Rev Econ Household (2008) 6:327–346
DOI 10.1007/s11150-008-9041-6
Registered domestic partnerships among gay men
and lesbians: the role of economic factors
M. V. Lee Badgett Æ Gary J. Gates Æ Natalya C. Maisel
Received: 1 March 2007 / Accepted: 1 July 2008 / Published online: 24 July 2008
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract In this paper, we predict the demand for a marriage-like status—registered domestic partnership–among same-sex couples. Domestic partnership in the
state of California now comes with almost all of the rights and responsibilities of
marriage that a state can provide. We use the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender) Tobacco Use Survey conducted by the California Department of
Health and the Field Research Corporation in 2003. From this telephone survey, we
use a probability sample of 1,002 lesbian and gay individuals in California. Using
multinomial probit models of partnership status (single, not cohabiting, cohabiting,
or registered), we find limited evidence of economic motivations in the choice to
register. Gay men’s likelihood of registration rises with income; lesbians’ probability of registration rises with age. Couples with longer duration are more likely to
register, suggesting that registration and duration are complementary signals of
commitment and possibly of the need for rights and benefits of registration.
Keywords Economics of household Sexual orientation Lesbian and gay issues Marriage Domestic partnership Same-sex couples
M. V. Lee Badgett
Center for Public Policy & Administration, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
M. V. Lee Badgett (&) G. J. Gates
The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Avenue, P.O. Box 951476,
Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
e-mail: lbadgett@pubpol.umass.edu; badgett@law.ucla.edu
G. J. Gates
e-mail: gates@law.ucla.edu
N. C. Maisel
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, 1285 Franz Hall,
P.O. Box 951563, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
e-mail: maisel@ucla.edu
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JEL Classifications
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
J12 J16 J18
1 Introduction
Social scientists in every discipline have studied marriage. Until relatively
recently, the idea of a lifelong—or at least long-term—legal, personal, economic,
and social commitment between two individuals centered exclusively on a
heterosexual couple. Correspondingly, studies of marriage and relationships
focused almost exclusively on different-sex couples. In the last twenty years,
however, both legal and social institutions related to committed couples have
evolved considerably.
Social scientists have begun to learn about the social, economic, and psychological characteristics of same-sex couples (e.g. Blumstein and Schwartz 1983;
Badgett 2001; Gates and Ost 2004; Andersson et al. 2006; Black et al. 2007).
However, we know virtually nothing about which gay and lesbian couples decide to
take advantage of the opportunity to legally recognize their relationship and why
they make that choice, despite the fact that more than 23 percent of the U.S.
population now lives in a state with a form of legal recognition of same-sex couples
akin to marriage (e.g., marriage, civil unions, or domestic partnership).
Both the legislative debate over the recognition of same-sex couples and the
courtroom battles for the right to marry have highlighted the economic rights and
benefits that come with marriage (see Baker vs. State of Vermont; Goodridge vs.
Massachusetts). Since equality of access to those economic rights for same-sex
couples appears to be a central goal of advocates seeking the expansion of rights,
one might also expect economic considerations to play a central role in the decisions
of couples who gain those rights. Therefore, in this paper, we use a new Californiabased data source to study the influence of economic factors on the demand for
registered domestic partnership among same-sex couples. Registered domestic
partnerships (RDP) in the state of California comes with almost all of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage that a state can provide, and in recent litigation, the
State of California argued that registered domestic partnership is legally equivalent
to marriage in terms of such state-provided rights, benefits, and obligations. If
lesbian and gay individuals perceive domestic partnership to be equivalent to
marriage in terms of benefits and obligations, as we assume for our purposes, then
we would expect them to approach the decision to register in the same way they
would consider the decision to marry.
To analyze the decisions about cohabitation and registration among same-sex
couples, this study draws on the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)
Tobacco Use Survey, which was conducted by the California Department of Health
and the Field Research Corporation in 2003–2004. This telephone survey included a
probability sample of self-identified LGBT individuals in California with a total
sample size of 876 gay men and 280 lesbians. More than half (51%) of these
individuals lived with a partner, and 28% of partnered gay and lesbian people had
registered their partnerships in a state or local registry.
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Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
329
We estimate multinomial probit models of partnership status to predict whether
an individual is single, with a partner but not cohabiting, cohabiting with a partner
but not registered, or cohabiting and registered. The multivariate approach
distinguishes this paper from a recent study using the same dataset (see Carpenter
and Gates 2008, which compares cross-tabulations on same-sex couples across
datasets). We find limited evidence of economic motivations in the choice to
register, though we do observe that gay men’s likelihood of registration rises with
income. Couples with longer duration are more likely to register, suggesting that
registration and duration are complementary signals of commitment and possibly of
the need for rights and benefits of registration. Finally, we note that the relatively
weak evidence of economic motivations found here is also consistent with the
hypothesis that domestic partnership is viewed as an inferior status by lesbians and
gay men when compared with marriage, even though domestic partnership is legally
and economically equivalent to marriage for same-sex couples.
2 Conceptual framework
Why do couples marry, and why might same-sex couples seek legal recognition
through the marriage-like status of registered domestic partnership? Economic
theories of utility maximization and household production argue that couples will
marry when they are better off doing so (e.g. Becker 1991). Marriage may promote
an individual’s and a couple’s economic well-being for several reasons:
•
•
•
•
Promoting specialization of labor: In Becker’s household production model,
marriage increases household efficiency by promoting the division of labor
(Becker 1991). Specialization in particular tasks is risky for each individual,
though, since the household might break up. A long-term commitment sealed by
a marriage contract is important for providing security for both spouses and
makes specialization more likely.
Reducing ‘‘transaction costs’’: Robert Pollak (1985) argues that marriage has
practical value by reducing transaction costs for couples, which are the costs in
time and money involved in negotiating a legal relationship. The marital
contract defines what would happen if the marriage ends by death or divorce,
specifying who gets marital property and control of children. The long-term
nature of marriage removes the need to renegotiate the terms of the legal
relationship as couples experience changed circumstances.
Providing social insurance: Wealth and income pooling by married couples and
families provides insurance against bad times, such as the failure of a harvest or
the loss of a job (Pollak 1985). An employed person usually has a legal
obligation to support his or her spouse financially, if necessary.
Signaling commitment: The willingness to marry is an important signal of
commitment to a relationship (Grossbard-Shechtman 1982; Eskridge 1996), and
it may underlie many other advantages of marriage. By agreeing to marry, each
partner signals greater effort to maintain the relationship, a greater likelihood
that the relationship will endure, and perhaps an agreement to make a fair
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•
•
•
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
settlement if, despite the good intentions of both individuals, the relationship
should end.
Taking advantage of economies of scale: By encouraging larger household sizes
(more than one adult), marriage helps families take advantage of ‘‘economies of
scale’’ (Nelson 1988). Economies of scale mean that doubling the inputs of time
and other resources in some task results in more than double the output of
family-related goods and services.
Promoting the provision of caring labor: The long-term nature of the marital
commitment promotes reciprocity and altruism, as partners take care of one
another and any children they might be raising together. The unpaid work done
in families is essential for the survival of healthy human beings (Folbre 1994).
Access to institutional supports from third parties: Marriage also comes with
economic and legal benefits and rights that often make couples better off than if
they were to remain unmarried (e.g. Badgett 2001). Some are provided by the
state, such as the right to sue for wrongful death or to file joint taxes; some are
provided by third parties, such as employers who provide health insurance
benefits for spouses of employees.
Expectations of gaining from any or all of those advantages might enter into a
couple’s deliberations about marriage. If such factors make a couple better off, and
if none make a couple worse off (e.g. due to the absence of a marriage penalty in the
tax code), we would expect these welfare-enhancing aspects of marriage to increase
the likelihood that a couple would choose to marry. For instance, one study finds
that same-sex couples would pay lower state taxes when filing joint state tax returns
(Badgett and Sears 2005).
Some—but not all—of these gains can be achieved by couples through
cohabitation without legal recognition. To the extent that these economic gains
require long-term relationships to encourage reciprocity and specialization,
however, we would expect such motives to be more closely aligned with choosing
marriage than with cohabitation because of the legal obligations that flow from
marriage. And while cohabitation contracts could substitute for some of the
contractual aspects of marriage (assuming that courts will enforce the agreements),
private contracts cannot substitute for marriage when it comes to recognition by
third parties, such as the state or employers. Cohabitation contracts might be viewed
as inferior options to marriage also because they are likely to be more sensitive to
individuals’ relative bargaining power. Finally, relationships united solely by
private contracts are unlikely to enjoy the social and cultural recognition of a
publicly defined marriage.
Several other perspectives also suggest that the link between economic wellbeing and marriage is not so clear cut. Indeed, evidence from heterosexual couples
suggests that the crucial difference between marriage and cohabitation may be more
cultural than economic. In the United States, people are more likely to marry than
cohabit if they are religious and not politically liberal, as well as when they have
strong intentions to have children, have traditional ideas about gender roles, and do
not value their individual freedom as highly (Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel 1990;
Bumpass et al. 1991; Clarkberg et al. 1995; Smock 2000). Kiernan argues that the
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Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
331
choice to cohabit may involve a conscious desire to avoid dependency or a loss of
power, particularly for women (K. Kiernan 2002, ‘‘Unpublished manuscript’’).
Economic well-being might also be connected to marriage in other ways that
complicate the standard perspective in economics. Some have found that married men,
in particular, have higher wages in part because of selection of better-off individuals
into marriage (Benham 1974; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; Grossbard-Shechtman
1986; Gray 1997; Hersch and Stratton 2000). Two recent studies add to the evidence
for another effect of male income on different-sex marriage. A study of low-income
women (Edin and Kefalas 2005) and another of working class cohabiting couples
(Smock et al. 2005) suggest that some couples defer marriage until they have the
economic resources (jobs and stable incomes) thought necessary for marriage.
While economic theories of the family were developed to explain behavior of
different-sex couples, these conceptual frameworks might help explain the decisions
of same-sex couples, too, now that options for legal recognition have expanded (e.g.
Badgett 2001; Black et al. 2007). Other approaches suggest some alternative
hypotheses positing a more limited role for economic value in same-sex couples’
decision-making. First, some commentators have hypothesized that same-sex
couples lack the complementarities and the child-bearing intentions that characterize different-sex couples and that enhance the value of marriage for such couples
(e.g. Allen 2006), suggesting that applying an economic approach derived from the
experience of different-sex couples would be inappropriate for same-sex couples.
A second argument against a simple application of the economic model is that
registered domestic partnership may not be an institution that is equivalent to
marriage. As noted earlier, California’s registered domestic partnership was
designed to be the legal equivalent of marriage: ‘‘Registered domestic partners
shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law… as are granted to and imposed
upon spouses.’’ (California Family Code 297.5(a)) But procedures for entering a
marriage and a domestic partnership differ. While marriage requires a couple to
apply for a license in person and then go through a ceremony with an officiant and a
witness, domestic partnership registration only requires that couples send a signed
and notarized document to the California Secretary of State. Further, neither the
federal government nor most other states recognize the domestic partner status, as is
also the case with marriages of same-sex couples in Massachusetts. Other than the
portability and federal recognition issues, though, marriage and domestic partnership are economically equivalent for same-sex couples (although not for differentsex couples).1
But the fact that some same-sex couples in California sued for (and won) the
right to marry suggests that both couples and the California Supreme Court saw a
distinction between marriage and domestic partnership. Indeed, the Court found that
1
Even the California Supreme Court noted that domestic partnership provides virtually all of the rights
and obligations of marriage under California law. The Court ruled that calling legal recognition of
relationships ‘‘marriage’’ for different-sex couples and ‘‘domestic partnership’’ for same-sex couples
constitutes sexual orientation discrimination that violates the right to equal protection of the law. In re
Marriage
Cases,
California
Supreme
Court
(S147999),
May
15,
2008,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S147999.PDF (accessed May 15, 2008).
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M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
marriage differs from domestic partnership in its symbolic meaning and common
understanding, not in its legal rights and responsibilities.
As one considers the relationship between economic factors and registering as
domestic partners, Allen’s view that differences in child-bearing propensity mean
that economic theories of different-sex coupling are not appropriately applicable to
same-sex couples and the Court’s observation that domestic partnership and
marriage are inherently unequal offer two perspectives that contribute to additional
hypotheses: (1) economic factors should simply not matter in the decisions of samesex couples to register their partnership (a la Allen) or (2) the economic value of
legal recognition might be diminished or overshadowed by the separate-but-equal
nature of domestic partnership (a la the Court). In either case, the role of economic
factors in the choice to register as domestic partners is a question well-suited for
empirical testing.
Few opportunities exist to examine the choices of same-sex couples to seek legal
marriage or registration of their partnership, and few studies to date have analyzed
the situations that do exist. In the United States, only Massachusetts and, quite
recently, California have allowed same-sex couples to marry, but Vermont, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Oregon also offer a status that is intended
to provide all of the benefits of marriage that a state can provide. Canada, the
Netherlands, Spain, and South Africa allow same-sex couples to marry, and many
other European countries provide a status similar to civil unions. These situations
provide researchers with opportunities to analyze the marriage or registration
decisions of same-sex couples.
Several qualitative studies of nonrandom samples of same-sex couples have
analyzed the motives for seeking symbolic recognition (e.g. commitment ceremonies) or legal recognition (marriage, civil unions, or registered partnership) (Lewin
1988; Stiers 1999; Hull 2003; Schechter et al. 2005; Eskridge and Spedale 2006;
Badgett 2008). According to these studies, the legal and material benefits of
marriage played an important role in the decision of some same-sex couples to
marry in Massachusetts, and similar reasons are cited for American same-sex
couples’ stated desire to marry where marriage is not a legal option.2 For some
European couples, practical benefits such as immigration rights or preferences
appear to be attractive aspects of marriage or registered partnership (the European
equivalent of civil unions or California’s registered domestic partnership).3
Marriage’s creation of a legal framework for organizing a couple’s life together
is also an attractive feature of marriage for couples in both the United States and the
Netherlands (e.g. Badgett 2008).
These differing perspectives on the value of marriage suggest several more
specific hypotheses that we will analyze using the data described in the next section.
In some cases the existing conceptions of marriage lead to strong predictions about
2
See Schecter et al. 2005, on couples in Massachusetts. Stiers 1999, and Hull 2003, asked couples about
their intentions to marry or prioritization of marriage as an issue.
3
For Denmark, see Eskridge and Spedale 2006, p. 102. Andersson et al. 2005, find that many male samesex couples who have registered as partners in Norway and Sweden are binational couples, unlike female
same-sex couples and different-sex couples who married over the same period.
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Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
333
the effect of a variable, while in others the direction of an effect is an empirical
rather than a theoretical matter.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Income: Higher income individuals or couples might be more likely to marry,
either because they are more desirable mates or because the higher levels of
wealth held by high-income individuals create incentives and the financial
ability to marry or register. Wealthier couples might gain more from
registration, since a surviving partner will inherit when his or her partner
dies intestate (without a will). (California no longer has an estate tax, so
spousal advantages in that realm would not be relevant.) Since we do not have
direct measures of wealth in the CTUS, income will serve as a proxy for
wealth. Alternatively, Grossbard-Shechtman (1982) argues that higher income
men might be less likely to marry in heterosexual relationships. In her model,
men have a choice of giving risk averse women a high formal commitment
(marriage) and a smaller share of income or a combination of a lower level of
commitment and a higher share of income. Holding women’s characteristics
constant, men with higher incomes will be less likely to marry than are lower
income men, since the higher income men can offer women a higher share of
male income to compensate their female partners for the economic risks
associated with not marrying. If a similar dynamic operates for gay men or
lesbians, perhaps because of varying risk aversion between partners, higher
incomes might reduce the probability of registering a domestic partnership.
Age: Older individuals might be more likely to register or marry for economic
reasons. First, they might have a greater need to protect their assets because
they have more of them. Second, they might also have a greater need to protect
them because of vulnerability to serious illness or death.
Children: Having a child in the household would increase the likelihood of
coupling and registering. When one partner in a registered domestic (female)
partnership gives birth, her partner is automatically considered to be the
child’s legal parent. Accordingly, being registered domestic partners may
reduce the legal expenses necessary to establish parental rights. Also, if
domestic partners pool their income more, it might make it easier for one
partner to take primary responsibility for childrearing duties.
Need for social insurance or care: Recent events such as a serious illness or a
spell of unemployment (or the expectation that such an event might occur)
might increase the likelihood of marriage. Registered domestic partnership and
marriage give partners legal rights with respect to making health care decisions
for an incapacitated partner and provide hospital visitation rights. In the worstcase scenario, a partner’s death will give the surviving partner a stronger legal
position vis-à-vis the deceased partner’s estate. In other words, the legal and
economic value of registered domestic partnership is higher in these
circumstances. So to the extent that the practical value matters, couples in
which a partner has experienced serious illness or unemployment should be
more likely to register. However, the hypothesis about selection into marriage
suggests that an employed or healthy current or potential partner might not be
willing to take on caring responsibilities, reducing the likelihood of continuing
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(5)
(6)
(7)
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
or entering a more legally binding relationship. In economic terms, the supply
of individuals in precarious positions might be high in the marriage market,
but the demand for such individuals as partners might be quite low (GrossbardShechtman 1982; see also Mukhopadhyay 2008).
Sex: Female same-sex couples are more likely to be raising children than are
male couples, likely raising the unconditional rate of registration among
female couples. Even when controlling for current children in the household,
women might be more likely to marry or register than men because of greater
expectations of future childbearing within the relationship.
Marital history: Individuals who have married in the past are likely to have
greater knowledge of the practical advantages (and perhaps disadvantages) of
legal recognition. Those individuals might also possess marriage-positive
attitudes or beliefs that heighten their interest in the status that is as close to
marriage as same-sex couples can get in California. Thus this variable might
reflect both economic and cultural attraction to legal recognition.
Duration of relationship: On one hand, relationships that have lasted longer
might increase the likelihood that a couple is willing to make the commitment
embodied in registered domestic partnership. In that sense, personal and legal
commitments are complementary. On the other hand, in the absence of a legal
recognition option for same-sex couples, longevity of the relationship may act
as a substitute commitment device for both the couple and for the couple’s
family and community. Therefore, the effect of duration on the probability of
registering is an empirical question. Studies show that duration of relationship
is positively related to the pooling of income in heterosexual couples (Bonke
and Uldall-Poulsenl 2007; Winkler 1989). While studies of heterosexual
couples have found that longer cohabitation prior to marriage increases the risk
of divorce, those studies may not be helpful in understanding the effect of
duration on partnership registration for same-sex couples who have only
recently had options for formal legal recognition.
3 Data
3.1 Sample
To analyze the factors involved in the choice to legally register a same-sex
relationship, we use the California Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)
Tobacco Use Survey (or CTUS), which was conducted in 2003–2004 by the Field
Research Corporation for the California Department of Health. This telephone
survey asked a series of questions related to smoking and other matters to a
probability sample of 2,287 primarily LGBT-identified individuals in California. We
use a subsample of lesbians and gay men from this larger survey, as discussed below.
The CTUS used a stratified sampling method to derive a representative sample of
the LGBT population in California. (See Bye, Albright, and Krotki (2004) for more
detail on weighting and stratification procedures.) The household-level survey
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Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
335
sampled six geographic strata that had low, average, and high proportions of samesex ‘‘unmarried partners’’ in Census 2000. (See Gates and Ost 2004, for details
about Census counts of same-sex couples.) Since the Census data only allow
identification of same-sex couples, the CTUS sampling strategy could bias the
sample toward having more same-sex couples among the LGBT people surveyed
than is representative among all LGBT people in California. Indeed, Carpenter and
Gates (2008) showed that the proportion of lesbians and gay men partnered with
someone of the same sex is relatively high in this sample when compared to the
California Health Interview Survey, another smaller probability sample of
California lesbians and gay men. However, the demographic characteristics of
couples in Census 2000 and the CHIS are very similar to the CTUS couples,
suggesting that the sampling procedure resulted in no serious bias in the
characteristics of the couples.4
Respondents contacted through random-digit-dialing were asked a screening
question about their sexual orientation and about sexual behavior with same-sex
partners in order to assess each household for inclusion in the sample.5 The sample
in this study includes only those men and women who self-identified as gay or
lesbian on a later question. Our focus here is on lesbians and gay men because they
are the most likely to partner with and register a relationship with someone of the
same sex. We removed bisexuals from the sample because of the need for more
complex modeling of the sex of a partner in addition to choices about cohabitation
and registration. Two-thirds of the partnered bisexuals in this dataset report having a
different-sex partner. In contrast, virtually no self-identified gay men or lesbians are
partnered with someone of a different sex. We also removed transgender
respondents because of the difficulty of identifying how both respondents and the
state would classify transgender individuals for purposes of defining a same-sex
relationship. We also did not include a small group of lesbians and gay men who
said they were currently married. Unfortunately, the survey did not permit us to
determine the sex of spouses in the cases where individuals said they were currently
married. Finally, for consistency regarding gay and lesbian identity, we eliminated
respondents who identified their sexual orientation as ‘‘no label’’, ‘‘queer’’,
‘‘questioning’’, or ‘‘other’’. After eliminating those with some missing data on
variables studied, we have usable data from 768 gay men and 234 lesbians
(N = 1002).6
4
However, the one exception to the similarities is that the rates of child-rearing were much lower in the
CHIS than in the Census or the CTUS.
5
The screening questions were as follows: ‘‘We are interested in speaking with people who are not often
studied in public health research: gay and bisexual men. Would you include yourself in one of these
groups?’’ The question for women used ‘‘lesbian or bisexual women.’’ If the respondent answered no to
this question, a second question was asked as follows (female example shown here): ‘‘Regardless of
whether a person thinks of herself as lesbian, bisexual or heterosexual, we are also interested in speaking
with women who have had sex with other women at any time in their life. Do you fall into this
category?’’.
6
From the original sample of 2,287 individuals survey, we removed 239 individuals who did not answer
the sexual orientation question, 438 men and women who identified as heterosexual, 328 who identified as
bisexual, 55 transgender respondents, 30 individuals who said they were currently married, 53
respondents who chose ‘‘no label’’, and 54 who identified as queer, questioning, or other.
123
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M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
3.2 Partnership and DP registration
The CTUS asked respondents if they ‘‘currently have a primary partner,’’ with
primary partner defined as ‘‘someone you love more than anyone else and feel a
unique commitment to.’’ Subsequent questions asked about the sex of the partner,
whether the couple lived together and whether their domestic partnership was
registered with either the local or state government. Of those with a primary partner,
127 were living apart from their partner (27.7% weighted percentage of respondents
with a partner), 233 were living together but were not registered (55.1% weighted),
and 171 were living together and were registered (27.7% weighted).
Unfortunately, the wording of the registration question does not distinguish
between state and local registration. In 2003–2004, state registration as domestic
partners entailed a much larger set of rights and responsibilities than did local
registration in several cities in California. (Most local registration processes result in
very few benefits or obligations.) In particular, the rights and responsibilities
embodied in state domestic partner registration more closely resembled those of
marriage as a result of legislation that was passed during the time the survey was in
the field.
Despite the ambiguity of the question, we argue that most of the people
answering ‘‘yes’’ to the survey question on registration were registered with the
state and that those who were only registered with a local government shared a
personally (if not legally) equivalent commitment. First, the relative numbers of
registrations suggest that anyone who is ‘‘registered’’ in our data is much more
likely to be registered with the state than with a city. By the end of June 2003,
19,734 couples had registered their partnerships with the state (Secretary of State
2006), and 94–95% were same-sex couples (Susan Cochran, personal communication 2005). That total is much larger than the typical number of local
registrations, which numbered only in the hundreds (at most) for same-sex and
different-sex couples in several large cities from which we were able to gather data
(Sacramento et al.). Indeed, the CTUS tracks the data on partnership registrations
reasonably closely. In 2004, the count of registered domestic partnerships was 32%
of the number of same-sex couples counted in the Census, which is close to the
CTUS weighted rate of 28%.
Second, a comparison of a sample of registered same-sex couples in the city of
Berkeley with the list of state-registered couples indicates that a sizable minority of
those couples are registered with the state as well as with the city. Third, it is
possible that couples equate the significance of state and local registration out of the
mistaken belief that local registration gives them the same legal status as state
registration. The California Secretary of State’s webpage on domestic partnership
includes a clarification that local registration is not equivalent to state registration,
suggesting that this is a common source of confusion. In the end, although we
cannot conclusively say that individuals with registered domestic partners in our
dataset are registered with the state, we argue that registration among couples in the
CTUS is either in reality or in perception a legally meaningful registration at the
state level.
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Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
Table 1 Mean characteristics
by sex of gay and lesbian
sample, LGBT California
tobacco use survey
337
All GL
Gay men
Lesbians
Single (%)
35.8
42.8
24.5
Partner-not cohabiting (%)
11.0
11.2
10.7
Partner-cohabiting, not RDP (%)
35.4
35.2
35.7
Partner-RDP (%)
17.8
10.8
29.1
Age
42.3
42.5
42.0
College (%)
53.5
55.6
50.3
White (%)
75.0
77.1
71.6
Black (%)
5.7
2.7
10.4
Hispanic (%)
14.0
13.3
15.3
Other (%)
7.1
9.8
2.7
Race/ethnicity
Total duration (among partnered)
9.7
10.8
8.4
Illness (%)
12.3
12.5
11.9
Unemployment (%)
20.1
19.4
21.2
Individual income ($)
42,426
43,694
40,379
Ever married (%)
16.4
12.7
22.2
Has child (%)
14.7
7.5
26.4
Female (%)
38.2
0.0
100.0
N
1,002
768
234
3.3 Other measures
The CTUS also includes data on each respondent’s age, education, sex, household
income (cut in half as a proxy for individual income for people in couples), presence
of children under age 18 in the home,7 marital history (ever married), and race/
ethnicity. The survey also asked respondents to indicate whether they had lost a job
in the last year or whether they or their partner had been diagnosed with a serious
illness in the last year. In addition to the partnership status of each respondent, we
have information on the duration of relationships. However, we have very little
information about partners of respondents other than whether they have died or been
diagnosed with a serious illness in the last year.
Table 1 presents means from the CTUS for all gay and lesbian respondents and
for gay men and for lesbians separately. We use sampling weights created by Field
Research Corporation to better represent the characteristics of the population of gay
and lesbian Californians. More than 40% of gay men (but only a quarter of lesbians)
are single. A third of both groups live with a partner without registration, while
lesbians are almost twice as likely as gay men to be in a registered domestic
partnership. Gay men are slightly older and more likely to be white and college
7
Respondents are not asked about the age or origins of the children, e.g. whether they were born into the
current relationship or a past relationship.
123
338
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
Table 2 Means by partnership status for gay and lesbian sample, LGBT California tobacco use survey
Single
All partnered
Partnered–by status
Not cohabiting
Cohabiting only
Registered
Age
42.1
42.4
40.3
41.4
45.8
College (%)
49.7
55.6
48.0
54.1
63.3
White (%)
70.3
77.6
68.5
77.8
82.8
Black (%)
5.3
5.9
10.8
6.5
1.5
Hispanic (%)
14.4
13.9
12.4
14.7
13.1
Other (%)
11.4
4.7
8.4
4.4
3.0
Total duration
0
9.8
4.9
10.1
12.2
Illness (%)
15.2
10.6
13.7
9.7
10.7
Unemployment (%)
28.0
15.6
17.3
16.8
12.3
Individual income ($)
38,343
44,705
39,152
44,367
48,821
Race/ethnicity
Ever married (%)
11.7
18.9
20.1
12.5
31.1
Has child (%)
8.8
18.0
20.7
15.2
22.0
Female (%)
26.2
45.0
37.2
38.6
62.5
N
471
531
127
233
171
educated than are lesbians. Lesbians have lower incomes and are more likely to be
Hispanic, unemployed, ever married, and raising children than are gay men.
Table 2 separates the sample by partnership status. Compared with single gay
men and lesbians, partnered individuals look quite similar, with some exceptions.
Partnered individuals are less likely to have been ill or unemployed recently, and
partnered people have higher incomes and are more likely to be female. The last
three columns of Table 2 split those in couples by their cohabitation and registration
status. The comparison of couples suggests that people in registered domestic
partnerships are older and are more likely to be white, female, and ever married than
are people whose partnerships are not registered. Identifying predictors of
registration more precisely requires a multivariate approach, however.
4 Method
The decision to marry or to register as domestic partners involves at least three
components, each of which tracks the data available from the CTUS. The first
component is the decision to be in a serious romantic relationship. From that
perspective, the empirical question involves comparisons between people who are in
such a relationship with those who are not. The second component is the decision
about cohabitation. This second component also implies a third component—the
decision to marry/register or not. (In California, registered domestic partners are
required to have a common residence, which makes cohabitation a prerequisite to
registration.) While that third marriage/registration decision may or may not be
123
Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
339
made explicitly by couples, remaining in the default status of legally single still
constitutes a decision of a sort.
One way to model these decisions is in a complex three-stage decision-making
process: first decide whether to date, then whether to cohabit or not, and then (if
cohabiting) whether to register. However, work by Seltzer (2000) and Smock (2000)
suggests dating and cohabitation do not always represent the first steps toward
marriage, even for heterosexual couples. Some heterosexual individuals choose not
to marry and to instead live with unmarried partners or have a non-cohabiting
partner.
An alternative way of modeling the competing risks gives individuals all four
options, which reflects the possibility that the decision to cohabit and marry/register
might occur as a package rather than in sequential steps. Accordingly, we model
individuals’ decisions with a multinomial probit procedure that allows for four
possible states: single, partnering without cohabitation, cohabitation, or legal
recognition.8 Since we are most interested in the contrast between cohabitors who
are and are not registered domestic partners, we use the registered cohabitors as the
base case for the multinomial probits for ease of comparison.
5 Results
Tables 3 and 4 present findings from the multinomial probit models for women
(Table 3) and men (Table 4). Two separate models are estimated in each table. The
first model in the left-hand columns includes all women (men). Thus for the first
model, each panel of Tables 3 and 4 presents coefficients from the equation
predicting being (1) single, (2) partnered but not cohabiting, or (3) partnered and
cohabiting but not registered, the reference being registered domestic partners
(RDPs). The second model, in the right-hand columns, limits the sample to people
in couples, thus capturing the effect of the characteristics on a partnered person’s
probability of cohabiting as opposed to being registered.
The coefficients in the multinomial probit procedure reflect the probability of
being in a particular status relative to being registered domestic partners. Positive
coefficients mean that higher levels of that variable increase the probability of being
in that status relative to being registered; negative coefficients mean that factor
reduces the probability of being in the status relative to being registered. Here we
focus mainly on the factors that distinguish RDPs from partnered respondents who
live with their partners, having also allowed respondents to be in the other two
categories.
For women, few characteristics distinguish lesbians in registered domestic
partnerships from those in other statuses.
8
We initially estimated multinomial logit models, which result in similar findings. However, tests of the
required independence of irrelevant alternatives rejected the null hypothesis that IIA is an appropriate
assumption in this situation.
123
123
Age
1.843*
0.966
* P \ 0.10, ** P \ 0.05, *** P \ 0.01
Note: Reference group is cohabiting women in a registered partnership
0.941
0.571
0.578
0.732
0.770
0.762
0.000
1.516*
-0.376
-1.048*
-0.003
-0.807
1.178
0.00001
0.133
-0.540
0.021
0.918
0.456
0.551
0.859
0.645
0.752
0.000
0.595
0.691
0.484
-0.008
-0.644
0.599
1.882**
-0.858
2.008*
0.00001
0.393
-0.005
-0.194
1.553
0.456
0.706
0.658
-0.026
-0.586
Coeff.
Constant
-0.566
0.479
1.579**
-0.477
1.397*
0.000001
0.382
-0.167
0.021
0.507
SE
-0.557***
0.488
0.539
0.901
0.674
0.739
0.000
-0.061***
-0.433
Coeff.
Duration
-1.189**
0.657
Other
Any child
0.015
Hispanic
-0.905*
1.201
Black
Ever married
0.00001
Income indiv
0.580
0.707
0.652
-0.303
0.021
0.461
0.003
-1.336***
Unemploy
Illness
College
SE
1.056
0.123
0.631
0.710
0.815
0.752
1.200
0.000
0.738
0.844
0.535
0.030
SE
Coeff
Coeff.
SE
Partnered, non cohabiting
Partnered,
non cohabiting
Single (no partner)
Partnered, cohabiting,
not registered
Partnered women only
All women
Table 3 Multinomial probit models predicting partnership status for women
1.783*
-0.042
-0.767
-1.118*
-0.808
-0.816
1.634
0.00002*
0.056
-0.686
-0.340
-0.031
Coeff.
1.057
0.040
0.480
0.600
0.891
0.692
1.104
0.000
0.620
0.714
0.549
0.031
SE
Partnered, cohabiting,
not registered
340
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
Other
0.000
0.000
-0.00001**
0.000
-0.594
0.112
0.563
1.182
-0.00001
0.522
0.553
0.576
0.694
0.967
0.000
0.612
* P \ 0.10, ** P \ 0.05, *** P \ 0.01
Note: Reference group is cohabiting men in a registered partnership
1.517**
0.684
0.995
0.028
0.780
0.553
0.475
0.609
0.520
0.800
1.053**
-0.065
0.021
0.536
-0.094***
0.083
0.527
-0.115
-0.068
0.762
-0.283
0.379
0.374
0.046**
-0.024
-0.651
0.637
0.518
0.471
0.507
0.619
0.768
0.324
0.238
0.012
0.347
Duration
1.303**
-0.304
-0.076
0.583
0.974
-0.00001
0.487
0.510
0.147
-0.012
Constant
0.540
0.416
0.452
0.477
0.705
0.374
-0.004
0.429
0.014
0.607
1.561**
0.351
0.331
0.216
0.000
SE
1.524**
0.514
Any child
-0.459
0.185
0.666
Hispanic
Ever married
0.238
Black
-0.00001***
Unemploy
Income indiv
0.709**
0.560*
Illness
0.316
Coeff.
0.011
SE
-0.009
0.352
Age
College
Coeff.
Coeff.
SE
Coeff.
SE
Partnered,
non cohabiting
Partnered,
non cohabiting
Single (no partner)
Partnered, cohabiting,
not registered
Partnered men only
All men
Table 4 Multinomial probit models predicting partnership status for men
1.938**
-0.005
0.770
-0.239
0.238
0.762
-0.525
-0.00002**
0.345
0.699*
0.153
-0.009
Coeff.
0.926
0.024
0.644
0.533
0.700
0.617
1.020
0.000
0.443
0.404
0.424
0.020
SE
Partnered, cohabiting,
not registered
Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
341
123
342
•
•
•
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
Single versus RDP: Compared with RDPs, single lesbians are less likely to have
a college degree (a negative coefficient in the first panel of Table 3),9 less likely
to have been ever married, and less likely to have had a child.
Non-cohabiting versus RDP: Lesbians with non-cohabiting partners are younger
than registered lesbians, as shown by negative coefficients on age in the second
panel of Table 2. The non-cohabitants are also more likely to be black and other
(primarily Asian American) than are RDPs. In the second model that predicts
registration for lesbians only in couples, the racial patterns hold up. However,
age is no longer statistically significant, while duration of relationship is
negatively related to non-cohabitation. In other words, non-cohabiting couples
have shorter relationships than registered couples, and older couples tend to
have longer relationships.
Cohabiting versus RDP: Lesbians who live with their partners are also younger
than RDPs, but that difference is not statistically significant. In both models,
lesbians in RDPs are more likely to have ever been married than unregistered
cohabitants. (In unreported simple probits predicting registration only among
couples who live together, the ever-married variable is still the only significant
predictor of registration for lesbians who live with their partners.)
Among men in Table 4, different factors distinguish RDPs from men in other
partner status groups.
•
•
•
Single versus RDP: Having been diagnosed with a serious illness and having lost
your job increases the probability of being single relative to being registered.
Single men tend to have lower incomes than men with registered partnerships.
Non-cohabiting versus RDP: Having children increases the likelihood of having
a non-cohabiting partner. In the second model predicting registration only for
men in couples, the presence of children also decreases the likelihood of
registration (the coefficient shows children are a positive predictor of being a
non-cohabitant). Older men in cohabiting partnerships and men who have
recently experienced a serious illness are more likely to have non-cohabiting
partners over registered partners. In contrast, men in longer relationships are
more likely to be registered than non-cohabiting.
Cohabiting versus RDP: Income is the main factor that distinguishes the
registered and non-registered men who live with partners. In both models
9
In the specifications shown, we control for educational attainment with an indicator variable for having
at least a college degree. We used this simple specification to provide a more intuitive interpretation of
our findings. The current specifications suggest that, while not significant, women in registered
partnerships do appear to have higher levels of education. We also estimated the models using indicators
for some college, college, and graduate degrees. Comparing single women and those in registered
partners, the specification suggests an even weaker association with education as none of the indicators
are significant. Comparing non-registered partnered women (both cohabiting and non-cohabiting) to those
in registered partners, the indicator for some college is positive and significant. This suggests that the
‘‘threshold’’ for finding that women in registered partnerships have higher levels of education is likely
higher than the ‘‘some college’’ level. To test this, we also estimated the models with an indictor for a
graduate degree only. In this case, we find that single and non-cohabiting partnered women are
significantly less likely than women in registered partnerships to hold a graduate degree. There is not a
significant difference between cohabiting registered and non-registered women. There were not
significant results for men.
123
Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
343
estimated for men, higher income individuals are more likely to be registered.
Individuals in a cohabiting couple where at least one partner has experienced a
serious illness are less likely to be registered. (In simple probits predicting
registration, having children also decreases the likelihood of registration.)
Similar multinomial probit models (not shown) that combine the male and female
subsamples find that being female is positively related to being in a registered
partnership in all comparisons. This finding fits with the gender pattern seen in
Vermont civil unions (Solomon et al. 2003), but contrasts sharply with higher
proportions of male couples than female couples initially marrying or registering in
European countries (Waaldijk 2001; Rothblum 2005).
Overall, these findings suggest several conclusions about the economic
motivations for registration as domestic partners in California: evidence of
economic motivations is present but limited. First, the most direct economic
measure—income—appears to matter only for men, increasing the probability of
registration. Income might be an effective proxy for wealth, and hence for the value
of the legal framework that guides the distribution of assets in the case of death or
relationship dissolution. Higher incomes might allow for more public celebrations
that could (but do not necessarily) go along with the simple bureaucratic process of
creating a registered domestic partnership. Or men with higher incomes might seek
out registered domestic partnership as a legal status that also has a higher social
status. However, it is not clear why income would not matter for women in the same
way if these economic factors are important. Interpreting the gender difference in
the context of Grossbard-Shechtman’s model suggests that gay men might be more
risk averse than lesbians, with high income gay men using their income to convince
their partners to marry in order to create more stable relationships (GrossbardShechtman 1982). It may be that within gay male relationships, the lower earning
partner receives a higher income transfer from his higher earning partner than their
female counterparts in lesbian or heterosexual relationships receive from their
partners.
Second, economic factors may be at work in several less direct measures of the
economic value of registration. Perhaps age better captures these economic
considerations for women than does income. Older women are more likely to be
registered (though the differences are not always statistically significant), perhaps
because they have more assets to protect or feel more vulnerable to illness or death
compared with younger women, although these effects disappear when controlling
for relationship duration.
Third, we find a positive impact of duration on the likelihood of being registered
versus being in a non-cohabiting relationship for both men and women. This
suggests that longevity of relationships is also a measure of commitment, and that
longevity is complementary to registration rather than being a substitute for legal
status. Since domestic partnership registration was a very recent option at the time
of the survey, the causal connections are likely to be clearer here: longer duration
makes registration more likely rather than the other way around. Longtime couples
have had time to engage in symbolic or practical steps to achieve some legal
protection or cultural recognition for their relationships. The length of the
123
344
M. V. Lee Badgett et al.
relationship provides information to each individual in the couple that the other is
seriously committed to the relationship. Longtime couples have also had time to
achieve the kinds of economic gains that some economic theories predict are likely
tied to marriage, such as economics of scale, social insurance, and even
specialization.
Long duration couples have had time to establish themselves socially and
economically, so the relative gains to registration for them are likely smaller than
the gains for newer couples. In this case, one might expect registered couples to
have shorter duration relationships than their non-registered counterparts. But we
find the opposite. Long duration couples are in fact more likely than newer couples
to seek registration. Clearly, they see a distinct value to registration that goes
beyond what longevity can facilitate. This finding is consistent with an economic
explanation whereby couples see a clear value in the specific legal and economic
benefits that only a formalized status can provide.
The economic relevance of other meaningful characteristics that distinguish
registered gay men and lesbians from other individuals is harder to infer, however.
Take, for example, the role of having ever been married. If having been married
conveys information about the economic value of registration, then we would also
expect ever married men and women to be more likely to register. While this is true
for women, it does not hold for men. Of course, we know that the general economic
circumstances for men and women are quite different, so perhaps it is not a surprise
that they would respond differently to some economic incentives. We would also
expect that the experience of a serious illness by a partner would lead couples to
register as a way of providing additional economic protection. But it does not. In
fact, for men, illness is negatively associated with registration.
Women’s greater demand for registered domestic partnership compared with
men also creates ambiguities in relation to an economic explanation. On the one
hand, if gender were simply a proxy for different levels of wealth, we would expect
women to be less likely to register since they have fewer financial assets that
registration and accompanying formal dissolution/divorce laws could protect. On
the other hand, lesbians are more likely to have children than gay men and this
could certainly complicate such a simplistic explanation since domestic partnership
offers potential economic incentives associated with parenting and children. For
example, registration can provide easier access to health care for all members of a
family. It can also make it easier for both partners to gain parental rights, meaning
that both partners would be able to make important decisions in the case of a
medical emergency affecting a child.
Curiously, the presence of children in the home has a positive influence on
lesbians’ propensity to partner and register but a negative influence on gay men’s
propensity to cohabit. One could certainly make an argument that the positive
association between children and registration for lesbians is evidence that they are
responding to some of the economic incentives above, but given that gay men do not
respond in the same way, there might be other factors at play. Perhaps lesbians with
children gain more from having a partner’s involvement and household labor than
do gay men with children. Or perhaps children are a more attractive characteristic
for potential lesbian partners than for potential gay male partners. Census data
123
Registered domestic partnerships among gay men and lesbians
345
suggest that many of the children being raised by same-sex couples are likely to
have been born into prior heterosexual relationships (Gates and Romero 2008).
Evidence also suggests that women are more likely than men to have sole custody of
children (Cancian and Meyer 1998; Cook and Brown 2005). Single gay men may
perceive a greater risk of a custody challenge if they were to partner with another
man than single lesbians perceive if they were to partner with a woman. It is also
possible that the gender difference in registration reflects women’s greater
intentions to have children in the future, or even a greater biologically-based
preference for commitment.
Finally, we offer a quite different potential explanation for the lack of strong
predictive power of likely covariates of registration. If same-sex couples see
domestic partnership as an inferior legal and symbolic status when compared with
marriage, they might not react in the way predicted by economic theory. Registered
domestic partnership is simply not marriage. The federal government does not
recognize the status and it is generally not portable across state lines (with the
exception of a handful of states that recognize other states’ civil union and civil
union-like relationships). Entering domestic partnership requires no ceremony or
public vows. In short, couples’ actions (or, perhaps more appropriately, inactions)
may indicate the lesser economic and cultural value of domestic partnerships. Our
data suggest that only about a third of same-sex cohabiting couples in California are
registered. In contrast, 91% of cohabiting different-sex couples in California are
married.10 By heterosexual standards, lesbians and gay men appear to have a
relatively low take-up rate for formal recognition of their relationships. This suggests
that policymakers who have created separate statuses to recognize the relationships
of lesbians and gay men have not created a status that lesbians and gay men view as
equivalent to marriage. As more states begin to offer marriage to same-sex couples,
researchers will be presented with better conditions under which they can assess the
relative value of marriage to lesbians and gay men and the potential differences in
how they value marriage compared to other forms of legal recognition.
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