“Evolutionary Acquisition” Is a Promising
Strategy, But Has Been Difficult
to Implement
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n 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) specified evolutionary acquisition (EA) as the
preferred approach to weapon system acquisition, and spiral development as the preferred means of
implementation. EA strategies aim to develop new capabilities in multiple increments, as opposed to
the traditional strategy of developing a full capability in a single, lengthier step. EA strategies are meant
to reduce the time it takes to field operationally useful equipment, control technical risk and cost growth,
and make cost estimates more reliable for each stage of development, while allowing greater flexibility
to evaluate and improve a program based on experience in the field. This greater flexibility arises in part
from the fact that, with the spiral development approach, the end-state requirements are not known at
program initiation, but rather emerge and evolve through an iterative process of phased development and
operational testing. However, there is little documented evidence to assess the policy.
RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) has performed research to help the U.S. Air Force acquisition
management community formulate cost analysis and program management policies that anticipate and
respond to more widespread use of EA strategies. As part of this effort, PAF studied the implementation
of EA concepts in five defense space acquisition programs. Space programs were chosen because they
have recently grown in importance for the future of the Air Force, they are central to DoD’s plans for
transforming the U.S. armed forces, and they reflect the Air Force’s recent review and overhaul of space
acquisition policy to include the use of EA concepts. The case studies suggest the following conclusions:
• The existing acquisition environment is not conducive to the uncertainties inherent in EA
programs. Political, bureaucratic, and regulatory influences favor more detail about the end stages of
a program, including its estimated cost at completion, than EA strategies using spiral development can
provide. These pressures have forced program managers to seek larger technical advancements in the
early phases of a program, map out longer-term technical plans in greater detail, and attempt to reduce
up-front uncertainties about end-state requirements, thereby mitigating the benefits of lower risk and
greater flexibility.
• EA programs require an evolutionary costing approach. Analysts must update their cost estimates at
each stage of the program, requiring substantial interaction with engineers and contractors. Long-term
program life-cycle cost estimates at the early stages of a program are impractical given the intentional
uncertainty involved in spiral development.
There is a strong consensus among the cost analysts interviewed that EA is an important and useful tool
that can benefit program managers if handled with care. Further research is needed to determine how EA
can be implemented most effectively given the political, bureaucratic, and regulatory realities of the current
acquisition environment.
This research brief describes work done for RAND Project AIR FORCE and documented in Evolutionary Acquisition: Implementation Challenges for Defense Space Programs, by Mark
A. Lorell, Julia F. Lowell, and Obaid Younossi, MG-431-AF (available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG431/), 2006, 146 pp., ISBN: 0-8330-3882-6. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s
publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark.
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THE ARTS
CHILD POLICY
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CIVIL JUSTICE
EDUCATION
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY
This product is part of the RAND Corporation
research brief series. RAND research briefs present
policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peerreviewed documents or of a body of published work.
POPULATION AND AGING
PUBLIC SAFETY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
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