Alternative choices over the future spending squeeze Rowena Crawford

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Alternative choices over the future
spending squeeze
Rowena Crawford
© Institute for Fiscal Studies
Progress to date
• How much of the planning spending cut has been achieved to date
depends on the definition used
• Prime Minister has favoured “Total spending less debt interest”
focussing on a £25bn cut over 2016–17 and 2017–18
– on the same basis now a £30bn cut over those two years
– more importantly a £38bn cut over five years to 2019–20
– compares to £11bn cut over four years to 2014–15, so only 23% of
the planned 2010–11 to 2019–20 cut done by end 2014–15
– in part due to faster growth in pensioner benefits over the earlier
period
• We will focus on “Departmental Expenditure Limits” (DEL)
– essentially spending by Whitehall departments on admin and services
– 39% of the planned 2010–11 to 2019–20 cut done by end 2014–15
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Planned and implied departmental spending
Real departmental spending
(indexed to 100 in 2010-11)
110
This parliament (10-11 to 14-15):
-2.2% average annual cut
-8.6% cumulative cut
100
90
80
70
60
50
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Nine years of consolidation
-2.8% average annual cut
-22.2% cumulative cut
Outturn
Allocated between departments
Yet to be allocated
Next parliament (14-15 to 19-20):
-3.2% average annual cut
-14.9% cumulative cut
Planned and implied departmental spending
Real departmental spending
(indexed to 100 in 2010-11)
110
“Allocated period” (10-11 to 15-16):
-2.0% average annual cut
-9.5% cumulative cut
100
90
80
70
60
50
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“Unallocated period” (15-16 to 19-20):
-3.7% average annual cut
Outturn
-14.1% cumulative cut
Allocated between departments
Yet to be allocated
Some departments faring particularly badly
• NHS, aid and schools (non-investment) spending have been
relatively protected
Real % change
• Other areas have therefore fared worse than total DEL figures imply:
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
Total DEL
6.5
'Protected' areas
'Unprotected' areas
6.5
0.0
-9.5
-19.9
-14.1
-26.3
-22.2
-41.0
Allocated period
Unallocated period
Total consolidation
(2010-11 to 2015-16) (2015-16 to 2019-20) (2010-11 to 2019-20)
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1949-50
1952-53
1955-56
1958-59
1961-62
1964-65
1967-68
1970-71
1973-74
1976-77
1979-80
1982-83
1985-86
1988-89
1991-92
1994-95
1997-98
2000-01
2003-04
2006-07
2009-10
2012-13
2015-16
2018-19
Percentage of total national income (%)
The changing size of the state
60
50
40
30
TME
20
10
TME less debt
interest
0
Sources: EFO December 2014, ONS
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1949-50
1952-53
1955-56
1958-59
1961-62
1964-65
1967-68
1970-71
1973-74
1976-77
1979-80
1982-83
1985-86
1988-89
1991-92
1994-95
1997-98
2000-01
2003-04
2006-07
2009-10
2012-13
2015-16
2018-19
Percentage of total public spending (%)
The changing role of the state
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Health
State pension
Debt interest
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Sources: PESA 2014, DWP Benefit Expenditure tables 2014,
EFO December 2014, ONS
Planned and implied departmental spending
Real departmental spending
(indexed to 100 in 2010-11)
110
100
Outturn
Allocated between departments
Yet to be allocated
90
80
70
60
50
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“Unallocated period” (15-16 to 19-20):
-3.7% average annual cut
-14.1% cumulative cut
How could future tax increases/welfare spending
cuts change the picture?
Tax increase or social security spending
cut, £ billion (2015–16 terms)
50
Total DEL
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
Real change in departmental spending, 2015–16 to 2019–20
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5%
How could future tax increases/welfare spending
cuts change the picture?
Tax increase or social security spending
cut, £ billion (2015–16 terms)
50
Total DEL
45
No further real DEL cut:
Would require £47 billion
welfare cuts/tax increase
40
35
30
25
20
DEL cut at same average annual
rate as over 2010-11 to 2015-16:
Would require £21 billion welfare
cuts/tax increase
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-20%
Current coalition plans
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
Real change in departmental spending, 2015–16 to 2019–20
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5%
Some possible alternative scenarios
“Coalition policy”
“Same rate DEL”
“Osborne max”
£21bn additional
welfare cut / tax rise
“£12 bn additional
welfare cut”
“£7.2 bn tax cut”
Real % cut 2015-16 to 2019-20
0
-5
-7.7
-10
-15
-14.1
-14.3
-20
-25
-26.3
-30
Total DEL
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'Unprotected' DEL
Some possible alternative scenarios
“Coalition policy”
“Same rate DEL”
“Osborne max”
“Current budget
balance”
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = 0% GDP
PSNB =1.2% GDP
£21bn additional
welfare cut / tax rise
“£12 bn additional
welfare cut”
No net change to
welfare/ tax
“£7.2 bn tax cut”
Real % cut 2015-16 to 2019-20
0
-1.3 -2.3
-5
-10
-15
-6.6
-7.7
-12.3
-14.1
-14.3
-20
-25
-26.3
-30
Total DEL
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'Unprotected' DEL
Some possible alternative scenarios
“Coalition policy”
“Same rate DEL”
“Osborne max”
“Current budget
balance”
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = 0% GDP
PSNB =1.2% GDP
£21bn additional
welfare cut / tax rise
“£12 bn additional
welfare cut”
No net change to
welfare/ tax
“£7.2 bn tax cut”
Real % cut 2010-11 to 2019-20
0
-5
-10
-10.6
-15
-25
-15.4
-16.4
-20
-21.8
-22.2
-30
-31.4
-35
-29.8
-40
-45
-41.0
Total DEL
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'Unprotected' DEL
The cost of higher borrowing
• Any additional spending financed from higher borrowing would
result in higher debt and a greater proportion of spending going
on debt interest spending
• Running a current budget surplus (borrowing 1.2% GDP) from
2017-18 onwards rather than coalition plans and zero borrowing
in 2019-20 would result in:
– 2.4% national income higher debt in 2020-21
– £1.5 billion higher debt interest payments (2015-16 terms)
• Impact would be larger if higher levels of borrowing are
maintained in the longer term
– E.g. see HMT projections in chart 1.9 (p27) of Autumn Statement
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Summary
• Current coalition plans imply large cuts to departmental spending still
to come
– Cumulative cuts over whole consolidation could reach 22% for all
departmental spending, and 41% for unprotected areas
• Cuts beyond 2015-16 could be reduced by further welfare spending
cuts, tax increases and/or higher borrowing
• Tory, Labour and Lib Dem fiscal rules all allow for greater borrowing
than currently forecast under coalition policy
– Tories to a lesser extent than Labour/Lib Dems as aiming for zero
borrowing rather than borrowing up to amount spent on investment
• Any additional spending financed from higher borrowing would result
in higher debt and a greater proportion of spending going on debt
interest spending
– Impact would be relatively small up to 2019-20; would be larger if higher
levels of borrowing are maintained in the longer term
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Some possible alternative scenarios (£bn figures)
“Coalition policy”
“Same rate DEL”
“Osborne max”
“Current budget
balance”
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = 0% GDP
PSNB =1.2% GDP
£21bn additional
welfare cut / tax rise
“£12 bn additional
welfare cut”
No net change to
welfare/ tax
Real £cut 2015-16 to 2019-20
(£ billion, 2015-16 prices)
“£7.2 bn tax cut”
0
-4.6 -4.6
-10
-20
-24.0 -24.0
-30
-27.9 -27.9
-40
-50
-51.4 -51.4
-60
Total DEL
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'Unprotected' DEL
Some possible alternative scenarios (£bn figure)
“Coalition policy”
“Same rate DEL”
“Osborne max”
“Current budget
balance”
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = -1.0% GDP
PSNB = 0% GDP
PSNB =1.2% GDP
£21bn additional
welfare cut / tax rise
“£12 bn additional
welfare cut”
No net change to
welfare/ tax
“£7.2 bn tax cut”
Real cut 2010-11 to 2019-20
(£billion, 2015-16 prices)
0
-20
-40
-42.8
-60
-53.1
-80
-100
-62.2
-66.1
-76.4
-72.5
-89.5
-99.8
-120
Total DEL
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'Unprotected' DEL
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