians and parts of the private sector. The most formal and
89
Comment made by BMW Group (Thailand). See The Nation, “Thai-Japan FTA
Talks: Warning from Carmakers,” April 8, 2005.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
85
systematic coalition to rally against FTA was initially formed by NGOs
under the name ‘FTA Watch’ and came to find increasing support from
such groups as academia, senators 90 and members of congress. This
coalition’s focus has been to pressure the government on issues relating to
the Thailand-US FTA in particular as well as issues of legitimacy and
accountability in the conduct of the government’s overall FTA policy.
The dissenting camp has opposed FTAs on many grounds. Because the
concluded FTAs bypassed any process of public scrutiny by parliament or
the senate, the first issue of contention has been the lack of good
governance and transparency in the government’s conduct of FTA
negotiations. Senators and members of parliament in the opposition party
accused the government of hiding information from the public and
expressed fear that the government might illegally bypass constitutional
processes to conclude the FTA. 91 With the government holding a majority
in parliament, one critic described the political climate as
“parliamentarian dictatorship by capitalists" 92 which facilitates FTAs
being negotiated in a way that would bring benefits mainly to associates of
the government. 93 Conflicts of interest embedded in FTA policy were
brought to the attention of the public with the Thailand-Australia FTA.
Some NGOs suspected that this deal benefited the personal business
interests of groups related to the government in the telecoms and auto
sectors at the expense of local dairy farmers.94
Opposing voices also raised concerns about the potential adverse
impact economic liberalisation could have on small farmers and
entrepreneurs, which make up a large proportion of the population. 95
Activists working on the small-scale sustainable agriculture movement
90
Senators in five key upper house committees – on foreign affairs, agriculture, finance
and banking, economics, commerce and industry, social development, and human security
showed opposition to the government’s FTA policy.
91
Achara Asgatagacgat and Chatrudee Theparat, “Free Trade Has Its Many Costs,”
Bangkok Post, February 16, 2004. In the article, Kalaya Sophonpanich, a member of the
opposition Democrat party referred to articles 3 and 224 of the constitution that any
international obligation that might affect Thailand's sovereignty must have the
endorsement of the parliament, thus, ‘… the parliament is entitled to a special committee to
study the pros and cons before binding ourselves to any country, especially the US’. The
chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee also shared similar concerns (Nophakhun
Limsamarnphun, “Bilateral Free Trade is A Game of High Stakes,” The Nation, February
23, 2004).
92
Rungrawee Pinyorat, “Activists Want New Law to Control FTAs Process,” The
Nation, March 20, 2004. The phrase was from a law academic.
93
Achara Asgatagacgat and Chatrudee Theparat, Bangkok Post, “ Free Trade Has Its
Many Costs,” February 16, 2004. This concern was expressed by a leading academic in
Thailand.
94
Bangkok Post, “Explanation of FTA Is Lacking Woefully,” July 6, 2004.
95
FTA Watch (in Thai), Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand (Bangkok
:FTA Watch, 2004).
86
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
insisted that small-scale farmers’ earnings and ways of life were likely to
be severely affected due to their limited ability to adjust to new kind of
crops and without sufficient adjustment assistance programs from the
government. 96
Opposition is strongest to the Thailand-US FTA and to intellectual
property rights protection. It is expected that the US will demand
Thailand tighten beyond the current TRIPS agreement. This is singled out
as the issue of deepest threat, and various groups have shared concerns.
The Thai Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS feared that yielding
to Washington’s request would result in limited access to drugs by AIDS
patients. 97 Other consumer organisations also feared that more stringent
protection of drug patents would result in higher drug prices. Those
working on local biodiversity argued that if Thailand accepted the US
demand, it would result in a monopoly on seeds by the US which would
hurt Thai farmers, and lead to long-term exploitation of local biodiversity
by US MNCs.98 FTA Watch and its allies later formally demanded the
withdrawal of intellectual property issues from the Thailand-US FTA.
Opposition groups also demonstrated a certain amount of nationalism.
For example, concern over the loss of Thai sovereignty occupies quite a
significant space in their arguments. In fact, FTA Watch named their
campaign against Thailand-US FTA “Sovereignty Not for Sale”99 and
declared in their official statement that the Thailand-US FTA would lead
to the country being colonised by the US and the Thai state will lose
economic and legal sovereignty to the US.100
These groups have resorted to various measures in order to pressure
the government into adhering to their demands: from street protests,
signature gathering and sending letters to the governments of the
negotiating countries warning them of undemocratic processes in FTA
negotiations. In June 2005, FTA Watch’s political strategies took a
further step by submitting a letter to the UN Human Rights Committee
pledging that the Thai government’s FTA policy involved violations of
96
Bangkok Post, “Free Trade or One-way Street,” December 2, 2004.
Rungrawee C Pinyorat, “Trade Negotiations: FTA Opponents Plan Rally,” The
Nation, June 30, 2004.
98
FTA Watch (in Thai), Thailand-US Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand
(Bangkok :FTA Watch, 2004), 53-55; Vasana Chinvarakorn, “Free or Even Fair?”
Bangkok Post, July 11, 2005.
99
FTA Watch, “Thailand-US Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand” and FTA
Watch, “Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand.”
100
FTA Watch, “Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand,” XII. Author’s
translation
97
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
87
human rights, especially the people’s right to health 101 in relation to the
intellectual property issue under the Thailand-US FTA.
Analysis: Political Cleavages and Coalitions
Using the empirical evidence, the politics of FTAs will be explained
using the theoretical framework set out above. First, the response of the
economic coalition will be explained. Second, the response from social and
political coalitions will be discussed. Finally, the overall pattern of
political cleavage and coalitions will be discussed and summarised.
9.
EXPLAINING THE ECONOMIC C OALITION
The Sectoral Model and the Economic Coalition
The economic approach is useful in explaining business responses in
which the economic effects of trade liberalisation trigger economic actors
to reformulate their preferences. Businesses were receptive to the
government’s initiative as opening markets for exports directly enhances
the potential income of exporters. Moreover, liberalisation through
preferential trade agreements such as FTA allows even more explicit gains
to the export sector than unilateral or multilateral liberalisation. With
bilateral liberalisation, exports benefit indirectly from lower prices of
imported raw materials and, hence, lower costs of production. Under the
GATT/W TO, the principle of multilateralism means that trade rules will
be extended without discrimination to all members of the GAT T/WTO. 102
Therefore, even if exports can enjoy lower barriers in trade regimes
around the world, multilateral liberalisation does not give them a
competitive edge over competitors in the way that preferential
arrangements from FTAs can.
Ravenhill103 emphasises the point that, because preferential
agreements create exclusivity of market access between member countries,
exporters in non-member countries will invest in political activity to push
their government to establish preferential agreements with trading
partners in order to avoid the discriminatory effect of being excluded in
the first place. Therefore, in addition to general preferences toward free
trade or protectionism, the nature of how market opening is pursued and
through which policy instrument, can intensify the preferences of actors.
FTAs can alleviate discriminatory effects in the current trend towards
101
FTA Watch, “Thailand’s Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights Obligations:
Letter for Submission to the 84 th Session of the UN Human Rights Committee” (2005) at
www.ftawatch.org.
102
Gilpin, 218.
103
Ravenhill, 313.
88
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
competitive regionalism while simultaneously creating a competitive edge
for Thai products in important markets. Traditionally, the preferences of
protectionists have been more intense because free trade generates diffuse
benefits but concentrated costs for protected industries.104 Free trade
policy via FTAs, however, has the opposite effect by generating
concentrated benefits to exporters while costs to importers are more
diffuse given that it can provide for gradual liberalisation and an
adjustment period for sensitive products. 105 With concentrated benefits to
exporters giving exporters a higher preference and intensity toward free
trade, FTAs can easily secure support from exporters for liberalisation.
Because the economic impact of FTAs is estimated in terms of
competitiveness, interests among business were aligned along the importexport cleavage as predicted by the Ricardo-Viner model. Export interests
were identified as the main beneficiaries from the policy by the business
associations and they were explicit in expressing their support for the
policy. The FTI consistently pointed out that FTAs would lead to the
expansion of producers with already high export volume such as the
textile and electronics industries.106 The automobile club of the FTI
emphasised that the local vehicle industry would gain greatly from the
Thailand-Australia FTA and Thailand-US FTAs.107
Politics unfolding around the Thailand-Japan FTA also testified to the
pattern of political alignment along the lines of import-export interests.
As discussed earlier, opposing interests’ political alignment consisted of
domestic steel producers, auto parts manufacturers and non-Japanese car
companies, which are import-competing sectors vis-à-vis Japan, while
exporters, especially the food industry, supported the Thailand-Japan FTA
initially but their support plummeted when the negotiation did not seem to
advance their interests. Such a pattern is consistent with both trade data
and estimates from a TDRI (Thailand Development Research Institute)
study about the potential impact of the Thailand-Japan FTA. 108 The
TDRI consistently estimates that industries that will be able to expand
exports to Japan are agricultural products and food-processing products
104
Goldstein and Martin, 608.
Grossman and Helpman, 669.
106
Speech delivered by the Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries at the “Free
Trade Agreements: Opportunities for Business” seminar at Bangkok, February, 2004.
Comment made by the chairman of international economic committee of the Federation of
Thai Industries in Benjaprut Akkarasriprapai and Achara Pongvutitham, “FTAs to Boost
GDP by 26%, Official Says,” The Nation, 11 October 2004.
107
The Nation, “Push for FTAs with US, Australia and Japan by Year’s End,” 20
February 2004.
108
TDRI (in Thai), “Sub-topic Study Number 2: Preliminary Analysis on the Impact
from Thailand-Japan Free Trade Agreement,” Thailand Development Research Institute
(2005) at www.ftadigest.com.
105
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
89
while industries that will be hardest hit from increasing Japanese imports
are auto parts, chemical and metal products (see table 3).
Table 3. Estimates of the Impact of the Thailand-Japan Free Trade
Agree m ent on Change in Productions by Sector
Sector
Agriculture
Food-processing
Textiles
Leather-related
Paper
Petroleum
Chemical
Mining
Metal
Vehicles and Parts
Transportation Equipments
Electronics
Engine
Average
Source: adapted from TDRI (2005)
Cha ng e in
percentag e)
9.02
12.15
-0.12
-0.83
-0.18
0.25
-3.85
-0.90
-3.03
-15.12
1.02
0.15
-0.44
1.16
Production
(by
Institutional factors add explanations to the pattern of political alignment
based on industry. Within the business associations, the organisation of
members along industry lines facilitates industry in overcoming collective
action problems in their political mobilisation. It also explains the relative
silence of import-competing industries vis-à-vis other countries beside
Japan. Export sectors are the most prominent and powerful in the
economy and within the business associations. Major export industries
such as food, textiles and garments, auto, electronic and electrical
industries have firm control in business associations and they are active
participants in FTA policy forums. Thus, it is possible that the weaker
industries which are mostly import-competing industries may oppose the
liberalisation policy but their preferences will not be fully transmitted
through their representative organisations.
Limitations of the Factoral Model
Another theoretical puzzle is why business responses correspond more
to the sectoral than the factoral model. In a capitalist economy like
Thailand, where owners of factors can be divided along class line of
90
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
capitalists and labour,109 why are interests not aligned along the line of
class? To answer this, it will be shown that the Heckscher-Ohlin
model/Stolper-Samuelson theorem is insufficient in predicting the
preferences of economic actors, and institutional factors also prevent the
political mobilisation of some groups.
The first part of puzzle is preference formation. As set out in section
3.2, according to the model, it is predicted that the owners of capital will
oppose while labour will favour free trade policy in Thailand. However,
empirical evidence indicates that the opposite is true. Capital owners in
business associations showed support for free trade while positive
responses from labour representatives were not to be found. Why is this
the case?
The first critical point of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that it
predicts a country’s comparative advantage on the level of the abundance
and scarcity of resources. As a developing country, factor proportionality
in Thailand is one of low capital-labour ratio. 110 However, as Thai
industrialists have embarked upon industrialisation in the international
setting, the rapid transnationalisation of modern sectors and the scale of
output tend to favour capital/technology-intensive techniques that
discourage the use of labour.111 Consequently, the country’s competitive
advantage has diverged away from its factor endowment. As the abundant
factor is not sufficiently utilised in domestic production, owners of the
abundant factor may not benefit from the prospect of free trade. And
since capital-intensive industries are mostly concentrated in the exportoriented sector, it is the case, as observed, that capital owners’ preference
is toward free trade in Thailand. In addition, as Bowie and Unger112 state:
“to understand the political impact of relative factor scarcities, we need to
know something about who controls them.” The capitalist pattern in
which dominant capitalists in Thailand have diversified their investments
109
Kewin Hewison, “Emerging Social Forces in Thailand: New Political and
Economic Roles” in The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald’s and MiddleClass Revolution ed. Richard Robinson and David S.G Goodman, 139-142 (London and
New York: Routledge, 1996).
110
Juanjai Ajanant, “Trade and Industrialization of Thailand in 2020” in
Restructuring Asian Economics for the New Millennium, Research in Asian Studies vol.
9B, ed. J.R. Behrman, M. Dutta, S.L. Husted, P. Sumalee, C. Suthipand and
Wiboonchutikula, 748 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2001).
111
Ajanant, 748; Vali Jamal, “NIKKEI Interviews: Employment in Asia” in
Liberalisation and Labour ed. Rajah Rasian and Norbert von Hofmann, 31 (Singapore:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996). As Ajanant argues, this is partly because the availability
of technology that is most suitable to the market size and financial capacity of a firm may
not be the one that corresponds with the country’s factor proportion. For example, labourintensive production technologies may not lead to cost optimisation on a long-term basis.
Since labour-intensive techniques that can match market demand are not always available,
business has to utilise available technologies whether it is capital-intensive or not.
112
Bowie and Unger, 20.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
91
and spread their business interests across various sectors with different
relative factor intensities makes it problematic to predict trade policy
preferences based on factor endowment. 113
The capacity of groups to overcome collective action problems and
institutional factors also explain the limited application of the factoral
model regarding the response from labour. Thai labour organisation is
relatively weak 114 and worker or class organisations are not
institutionalised enough to build political strength. 115 Goldstein and
Martin 116 note that the role of information regarding distributional
implications from trade agreements is important in providing incentives
for groups to mobilise. As FTAs are carried out in the realm of
international economic policy where public debate takes place in the
narrow circle among the urban class and political and business elites, labour
groups lack knowledge about the potential impacts of FTAs. This has
hindered them from effectively formulating their preferences toward
policy and diminished their ability to mobilise.117 Thai labour experts
further point out that lack of leadership and unity among many labour
unions as well as clear political targets are factors that explain the absence
of labour in the contemporary Thai political scene. 118 Nevertheless, labour
mobilisation in response to FTAs may come long after the policy
announcement or even its implementation. As the Thai Labour
Campaign 119 speculates: “when the worst comes to the worst (the situation
of labour), and adverse consequences from FTAs actually happen in the
future, many factories may have to close down and workers will be laid off.
Only then will it be known whether or not any labour movement will
occur. Only in a time of crisis can the real power of labour be seen.”
Therefore, institutional weakness may lead to a lag in response by some
groups toward trade policy but circumstances may help groups to
113
Ibid., 21, 134.
Unger, 59; Bowie and Unger, 20; Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy
and Politics,” 187-221; Shigeru Itoga, “Labor Issues and APEC Liberalisation: Case of
Thailand and Malaysia,” IDE APEC Study Centre Working Paper Series No.1 Fiscal Year
1996/1997, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation
(1997) at www.ide.go.jp.
115
Thailand has had one of the lowest rates of formal union membership among
democratic countries; See Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics,”
215, 221.
116
Goldstein and Martin.
117 This point is made by the Thai Labour Campaign; see Bangkokbiz News, “Keep
Watch: FTAs Might Give Rise to Thai Labor Mobilisation,” May 2, 2005 (in Thai).
118
Interview with the Director of Thai Labour Campaign (a Thai NGO working on
labour rights with association to Chulalongkorn University) and Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labour and Social Welfare in Bangkokbiz News, May 2, 2005.
119
Ibid.
114
92
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
overcome collective action problems and pursue their preferences in a
more confrontational manner, such as by massive protests or strikes.
Partial Economic Pluralism: the Thai Political Economy
Even in the sectoral model, political coalitions and mobilisation
among economic interest groups are not very clear and systematic,
especially if compared to their Western counterparts,120 nor are there
acute political cleavages among businesses themselves. Business could more
or less maintain a coherent voice in supporting or criticising the FTA
policy. Rogowski 121 notes that one possible reason political cleavage
might not arise as the result of greater exposure to trade is when
government can reallocate gains from winners to compensate losers so
that their income remains unchanged.122 As Rogowski also observes, this is
unlikely and rather, “the natural tendency is for gainers to husband their
winnings and to stop the ears to the cries of the afflicted.”123 Likewise in
the Thai case, there are no governmental trade adjustment assistance
programs in place that can change the preferences of the losers.
This provides a critical point for both theoretical models. The theory
of the domestic politics of trade policy that emerged mostly in Western
democratic societies can satisfactorily predict the preference formation of
economic actors. However, the institutional factors, especially in a
political context that does not fit perfectly with a model of democratic
economic pluralism, plays an important mediating role in determining the
actual formation of domestic political coalitions and the role of interest
groups in the politics of the liberalisation process. In the Thai context, it
is not that the preferences of actors, both importers and exporters, have
not been affected. Although exporters are more politically visible, business
groups often also express concerns about potential losers. The pattern and
institutional nature of Thai public policymaking can explain the relatively
weak and less visible interest representation of Thai interest groups even
when preferences are formed.
One important institutional feature is the business-government
relationship. Patterns of private sector representation under peak
associations (the TCC and the FTI) mean that the private sector usually
presents quite a coherent voice in their support or opposition toward
policy. Moreover, the cooperative nature of government-business
120
For example, US business formed a formal and systematic coalition in support of
the Thailand-US FTA: the US-Thailand Free Trade Agreement Business Coalition.
121
Ronald Rogowski, “Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic
Political Alignments” in International Political Economy: Perspective on Global Power
and Wealth (4 th ed.), ed. Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake (Boston: Routledge, 2000).
122
Ibid., 325.
123
Ibid.,325.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
93
relationships explains overall business support for FTA policy even when
losers can be identified. Laothamatas124 summarises that “business
associations have generally employed non-confrontational tactics in
seeking to induce policy cooperation from the government. Occasionally
though, they have resorted to more aggressive means to advance their
policy preferences.” In the policy process of FTA negotiations, business
associations can secure an insider status and have influence over the
government’s position during negotiations.125 They can advance their
preferences in the policy-making process without forming explicit
coalitions or taking public stances to pressurise the government. An
‘occasional case’ of confrontation is exemplified by the Thailand-Japan
FTA case. This case stimulated business to publicly announce their
positions because the negotiation became highly politicised with the
Japanese side trying to lobby cabinet members and the prime minister,
while the Thai business sector felt threatened that their opinions would be
overruled. Such direct criticism against the government’s behaviour, rather
than trade liberalisation per se, seems to be needed to ensure that
industry’s interests are protected.
Outside the formal channels of business political influence, it is widely
accepted that part of economic policy in Thailand is still being formulated
through ad hoc clientelistic channels rather than formal, inclusive
associations with legitimate consultative mechanisms. 126 Laothamatas 127
argues that although a growing influence of organised business interest has
been present, “with electoral politics…corrupt dealings between
government and business again picked up,”128 however, “clientelistic
networking and corruption have not thus far obstructed the search for
efficient economic strategies.”129 Another academic contends that, “the
significant liberalisation in Southeast Asia has not been driven by new
domestic coalitions of pro-market business or middle-class interest
groups.”130 In the case of Thailand, the adapted although existing patterns
124
Laothamatas, “From Clienelism to Partnership: Business-Government Relations
in Thailand,” 204.
125
Wynn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics (London: Macmillian Press,
2000), 19 distinguishes between insider and outsider groups. Insider groups are
“regarded as legitimate by government and consulted on a regular basis.” In contrast,
outsider groups “either do not wish to become enmeshed in a consultative relationship
with officials, or are unable to gain recognition.”
126
Unger, 72; Laothamatas, “From Clienelism to Partnership: Business-Government
Relations in Thailand”, 209.
127
Laothamatas, “From Clienelism to Partnership: Business-Government Relations
in Thailand.”
128
Ibid., 209.
129
Ibid.
130
Greg Felker, “Globalization and Southeast Asia” (Draft Paper), Stanford
94
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
of state-business relationships between family-oligarchic business structures
and business-backed parliamentarism has remained the defining feature in
the politics of liberalisation. 131 Such factors are not the whole story, given
the active participation by business associations in the FTA policy
process. However, one conclusion that can be confirmed is that the semidemocratic capitalist system of Thailand makes it tricky for all relevant
economic actors to fully form political coalitions, align their interests and
be fully represented according to their policy preferences.
10. EXPLAINING THE SOCIAL/POLITICAL C OALITION
While the economic approach has explanatory power in relation to
the economic coalition, it can only provide limited insights about the
change in non-economic interests and the motivation for non-economic
actors to attempt to influence trade policy. Oatley 132 elaborates that:
The society-centred approach tells us nothing about why groups that
focus on the environment or human rights spend resources attempting to
influence trade policy. Nor does it provide any basis with which to make
sense of such groups’ trade policy preferences. In the past, such a
weakness could perhaps be neglected because non-economic groups
played only a small role in trade politics. The contemporary backlash
against globalisation suggests, however, that these groups must
increasingly be incorporated into society-centred models of trade
politics.
Developments in the international economic and political order,
whether in the broader context or specific to the trading regime, lead to
new factors and forces that have to be included in the trade politics
equation. Understanding the politics of trade today is intricately linked
with the politics of globalisation. Committing a country to a certain
liberalisation regime often entails changes in commercial laws in order to
make them compatible with the rules in those regimes. More than ensuring
that trade will be freer, trade liberalisation in this context seeks to ensure
that international trade relations will be governed. Consequentially,
liberalisation will affect and constrain commercial practices and
production and consumption patterns, both through changes in price and
changes in regulations. Changes in economic activities have a more
fundamental impact on peoples’ ways of life and societal values. In this
chain of reactions, trade policy extends its realm of influence beyond the
economic space of actors’ interests.
Institute for International Studies, 17 (2004) http://iisdb.stanford.edu/evnts/3878/Felker_SEAF_paper.pdf.
131
Ibid.
132
Oatley, 108.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
95
Previously, political coalitions necessary to open up the country in
Thailand were composed only of the state (such as military leaders or
bureaucrats) and business elites while the rest of the country was dragged
along with them. 133 Today, the empirical evidence shows that participants
from civil society sectors have become the new main actors in trade
politics and their support will be an important variable in maintaining
enough political backing for the liberalisation agenda.
In the analytical framework of preferences and institutions, sources of
preferences, which bring social actors into trade politics, are traced and
institutional backgrounds facilitating the forceful rise of this new coalition
are discussed. This will be employed in the hope that a certain level of
systematic analysis can be satisfied. However, the exploratory nature of
the analysis in this unfamiliar area of trade politics should be equally
productive. Since the social/political coalition actively opposes FTAs
specifically in the case of the Thailand-US FTA, this FTA will be focused
on as a case representative of new trends in the domestic politics of trade.
Sources of Preferences
In the trade arena, national policy is closely linked with processes at
the international level, which set the framework for a country to pursue
its policy preferences. The global trading regime and international trade
policy landscape provide a particular context and condition for
liberalisation. The context in which bilateral FTAs are being pursued is
partly characterised by the proliferation of comprehensive agreements,
which is part of the United States’ grand strategy of using FTAs to
stimulate competitive liberalisation in a manner consistent with US
interests. The US expects to use US-modelled comprehensive bilateral
FTAs to establish precedents for wider agreements at the multilateral
level.134 To pursue a bilateral FTA strategy with a more powerful strategic
partner like the US, it is inevitable for Thailand to accept the terms and
conditions imposed by the US. As discussed above, that comprehensive
agreement involves deep economic liberalisation and results in farreaching impacts on the domestic economy and society. Policies of
liberalisation in the form of comprehensive FTAs have strong social
implications, are thus the first source of preferences for non-economic
actors.
133
Bowie and Unger.
Richard E. Feinberg, “The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Agreements,” Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University
of California, Sandiego (2003), 2.
134
96
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Richardson 135 discusses the importance of incorporating knowledge
about experiences elsewhere in public policy making and notes that policy
transfers from one country to another is an increasingly important
component of the policy learning process. In a similar vein, Bowie and
Unger 136 note that in a complex global environment, predicting future
impacts and estimating one’s own utilities toward a policy can be difficult
and often, actors’ interests are not clearly articulated even to themselves.
Thus, when the external model of those that experience similar events is
available, actors are prone to draw parallels from experiences elsewhere in
estimating their expected gains and losses and mobilising political pressure
based on their interests, estimated through use of such analogies, which
they term the “demonstration effect.” 137
Most of the arguments by opponents to FTAs from NGOs and civil
society show that their preferences are drawn from events in the
international arena both as a global political space and from other
countries. Using the legitimacy and participation issues related to the
W TO, they opposed Thai government on similar grounds. Resistance and
resentment against free trade pacts, especially in relation to US-involved
North-South agreements in other regions also provided the demonstration
effect for NGOs, who predicted that similar consequences were likely in
the Thai case. FTA Watch often support their case by pointing to
disastrous consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 138 and how the US can force less powerful negotiating partners
to accept terms unfavourable to them but to the benefit of the US, using
the example of the US-Chile FTA. 139 And as Latin American NGOs have
actively engaged in political mobilisation and established themselves as
significant actors in the trade politics140 of NAFTA and the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), political mobilisation by FTA
Watch can be seen as being partly influenced by their counterparts. 141
135
Jeremy Richardson, ‘Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change’ Political
Studies vol. 48 (2000): 1006-1025.
136
Bowie and Unger.
137
Ibid., 23.
138
NAFTA is often used as a sample case to show ill consequences of trade
agreements between developing countries and the US. Critics of NAFTA often point out
that the flood of cheaper agricultural goods from the US have hurt Mexican farmers, US FDI
has damaged the environment, industrialization headed by US MNCs forced indigenous
people to relocate from their land and change their livelihoods etc.
139
FTA Watch, “Thailand-US Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand” and FTA
Watch, “Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand.”
140
Karen Brock and Rosemary McGee, “Mapping Trade Policy: Understanding the
Challenges of Civil Society Participation,” Institute of Development Studies Working
Paper 225, Institute of Development Studies, England, 2004, 13.
141
Although this cannot be said for certain, there are strong linkages and networking
among Thai NGOs and their international counterparts, especially those from South
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
97
Therefore, when existing examples from other countries can be drawn
with a high level of compatibility, knowledge from other countries is
important as a source for social actors to formulate their policy
preferences.
Although actors from the social/political coalition come from a
diverse range of sectors, their interests are well-aligned in their opposition
to FTA policy and in particular the issue of excluding intellectual property
rights from the Thailand-US FTA. Their political alignment, as reflected
in FTA Watch’s statements, suggests that the role of ideas is important in
uniting social actors in contrast to how interests unite economic actors.
The coalition’s aims are clearly stated: “(FTA Watch’s) aim is to provide
the public with in-depth information and analyses of the FTAs,
particularly on their potentially adverse effects on the more vulnerable
sectors of Thai society, i.e., small businesses, people living with HIV/AIDS
and the poor in general.” The fundamental ideological element detected
here is the issue of the legitimacy of the government in representing the
people. Most of the organisations involved with FTA Watch definitely see
themselves as representatives of the marginalised groups. The idea of
justice and fair representation (or lack of it) is, thus, the common ground
uniting them.
However, if this coalition is placed in the larger context of Thailand’s
political climate, this pattern of interest constellation is quite predictable.
Moreover, the diversity of actors who see their political interests aligned
implies that there is a larger trend and broader trajectory to which this
opposition is related or which it is trying to address.
As Thailand finds itself immersed in the globalisation process as well
as trying to come to terms with the 1997 economic crash, a political
divide that has characterised the country has been termed by Thai
academics and the press as a global-local divide.142 This global-local
tension is rooted in the dualistic structure of Thai economic development,
where export-oriented industrialisation and financial liberalisation gave
rise to an urban-based, internationally-oriented, capital-intensive and
technology-driven modern economy that is detached from the agrarianbased economy in the rural area which still inhibits the majority of the
America. For example, FTA Watch organised a conference and invited speakers from
activist from Mexican Action Network on Free Trade and Global Trade Watch.
142
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, “Democracy, Capitalism and Crisis:
Examining Recent Political Transitions in Thailand,” Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok (2001); Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Thailand and Globalisation” in East Asia and
Globalisation, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Kewin
Hewison, “Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand,” The Pacific
Review, vol. 13, no. 2 (2000): 279-296. Alternatively, this could be read as a globalizercommunitarian divide (Hamilton-Hart, 191).
98
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
population. 143 The modern economy is populated by ‘globalisers’ (see
table 4), consisting of commercial interests that promote corporate
capitalism and advocate the advantages of liberalisation and the operation
of the market. 144
At the other extreme, deeper globalisation often has negative
consequences on the less flexible and less powerful local portion of
society. Rodrik 145 observes that globalisation accentuates asymmetries
between those who have the skills and mobility to flourish in global
markets and those who either don’t have these advantages or perceive
that the expansion of the market is inimical to social stability and deeply
held norms. These consequences have been reinforced throughout the
modern period as social implications have been consistently neglected by
governments and people feel that the welfare of the masses has been
subordinated the benefit of the wealthy few. Localists, with NGOs and
social movements as significant participants 146 emerged in reaction to
these consequences. They opposed globalisation, called for “justice in the
international system and within individual nation-state,” 147 sought to
break away from the domination of the neo-liberal model of economic
growth and are suspicious of liberalisation and market economies.148
143
Phongpaichit, “Democracy, Capitalism and Crisis: Examining Recent Political
Transitions in Thailand,” 11.
144
Hewison, ‘Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand’, 279
145
Rodrik, ‘Has Globalization Gone Too Far?” 2-3.
146
Hewison, “Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand,” 282.
147
Ibid., 282.
148
Ibid., 285-286.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
99
Table 4. Sum mary of Globalists vs. Localists tension in the
Politics of Globalisation in Thailand
Globalists
Issues
•
•
•
Actors
•
Market orientation
Deepening globalisation
and economic
integration with the
international economy
Promote corporate
capitalism and
advantages of
globalisation
Localists/Opponents of
Globalisation
• Opposition to economic
growth, urban and
industrialism
• Advocates of local
community/rural culture
• Conservative nationalists
aiming to protect Thai
culture
• Economic self-reliance,
alternative developmental
path such as selfsufficient economics or
sustainable development
• Critical of materialism
and consumerism
• NGOs and social
movements
• Farmers
• Environmentallyconcerned groups
• Buddhist monks
Newly emergent and
long-established
Bangkok-based business
families
• Well-established urban
capitalism
• Foreign capital
• Technocrats in
economic bureaucracies
Source: Hart; and Hewison. Tabulation created by author.
In this broader and deeper setting, it can be seen that the global-local
divide spilled over into the politics of trade policy and influenced the
preference formation of social actors. Opponents of FTAs argue that they
are undertaken for the benefit of narrow commercial interests at the
expense of the rest of the population. They argue that the poor and
socially disadvantaged groups like small farmers and small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) will find it hardest to adjust, as the Thai government
rushes the country into yet another trap set by the US to advance their
neo-liberal agenda. The Thailand-US FTA undermines Thai sovereignty
while Thai culture and heritage will be further destroyed by greater
penetration of society by capitalistic forces and exploitation by foreign
investors.
100
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Institutional Factors: NGO Movements
Given that NGO and civil society are new actors in the arena of trade
policy, the institutional factor is especially important in facilitating their
entrance to the area. An emerging institutional background that facilitates
social actors and NGOs actively engaging in trade politics as well as
assisting diverse actors to form a fairly cohesive and unified coalition
against an FTA, lies at the heart of the establishment of new social forces
and their immersion in the public policy making process. In Thailand, as
social movements have developed into a loose, but identifiable set of
interlocking networks, activists have begun to debate how to deliver their
politics into the formal arena of parliamentary democracy. Political
mobilisation and networking activities among NGOs, as well as their
participation in the national political arena, have become more
institutionalised.149 Such institutional structures have paved the way for
their active role in trade politics, in an environment where trade policy
has become strongly related to traditional areas of concerns for Thai civil
society, such as the rural community, development, and poverty.
11. POLITICAL CLEAVAGE : THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIVIDE
To summarise, the two coalitions that have emerged in response to
the government’s FTA policy can be explicitly distinguished by their
different foci and how their preferences have changed due to the potential
impact of trade liberalisation. However, the two coalitions cannot be
definitely determined by the political stances of proponents and
opponents. Even if the economic coalition is characterised largely as
supporting the policy, they voice opposition once elements of the policy
deviate from their interests. Nevertheless, it can still be said that the
government can secure support for FTA policy from business while it has
to deal with outright resistance from the social/political coalition. The
pattern of coalitions that has emerged reflects a more fundamental divide
between groups in response to the challenge of free trade. The main
factors characterising the two coalitions are their preferences and the
arguments supporting their cases. While the first group argues mainly
about the economic benefits and costs of the policy, the second group’s
preferences and arguments are grounded in the social impacts.
This political divide of the economic vs. the social coalition is
structural both in terms of the national political economy and the
international setting. The formation of preferences toward the FTA is
149
Phongpaichit and Baker, “Thailand: Economy and Politics”; Pasuk Phongpaichit,
“Civilizing the State: State, Civil Society and Politics in Thailand,” The Wertheim
Lecture 1999, Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam (1999).
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
101
structurally rooted in the pattern of liberalisation in a context of
globalisation and the landscape of international trade. Deeper globalisation
as a result of FTAs promised benefits for market-oriented actors, but it has
raised concerns among social actors about the social implications of free
trade policy. The dualistic pattern of economic development in Thailand
resulting in an economic and social asymmetry in the country further
reinforces social concerns about free trade policy at the same time as
export interests are advanced through the neo-liberal agenda and marketled economic development policies.
Table 5. Political Cleavages in Response to FTA Policy in Thailand
Source of
Preferences
Main Actors
Political
Argument/
Rationale
Supporting their
political stances
Political
Strategies/Position
Economic
Coalition
Economic Interests
Social/Political Coalition
Business Associations
Some Economists
Leading Business
figures
International
Competitiveness
Fair Competition
(when opposing
liberalisation e.g.
steel industry in
Thai-Japan FTA)
Social movements, local
NGOs, international NGOs,
politicians, academics
Insider Status –
regular consultative
system with
government agencies
during negotiation
Outsider Status – excluded
from formal and regular
consultative system with
government agencies, street
protests, sending letters to
The Role of Ideas
Concerns for fairness and
justice
Unfair trade deal on
international stage
Adverse social effects on the
disadvantaged from
globalisation and deeper
economic integration
Unfairness for the
disadvantaged groups
Lack of representativeness
of the government in
negotiating FTAs
Loss of Sovereignty
Capitalism profits at the
expense of grassroots
sufferings
102
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Economic
Coalition
process.
FTA of Co ncern
Issue of Concern
Political Dema nds
for FTA
negotiation
Social/Political Coalition
foreign governments
(negotiating partners) and
international organisations
(the UN)
FTA Thai-Japan,
FTA Thai-China
FTAs with major
economic
implications
Tariff Reduction
Unfair trade practices
after liberalisation
FTA Thai-US
FTAs with major social and
political implications
Longer Adjustment
Periods for sensitive
sectors
Government
assistance programs
to upgrade industries
by increasing
production efficiency
and upgrading product
quality and
competitiveness
Suspend the negotiation
Withdrawal of certain issues
Deep economic integration
involving change in
regulatory and institutional
arrangements such as:
Intellectual property rights
Investment regime
12. C ONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to look at interest configuration and the
subsequent political activities of domestic socioeconomic actors in
response to the Thai government’s liberalisation agenda and bilateral FTA
policy. Using the theoretical framework of domestic politics and
internationalisation, the theoretical underpinning of the paper is that the
exposure of the country to international markets will change domestic
actors’ preferences which will cause them to respond in such a way that
their preferences can be fulfilled. Institutional factors will then act as a
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
103
mediating factor between actors’ preferences and their ability to organise
or form coalitions.
Investigating the case of FTA policy in Thailand, this paper concludes
that the established theory of the domestic politics of trade based on
economic models can provide insights into the way preferences of
economic actors are formed, but it has less to say in terms of the
emergence of a new non-economic coalition whose preferences are
affected by free trade agreements in non-economic terms.
Moreover, attention to preferences alone is not sufficient.
Institutions are a significant intervening factor which helps to explain the
actual formation of political coalitions which might deviate from actors’
preferences, the pattern of representation and the roles of interest groups
in the politics of trade policy. In the case of Thailand, partial economic
pluralism explains the lower degree of interest representation and political
coalition by business compared to what can be observed in Western
countries, especially the US. On the other hand, increasing
democratisation, the institutionalisation of social forces and the
emergence of civil society explain the entrance of NGOs and other social
actors into this area of trade politics.
The paper also argues that the political cleavages characterising the
domestic politics of Thai FTA policy is the divide between the economic
and social/political coalitions. Actors in each coalition have different
sources of preferences. While actors in the first coalition base their
preferences solely in terms of economic interests, those in the second
draw their preferences from ideas and values and oppose the policy based
on the social implications of free trade.
The distinction between economic and political coalitions implies that
under globalisation and in order to embark upon liberalisation,
governments have to garner political support by managing the social and
political implications of liberalisation policy. The emergence of the
cleavage between the business coalition, which emphasises an economic
justification of liberalisation, and those who are anxious about the social
and political effects will change the whole political equation of the
liberalisation process. Attention to the issue of legitimacy, and the
assurance for the general population that the government will not trade
narrow economic benefits for the suffering of the masses, has become a
major requirement for successful liberalisation efforts.
Using a society-centred approach to domestic politics, the limitation
of this paper lies in its scope: by not giving due attention to the state that
the state-centred approach would afford. The state-centred approach
should be used to complement the society-centred approach in order to
arrive at a more complete analysis of the domestic politics of trade,
especially by looking at the patterns of influence that each interest group
104
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
has on policy outcomes. Given that the state may not respond with equal
enthusiasm to different social groups’ demands, further research should
aim to understand why the demands of certain groups are attended to while
the influence of other groups is limited even when their preferences are
represented in a democratic society.
As for Thai NGOs, although they have established themselves as
significant actors in the politics of FTAs, it is as yet inconclusive whether
their participation in this area will become institutionalised. They also
face the challenge of how to ensure that their political mobilisation will be
influential enough so that the capitalist-oriented government will realise
its obligation to achieve a better balance between the economic and social
impacts of economic liberalisation policy.
REFERENCES
Ahearn, Raymond J. and Wayne M. Morrison. “U.S. - Thailand Free
Trade Agreement Negotiations.” the United States Congressional
Research
Service
(2004).
http://us-asean.org/us-thaifta/RL32314.pdf.
Ajanant, Juanjai. “ Trade and Industrialization of Thailand in 2020” in
Restructuring Asian Econo mics for the New Millennium, Research
in Asian Studies vol. 9B, edited by J.R. Behrman, M. Dutta, S.L.
Husted, P. Sumalee, C. Suthipand and Wiboonchutikula, 743-772.
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2001.
Akkarasriprapai, Benjaprut and Achara Pongvutitham, “FTAs to Boost
GDP by 26%, Official Says.” The Nation, October 11, 2004 via
FTA Watch, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Akrasanee, Narongchai. ‘The FTA Architecture of Thailand’,
Presentation at Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC)
Trade Forum Meeting 22 nd -25 th May, 2005, Jeju Island, Korea,
2005.
Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. “The Political Economy of Trading
States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and
Domestic Political Institutions” in International Political
Economy: Perspective on Global Power and Wealth (4 th ed),
edited by Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake. Boston: Routledge,
2000.
Asgatagacgat, Achara and Chatrudee Theparat. “Free Trade Has Its Many
Costs.” Bangkok Post, February 16, 2004 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Baldwin, Robert E. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives vol. 3, no. 4 (1989): 119-135.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
105
Bangkokbiz News. “Keep Watch: FTAs Might Give Rise to Thai Labor
Mobilization,” Bangkokbiz News, May 2, 2005 (in Thai) via FTA
Watch, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Bangkok Post. “Explanation of FTA Is Lacking Woefully,” July 6, 2004
via FTA Watch, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
———. ‘Free Trade or One-way Street’, December 2, 2004 via FTA
Watch, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Bowie, Alasdair and Danny Unger. The Politics of Open Economies:
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Brock, Karen and Rosemary McGee. “Mapping Trade Policy:
Understanding the Challenges of Civil Society Participation.”
Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 225, Institute of
Development Studies, England, (2004).
Changsorn, Pichaya and Usanee Mongkolporn. “No Running Away from
FTAs,” The Nation, April 2, 2004 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Charlton, Andrew H. and Joseph Stiglitz. “Common Values for the
Development
Round”
(2004),
http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/website/Co
mmon_Values_for_the_Development_Round.htm.
Chinvarakorn, Vasana. “Free or Even Fair?” Bangkok Post, July 11, 2005.
Choudry, Aziz. “The Elephant, the Rabbit, the Cobra and the Gold:
Fighting the US-Thailand Free Trade Agreement,” Scoop
Independent
News,
March
29,
2004,
http://www.scoop.nz/stories/HL0403/S00306.htm?mode=print.
Coughlin, Cletus C., Alec K. Chrystal and Geoffrey E. Wood.
“Protectionist Trade Policies: A Survey of Theory, Evidence and
Rationale” in International Political Econo my: Perspective on
Global Power and Wealth (4 th ed.) edited by Jeffry A. Frieden and
David A. Lake. Boston: Routledge, 2000.
Cox, Ronald W. “Explaining Business Support for Regional Trade
Agreements” in International Political Econo my: Perspective on
Global Power and Wealth (4 th ed), edited by Jeffry A. Frieden, and
David A. Lake. Boston: Routledge, 2000.
Dent, Christopher M. “ The New Economic Bilateralism and Southeast
Asia: Region-Convergent or Region-Divergent?” Institute of
Political and Economic Governance (IPEG) Papers in Global
Political Economy, No. 7 (April 2004).
Department of Trade Negotiations, the Ministry of Commerce, “FTA:
Free Trade Agreement,” www.thaifta.com.
Doner, Richard F. and Ansil Ramsay. “Postimperialism and Development
in Thailand.” World Development vol 21, no. 5 (1993): 691-704.
106
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
———. ‘The Challenges of Economic Upgrading in Liberalizing Thailand’
in States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions
Back In, edited by Linda Weiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003
Dornbusch, Rudiger. “ The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing
Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 6, no. 1 (1992):
pp 69-85
Dunleavy, P. and Brendan O’Leary. Theories of the State. London:
Macmillan, 1987.
Dunleavy, P. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Hemel
Hempsted, Harvester (1991).
Esty, Daniel C. “The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis.”
World Trade Review vol. 1, no. 1 (2002): 7-22.
Feinberg, Richard E. “ The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Agreements.” Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies, University of California, San Diego (2003).
Felker, Greg. “Globalization and Southeast Asia” (Draft Paper), Stanford
Institute for International Studies (2004) at
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3878/Felker_SEAF_paper.pdf.
Frieden, Jeffrey A. and Ronald Rogowski. “The Impact of International
Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview” in
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Robert O.
Keohane and Helen V. Milner. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
FTA Monitoring Committee, the Fiscal Policy Research Institute, “FTA
Monitoring”, www.ftamonitoring.com.
FTA Watch coalition, “FTA Watch”, www.ftawatch.org.
FTA Watch (in Thai). Thailand-US Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on
Thailand. Bangkok :FTA Watch, 2004.
———. Free Trade Agreement: Impacts on Thailand. Bangkok: FTA
Watch, 2004.
FTA Watch. “ Thailand’s Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights
Obligations: Letter for Submission to the 84 th Session of the UN
Human Rights Committee” (2005) at www.ftawatch.org.
Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. “Internationalization, Institutions, and
Political Change” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics,
edited by Robert O. Keohane, and Helen V. Milner. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Gilpin, Robert. Global Political Economy: Understanding International
Economic Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Goldstein, Judith and Lisa L. Martin. “Legalization, Trade Liberalization,
and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note.” International
Organization vol. 54, no. 3 (2000): 603-632.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
107
Gourevitch, Peter. “ The Second Image Reversed: The International
Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization vol. 32,
no. 4 (1978): 881-912.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. “ The Politics of Free Trade
Agreements.” The American Economic Review vol. 85, no. 4
(1995): 667-690.
Grant, Wynn. Pressure Groups and British Politics. London: Macmillian
Press, 2000.
Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. “Thailand and Globalization” in East Asia and
Globalization, edited by Samuel S Kim. Maryland: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2000.
Henderson, David. “W TO 2002: Imaginary Crisis, Real Problems.” World
Trade Review vol. 1, no. 3 (2002): 277-296.
Hewison, Kewin. “Emerging Social Forces in Thailand: New Political and
Economic Roles” in The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones,
McDonald’s and Middle-Class Revolution edited by Richard
Robinson and David S.G Goodman. London and New York:
Routledge, 1996.
Hewison, Kewin. “Thailand: Capitalist Development and the State’ in The
Political Economy of South-East Asia: An Introduction, edited by
Garry Rodan, Kewin Hewinson and Richard Robinson. Melbourne:
Oxford University Press, 1998.
———. “Resisting Globalization: A Study of Localism in Thailand.” The
Pacific Review vol. 13, no. 2 (2000): 279-296.
———. “Thailand’s Capitalism Before and After the Economic Crisis” in
Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asia Crisis, edited by
Richard Robinson, Mark Beeson, Kanishka Jayasuriya and HyukRae Kim. London: Routledge, 2000.
———. “The Politics of Neo-Liberalism: Class and Capitalism in
Contemporary Thailand.” Working Paper Series: No. 45, Hong
Kong Southeast Asia Research Centre, The City University of
Hong
Kong
(2003)
at
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP45_03_Hewison.pl.
Hocking, Brian. “ Trade Politics: Environments, Agendas and Processes”
in Trade Politics: International, Domestic and Regional
Perspectives, edited by Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire.
London: Routledge, 1999.
Hoekman, Bernard and Michel Kostecki. The Political Economy of the
World Trading System: WTO and Beyond (2 nd ed.) Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
Intal J.R., Ponciano. “Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
Business.” Paper prepared for ‘Business for Development’
Conference hosted by Department of Trade and International
108
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
Trade Center, 21-22 October, 2004, Philippine Trade Training
Center, Manila.
Itoga, Shigeru. “Labor Issues and APEC Liberalization: Case of Thailand
and Malaysia.” IDE APEC Study Center Working Paper Series
No.1 Fiscal Year 1996/1997, Institute of Developing Economies,
Japan External Trade Organization (1997) at www.ide.go.jp.
Jamal, Vali. “NIKKEI Interviews: Employment in Asia” in Liberalization
and Labor, edited by Rajah Rasian and Norbert von Hofmann.
Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996.
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership (JTEP) Office. “Japan-Thailand
Economic Partnership Agreement.” www.mfa.go.th/jtepa.
Jayasuriya, Kanishka. “Embedded Mercantilism and Open Regionalism: the
Crisis of Regional Political Project.” Third World Quarterly vol.
24, no. 2 (2003): 339-355.
Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. “Internationalization and
Domestic Politics: An Introduction” in Internationalization and
Domestic Politics, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V.
Milner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Krongkaew, Medhi. “ The Economics of Institutional Change: Making
Economic Policy in Thailand” in Institutions and Econo mic
Change in Southeast Asia: the Context of Development from the
1960s to the 1990s, edited by Colin Barlow and Edward Elgar. UK:
Cheltenham, 1999.
Laothamatas, Anek. “From Clientelism to Partnership: BusinessGovernment Relations in Thailand” in Business and Government
in Industrializing Asia, edited by Andrew MacIntyre. New South
Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1994.
Laothamatas, Anek. Business Associations and the New Political Econo my
of Thailand, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992.
Limsamarnphun, Nophakhun. “Bilateral Free Trade is A Game of High
Stakes,” The Nation’, February 23, 2004 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Lloyd, P.J. “New Regionalism and New Bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific.”
Visiting Researchers Series No. 3, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies (2002).
Low, Linda. “ The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization.” AsiaPacific Develop ment Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-23.
MacIntyre, Andrew. “Business, Government and Development: Northeast
and Southeast Asian Comparisons” in Business and Government in
Industrializing Asia, edited by Andrew MacIntyre. New South
Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1994.
Ministry of Commerce (in Thai). FTA Fact Book. Bangkok: Department
of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce, 2004.
VOL. 2 ,
NO.
1 —MAY 2 0 0 6
109
Nagai, Fumio. “ Thailand’s Trade Policy: WTO plus FTA?” IDE APEC
Study Centre, Working Paper Series 01/02-No.6, APEC Study
Centre, Institute of Developing Economies (2002).
Na Thalang, Jeerawat. “Advice From Economists: Focus FTAs on Major
Markets,” The Nation, September 25, 2004 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Oatley, Thomas. International Political Economy: Interests and
Institutions in the Global Econo my. New York: PearsonLongman, 2004.
Phongpaichit, Pasuk. “Civilizing the State: State, Civil Society and
Politics in Thailand.” The Wertheim Lecture 1999, Centre for
Asian Studies Amsterdam (1999).
Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Chris Baker. Thailand: Economy and Politics
(2n Ed.) Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 2002.
———. “Democracy, Capitalism and Crisis: Examining Recent Political
Transitions in Thailand.” Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University,
2001.
Pinyorat, Rungrawee C. ‘Activists Want New Law to Control FTAs
Process’, The Nation, March 20, 2004 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
———. “Trade Negotiations: FTA Opponents Plan Rally, The Nation,”
June
30,
2004
via
FTA
Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgibin/content/newse/list.pl.
Ravenhill, John. “ The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific.” Third World
Quarterly vol. 24, no. 2 (2003): 299-317.
Richardson, Jeremy. “Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change.”
Political Studies vol. 48 (2000): 1006-1025.
Rodan, G. The Political Economy of South-East Asia: Conflicts, Crises and
Change, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Rodrik, Dani. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington D.C.:
Institute of International Economics, 1997.
———. “Feasible Globalizations.” John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University (2002) at,
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Feasglob.pdf.
Rogowski, Ronald. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects
Do mestic Political Align ments. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1989.
———. “Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic
Political Alignments” in International Political Economy:
Perspective on Global Power and Wealth (4 th ed.), edited by Jeffry
A. Frieden and David A. Lake. Boston: Routledge, 2000.
Shinawatra, Thaksin (in Thai). “Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities for
Business.” Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra,
110
IN TE RN A T I O N AL P U BL I C P O L I CY R E VIE W
February 19 th , 2004 at the Federation of Thai Industries’ Seminar
on Free Trade Agreements, UNESCAP (2004).
Solingen, Etel. ‘ASEAN, Quo Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and Regional
Cooperation’ Contemporary Southeast Asia vol. 21, no. 1 (1999):
pp30-53.
TDRI (in Thai). “Report of the Study on Impacts from Thailand-United
States Free Trade Agreement.” Thailand Development Research
Institute, Bangkok, Thailand (2003).
———. “Sub-topic Study Number 2: Preliminary Analysis on the Impact
from Thailand-Japan Free Trade Agreement.” Thailand
Development Research Institute (2005) at www.ftadigest.com.
TDRI, “FTA Digest”, www.ftadigest.com.
The
Economist,
“Country
Briefings:
Thailand,”
2004.
www.economist.com.
The Nation, “Furore over Steel ‘Cave-in,’” April 5, 2005 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
———. “Push for FTAs with US, Australia and Japan by Year’s End,”
February 20. 2004 via FTA Watch, http://www.ftawatch.org/cgibin/content/newse/list.pl.
———. “Thai-Japan FTA Talks: Warning from Carmakers,” April 8,
2005
via
FTA
Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgibin/content/newse/list.pl.
Treerapongpichit, Busrin, “Local Manufacturers Cry Foul Over Change in
Stance on Steel,” Bangkok Post, April 4, 2005 via FTA Watch,
http://www.ftawatch.org/cgi-bin/content/newse/list.pl.
Unger, Danny. Building Social Capital in Thailand: Fibres, Finance, and
Infrastructure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
USTR (United States Trade Representative). “Letter to House of
Representatives on Intent to Negotiate FTA with Thailand.”
USTR (2004) at www.ustr.gov.
———. “Letter to Senate on Intent to Negotiate FTA with Thailand.”
USTR (2004) at www.ustr.gov.
US-Thailand FTA Business Coalition. “US-Thailand FTA Business
Coalition.” http://www.us-asean.org/us-thai-fta/
World Bank. “Thailand Economic Monitor.” World Bank Thailand Office
(2005) www.worldbank.org.