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When Tribesmen do not act Tribal:
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as
Schizophrenia)
Igor Cherstich
a a
University College of London, UK
Published online: 05 Nov 2014.
To cite this article: Igor Cherstich (2014): When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as
Ideology (not as Schizophrenia), Middle East Critique, DOI:
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Middle East Critique , 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2014.969890
When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan
Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia)
IGOR CHERSTICH
University College of London, UK
A
BSTRACT
The article seeks to problematize recent studies on Libyan tribalism. It argues that tribal identity is not, as some commentators suggest, a static reality that stands in opposition to ideological discourses like national identity. Rather, Libyan tribalism is an ideology in itself, and one that is compatible with national aspirations. The article offers also an analysis of the recent rise of tribal identity in Libya. In particular, the author suggests that Libya is not struggling to become a nation because of ingrained tribal identity. On the contrary, tribalism is growing stronger due to the legacy left by Qadhdhafi and the failure of the ‘new’ Libyan state to provide social security for its citizens.
K EY W ORDS : Identity; Ideology; Libya; Nationalism; Tribalism
Commentators on the Libyan revolution of 2011 often have used the term ‘tribalism’ as an empty mantra. Journalists and academics repeatedly have stated that Libya is comprised of tribes and that tribal leaders have played an active role during the war, siding either with the Qadhdhafi regime or with the revolution. They hardly have explained, however, what it means to be a Libyan tribesman, particularly in the context of the ‘new’ Libya that is emerging after the revolution. What is tribalism? Who are the tribesmen? Do they share a common national identity? Media commentators have avoided these questions and hastily dismissed Libya as a collection of ‘tribes with a flag.’
Scholars, on the other hand, have considered the tribes as a force that, although active in the national uprising, now is preventing Libya from becoming a nation.
Wolfram Lacher, in particular, has suggested that the tribal hinterland of the country constitutes a ‘conservative’ and divisive force that stands in opposition to urban revolutionary networks organized according to national
Correspondence Address : Prof. Igor Cherstich, Department of Anthropology, University College of London, 14
Taviton Street, London WC1H 0BW, UK. Email: I.cherstich@ucl.ac.uk
1
T. Friedman (
The New York Times , March 22, 2011; and B. Barber (
) Yes, Saif is
2 a Qadhdhafi, but there is still a real Reformer inside, The Guardian , April 13, 2011. Tribalism is a recent
‘discovery’ in Western media, see further I. Cherstich (2011) Libya’s Revolution: Tribe, Nation, Politics,
Open Democracy , October 3, 2011. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/igor-cherstich/libyasrevolution-tribe-nation-politics , accessed June 19, 2014.
R. B. St John (
) The Post-Qadhafi Economy, in: J. Pack (ed.) The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future , pp. 100 – 101 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
q
2014 Editors of Middle East Critique
2 I. Cherstich or Islamist principles.
The media pundits have made abundant use of the tribal mantra, stressing that Libya is about tribes without explaining what the Libyan tribes are about.
The scholars successfully have proven that tribalism is only one of the facets of the revolution, but they have not explored how these facets (tribal, urban, national, religious) inform each other. Libya-watchers have failed to explain whether tribesmen can think national, thus portraying Libya as a ‘schizophrenic’ country: For some, a place where tribesmen delude themselves into being a nation; for others, a context where cohesive national identity constantly is threatened by tribal dissociation.
This view of a schizophrenic Libya presents an evident limit: It bears little relation to the ethnographic reality of the country. Those who see Libyans as ‘tribes with a flag’ ignore that in Tripoli and surrounding areas tribal membership is not considered important.
Similarly, Lacher, who traces a dichotomy between ‘tribal hinterland’ and ‘urban revolutionary spirit,’
disregards the fact that in cities like Benghazi—one of the epicentres of the revolution,
tribal identity often is deemed important,
and he thus proposes a false dichotomy of ‘city’ and ‘countryside’ that has been problematized in social science.
By presenting an opposition between tribes and ‘revolutionary militias’
with national or Islamist aspirations, he also ignores that many militias also have a strong
In this article I will demonstrate these limitations, but I also will focus on a more crucial problem: these commentators have misunderstood the very nature of
Libyan tribalism. If it is true that the fundamental aspect of schizophrenia is confusion
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8
9
W. Lacher (
2013 ) The Rise of Tribal Politics, ibid, pp. 152, 158, 166, 168.
Ibid, p. 163.
BBC News (2011) Libya Protests: Second City Benghazi hit by Violence, February 16, 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12477275 , accessed February 9, 2014.
In a 1994 survey conducted in Libya, A. Obeidi found that 43% of the urban interviewees were very attached to a tribe, 47% were attached to some degree, and only 10% were not attached at all; see A. Obeidi (
Political Culture in Libya , p. 122 (London: Routledge). On tribes and cities in Libya, see also A. Ahmida
(
Forgotten Voices: Power and Agency in Colonial and Postcolonial Libya , pp. 19 – 34 (London:
Routledge).
Curiously, W. Lacher admits that his dichotomy tribes/cities is an oversimplification (Lacher, The Rise, p. 167), but that does not prevent him from using it as his main argument. Furthermore, he describes the rise of tribal politics in post-Qadhdhafi Libya as an ascendency of the periphery (the ‘local level’) against old centres of power (ibid, p. 152). This analytical lens, however, does not make much sense because Muammar
Qadhdhafi (the ‘centre of the centres of power’) was, among other identities, a member of the Qadhafa tribe.
Tribesmen are also many of the leading political figures of the pre and post Qadhdhafi era. Contrary to what
Lacher implies, therefore, Libyan tribalism never has been a ‘peripheral phenomenon.’ Since Qadhdhafi and some of his ‘free officers’ belonged to minor tribes, their rise to power in 1969 could be read as an ascendency of peripheral tribes against more influential tribal groups, but even this reading would be partial. Today many social scientists prefer to adopt a multi-centered approach rather than a strict dichotomy of centre/periphery.
This approach takes into account the fact that the narrative of ‘center’ and periphery’ often is designed according to the specific point of view of power-holders and does not necessarily reflect reality in all its complexities; see further M. Carrin & L. Guzy (
Voices from the Periphery (London: Routledge).
Lacher, The Rise, p. 166.
Among the militias with a tribal component one can mention the Zintan militias (some of which have cooperated with the former national government), and the Misurata militia. The latter, in particular, has strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood [ ikhwan al muslimin ]. It might be argued that the Brotherhood is not, technically, an Islamist organisation. However, in Libya it is perceived as such. My Libyan informants often use the term ikhwan al muslimin , or simply ikhwan as a synonym for ‘Islamists.’
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 3
then the view of a schizophrenic Libya is fundamentally schizophrenic perception. In the schizophrenic mind-set words, ideas and symbols are misunderstood for things.
The schizophrenic, Freud and Lacan argue, is convinced that jokes, puns and metaphors are to be taken seriously because the healthy relationship between the symbolic realm and the real is severed. Something very similar happens here.
Tribalism is taken to be a reality that is opposed to national sentiment, while in fact,
I argue, it is a dynamic language that is compatible with it.
The proponents of a ‘schizophrenic’ Libya put forward a specific false dichotomy: They consider tribal identity as a real, local entity, and national identity as an ideology.
The supporters of the ‘tribes with a flag’ argument see national sentiment as a veneer:
A flag, an ideology that covers up the tangible reality of tribalism. Similarly, Lacher sees tribal groups as forces ‘uninterested in the emergence of national political camps along
and which are opposed to ‘ideologically based networks,’
thus differentiating between Libyans who deal with ‘tribal politics’ (based on local, tribal ties and norms) and Libyans involved with ‘ideological politics’
(focused either on national or religious ideology). However, based on my encounters with Libyan tribalism,
I believe that this dichotomy is incorrect because tribalism too is an ideology. Tribalism is neither a stagnant reality covered by a thin layer of national ideology nor a rooted heritage that is opposed to ideological discourses. Rather, tribalism is an idiom that Libyan tribesmen use, do not use, or manipulate in different ways in different situations.
Obviously, by arguing that Libyan tribalism is ideology, my intention is not to deny the reality of tribal ties and divisions, and nor do I want to diminish their importance in the lives of the tribesmen. On the contrary, I propose that Libyan tribesmen have ‘national’ and ‘tribal’ as two available narratives (together with others like ‘Islam’ or ‘the revolution’), and that they combine them in complex ways in order to describe, navigate, and affect social reality.
This argument has a number of implications. First of all, any analysis that features tribalism as a monolithic component of the Libyan mind is misleading because, as I will show through some ethnographic vignettes, tribesmen can privilege forms of non-tribal conduct and have national aspirations. Secondly, Libyan tribalism cannot be seen, as
Lacher suggests, as a ‘conservative reality.’ Although aware that tribalism changes due to political circumstances,
Lacher does not consider the most obvious consequence of this
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D. Nobus (
Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge);
A. de Wahelens & W. Ver Eecke (
Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia , p. 23 (Leuven: Leuven
University Press). For a different take on the topic see G. Deleuze & F. Guattari (
A Thousand Plateaus
(London: Continuum); and for a critique of Deleuze’s & Guattari’s approach, see M. Recalcati (
Il Complesso di Telemaco (Milan: Feltrinelli).
Wahelens & Ver Eecke, Phenomenology, p. 23.
Lacher, The Rise, p. 166.
Ibid, p. 151.
Ibid, pp. 152, 167.
This article is informed by three research trips to Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) between 2002 and 2003;
15 months of fieldwork, mainly in Western Libya (Tripolitania) but also in the eastern region, between 2006 and 2008; and a shorter fieldwork study in Tripoli and Benghazi during 2012. In addition, I have had extensive ongoing conversations with Libyan friends since 2012. All interviews were conducted in Arabic. To protect privacy of my informants, I use pseudo-names and omit tribal membership.
Lacher, The Rise, p. 152.
4 I. Cherstich point: Far from being a ‘conservative’ trait of Libyan culture, tribal identity is a dynamic ideology that constantly is transforming. Bearing this in mind, I will show that rather than being inherently conservative, tribalism is becoming conservative because of the practical necessities of the tribesmen. Many Libyans resort to tribal connections, rather than to
‘state means,’ not because they are culturally wired to do so, nor because they are fundamentally opposed to the nation state or other ideological discourses, but simply because in the current political climate making use of tribal means is the only way to conduct a functional life. In some areas of the country tribal identity is becoming stronger because after 40 years of arbitrary rule, one year of civil war, and more than two years of complex post-hostilities political re-shaping, the new Libyan government still is struggling to secure social protection for its citizens. Libya, therefore, is not failing to become a nation because of tribalism. Rather tribalism is growing stronger because in post-Qadhdhafi Libya, the state is traumatically absent.
From Segmentation to Ideology
In order to demonstrate that Libyan tribalism is ideology, it is first important to clarify that tribal dynamics often have been used as an ideological tool. The qabayl [tribes, sing., qabyla ) played a fundamental political role in the pre-Qadhdhafi era,
but the regime attempted to diminish their political prominence during its first decade in power
(1969 – 79).
Preoccupied with the possibility of internal disunion, Colonel Qadhdhafi condemned tribalism as incompatible with his notion of a unified ‘stateless’ Jamahiriya based on direct political participation.
Although keen to see the tribe as a ‘natural’ institution untouched by the corruptive influence of state politics, Qadhdhafi also viewed
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In the first half of the twentieth century the tribes of Eastern Libya unified under the leadership of the Sanusi
Sufi order, and fought against the Italian invaders. This phenomenon shows that Libyan tribes are capable of inclusive social membership other than the tribe, although scholars have debated the degree to which the
Sanusi leaders were able to unify the tribal groups effectively; see E. Evans Pritchard ( 1949 )
The Sanusi of
Cyrenaica (Oxford: Oxford University Press); N. Ziadeh (
Sanusiyah: A study of a revivalist movement in Islam
(Leiden: Brill); E. Peters ( 1990
) The Bedouin of Cyrenaica (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press). What is certain is that tribal politics played a role in the vicissitudes of the Sanusis. According to some of my informants, the choice of renowned Sanusi leader Omar al Mukhtar as head of the anti-Italian guerrillas was because he belonged to the Amnifah, a small tribe unrelated to any of the larger tribal groups of Eastern
Libya, and this enabled him to act as an impartial commander.
Descriptive accounts of the tribes’ political role under the regime and during the 2011 revolution can be found in
, The Rise, Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution, in: Middle East Policy , 18(4), pp. 140 – 154; and G. Joffe (
2013 ) Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2011 Uprisings, in: J. Pack (ed.)
The
2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). What it is missing in these analyses is the notion that tribalism is an ideology, not a detailed description of the facts.
Hence, in this article I concentrate on the former rather than on the latter. For an account of tribal politics before Qadhdhafi’s rise to power, see A. Ahmida (
The Making of Modern Libya (Albany: State
University of New York Press).
Jamahiriya loosely translates as state of the masses. Qadhdhafi envisaged it as embodying antiinstitutionalism, Nasserist socialism, textual Islam and politics without representation; see further
D. Vandewalle (
A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In adopting an initial anti-tribal attitude, the regime aimed to remove tribal leaders from offices and substitute them with political figures loyal to the Jamahiriya . These loyalists, however, often were members of Qadhdhafi’s tribe or of other loyal tribes; See further Obeidi (
Political Culture , p. 117; and J. Davis (
Libyan Politics:
Tribe and Revolution , p. 23 (London: I. B. Tauris).
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 5
Libya as one ‘big tribe’ within which there was no room for dangerous inter-tribal
After the imposition of sanctions by the international community,
however,
Qadhdhafi cunningly changed his position. In an attempt to maintain internal stability in the face of external pressure, the regime ‘rehabilitated’ the tribes and managed to use them as a tool to keep its grip on the country.
In 1993 the Libyan government created a new assembly of tribal leaders, the Popular
Social Leadership, with the purpose of monitoring Libyan citizens through the authority of tribal heads.
In its rehabilitated incarnation, tribalism was mixed extensively with national discourses, because Qadhdhafi encouraged tribal leaders to denounce fellow tribesmen whose political ideas clashed with the national Jamahiriya project.
In some
cases the tribes resisted this attempt to merge tribal ethos with the national agenda,
but the mixture of ‘national’ and ‘tribal’ marked both the final years of the regime and the
2011 revolution.
The fact that Qadhdhafi, a member of the Qadhafa tribe, decided first to suppress and then to celebrate tribal identity is proof of the ideological nature of tribal dynamics. However, as the anthropological debate has shown, Libyan tribalism can be considered as ideology for other, more important reasons.
In the past, anthropologists interested in tribalism were puzzled by the fact that different tribal groups could coexist without living in state of permanent warfare.
In an attempt to solve this conundrum, ethnographers proposed to look at tribal societies as being divided into ‘segments’: groups organized around notions of common ancestorship (whether historical or mythical) and manage to coexist in a state of ‘ordered anarchy.’
They perceived tribal segments as forming a system ‘sustained by a balance of power between its elements,’ a balance achieved through a fragile but effective equilibrium of constant conflict, alliance and mediation.
The segmentary system, in many anthropological works, is depicted as being characterized by strict rules built around the
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Davis, Libyan Politics , pp. 40 – 44.
Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya , p. 158.
Many tribal leaders acted as the longa manus of the regime forcing people to recurr to tribal means in their
everyday life. According to M. Ouannes ( 2012
) ‘A tribal society absolves the power from the obligation to recognise civil society and democratic politics.’ in idem, Sociologie d’une revolte Armee: Le Cas de Libyein,
African Sociological Review , 16, p. 31 [quote translated from French by author].
According to anthropologist S. Caton ( 1990
) ‘when the state is powerful, it will tend toward direct tribal rule by circumventing, or perhaps even eliminating, the tribal elites; when it is vulnerable to external aggression and internal strife, the state
. . .
will rule indirectly through them.’ Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State
Formation, in: P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East , p. 100 (Berkeley:
University of California Press).
Obeidi (
) Political Culture in Libya , p. 118.
Davis, Libyan Politics , pp. 40 – 44.
According to M. Bamyeh (2011) ‘A sample of 28 tribal declarations, issued between 23 February and 8 March
2011, reveals that the vast majority highlighted national unity or national salvation rather than tribal interests.’ in: Is the 2011 Libyan Revolution an Exception?, Jadaliyya , March 25, 2011. Available at http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1001/is-the-2011-libyan-revolution-an-exception . accessed June 19, 2014).
For an analysis of the focus on violence in the anthropology of tribalism see L. Abu-Lughod (
Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World, Annual Review of Anthropology , 18, p. 286.
Ibid, p. 281.
See further P. Dresch (1969) The Significance of the Course Events Take in Segmentary Systems, American
Ethnologist , 13(2), p. 309; E. Gellner (
Saints of the Atlas (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson);
E. E. Evans-Pritchard (
The Nuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press); and H. Munson (
Gellner’s Segmentary Analysis of Morocco’s Ait c
Attain, Man , 28(2), pp. 267 – 280.
6 I. Cherstich principle of ‘me against my brothers, my brothers and me against our cousins; my brothers, cousins and me against the world.’
Echoes of this view of tribalism as local and divisive reality can be found in the analysis of Lacher. Later on, however, anthropologists abandoned this model in favour of a more dynamic view of tribalism. Though ready to accept tribal segmentation as a real phenomenon, ethnographers realised that tribesmen do not always act tribal.
Anthropologists observed that frequently members of the same tribe practice different traditions, and follow different leaders, even when they are not ‘supposed to.’
Sometimes tribesmen maintain that they follow strict rules of alliance based on common ancestorship, but in actual fact they ascribe common descent ‘posthumously’ to their
When faced with this fluidity, ethnographers, particularly those working in the
Middle East, discovered that tribal rules are flexible and manipulable,
and that tribalism is, more than anything a ‘political language,’
that is characterized by elasticity and heterogeneity. Naturally, tribal norms always are defined within tribal
but often the same tribal principles can be invoked and applied for completely antithetical purposes.
The notion of tribe therefore has been re-formulated in terms of ‘relational possibilities, available social resources, rather than entailed obligations or incontrovertible rights.’
Ethnographers realized that tribalism is a language that tribesmen use to manipulate reality, rather than a static reality in itself. Furthermore, they also discovered that it is not the only language tribesmen use. Anthropologists understood that frequently, even when tribesmen are very conscious of their tribal identity, they privilege forms of social membership other than the tribe, like the town or the state.
Ethnographers found that at times the language of modern nationalism supplants tribal authority, while other times tribalism is embraced as a form of resistance against the state.
However, they also understood that often tribesmen combined ‘national’ and ‘tribal’ in complex ways, enduring as two available narratives.
Far from being inherently anti-state, tribalism is therefore an ideology that tribesmen might or might not use in order to
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) Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective, in: P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (eds)
Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East , p. 160 (Berkeley: University of California Press).
M. Fried (
The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park: Publishing Company).
P. Khoury & J. Kostiner (
1990 ) Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation, Khoury &
Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation , p. 5.
W. Lancaster (
The Rwala Bedouin Today , pp. 35, 151 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
M. Meeker (
Literature and Violence in North Arabia , p. 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Dale Eickelman (
The Middle East: an Anthropological Approach , p. 98. (London: Prentice Hall)
) The Significance of the Course Events Take in Segmentary Systems, pp. 309 – 324.
A. Hammoudi (
1980 ) Segmentary, Social Stratification, Political Power and Sainthood: Reflections on
Gellner’s Theses, Economy and Society , 9(3), pp. 279 – 303.
L. Rosen (
1979 ) Social identity and Points of Attachment: Approaches to Social Organization, in: L. Rosen
et al. (eds) Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , p. 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
A. Lughod (1989) Zones of Theory, p. 269; Rosen, Social identity, pp. 19 – 111; S. Caton ( 1987
) Power,
Persuasion, and Language: A Critique to the Segmentary Model in the Middle East, International Journal of
Middle-East Studies
, 19(1), pp. 77 – 102; and Geertz ( 1979 ) The Meaning of Family Ties, in: L. Rosen et al.
(eds) Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society , pp. 315 – 391.
Khoury & Kostiner, Introduction, p. 13.
Ibid, pp. 3 – 4; R. Tapper (
1990 ) Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in
the Middle East, in: Khoury & Kostiner (eds) Tribes and State Formation , pp. 69 – 70.
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 7 counterbalance state discourses depending on the context. Some scholars even propose that ‘there are elements of state within every tribe and of tribe within every state,’
because tribes implement regulations of power that are very similar, if not identical, to
while the state also can be segmentary, in terms of division
‘Tribal thinking’ and ‘state-thinking’ are closer to each other than one might expect, and this is particularly important for an understanding of the
Libyan case.
Tribal Ideology and Tribal Reality
A number of ethnographic studies have shown that Libyan tribalism is a ‘conceptual
an ‘ideology,’
although recent commentators (and some leading scholars
working on Libyan tribes) have ignored the findings of these publications. These studies have demonstrated that concerns related to lineage and ancestorship (whether mythical or real) constitutes only one aspect of the life of Libyan tribesmen, and not necessarily the most important one.
They have shown that Libyan tribesmen constantly break or ignore their own supposedly strict tribal rules out of convenience,
and that even though tribesmen describe their ethos in complete antithesis to the state, they also engage with it in many ways, both on a practical and on an ideological level.
On the one hand, this body of work proves that tribal ideology influenced Qadhdhafi’s conceptualization of the Libyan nation as a stateless ‘big tribe.’
On the other hand, it demonstrated that national identity has had a deep and enduring impact in the life of
Libyan tribesmen.
Amal Obeidi, in particular, discovered that Libyan tribesmen often relate to the state
(or the city, the family, or Islam) as their primal nexus of social attachment.
She also discovered that Libyans who make use of tribal connections often do so out of practical necessity and theoretically are willing to drop tribal identification (and to consider themselves only as Libyans).
In her work, Obeidi proposed that tribal solidarity is not a static feature of Libyan culture, but rather a practical attempt to create a civil society in a country that, due to the institutional absence of its government, never had one.
In discovering these dynamics, she shed light on the ideological nature of tribalism, and
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46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
Tapper, Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople, p. 69.
D. Sneath (
The Headless State (New York: Columbia University Press).
Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus , pp. 208 – 231.
R. Behnke (
The Herders of Cyrenaica , p. 93 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press).
Ibid. p. 105; Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica , pp. 70, 81; and Davis, Libyan Politics , p. 93.
As for instance, L. Anderson ( 1990 ) Tribe and State, Libyan Anomalies, in: Khoury & Kostiner (eds)
Tribes and State Formation.
Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica , p. 81.
Ibid, p. 70; and Davis, Libyan Politics , pp. 191 – 196.
Davis, Libyan Politics , p. 43.
See earlier on in the article, and Ibid. p. 43.
Obeidi (2103) Political Culture in Libya , pp. 108 – 133.
Ibid.
The regime opposed the creation of parties and associations, seen as an obstacle to direct political participation.
8 I. Cherstich suggested that tribesmen act tribal because of circumstances, not because they are culturally unable to do otherwise.
By looking at these considerations, one realizes that Libyan tribalism is much more complex than Lacher and other commentators make it to be. Libyan tribalism is an ideology that presents itself as an all-encompassing anti-state ethos made out of welldefined rules and norms. In actual facts, however, this ideology is practiced in different ways depending on the personal and political circumstances in which tribesmen find themselves.
Unfortunately, the anthropology of Libyan tribalism has not engaged with broader philosophical debates on the concept of ‘ideology.’ However, drawing on authors who have done so, one can conclude that Libyan tribal ethos, like all ideologies, inspires concrete attitudes, shapes subjectivities and provides orientations for action.
However,
it also enables tribesmen to re-elaborate,
ignore, change,
and manoeuvre
around their own ideology. Certainly, the life of Libyan tribesmen always will be influenced by the ideology of tribalism, but the two are not one and the same: There always will be aspects of the tribesmen’s lives that ‘exceed’ the ideological representation of tribalism.
It is this complex relationship between the representation of tribalism and the practice of it that is missing in the recent commentary on Libya. In making this criticism, I do not
propose a clear-cut distinction between tribal reality and tribal ideology
I assume that the reality of tribesmen is completely ideologized).
(and nor do
Rather, I believe that reality—in this case the reality of tribalism—always is ideologized to different degrees,
63 symbolization and essentialization.
In this sense, tribesmen are more than tribal people.
Libyan tribalism is therefore both more and less than it seems: Not a well-defined
‘schizophrenic’ and divisive reality, but a complex ideology that enables tribesmen not to be bound by it completely.
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61
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Obeidi (
Political Culture in Libya , ‘We should remember that people identify with the tribal system in a society in certain circumstances. Many who do identify with it in such circumstances might prefer to live in a society where tribe did not matter, and would therefore be willing in principle to drop their identity.’ p. 131.
The same is true for all ideologies; see S. Ortner (
) Anthropology and Social Theory , pp. 4 – 16 (London:
Duke University Press).
L. Althusser (
Lenin and Philosophy (London: Monthly Review Press); A. Gramsci (
Selections from the Prison Notebooks , p. 374 (London: Lawrence); and C. Geertz (
The Interpretation of Cultures , pp. 55 – 83 (New York: Basic Books).
S. Hall (
1980 ) Encoding/Decoding, in: S. Hall et al. (eds)
Culture, Media, Language , pp. 107 – 116 (London:
Routledge).
M. Sahlins (
Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press); and Ortner, Anthropology and Social Theory , p. 15.
Pierre Bourdieu (
The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
As the classical Marxist analysis of ideology might suggest. M. Barrett (
The Politics of Truth – from
Marx to Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
As the post-modernist reflections on ideology infer; see ibid.
G. Luka`cs (
History of Class Consciousness (Berlin: Merlin Press).
S. Z
Mapping Ideology (London: Verso);
(1987) The Sublime
Object of Ideology (London: Verso). According to post-Marxist philosopher Alain Badiou. ‘Truth’ becomes discernable from ideology in some specific ‘events’ like ‘politics’ (understood, amongst other things, as the contextual—and often peculiar—conditions in which an individual lives in). These philosophical reflections urge us to contextualise tribal practice within the practical and political situation of the tribesmen, rather than essentializing tribalism as Lacher does. See A. Badiou (
Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury).
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 9
Tribesmen beyond Tribalism
This dynamic relationship between tribal reality and tribal ideology is reflected first of all in the geographical dimension of the tribes. Libyans, whether tribal or non-tribal, often describe tribes as a non-urban phenomenon. In actual fact, however, and contrary to what
Lacher proposed
the country does not have a well-defined tribal hinterland that stands in opposition to the cities. Even though in the capital city of Tripoli tribal identity tends not to be important, many other cities have a fairly strong sense of tribal identity, as in the wellknown case of Misurata,
third largest urban centre in Libya. Doubtlessly, there is an historical link between some tribal groups and less-urbanized areas, and part of tribal ethos expects a tribesman to keep his relationship to the homeland of the tribe. However, many contemporary Libyan tribes are not homogeneous groups located in defined areas, but rather networks of people who have decided to live in different cities, often very far from
each other (and very far from the ancestral homeland of their tribe).
It is important to remember that under the Qadhdhafi regime, Tripoli was the sole administrative centre of the country
and Tripolitania a much more developed region than either Cyrenaica or Fezzan,
so that since the 1970s the capital (and to an extent the province of Tripolitania) has attracted many Libyans from less urbanized areas. If it is true that Tripoli is not tribal, it is also true that many tribesmen live in the city.
Interestingly, tribesmen tend to refer to the dichotomy of tribes/cities even when they are completely urbanized (and had been for generations), or when they live (and had lived for generations) far from the original homeland of their tribes. Often tribesmen do so in order to stress a supposed ‘freedom’ of the tribal ethos from the shackles of urban life. The same ideological notion also and often is used by non-tribal Libyans to highlight their
supposedly ‘modern’ lifestyle emancipated from tradition.
In the light of these considerations, one realizes that the notion of tribalism as a non-urban phenomenon is an ideological construction rather than a well-defined contemporary reality, and that the commentary on Libyan tribalism fails to understand this nuance.
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69
70
71
According to Lacher, ‘tribal politics was particularly important only in the hinterland.’ See Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 166.
BBC News (2011) Libya Crisis: Misrata Tribes may fight Rebels, April 23, 2011; Available at http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-13173628 , accessed May 15, 2014.
All Libyan tribes have an ancestral homeland constituted by a specific region, area or town. At times this connection is clear in the nomenclature of the tribe itself, as in the above-mentioned case of Misurata, home to a group of sub-tribes indicated by the umbrella term of Misrata tribe.
At the time of my 2006 – 2008 fieldwork Libyans could have their passports issued only in Tripoli, and the same applied for almost all other bureaucratic aspects of their lives.
According to many Cyrenaican friends, Eastern Libya always has been characterized by a general anti-
Qadhdhafi attitude. Some told me that Qadhdhafi’s choice to marry a member of the Brahasa tribe, one of the most important tribal groups in Eastern Libya, had the purpose of helping solve this antipathy. In my experience, police forces in Cyrenaican towns and cities always had some representatives either of
Qadhdhafi’s tribe, or of one of the tribes loyal to him.
Tripoli is the site for the graves of several important tribal figures. Sidhi Sulayman, for instance, the ancestral progenitor of the Fwatir tribe (discussed later in text) is buried in the capital, and his tomb hosts a mazar , an annual festival in his honour that is very popular among the Fwatir .
A friend from Tripoli (a lawyer in his sixties) told me in 2008: ‘We are civilised people. We do not have tribes.’
10 I. Cherstich
In this regard, it is interesting to note that tribal ties can be more important in large cities than in smaller towns. In 2012, for example, Ashraf, a tribesmen and a university student in his twenties who lived in Benghazi, explained that unlike small towns, large urban centres tend to host members of different tribes. He said that when faced with this diversity tribesmen forge particularly strong relationships with members of their own tribe because
‘in a big city it is useful to have a network of people you can count on, if you get your car stolen or something, you can try to get it back using your tribal network.’ Interestingly, in small towns and in less urbanized areas (particularly in those where the majority of people belong to one tribe), Libyans do not use the name of the tribe as surnames. Conversely, in large cities, very often the name of the tribe is used for surnames.
The ideological nature of Libyan tribalism also characterizes the relationship between tribesmen and their leaders. In my fieldwork experiences I have never met a Libyan who knew the identity of his tribal head. Many of my informants, even those who were very proud of their tribal identity, would inquire about the identity of their leaders only in situations that required their help or mediation.
In this regard, it is important to clarify that tribes have a mutual aid fund to which tribesmen are supposed to contribute by paying a monthly contribution of two dinars. Tribal leaders are not supposed to use this fund for personal affairs, but rather to help fellow tribesmen in hardship (it is for this reason, that tribal heads have normal, often surprisingly humble, jobs). Some tribesmen pay regularly, others do not, but those who pay often do not inquire about who administers the fund as long as they can benefit from it.
This interesting mixture of knowledge about tribal organization and ignorance of tribal dynamics testifies to the complex relationship between tribal practice and tribal ideology that characterized many conversations I had with tribesmen. In a 2012 conversation,
Mohsin, for instance, an IT person in his mid-thirties (and the proud member of one of the most important tribes in Cyrenaica), spent considerable time describing the greatness of his tribe, but he also said:
My father died, and I did not have the money to pay for the funeral. So one of my relatives suggested that we should contact our tribal leader, because we had been paying the monthly contribution. So we did, and they came and paid for the funeral.
It was the first time I met the heads of my tribes. I did not even know who they are.
I think they only decided to help me because funerals are not that expensive.
Tribal organization also has a strong ideological aspect. Often, when asked about the structure of his tribe, a tribesman explained that tribal organization is a precise system regulated by specific regulations: Qabayl [tribes] can be united into a saff , an inter-tribal
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Under Qadhdhafi thefts and crimes often were punished using a complex mixture of state law and tribal law.
Often a judge would produce a verdict only after tribal representatives of the parties involved had reached an agreement. Naturally, if people were not happy with tribal law justice, they could call for the application of state law, and vice versa. Often this was a way to compensate for the strong deficiencies in the Libyan court system.
According to some informants, tribesmen can benefit from the fund only in cases of unexpected hardship. I was told that in the case of a car accident, a tribesman can benefit from the fund only if his car regularly is insured and the insurance does not cover the damage.
Note that in some tribes there are assemblies of tribal leaders rather than a single tribal head.
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 11 confederacy regulated by precise rules and norms. In turn each qabyla is divided into sub-tribes, or buyut (sing.
bayt , ‘house’), and, each bayt is divided into lahmat (sing.
lahma , ‘family groups’). However (as already noticed by Peters
Libya often is a contested affair rather than a systematic phenomenon. In my experience, particularly when it comes to larger tribes, sub-tribes tend to define themselves (and to act) as an independent qabayl , tribes in their own right. To complicate matters even further, often several tribesmen claim to be the head of a particular tribe, a phenomenon that appeared clearly during the revolution when members of the same tribe could be found among both Qadhdhafi’s supporters and the revolutionary forces.
Tribesmen can demonstrate a striking ancestral memory in tracing their ties of kinship and alliance. Some would know, for instance, whether their group descends from the Banu
Sulaym or the Banu Hilal (the two main Arab tribes that migrated to and settled in the country during the seventh century CE) or whether their tribes enjoy the status of marabitin (tribes whose main ancestor is a saintly figure).
Nonetheless, very often these genealogies are disputed narratives rather than well-defined accounts. The Fwatir , a renowned tribe in the area of Zlitan, in Tripolitania, are a good example, as the tribe is considered to be the tribe of origin of Sidhi Abdussalam el Asmar, the most important saint in Libyan folklore. However, in the past the saint’s descendant’s originated a sub-group of tribes known as awlad as Shaykh [the children of the shaykh ], and if some see these groups as sub-tribes of the Fwatir , others describe them as tribes in their own right.
These contested narratives become very important when it comes to decide, for instance, who should benefit from the profit generated by the shrine dedicated to the saint in Zlitan. In the past (and even in the aftermath of the revolution) the two groups have entered into conflict, even though, according to tribal rules, their relationship should be one of peace, kinship and alliance.
These considerations help us to appreciate the ideological nature of tribalism. It is by stressing that tribalism is ideology (rather than by using the static models proposed by commentators of Libyan tribalism) that one can contextualize better the tribal dynamics during and after the fall of the Qadhdhafi regime. In particular, one can understand better how tribes that traditionally have been united in a tribal confederacy, or saff , with the
Qadhafa (Qadhdhafi’s tribe) have chosen to ignore the dynamics of tribal alliance and to side against Qadhdhafi. Though aware of these dynamics,
Lacher proposes a dichotomy of revolutionary and tribal that does not take into account how tribesmen can ignore tribal
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Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica , p. 95.
Lacher is aware of these dynamics. However, he does not consider that similar aspects of tribal practice indicate the ideological nature of tribalism (and that therefore, contrary to what he suggests, tribalism cannot be understood as a well-defined reality opposed to ideological discourses); see Lacher, The Rise of Tribal
Politics, p. 153.
Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica , pp. 65 – 70; Peters, The Bedouin of Cyrenaica , pp. 40 – 83. Very often members of marabitin tribes described their status in ironic terms, such as this comment by one of my informants: ‘Can you believe that I actually come from a tribe of saints?’.
J. Clarke reported a similar case in his study of the Siaan, a well-known tribe in Western Libya. Although divided into four main sub-tribes during the twentieth century, the Siaan have developed more sub-divisions.
Interestingly, members of the original Siaan sub-tribes consider the tribe as descendants of a saint, but one of the most recent sub-groups does not. See further J. Clarke (
) The Siaan: Pastoralists of the Jefara, in
J. Clarke (ed.) Field-studies in Libya , pp 52 – 59 (Durham: The University of Durham).
Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 157.
12 I. Cherstich ethos and privilege revolutionary discourses. This is the case for instance, of the Zintan tribe, whose youth embraced revolutionary sympathies and pushed their elders to break their alliance with the Qadhafa,
but also of some sections of the large and renowned
Warfalla tribe. Even though the Warfalla have sided with Qadhdhafi (and had been united to his tribe in the same saff ), sections of the tribe were among the earliest to defect from the
regime at the beginning of the revolution.
In light of these facts, one can appreciate that
Libyan tribesmen juggle between different identities (and sets of norms, discourses etc.), stressing one over the other depending on the situation.
Tribal ethos is a discourse that often is combined with other discourses and styles of behavior, even with ones that seem to contradict tribalism. This was a defining aspect in the lives of the tribesmen I studied during my fieldwork. For instance, I documented the presence of Salafi sympathizers in areas that traditionally are considered as tribal, like the
Jebel Akhdar region in Cyrenaica. Many of these Cyrenaican Salafis come from a tribal background, and if some disregard the concept of tribe as a divisive agent for Muslims, others, including some notable tribal leaders, do not see any contradiction between practicing Salafi Islam as a form of overarching Islamic identity, and celebrating tribal particularism. The great majority of Cyrenaican tribal Salafis have no sympathy for
Islamist militant groups, and consider Salafism as a peaceful attempt to be faithful to the scriptures that has nothing to do with violence or terrorism. In some cases, they even told me that a good Muslim should not be involved in politics in any way. However, there are exceptions, and in the Derna area, for instance, many Libyans from tribal backgrounds have developed strong ideological links with Al-Qaeda and other forms of transnational jihadism. It is true that Cyrenaican tribal leaders, particularly today, are unified against
Islamism,
but it is also true that, in contrast with Lacher’s dichotomy between tribal and ideological, many Cyrenaican Islamists come from a tribal background.
A similar combination of different ideological discourses also characterizes the relationship between tribesmen and the state. For instance, in 2012 Khaled, one of several leaders in a fairly large Cyrenaican tribe, stressed the independence of the tribes from the state: ‘The law is always unfair. The Arabs do not want the law, for the tribes are the (true) spirit of the law.’ Interestingly, Khaled, who is in his fifties and runs a car-repair garage, had moved to Tripoli, and therefore far from his tribe, some 40 years ago (he would visit the tribal homeland only if his services as tribal head were required). Even more interestingly (and in apparent contradiction with his opinion on the state), Khaled was very proud that his son had joined the state police. He told me of an incident that involved him, a man from the city of Tarhuna tried to shoot someone in his garage. He explained:
‘My son works in the police, and I phoned the police and they sorted it out.’
Significantly, he finished our interview by saying that the state should do something to
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82
83
Ouannes, Sociologie d’une Revolte Armee, p. 32.
In 1993, members of the Warfalla were involved in an unsuccessful attempt to depose Qadhdhafi.
An understanding of tribal fluidity can help us to comprehend, how Qadhdhafi, member of a minor, and historically unimportant tribe, has been able to gain power.
All Cyrenaican tribal leaders have expressed support for Gen. Khalifa Haftar who in 2014 declared ‘war’ against Islamists and engaged in battle with Cyrenaican militias. See further Al Jazeera (2014) Hundreds rally in support for Libya’s Haftar. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/rally-supportlibya-haftar-2014530174849451933.html
, accessed June 25, 2014.
Ibid.
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 13 disarm the militias in Libya, since he considered himself a Libyan, a revolutionary and a democratic, but he despised federalism,
and his status of tribal leader had been certified by the previous government with an official state stamp. The anti-state tribesman sought confirmation of his status from the state and had well-defined national aspirations.
In light of these considerations, it does not come as a surprise that tribesmen are often ready to bypass tribal ethos in the name of broader national or religious principles. Hasan, for instance, an unemployed technician who belonged to one of the largest tribes of
Eastern Libya, said he was ‘proud to have a million fellow tribesmen who can help me if
I need to, I know the history of my tribe in details.’ However, he added: ‘I am thirty-five, and what have these people done for me? Do they care if I eat well, or how my family is doing?’
He added that many people he knew could not find a job because they live in areas where the majority belonged to different tribes. He explained: ‘Qadhdhafi had fuelled tribal divisions, prevented us from being a state, but Libyans should know that they have rights and that finding a job should not be a matter of what tribe you belong to.’
Interestingly, Hasan’s tribe had sided against Qadhdhafi, but during the war some
Qadhdhafi sympathizers from Tripolitania asked him for hospitality because they feared for their lives. Hasan accepted because he saw this his duty as a Muslim and as a
Libyan, and because he thought that the true spirit of the revolution should be one of forgiveness and reintegration. When this fact came to be known, the head of Hasan’s subtribe commanded him to denounce them. In a very non-tribal fashion, Hasan accompanied his guests to a safer area with his car, and lied to his leader saying that they had fled overnight.
Tribalism as Practical Necessity
Through an appreciation of the ideological nature of tribalism (and of the fluidity of tribal practice), one also can understand that the presence of a strong, conservative tribal identity in today’s Libya is the result of a process, rather than a direct product of a supposedly inherent schizophrenia in Libyan culture, as Lacher has suggested. A decade ago, Amal
Obeidi demonstrated that tribal identity slowly was becoming weaker in Libya.
However, since the revolution the situation has changed. Significantly, many Libyan friends have changed the names of their profiles on Facebook and other social media:
Whereas in the past they had used just forename and surname, now they have added the name of their tribes. In the words of Mohammed, a university student from Cyrenaica:
People are scared. The state is weak. The police and the army do not function properly, so people turn to the tribe, even people who did not care about the tribe, because the tribe is the only organisation that can protect them.
. . .
In the midst of
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87
The debate on federalism has characterised the politics of post-Qadhdhafi Libya. According to Lacher, tribesmen tend to be federalists, but I do not think this is true. See Lacher, The Rise of Tribal Politics, p. 166.
I have noticed confusion about the term in Libya. When I talked in detail with Libyans who advocated federalism (‘ federaliya ’), I realized that what they actually wanted was decentralization.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya , p. 125.
14 I. Cherstich chaos, people help fellow tribesmen in exchange for favors. Recently I was fired from my job, and my position was given to someone who belongs to a larger tribe.
In light of the ideological nature of tribalism, one can conclude that tribal ethos is an available cultural system of mutual help, and that in post-Qadhdhafi Libya this system offers a practical solution to practical problems. In 2012, tribal leader Khaled mentioned above) told me that, due to the chaotic situation of the country, his tribesmen ask him to intervene as problem-solver much more often than they had done in the past
I am dealing with these issues every day! Now, more than before.
. . .
The law is there, but there are no people who enforce the law. Nowadays a militiaman can beat up a policeman if he wants to, but we want democracy, law, justice, and all these things for everyone, not tribe against tribe, all Libyans united
. . .
if the law is not working, then the tribe works. Now it is the tribe that works, maybe it is the tribe that takes the weapon from you and takes you to the police.
Statements like this become particularly significant if one looks at the concrete absence of the state in state-run bodies. Ibrahim, an army captain from Tripoli in his thirties, said in
2012:
It is necessary that we have a police and an army, Libyans want these things
. . .
if there was a national army they would sort things out. Now the people from the army are (forced to stay) in their houses, I have not worn my uniform since the seventeenth of February.
Even though in 2014 the situation had changed, the state still struggles to coordinate both army and police on a national level.
The fact that tribesmen refer to non-state means becomes less peculiar if one realizes that, due to the absence of the state, non-tribal
Libyans are also doing the same.
For instance, in 2012 Abdallah, an English teacher in his late twenties from the city of Tripoli, spent some time explaining that urban Libya and tribal Libya are two completely different things, and he proposed a dichotomy that I have attempted to deconstruct throughout the paper. However, he also explained that given the unpredictability of the political situation in Libya (and the consequent absence of the state), urban neighbourhoods are functioning as self-monitoring communities, almost like small tribes:
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89
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91
Private 2014 email, here quoted with Mohammed’s permission.
February 17, 2011, is deemed the symbolic beginning of the Libyan revolution, although a number of meaningful anti-Qadhdhafi acts were performed on February 15.
The ‘personalized’ character of the army forces becomes clear if one looks at the recent events involving
General Khalifa Haftar. See note 82.
A deeper exploration of this phenomenon can be found in I. Cherstich (
forthcoming ) ‘Now I want the Law!—
Libyans seeking ‘Non-State Justice’ in the hope of ‘State-Justice’ (an Ethnographic take), Law, Social Justice and Global Development .
Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia) 15
In my neighbourhood some young men volunteered to set up checkpoints—they are not paid by the way! And they know the people who live in the neighbourhood, so no outsiders can come in without being checked. We know one another by face!
In the light of these considerations one can appreciate that tribesmen, like all Libyans, are using available cultural means to deal with concrete, particularly problematic situations.
Multiplicity as Analytical Necessity
Once tribalism is contextualized properly, it is possible to realize that, contrary to what has been proposed in the recent commentary about Libya, tribal ethos, national aspirations, revolution and religiosity are not isolated components in post-Qadhdhafi Libya. Rather, they are discourses that coexist, merge, and constantly transform, and that cannot be inscribed within static models and dichotomies based on the opposition between tribal and national or tribal and ideological. When faced with this complexity, one realizes that the
Libyan case only can be understood through an appreciation of the multiplicity of narratives that characterize it. In proposing multiplicity as an analytical lens, I do not mean to propose that analysts should refrain from formulating specific opinions and frameworks, and nor do I suggest that they abandon any attempt to identify the main agents involved in the country’s recent vicissitudes. Rather, I argue that, in order to make sense of Libya’s complexity, first one has to recognize it. Appreciating the ideological nature of tribalism is the first step in that direction, but it is also the only way to do justice to one of the most intricate aspects of Libyan culture. It is necessary to understand that tribesmen can be, and often are, more than tribal people, and that the degree to which tribal practice resembles tribal ideology changes according to circumstances, political changes and practical necessities. Avoiding this discussion means talking about tribalism without talking about tribesmen: Assuming an ideological stance rather than attempting to understand the depth of Libyan ideologies.
Acknowledgements
The research was partly supported by ERC-2013-CoG [617970, CARP ]. My last trip to Libya was made possible by Prof. Jan Michiel Otto ( the Van Vollenhoven Institute, Leiden ), whom I wish to thank.
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