1974 PHILIP C. JESSUP I NTERNATIONAL LAW
r100T COURT MEt'10RIALS ON BEHALF OF
APPLI CANT AND RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF
INDUSTRIA V. THE STATE OF LATIA
DAVID C. CAYLOR
KENNETH Q. LARSON
, No. 1974-001
IN THE, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACEI='ALACE, THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS
March Term, 1974
THE
, ..,....
.STATE "OF INDUSTRIA,
.
"
Applicant,
v.
, ,
\THESTATEOF LATIA,
Respondent.
On Submission to the
Interriational Court of Justice
.
, .'"
1· , ' 1
,
••
'
TEAM NO. I
February 22, 1974 ,
. Agents for Industria :
I N 0 E X
Page
Index of Authorities
•
Jurisdiction • • • • •
• • • • • •
Questions Presented • . • ' .
Statement of Facts .
Summary of Argument .
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Argument and Authorities • • • • • •
I.
THE DEEP OCEAN MINING ACT IS JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
• • • • • • • •
A.
B.
II.
1
1
Freedom of the high seas, both as customarily
practiced and as codified by the 1958 Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, permits Industrian ships to mine the subsoil of the
high seas.
. ....
.. .. . .... .
1
The Deep Ocean Mining Act realistically
meets the needs of the world community by
ensuring adequate mineral suppli e s, preventing partitioning of the high seas , and promoting international cooperation.
•• • • • . • 4
BECAUSE TRACT #1 IS AN AREA OF THE HIGH SEAS
OVER WHICH LATIA HAS NEVER HAD JURISDICTION,
INDUSTRIA ' S MINING OPERATIONS WERE LAWFUL.
A.
Latia's claimed 200-mile fisheries zone
violates international law and cannot
serve as a basis for extending its territorial sea .
B.
C.
7
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.
.
Latia's claim to a 200-mile territorial
sea violates the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and customary international law.
•••••
.
.
. 7
• • • 9
Because Tract #1 is neither adjacent to
Latia's coast nor expl,oitable, Latia's
claim that its continental shelf extends
to Tract #1 violates the Convention on
the Co~tinental Shelf and customary inter-
national law. · . • • . • . • ••
. . . • . . . 12
ii
Page
D.
III.
Because Latia's claimed 300-mile economic resource zone neither conforms to the
1958 Conventions nor bears any relation
to Latia's capabilities or needs, the
claim violates international law.
..·..
15
• • •
18
·..
18
LATIA'S ACTIONS AGAINST INDUSTRIAN SHIPS
VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
• •••••
By ini tiating armed aggression against
Industrian ships · on the high seas, Latia
violated international law.
•••• • •
A.
B.
Latia's unlawful pursuit of Carrier and
use of excessive force against Gatherer
entitl e Industria to compensation for all
damages..
Conclusion •
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II
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II
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lit
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Appendix B • •
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o
I N D E X
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20
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23
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24
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Appendix A
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•
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25
•
AUT H 0 R I TIE S
F
Page
Treaties
Deep Ocean Mining Act (1973) • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••
DOMA
§
2(b)
•
DOMA
§
2 (c)
• •
DOMA
§
3 •
DOMA
§
4 (c) • • •
DOMA
§
5
DOMA
§ 6 •
DOMA
§
7
.. •
•
• • • • •
.• ..
•
• • • •
• • • • • •
·
•
•
•
• •
• • •
• • •
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...
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•
4
.6, 14
• •
..• .• ·.• .....
. . • • • • . . . • • . • 2,
,
• •
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•
5
7
6
•
• • • •
• • •
1
• • •
·
•
•
5, 6
•
•
.
6
iii
Page
Treaties (Cont.)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1) (a),
done May 23, 19.69, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 • • • • • • • 4
..., ..
Vienna Convention art. 26 •
.
• •
• •
.• .• .
Convention on the High Seas, done April 29 , 1958,
T. LA.S. No. 5200; U. N . T.s:-lf2 • •
•
.
16
..
•
. • · • 2, 3, 16 ,
23 . • . . . . • • . . • •
23 (7) . . .
·....·.
Convention on the High Seas art . 2 • • •
Convention on t he High Seas art .
18
21
'
Convention on the High Seas art.
2
22
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, done April 29, 1958, T.I . A.S . 5639;
516 U.N.T.S. 205 . •
.
.
•.•
.
.....
.
...
•.. 9
Convention on the Territorial Sea art . 24 • • • • • • • • • 16
Convention on the Territorial Sea art . 24(1)
17
Convention on the Territorial Sea art . 24(2)
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 28,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 ; 499 U.N.T.S . 311 •
Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1 • •
Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 3 •
U.N . CHARTER art. 51 • • •
.......
.
•
....
9
3
• •
12
• • • •
16
.19 , 22
•
Cases
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case , 12 INT'L LEG. MAT.
300 (1973)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
• .
.
• • • • • .
•
8, 9
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ,
I.C.J . .
.
Fisheries Case,
••
..
. . . . . . .[1969]
.....
.
' 12 , 13 , 16 , 17
[1951] I.C.J. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Corfu Channel Case (Merits),
[1949] I.C.J • • • • • • • • •
9
19
iv
Cases (Cont.)
Page
Claim of the British Ship "I'm Alone" v. United
29 AM. J .
.
Naulila Incident Arbitration 409, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.
1012 (1928),6 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
154 (1943) • • . . • • • • • • • • • .
.
" 22
• 22
•
Le Louis [1917] 2 Dods, 210-243 • • • • . • • • •
19
Treatises
J. ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF
THE SEA (1970)
" .. " " ..
II
"
III
..
"
"
"
•
•
"
•
•
B. BRITTIN & L. WATSON , INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
SEAGOING OFFICERS (3d ed. 1 9 7 2 ) .
D. BROWN, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1970)
•
•
14
24, 25
1
•
D. BOWETT , SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958)
19
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC I NTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1973)
• • • • • • •
• • • . 20
C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
(6th ed. 1967) • . • • • • • • •
•• • • •
7, 19
Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor
Sovereignty , in THE LAW OF THE SEA
(L. Alexander ed . 1967)
•••
•
•
14
M. GREEN , INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968)
•
9 , 20
•
D. JOHNSTON & E . GOLD , THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA : SURVEY, ANALYSIS, AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS, OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. 17 (1973)
•• •
• • • ••
• • •
1 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (E. Lauterpacht ed . 1970) . • • • • • •
• ••
J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF
~HE
SEA (1965).
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE , THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS (1962)
• •• • ••• • • •••• • • •
16
2
5
7, 14
1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 233 (S. Lay,
R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist ed. 1973) • • • • • • 11
v
Page
Treatises (Cant.)
S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES
(1963) • . . • • • . • • • •
• • • • • 3, 15
....
S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (1972) • • • • • • • • • • • • •
....... 7
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1952) • • • • • • • • •
. . . . . . 22
POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 21, 22
1 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed .
1957) . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .
2 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (196B)
...
•
1
• 19 , 21
Z . SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1966) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 14
J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
(7th ed. 1972)
• • • • • • • •
R. SWIFT, INrERNATIONAL LAW (1969)
•
• •
11
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965) • • •
5
22
•
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)
B, 11
• ••
19
Periodicals
Bowett, Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of
the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L.
1955-56, at 130 (1957) • • • • • • • "• • • •
Friedmann , Selden Redivivus--Toward a Partition
of the Seas? , 65 AM. J . INT'L L . 757 (1971)'.
. . . 19
....
Goldie , International Law of the Sea: A Review of
States' Offshore Claims and Com etences , 24
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV .
Fe • 1
•• •
• • • . 10
4
Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Miner al Resources
Act--A Neyative View, 10 SAN DIEGO L . REV.
446 (1973
. • • • • • •
...............
10
vi
Page
Periodicals (Cont.)
Sea Minin , 7 SAN
5, 6, 13, 14
Nelson, The Patrimonial Sea, 22 INT'L L. &
COMPo L. Q. 668 (1973).
• ••• •
.. .. .. .. . . .
10
Pardo, An International Regime for the Deep
Seabed: Develo in Law or Develo in Anarch?,
TEX . INT L L. F.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. • • • 13, 17
Phleger, Recent Develoements Affecting the Re,ime
of the Hilh Seas, ~n DEP'T STATE BULL. 93
(June 6,
955) . ... ...... . .... . . .... .. . .
.. . .. ..
11
428 (1969) ...... . ...... . . . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .
lB
Note, Seizure of United States Fishing Vessels-The Status of the Wet· war, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
Misc e llaneous
American Tuna Boat Association, DATA ON SEIZURES
OF U.S. TUNA BOAT CLIPPERS DURING PERIOD JANUARY
1961-JUNE, 1969, Table 1 (1969) • • • • • • • • • • • • • B
The Bulgaria--Czechoslovokia--Hungary--U.S.S.R.
Declaration of 1972, 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 215
(1973)
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. .. . . ..
..
The Colombia--Mexico--Venezuela Declaration of 1973,
12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 570 (1973) • • • • • • • • •
11
• • • 11
COMM'N TO STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, Nineteenth Rep.,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA 16
(1970) ..........
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....
..
.. -.
.. ...
..
7
COMM'N TO STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, Twenty-First Rep.,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA (II)
17
(1970)
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4, 15
..
The Comm. on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the Am.
Branch of the Int'l L. Ass'n, Second Interim Report on Deep Sea Mineral Resources pt. VII, in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT
(5.. Oda ed..
1972)
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3
vii
Miscellaneous (Cont . )
Page
Henkin, The Continental Shelf , in FOURTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 171 (L. Alexander ed. 1969) • •
·..
10
G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR. U.N. Doc. A/7834
(1969) . . . . . .. • . . • • . . . . . . . • • • •
16
Inter-American Juridical Comm., Opinion on the
Breadth of the Territorial Sea 1969 O.A.S'./OD
O. E.A./Ser.l/VI.2 (English) CIJ-80, at 33
& n.49 • • • .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
17
·..
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N . GAOR, Supp. 9 ,
at 24, U.N . Doc . A/3l59 (1956) • • • • • • •
2, 9, 16
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 23 U. N. GAOR, at 9, 10,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/19 Add. 1 (1968) • • • • • • • • 1
Report of the 358th Meeting, 1 Y. B. INT'L L .
COMM'N 136 (1956) • • • • • • • , • • • • ..
Santo Domingo Declaration, 11 INT'L LEG. MAT,.
892 (1972) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. ..
.
..
12
..·..
11
23 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. To Study t he Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floo'r Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisd. , A/AC.135/R.l
(1968)
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....
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4, 7
23 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. To Study the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond ,
the Limits of National Jurisd. , A/AC.135/R.5
(1968)
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5, 6
24 U.N. GAOR, Report of Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisd., Supp. 22 , at 108,
1 09. U. N• Doc . A/7 622 (1969) • • • • • 3, 5 , 6 , 7 , 13
viii
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
. MARCH TERM
1974
CASE NO. 1974-001
THE STATE OF INDUSTRIA,
Applicant
v.
THE STATE OF LATIA,
Respondent
MEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANT
J URI S D I C T ION
The parties have agreed to submit this dispute to the
International Court of Justice for its determination.
ix
oU
I.
II.
III.
EST ION S
PRE SEN TED
WHETHER THE DEEP OCEAN MINING ACT IS JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
WHETHER LATIA HAS JURISDICTION OVER TRACT 11?
WHETHER LATIA'S ACTIONS AGAINST INDUSTRIAN SHIPS
VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW?
o
STATEMENT
F
F ACT S
The parties have ' stipulated the facts before the Court.
SUMMARY
o
F
A R GUM E N T
The Deep Ocean Mining Act is justified under international
law.
Under the principle of freedom of the high seas, Indus-
trian ships
~ave
the right to mine the subsoil of the high seas.
Furthermore, the Deep Ocean Mining Act complies with the 1958
Geneva Conventions by protecting the freedom of the high seas
and ensuring the orderly development of ocean resources.
Because Tract #1 is an area of the high seas, and Latia
has never had jurisdiction over it, Industria's mining operations on Tract #1 were lawful.
By initiating armed aggression against Industrian ships
on the high seas, Latia violated international law.
Latia's
unlawful pursuit of Carrier, and its use of excessive force
against Gatherer, entitle Industri'a to compensation for ' all
damages.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.
THE DEEP OCEAN MINING ACT IS JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A.
Freedom of the high seas, both as customarily
practiced and as codified by the 1958 Geneva Converence on the Law of the Sea, ~ermits Industrian ships
to mine the subsoil of the h~gh seas.
The ri hts authorized b the Dee
tent w~t ~nternat~ona law.
Ocean Minin
Act are consis-
The high seas are those parts of the oceans which lie seaward of any nation's territorial sea.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (3d ed. 1957).
1 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER,
The principle of the free-
dom of the high seas as recognized by customary international
law applies to all the waters of the open sea.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (1970).
D. BROWN, PUBLIC
One corollary of this principle
is that all states may exploit the minerals and organic
resources of the high seas and its subsoil.
Id. at 103.
The International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on the
Law of the Sea has noted that the subsoil of the high seas is
capable of at least temporary occupation for scientific and
economic activities as long as there is no unreasonable interference with navigation.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 23 U.N.
GAOR, at 9, 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/19 Add. 1 (1968). Accord,
ingly, the Deep Ocean Mining Act [DOMA) permits only temporary occupation of licensed areas of the high seas, for the
limited purpose of extracting minerals, and prohibits
2
unreasonable interference with any customary use of the ocean.
DOHA § 4(c).
DOHA therefore, is consistent with customary
international law.
DOHA complies with the 1958 Geneva Conventions by protecting
the freedom of the high seas and ensuring the orderly development of ocean resources.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions produced the most successful
codification of the customary law of the sea .
PACHT, I NTERNATIONAL LAW 98
1 H. LAUTER-
(E . Lauter pacht ed . 1970).
Freedom of the high seas is defined in Article 2 of the
Convention on the High Seas.
The Convention observed that
freedom of the high seas i s comprised of not only the freedoms of navigation, fishing, cable-laying and overflight, but
also of other freedoms which are recognized by the general
principles of international law.
Convention on the High
Seas , done April 29 , 1 958 , T.I.A . S. No . 5200; 450 U. N. T.S.
82 [ hereinafter cited as CHSJ .
The International Law Com-
mission explained that these other freedoms include the freedom to mine mineral resources .
Int ' l L. Comm'n , Report, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 , at 24, U.N. Doc . A/3l59 (1956)
after cited as 11 1. L.C.J.
[herein-
DOHA violates none of the free-
doms enumerated by the Convention; on the contrary , DOHA
makes express provision for protecting the traditional freedoms of the seas by authorizing it,!> secretary to prevent any
unreasonable interference with ocean usage.
DOHA 5 4(c).
DOHA thereby gives its member-states the administrative control deemed neces s ary by t he U.N. Permanent Sea-bed Committee
3
to ensure the protection of these freedoms.
24 U.N. GAOR,
Report of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisd., Supp.
22, at 108, 109, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1969)
[hereinafter cited
as Sea-bed Comm.J.
The right of DOMA licensees to exploit submarine resources requires no
~ew
doctrinal justification:
herent in freedom of the high seas.
CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 151 (1963).
it is in-
S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL
Indeed, as long as min-
ing operations are conducted with reasonable regard for the
interests of other states, as Ocean Mining Company's operations
are, the operations are permitted and protected by international law.
The Comm. on Deep Sea Mineral Resources of the
Am. Branch of the Int'l L. Ass'n, Second Interim Report on
Deep Sea Mineral Resources pt. VII, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (S. Oda ed. 1972).
Since DOMA
operations are specifically limited to extracting hard minerals from the subsoil of the high seas, no DOMA state purports to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.
Therefore, DOMA complies with the CHS by respecting the freedom of the seas.
CHS art. 2.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf [CCSJ, to ensure
the orderly development of the ocean's resources, limited
mining by non-coastal nations to the subsoil of the high seas.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 28, 1958,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as ccsJ.
DOMA recognizes and implements this aspiration by incorporating
4
the Convention's definition of continental shelf.
2(b).
DOMA S
This explicit reference to the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf is convincing evidence that the framers of
DOMA intended DOMA to reflect the spirit of all the Conventions.
B.
The Deep Ocean Mining Act realistically meets the
needs of the world community by ensuring adequate
mineral supplies, preventing partitioning of the
high seas, and promoting international cooperation.
Multilateral treaties are particularly desirable for meeting the needs of the world community.
Friedmann, Selden Re-
divivus--Towards a Partition of the Seas?, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 757, 770 (1971) .
DOMA is a multilateral treaty as defined
by the Vienna Convention.
Treaties,
39/27.
art~
Vienna Convention on the Law of
2(1) (a), done May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
Such treaties are an efficient and equitable method
for ensuring the orderly and progressive exploitation of the
resources of the high seas.
23 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm. to
Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisd., A/AC.135/R.l, at lB
(196B)
[hereinafter cited as Ad Hoc Comm.l.
Multilateral
treaties impose enforceable self-restraints on their participants and avoid the unlimited and disruptive claims resulting
from unreasonable unilateral actions such as Latia's.
See
COMM'N TO STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, -'Twenty-First Rep., THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA (II) 17 (1970)
[here-
inafter cited as U.N. & BED OF THE SEAl.
DOMA requires its
members to adhere to specific regulations
~hich
prevent
5
unlimited prescription of the high seas.
DOMA § 3.
Thus,
DOMA prevents a massive race to partition the seas through
unilateral action.
Manganese nodules contain at least fifteen metals essential to the world's continuing industrial and technological
development.
Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 4BB, 496 (1970)
DIEGO].
[hereinafter cited as 7 SAN
Although these minerals are being rapidly depleted
on land, the oceans contain vast reserves sufficient to meet
the world's needs.
27B (1965).
J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA
Most developing coastal states with extended
jurisdiction cannot effectively exploit the resources within
these areas because they lack sufficient technology.
The re-
sult will be a critical shortage of vitally needed resources.
Ad Hoc Comm. 11.
DOMA prevents the void resulting from lack
of adequate production by encouraging mutual assistance and
cooperation among participating states.
DOMA § 6.
Securing adequate supplies and systematic production of
minerals from ocean resources will stabilize world markets by
averting fluctuations in market prices caused by shortages.
Sea-bed Comm. 109.
The cooperation engendered by DOMA dis-
courages price manipulation by single-nation monopolies.
Additionally, the security which DOMA provides its licensees
will attract · the investment
capit~l
exploitation of ocean resources.
needed to realize effective
6
DOMA's ~rovision for recognition of its licensees by any
future ~nternational regime is necessary for the realization of orderly ocean development.
Section 7 of DOMA protects the investments of licensees
under any forthcoming international regime.
This provision
is reasonable and necessary for DOMA to be a viable solution
to the problems involved in ocean mining.
DOMA § 7.
The
high costs involved in exploring and developing ocean mineral
sites would render non-recognition by an international regime
an inequity to licensees and would greatly discourage investment, exploration, and exploitation.
Because experts suggest licensing tracts of 1,000 to 5,000
square miles, the 100-square-mile maximum tract size allowed
by DOMA would be reasonable under any future regime.
§
2 (c); 7 SAN, DIEGO 488, 500.
DOMA
DOMA' s trust fund contr ibutes
an equitable amount to developing states; therefore, permitting
the continuation of mining operations under DOMA licenses
would not impair the functioning of the regime.
Ad Hoc Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.13~/R.5,
DOMA § 5, 6;
at 11.
The restrictions placed on licensees by DOMA are extremely
stringent and would probably exceed those of any future international regime.
Sea-bed Comm. 153.
Moreover, DOMA's licens-
ing period of twenty years is brief, so that even if it
proved incompatible with an international regime the remaining licensing period would be relatively short.
The licensing provisions of DOMA are consistent with
those of the U.N. Seabed Committee's Legal Sub-committee.
Both licensing programs employ a "double C?oncession system"
7
in which the state acts as the administrator of the mining
operations.
Sea-bed Comm. 108 & n.26.
As administrators of
these operations, DOMA nations can ensure effective exploitation while protecting the other uses of the oceans.
DOMA
§
4(0), ~ Ad Hoc Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.l35/R.l, at 16.
Moreover, a prime requisite of the proposed regime will
be to grant companies the security of tenure necessary for inducing investment of the large sums essential to ocean development.
COMM'N TO STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, Nineteenth Report,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA 16 (1969).
It is
reasonable for DOMA to give its licensees the same protection
that an international regime will give its licensees.
II.
BECAUSE TRACT #1 IS AN AREA OF THE HIGH SEAS OVER WHICH
LATIA HAS NEVER HAD JURISDICTION, INDUSTRIA'S MINING
OPERATIONS WERE LAWFUL.
A.
Latia's claimed 200-mile fisheries zone violates
international law and cannot serve as a basis for
extending its territorial sea.
Latia ' s claim to fisheries jurisdiction does not conform
to the customary practice of nations.
The 1958 Geneva Con-
ference did not recognize exclusive fisheries zones such as
Latia has claimed.
M. MCDOUGAL & ·W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER
OF THE OCEANS 539 (1962)
BURKE]
I
[hereinafter cited as MCDOUGAL &
C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
(6th ed. 1967).
§
27a
Over two-thirds · (fifty-seven) of the world's
developing coastal states do not claim exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction beyond twelve miles.
S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF OCEAN DEVELOPMENT 372 (1972).
8
Regular protests of fisheries zones such as Latia's
demonstrate that such zones are inconsistent with international
law.
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1102 (1965).
General lack of recognition of claims to extended fisheries
jurisdiction has been fur.ther demonstrated by continued fishing of the declared zones by foreign nationals.
See American
Tuna Boat Association, DATA ON SEIZURES OF U.S. TUNA BOAT
CLIPPERS DURING PERIOD JANUARY 1961-JUNE 1969, Table 1 (1969) .
In fact, periodically, Latia has had to exclude foreign fishing ships from its own declared zone.
This continued non-
recognition of Latia's claimed fisheries jurisdiction, viewed
in conjunction with widespread protest and infringement of
similarly claimed zones, demonstrates that Latia's claim has
no basis in international law .
In the Fi~heries Jurisdiction Case of 1973, Judge Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice recognized that there is no generally accepted method of validly asserting exclusive fisheries jurisdiction unilaterally, except as part of a valid claim to
territorial waters .
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 12 INT'L
LEG. MAT . 300 , 312 (1973).
When Latia cla'imed its fisheries
zone, it had no territorial sea upon which to base this claim.
Thus, Latia's claim to a 200-mile fisheries zone is invalid.
A void exercise of jurisdiction can never be the basis for
further assertions of jurisdiction,.
Therefore, Latia cannot
base its claim to a 200-mile territorial sea upon an invalid
claim to a 200-mile fisheries zone.
9
B.
Latia's claim to a 200-mile territorial s e a violates
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone and customary international law .
This Court has declared arbitrary, unilateral extensions
of territorial seas to be unlawful.
I.C.J. 132.
Fisheries Case,
[1951]
Extensions of two hundred miles are arbitrary
under any circumstances.
The vast majority of states agree
that claims to more than twelve miles violate international
law.
M. GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1973) .
In preparing
its draft of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, the International Law Commission expressly sta t ed that extensions
beyond twelve miles derogate from freedom of the seas and are
not permitted under international law.
11 I.L.C . 13.
Arti-
cle 24(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone states that a nation claiming a twelve-mile
territorial sea is entitled to no . contiguous zone .
Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art . 24(2),
done April 29 , 1958 , T.I.A.S. 5639; 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as CTSCZ]; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 12 INT ' L
LEG. MAT. 310, n.l (1973).
The implication of this provision
is that no state may claim a territorial sea beyond twelve
miles .
Fisheries Jurisdiction Ca se, 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 310 ,
n.l (1973).
Twelve miles, therefore, is the prescribed outer
limit of the territorial sea , and ,,any extension beyond that
distance is contrary to the CTSCZ.
International law prohibits claims of limited jurisdiction,
such as Latia's claim to a 200-mile fisheries zone, from
10
ripening into claims of total national sovereignty.
Knight,
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act--A Negative View,
10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446, 456 (1973).
This device, sometimes
called creeping jurisdiction, would allow Latia to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly .
Henkin , The Con-
tinental Shelf, in FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 171, 175-76 (L. Alexander ed. 1969).
Creeping juris-
diction jeopardizes local, regi9nal, and international interests in the freedom of the seas.
the Sea:
Goldie, International Law of
A Review of States ' Offshore Claims and Competences,
24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 43, 52 (Feb. 1972) .
The reality of the danger is manifest in Latia ' s past and
present actions.
Latia's 200-mile fisheries zone, although
excessive, was at least limited in its allegation of sovereignty.
In 1966, however, Latia shed any pretense of preserv-
ing the limitation, and even today it purports to exercise
full sovereignty over the entire 200-mile zone .
Now another
new claim , unfounded and vaguely defined, stretches across an
unprecedented three hundred miles of high sea.
The survival
of the traditional freedoms of the sea in this extensive area
is seriously threatened.
Latia's past claims reinforce the
probability that it is attempting to lay the foundation for a
future claim to a 300-mile territorial sea.
See Nelson, The
Patrimonial Sea, 22 INT'L & COMP o L. Q. 668, 683 (1973).
The
prohibition against creeping jurisdiction protects the high
11
seas from such unilateral nationalization of seabed resources.
R. SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (1969).
The effect of all
nations' claiming territorial seas of two hundred miles would
be to reduce vast areas of the high seas to national sovereignty.
[See Appendices.)
There are additional reasons for this Court to reject
Latia's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea.
Numerous multi-
lateral declarations have affirmed the principle that no state
may validly extend the limits of its territorial sea beyond
twelve miles.
~.,
Santo Domingo Declaration, 11 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 892 (1972); The Columbia--Mexico--Venezuela Declaration
of 1973, 12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 570 (1973); The Bulgaria-Czecholovokia--Hungary--U.S.S.R. Declaration of 1972, 12
INT'L LEG. MAT. 215 (1973).
Attempted extensions of terri-
torial seas beyond twelve miles have been vigorously protested .
Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High
Seas, in DEP ' T STATE BULL. 937 (June 6, 1955).
Because of
such protests, most states which formerly claimed territorial
seas of two hundred miles have recanted, now declaring that
they are exercising only limited jurisdiction .
See 1 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 233 (S. Lay . R. Churchill,
& M. Nordquist ed. 1973); 4 M.
~iITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 69 (1965).
Even Latia has manifested insecurity in its position.
On one hand it asserts sovereignty over Tract #1, while on
the other hand it admits an obligation to the world community
12
which is inconsistent with its claim of total sovereignty.
If Latia had exclusive sovereignty over Tract #1, it had no
obligation to share the income from this area.
By setting
aside ten per cent of the profits from Tract #1, Latia
tacitly admits that the tract is on the high seas.
Since Tract #1 is outside Latia's jurisdiction, this
Court should uphold Industria's right to mine that tract.
C.
Because Tract #1 is neither adjacent to Latia's
coast nor exploitable, Latia's claim that its continental shelf extends to Tract #1 violates the
Convention on the Continental Shelf and customary
international law.
The CCS stated that beyond the depth of two hundred
meters, the limits of the continental shelf are to be determined by applying the criteria of adjacency and exploitability
conjunctively.
CCS art. 1.
Tract #1 is neither adjacent to
Latia's coast nor is it exploitable.
The term adjacency was originally proposed by Frederico
Garcia Amador, chairman of the International Law Commission,
who stated that adjacency would not encompass extensions
beyond 25 miles.
Report of the 358th Meeting, 1 Y. B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 136 (1956).
This Court has recently taken the position that "by no
stretch of the imagination can a point • • • say a hundred
miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be regarded as
'adjacent' to it • • • • "
[19691 I.C.J. 30.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
13
Tract #1 is no more exploitable than it is adjacent.
Under any application of exploitability, Latia's claim to
sovereignty over Tract #1 is invalid.
This Court, as well as
other authorities, has recognized that the 1958 Convention's
definition of exploitability was not intended to authorize
unlimited extensions of jurisdiction.
Id. at 103; Sea-bed
Comm . 83; 7 SAN DIEGO 488, 494.
Latia has attempted to use the exploitability criterion
· to claim jurisdiction over an area of the seabed 120 miles
off its coast.
To base the exploitability criterion on either
Industria's present or Latia's future exploitative capabilities,
would allow any state to extend its sovereignty to mid-ocean.
Because Latia's technology is not sufficiently advanced to
utilize the resources of Tract #1, Latia has no reasonable
basis for asserting jurisdiction over the area.
Latia ' s at-
tempted extension of its continental shelf to Tract #1 is,
therefore, just as unreasonable as an extension to mid-ocean:
neither bears any relation to Latia's capabilities ' or needs.
Permitting a coastal state to denominate the deep seabed
as a continental shelf on the basis of its future capability
or other nations' present capability to utilize shelf resources would be disastrous .
When nations realized that sover-
eignty could be obtained by simple proclamation there would be
a massive rush to partition the high seas.
national Regime for the Deep Seabed:
Pardo, An
Inter-
Developing Law or De-
veloping Anarchy?, 5 TEX . INT'L L. F. 204, 207
(1970).
14
Assuming, arguendo, that the test to be applied in determining exploitability is the technical ability of other
states to exploit, Latia still cannot claim Tract #1.
The
ability to extract small quantities of minerals does not
prove that bulk recovery is possible.
J. ANDRASSY, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 78
(1970).
The
measure of exploitative capability includes not only technical potential but also such practical limiting factors as
the economics of the enterprise.
leas t
~ ne
MCDOUGAL & BURKE 690.
At
thousand square miles of seabed will be necessary
to render the recovery of manganese nodules profitable.
DIEGO 500.
7 SAN
By this standard the maximum tract size granted
under DOMA is too small to yield a profit • . DOMA § 2(c).
Additionally, the cost of metals extracted from manganese
.nodules will exceed that of land based sources for years to
come.
Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Sovereignty, in
THE LAW OF THE SEA 154 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
Exploitation
is only proven possible when shown to be economically feasible.
z.
SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 104
(1966).
Since extraction of nodules from - Tract #1 has not
been proven to be profitable, Latia cannot successfully maintain that Tract #1 has been proven exploitable.
If one ship-
load of unrefined ore were deemed to be proof of exploitability,
other states would attempt to follow Latia's lead.
Subsequent
extensions by Latia and other states would create vast areas
which no one could develop and states with little or no coast
15
would be totally excluded from deep ocean development.
U.N.
& BED OF THE SEA 17.
Prior to its seizure of Gatherer, Latia had no technological ability to exploit manganese nodules.
The technical
knowledge which Latia now possesses was seized illegally from
Industria, and therefore Latia has no valid claim to technological ability.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that Latia now
possesses the technological ability to mine Tract #1, Latia
still could not employ the exploitability criterion as a
basis for extending its sovereignty.
Latia cannot now extend
sovereignty over Tract #1 because subsequent technological
discoveries cannot be used as the basis for validating prior
claims.
Moreover, technological ability to exploit requires
a showing of the capacity to ensure an effective long-range
development of the claimed area.
Because neither Ocean Mining
Company nor Latia has proven Tract #1 to be exploitable,
. Latia's assertion has no basis in international law.
There-
fore, this Court should find that Latia has no jurisdiction
over Tract # 1.
D.
Because Latia's claimed 300-mile economic resource
zone neither conforms to the 1958 Conventions nor
bears an relation to Latia's ca abilities or needs
the c a1m V10 ates 1nternat1onal law.
International law does not recognize the economic resource
zone concept employed by Latia.
OF SEA RESOURCES 20 (1963).
S. ODA , INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
As a party to the 1958
16
Conventions, Latia is bound to recognize areas beyond its
twelve-mile territorial sea as being high seas not subject
to the jurisdiction of any state.
CHS art. 2; CCS art. 3.
Latia's claim to a three ' hundred-mile zone violates its
treaty obligations and thus violates international law.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, done May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,' 39/27.
The purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to promote the
orderly development of the oceans.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
See 11 I.L.C. 2-4;
(1 969) I.C.J. 92.
Uni-
lateral extensions based on eonomic resource zones undermine
this purpose.
Actions such as Latia's would subject the en-
tire ocean floor to similar unjustified claims, thus violating
principles espoused by the international community.
G.A. Res.
2574, 24 U. N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/7834 (1969) .
There is no essential difference between an economic resource zone and a contiguous zone.
Under both the economic
resource zone concept and the contiguous zone concept, coastal
states would exercise limited jurisdiction for specific purposes over areas lying adjacent to their coasts.
D. JOHNSTON
& E. GOLD, THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:
SURVEY,
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS, OCCASIONAL PAPER No.
17, at 1
(1973); CTSCZ art. 24.
The economic resource zone concept alluded to by the InterAmerican Juridical Committee would permit a coastal state to
exercise limited jurisdiction over adjacent coastal waters
17
for the regulation of fiscal matters.
Inter-American Juridi-
cal Comm., Opinion on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea [19661
O.A.S./OD O.E.A./Ser.l/VI.2 (English) CIJ-80, at 33 & n.49.
This limited authority is identical to that which the CTSCZ
grants the coastal state.
CTSCZ art. 24(1).
Latia's econo-
' mic resource zone, therefore, is nothing more than a contiguous zone.
Since the CTSCZ expressly prohibits the establish-
ment of such a zone beyond twelve miles, Latia's claim to a
300-mile economic resource zone i s unlawful.
This Court has recognized that extensions of national
jurisdiction over the ocean must conform to the 1958 Conventions and be reasonabl e in relation to the coastal state ' s
particular needs.
I.C.J. 50 , 51 .
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
[19691
Latia ' s actions do not guarantee the freedom
of scientific research.
Mr . Arvid Pardo , Malta's ambassador
to the United Nations , pointed out that unilateral acts such
as Latia's will probably interfere with the freedom of scientific resea rch and al l other traditional freedoms of the high
seas .
Pardo , An International Regime for the Seabed :
Devel-
oping Law or Developing Anarchy? , 5 TEX . INT ' L L. F. 204, 206
(1970).
Latia ' s unlawful attempt to extend its jurisdiction
has prevented Industria from exerc i sing its rights to the
freedoms of scientific research , navigation , and exploitation.
Latia's ~laims neither conform to the 1958 Conventions,
nor bear any relation to Latia ' s capabilities or needs .
Thus,
Latia's actions are contrary to international law, and should
18
be so declared by this court.
III.
LATIA'S ACTIONS AGAINST INDUSTRIAN SHIPS VIOLATED
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Latia ' s seizure of Industrian ships and its subsequent
actions violated international law .
lawful for two reasons:
These actions were un-
first, Latia initiated armed aggres-
sion against Industrian ships; and second, Latia used excessive force following . an unlawful pursuit on the high seas.
A.
By initiating armed aqqression against Industrian
ships on the high seas, Latia violated international
law.
No state may lawfully claim sovereignty over the high seas.
CHS art. 2.
Latia's unwarranted extension of its territorial
sea is an indefensible attempt to usurp the freedom of all nations to use the high seas .
Because Latia gave notice to the world that it would use
force to further its unfounded claims , Industria was entitled
to give its citizens a modicum of protection by arming
Gatherer .
Note , Se i zure of United States -Fishing Vessels--
The Status of the Wet War , 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV . 428, 439-40
(1 969).
That these token arms were- not intended for aggres-
sive use was demonstrated by Gatherer's refusal to retaliate
against Latia's unprovoked attack . ,
Gatherer was engaged in lawful mining activities on the
high seas when Interceptor appeared and demanded that Gatherer
depart .
Gatherer had the right to give notice by firing a
19
return warning shot that it would not willingly give up its
rights on the high seas unless forced to do so.
This Court
has recognized that states are not bound to refrain from
exercising lawful rights merely because they may be challenged
or even resisted by coastal states.
Corfu Channel Case
(Merits), [19491 I.C.J. 29.
Latia's use of force was excessive and unjustified on
any grounds .
A universally accepted doctrine of international
law establishes that " a merchant ship flying the flag of a
recognized state is immune from interference on the high seas
by the ships of any nation other than its own.
Le Louis [19171
2 Dods, 210-243; COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
S 333 (6th ed. 1967).
Nevertheless, Interceptor attacked
Gatherer without provocation, damaged the ship and injured
some of its crew.
Certainly the doctrine of self-defense cannot be invoked by Latia to defend its actions on the high seas.
SCHWARTZENBERGER,INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1968).
2 G.
Self-defense
cannot be exercised against one who is acting lawfully.
BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW" 256 (1958).
defense is a response to the act of aggression.
MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 979 (1965).
D.
Self-
5 M. WHITE-
For the doc-
trine to be invoked, the accused aggressor must be the first
to act.
In the absence of such an act there can be no self-
defense.
Because Industria committed no act of aggression
Latia cannot validly assert a right to self-defense.
U.N.
CHARTER art. 51; Bowett, Collective Self-Defense Under the
20
United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 1955-56, at 130, 148
(1957).
Latia's use of force, therefore, was unlawful.
Furthermore, self-help cannot be used to resolve disputes
over territory:
[T)he territorial privilege is subject to curtailme nt in cases of dispute:
the. claim to the privilege cannot be supported by self-help which would
render the right , ~ post facto, extraterritorial,
and serious breaches of the peace are not a justifiable means of upholding exceptional rights .
I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
366 (2d ed. 1973).
Territorial privileges over Tract #1 were in dispute.
Latia
wrongfully claimed full sovereignty, while Industria engaged
in limited activities universally permitted on the high seas.
Latia resorted to armed aggression against a merchant ship
and a mining rig, thereby violating international law.
B.
Latia's unlawful pursuit of Carrier and use of
excessive force against Gatherer entitle Industria
to compensation for all damages.
Latia's seizure and adjudication of Gatherer and Carrier's
cargo violate international law .
Where recognized responsi-
bilities under international law are violated, municipal law
is irrelevant.
M. GREEN , INTERNATIONAL LAW 244-45 (1973).
Even if Latia's actions are in compliance with its municipal
law, reliance upon municipal legislation cannot validate
actions otherwise invalid under international law.
Under t he CHS hot pursuit may be commenced only within
the territorial sea and then only after the pursued ship is
21
notified by visual or auditory signals.
CHSart. 23.
The
only notice given Carrier occurred beyond Latia's claimed
territorial sea, making Latia's pursuit and seizure direct
violations of international law.
Because no notice was given
Carrier, as required by this convention, hot pursuit could
not have been commenced lawfully.
Furthermore, although Industria's mining operations had
been in progress for several days, Latia waited until the
first load of nodules had been recovered before commencing
pursuit of Carrier.
Even if Latia at one time had the right
to pursue, its failure to take timely action constituted an
abuse of rights which is a breach of international law.
The
substantial lapse of time between commencement of mining
operations
a~d
the pursuit was unjustifiable .
N. POULANTZAS ,
THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as POULANTZAS).
Therefore, Latia lost its
right to rely on the doctrine of hot pursuit.
Gatherer was outside Latia ' s territorial sea in an area
beyond its continental shelf.
Latia, therefore, had no
jurisdiction to interfere with Gatherer's activities.
Assum-
ing, arguendo, that this Court finds that the actions took
place within Latia's territorial sea or above its continental
shelf , Latia's responses were unjustified.
Only responses
which do not involve the use of armed force, i.e. pacific reprisals, conform with Latia's obligations as a member of the
United Nations.
2 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58
22
(1968); U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
A·s suming, further, that international law permits Latia
to use force, nevertheless, Latia's actions were unlawful.
Latia's positive reprisal by use of excessive force constituted a violation of international law, because the act must
'be in proportion to the wrong.
LAW
§
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
389, at 140-41 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952) .
A state
may exert only the amount of compulsion necessary to achieve
its ends .
Id.Latia ' s unprovoked attack, which rendered the
mining rig inoperative and injured its crew members, was excessive by any standard.
Even if Industria's actions had
been unlawful, Latia's use of unjustifiable force permits
Industria to be indemnified for its costs a.nd damages.
POULANTZAS
26~-65.
Failure to observe a rule of international
law gives a state a claim for satisfaction whether it be
diplomatic in character or in the form of indemnity or reparation.
J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21
(7th ed. 1972);
~
also CHS art . 23 (7).
For the above reasons, this Court should award Industria
return of the nodules, return of Gatherer, reimbursement of
all fines and assessments, and compensation for all other
costs including lost profits on the mining operation and prejudgment interest .
POULANTZAS 265.
The Court would also be
justified in awarding Industria moral damages.
Claim of the
British Ship "I'm Alone" v. United States, Report of Commissioners, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 326, 331 (1935); Naulila Incident
23
Arbitration 409, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1012 (1928), 6 HACKWORTH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1943).
C O ' N C L U S ION
WHEREFORE, for , the reasons set forth above, Applicant
respectfully prays that the International Court of Justice
render its decision in favor of Industria, finding that:
(1)
Tract #1 is outside Latia's jurisdiction.
(2)
Latia ' s actions against Industrian ships violated the
freedom of the seas.
(3)
Industria is entitled to the return of all confiscated
property, reimbursement of all fines and assessments,
compensation for lost profits, and moral damages.
(4)
Industria may exploit Tract #1 under a DOMA license.
Respectfully submitted,
Team No. 1
Agents fo~ Industria
,
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The Caribbean Sea and a Twelve-Mile Limit
B. BRITTIN & L. WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 80 (3d ed . 1972)
[The desirable effects of allowing
universal extensions to the maximum
twelve-mile limit, as recognized by
international law.]
No. 1974-00 1
IN THE ' INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE; THE HAGUE; NETHERLANDS
March Terin, 1974
THE,','STATE OF INDUSTRIA,
',
,
Applicant:
THE STATE OF LATIA,
Respondent.
On Submission to the
.1nternationaf Court 'of Justice
:'COUNTER~MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
:; ':
,
"
: ,.' .
. '. , ;
,
.'
, "-
'
. '",
•
.'
•
'
.
,
.
'
!
" ,'
,
':
TEAM NO . .1
Agents fot Latia,
I N D E X
Page
Index of Authorities
ii
Jurisdiction • • • •
viii
• •
Questions Presented
•
ix
•
Statement of Facts •
ix
Summary of Argument
•
ix
Argument and Authorities •
1
I.
LATIA HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER TRACT #1
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.
International law does not prohibit
Latia from exercising exclusive sovereignty over a 200-mile territorial
sea. . . . . .. ..
..
.. .. .. .. .. .
1
Latia's exercise of sovereignty over
Tract #1 is justified under international law by the continental shelf
doctrine .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. ..
9
'Latia' s establishment of a 300-mile
economic resource zone is recognized
under international law • • • • • •
16
..
B.
C.
II .
1
.
INDUSTRIA BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
GRANTING A LICENSE WHICH AUTHORIZED THE
VIOLATION OF LATIA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER
TRACT #1 ..
A.
B.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
20
The licensing of Tract #1 violates
international law by not respecting
Latia's territory and ignoring the
purpose of the 1958 Conventions
20
Industria's breach of Latia's sovereignty violated both DOMA and international law, justifying Latia's actions in preventing mining operations
' and protecting its la~ful interests.
23
. . . . . . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. ..
25
Conclusion • ..
ii
I N D E X
0 F
AUT H 0 R I TIE S
Page
Treaties and U.N. Resolutions
Deep Ocean Mining Act (1973)
DOHA
§
1 .
DOHA
§
2(b)
DOMA S 4 • •
DOMA
§
4 (c) •
DOHA
§
6
•
8
•
..
21
21, 23
•
• • •
•
•
•
•
•
.
20
21, 22, 23
•
22
DOHA S 7
21
•
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art . 2(1) (a),
done May 23 , 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27.
Vienna Convention art . 26
....
~
.. .. .. .. ..
8, 23
• •
23
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone ,
done April 29 , 1958 , T . 1.A.S . 5639; 516 U.N . T.S.
'2l5"5 " . .. .. . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. .
4
Convention on the Territorial Sea art. 1
8
Convention on the Territorial Sea art . 2
6, 8
Convention on the Territorial Sea art . 14
7
Convention on the Territorial Sea art. 16 -
7
Convention on the Territorial Sea art. 16 ( 1 )
8
Convention on the Territor i al Sea art . 24.
. .
Convention on the High Seas, done .Apri1 29 , 1958 ,
. . .. 0\ .. . . . .
450 U.N.T.S . 82
....
. .
16
.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 28,
195 B, T. 1. A. S • No • 5578; 499 u. N:T:S . 311
Convention on the
. ..
20
• • • • 9
Continental Shelf art. 1 • • • • • 9, 14, 23
iii
Treaties and U.N. Resolutions (Cont.)
Page
Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 2(1)
10, 15
·
Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 2(2) •
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3
15
•
23
• •
U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1 • •
•
G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/C./544
·...
(1970)
•••••••••••.•...
23
•
21
Statutes
Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, S.2801,
92d Cong., 1st Sess . (1971)
• • • •••••
·..
17
Cases
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J.
South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J.
Fisheries Case ,
11
• • •
[1951] I.C.J • •
2
•
• • • • 6
•
In the Matter of an Arbitration Between Petroleum
Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh
of Abu Dhabi, 1 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 247 (1952)
(full text rep'd). • • • • • • • • •
•••••
12
Treatises
J. ANDRASSY , INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF
THE SEA (1970) • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • 6, 11
O. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1966) • •
•
•
• •
• •
. ..
.
.
.
22
"\
W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1966)
•
•
• •
• •
.
... . ...........
.
2
H. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Higgin's 8th ed.
(1924)
•
e.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
23
iv
Treatises (Cont.)
Page
D. JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
. LAW OF THE SEA: SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND
APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS , OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. 17, (1973) . • • • • • • . • • • 16, 18, 19
Laque, Deep Ocean Mining: Prospects and Anticipated
Short-Term Benefits, in PACEM IN MARIBUS 131
(E. Borgese ed. 1972)
•••••••••••
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (E. Lauterpacht
ed. 1970)
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
5
..
..... .
4
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
(1962)
.
.
.
..
.
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
.
.
.
.
8, 13
.
2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (S. Lay,
R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist ed. 1973) • •
•
1 D. O'CONNELL , INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1970) •
12
6
S . ODA , INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES
(1963)
.
....
......
" ..
....
.. 14
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. H.
Lauterpacht 1955)
•• •
• • • • • •
..
.. ..
.. 24
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIOl~AL LAW (7th ed . H.
Lauterpacht 1952)
• • •
••• ••••
•
24
C . RONNING, LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY (1963) • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
18
0
"
..
1 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER , INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed .
1957) . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
2 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968)
2
•
24
Z. SLOUKA , INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF (1968) • • • • • . . • • • • • •
J. 'STARKE , AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER~ATIONAL LAW
(7th ed . 1972) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)
5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)
10
.. .. 13
••
7
24
v
Periodicals
Page
Auburn ,T
~ih:;:e:-il'-i9r-:.7:;3~C::.o~n.::f~e:;:r~e~n:::c~e:.:-:o:::;n~t=h:;;e7'L~a:.:w:--;0<if~t2h=-e=-.::::s.::e~a
in the Light of Current Trends in State
Seabed Practice, 50 CANADIAN B. REV. 87
(1972) . .
. . .
• • 5, 14
. . . .....
Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea-Security of Investment, 2 INT'L. LAW. 67
(1967) . • . . . . •
. . . . · . 2,
Brown & Fabian, Diplomats at Sea, 52 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 301 (1974) • • • . • . • • • • •
·..
f;I
13
• • • • •
Goldie, International Law of the Sea--A Review
of States' Offshore Claims and Competences,
24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 43 (Feb. 1972).
19
• •• 3
Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the
Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV.
597 (1959)
............ .
5
Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act--A Neyative View, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
446 (1973
••.•••.•.••••••
• 17, 22
Lecuona, The E uador Fisheries Dis ute (A new
approach to an old problem, 2 J. MARITIME
L. & COMM. 91 (1970)
••••••
..
4
H. Lauterpacht, soverei~nty Over Submarine Areas,
27 BRIT. Y. B. INT L L. 1950, at 376 (1951) • • • 12
Laylan, Past, Present, and Future Developments of
the Customar International Law of the Sea and
Deep Seabed,S INT L LAW. 442
• • •
1
Report of the Australian Branch Committee on Deep
Sea Mining, AUSTL. Y. B. INT'L L. 1968-69,
at 149
(1971)
.
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
. 11
Note, Seizure of United States Fishing Vessels--A
Status of the Wet War, 6 SAN ~EGO L. REV.
428 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Shuman, Pacific Fisheries Conservation Conventions,
2 SYDNEY L. REV. 436 (1958) • • • • • • • • ••
2
vi
Periodicals (Cont.)
Page
Young, The Develoeing Law of the Deep Seabed:
American Att1tudes, 5 TEX. INT'L L. F.
235 (1958) • • • • • • • • • •
....
• • • .
• 11
Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf: A First Impression, 52 AM. J. INT'L
L. 733 (1958)
••••••••
.......
9, 14
Miscellaneous
African States: Conclusions of the Regional
Seminar on the Law of the Sea, 12 INT'L
LEG. MAT. 210 (1973) • • • • •
.....
.
.
COMMON TO STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, Twenty-First
Report, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE
SEA (II) (1970). • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
. . 19
10, 12
Declaration of Santo Domingo , 11 INT'L LEG. MAT.
89 2 (1972) • • . • • • .
• • • •
• • • 19
FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL
POLICY RECOMMEDNATIONS 152 (L . Alexander ed.
1969) . . . . . . . .
.
.
...
~
. ......
.
. 17
Inter-American Council of Jurists, Third Meetins,
Doc. A/AC. 4/102, at 249 (1956)
3
Inter-American Council of Jurists, Third Meetins,
Doc. A/AC. 4/Add. 1, at 252 (1956 )
• •
3
. · · · · · '. . .
·····
Inter-American Council of Jurists, Third Meetins,
Doc. A/CN. 4/102, at 249 (1956) • •
•
•
·
··
•
1
Inter-American Juridical Comm., Opinion on the
Breadth of the Territorial Sea, [1966] O.A.S.
/OD 0.E.A./Ser.I/VI.2 (English) CIJ-80 • • • • • . 18
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N. ~OR,
Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/31S9
(1956) • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4, 7, 9, 13, 15, 21
11 INT 'L LEG. MAT 226 (1972)
•
.......
24
vii
Miscellaneous (Cont.)
Page
INTERIM REP. OF NAT'L PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
July 9, 1968, at 6 • • • • • • • • • • • •
·...
League of Nations Off. J., Doc . C. 196 . M.70.V ,
at 122 (1927) . . • . • • • . • • • • .
1 PUB. LAND. L. REV.COMM'N, STUDY OF OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED
••••
STATES pt. 2, (1st Rev . 1969)
..
Santiago Declaration, U.N. Doc. ST/LEA/SER.8/6 ,
223-24 (1952) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .
11
• 5
• •
11, 14
·. ..
24 U.N. GAOR, Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of Nat ' l Jurisd., Supp. 22,
at 108, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1969)
••••• ,
17 U.N. GAOR A/5344/Add. 1, A/L.412/Rev. 2 (1962)
18
10
•
17
viii
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
MARCH TERM
1974
CASE NO. 1974-001
THE STATE OF INDUSTRIA,
v.
Applicant
THE STATE OF LATIA ,
Respondent
COUNTER-MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT
J URI S D I C T ION
The parties have agreed to submit this dispute to the
International CouFtof Justice for its determination.
ix
o
I.
II.
U EST ION S
PRE SEN TED
WHETHER LATIA HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER TRACT II UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
WHETHER INDUSTRIA BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY GRANTING
A LICENSE WHICH AUTHORIZED THE VIOLATION OF LATIA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TRACT II?
o
S TAT E MEN T
F ACT S
F
The parties have stipulated the .facts before the Court.
SUMMARY
o
F
ARGUMENT
Latia has sovereignty over Tract #1 under international law .
International law does not prohibit Latia from exercising exclusive sovereignty over a 200-mile territorial sea.
Latia's exercise of sovereignty over Tract #1 is justified
under international law by the continental shelf doctrine.
Because Latia has sovereignty over its continental shelf, Latia
has lawfully exercised those rights necessary to ensure that
sovereignty.
Latia's establishment of a 300-mile economic resource zone
is recognized under international law.
Industria breached international law by granting a license
which authorized the violation of Latia's sovereignty over Tract
u.
Industria's breach of Latia's' sovereignty justified Latia's
\
actions preventing mining operations and protecting its lawful
interests.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.
LATIA HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER TRACT tl UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW .
A.
International law does not erohibit Latia from
over a 200-mile
exercis~ng exclusive sovere~gnty
terr~torial sea.
In 1966, Latia lawfully extended the limits of its territorial sea.
Its action is justified by the customary rule
that territorial seas have no uniform limits.
This custom-
ary rule was codified by the 1958 Conference on the Law of
the Sea.
Latia's action is further justified by its conform-
ity with the criterion by which any such extension must be
judged:
reasonableness.
1.
Customary international law prescribes no uniform
limits for territorial seas.
The customary rule limiting the breadth of a territorial
sea is founded on the criterion of reasonableness.
Laylan,
Pa st, Present, and Future Development of the Customary International Law of the Sea and Deep Seabed, 5 -INT'L LAW. 442,
444 (1971).
Historically, the three-mile limit was widely
applied because it adequately met the needs of earlier times.
While the three-mile limit was adopted as a reasonable measure of self-defense, states
motiva~ed
by other needs tradi-
tionally have acknowledged greater limits.
Such limits have
been recognized as being based on geographical, economic ,
biological, and security considerations.
Inter-American
2
Council of Jurists, Third Meeting, Doc, A/CN. 4/102, at 249
(1956).
The three-mile limit, which was never a universally
applicable rule of international law, is no longer reasonable.
No te, Seizure of United States Fishing Vessels--A Status of
the wet War, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV, 428, 430 (1969).
Three-mile
territorial seas no longer guarantee the security of coastal
states against aggression by belligerent warships.
1 G.
SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 351 (3d ed. 1957).
For
centuries the three-mile limit has been based on the pre-supposition that ocean resources are inexhaustible.
This miscon-
ception is no longer tenable in view of modern technology.
Shuman, Pacific Fishery Conservation Conventions, 2 SYDNEY L .
REV. 436 (1958).
Technological developments have opened the
ocean floor to wholesale exploitation of resources to the point
of exhaustion, rendering the three-mile limit obsolete.
Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea--Security of
Investment, 2 INT'L LAW. 67', 69 (1967).
The traditional bases for restricted territorial-sea limits
are no longer applicable because they do not meet the reasonable
needs of coastal states ,
When, as in this, 'case, the basis for
a rule no longer exists, the rule becomes invalid.
See W.
COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-18 (1966).
Since the vast majority of nations cannot utilize the high
seas as industrialized states can, 'the three-mile rule does
not represent the interests of the world community and is contrary to international law.
South West Africa Cases,
[1966]
3
I.C.J. 248.
Accordingly, the territorial seas of most coast-
al states now exceed three miles.
Presently, Latia is one of
over eighty nations which have territorial seas extending beyond three miles.
Goldie, International Law of the Sea--A
Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences, 24 NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE REV. 43, 66 (Feb. 1972).
Thus, Latia is not bound
to follow the three-mile rule.
2.
The 1958 Conventions codified the rule that
international law prescribes no uniform
limits for territorial seas .
The conference at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956 is representative of the law concerning the limits of territorial seas
existing prior to the 1958 Conventions.
The conference noted
a diversity of positions as to the breadth of territorial seas
under international law.
Inter-American Council of Jurists,
Third Meeting, Doc. A/AC. '4/Add. 1, at 252 (1956).
In the
same year, the Inter-American Council of Jurists passed a resolution declaring that the three-mile limit was not a general
rule of international law, and that enlargement of the territorial sea beyond three miles was justifiable.
Further, each
nation was to establish its territorial waters within reasonable limits, taking into account the geographical, geological,
biological, and economic needs of its population.
Inter-
American Council of Jurists, Third "Meeting,
Doc. A/AC. 4/102,
,
at 249 (1956).
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone recognized that there are no uniform limits to the
4
territorial sea.
Contiguous Zone,
Convention on the Territorial Sea and
~
April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. 5639; 516
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as CTSCZ]; Int'l Law Comm'n,
Report, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3l59 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as 11 I.L.C.].
This convention is the most
successful codification of the law on territorial seas to date.
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
The CTSCZ did not set any fixed limit on the breadth of
territorial seas.
This convention reflects the fact that a
rigid delimitation would in itself be unreasonable because it
fails to take into account the particular needs of individual
c o astal states.
Should this Court require Latia to refrain
from extending the limits of its jurisdiction, the law of the
sea would revert to pre-convention days when major maritime
powers sought ' a rigid three-mile delimitation.
then be free to exploit the ocean at will .
They would
Lecuona, The Ecua-
dor Fisheries Dispute (A new approach to an old problem), 2 J.
MARITIME L. & COMM. 91, 111-113 (1970).
Reasonableness, the
only viable standard for evaluating a state's actions, would
be eliminated from international law.
Thus , to grant Indus-
tria's demands would render the convention meaningless by
seriously undermining orderly development.
3.
Latia's . 200-mile territorial sea is reasonable
for the protection of · ~ts economic security.
Developed states such as the U.S.S.R., Japan, and the U.S.A.
have shown conspicuous irresponsibility and bad faith in their
5
exploitation of ocean resources.
With their "floating canner-
ies," developed states have been able to decimate whole species of fish within certain regions of the oceans.
The Three-Mile Limit:
Heinzen,
Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, 11
STAN. L. REV. 597, 660 (1959).
The near extinction of the blue
whale is an example of their myopic disregard for the consequences of their irresponsible conduct.
League of Nations
Off. J., Doc. C. 196.M.70.V. , at 122 (1927).
The attitude of
such states toward non-living ocean resources is no different.
Technological developments now enable countries such as Industria to strip rich areas of the seabed of all precious minerals.
Auburn, The 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea in the
Light of Current Trends in State Seabed Practice, 50 CANADIAN
B. REV. 87. 104-05 (1972).
Because certain portions of the ocean contain richer deposits than others, states will be induced to travel great distances to exploit such areas.
Developing coastal states cannot
afford to acquiesce passively while mineral-rich hot spots,
such as Tract #1 , lying adjacent to their coasts, are totally
exhausted, merely because the international- community has
failed to reach any agreement on the problem.
Ocean Mining:
Prospects and Anticipated Short-Term Benefits ,
in PACEM IN MARIBUS
131, 135 (E. Borgese ed. 1972).
economic security is vital to the
integrity.
Laque, Deep
m~intenance
Latia's
of its sovereign
Latia has the right to protect its sovereignty by
taking reasonable measures to ensure its future economic development.
As pointed out in the Fisheries Case, the special
6
interests of the coastal state determine whether extensions of
sovereignty will be justified under the criterion of reasonableness .
Fisheries Case,
[19511 I.C.J. 133.
Latia's ex-
tension of its sovereignty to the 200-mile limits meets the
criterion of reasonableness.
Lack of
commun~ty
rote st evidencesreco nition b
t at Lat~a s c a~m ~s reasona
the international
e.
Latia's declaration of sovereignty over its 200 - mile territorial sea was not protested by any state .
This lack of pro-
test is strong evidence that Latia ' s action was reasonable
and in conformity with international law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2d ed . 1970).
1 D. O'CONNELL,
For example , the Inter-
national Court of Justice found that t he United Kingdom's failure to protest Norway's declaration of territorial sea warranted Norway ' s enforcement of its system against the United Kingdom.
Fisheries Case,
[19511 I.C.J . 139.
Such declarations,
when not followed by protest , are the key to perfe cting title
under international law.
J. ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 57 (1970) .
Unprotested declarations,
such as Latia ' s territorial sea proclamation in 1966, are proof
of conformity with international law .
Id.
Latia reasonably exercised sovereign rights over its territor~al sea ~n conform~ty w~th ~nternat~onal law.
The CTSCZ permits a littoral
s~ate
to exercise total sov-
ereignty over a belt of sea adjacent to its coast described as
a territorial sea.
CTSCZ art . 2.
For jurisdictional purposes,
the control exercised by the littoral state over this area is
7
no different from that which is exercised over its land territory.
11 I.L.C . 12.
Latia's actions have effectively demonstrated its exercise
of territorial authority over Tract #1.
Latia gave ample no-
tice to the international community that it would exercise sovereign rights over Tract #1 by publishing its proclamation in
1966.
This proclamation formally codified Latia's pre-exis-
tent right to exercise sovereignty over its 200-mile territorial sea.
Physical presence is not required for Latia's
occupation to be effective
bec~use
such ocean areas are not
readily susceptible to this type of control.
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 743 (1965).
4 M. WHITEMAN,
In 1973 , when Latia's
territorial seas were violated by Industrian ships, Latia lawfully exercised its sovereign rights.
The CTSCZ expressly grants a coastal state the right to
regulate passage of ships within its territorial sea and to
classify such passage as either innocent or non-innocent.
CTSCZ art . 16.
Latia, as a coastal state, may take the steps
necessary to protect its interests by curtailing passage of
foreign ships which do not comply with Latia's laws and regulations.
CTSCZ art. 14, 11 I.L.C. 19.
Because Latia has
territorial sovereignty over Tract #1, its right to regulate
and prohibit activities concerning the tract is recognized by
international law.
11 I.L.C . 19.
Latia published by proclamation that no ship could enter
its territorial sea for the purpose of exploitation and related activities.
This proclamation provided reasonable
8
notice to countries licensed under Deep Ocean Mining Act
[DOMAI
that any attempts to exploit Tract #1 would be opposed
by force if necessary.
By their actions, Industrian ships
licensed under DOMA left Latia no choice but to take the
measures necessary
to enforce its regulations.
Passage within a coastal state's territorial sea is never
innocent when it violates that state's regulations.
M.
MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 253 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as . MCDOUGAL & BURKEl.
Industria's ships
disregarded Latia's published proclamation by engaging in recovery operations on Tract #1 .
This disregard removed any
doubt that i ts ships were engaged in non-innocent passage .
The CTSCZ authorizes Latia to take necessary measures to prevent the non-innocent passage of Industria's ships within
Latia's territorial sea.
CTSCZ art . 16(1).
Thus , Latia ' s
seizure and subsequent actions concerning Carrier and
Gatherer are justified under international law.
Latia and Industria are both parties to the 1958 CTSCZ,
'.:md are therefore bound to it under the doctrine of pacta
sunt servanda .
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 26, done May 23, 1969 , U.N. Doc . A/Conf. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Conventionl.
Latia adhered to the
CTSCZ by properly proclaiming its sovereignty over its
territorial sea and exercising the " ) urisdiction granted to
it by the CTSCZ .
Industria violated the CTSCZ by authoriz-
ing its ships to invade Latia ' s territorial sea for the noninnocent purpose of mining its seabed.
CTSCZ arts. 1, 2.
9
Industria's violations of its obligations under the CTSCZ
are a violation of international law.
On the basis of
these facts, this court has sufficient evidence to deny all
of Industria's demands.
B.
Latia's exercise of soverei~nty over Tract 11
is justified under internat~onal law by the
continental shelf doctrine.
Latia's exclusive sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil
of Tract #1 is consistent with the 1958 Conventions.
Further-
more, this sovereignty is justifiable by the natural prolongation rule.
Latia has sovereignty over any area of the seabed
and subsoil adjacent to its coast which is proven to be capable of exploitation.
Tract #1 is such an area, and is with-
in Latia's control.
Latia's
a~plication
of the exploitability criterion in dewith the 1958
limitin~ ~ts continental shelf is consistent
Convent~on on the Continental Shelf.
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf codified the
limits of .the continental shelf.
Shelf,
~
Convention on the Continental
April 28, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5578; 499 U.N.T.S. 311
[hereinafter cited as CCS).
Because geographic realities
alone are not a suitable standard, the CCS decided that the
outer limits were to be determined by the criteria of exploitability and adjacency.
CCS art. 1; 11 I.L.C. 41.
The exploitability criterion employed by the CCS permits
littoral states to exercise jurisdiction off their coasts
to any depth which currently admits of exploitation by any
nation in the world.
Young, The Geneva Convention on the
10
Continental Shelf:
' 733, 735 (1958).
A First Impression, 52 AM. J. INT'L L.
Exploitability, then, is determined by the
state of the world's technology and does not depend on solely
geographical definitions of continental shelf.
COMM'N TO
STUDY THE ORG. OF PEACE, Twenty-First Report, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA (II) 16 (1970)
cited as U.N. & BED OF THE SEAl.
[hereinafter
The CCS declares that the
-coastal state's sovereignty does not depend on actual occupation, exploitation, or upon any proclamation by the coastal
state.
CCS art. 2 (1).
Thus, Deep Ocean Mining's operations
are sufficient to prove the exploitability of Latia's continental shelf.
Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND TEE CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF 106 (1968).
The framers of the CCS recognized that the limits of the
,
continental shelf as defined by the convention extend beyond
the 200-meter isobath.
11 I.L.C. 41-42.
The report of the
United Nation's Sea-bed Committee proposed that the continental shelf extend to 2,500 meters or 100 miles, whichever encompasses the greater area.
24 U.N. GAOR, Rept. of the Comm.
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of Nat'l Jurisd., Supp. 22, at 108, U.N. Doc.
A/7622 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Sea-bed Comm.l.
This
proposal demonstrates that the present trend in the world
community is to define continental shelves to include areas
at depths even greater than that of Tract #1.
Under the
CCS and consistent with modern practice, Tract #1, therefore, is well within Latia's continental shelf.
11
Alternatively, under the natural prolongation rule, Latia
has control over the submerged land mass extending beyond
and including the area of Tract #1.
This Court has referred to the natural prolongation rule
as "the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to
the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the Geneva
~onvention,
..
I.C.J. 22.
This rule gives the coastal state exclusive sover-
." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969]
eignty over those areas which are a continuation of its
continental land mass .' Id .
The continental terrace, extend-
ing to the ocean floor, is composed of the borderlands,
slopes, and at least the landward portion of the continental
rise.
1 PUB. LAND L . REV . COMM'N , STUDY OF OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 2, at 1 (1st Rev. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1 LAND L. REV.].
The underlying rock
structure of the continental land mass and the continental
terrace are identical .
J . ANDRASSY , I NTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 170 (1970).
Coastal nations, there-
fore , have exclusive jurisdiction over the resources of the
continental land mass seaward to where that land mass meets
the abyssal ocean floor .
INTERIM REPORT OF THE NAT ' L PETRO-
LEUM COUNCIL, July 9 , 1968 , at 6; Young , The Developing Law
of the Deep Seabed:
American Attitudes, 5 TEX . INT ' L . L. F.
235 (1969).
Under the natural prolongation \ rule , the sovereignty
of the littoral state in many instances will extend to
depths of four to five thousand meters.
Report of the
Australian Branch Committe.e on Deep Sea Mining, AUSTL . Y. B.
12
INT'L L. 968-69, at 149 (1971).
Consequently, at a depth
of 2,100 meters, Tract #1 is well within the acceptable
limits.
Recent aeplications of the continental shelf doctrine prove
that Lat~a's actions conform with customary and conventional
international law.
Under existing international law there are no clear geographical limits to the continental shelf other than technology and adjacency.
U.N. & BED OF THE SEA 16.
As of 1973,
.twenty-two parties to the CCS employed these criteria to extend the outer margins of their continental shelves beyond
200 meters.
Latia's exercise of sovereignty over its con-
tinental shelf is consistent with that of forty-five other
nations.
2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 871 (S. Lay,
R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist ed. 1973).
Such sovereign
rights over adjacent submarine areas are now part of custornary international law.
H. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty
Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 1950, at 376,
431 (1951).
International law recognizes Latia's ability as a coastal state to most effectively utilize its continental shelf.
Id., at 407.
Competition for the most economical deposits
will promote claimjumping, piracy, and related problems.
The only realistic approach to rational, orderly exploitation
\
of submarine resources is for this Court to allow Latia,
as a coastal state, to control its continental shelf.
In the Matter of an Arbitration· Between Petroleum Development
13
(Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 1
INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 247
(1952); MCDOUGAL & BURKE 639.
Although Latia exercised soverei~nty only in accordance with its reasonable needs, ~t has the right to
exercise sovereignty over the subsoil of its continental shelf to mid-ocean.
Following the conference at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956,
the International
La~
Commission convened to develop
a definition of the limits of the continental shelf
for the 1958 conference at Geneva.
The exploitability
criterion promulgated at Ciudad Trujillo was adopted
by the commission in spite of the argument that it would
dangerously impair the stabi lity of any limits adopted.
11 I.L . C. 41 .
The decision of the commission , and later
the CCS , to reject the argument and to adopt the exploitability criterion has led to the conclusion that
it was the objective of the CCS to divide the beds of
the seas among the coastal nations .
Bernfeld, Developing
the Resources of the Sea--Security of I nvestment , 2 INT'L
LAW. 67 , 72 (1967).
This conclusion is reinforced by the decision of the
International Law Commission to depart from a geographical concept of the continental shelf in favor of a
legal definition; i.e. , exploitability.
11 I.L.C. 41.
The term continental shelf is thus \ found to be purely
notional , since the commission made it clear that it
was to apply even in areas where there is no geographical shelf .
11 I.L.C. 41-42; J. STARKE , AN INTRODUCTION
14
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 226, 227 (7th ed. 1972).
Under the legal definition of the continental shelf,
which was adopted by the CCS, Latia's exercise of jurisdiction is limited only by technology.
Accordingly,
international law has recognized that all of the world's
oceans are subject to national appropriation.
REV. 21 n.79.
1 LAND L.
Under Article 1 of the CCS every coastal
nation would be able to assert rights outward from its
coast to the maximum depth of exploitation reached anywhere, regardless of its own capabilities or local conditions.
Shelf:
(1958) •
Young, The Geneva Convention on the Continental
A
F~irst
Impression, 52 AM J. INT' L L. 733, 735
Under the CCS's definition , the continental shelf
extends or is capable of extending to all submarine areas
underlying the high seas.
1 LAND L. REV. 21.
It has been argued that the exploitability criterion
was never intended to permit continental shelves to extend
to mid-ocean.
Even if this argument were tenable, the CCS
has rejected it by legally dividing the entire ocean floor
among the coastal states.
S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
OF SEA RESOURCES 167 (1963).
Thus, under international law Latia has the right
to extend its sovereignty to any point proven exploitable by any member of the international community.
Nations now have the capability to mine mid-ocean basins.
Auburn, The 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea in the
Light of Current Trends in State Seabed Practice, 50
15
CANADIAN B. REV. 87, 103 (1972).
Latia could, there-
fore, exercise sovereignty over the subsoil of the
high seas to mid-ocean.
Nevertheless, Latia has made
only a limited extension suited to its needs as a developing nation.
Since Latia has the right to extend
its continental shelf to mid-ocean, Latia ' s extension
to an area only 120 miles off its coast cannot be
deemed either unreasonable or contrary t o international
law.
Because Latia has sovereignty over its cont i nental shelf
it may exercise those rights necessary to ensure that
sovereignty.
A coastal state has all rights necessary to control
the exploitation of its continental shelf .
Included is
the right to prevent and punish violations of the state's
regulations.
11 I.L.C. 42.
No other state may engage in
exploitation or make claims to Latia's continental shelf
without Latia ' s express consent , regardless of whether
Latia is actually exploiting its shelf .
CCS art . 2(1),
(2) •
Preventing ships licensed under DOMA from mining on
Latia's continental shelf was a valid exercise of Latia ' s
sove reign authority over Tract #1 .
For the above reasons,
this Court should deny Industria ' s demands for return of
Gatherer , and reimbursement of fines and costs.
Furthermore,
this Court should hold that Latia ' s actions were a lawful
exercise of its rights over the continental shelf.
16
C.
Latia's establishment of a 300-mile economic resource zone is recognized under international law.
Latia's economic resource zone is recognized under international law and conforms with the rights expressed in several multilateral proclamations.
Latia may exercise limited
control over its economic resource zone.
This control applies
only to the resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil without affecting the freedom of navigation or other uses of the
ocean.
Latia's economic resource zone is recognized under international law.
The economic resource zone concept as recognized under
international law establishes extensive maritime zones beyond
territorial limits within which the coastal . states may exercise preferential rights with respect to resources.
D.
JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:
SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS, OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. 17, at 1 (1973)
GOLD].
[hereinafter cited as JOHNSTON &
The concept of the contiguous zone under Article 24
of the CTSCZ should not be confused with the economic resource concept.
The economic resource zone extends beyond
the twelve-mile limitation of the contiguous zone.
More-
over, the contiguous zone is limited by the CTSCZ to the "prevention of infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration or
\.
sanitary regulations", while the economic resource zone
serves to protect a coastal state's offshore resources.
CTSCZ art. 24(1).
17
To provide for coastal state's economic security,
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) would permit exploitation of a developing state's resources only by that
state.
17 U.N. GAOR A/5344/Add. 1, A/L.412/Rev. 2 (1962).
DOMA and other reciprocal treaties between developed nations threaten a littoral state's resources because areas
adjacent to the developing state's coast could be licensed
under such agreements.
Proposed legislation in the United
States of America, the Deep Sea Hard Mineral Resources Act,
S.2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
Legislation of this
type leaves Latia and other developing states no choice
but to extend economic resource zones two hundred miles
or more .
Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act--A Negative View , 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446 , 454-55
(1973).
Preservation of economic security requires the
monitoring of offshore activities which may jeopardize a
coastal state's utilization of mineral resources lying reasonably beyond its continental shelf .
FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
I
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
NA-
TIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 152 (L . Alexander ed. 1969).
Latia's economic resource zone conforms with the rights
expressed in several multilateral declarations.
A customary rule of law has developed through multilateral
conventions and declarations recognizing the rights of a
littoral state to establish an economic resource zone.
Latia's
establishment of a 300-mile zone over which it may exercise
jurisdiction for limited purposes is not without precedent
18
in international law.
Although not so denominated, the
economic resource zone concept was employed in the late
1930's.
In 1939, several American republics concluded
the Declaration of Panama, which proclaimed a 300-mile
security zone to protect against aggression by belligerent
powers.
Inter-American Juridical Comm., Opinion on the
Breadth of the Territorial Sea, (1966) O.A.S./OD O.E.A./
Ser.l/VI.2 (English) CIJ-80, at 24, 28.
Both this zone
and Latia's economic resource zone serve to protect coastal
states from external aggression.
Latia's right as a coastal
state to establish such a zone is considered to be an inherent
right of a coastal state under international law.
C. RONNING,
LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 108 (1963).
In 1952, several Latin American states proclaimed their
rights to establish maritime zones extending not less than
two hundred miles from their coasts.
Santiago Declaration,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEA/SER.B/6, 723-24 (1952).
These zones are
essentially the same as Latia's in that they are subject to
less than complete territorial jurisdiction.
The basis for the economic resource zone concept was
recognized at the U.N.
at Geneva in 1964.
Conference on Trade and Development
JOHNSTON & GOLD 4 & n.16.
This conference
noted the economic difficulties, trade disparities, and living
inequalities of developing
nations~
and contrasted them with
the affluence, economic supremacy, and trade monopolies of
the developed countries.
Id. at 4.
These considerations
are reflected by a resolution on territorial seas adopted by
19
the Organization of African Un!ty which endorsed a recommendation made by the Scientific 'C ouncil for Africa.
This or-
ganization declared that 212 nautical miles would constitute
the national economic limit in the oceans and seas surrounding Africa.
Id. at 6.
In 1972, eighteen African states at a seminar on the law
of the sea also endorsed this economic resource zone concept.
African States:
Conclusions of
th~
,
Regional Seminar on the
Law of the Sea, 12 INT ' L LEG. MAT. 210 (1973) .
In June of the
same year, ten Caribbean states adopted a similar version of
the economic resource zone concept.
Declaration of Santo
Domingo, 11 INT'L. LEG. MAT 892 (1972) .
In 1973 , seventy-six
states met in Algeria and recognized the economic resource
zone concept.
Brown & Fabian , Diplomats at Sea, 52 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 301 , 307 (1974).
These proclamations consistently state that the breadth
of the economic resource zone is to be determined by individual
nations on the basis of their regional resources .
Consequent-
ly , Latia's economic resource zone is consistent with the
views expressed by these multilateral declarations .
Complying with the express practices of the world community,
Latia's action in proclaiming an economic resource zone is a
lawful exercise of its rights under international law.
This
Court, therefore, should formally recognize Latia's economic
··; resource zone as conforming with international law.
20
II.
INDUSTRIA BREACHED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY GRANTING A
LICENSE WHICH AUTHORIZED THE VIOLATION OF LATIA'S
SOVEREIGNTY OVER TRACT #1.
A.
The licensing of Tract #1 violates international
law by not respecting Latia's territory and ignoring the purpose of the 1958 Conventions.
Legislative acts, such as DOHA, do not violate international law until applied unlawfully.
Industria's licens-
ing of Tract #1 violated international law for the following reasons:
first, it subjects the high seas to sovereign-
ty; second, it allows mining within another state's territorialsea; and third, it is contrary to the purpose of the
1958 Conventions.
By licensing Tract #1 pursuant to DOHA,
Industria has violated international law and rendered DOMA
unlawful .
DOMA, as a
sovere~gnty
0
Industria, sub"ects the hi h seas to the
~n v~olat~on of ~nternat~onal
l~censees
law.
The High Seas Convention states that no nation may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.
Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958,
450 U.N.T.S . 82 [hereinafter cited as CHSj -.
Yet, Section 4
of DOMA gives the Secretary the authority to grant exclusive
rights to licensees to develop areas of the high seas.
purporting to subject these licensed areas to their
By
sovereign~
ty, DOMA licensees are in direct violation of the CHS.
Be-
cause Latia does not purport to exercise sovereignty over
any part of the high seas, its right to mine is protected by
international law as one of the freedoms of the seas.
21
See 11 I.L.C. 24.
DOMA is unlawful because it allows mining within another
state's territorial sea.
Under Section 2(b) of DOMA, licensees may mine areas within the territorial seas ofa coastal state which has not extended the limits of its continental shelf to the outer limits
of its territorial sea.
By failing to restrict licensees to
areas outside both the territorial sea and continental shelf
as required by the Geneva Conventions, DOMA authorizes mining within another state ' s territorial sea.
Pursuant to this
provision, Industrian ships invaded Latia's territorial sea
,and began mining operations.
DOMA is contrary to the purpose of the 1958 Conventions because ~t underm~nes the orderly development of the oceans and
establishes an illusory trust.
The purpose of the 1958 Conventions was to promote good
order in ocean development.
See 11 I.L.C. 2-4 .
the purpose of these conventions.
DOMA violates
Although Section 1 of DOMA
2urports to make this agreement an interim measure, Sections
4(c) and 7 demonstrate that DOMA licenses are to remain in
effect regardless of any future international regime.
These
provisions of DOMA directly contradict United Nations Resolution 2749 (XXV) which declares that no state may exercise or
acquire rights with respect to the high seas or its resources
\
incompatible with the forthcoming international regime.
Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C./544 (1970).
G.A.
A unani-
mous resolution of this type is a strong indication of the
22
international public policy of orderly ocean development
which DOMA ignores.
O. ASAMDAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 7 (1966).
Moreover, by failing to restrict the number of licenses
available to any licensee, Section 4(c) of DOMA allows block
licensing.
This licensing would undermine the orderly devel-
opment of the oceans by encouraging races to grab the most
favorable mining sites.
Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
Resources Act--A Negative View, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446, 497
(1973).
The effect of DOMA-type treaties is to encourage
technologically advanced states to band together to the detriment of developing states with little or no mining capability.
Section 6 of DOMA is self-serving in that it purports to
establish a fund exclusively for assisting the reciprocating
states: realistically, it assists no state.
This fund is an
illusory trust which ignores the community of developing nations.
While DOMA purports to place ten per cent of all tax
revenues from licenses in trust for reciprocating developing
states, the amount deposited is limited to that amount contributed by other developed states per license.
Thus, if any
developed state which has been issued a license fails to deposit funds, all other DOMA states are released from their
obligations to deposit any funds in trust.
Furthermore, the
trust fund under DOMA consists of only ten per cent of tax
revenues, whereas ten per cent of total gross production would
23
be distributed to the world community under Latia's proThe effect of DOMA's illusory trust is to create a
posal.
cartel of industrialized nations bound by mutual selfinterest.
B.
Industria's breach of Latia's soverei~nt~ violated
both DOMA and international law, just1fY1ng Latia's
actions in preventing mining operations and protecting its lawful interests.
Assuming , arguendo, that DOMA is valid, Industria violated its provisions • .· Industria violated both Section 2 (b)
of DOMA and Article 1 of the CCS by ignoring the exploitability
criterion.
Consequently, Industria licensed an area which
was on Latia's continental shelf.
The illegality of Industria's
action , coupled with Latia ' s immediate protest and subsequent
seizure of ships precludes any possible prescriptive claim by
Industria.
1924).
H. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Higgin's 8th ed.
Although DOMA permits its members to enact domestic
legislation, DOMA itself is a multilateral convention.
Convention, art . 2(1) (a).
rule of pacta
~
Vienna
Therefore, Industria violated the
servanda by breaching its preexisting treaty
obligations under both DOMA and the CCS.
U.N. CHARTER art .
2, para . 3 ; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
26 , done May 23 , 1969 , U.N. Doc. A/Cong . 39/27.
By refusing to submit to arbitration and continuing its
course of action despite Lat i a ' s pr.otests , Industria violated
its duty to arbitrate under both DOMA Section 4(c) and the
United Nations Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 33 , para . 1.
Latia's
protest gave effective advance notice to Industria that Latia
24
would resort to self-help if necessary, thus shifting the
burden to Industria to submit this dispute to arbitration
before self-help became necessary.
2 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1968).
In January, 1973 , the General Assembly unanimously
passed a resolution expressly condemning actions aimed
at coercing, directly or indirectly, other states engaged
in the exercise of their sovereign rights over natural resources.
11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 226 (1972).
Yet in March, 1973,
Industria engaged in coercive economic aggression in violation
,
of Latia ' s sovereign rights over its natural resources.
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 831 (1965) .
See 5
This
aggression justified Latia ' s actions in preventing the mining
operations and protecting its lawful interests.
Because Carrier was engaged in economic aggression within Latia's territorial sea, its passage was non-innocent.
Accordingly, Latia's pursui't of Carrier , initiated within its
territorial sea , was lawful.
1 L . OPPENHEIM , INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 266 , at 604 (8th ed . H. Lauterpacht 1955) .
The seizure
of Ca r ri e r and subsequent adjudication of t he nodules from
Tract #1 were justified as a lawful exercise of Latia's sovereign jur i sdiction .
For the same reasons, the seizure and
adjudication of Gatherer within Lat i a's territorial sea were
valid exercises of Latia's police P9wer .
The disposition of
captured vessels which have violated Latia's laws is strictly
a municipal matter which Latian courts may settle according
to their own discretion.
2 L . OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
25
§
434 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
Industria, which vio-
lated both international and Latian law, is entitled to no
relief from this Court.
CON C L U 5 ION
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Respondent
respectfully prays that the International Court of Justice
render its decision in favor of Latia, finding that:
(1)
Latia lawfully exercised sovereignty over its territorial sea, continental shelf , and economic resource
zone.
(2)
Latia is entitled to retain possession of Gatherer and
Carrier's cargo.
(3)
Latia is entitled to conduct deep ocean mining operations
in any area subject to its sovereignty and even beyond.
(4)
Industria committed a breach of international law by
violating Latia's sovereign rights over Tract #1.
Respectfully submitted,
Team No. 1
Agents for Latia