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Creative Responses to Separation: Israeli and Palestinian Joint Activism in Bil'in
Maia Carter Hallward
Journal of Peace Research 2009 46: 541
DOI: 10.1177/0022343309334612
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vol. 46, no. 4, 2009, pp. 541–558
Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi,
Singapore and Washington DC) http://jpr.sagepub.com
DOI 10.1177/0022343309334612
Creative Responses to Separation: Israeli and
Palestinian Joint Activism in Bil’in*
MAIA CARTER HALLWARD
Department of Political Science and International Affairs,
Kennesaw State University
This article examines creative ways in which Israeli and Palestinian activists engage with each other and
the powers seeking to separate them in their nonviolent struggles for a just and lasting peace. Using the
geopolitical theory of territoriality, the article briefly examines a number of administrative, physical, and
psychological barriers facing joint activism and the strategies activists use to counteract them. Drawing
on nonviolent theory and practice, the article analyzes how activists exert power through the creative use
of symbols and practices that undermine the legitimacy of occupation policies. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2004–05 and July 2006, the article explores the implications of this activism on conceptions
of identity, and strategies for restarting a moribund peace process. The relative ‘success’ of sustained
joint action in Bil’in can provide scholars and policymakers with innovative approaches for addressing
some of the outstanding issues needing to be addressed by official negotiators. Although government
bodies are more constrained than activists, the imaginative means of engaging with the system – and the
reframing of issues through the redeployment of ‘commonplaces’ – can perhaps provide inspiration, if
not leverage, for thinking outside of the box.
Introduction: Landscape of Conflict
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has historically garnered a great deal of international
attention compared with other international
conflicts. A variety of conflict resolution
approaches have been used over time,
including problem-solving efforts bringing
together Palestinian and Israeli ‘influentials’
(Kelman, 1982; Fisher, 1997), ‘dialogue’ or
‘encounter’ projects bringing together school
children or professionals (Abu-Nimer, 1999;
Feuerverger, 2001), formal diplomatic negotiations (Mikhail-Ashrawi, 1995), and international conferences or meetings, such as
Madrid (1991) and Annapolis (2007). Israelis
and Palestinians from a variety of political perspectives have also engaged in peace
* Correspondence should be directed to the author at:
mhallwar@kennesaw.edu.
activism, using nonviolent tactics – including
letter writing, demonstrations, direct action,
tax resistance, strikes, and military refusal –
to question the status quo and call for more
radical socio-economic and political changes
(Hall-Cathala, 1990; Abu-Nimer, 2006).
Such efforts have had varying degrees of success over the years. For example, while the
Israeli group Peace Now was successful in
mobilizing public support for the signing of
the Camp David Accords (Bar-On, 1996),
its efforts to halt settlement expansion in the
West Bank have met with less success (Tilley,
2005; Ofran & Etkes, 2007).
The Challenge of ‘Joint Struggle’
The Bil’in case is interesting because of
the length of sustained nonviolent struggle
against the separation barrier, even after its
construction, and as an example of ‘joint’
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(Palestinian and Israeli) struggle. In the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, anyone participating in ‘joint’ efforts sometimes runs
the risk of being seen as a ‘traitor’ to one’s
national cause or as a ‘collaborator’ with the
enemy. Conflict resolution efforts often try to
mitigate this perception through programs to
humanize the ‘Other’ and by bringing people
from different communities together around
shared concerns. This approach was tried
with limited success after the signing of the
Oslo Accords and was criticized by Israelis
and Palestinians alike for reasons including: different objectives for participation
in such groups, power differences between
participants, and failure to address the root
causes of the conflict (see Hurwitz, 1992;
Lustick, 1997; Maoz, 2000; Hassassian,
2002; Kaufman, Salem & Verhoeven, 2006).
Since the collapse of the Oslo Process (often
equated with the failure of Camp David
2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the alAqsa Intifada) the problem of ‘joint’ struggle
has been further compounded by the ‘no
partner’ narrative among Israelis and ‘antinormalization’ rhetoric among Palestinians,
as well as by legal measures and physical infrastructure aimed at separating the populations
(IPCRI, 2002; Celso, 2003; Gordon, 2004).
Even among those Israelis and Palestinians
working for a durable peace, the high degree
of diversity of opinion and disparity of goals
makes joint work challenging (Hassassian,
2002; Hermann, 2002).
Post-Oslo Activism and the Case of Bil’in
Although diplomatic efforts such as the Arab
Peace Initiative (2002) and the Annapolis Meeting (2007) have found little traction, the West Bank village of Bil’in – in
cooperation with Israeli and ‘international’1
1
The term ‘international’, while problematic, is generally used within the activist community to refer to anyone
whose primary passport is non-Israeli (most West Bank
residents do not have a passport; for those who do, their
Palestinian ID, which has precedence for Israeli authorities,
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
activists – continues (as of time of writing
in December 2007) to hold nonviolent demonstrations against the route of the separation barrier, which divides the village from
its agricultural lands, and win an Israeli High
Court ruling that the route of the barrier
through Bil’in should be changed (Associated
Press, 2007).
Bil’in is a small agricultural town in the
Ramallah district of the Central West Bank.
Located approximately 2.5 miles from the
Green Line (1949 Armistice Line), Bil’in has
been the site of on-going nonviolent resistance
since February of 2005, when wall construction began in the village. The livelihood of
Bil’in is severely threatened by the separation
barrier, as it cuts villagers off from 50–60%
of their village lands, depriving the 1,600
village residents of access to their olive trees,
a mainstay of the Palestinian rural economy.
The barrier prevents Palestinian farmers from
having regular, unimpeded access and therefore makes it difficult for farmers to maintain
their crops and feed their families (Khatib,
2005; Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005).
Why has Bil’in been successful in sustaining an Israeli–Palestinian joint struggle
when so many other efforts have collapsed?
This article uses the theoretical concepts
of ‘territoriality’ and ‘legitimation’ to overview some of the obstacles facing Israeli and
Palestinian peace activists. It then analyzes
the case of Bil’in to explore the ways in
which Palestinians and Israelis strategically –
and creatively – use the resources at their disposal to confront Israeli administrative and
military power through nonviolent activism.
The article draws on extensive fieldwork
(interviews, participant observation) among
Israeli and Palestinian activists conducted
is linked to it). Some ‘internationals’ are Jews or of
Palestinian heritage living in Europe or the USA, some
are employed by NGOs or volunteer associations based
in Israel or the West Bank, and others are independent
activists.
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Maia Carter Hallward
in 2004–05,2 a July 2006 visit to Bil’in,
film footage of village resistance by Emad
Bornat,3 and Shai Pollack’s Bil’in Habibiti,
as well as reports posted on activist websites
and circulated via email listserves (including
Alternative Information Center, Ta’ayush,
Gush Shalom, New Profile, and Occupation
Magazine). It also draws on news coverage
of Bil’in taken primarily from the Israeli
English language press, much of which is
available through the Occupation Magazine
website (http://www.kibush.co.il).
The purpose of this article is not only to
draw attention to the creative, constructive
engagement between Palestinians and Israelis
that often goes unseen in the mainstream
press, but also to suggest an alternative theoretical lens that scholars and policymakers
could use when conceptualizing obstacles to
and possibilities for regional peacemaking.
Furthermore, the article highlights the disconnect between events on the ground and
high-level political discussions in terms of
issues and process.
Terrioriality: Enforcing Separation
There is no question that boundaries are a
contentious issue in the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict; not only does Israel lack official state
boundaries, but the issue was one of several
consistently put off for ‘final status’ negotiations during the Oslo years. A boundaryfocused approach examines how boundaries
are created and sustained through a history
of decisionmaking and patterns of sociopolitical transactions; the process of boundary
delimitation, in this view, creates categories
of identification rather than a priori qualities
(Abbott, 1995; Lewis & Wigen, 1997; Tilly,
2002). Using the theory of ‘territoriality’
2
This research was partially funded by the Palestinian
American Research Center (PARC) and focused on the
activities, identities, and goals of seven activist groups.
3
A CD of Bornat’s film footage was given to a 2006 delegation to Bil’in. This 60-minute homemade video provides
an eyewitness account of the demonstrations.
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
focuses on the process of drawing and
communicating boundaries as well as the
power relationship that defines who and what
can cross that boundary and when (Sack,
1986). In the case of Israel/Palestine, identity
classifications, checkpoints, and the separation
barrier demonstrate the interaction between
geographic, political, and social identities.
One of the features of territoriality is that
it classifies by area rather than type. Thus, all
who live within a specific area are classified
accordingly, regardless of felt identification
or other personal characteristics (such as
language, culture, etc.) (Sack, 1986). In the
Israeli–Palestinian case, this is particularly
important when considering ‘Palestinian’
identity, as those Arabs4 living in the West
Bank lack any formal citizenship and carry
Palestinian ID cards, while the Arabs living
in what became the state of Israel have Israeli
citizenship. West Bank Palestinians are further classified according to administrative
district, and movement to other districts
(not to mention the Gaza Strip or Israel) is
highly regulated (MachsomWatch, 2005;
B’Tselem, 2007a). The Oslo Accords classified different areas of the West Bank as A, B,
or C, with different degrees of Palestinian
control vis-à-vis civil and security administration. This ‘bounding’ of territory has numerous consequences for joint activism, among
them: a different system of laws applied to
‘Israelis’ and ‘Palestinians’;5 a checkpoint
regime enforcing movement between areas;
and the route of the separation barrier itself,
which provides a focus for the struggle.
4
Entire books have been written on the challenges of defining and naming identity in Israeli and Palestinian societies
(see Khalidi, 1997; Rouhana, 1997; Jones & Murphy,
2002). The naming of the Palestinian Arab population in
Israel is particularly challenging and so in this limited space
I omit much necessary nuance.
5
I have these labels in quotation marks to note the problematic nature of such categorizations, given the diversity
of both societies. For more on the complexity of Israeli
and Palestinian identity, see King-Irani (2000); Ben-Rafael
(2002); Rowland & Frank (2002); Kanaaneh (2003);
Al-Haj (2005).
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Legal System
Sack outlines ten territorial ‘tendencies’
useful for examining policies and practices
that impact social, political, and geographic
boundaries; several are particularly relevant
for exploring legal issues relevant to the
nonviolent joint struggle in Bil’in. The displacing tendency shifts attention from the
relationship between the controller and the
controlled to the territory itself, by appealing to the laws relevant to that particular
territory and ignoring the role of the controller (in this case, the Israeli government
and the settlement enterprise6) in establishing those laws and defining the scope
of their applicability. This is connected to
another tendency, the focus on the impersonal relationships that result from classifying by area rather than type. In the case of
Israel/Palestine, for example, those living in
‘Area A’ fall under a different set of laws than
do those living in ‘Area C’ or those living
within the boundaries of Israeli settlements.
Jewish settlers living in the West Bank have
Israeli citizenship and are under the jurisdiction of Israeli civil courts. Palestinians,
however, fall under a complex mixture of
Ottoman, Jordanian, and Palestinian law
and emergency orders dating to the British
mandate, and they are under the jurisdiction of Israeli military courts. Which laws
have precedence in which instances is further complicated by the different degrees of
Palestinian autonomy in areas A, B, and C
(which were defined by Oslo but ultimately
determined by Israeli military presence) (see
Tilley, 2005; Yehuda, 2005; Weizman, 2007:
121). The relationship between Palestinians
and settlers is thus defined by membership
categories dependent on living within a specific territory rather than being a particular
6
Space does not allow a full discussion of the cooperation between the Israeli government and settlement enterprise and the history of land zoning, etc. For an extended
discussion of this process, see Weizman (2007); Zertal &
Eldar (2007).
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
type of person, which can result in policies
not appearing ‘racial’ provided one ignores
the mechanisms controlling ability to live in
the settlements or change one’s legal place of
residence (Bakri, 2004; Yehuda, 2005).
The applicability of different sets of laws
directly impacts joint struggle; Palestinian
activists face military courts, the possibility
of administrative detention, and village-wide
consequences (such as road closures, curfew, etc.) for their participation in demonstrations, whereas their Israeli counterparts
are more likely to spend a few hours at
a detention center or in jail before being
released (Bronner, 2004; Mor, 2005). Other
stakes are also higher for the Palestinians,
however, as they are often struggling for
their land and livelihood in addition to a
sense of justice, morality, ideology, etc. The
question of legal legitimacy has also played a
direct role in the joint struggle in Bil’in, as
activists have organized demonstrations with
props that refer directly to international law
(thereby questioning the legitimacy of Israeli
and other locally applied laws). In addition,
activists brought (and ‘won’) the case of the
route of the separation barrier in Bil’in to the
Israeli High Court; since only Israelis can
bring cases to the Israeli legal system, submitting the claim would have been much more
difficult in the absence of joint struggle.
Infrastructure of Separation
Checkpoints are classic symbols of territoriality: they delimit a boundary while soldiers
staffing them enforce regulations regarding
who can cross. The numerous checkpoints –
47 permanent checkpoints within the West
Bank in addition to 33 ‘last inspection points’
between Israel and the West Bank and hundreds of ‘flying’ checkpoints (OCHA, 2004;
B’Tselem, 2007a,b) – have significant ramifications for joint activism as they impede the
movement of Palestinians within the West
Bank and can prevent Israelis from entering.
Israeli law forbids Israeli citizens from
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Maia Carter Hallward
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
entering areas under nominal Palestinian
control (the major cities of Ramallah, Nablus,
Bethlehem, and Hebron, which were classified as areas ‘A’ under the Oslo Accords),
and it is extremely difficult for Palestinians
to obtain permission to travel to Jerusalem
or areas within 1948 Israel. Language used to
justify the checkpoints often reflects the displacing tendency of territoriality, as it shifts
focus away from the location of the checkpoints (which are within the West Bank
rather than along any ‘international’ border),
as well as the relationship between the controllers and the controlled, which focuses on
the regulation of who can cross and not on
who has the power to make that classification
(MachsomWatch, 2005). Given that one’s
ID determines whether or not one can pass
a checkpoint – and that Palestinians carrying Israeli IDs are banned from major West
Bank cities, as are Jewish Israelis, although
Jewish Israeli settlers can bypass most checkpoints with ease, owing to their separate road
system – further illustrates the interconnection between these territorial tendencies and
the maintenance of separate Palestinian and
Israeli lived realities.
Israel’s separation barrier7 creates a physical boundary that is crossable only at a limited number of gates by those carrying a
difficult to obtain permit (OCHA, 2004;
B’Tselem, 2007a,b; OCHA, 2007). The
boundary classifies by ‘area’ in that it separates what is deemed ‘Israel’ (including many
settlements) from what is deemed ‘Palestine’
even though Palestinian-owned land (and
Palestinians) are located on both sides of
the boundary (Mueller, 2004; GodfreyGoldstein, 2005; Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz,
2005). The barrier also serves a place-clearing
function by removing the presence of those
Palestinians who cannot obtain permits8
from the ‘Israeli’ side; as mentioned earlier,
this creates ‘empty’ space for implementing pre-existing settlement expansion plans
(Godfrey-Goldstein, 2005; Lein & CohenLifshitz, 2005). Consequently, the route of
the separation barrier re-inscribes and reenforces geographical boundaries of identity.
The route of the barrier has been a rallying
point for joint Israeli–Palestinian activism;
this has included bringing cases before the
Israeli High Court and the International
Court of Justice (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz,
2005; Mor, 2005).
A system of restricted roads in the West
Bank also maintains separation between
Israeli settlers and West Bank Palestinians.
These roads facilitate movement of settlers
between their homes and their workplaces
in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem without having
to encounter Palestinians (B’Tselem, 2004;
PASSIA, 2004; Tilley, 2005). The road system, like the separation barrier, supports the
maintenance of separate boundaries of identity. For Palestinians, restricted roads dissect
the West Bank and prevent them from accessing neighboring villages or sometimes even
their own land (it is illegal for Palestinians
to cross some roads), whereas they connect
settlers with Israelis living within the 1948
boundaries.
This system impacts joint activism as it
makes transportation to demonstrations or
actions difficult to coordinate. Palestinians
cannot travel on bypass roads unless they
are in an Israeli vehicle; even then, Israeli
vehicles (designated as such by their yellow
license plate) can be selectively stopped at
checkpoints. When this occurs, all passengers must show their IDs, and sometimes
Palestinian riders are asked to step out of the
vehicle for further inspection or because they
7
8
Also called the ‘Security Fence’ or ‘Apartheid/Annexation
Wall’. I use B’Tselem’s somewhat more ‘neutral’ term of
‘separation barrier’ because it consists of fences, walls, sand
traps, surveillance equipment, patrol roads, and trenches.
Permits can be denied without any reason given; they can
also be denied on ‘security’ grounds, including if anyone in
the family has ever been injured by a member of the IDF
(MachsomWatch, 2005).
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lack the proper permit while the vehicle is
waved on. Because of the many roadblocks
and checkpoints on the Palestinian roads,
it can sometimes (ironically) be easier for
Israeli activists to access Palestinian towns
throughout the West Bank (via settler roads)
than it is for Palestinians from other towns.
Yet the buses or vans of Israeli activists are
often stopped at the entrance points to the
West Bank and can be denied entry even
when appropriate clearances were obtained
in advance.
The case study of Bil’in that follows highlights the ways Palestinian, Israeli, and international demonstrators seek to counteract
these territorial tendencies. For example,
Israelis must try to circumvent the checkpoints and road blocks that are erected to
prevent their entry into Bil’in for Friday
demonstrations. In addition, Palestinians
try to counter territorial tendencies by ‘personalizing’ the struggle and countering ‘displacement’ through creative protest that
highlights the relationships of control built
into ‘impersonal’ Israeli laws and regulations
and appeals to international and human
rights law. The case also demonstrates the
benefits of intervening in the conflict on
multiple levels (grassroots, legal system,
national media) using a range of available
tactics – a range that is expanded through
the inclusion of both Israeli and Palestinian
actors and through the strategic legitimation
of the struggle through selective appeal to
cultural symbols and societal beliefs.
Combating Separation: Nonviolent
Strategies of Resistance
Legitimation-Creating Alternative Stories
One of the strategies of resistance used by
Israeli and Palestinian activists involves shifting portrayal of the Palestinian resistance
movement from terrorism to legitimate
nonviolent struggle against an oppressive
occupying force. To this end, activists draw
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
on ‘commonplaces’ (tropes) – frequently
cited words, phrases, or events in their
sociopolitical context – when selecting slogans and demonstration themes (Shotter,
1993). Activists shift the meaning of these
commonplaces by altering the context and
manner in which they are used while still
remaining within the scope of what is seen as
acceptable; to be successful in policy change
or in attracting supporters, activities must be
seen as legitimate and relevant to their current social, political, and historical setting
(Jackson, 2002: 454). Consequently, efforts
at joint struggle are particularly challenging given that they operate within multiple
societal contexts and must appear legitimate
not only to stakeholders with varied sociopolitical values, cultural symbols, and status
within their national communities, but also
to those with very different experiences of
the broader conflict and the national ‘Other’
(see Awwad, 2001; Maoz et al., 2002).
Bil’in activists seek to legitimate their joint
action in the context of a conflict that has,
since 2000, resulted in thousands of deaths
and strengthened separation tendencies –
geopolitical and narrative – within Israeli
and Palestinian societies. In addition to the
physical obstacles noted earlier, school curricula, separate schools, ID cards issued based
on ‘nationality’ for Israelis and birthplace for
Palestinians, and the politics of memory and
commemoration – Holocaust Remembrance
Day, Land Day, etc. – all contribute to the
separation that Israeli and Palestinian activists must combat.9 Societal experience of
the conflict and the history of institutional
framing of – and response to – acts of physical, psychological, and cultural violence pose
additional obstacles to joint struggle. The
framing of their actions through selective
9
Space does not allow a full discussion here. For sources
discussing the separate narratives of Israeli and Palestinian
identity, see, for example Khalidi (1997); Kimmerling
(2001); Golan-Agnon (2005); Massad (2006).
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Maia Carter Hallward
use of symbols and phrases, combined with
the use of nonviolent tactics, is one strategy
activists have used to counteract ‘Other’ as
‘Enemy’ narratives.
The Power of Nonviolence
Although peace and justice movements are
often left out of mainstream histories, both
Israeli and Palestinian societies have longdocumented experience with nonviolent
efforts for social change. Israeli groups have
used nonviolent tactics such as holding vigils
or demonstrations, like the protests involving hundreds of thousands in response to
Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and
have used contacts with elected officials
to push for change (Bar-On, 1996), while
Palestinians have often used nonviolent
methods of strike, boycott, tax resistance,
or direct action (see Hall-Cathala, 1990;
Boulding, 2000; Saleh, 2003). Tactical and
strategic differences in the use of nonviolence stem from different degrees of access to
formal structures and institutions of power
(the military, representative government,
economic strength), sociocultural dynamics,
and political objectives. In response to the
outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the start
of construction of the separation barrier, a
number of peace and justice groups shifted
their strategy and tactics (or else went into a
period of quietude).
Nonviolence theory traditionally conceptualizes power as a dynamic social relation,
rooted in obedience and the power of consent (Sharp, 2005). It is consistent with the
Foucauldian perspective that power operates
not only through mechanisms of repression
and exclusion, but also through those of
cooperation and the sharing of knowledge.
Consequently, nonviolent theorists analyze
power dynamics not only by looking at
sources of ‘hard’ power, but also by examining how mechanisms and procedures of
domination ‘are displaced, extended, and
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
altered’ through active resistance (Foucault,
1980: 99). In Israel/Palestine, nonviolent
activists seek to change the structural
inequalities and injustices they see evidenced
in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.
While Israeli and Palestinian activists differ
(within and between societies and groups) in
their ultimate vision of a ‘just, lasting and
secure peace’, because of limitations in numbers and resources, activists often focus on
the abuses of occupation over which there
is no contention, such as the route of the
separation barrier or checkpoints separating Palestinian villages from critical services
in larger Palestinian cities.10 In the case of
Bil’in (and in other villages where Israelis
and Palestinian have worked together to
challenge other occupation policies), nonviolent activists draw on strategies set forth
by scholars of nonviolence: that is, challenging the legitimacy of cultural narratives and
political institutions, making latent conflict
(i.e. structural violence) overt, and transcending imposed or accepted divisions in
pursuit of integrating, compromising, or
broadening goals (see Sharp, 1973; Curle,
1995; Galtung, 1996).
The section that follows examines some of
the strategies nonviolent activists have used
in the case of Bil’in to (a) document the existence of nonviolent, ‘joint’ efforts in Israel/
Palestine and (b) explore reasons contributing to the relative success of this particular
village in sustaining protest and attention,
and in achieving limited legal victories. It
focuses on localized mechanisms of power
and resistance, including the ways in which
protestors reconnect sociopolitical symbols
(commonplaces) in an effort to delegitimize
Israeli occupation policies.
10
Of course, contention may exist when looking at the
segments of Israeli and Palestinian society that do not
support groups engaged in nonviolent change to end the
occupation.
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Creative Responses to Separation:
Activism in Action
Many Palestinian villages have been affected
by the route of the separation barrier and
have protested the construction of the barrier
nonviolently; representatives have met (in
Ramallah, Bil’in, and elsewhere) to develop
a national nonviolent strategy and share
experiences. Activists in Bil’in have learned
from this corporate experience in terms of
formulating their own strategy and tactics.
A few lessons are highlighted here, including
the importance of creative actions, partnering with Israelis and ‘internationals’, shifting
the discourse, and engaging in communitylevel public relations and legal battles
simultaneously.
Creativity at Work
Bil’in has attracted media coverage partly
because of the unique actions designed and
implemented by activists. For over 135 consecutive weeks since early 2005, the villagers
of Bil’in have demonstrated – often with a
new creative touch – even after the barrier
construction was completed. While some
actions in Bil’in have paralleled those of
activists in other parts of the West Bank (for
example, chaining themselves to olive trees
to prevent their uprooting or marching en
masse toward the planned route of the separation barrier), Bil’in organizers have devised
distinctive motifs for their weekly demonstrations. More than mere advertising campaigns to attract media attention, the weekly
themes carry strong political messages – often
through visual imagery – that seek to engage
with the humanity and moral principles of
soldiers, on-lookers, and any who might see
media coverage of the event. Activists seek to
move beyond the impersonal and displacing
tendencies of the official narrative to visually
depict not just the confrontation that can
sometimes occur between soldiers and protestors, but rather the reason for the protest.
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
Through their creative banners, floats, and
actions, the residents of Bil’in strive to shift
the coverage of their demonstration away
from the ‘illegality’ of their presence in a
‘closed military zone’ to the relationship
between Occupier and Occupied and thereby
counteract the effects of territoriality.
The messages of the Bil’in residents (as
well as their Israeli and international partners) are aimed not only at Israelis, but also
at other Palestinians, the United States, the
United Nations, and global civil society. For
example, activists created a huge model of
the ‘Scales of Injustice’, which they carried
in the front of the marchers. The scale was
‘balancing’ balls of unequal size, with the
larger, heavier one wrapped in an Israeli flag;
the fulcrum was held by Uncle Sam, representing the US role in the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict. Other imagery made it clear that the
message was aimed at Israel’s failure to abide
by international legal decisions, such as the
International Court of Justice ruling against
the wall, and a long list of UN Resolutions
(Keller, 2005; Bornat, 2006). On another
occasion, the protesters brought a sliding
board that children and adults slid down in
the middle of the construction site, challenging the idea that this was emptiable space,
simply a ‘construction zone’, but rather had
been the ‘playground’ of the community that
pre-existed the bulldozers. Activists also built
a cage in which women, children, a goat, and
internationals sat, waiting for the soldiers to
arrive. Their message shifted the imagery of
the separation barrier from that of security,
to that of imprisonment, seeking to inform
viewers that because the barrier cuts deep
into the West Bank (~3 km at Bil’in) and
wiggles all around, it cages in the Palestinians
and prevents them from accessing their land,
fellow Palestinians, and the international
community (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz, 2005).
Creative protest seeks to personalize the
struggle and to fill the space with evidence
of its Palestinian landowners. In the summer
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Maia Carter Hallward
of 2006, Mansour, a local village activist,
and his bride got married in the middle of a
Friday demonstration. The bride and groom
came in full dress; soldiers responded as they
had to all the other demonstrations, ignoring that a wedding ceremony was going
on with small children in attendance. The
wedding qua protest was symbolic on many
levels. First, it signified the commitment of
Mansour, who is quite active in the Popular
Committee Against the Wall, to the weekly
demonstrations. Second, it signifies that marriage, and the mere carrying on with daily
life (sumud, or steadfastness), is for many
Palestinians a sign of resistance in the face
of an occupation that makes ‘simple’ tasks
like going to work or selling one’s produce
extremely difficult and often humiliating.
Third, the wedding deploys the commonplace of the ‘demographic struggle’, suggesting that Palestinians will resist through their
higher birthrate and thereby threaten Israel’s
Jewish majority.
Engaging the Power of Joint Action
Palestinian, Israeli, and international protestors in Bil’in lack the ‘hard’ power held by
the Israeli army and border police, but they
do hold many forms of ‘soft’ or informal
power through appealing to norms and institutions seen as valuable or legitimate by their
opponent (Nye, 2001). Activists also wield
power by challenging traditional ‘we’–‘they’
boundaries. Soldiers readily admit that the
presence of Israeli activists in the crowd of
protestors changes the nature of the game;
certain weapons (such as rubber-coated bullets) suddenly become illegitimate (see, for
example, Isadora, 2004; Rapaport, 2005).11
The solidarity and support of the 40 or 50
Israelis who are in almost constant contact
with the villagers also sends a message to
Palestinians as it demonstrates the existence
11
This does not mean the army does not use rubber-coated
bullets against Israeli protestors; it has, but not with as
much frequency or surety.
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
of Israelis with whom they can have a
relatively ‘normal’ relationship. Palestinians
invite the Israelis and treat them as partners
in the struggle, but by being the initiators
and architects behind the planning of the
demonstrations, the Palestinians retain a
degree of power and superficial sovereignty
in their village.
Joint action provides the means to
challenge three forms of power held by the
occupying force in the West Bank (Sharp,
2005: 29). First, it undermines the moral
authority of state actions (such as the construction of settlements or the route of
the wall) by questioning policies and decisions through cases brought to the High
Court. Second, when more Israelis join with
Palestinians in nonviolent resistance, especially when soldiers question the military’s
actions vis-à-vis unarmed demonstrators, it
can alter soldiers’ interpretation of orders and
increase military pressure for policy change.
Third, coverage (albeit relatively limited) of
the political messages and nonviolent strategies evident in Bil’in’s creative protest has
been circulated in Israeli, Palestinian, and
international circles, which opens the possibility of challenging existing conceptions
regarding reasons for, nature, and goals of
Palestinian resistance.
Part of the reframing of the conflict that
occurs in sites of joint struggle like Bil’in
involves the shifting of conflict terms. Rather
than a zero-sum conflict of ‘Israelis’ vs.
‘Palestinians’, the nonviolent struggle
becomes a positive conflict for freedom
and human rights, making latent conflict/
injustice manifest. The consequence of this
reframing is that boundaries of identity are
configured differently in Bil’in, with lines of
belonging often drawn based on position visà-vis key issues rather than official national
labels. This rebounding has key implications for moving from an ‘existential enemy’
narrative to one of tolerance, coexistence,
and cooperation. Indeed, Bil’in has built
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connections between all sorts of unlikely
actors, such as that between Laser, an Israeli
born into an ultra-Orthodox village who was
the spokesman for the gay–lesbian faction in
the leftist Meretz party, and Sheikh Hassan
Yusuf, who has served over 6 years in prison
and is a leader of Hamas. At one demonstration, Sheikh Yusuf said ‘I am happy that you
are here, the Israelis’, contradicting what one
hears in the media about Hamas’s desire to
destroy Israel (Rapaport, 2005). Such shifts
occur through an active process of sharing
experiences of relative equality (putting selves
at risk) in a conflict situation characterized
largely by power inequality, and working for
common goals (challenging the route of the
separation barrier in Bil’in). Muhammed, a
Bil’in resident active with the Popular Committee responsible for organizing demonstrations, emphasizes:
We have built trust and strong relationships
by participating together in the clashes. Israelis
are with Palestinians in the front row …. It’s
not like Jonathan is at the beach saying how
much he wants peace while Muhammad is
being beaten …. Palestinian and Israeli, their
relationship is grounded in a shared struggle.
It doesn’t spring from a peace center, where
everybody talks about peace and how much
they love each other. (Blecher, 2006)
Jonathan, an active Israeli organizer, echoes
the importance of challenging typical (asymmetrical) patterns of Israeli–Palestinian interaction, stating:
The fact that there are Israelis who are crossing
the line … against everything we are supposed
to believe, is an achievement. The fact that
Israelis and Palestinians are able to act together
in a … self-aware way, with Palestinians taking the lead, and where politics of privilege are
considered, is an achievement in and of itself.
(Blecher, 2006)
Muhammed and Jonathan both emphasize
the unique capacity of joint struggle for
building bonds that transcend – and defy –
the official narratives of both societies. Their
narrative of justice and equality challenges
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
the legitimacy of policies and practices that
perpetuate inequality between Israelis and
Palestinians and actively seek to separate and
divide the two societies. Both demonstrate
a keen awareness of the power dynamics
involved not only in their relationship as
‘partners’ but also within the terminology
used to describe their movement. For example, they talk about their ‘civil’ or ‘popular’
struggle rather than their ‘nonviolent’ one; the
adjective is racist, they claim, as it would not
be used to describe an Israeli demonstration
(assumed to be nonviolent) (Blecher, 2006).
Despite the partnership and bonds of solidarity, Israelis and Palestinians recognize their
differences. While Israelis are just as likely
to be beaten as Palestinians, when arrests are
made, Israelis are often released within hours,
while Palestinians can remain in prison for
weeks. After the demonstrations, Israelis can
return home to Tel Aviv and their ‘normal’
lives, while Palestinians remain in their village under the watch of the soldiers, subject
to midnight raids on the village and other
forms of collective punishment. Furthermore,
although Palestinians are the initiators of
the demonstrations and invite Israelis to come
(demonstrating their power and agency), the
presence of Israelis at demonstrations makes
it easier for Palestinians to join the march as
they know the army’s response will likely be
moderated (somewhat), owing to the presence of Israeli civilians (Mor, 2005; Rapaport,
2005; Pollack, 2006). Joint action provides
opportunities (albeit sometimes limited) for
engaging the media and political leadership
of both communities, pooling (different)
resources, and intervening in multiple aspects
of the conflict.
Delinking and Redeploying Commonplaces:
The Palestinian Outpost
Bil’in activists have often sought to reframe
the conflict through the strategic deployment
of key symbols and commonplaces yoked
together in a new ways. One of the most
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Maia Carter Hallward
creative examples of this was the building
of an ‘illegal (Palestinian) outpost’ as a sign
of resistance to the hundreds of Israeli outposts scattered throughout the West Bank.12
In the middle of December 2005, residents
of Bil’in put a caravan trailer on village lands
on the Israeli side of the separation barrier
and declared it an ‘illegal outpost’, drawing on the terminology used in the international arena for those settlements which
Israel itself deems illegal and has promised
on numerous occasions to dismantle (but
has generally not done) (Shulman, 2006).13
By using a caravan trailer (often the first sign
of a new Jewish settlement on a Palestinian
hilltop), the Palestinians were tapping into
a set of commonplaces understood by the
Israeli and Palestinian communities (Shotter,
1993). The act, therefore, had great symbolism for those undertaking and witnessing the
act. Within 36 hours Israeli authorities had
demolished the caravan, but shortly thereafter the Palestinians returned with another
trailer. When the authorities arrived this
time, however, the Palestinians inquired as to
why their outpost (built on their own land)
was destroyed so quickly when Jewish settlers could build without permits (on land
owned by Bil’in residents) and their buildings were left standing. The Israeli authorities
responded that the apartment buildings of
Modi’in Illit were ‘real buildings’ whereas the
outpost was not. When asked what defined
a building, the Israeli officials replied that it
needed ‘four walls, a roof, an interior with at
least 10 square meters, and a window’. The
authorities also noted that if they were to find
such a building the law would require waiting
at least 10 days before tearing it down so that
the owners could appeal (Shulman, 2006).
12
Most of these outposts are illegal under Israeli law, as
documented in the Talia Sasson report http://www.fmep.
org/documents/sassonreport.html (accessed 8 May 2007).
As of July 2004, the Israeli group Peace Now reported a
total of 97 outposts, 52 of which were erected after 2001
(PASSIA, 2004).
13
All settlements are illegal under international law.
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
During the course of a rainy night villagers
worked to build the house, managing to get
all the supplies across the muddy wadi despite
the rain and build a house to the specifications
of the Civil Administration. The next morning the authorities were astonished to see the
house, which had appeared like a mushroom
in the night. It stands to this day and has
been named ‘The Bil’in Center for the Joint
Struggle for Peace’. Since the construction of
the outpost, Israelis and internationals have
kept a constant presence in the Center (as of
time of writing in December 2007). Numerous activities have been held there, including
tours of the site, soccer games on the nearby
field, lunch meetings, and film screenings
in an open area where makeshift seats have
been arranged under a simple canopy. Bil’in
residents say that they will take their outpost down once the Israelis have taken theirs
down (specifically those settlements built on
land belonging to Palestinians).14
Linking Protest with Politics:
Engaging on Multiple Levels
In February 2006, and again in April 2007,
Bil’in hosted an international conference on
nonviolence and joint struggle. A national
conference – for Palestinians from villages
around the West Bank – was convened earlier in 2007. The program of both international conferences shows the effort of Bil’in
activists to link into international struggles
and to build ties with nonviolent movements
elsewhere (Bil’in, 2007). Speakers included
Israeli, Palestinian, and international political,
media, and NGO representatives. Palestinian
organizers from different areas of the West
Bank shared stories of nonviolent resistance
in their respective villages and the outcome
of the national conference. Workshops and
panels focused primarily on strategies of
14
I toured this site and heard the story from one of the
organizers of the Bil’in Popular Committee in July 2006
while participating in an Interfaith Peacebuilders study trip
to Israel/Palestine.
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carrying on the resistance (i.e. joint struggle,
media) and improving its strategic leverage.
Like building an ‘outpost’ and constructing it
so that it was a ‘real building’, holding a conference was another form of legitimizing the
resistance of the Bil’in villagers. Just as academics and professionals in Israel, the United
States, Palestinian urban areas, and elsewhere
could conduct conferences, so could the
small rural village of Bil’in. By framing their
struggle in terms understood and respected
by the West, Bil’in was better able to exert
leverage and gain media attention.
Bil’in activists have also used existing
politico-legal structures to effect change. For
example, Palestinians have tried to influence Palestinian leaders to pay more attention to rural issues, particularly the impact
of the barrier route on local livelihoods, and
to increase visibility of this issue in international talks. The visibility of the struggle
in Bil’in resulted in at least limited success
in bringing politicians to view the situation
first-hand. On 20 January 2006, the weekly
demonstration drew large numbers of candidates for the Parliamentary elections. Uri
Avnery, a veteran peace activist and leader
of Gush Shalom, argued that the presence
of Palestinian political activists at the weekly
demonstration as part of an election campaign demonstrates the increasing significance of the wall on the national political
agenda. While many Palestinian politicians
have been slow to respond to and speak out
against the wall on the national and international scene, the struggle in villages like
Budrus, Biddu, Jayyous, Beit Surik, and
Bil’in has helped raise that profile and make
the politicians realize that they too must
show interest – even if only to win votes or
gain free publicity (Jumma, 2004; Morar,
2005; Avnery, 2006).
One of the major strategic benefits of joint
struggle is that it facilitates Palestinian access
to the Israeli court system. In January 2006,
Peace Now and the Head of the Council of
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
Bil’in filed a petition with the Israeli High
Court of Justice against the construction
of the Matityahu East neighborhood, an
extension of the Modi’in Illit settlement
block built on village lands. An investigation revealed that the new extension of the
settlement was being built against existing
planning and construction laws and therefore was not approved even under Israeli law
(all settlement construction is illegal under
international law) (Lein & Cohen-Lifshitz,
2005). In response, a temporary injunction
put a freeze on any further building in the
compound and banned residents from using
the apartments already constructed (Eldar,
2006; Taayush, 2006). On 4 September
2007, Israeli and Palestinian activists won
a ‘victory’ in the Israeli High Court when it
‘ordered the state to redraw, partially dismantle and rebuild’ a section of the separation
barrier passing through Bil’in (Yoaz, 2007).
While the ruling was much heralded in some
circles, Palestinians (and some Israelis) viewed
the ruling as a more limited accomplishment.
While the ruling demonstrated the power of
sustained nonviolent joint action to effect
minimal concessions from the institutional
authorities, reactions highlight the gaps in
perspectives and objectives between broad
swathes of the Israeli and Palestinian population (including the peace movements).
Rather than celebrating a victory, some
pointed to the fact that there is no guarantee
that the military will act as directed, or that
the ruling does not question the legitimacy
of the barrier itself. Others noted that a ruling by the High Court later that day ‘legalized’ the settlement being built on Bil’in land
(Mansour, 2007; Qumsiyeh, 2007; Yahni,
Atinsky & Warschawski, 2007).
Conclusion
Nonviolent activism in Bil’in has had mixed
results. The ‘success’ of the nonviolent struggle in Bil’in – in terms of sustained joint
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Maia Carter Hallward
partnership, efforts to reframe the issues,
and court rulings – suggests certain lessons
for Western donors and political elites seeking to ‘restart’ a Middle East peace process.
On an organizational level, sustained joint
effort has been credited to the close relationship between the popular committee and
the community; the relationship of trust
and shared decisionmaking between Israelis,
Palestinians and Internationals; the creativity of the demonstrations; and knowing what
they want to (and can) achieve. These factors have been augmented by the location of
Bil’in, which is easily accessible from either
Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and the very clear case
Israeli organizations have helped document
regarding the relationship between the route
of the Wall and planned settlement expansion (Blecher, 2006). In other areas, Bil’in
has not achieved its objectives: the separation barrier still divides farmers from their
lands, the High Court ruling was limited in
its scope and implementation, mainstream
Israelis still want the conflict to simply go
away (as seen in the focus on separation
and disengagement), and high-level political meetings continue to avoid discussing
issues of critical concern to local residents,
such as the separation barrier. Nevertheless,
the sustained effort in Bil’in demonstrates
a political will often absent at higher levels
and a commitment to seeking redress for key
issues. The case of Bil’in suggests several lessons of particular import for policymakers
and international actors (donors, aid agencies, NGOs) in the wake of the Annapolis
Conference and a renewed (albeit highly
debated) effort at high-level peacemaking.
These general principles can be adapted by
actors at different levels (i.e. local activists) to
their own particular form of intervention.
Pay Attention to Issues of Power and
Asymmetry In Bil’in, Israelis and Palestinians have managed to transcend the forces of
separation and build a partnership through
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
action around a common goal. While
those involved acknowledge the asymmetry
between Israeli and Palestinian partners in
terms of legal protection, (lack of ) citizenship, economic status, and relationship to
those holding the guns, by facing the risk of
injury together – Israelis acting in solidarity
with Palestinians – activists forge bonds of
respect and trust that are difficult to build
through monthly discussion groups in
safe spaces away from core conflict issues.
Furthermore, efforts are made to create as
equal a partnership as possible, by allowing
both parties to exert power within their areas
of leverage. For example, Palestinians have
the power to set the course of action, restrain
stone throwing, and invite Israeli activists to
participate; Israelis have the power to more
freely challenge the legitimacy of soldiers’
actions and to bring legal cases to the Israeli
court system. By empowering both parties,
chances of sustained partnership are heightened. In their projects, third parties should
think critically about ways to create a climate of equality even while recognizing and
seeking to address the broader inequalities
between Israelis and Palestinians as well as
within each respective community. Policymakers should consider the differential ability of political actors to carry out assigned
tasks (i.e. confidence-building measures)
and seek ways to empower Palestinian leaders without imposing their own views and
proscriptions.
Spend Time Building Relationships with a
Broad Constituency One of the successes
of Bil’in has been the engagement of the
entire village in the struggle and the network
it has developed with numerous Israeli and
international individuals and groups. While
not all villagers and Israelis see eye-to-eye (on
issues like dress, for example) compromise is
encouraged: Israeli organizers encourage modest dress in their emails, and villagers ignore
deviations. Israelis are often invited to spend
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Thursday nights in the village to ensure their
presence at Friday demonstrations, which
provides an opportunity for additional interaction and deepening of relationships. Activists have also sought to develop linkages with
nonviolent activists from other Palestinian
villages and from struggles elsewhere (like
Northern Ireland, South Africa). Building
broad and deep coalitions expands the leverage and the legitimacy of the movement.
Third parties should seek to build broadbased legitimacy for their political efforts.
For example, while leaders from other Arab
states were invited to the Annapolis conference, less effort was made to ensure broad
support within Palestinian society in particular. Not only were political factions like
Hamas excluded, but by avoiding key issues
(i.e. the cutting off of electricity in Gaza, the
separation barrier) related to their daily struggle to survive, so were large segments of the
Palestinian population. Local activists should
continue their outreach efforts to raise awareness within Israel regarding the situation on
the ground in the Palestinian Territories,
and within Palestine regarding the utility of
nonviolence as well as the possibility of joint
struggle with Israeli counterparts.
Seek To Reframe Conflict Discourse Activists engaging in a joint struggle for peace and
justice should seek to legitimize their efforts
through appeals to sociopolitical symbols
and commonplaces prevalent in their respective communities in new and creative ways.
Actions such as building the Palestinian
outpost or demonstrations using symbols of
international justice, human rights, and freedom force conflict parties to re-examine the
meaning and significance of these symbols as
related to the conflict when they are linked
together – or to other symbols – in ways that
challenge popular social conceptions. Furthermore, by using Israeli law and courts to make
their case in addition to grassroots protests,
Bil’in activists demonstrate their willingness
volume 46 / number 4 / july 2009
to adhere to the rule of law, despite their
portrayal in the mainstream media as violent
rioters. Imaginative protests focusing on the
struggle as a positive one for human rights
and justice rather than merely a negative one
against the Israelis (as opposed to specific
occupation policies) have also strengthened
the movement and allowed for the continued
partnership of Israeli and international activists. Policymakers should draw on the creativity expressed here as well as elsewhere15
to address difficult issues such as sovereignty
over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif
and move beyond essential, stereotypic portrayals of key actors. Local and international
activists should try to (continue) use strategic sociocultural, political, and religious
commonplaces as a way to gain leverage in
broader society and to challenge commonly
held assumptions and misperceptions regarding the conflict. This strategy requires careful
consideration of audience and context.
Identify and Address Obstacles to Cooperation The use of theoretical lenses such
as territoriality can help policymakers and
NGOs identify barriers to cooperation
beyond attitudinal change. Analyzing the
ways in which political, social, and geographical boundaries intersect and overlap
can help third parties design interventions
that strengthen non-exclusivist boundings of
identity. Local activists can consider the ways
they (consciously or not) ‘bound’ their communities through use of language, location
of meetings, operating principles, etc.
Create a Process that Recognizes Different Sources of Legitimacy and Views of
Success The case of Bil’in demonstrates the
importance of both process and outcome in
15
For example, organizations such as the Israel Palestine
Center for Research and Information (http://www.ipcri.
org) and Common Ground News Service (http://www.
commongroundnews.org) have put forth creative solutions
to final status issues.
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Maia Carter Hallward
joint struggles. The varied reaction to the
Israeli High Court ruling demonstrates the
vast differences in mainstream Israeli and
Palestinian public opinion regarding the
reasons for and potential solutions to conflict, as well as the proper role of the Israeli
High Court (as opposed to the International
Court of Justice or religious courts) in cases
related to the separation barrier and settlements. Even those skeptical of the court ruling, however, note the importance of Bil’in’s
joint nonviolent struggle and praise the
efforts of Palestinians and Israelis in putting
aside differences, focusing on commonalities,
and seeking an equal partnership. Although
Israelis and Palestinians might regard particular outcomes differently (i.e. the court
ruling), the relationship among activists
has endured, partly because of the attention
to establishing relationships based – to the
extent possible – on equality.
By concentrating on the process-side of the
relationship – developing jointly planned (and
implemented) actions rather than a jointly
articulated peace platform – Bil’in activists
have steered clear of some of the problems
encountered when trying to outline specific
details for a peace agreement. While some
might see this as simply delaying the inevitable, others might argue that taking the time
to develop a principle-based relationship that
recognizes (while not necessarily agreeing
with) different perspectives and strives to
create conditions of equality among the partners might make it easier to reach accommodation and compromise in the future.
Third-party actors should carefully consider
process as well as outcome when designing
interventions or planning joint activities, considering carefully which laws, frameworks,
and participants are seen as legitimate by the
parties involved and striving to create equal
partnerships. For example, the ICRC recently
called for political action in addition to
humanitarian assistance in Gaza, highlighting
the legitimacy of international humanitarian
JOINT ACTIVISM
IN
BIL’IN
law in addition to Israeli security concerns,
and calling for substantive structural changes
to ameliorate the dire inequality between the
parties (ICRC, 2007). In order to obtain
desired outcomes, policymakers and other
third parties must create a legitimate process
in the eyes of both Israeli and Palestinian
stakeholders, one that accounts for both parties’ needs (economic, security, etc.) and is not
divorced from realities on the ground. While
good process can sustain temporary setbacks
in terms of outcomes, outcomes without process can be reversed by spoilers.
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MAIA CARTER HALLWARD, b. 1976,
PhD in International Relations (American
University, 2006); Assistant Professor,
Kennesaw State University (2006– ); editorial
board, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (2003– ). Current book project: Challenging the Boundaries of ‘Peace’: Identity and
Activism in the al-Aqsa Intifada.
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