Do Politicians Change Public Attitudes?
Magnus Carlsson
Linnaeus University
Gordon Dahl
UC San Diego
May 9, 2014
Dan-Olof Rooth
Linnaeus University
Introduction
A large literature asks:
ˆ
Can voters aect political parties / politicians?
But what about the reverse question:
ˆ
Can political parties / politicians aect voters?
In this paper, we study whether political representation aects
public attitudes on important policy questions
The Power of Political Representation
By being elected to oce, politicians have an opportunity to shape
public attitudes
ˆ
Platform to express ideas
ˆ
Media attention
ˆ
Implementation of policies
Shaping attitudes can help (or hurt) with re-election
ˆ
Politicians care about both re-election probabilities and
advancing their preferred policy position
Setting
Local City Council Elections in Sweden
ˆ
Lots of elections (∼290 per election year)
ˆ
Many seats to ll at the local level (∼45)
ˆ
Many parties vying for seats (∼8)
Small, single issue parties which attracted voters on two key issues
1
Green Party: anti-nuclear energy (1988-1998)
2
Swedish Democrats: anti-immigration (2002-2012)
Advantages
ˆ
Single issue parties: It is clear what attitudes might be aected
ˆ
Small parties: The jumps in the seat share are larger
(good for identication)
Single Issue Party #1: Green Party and Nuclear Energy
Historical timeline
ˆ
1970's: Nuclear plants built
ˆ
1979: Three Mile Island accident
ˆ
1980: Referendum on nuclear power
ˆ
1981: Formation of Green Party
ˆ
1986: Chernobyl accident
(radioactive exposure in Sweden)
Nuclear Plants close to major cities
ˆ
Gothenburg North of Ringhals
ˆ
Malmö South of Barsebäck
ˆ
Stockholm btwn Forsmark / Oskarshamn
Single Issue Party #1: Green Party and Nuclear Energy
1) 1988 Green Party Platform
Concrete aims
1. ... Phase out nuclear
power within 3 years ...
2) 1994 survey: 3 most important topics for each party
ˆ
ˆ
Most parties had employment or the economy in their top 3
Green Party had environment rst, and was only party with
nuclear energy mentioned
Single Issue Party #2: Swedish Democrats and Immigration
Our most important issues
Responsible immigration policy
Identication Idea (details later)
Take advantage of large non-linearities in the seat assignment rule
ˆ
Idea: thresholds in the rule generate jumps in whether a seat is
awarded in otherwise similar elections
Simplied example: One city council and two elections
ˆ
Election 1: Party A gets 2.09% of votes and assigned 0 seats
ˆ
Election 2: Party A gets 2.10% and assigned 1 seat
ˆ
Elections 1 and 2 approximately the same except for # seats
ˆ
Compare post election attitudes in Election 1 versus 2
In reality the seat assignment rule is more involved with thresholds
varying based on the vote shares of all other parties
Preview of Results: Nuclear Energy
Evidence that politicians aect public attitudes
... and are (modestly) rewarded at the ballot box the next election
Green Party (anti-nuclear) politicians who get elected
ˆ
Cause more negative attitudes towards nuclear energy
ˆ
ˆ
1 more seat increases negative attitudes by ∼2.6%
Cause higher votes for Green Party in next local election in 2
out of 3 elections
Preview of Results: Immigration
Evidence that politicians aect public attitudes
but not in the party's intended direction ... and no incumbency eect in the next election
Swedish Democrat (anti-immigration) politicians who get elected
ˆ
Cause less negative attitudes towards immigration
ˆ
ˆ
1 more seat reduces negative attitudes by ∼4%
Do not cause higher votes for SD Party in next election once
the party reaches a critical mass
Preview of Results: Newspaper Coverage and Content
Media coverage in local newspapers
ˆ
Focus on SD party and immigration attitudes, since data not
available for earlier years
ˆ
SD mentioned more often in local newspapers
ˆ
ˆ
1 more seat increases articles mentioning SD by ∼35%
Immigration and integration policy mentioned more often in
articles, even without mentioning SD
ˆ
SD associated with words such as racism and xenophobia
Four Strands of Related Research
1) Policy aected by election results
ˆ
Downs (1957), Lee, Moretti & Butler (QJE 2004),
Petterson-Lidbom (JEEA 2010), Besley & Case (JEL 2003),
Levitt (AER 1996), Folke (JEEA 2013, similar Swedish data
for an earlier time period)
2) Incumbency (person or party)
ˆ
Lee (JOE 2008) plus many poli sci papers
3) Politics and media
ˆ
DellaVigna & Kaplan (QJE 2007), Gerber, Kaplan & Berger
(AEJ-Applied 2009), Gentzkow (QJE 2006), Strömberg (QJE
2004), Strömberg & Shapiro (JPE 2010)
4) Attitudes/behavior aected (by religious leaders)
ˆ
Bassi & Rasul (WP 2012), Stroebel & Benthem (WP 2012)
Swedish Political Parties
Today, there are eight major parties in Sweden
1
Moderate Party (M)
2
Christian Democrats (KD)
3
Centre Party (C)
4
People's Party (FP)
5
Social Democratic Party (S)
6
Left Party (V)
7
Green Party (MP)
8
Swedish Democrats (SD)
(New Democracy (NyD) got seats in parliament in 1991)
Parties often form coalitions. Coalitions can vary over time and
over dierent policy areas (education, healthcare etc.)
Swedish Election System
General elections occur every 4 years (previously 3) at the national
(N=1), the county (N=21), and the city council (N=290) level
ˆ
We focus on local elections to have enough observations
Sweden has a multi-party proportional election system
ˆ
There is no single winner in an election
ˆ
Instead each party is allocated seats in the City Council
approximately in proportion to the party´s vote share
Swedish city councils have a large autonomy
ˆ
Levy taxes (around 30 percent of earnings)
ˆ
Largest expenditures are childcare, education, elderly care
ˆ
Arrange for local provision of electricity and public safety
ˆ
Decide on refugee placement and immigrant integration plans
Seat Assignment Rule
Council seats allocated according to modied Sainte-Laguë method
ˆ
AKA the highest quotient , or odd number rule
ˆ
After the votes, vp , for each party have been tallied, successive
quotients, qp , are calculated for each party based on the
number of seats, sp , each party has received so far:
(v
qp (vp , sp )
ˆ
=
p
1.4
p
sp
v
2s +1
p
sp
=0
≥1
Example #1 with 3 parties and 5 seats
Quotient
Party
Votes
%
/1.4
/3
/5
/7
Party A
56,250
~57%
40,178 (1)
18,750 (3)
11,250 (4)
8,035
Party B
28,950
~29%
20,679 (2)
9,650 (5)
5,790
4,136
Party C
13,496
~14%
9,640
4,499
2,699
1,928
Discontinuities in Seats
There are several ways large discontinuities can arise, i.e., where
vote shares move negligibly but result in discrete jumps in seats
ˆ
Example #2: 28 new people decide to vote for Party C, no
change in votes for other parties
Quotient
Party
Votes
%
/1.4
/3
/5
/7
Party A
56,250
~57%
40,178 (1)
18,750 (3)
11,250 (4)
8,035
Party B
28,950
Party C
13,496
~29%
20,679 (2)
9,650 (5)
5,790
4,136
~14%
9,640
4,499
2,699
1,928
Baseline
28 new people now decide to vote for Party C
Party A
56,250
~57%
40,178 (1)
18,750 (3)
11,250 (4)
8,035
Party B
28,950
~29%
20,679 (2)
9,650
5,790
4,136
Party C
13,524
~14%
9,660 (5)
4,508
2,705
1,932
Discontinuities in Seats, cont.
Even if the votes for Party C remain unchanged, the number of
seats for Party C can change.
ˆ
Example #3: 60 voters switch from voting for Party B to
voting for Party A
Quotient
Party
Votes
%
/1.4
/3
/5
/7
Party A
56,250
~57%
40,178 (1)
18,750 (3)
11,250 (4)
8,035
Party B
28,950
Party C
13,496
~29%
20,679 (2)
9,650 (5)
5,790
4,136
~14%
9,640
4,499
2,699
1,928
Baseline
Party C unchanged and 60 voters switch from Party B to A
Party A
56,310
~57%
40,221 (1)
18,770 (3)
11,262 (4)
8,044
Party B
28,890
~29%
20,635 (2)
9,630
5,778
4,127
Party C
13,496
~14%
9,640 (5)
4,499
2,699
1,928
Many Local Random Experiments
Many parties and elections over time
ˆ
The same rule applies over time and across city councils
ˆ
Cut-os for being awarded a seat vary
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
from election to election
by vote shares for the various parties
the number of seats
A large number of local random experiments
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
a proportional election system generates more close elections
compared to a majoritarian system
many seats: On average 45 seats in a city council
small parties do not need many votes to get a seat (∼2%)
Regression Model
Causal relationship we want to estimate:
yjt
= αj + θf (zj ,t −1 ) + ujt
(1)
ˆ
yjt measures attitudes, j indexes municipality, t indexes time
ˆ
f
ˆ
f
(.)
is share of seats the SD party gets
ˆ
modied Sainte-Laguë seat allocation method determines this
(.)
is a known function of inputs zj ,t −1 : number of available
seats and votes (or equivalently, vote shares) for all parties
Estimate of
ˆ
θ
likely to suer from omitted variable bias
Votes in prior election are a function of attitudes and attitudes
are correlated over time
Identication
Identication strategy: Only use non-linear threshold variation
Augment outcome equation with a exible (but continuous and
smooth) function of zj ,t −1 :
yjt
= αj + θf (zj ,t −1 ) + g (zj ,t −1 ) + ejt
Adding g (.) ensures we identify
θ
(2)
solely from sharp nonlinearities in
the voting algorithm, and not from the zj ,t −1 variables themselves
ˆ
f
(.),
the share of seats awarded to the SD party, does not
need to be estimated; it is determined by the voting algorithm
ˆ
g (.) must be estimated and captures how votes / vote shares
aect attitudes
ˆ
We will include municipality xed eects
Note: f
(.)
has no time or region subscripts by denition; for our
baseline regressions, we impose this on the g (.) function too
Control Function Interpretation
Estimation strategy can be interpreted as a control function
ˆ
The control function is g (.)
ˆ
Identifying assumption is g (.)
ˆ
= E [ujt |αj , zj ,t −1 ]
This implies the error term in the augmented regression is
conditionally mean zero: E [e |α , f (z , −1 ), g (z , −1 )] = 0
jt
j
j t
j t
Tradeo: need to estimate g (.) exibly, but this comes at the cost
of precision
ˆ
We estimate with various order polynomials
ˆ
Identication derives from the large nonlinear jumps in seats
ˆ
Assuming a xed order polynomial,
consistent
θ̂
is identied and
Comparison to Regression Discontinuity
yjt
= αj + θf (zj ,t −1 ) + g (zj ,t −1 ) + ejt
Similar to RD, with a few key dierences
ˆ
The cutos f
ˆ
g (.) is high dimensional
ˆ
g (.) is a global function, assumed to be the same for all
(.)
vary with each election
elections regardless of the cuto f
ˆ
ˆ
(.)
Cannot do local linear regression and no natural way to weight
observations relative to distance from changing cutos
With many running variables it is dicult to draw a graph
Attitudes
Attitudes measured at the municipality level
1) Attitudes towards nuclear energy
ˆ
SOM attitude survey
ˆ
1988-1998
ˆ
random sample of 16,392 respondents
2) Attitudes on immigration
ˆ
FSI attitude survey
ˆ
2002-2013
ˆ
random sample of 21,499 respondents
Attitude Variable #1: Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy question, 1988-1998:
In 1980 we had a referendum on nuclear power in
Sweden. After the referendum, parliament decided to
phase out nuclear power by 2010. What is your opinion
about nuclear energy use in Sweden?
A) Stop nuclear power immediately.
B) Stop nuclear power earlier than 2010.
C) Phase out nuclear power by 2010.
D) Phase out nuclear power, but after 2010.
E) Do not phase out nuclear power at all. Keep using it.
F) No opinion.
Dummy variable for negative attitudes: alternative A or B
Negative Attitudes towards Nuclear Energy
Distribution of negative attitudes towards nuclear energy across
municipalities in the three post-election periods
City Council Vote Shares, 1988-1994
Green Party (anti-nuclear) in blue: 5.5% in 1988, 3.4% in 1991,
5.0% in 1994, 4.5% in 1998
Attitude Variable #2: Immigration
Immigration question, 2002-2012:
Should Sweden continue accepting immigrants to the
same extent as now?
A) To a greater extent
B) To the same extent
C) To a lesser extent
D) Do not know
Dummy variable for negative attitudes: alternative C
Negative Attitudes towards Immigration
Distribution of negative attitudes towards immigraton across
municipalities in the three post-election periods
City Council Vote Shares, 2002-2010
SD Party (anti-immigration) in blue: 0.4% in 2002, 2.9% in 2006,
5.7% in 2010
Estimating Equation
yijt
= αj + λt + β xi + θf (zj ,t −1 ) + g (zj ,t −1 ) + eijt
ˆ
yjt is attitude variable, measured in years after election
ˆ
include municipality f.e.'s
ˆ
include xi to control for individual characteristics
ˆ
f (zj ,t −1 ) is seat share obtained in last election
ˆ
g (zj ,t −1 ) is control function
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
αj
and survey year f.e.'s
λt
has same inputs as seat share algorithm
these inputs consist of vote shares for all parties, total number
votes in municipality, and total number seats
we model g (.) with high order polynomials and interactions
Polynomial Control Functions
g (.)
= g (vs1 , vs2 , vs3 , vs4 , vs5 , vs6 , vs7 , vs8 , vs9, seats , votes )
ˆ
A) Vote share for main party of interest (1 term):
ˆ
B) 1st order (10 terms)
γ1 vs1
ˆ γ1 vs1 + γ2 vs2 + γ3 vs3 + γ4 vs4 + γ5 vs5 + γ6 vs6 + γ7 vs7 +
γ8 vs8 + γ9 seats + γ10 votes
ˆ
C) 2st order, no interactions (21 terms)
ˆ γ1 vs1 + γ11 vs12 + γ2 vs2 + γ22 vs22 + γ3 vs3 + γ33 vs32 + ...
ˆ Similarly for D) 3rd order, no interactions (32 terms)
E) 4th order, no interactions (43 terms)
ˆ
F) 4th order, with 2nd order interactions (85 terms)
ˆ
ˆ
E plus γ12 vs1 vs2 + γ13 vs1 vs3 + γ23 vs2 vs3 + ...
G) F + 3rd order interactions for party of interest (121 terms)
ˆ
F plus γ112 vs12 vs2 + γ113 vs12 vs3 + γ123 vs1 vs2 vs3 + ...
OLS Estimates of Green Party (MP) Representation on Nuclear Attitudes
Dep var: Negative attitude on nuclear energy
MP seat share×100
.0013
.0009
-.0018
-.0017
(.0015)
(.0015)
(.0015)
(.0016)
Secondary education
-.0311**
(relative to compulsory)
-.0301**
(.0074)
(.0073)
College education
-.0197**
-.0143**
(.0089)
(.0099)
Female
.0991**
.1017**
(.0053)
(.0053)
Age
-.0077**
-.0079**
(.0012)
(.0013)
.0059**
.0061**
(.0013)
(.0013)
Age squared×100
Municipality f.e.'s
R-squared
.0100
.0430
X
X
.0347
.0682
Notes: Overall mean: .15, obs: 16,392, muncipalities: 290, s.e.'s clustered by muni.
CF Estimates of Green Party (MP) Representation on Nuclear Attitudes
MP seat share×100
Control fn (# terms)
Dep var: Negative attitude on nuclear energy
.0066* .0065 .0080** .0089** .0099** .0130*** .0113**
(.0039) (.0040) (.0041) (.0042) (.0042) (.0048) (.0052)
A) MP vote share only 1
B) 1st order
C) 2nd, no interactions
D) 3rd, no interations
E) 4th, no interactions
F) 4th, with 2nd interactions
G) F + 3rd order MP terms
10
21
32
43
86
Muni & year f.e.'s
X
X
X
X
X
X
R-squared
.0685 .0688 .0696 .0699 .0709 .0739
Notes: Overall mean: .15, obs: 16,392, municipalities: 290, s.e.'s clustered by muni.
121
X
.0763
OLS Estimates of Swedish Democrat (SD) Representation on Immigration Attitudes
Dep var: Negative attitude on immigration
SD seat share×100
.0155**
.0133**
-.0035
-.0046*
(.0027)
(.0017)
(.0027)
(.0027)
Immigrant
Secondary education
(relative to compulsory)
-.0437**
-.0471**
(.0092)
(.0095)
-.0369**
-.0339**
(.0086)
(.0088)
College education
-.2689**
-.2563**
(.0085)
(.0097)
Female
-.0348**
-.0343**
(.0060)
(.0061)
Age
.0037**
.0032**
(.0013)
(.0013)
Age squared×100
-.0021
-.0016
(.0014)
(.0014)
Municipality f.e.'s
R-squared
.0102
.0760
X
X
.0394
.0960
Notes: Overall mean: .61, obs: 21,499, municipalities: 290, s.e.'s clustered by muni.
CF Estimates of Swedish Democrat (SD) Representation on Immigration Attitudes
SD seat share×100
Control fn (# terms)
Dep var: Negative attitude on immigration
-.0115** -.0132** -.0149** -.0152** -.0172** -.01894** -.0193**
(.0058) (.0050) (.0052) (.0053) (.0055) (.0054) (.0056)
A) SD vote share
1
B) 1st order
C) 2nd, no interactions
D) 3rd, no interations
E) 4th, no interactions
F) 4th, with 2nd interactions
G) F + 3rd order SD terms
10
21
32
43
86
Muni & year f.e.'s
X
X
X
X
X
X
R-squared
.0961 .0967 .0979 .0985 .0991 .1011
Notes: Overall mean: .61, obs: 21,499, municipalities: 290, s.e.'s clustered by muni.
121
X
.1027
Robustness
Alternative specications
ˆ
Non-linearities in eect of seat share: # of seats
ˆ
eect is almost linear so seat shares is a good approximation
ˆ
Allow g (.) to vary by election year: No change
ˆ
Allow g (.) to vary by region: No change
ˆ
Dropping attitudes collected in election years: No change
ˆ
Dropping municipality xed eects: Estimates somewhat
smaller but still signicant
ˆ
SD: Not aected by unstable seats
ˆ
MP: Not simply the fear of living close to a nuclear plant
Incumbency Eects and Attitudes for Green Party (MP)
MP seat share×100
× 1988 election year
×
1991 election year
×
1994 election year
# muni's
Log votes next election Neg. attitudes w/ party
Naive OLS Control Fn after election representation
.3143**
(.0305)
.3552**
(.0395)
.2569**
(.0345)
.0401*
(.0226)
.0490**
(.0223)
-.0130
(.0246)
.0085
(.0064)
.0160**
(.0063)
.0160**
(.0062)
259 / 284
229 / 286
242 / 288
R-squared
.3384
.9079
.0735
Obs.
858
858
16,392
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality. Specications include xed eects for municipality and
year. Control function includes 4th order polynomials with 2nd order interactions (86 terms).
Incumbency Eects and Attitudes for Swedish Democrats (SD)
SD seat share×100
× 2002 election year
×
2006 election year
×
2010 election year
# muni's
Log votes next election Neg. attitudes w/ party
Naive OLS Control Fn after election representation
.4424**
(.0563)
.1887**
(.0238)
.0764*
(.0410)
-.0117
(.0297)
-.0010
(.0100)
-.0191**
(.0059)
-.0229**
(.0058)
29 / 290
144 / 290
246 / 290
R-squared
.2231
.8716
.0844
Obs.
580
580
21,499
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality. Specications include xed eects for municipality and
year. Control function includes 4th order polynomials with 2nd order interactions (86 terms).
Newspaper Coverage and Content
Does newspaper coverage increases after a party wins a seat?
ˆ
Do newspapers give more attention to winning party?
ˆ
Do newspapers devote more attention to party's key issues?
ˆ
Is coverage positive or negative?
Data: All articles for all newspapers in Sweden
ˆ
Information only available for 2006-2013 period
ˆ
ˆ
Given available data, focus on newspaper coverage of Swedish
Democrats and immigration for 2 elections
139 newspapers
ˆ
ˆ
large public subsidies of local newspapers
newspapers often cover more than one municipality
We search for key words dealing with SD and immigration
Eect of SD Representation on Newspaper Coverage
Dep var: arcsinh(articles per 100 days)
SD seat share×100
Search term: Swedish Democrat
.0525** .1349** .1415** .1630** .1603** .2128**
(.0215) (.0454) (.0592) (.0678) (.0688) (.0787)
Control function (# terms)
A) None (OLS)
0
B) SD vote share
1
C) 1st order
10
D) 2nd order, no interactions
21
E) 3rd order, no interactions
F) 4th order, no interactions
Ave. # articles
per paper per year
110
R-squared
.9851 .9860 .9869 .9896
Newspaper f.e.'s
X
X
X
X
Notes: 278 observations, 139 newspapers, s.e.'s clustered by newspaper.
32
.9920
X
43
.9932
X
Eect of SD Representation on Newspaper Content
Dep var: arcsinh(articles per 100 days)
Search terms:
Swedish Democrats AND
Racism OR Xenophobia
OLS
SD seat share×100
Control Fn
(Racism OR Xenophobia)
OLS
Control Fn
.0072
.1903*
.0396
.1873**
(.0267)
(.1053)
(.0243)
(.0682)
.9755
.9874
.9706
.9878
X
X
X
X
Ave # articles
per paper per year
R-squared
Newspaper f.e.'s
90
24
Notes: 278 observations, 139 newspapers, s.e.'s clustered by newspaper. Control
function includes 4th order polynomials with no interaction terms (43 terms).
Eect of SD Representation on Newspaper Content, continued
Dep var: arcsinh(articles per 100 days)
Search terms:
Swedish Democrats AND
Immigrants AND Integration
SD seat share×100
Immigrants AND Integration
OLS
Control Fn
OLS
Control Fn
-.0117
.1603**
-.0064**
.0687*
(.0230)
(.0636)
(.0156)
(.0404)
.9720
.9893
.9505
.9708
X
X
X
X
Ave # articles
per paper per year
R-squared
Newspaper f.e.'s
21
5
Notes: 278 observations, 139 newspapers, s.e.'s clustered by newspaper. Control
function includes 4th order polynomials with no interaction terms (43 terms).
Heterogeneous Eects of Political Representation on Attitudes
Dependent Variables: Negative Attitudes (toward Nuclear Energy or Immigration)
High Low
Age
Age
All Educ Educ Females Males ≤45
>45
A: MP Party
(Reminder: Negative nuclear energy attitudes higher for less educated, female, and young)
MP seat share .013** .019 .009*
×100
(.005) (.012) (.005)
Obs.
16,392 3,402 12,602
.016*
(.008)
8,216
.007
(.006)
8,171
.010
(.007)
8,583
.009
(.007)
7,374
B: SD Party
(Reminder: Negative immigration attitudes higher for less educated, male, and older)
SD seat share -.019** -.006 -.023** -.007 -.024** -.010
-.020**
×100
(.005) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.008)
(.006)
Obs.
21,499 7,166 14,160 11,998 11,250 10,032
11,433
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality. Specications include xed eects for municipality and
year. Control function includes 4th order polynomials with 2nd order interactions (86 terms).
Exogeneity Tests
Dependent Variables: Municipality Characteristics
%
% net
Tax
%
%
%
UE
Voting migration rate foreign college > 45 rate
MP seat share -.0008
×100
(.0414)
Obs.
848
-.0207
(.0452)
844
A: MP Party (1988, 1991, 1994)
.0175 -.0004 -.0267 .0254 -.0218
(.0315) (.0303) (.0366) (.0538) (.0840)
844
844
844
844
843
B: SD Party (2002, 2006, 2010)
Lagged
attitudes
-.0081
(.0057)
16,392
SD seat share -.0279 .0206 .0080 .0073 -.0268 -.0425 .0816 .0076
×100
(.0447) (.0359) (.0323) (.0354) (.0325) (.0468) (.0671) (.0047)
Obs.
864
863
863
863
863
863
863 24,030
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality. Specications include xed eects for municipality and
year. Control function includes 4th order polynomials with 2nd order interactions (86 terms).
Conclusion
Can politicians change public attitudes? YES
ˆ
Causal evidence that political representation aects public
attitudes for two important policy issues
ˆ
Green Party causes more negative attitudes towards nuclear
energy, in line with the party's policy position
ˆ Rewarded at the ballot box in 2 of 3 ensuing elections
ˆ
Swedish Democrats reduce negative attitudes towards
immigration, opposite the party's policy position
ˆ Experience no incubency benet after reaching critical mass
Evidence for media attention as a mechanism
ˆ
Swedish Democrats seem to have increased the debate about
immigration policy in local newspapers, but not always in a
light favorable for their party