Proceedings of 10th Global Business and Social Science Research Conference
23 -24 June 2014, Radisson Blu Hotel, Beijing, China, ISBN: 978-1-922069-55-9
Mandatory and Voluntary Information Disclosure and the
Effects on Financial Analysts: Evidence from China
Wang Shengnian1, Gao Weiting2 and Liang Han 3, *
This paper employs panel data analysis approaches with fixed
effects on information collected from Chinese public firms in 20062010 to investigate the effects of mandatory earnings surprise
warnings issued by management on financial analysts in terms of
the number of following and the accuracy of earnings forecasts. We
find that compared with voluntary earnings forecasts issued by
management, firms which issue mandatory earnings surprise
warnings attract fewer financial analysts to cover them and the
following financial analysts forecast their earnings less accurately
and more dispersedly. It justifies the mandatory earnings surprise
warnings policy issued by CSRC in 2006.
Key words: Mandatory Earnings Surprise Warnings; Voluntary Earnings Forecasts;
Financial Analysts
JEL classification: M10, M41, M48
_____________________________________________________________________
1
Professor in Financial Management, School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University,
Shihezi, Xinjiang, China, 832003, west_sd@126.com
2
Administration of Taxation, Urumqi, Xinjiang, China, 832003, gaowtxj@sina.com
3
Visiting Professor, School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi, Xinjiang,
China, 832003; and Reader in Financial Management, Surrey Business School, University of
Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, U.K, GU2 7XH
*
Corresponding author, L.Han@surrey.ac.uk, Tel: +4401483689944