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Reducing risk in an uncertain world
AN N UAL R E P O R T 2013 – 2014
NAT I ONAL SECUR I T Y R ES EAR C H DIV IS IO N
RAND National Defense Research Institute
Observations from the Directors
(facing page)
Timeline, 1985–1999
(front cover foldout)
Timeline, 2000–2014
(back cover foldout)
NDRI—30 years strengthening security
National Defense Research Institute
The timeline on these pages and its continuation on the
inside back cover commemorates the 30-year history of the
National Defense Research Institute by way of some key
projects completed over that period. The work listed has
informed policy, shown the way to savings and efficiencies,
and supported decisionmaker priorities in acquisition and
technology policy; logistics, manpower, and personnel;
military health; international security; strategy and planning; and intelligence policy. The 45 projects shown here
are highlights representative of the thousands of projects
conducted in NDRI’s first 30 years.
1985
1986
1987
1988
Examined U.S.
Middle East strategy;
results used in shaping
U.S. response to
Gulf crisis
Showed that
advertising was
a cost-effective
means of increasing
recruitment
1989
1990
1991
1992
Pioneered and
At congressional
actively extended
Influenced NATO
request, analyzed
Assessed potential
the concept of
proposals on confidence- uses of competition
structure and mix
building cooperative and security-building
of future active
in B-2 and Advanced
forces in developing measures in Europe
and reserve forces
Cruise Missile
countries
acquisition
Designed the
Evaluated close-support
Enlistment Bonus
platforms in terms
Assessed the potential
Experiment and
of enhancements to
of high-altitude,
analyzed results
combat forces
long-range sensors
showing bonuses’
for tactical
effectiveness
reconnaissance
Evaluated health care
use and cost changes
in response to OSD’s
CHAMPUS reform
initiative
Used war gaming to
explore the role of
technology in future
military outcomes
Helped DoD
conceptualize the
1997 QDR’s
shape-respond-prepare
force-planning
strategy
Concluded that sexual
orientation should be
viewed as not germane
for who should serve
or in what capacity
1993
1994
Assessed the continued
appropriateness of
mandatory retirement
for general/flag officers
1995
1996
1997
Examined new
Established
technologies that
a foundational
could help light
theory of military
forces overcome
Examined the
compensation
attacks by heavy
implications
and personnel
ones
of revolutions in
policy
military affairs for
Showed how to
military outcomes
swiftly and efficiently
on the Korean
restart defense system
peninsula
production lines
Provided cost
assessment and
planning assistance
for NATO
enlargement
Showed that a switch
to a civilian-style
retirement system could
save $2 billion per year
1998
1999
Related timing
and cost in carrier
production, resulting
in a money-saving
earlier build start
Year is typically year of key publication; some projects extended over multiple years,
so specific placement is somewhat notional
CHAMPUS
NATO
OSD
QDR
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (succeeded by TRICARE)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Quadrennial Defense Review
Provided technical
support to Gilmore
Commission on
terrorist use of
WMD in the U.S.
2000
Analyzed consolidation,
competition, and
innovation in the military
aircraft industry
2001
2002
2003
Informed Navy
acquisition decisions
on programs involving
hundreds of billions
of dollars, permitting
large efficiencies
Advised Liberia’s
president on
reorganizing her
country’s security
sector
2004
2005
2006
Offered on-site
Examined the pay,
analytical support
promotion, and retention
to the counter-IED
of high-quality DoD
For a major DoD review
campaign in Iraq
civilian workers
(QRMC), recommended
substantial revisions to
Recommended a
military compensation
capabilities-based
structure
approach to planning,
Examined options for
Assessed
as embraced by
holding down TRICARE
strategies and
DoD in the QDR
costs while ensuring
policies for
quality health care
information
warfare
Informed repeal
of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy;
major finding—
allowing gays to
serve would not
affect unit cohesion
Showed that
income losses
among activated
reservists
are relatively
uncommon
Helped NGA
improve the strategic
focus of its R&D
activities
Informed the
decision by the
Examined effects
Secretary of Defense
of deployment on
about a long-range
military families
strike platform
and service member
retention
2007
2008
Provided analytic
expertise to the
Commission on
Care for America’s
Wounded Warriors
2009
2010
Analyzed terrorist
transit hubs, influencing
counterterrorism
priorities and plans
Showed that military
pay growth could
be slowed with little
risk of manpower
shortages
2011
2012
2013
2014
Developed scenarios
Working in
and conducted
Afghanistan, helped
Determined
campaign analyses,
design and implement
the savings
directly informing QDR
from multiyear successful local defense
decisions regarding
forces and otherwise
procurement
capabilities and
support SOF
of the F-22A
operational concepts
fighter
Assessed DoD
psychological health and
Conducted AoA for
family support programs,
Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent,
including influential
with implications for fleet
review of suicide
size, design characteristics,
prevention strategies
operational availability
Proposed supply chain
modifications that
produced efficiencies
and shaped policy
Year is typically year of key publication; some projects extended over multiple years,
so specific placement is somewhat notional
AoA
IED
NGA
QDR
QRMC
R&D
SOF
WMD
Analysis of Alternatives
improvised explosive device
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Quadrennial Defense Review
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
research and development
special operations forces
weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical, etc.)
N
ovember 2014 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment
of the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), RAND’s federally
funded research and development center serving the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and other DoD elements outside the Army and
Air Force. The idea for the new center originated with Don Rice,
then President of RAND (and later Secretary of the Air Force), who
realized that RAND’s OSD work had many of the attributes of an FFRDC
relationship but without the name. It seemed a small but advantageous
step to formalize the relationship by packaging these streams of research
together. The Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed, and NDRI was born.
As directors of an FFRDC, RAND managers of OSD-sponsored research
have been better able to plan for exploratory analyses, develop staff
capabilities, and conduct work cutting across domains, and have been
better able to support research sponsors. Assembling the OSD research
in an FFRDC also brought appropriate restrictions, e.g., we could not
compete against commercial firms on requests for proposals.
The new FFRDC faced challenges in its early years, when I served as
director. First, the DoD R&D budget peaked in 1985, and the total DoD
budget peaked two years later, placing NDRI into a regime of resource
decline. Then, in 1989, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, followed by the Soviet
Union in 1991. The latter earth-shaking events, which were, of course,
great news for the United States, fundamentally changed defense
planning and complicated analysis. The need to economize became
amplified into a broad force drawdown imperative. With no superpower
adversary, what would drive strategy? What would be the role of NATO?
How would force drawdown achieve efficiencies and result in fairness
to those who wanted to continue serving? What would become of
such large, risky acquisition programs as that for the B-2 bomber?
NDRI proved its worth to OSD in helping answer such major questions.
Through the FFRDC, RAND has advised decisionmakers as they have
tackled the hardest problems they face. OSD is in fact an ideal client for
RAND, whose mission is to help improve policy and decisionmaking
through research and analysis. In NDRI, research is the tool to achieve the
goal of better decisionmaking, where the research sponsor is the decision­
maker and the relationship is action-oriented—and where the RAND
hallmarks of quality and objectivity are highly valued by both parties.
Michael D. Rich
President and Chief Executive Officer
RAND Corporation
Director, NDRI, 1986–1993
I
n the 1990s, NDRI dealt with tectonic questions arising out of the
end of the Cold War. We produced the analytic framework that
enabled the U.S. government and key allies to judge whether, when,
and how to expand NATO. We laid the conceptual groundwork for
NATO’s enlargement as well as its reinvigoration. Meanwhile, the U.S.
defense establishment and its industrial base went through a period
of contraction and consolidation. NDRI provided a stream of studies
that showed the way toward rational reductions in defense production
and nationwide infrastructure.
David Gompert
Director, NDRI, 1993–2000
I
n 1998, Congress directed DoD to enter into a contract with an
FFRDC to establish the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
known informally as the Gilmore Commission. Chosen for this role,
NDRI drew upon researchers throughout RAND in providing technical
analyses to the Commission over the five years of its existence.
Supported by NDRI, the Commission established the analytical basis
for many of the homeland defense issues that surfaced after 9/11.
As part of this effort, we also advised the White House on organizing
the government to meet the post-9/11 security challenges. And NDRI’s
experience with the Gilmore Commission enhanced its utility in
providing significant, timely assistance to senior Pentagon leadership
regarding domestic response issues.
Jeffrey Isaacson
Director, NDRI, 2000–2004 *
D
uring Operation Iraqi Freedom, NDRI deployed analysts forward
to provide direct analytic support to U.S. and coalition forces
on the ground—for example, in their attempt to reduce the threat from
improvised explosive devices (IEDs). To help locate IEDs, we developed
a model that could narrow the coordinates within which the next device
might be found. RAND analysts in Iraq interacted directly with planners
to obtain data on upcoming operations that could then be analyzed,
both in theater and in more depth in the United States, to help operators
avoid or find the IEDs, according to their mission. From the data I saw, I
would assert with some confidence that these analyses helped save lives.
Eugene C. Gritton
Director, NDRI, 2004–2009
*Dr. Isaacson is now Vice President, Defense Systems & Assessments, Sandia National Laboratories.
I
f there’s an aphorism that sums up the past several years, it’s
“everything old is new again.” We are witnessing the evolution of a
new military power that could present serious challenges to U.S.
forces, at least regionally. Conflict threatening U.S. security interests
has broken out again in Iraq. And the budgetary resources available to
meet these challenges appear to be trending downward. DoD is thus
placing a premium on doing more with less. NDRI has put that principle
into operation in Afghanistan. There, we demonstrated that Afghan
cultures have for generations maintained security with local forces. NDRI
researchers in theater have since been helping coalition personnel to
implement such a concept among Afghan police. We have been told
that our support has been vital for the success of that endeavor.
Another topic we revisited was sexual orientation in the military. We
had conducted a study in 1993 that concluded that sexual orientation
was not germane to military service. This conclusion was only partially
reflected in the policy change that established the “don’t ask, don’t tell”
approach. In 2010, we were asked to reexamine this issue, with the
emphasis on understanding the implications of service by openly gay
men and lesbians and the possible approaches to implementing a
policy change. This project complemented other studies—on
recruitment of Hispanics and military jobs available to women—that
address DoD efforts to increase the diversity and inclusiveness of the
armed forces. Doing that will serve several important purposes: making
the services more representative of the U.S. population, bringing
new cultural experiences to bear on security-related challenges, and
broadening the pool of people interested in military service.
The need for NDRI today is as great as ever. The problems that must
be solved to assure the security of U.S. interests are becoming more and
more complicated. Technology is evolving more and more rapidly.
The source of innovation is as likely to be commercial as governmentsponsored, with potentially global inputs, which has implications for
security. Threats are evolving to adapt to countermeasures adopted
earlier by the United States.
All of these trends—as well as the summaries in this report of the
work done within the past year or so—illustrate the continued importance
of and demand for rigorous analysis in support of OSD, the combatant
commands, and other NDRI sponsors. It is not difficult to imagine that
we will be drawing similar conclusions about NDRI’s value 30 years hence.
Jack Riley
Director, NDRI, 2009–present
AN N UAL R E P O R T 2013 – 2014
NAT I ONAL SECUR I T Y R ES EAR C H DIV IS IO N
Contents
Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Selected Contributions
International Security and Defense Policy
Global Defense Strategy, Assets, and Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Preparing for the Collapse of the North Korean Government . . . . . . 6
Mapping the Path of Negotiated Settlements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Acquisition and Technology Policy
From Emerging Technologies to Future Weapon Systems . . . . . . . . 10
Integrating the DoD Supply Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Unmanned Maritime Surface Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Forces and Resources Policy
People, Resources, and Military Well-Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Reforming the Military Refinement System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Reducing Mental Health Stigma in the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Intelligence Policy
Agility in Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Assessing DoD’s Approach to Unauthorized Disclosures . . . . . . . . . 24
Making the National Reconnaissance Office More
Flexible and Agile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
NSRD Research Sponsors (2013–2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Publications (2013–2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
RAND National Defense Research Institute Advisory Board. . . . . . 34
RAND Board of Trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Overview
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy
and decisionmaking through research and analysis.
Since its founding in 1948, RAND has sought solutions to the most pressing
problems of the day, posed by policymakers in diverse domains—national
defense and homeland security, health care, labor, education, justice, infrastructure,
and the environment.
R AND projects bring together experts from multiple disciplines—
economists, social and behavioral scientists, engineers, and others—to address
topics within one policy domain or, often, issues that span or fall between them.
RAND provides valued analytic support to decisionmakers by
■ Developing
innovative solutions to complex problems
■ Providing
practical guidance and clear policy choices while also addressing
barriers to effective implementation
■ Using
advanced empirical methods and rigorous peer review to meet the
highest research standards
■ Maintaining
independence and objectivity by scrupulously avoiding
partisanship and vested interests
■ Ensuring
transparency and serving the public interest by widely disseminating
research publications and encouraging staff to participate in public forums
(when work is not classified or otherwise restricted).
Three of RAND’s research divisions perform work related to national security.
Project AIR FORCE and Arroyo Center, RAND’s Army research division, conduct
research and analysis under the sponsorship of those two military services. The
RAND National Security Research Division works under the sponsorship
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), other elements of the national
security community, and allied governments and security organizations.
Sponsors of the RAND National Security Research Division:
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified
combatant commands, the defense agencies, the Intelligence
Community, the Department of the Navy, the departments of
State and Homeland Security, foundations, and allied governments
and security organizations. (For a detailed list, see pp. 28–29.)
RAND headquarters, Santa Monica,
California (top). Promotion ceremony
for two of RAND’s military fellows
(middle). Former U.S. senator Elizabeth
Dole addressing the 2014 commencement at the Pardee RAND Graduate
School (bottom).
1
Through its National Security Research Division, RAND conducts research
on complex national security problems and defense management issues with
an emphasis on the difficult strategy and policy concerns of high-level
policymakers and their staffs. Policy domains include
■ International
■ Acquisition
■
security and defense policy
and technology policy
Forces and resources policy
■ Intelligence
policy.
Examples of research in each of these areas are shown beginning on p. 4.
Most of the National Security Research Division’s work, including all
of it sponsored by DoD, is performed through a federally funded research and
development center—the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). The
long-term relationship between NDRI and OSD, now in its 30th year, coupled
with NDRI’s broad sponsorship and its sponsors’ appreciation of its objectivity
and independence, has allowed NDRI to
■ Conduct
a continuous, integrated research and analytic program with a
particular emphasis on enduring issues that cut across organizational boundaries
■ Acquire
an in-depth understanding of DoD and its needs
■ Look
to the future, maintaining a mid- to long-range focus together with a
quick-response capability.
NDRI’s research agenda emerges from sponsor relationships marked by
close cooperation. NDRI helps identify and evaluate new policies, programs,
and technologies; frames alternative ways to implement current ones; and
provides further analytic and technical assistance as required. Decisionmakers
draw on NDRI’s analyses to develop strategic, tactical, and technological
responses to evolving threats, as well as to sustain a robust all-volunteer force,
reform intelligence collection and analysis, improve defense business practices,
and set other policy directions serving U.S. security interests.
At the same time, NDRI acts to sustain and improve the breadth and
depth of RAND’s technical expertise and its core investigative, theoretical, and
methodological capabilities—the resources and tools that will enable it to
address critical national security concerns for years to come.
RAND senior engineer Yool Kim testifies
on NDRI research before a U.S. Senate
committee audience (top). Jack Riley,
NDRI director, with Nancy Spruill,
OSD executive agent for NDRI (middle).
Audience for talk on Russia, RAND
“Issues in Focus” series (bottom).
2
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
RAND is an international pace setter in defense research and analysis.
Government officials, academics, and business leaders in the United States,
Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Middle East rely on RAND’s advice. They turn
to RAND for assistance with the complex problems they must confront. They
know they can count on RAND to independently and objectively analyze a
problem, place it in the appropriate context, and identify options to help them
make the best-informed decisions.
Cambridge
Santa Monica
Pittsburgh
Jackson
Brussels
Boston
Washington DC
New Orleans
Headquarters
Other offices
Canberra
3
International Security and Defense Policy
Global Defense Strategy,
Assets, and Partnerships
Selected Contributions FY13–14
Options for the Special Operations Forces
(SOF) Global Network
Seth Jones
Director, International
Security and Defense
Policy Center
■ Growing
anti-access/area-denial
threats demand the development
of new operational or strategic
concepts and force capabilities.
■ U.S.
global defense asset allocation
warrants continuing reevaluation
in light of the strategic rebalancing
to Asia, a changing dynamic
with Russia, and ongoing events
in the Greater Middle East and
North Africa.
In response to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance,
the U.S. Special Operations Command proposed a
new vision for a structure to respond more effectively
to emerging threats and deters future ones. The core
of this Global SOF Network vision consists of a global
network of SOF, interagency allies, and partners able
to respond rapidly to—and persistently address—
regional contingencies and threats to stability. Using an
analytically rigorous methodology, RAND developed
options for implementing the vision to provide persistent
low-level presence, responsiveness to contingencies,
and capacity-building for regional SOF. RAND also
assessed and recommended mechanisms to provide
more flexible funding to further increase the responsiveness of the envisioned global SOF network.
PROJECT LEADERS: Thomas S. Szayna, William Welser IV
rand.org/t/RR340, rand.org/t/RR360
■ RAND
assesses the implications
of strategic challenges to national
security and helps develop ways
for the United States and others
to meet those challenges with the
aid of allies and partners.
4
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
Lessons from Ending the U.S. War in Iraq
Ending the U.S. war in Iraq required handing off
responsibilities to the Iraqi government, redeploying
personnel, and property disposition. NDRI comprehensively reviewed the planning and execution of this
transition. The review showed how these tasks were
complicated by uncertainties regarding Iraqi politics
and continued U.S. troop presence. Recommendations
for future transitions addressed the need for a White
House–led interagency planning process established
well in advance of force departure, the need to work
with both relevant congressional committees and the
host nation to identify and fund post-transition requirements, prioritizing institution-building in the host
nation so that gains made can be sustained after force
departure, and the imperative to manage the political
transformation that will occur after force withdrawal,
among numerous other issues. The study is being used
by U.S. Central Command to ensure that the lessons
learned from Iraq inform transition planning now
under way in Afghanistan.
PROJECT LEADER: Rick Brennan, Jr.
rand.org/t/RR232
innovative deployment doctrine and a new base
operations strategy. This novel concept has contributed
to a broader understanding of how the United States
could better position itself to respond in conflicts with
adversaries that invest heavily in anti-access capabilities,
such as long-range ballistic and cruise missiles for
use against air bases. This concept has also informed
the Quadrennial Defense Review and broader DoD
development of new plans and strategies.
Michael J. Lostumbo
Report available to appropriate audiences upon request
PROJECT LEADER:
Operating in Anti-Access Environments
NDRI developed a new concept to enable air operations
in the face of anti-access threats. Specifically, it involves
operating from clusters of austere airfields using an
Recent Publications
China’s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities,
www.rand.org/t/RR118
Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy,
www.rand.org/t/RR521
Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint
Interventions in Local Context, www.rand.org/t/RR513
Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2013 Relative to Insurgencies
Since World War II, www.rand.org/t/RR396
Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the
Asia-Pacific Region,
www.rand.org/t/RR146
Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future,
www.rand.org/t/RR577
Disrupting Terrorist Transit Hubs
Building on prior studies, NDRI sought to inform efforts
against key adversarial networks operating in the Middle
East, Africa, and Europe. As part of the project, the study
team hypothesized that transit hubs could be points of
vulnerability for violent extremist groups. Using socialnetwork analysis and troves of intelligence reports, the team
confirmed this hypothesis; identified specific hubs used
by the groups to move money, weapons, and personnel to
key areas of conflict; and recommended ways to dismantle
these hubs. The team also proposed an approach for keeping such analyses up to date for direct operational use.
PROJECT LEADER:
Kim Cragin
Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Operational Vignettes, Lessons Learned, and a Survey of Selected Efforts,
www.rand.org/t/RR382
Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific,
www.rand.org/t/RR151
Toward a Secure and Stable Mali: Approaches to Engaging Local Actors,
www.rand.org/t/RR296
I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A N D D E F E N S E P O L I C Y
5
Preparing for the Collapse of
the North Korean Government
With its economy in dire straits, insufficient agriculture to feed its people, and a
repressive and tyrannical political system, the North Korean government may
collapse in the next 20–30 years. Indeed, a collapse could occur in the short term.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is apparently worried, as demonstrated by the
reported massive counter-coup exercise North Korea undertook in Pyongyang in
mid-March 2014.
The collapse of the
North Korean government
could lead to Korean
unification, but it could
also have disastrous
consequences that will
require preparation
to avoid.
— Bruce W. Bennett
Project Leader
6
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
Approach
The study’s author is an expert on Northeast Asian military issues and has visited
the area some 100 times. Here, he took a “backward planning” approach in
which he first identified the potential negative consequences of a North Korean
collapse (e.g., hoarding food and essential goods), then identified and explored
the causes (e.g., the collapse of the country’s monetary unit), and, finally, proposed
actions (e.g., humanitarian aid) to either preempt or respond to such consequences.
Findings
The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are woefully unprepared
for a North Korean government collapse. If adequately prepared, they could
orchestrate Korean unification. If not, they face the prospects of insurgency
and criminal activity bleeding into the south, potentially thwarting unification
and destabilizing the region.
In the immediate aftermath of a collapse, the North could well divide into
factions, none of which would have sufficient resources to ensure the survival of
the areas they would control. Food hoarding and waste brought on by fighting
are likely to amplify the existing North Korean humanitarian disaster, with
shortages putting millions at risk of starvation and possibly triggering a destabilizing refugee flood into the ROK and China. China, in particular, has been
quite clear that it does not want any such refugee flows.
Such a high-stakes crisis is likely to drive both ROK-U.S. and Chinese
humanitarian interventions into North Korea. Though they would seek to provide
aid, both interventions would be led by military forces attempting to reestablish
security, increasing the risk of accidental combat between the two forces,
with the potential to escalate into major combat, especially if they have not
coordinated their efforts.
Even if this worst-case scenario is avoided, the North Korean military is likely
to oppose both interventions through regular combat, insurgency, and criminal
behavior. Such engagement could include artillery and missiles fired against the
ROK, infiltration of the ROK by North Korean special forces, and possibly
even the use of weapons of mass destruction.
If such outcomes develop, the ROK-U.S. intervention in the North could fail.
China could take political control of much of the North, likely in cooperation with
one or more North Korean factions. Failure to achieve Korean unification under these
circumstances could doom the Korean Peninsula to division for many more decades.
Key Recommendations
■
■
The ROK/United States should establish plans for humanitarian aid and jobs,
selective amnesty, and property rights, and they should communicate these
plans to the North Koreans.
If the North Korean government collapses,
■ The ROK and United States should lead interventions to promptly deliver
significant amounts of humanitarian aid throughout North Korea, escorted
by military forces.
■ ROK/U.S. forces should seek prompt cease-fires for any conflicts in North
Korea and secure and eliminate WMD threats as swiftly as possible.
■ Coordination with other nations, especially China, will be necessary.
rand.org/t/RR331
I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A N D D E F E N S E P O L I C Y
7
Mapping the Path of
Negotiated Settlements
Afghanistan is at a critical juncture in the conflict that began in 2001. As U.S. engagement winds down, interest in a negotiated settlement between the country’s government and insurgent factions has increased. Historically, however, the road to such
settlements is fraught with false starts and delays. To assist national security planners
in pursuing this goal if they so choose, RAND NDRI researchers culled from similar
historical cases a master narrative that can help identify whether there has been progress toward this goal, what steps remain, and what challenges lie ahead.
If the Taliban doesn’t
perceive the results of
the first post-drawdown
fighting season as
stalemate, prospects
for settlement will be
delayed until they do.
— Colin P. Clarke and
Christopher Paul
Project Leaders
8
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Approach
This work is an extension of previous analyses of 71 insurgencies begun and
concluded since World War II. Twenty-nine of those conflicts ended in a negotiated settlement, and 13 of the 29 had “mixed” outcomes—that is, neither side
definitively won or lost. Further assessment revealed a sequence that generally
characterized the path to a negotiated settlement in these 13 cases.
Seven-Step Master Settlement Narrative
Military
stalemate
1
Power-sharing offer
(or other concession,
such as amnesty or
elections)
Brokered
cease-fire (not
always respected)
2
3
Acceptance of
insurgents as legitimate
negotiating partners
4
5
Third-party
guarantor
6
7
Moderation
of insurgent
leadership
Official
intermediate
agreement
Findings
The master narrative for negotiated settlements captures the essential sequence
of factors common to historically similar cases around the world:
1. The conflict bogs down into stalemate; both sides experience war-weariness
and share the perception that they are unlikely to prevail by force alone.
2. Negotiations can begin, if and when the government acknowledges the insurgents as legitimate negotiating partners.
3. Both sides agree to a cease-fire, one way to generate goodwill during negotiations.
4. Cease-fires are just one form that intermediate agreements can take; such
agreements build trust between the parties and offer the opportunity to demonstrate an ability to compromise and deliver on agreements, in small bites.
5. Eventually, the intermediate agreements must become substantial, and the
government must be prepared to make concessions, often in the form of
power-sharing offers, such as amnesty or elections.
6. Recalcitrance among the leaders on either side can result in moderation among
the leadership, through changes in leaders or changes in their perspectives.
7. Finally, third-party guarantors help guide the process to a close. Their
intervention can include peacekeeping (or enforcement), election monitoring,
economic and development aid, and legitimation of the overall process.
Implications for Afghanistan
It is still too early to tell whether the conflict in Afghanistan will definitively
end in a negotiated settlement. Most Afghan citizens want peace, but the battle
for legitimacy between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents continues.
Should it become clearer that a negotiated settlement is the ultimate end game,
it should be remembered that the path to agreement can be just as messy as any
military operation.
rand.org/t/RR469
I N T E R N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A N D D E F E N S E P O L I C Y
9
Acquisition and Technology Policy
From Emerging Technologies
to Future Weapon Systems
Selected Contributions FY13–14
Evaluating Risk in Major Acquisition
Programs
Cynthia R. Cook
Director, Acquisition and
Technology Policy
■ RAND
helps DoD and national
security partners evaluate emerging technologies for responding
to evolving threats.
■ New
technologies work best
when they are part of an integrated
approach to developing and
employing military power.
To assist decisionmakers responsible for identifying the
risks associated with major defense acquisition programs, RAND has developed the Assessor Tool. This
new tool offers an OSD-level approach to evaluating
system integration risk. It is meant for assessors, such
as OSD personnel, who may not be especially familiar
with the specific program under evaluation but still
may need to make judgments about the risks involved.
More specifically, the tool enables users to see how
well integration risk is being managed by providing a
standards-based valuation of integration issues that can
lead to cost and schedule growth and affect program
performance. This reproducible, documented tool may
assist in program office reporting for compliance with
the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act.
Lauren A. Mayer
rand.org/t/RR262, rand.org/t/TL113
PROJECT LEADER:
■ Budget
pressures and an increasingly uncertain world heighten
the importance of objective
analysis of the effectiveness and
the whole-life costs of weapon
systems.
10
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Operational Energy and Combat
Effectiveness
At OSD’s request, an NDRI team developed a methodology that adapted detailed combat effectiveness models
to account for the operational energy needs associated
with supporting combat missions. For the Army’s Ground
Combat Vehicle (GCV), the team simulated irregular
warfare and a major contingency operation (MCO).
The higher fuel consumption of the GCV-equipped
force in both types of scenario required larger combat
service support forces (providing, for example, fuel)
than those required by a similar Bradley-equipped force.
This resulted in a larger, more vulnerable unit footprint.
Use of the combat effectiveness models also allowed
an assessment of GCV unit effectiveness. In the
MCO scenario, the GCV unit suffered greater losses
and achieved fewer kills than a Bradley-equipped unit.
PROJECT LEADERS: John Matsumura, Endy M. Daehner
Report available to appropriate audiences upon request
Program Management Reforms, Schedule,
and Performance
As part of major continuing support to OSD’s Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses office,
NDRI analyzed the effects of management options
intended to improve acquisition program adherence
to schedule and budget. For example, DoD policy
guidance from 2005 and 2007 was designed to lengthen
program manager tenure, with an eye toward stability.
The research team found that available data did not
definitively permit an assessment of whether that guidance had the desired effect; however, the team was able
to calculate that average tenure is 33 months—longer
than some had thought. Another proposal advocated
more centralized guidance for managing acquisition
category II programs (procurement costs below
$2.2 billion, among other criteria), but the NDRI
Recent Publications
A Computational Model of Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism:
A Prototype for More-General Social-Science Modeling, www.rand.org/t/TR1220
Soldier-Portable Battery Supply: Foreign Dependence and Policy Options,
www.rand.org/t/RR500
team found that those programs are already performing
reasonably well. The project also addressed whether
identifying key “framing” assumptions could be a useful
risk management tool.
Mark V. Arena, Irv Blickstein, and
William Shelton
rand.org/t/MG1171z4
PROJECT LEADERS:
Small Businesses Owned by Service-Disabled
Veterans
Current DoD contracting with service-disabled
veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs) falls below
the federal 3-percent goal for prime contract dollars.
Searching for an explanation, NDRI identified the barriers
faced by SDVOSBs. Service-disabled veterans have lower
self-employment rates than other populations, competing
goals from other programs and limited oversight of subcontracting goals can impede use, support for dealing
with barriers is limited, and many SDVOSBs are disillusioned with the program. SDVOSB use might increase if
federal contracting staff had more awareness of industries
with ample SDVOSBs, if these staff had the resources
to review SDVOSB subcontracting, if SDVOSBs received
training on federal contracting, and if administrative
requirements were streamlined and communication
between the government and suppliers were improved.
Amy G. Cox, Nancy Y. Moore
rand.org/t/RR322
PROJECT LEADERS:
Venture Capital and Strategic Investment for Developing Government Mission
Capabilities, www.rand.org/t/RR176
ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
11
Integrating the DoD
Supply Chain
Over the past two decades, DoD has significantly improved performance and realized
substantial savings in its supply chain activities. However, most of these gains have
been within functions and processes, or stovepipes. Taking the next step toward
supply chain integration—intertwining supply chain design and decisions in ways
that consider impacts on other processes and the total supply chain—can help
achieve optimal performance and efficiency. Recently, DoD has adopted several
RAND recommendations based on that principle.
Efficiencies from recent
DoD supply chain
integration efforts are
resulting in savings likely
amounting to $100 million
to $200 million per year.
— Eric Peltz and
Marc Robbins
Project Leaders
12
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Approach
OSD asked NDRI to help it determine how to tap the full potential of supply
chain integration, as had previous RAND work on more efficiently supporting
DoD’s overseas customers through better integration of inventory, transportation, and distribution center planning. Based on this and other past
R AND research and ongoing DoD initiatives, NDRI developed a framework
for an integrated supply chain, identified barriers to and enablers of integration,
recommended how to align policy with the framework, and identified
associated opportunities for increasing efficiency.
Findings and Impacts
Many gaps in supply chain integration have been rooted in DoD policy,
which called for maximizing responsiveness to customers instead of meeting
customer support needs while minimizing the total cost of doing so; at the
same time, it focused on minimizing inventory costs rather than total costs,
which do not always move in tandem.
Incorporating detailed NDRI recommendations, DoD has recently updated
its policy with the release of the 2014 DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management
Procedures manual, which modifies many of the policies that had led to shortfalls
in supply chain integration.
Well-designed enablers in the form of incentives, decision-support tools,
financial controls, information systems, and career development can lead to
more effective execution of the new policy. In concert, DoD personnel need
improved understanding of supply chain interactions and greater levels of systems
thinking in both day-to-day job performance and long-term planning. This will
help instill integration in all aspects of supply chain design and management.
Using a common supply chain integration framework can help improve understanding of the overall design, the roles of each function and process, and
dependencies among them.
Acting on further recommendations from this research, the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) has applied supply chain integration–based approaches to planning
distribution center network composition, stock positioning and reallocation,
and transportation from suppliers to distribution centers and from distribution
centers to customers. DoD has already begun to reap savings from these changes.
Additonally, long lead times, especially in the face of the shifts in demand trends
so common in DoD, exacerbate forecast error, resulting in either excess inventory
or an inability to meet customer needs. By reducing lead times and order
quantities through better supplier integration with DLA and better logistics and
acquisition organizational integration within DLA, customer needs can be met
at lower supply chain cost.
The Way Forward
Opportunities remain for improving supply chain efficiency through better
organizational, process, and functional integration. Such integration should be
guided by an increased emphasis on minimizing total supply chain costs to meet
customer needs, as new DoD policy notes. In tandem, DoD should ensure that
supply chain workforce personnel understand how they affect the rest of the
supply chain and that they have the tools necessary to make integrated supply
chain decisions.
rand.org/t/TR1274
ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
13
Unmanned Maritime
Surface Vehicles
Unmanned vehicles have become increasingly important for military operations.
Yet, in comparison to those that operate in the air, on the ground, and under the sea,
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs)—those maintaining continuous, substantial contact with the sea surface—have received relatively little attention and investment.
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations therefore asked RAND to research the
prospective suitability of USVs for Navy missions and functions.
USVs represent an
opportunity for the Navy
to perform selected
missions and functions
more effectively and
at lower risk to sailors.
— Scott Savitz
Project Leader
14
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Approach
The researchers assessed the suitability of USV concepts of employment for 62
different offensive, defensive, data-collection, and other missions and functions.
Characteristics by which they assessed USV utility for these missions included
benefits or disadvantages relative to current approaches, USV attributes relevant
to the mission, technological prerequisites for USVs to accomplish the mission,
autonomy and communication requirements, programmatic issues, and the
comparative advantages or disadvantages of alternative platforms.
Findings
The inherent properties of USVs make them suitable for a range of Navy
missions and functions. For example, USVs’ ability to interact both above and
below the waterline enables them to serve as critical nodes for cross-domain
networks: They can provide communication links and other types of support
to aerial and undersea systems. Their role in these and other missions is
bolstered by several key features, such as their ability to persist in an environment for long periods and to support substantial payloads. Given that they are
unmanned, USVs can be subjected to risks that would be untenable for manned
platforms, including dangerous missions intended to overcome adversaries’
anti-access and area-denial measures. Missions and functions for which USVs
are particularly suitable include characterizing the physical environment;
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance against adversaries;
mine warfare; military deception; information operations and electronic warfare;
defense against small boats; testing, training, search and rescue; and support
to other unmanned vehicles.
The degree of advanced autonomy and assured communication that USVs
need is correlated with the complexity of their missions and operating environments. Some research and development efforts can leverage work being done for
other unmanned platforms, but advances in two areas—autonomous seakeeping
and maritime traffic avoidance—require USV-specific investment.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Advancing USVs for use in diverse Navy roles requires investment in USV
autonomy and assured communication. Designing USVs to enable them to carry
modular payloads can help them fulfill their potential, as can designing for
reliability and enabling them to be optionally manned. Successfully using USVs
also requires challenging programmatic decisions regarding which organizations
will be involved in developing requirements, sponsoring programs, and shaping
detailed concepts of employment.
rand.org/t/RR384
ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
15
Forces and Resources Policy
People, Resources, and
Military Well-Being
Selected Contributions FY13–14
Supporting Employers of Reserve
Component Members
John D. Winkler
Director, Forces and Resources
Policy Center
■ DoD
needs enough people, but
also the right people—those with
the skills necessary to meet
increasingly specialized demands
along the mission spectrum.
■ Having
recruited them, DoD needs
to take care of its people—their
health, their economic prospects,
and the needs of their families.
■ RAND
has four decades of
experience with personnel supply
research and years more on
health and quality of life—for
service members (active and
reserve), their families, and DoD
civilian workers.
16
Since the early 2000s, members of the reserve component
have been mobilized at a much higher rate than envisioned
when the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) was passed in 1994. That
legislation was designed to prevent hiring discrimination
and bolster job protection for members of the armed
forces, including reservists. DoD is concerned about
whether demands on civilian employers have become
too high and asked RAND to consider whether changes
are needed to USERRA, activation and deployment
policies, and the Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve program. NDRI researchers analyzed employer
awareness of USERRA, as well as its burdens and costs,
and concluded that changes to the act were not needed.
Instead, DoD can most effectively support employers
by modifying existing programs and procedures.
Susan M. Gates
rand.org/t/RR152
PROJECT LEADER:
Education Credentials as Predictors
of Attrition
The U.S. military services have traditionally used a tiering
system, based on education credentials such as high school
diplomas in combination with Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, to help gauge the likelihood
of a recruit’s persevering through his or her first term of
service. But what about less traditional credentials, such
as diplomas earned through homeschooling and distance
learning? OSD asked RAND to examine whether its
current education-credential tiering policy is still useful
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
in predicting first-term attrition. The RAND team
compared attrition rates for those having distance-learning
or homeschool credentials with those holding high school
diplomas, after controlling for other observable population
differences. Overall, the analyses support current tiering
policy, which classifies homeschool diplomas as Tier 1
(preferred) if a recruit’s AFQT score is 50 or higher
(i.e., they are treated the same as high school diploma
holders), or Tier 2 if a recruit’s AFQT score is lower than
50. The results also support classifying distance-learning
credentials as Tier 2 regardless of AFQT score.
Susan Burkhauser, Lawrence Hanser,
Chaitra Hardison
rand.org/t/RR374
PROJECT LEADERS:
The Future of the Joint IED Defeat
Organization
Does the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
have a future in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan
wars? Are its training activities duplicative of activities
in the military services? These questions motivated a
congressionally mandated assessment of JIEDDO
training that was conducted by NDRI. The assessment
concluded that while some programs and functions
appear similar to others in DoD, there is little evidence
of duplication among training programs or courses.
In fact, the programs and functions appear to add value
and provide a needed organizational structure. NDRI’s
analysis, reported to the department’s senior leadership,
was instrumental in DoD’s decision to retain JIEDDO.
PROJECT LEADER: Brad Martin
rand.org/t/RR421
Selected Recent Publications
The Health of Private Contractors in
Conflict Environments
Contractors working in conflict environments are
exposed to many of the same combat stressors as
military personnel—stressors known to have physical
and mental health implications. Yet, there has been little
research into the causes and consequences of combat
stress among contractors. RAND researchers surveyed
660 contractors and found that 25 percent met criteria
for probable posttraumatic stress disorder, 18 percent
screened positive for depression, and 50 percent reported
alcohol misuse. Contractors also suffer from physical
health problems. The survey results indicated that
there is a significant need for care that is not being met.
The report concludes with recommendations for reducing
contractor stress and increasing post-deployment care,
along with suggestions for additional research that
can build on this work.
PROJECT LEADER: Molly Dunigan
rand.org/t/RR420
Elements of Success: How Type of Secondary Education Credential Helps Predict
Enlistee Attrition, www.rand.org/t/RR374
Recruiting Older Youths: Insights from a New Survey of Army Recruits,
www.rand.org/t/RR247
Understanding the Cost and Quality of Military-Related Education Benefit
Programs, www.rand.org/t/RR297
Effects of Military Service on Earnings and Education Revisited: Variation by Service
Duration, Occupation, and Civilian Unemployment, www.rand.org/t/RR342
Development and Pilot Test of the RAND Suicide Prevention Program Evaluation
Toolkit, www.rand.org/t/RR283
First Steps Toward Improving DoD STEM Workforce Diversity: Response to the
2012 Department of Defense STEM Diversity Summit, www.rand.org/t/RR329
Analyses of the Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce: Update to Methods
and Results Through FY 2011, www.rand.org/t/RR110
FORCES AND RESOURCES POLICY
17
Reforming the Military
Retirement System
In 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense convened a working group of senior
representatives from across DoD to conduct a comprehensive review of military
compensation, focusing on retirement. An NDRI team assisted the working group
using RAND’s unique Dynamic Retention Model (DRM).
DRM analyses enable the U.S. military
to understand the retention and cost
effects of military retirement reforms in
a steady state and the transition to it.
— Beth J. Asch, James Hosek, and
Michael G. Mattock
Project Leaders
18
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The Model
The DRM, initially developed in the 1980s, is a state-of-the art modeling
capability that can be used to analyze the effect of changes in military compensation and personnel policies. Over the past decade, the model’s capabilities have
deepened considerably. Most recently, RAND developed a capability to analyze
costs and retention effects during the transition to a steady state after a new
policy is implemented. In the realm of military compensation, where it can take
30 years for policy changes to be fully phased in across the entire workforce,
information about the transition effects can help managers identify the optimal
strategy to achieve personnel management goals.
Application
The military retirement system is a defined-benefit plan that has been in place
for nearly 70 years. Despite this longevity, the current system has a number
of deficiencies. The system is inequitable because most servicemembers do not
vest in the retirement benefit. It is inefficient because too much compensation
is deferred in the form of retirement payments, which makes compensation
costs higher than necessary. And the system is inflexible because it induces
similar career lengths in all occupations.
Many alternatives to the current defined-benefit plan have been proposed
over the years, and there are many variations in how retirement plans can be
constructed. RAND’s analysis showed that a hybrid retirement system—one
that combines elements of a defined-benefit plan and a defined-contribution
plan—is feasible. It is thus possible to address criticisms of the current system
while maintaining key advantages. Depending on how retirement pay is computed,
how retirement eligibility criteria are defined, and when payouts are made, it is
possible to create a hybrid plan that lowers retirement costs, improves equity,
and maintains the size and experience mix of the force while offering personnel
managers a flexible tool for the future.
In addition to validating the potential effectiveness of a hybrid retirement
system, RAND used the newly developed DRM capabilities to analyze the
transition effects following implementation. In DoD, compensation changes
of this magnitude are generally phased in, with existing service members
“grandfathered” under the policies they signed up for and new policies applied
only to service members who join after a certain date. But there are other
strategies that can be adopted. RAND’s analysis showed that the department
could achieve cost savings far more rapidly if existing members were given a
choice of either being grandfathered under existing policies or switching to
a new retirement system.
rand.org/t/RR113
FORCES AND RESOURCES POLICY
19
Reducing Mental Health
Stigma in the Military
Despite the efforts of both DoD and the Veterans Health Administration to enhance
mental health services, many service members are not regularly seeking needed
care. The stigma associated with mental illness may be partly to blame. Without
appropriate treatment, these mental health problems can have wide-ranging and
negative impacts on the quality of life and the social, emotional, and cognitive
functioning of affected service members.
We have taken a first step
in better understanding
how stigma affects
decisions to seek treatment for mental health
disorders, but much is
still unknown.
— Joie D. Acosta
Project Leader
20
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Approach
DoD has established many stigma-reduction programs, but there has been no
comprehensive evaluation of their effectiveness. OSD asked RAND to inventory
and assess DoD’s stigma-reduction strategies to identify programmatic strengths
and gaps that need to be addressed. RAND used five complementary methods
to conduct this assessment: a literature review, a microsimulation modeling
of costs, interviews with program staff, prospective policy analysis, and an expert
panel. The researchers developed a conceptual model of stigma reduction that
identifies the various contexts from which stigma can emerge—individual,
social, institutional, and public—all of which must be addressed.
Findings
Despite popular opinion and a strong theoretical base that stigma deters
individuals from seeking treatment, RAND researchers were unable to identify
empirical literature to support this link. However, stigma may indirectly affect
treatment-seeking, affecting coping styles, attitudes, and intentions toward
seeking help.
A concerted effort is being made within DoD to reduce the stigma around
mental health disorders, with the goal of encouraging service members to seek
treatment. In recent years, there has been a cultural shift in
Conceptual model of stigma reduction in the military
which mental health and the benefits of treatment are discussed
more openly, and a vast array of programs have been established
Military norms and culture
that provide high-level education about mental health and the
Public context
availability of treatment.
RAND specifically identified five programs that include
Military policies, programs,
and treatment system
targeted activities designed to reduce stigma in the broader milInstitutional context
itary and public contexts for those with mental health disorders.
This complement of activities generally aligns with promising
Family, friends, and unit
Social context
intervention strategies described in the scientific literature and
may have contributed to the decline in perceptions of stigma.
Service
Although these programs represent an important step
member
Individual
forward for DoD, few stigma-reduction programs are being
context
evaluated for their effectiveness—in terms of both reach and
impact. Strengthening program evaluation will provide helpful
Perceived stigma
information about which programs should be scaled up or
implemented in other locations.
There is no “magic bullet” for addressing mental health stigma, but lessons
from effective civilian programs could help improve DoD programs targeting
military norms, culture, and social context.
Recommendations
RAND developed a set of priority actions for improving DoD’s approach to
stigma reduction. Twelve priorities fall into three broad categories: improving
stigma-reduction intervention programs, improving policies that contribute
to stigma reduction, and improving research and evaluation related to stigma
reduction. In addition, RAND recommends that DoD convene a task force to
explore the tensions between a commander’s need to assess unit fitness and the
member’s need for privacy with respect to mental health status and treatment.
rand.org/t/RR426
FORCES AND RESOURCES POLICY
21
Intelligence Policy
Agility in Intelligence
Selected Contributions FY13–14
Restoring and Deepening Trust at NSA
John V. Parachini
Director, Intelligence
Policy Center
■ The
realms of challenges and
threats that the United States
faces—East Asia, Eastern Europe,
cyberspace—are, in many ways,
unprecedented in their diversity.
■ Senior
U.S. policymakers rely on
the Intelligence Community to
collect and analyze valuable information providing insight, warning,
and context for decisionmaking.
■ RAND
has become a place for
the Intelligence Community to
turn for rigorous methodological
approaches to vexing problems
and innovative options to
address them.
22
The White House, Congress, foreign government leaders,
and the public have all expressed displeasure with the
National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) alleged data collection activities. An NDRI exploratory project aimed to
develop options for how NSA could rebuild trust with
key stakeholders. The project team examined past cases
where organizations lost that trust and identified actions
leaders took to restore it. Researchers investigated several
organizations that faced a collapse in public trust,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission
after the 2009 financial meltdown and BP following the
2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Comparing and
contrasting the cases, the project team derived lessons
about what worked well and what common pitfalls
should be avoided in efforts to regain public trust. The
findings of this preliminary research effort were shared
with officials at NSA.
Douglas Yeung and Paul Miller
Report forthcoming
PROJECT LEADERS:
Manpower for Biometrics-Enabled
Intelligence
The use of biometrics for intelligence has increased over
the past decade. Biometrics data populate watch lists,
enhance the protection of deployed forces, and facilitate
the identification and pursuit of terrorists and insurgents. It is unclear, though, whether there are enough
expert analytic personnel to meet the growing needs for
biometrics-enabled intelligence (BEI). In contrast to
well-established manpower fields, BEI does not have an
established framework for analyzing future manpower
allocation, which will be important as forces and resources
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shift with the drawdown in Afghanistan and budget
cutbacks. NDRI undertook a comprehensive study to
help determine how best to meet core BEI capabilities
over the long term. As part of the study, it systematically
assessed the allocation and employment of BEI
billets to identify the current BEI manpower baseline.
NDRI has also identified the policies and practices
necessary to establish an enduring BEI capability for the
combatant commands, services, and defense agencies.
PROJECT LEADER: Eric Landree
Report available to appropriate audiences subject
to sponsor approval
Intelligence Support to Policymakers
Most studies of relations between senior policymakers
and intelligence professionals, including previous work
by RAND, have focused on the President and cabinet
secretaries. This recent research examined intelligence
interaction with the critical senior working level of
policy (assistant secretaries and their deputies, senior
directors, and equivalents). According to findings from
dozens of interviews and four workshops, the needs
Selected Publications
Ensuring Language Capability in the Intelligence Community: What Factors Affect
the Best Mix of Military, Civilians, and Contractors, www.rand.org/t/TR1284
Workforce Planning in the Intelligence Community: A Retrospective,
www.rand.org/t/RR114
at that level vary enormously, depending on the
individual’s experience, contacts, and preferences.
Thus, support to a policy officer needs to be considered as part of a broader relationship, not merely the
delivery of products. To build fruitful relationships,
intelligence agencies should assess their own comparative strengths and weaknesses, then identify priority
clients and determine their information needs and
preferences, taking into account their experience with
intelligence. (Experience with intelligence, or, better,
in it, made policy clients much better at getting the
support they wanted.) Agencies will need to allocate
resources accordingly and establish tracking, oversight,
and feedback mechanisms.
PROJECT LEADERS:
Barbara H. Sude and Gregory F. Treverton
Strategic Planning in the Intelligence
Community
When done right, strategic planning makes agencies
perform better, adapt more quickly, and move more
nimbly to fulfill their missions. NDRI developed and
applied an analytical framework across several case studies
of strategic planning in the Intelligence Community.
The framework consists of a five-phase process:
(1) Define the planning exercise’s scope and procedures,
(2) produce a vision statement to lay out the organization’s core goals and to focus planning, (3) ruthlessly
assess the environment and bluntly consider how suited
the organization is to operate in it, (4) develop a plan to
ensure that the organization achieves its full potential,
and (5) rigorously implement the plan and make course
corrections as needed. Successful planning requires the
full, sustained participation of top leaders; a small,
centrally located planning office with real clout; a serious
appreciation of organizational culture; processes that
encourage prioritization; rigorous metrics to monitor
implementation; and ongoing communication that
conveys the plan to the full workforce candidly, credibly,
and crisply.
PROJECT LEADER:
Christopher S. Chivvis
National Intelligence University’s Role in Interagency Research: Recommendations
from the Intelligence Community, www.rand.org/t/RR243
Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East, www.rand.org/t/RR258
INTELLIGENCE POLICY
23
Assessing DoD’s Approach to
Unauthorized Disclosures
Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information—particularly leaks to the
media that put sensitive operations and intelligence sources and methods at risk—
have highlighted the inadequacy of extant law and policy to address the causes of
and remedies to such disclosures. This led the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence to initiate a series of comprehensive measures; it asked
RAND to review the measures and make recommendations as needed.
The single most important
action that DoD could
take to reduce leaks of
classified information is
to establish accountability
for offenders.
— James B. Bruce
Project Leader
24
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
Approach
RAND assigned two senior researchers with expertise on unauthorized
disclosures. They participated in each weekly meeting of DoD’s Unauthorized
Disclosures Program Implementation Team for four months. They also undertook
separate consultations or informational conversations with a number of relevant
individuals and subject-matter experts involved with unauthorized disclosures
and reviewed relevant documents and related background.
Findings
1. Identify leak
Identify leak
as a security
breach; open
a case
RAND RR409-2.1
The research found that the Unauthorized Disclosures Program Implementation Team has made discernible progress toward its goals, particularly in
clarifying processes, procedures, and sanctions; setting clearer boundaries for
impermissible behavior; building the needed infrastructure for addressing
the issue; improving awareness, education, and training; and integrating key
support functions, such as counterintelligence, law enforcement, information
assurance, legal staff, and external partners.
At the same time, many of these early successes are partial, fragile, and
temporary. DoD faces strategic obstacles in stemming disclosures, which have
many causes but few feasible and effective solutions. DoD also has a longstanding organizational culture that treats media leaks of classified information
as nearly risk-free, which suggests to some that the behavior is acceptable. To
be fully effective, efforts to address
An End-to-End Accountability Process
unauthorized disclosures must have
an end-to-end accountability process,
2. Establish case
3. Establish leak
4. Apply
from initial identification through
ownership
accountability
sanctions
the imposition of effective penalties
for violations.
Assign
Identify
Implement
The current plan focuses mostly
responsibility
leaker and
effective
to see the
on identifying and reporting leaks, but
adjudicate
penalties for
case through
these activities must be complemented
the case
leak behavior
to closure
by other, equally significant tasks
(see the figure), such as assigning
responsibility for acting on the reported disclosure and seeing the action through
all the needed steps to bring it to closure. The language and guidance addressing
unauthorized disclosures in DoD directives and manuals is often unclear,
inconsistent, or ambiguous, requiring clarification. Finally, the lack of metrics
to track results, the sensitivity of counterintelligence investigations, the insufficient
authority of Program Implementation Team members within their own components, and insufficient outreach to non-DoD elements all require attention to
improve implementation effectiveness.
Recommendations
RAND’s recommendations would help DoD sustain and build on its recent
successes. Specific recommendations include establishing end-to-end accountability,
empowering Program Implementation Team members within their components,
prioritizing the most serious disclosures for concerted action, establishing
metrics to track results, clarifying policies and ensuring language clarity and
consistency in all relevant documents, and laying the foundation for new
legislation to improve future measures to identify and punish those who leak
classified information.
rand.org/t/RR409
INTELLIGENCE POLICY
25
Making the NRO More
Flexible and Agile
During the Cold War, the U.S. Intelligence Community primarily faced a single,
well-identified threat. In the future, the greatest challenges the community will
face are likely to come from places. At the request of the National Reconnaissance
Office’s (NRO’s) Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate, NDRI conducted
research in two areas to help address this challenge and help mitigate the element
of surprise.
The biggest surprises
tend to come from third
parties and often not
from a direct competitor.
— Dave Baiocchi
Project Leader
26
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
Approach
NDRI researchers began by identifying the two ingredients needed for agile
systems: flexible engineering and an adaptable workforce. To address the
engineering component, they examined the benefits of modularity and developed
a list of factors to help determine whether the NRO’s space hardware was a
good candidate for a modular architecture. To assess how to improve flexibility
within the workforce, researchers spoke with ambassadors, chief executive officers,
military personnel, and health care professionals to determine how these professions respond to surprise. As a result of these interviews, they identified a set of
practices that could be used by anyone who works in an uncertain environment.
(The findings from these interviews were rich enough that NDRI created a
separate report devoted entirely to surprise.)
Findings
Modularity. The findings suggest that NRO payloads do not appear to be
strong candidates for modularization. The NRO faces uncertain future user
needs and a customer base that desires a highly flexible product, indicating
that it would benefit from a modular architecture. However, its systems rely
on cutting-edge technologies—and rapid changes in technology can quickly
outgrow the static interfaces in a modular architecture, rendering an entire
system useless. Moving forward, the NRO must be able to quantify the value
of its intelligence-gathering systems to find the optimal “knee in the curve”
for implementing modularity.
Surprise. All the professionals interviewed used common coping strategies,
such as relying on past experience and trying to reduce the level of chaos in their
environment. Two factors drove the differences between professions: how much
time professionals typically had to respond after an unexpected event (minutes
or seconds versus days or weeks) and the level of complexity in the work environment. The study found that organizations analogous to the NRO typically develop
generalized response frameworks rather than specific “what-if” plans. Furthermore, other humans—not something in the environment—cause the most
complex and chaotic situations, and because people usually have a good understanding of their most direct adversaries, the biggest source of surprise is
typically a third party.
Conclusions
NDRI drew three conclusions across the two research topics. First, modularity
and innovative methods are tools, not goals—meaning strategists should first
set priorities and mission objectives and only then settle on the mechanisms to
meet them. Second, success in both modularity and mitigating surprise will
benefit from investments in developing strategic plans or visions, along with
exercises designed to probe the future. Finally, becoming a more agile organization requires both adaptable engineering systems and a flexible staff that knows
how to creatively use those systems.
rand.org/t/RR336; rand.org/t/RR341
INTELLIGENCE POLICY
27
NSRD Research Sponsors (2013–2014*)
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT/COMBINED ORGANIZATIONS
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic and
Tactical Systems
Defense Acquisition University
Director, Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Transportation Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans
and Programs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding
Director, Research
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and
Industrial Base Policy
Director, Human Capital Initiatives
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
National Defense University Center for Complex Operations
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Readiness
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness
Director, Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and
Traumatic Brain Injury
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Department of Defense Education Activity
Federal Voting Assistance Program
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Director, Net Assessment
Joint Staff
Vice Director, Logistics (J-4)
Vice Director, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8)
International Security Assistance Force
NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan
Special Operations Joint Task Force–Afghanistan
Joint IED Defeat Organization
U.S. Pacific Command
Deputy Director, Intelligence (J-2)
U.S. Special Operations Command
Director, Inter-Agency Task Force
Chief, Global Special Operations Force Operational Planning Team
U.S. Strategic Command
Alternative Futures Division
28
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
Office of Naval Research
Program Executive Officer for C4I
Program Executive Officer for Ships
U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Readiness and
Logistics (N4)
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources (N8)
Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Postgraduate School
Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations
Director, Center on Contemporary Conflict Affairs
Regional Security Education Program
Naval Special Warfare Command
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group 3
U.S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Intelligence Department
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Center for Marine Expeditionary Intelligence Knowledge
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
OTHER DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS
INTERNATIONAL SPONSORS
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Science Office
Information Innovation Office
Strategic Technologies Office
Defense Logistics Agency
Director, DLA Distribution
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Programs Deputy for Building Partnership Capacity
National Defense University
Center for Complex Operations
U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency
National Air and Space Intelligence Center
Commonwealth of Australia
Department of Defence
Republic of Korea
Army
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Export-Import Bank of Korea
Korea Institute of Defense Analyses
Ministry of Unification
National Research Council for Economics, Humanities,
and Social Sciences
Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Republic of Singapore
Ministry of Defence
Thailand
Ministry of Science Technology of Thailand
United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence
OTHER INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
National Intelligence Council
Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Directorate for Science and Technology
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Director, InnoVision
National Reconnaissance Organization
*Through June 2014
OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Department of State
OTHER U.S. SPONSORS
Analytic Services, Inc.
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation
Carnegie Corporation of New York
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Dole Foundation
The Ford Foundation
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
MITRE
Ploughshares Fund
SAIC
Smith Richardson Foundation
Stanford University
University of Southern California
Wounded Warrior Project
29
Publications (2013–2014*)
Analyses of the Department of Defense Acquisition
Workforce: Update to Methods and Results Through
FY 2011, Susan M. Gates, Elizabeth Roth,
Sinduja Srinivasan, and Lindsay Daugherty,
RR-110-OSD, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR110.
Analysis to Inform Defense Planning Despite
Austerity, Paul K. Davis, RR-482-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR482.
Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and U.S. Security,
Lynn E. Davis, Michael J. McNerney,
James S. Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting,
and Daniel Byman, RR-449-RC, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR449.
Artists and the Arab Uprisings, Lowell H. Schwartz,
Dalia Dassa Kaye, and Jeffrey Martini, RR-271SRF, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR271.
Assessing Aegis Program Transition to an OpenArchitecture Model, Paul DeLuca, Joel B. Predd,
Michael Nixon, Irv Blickstein, Robert W. Button,
James G. Kallimani, and Shane Tierney,
RR-161-NAVY, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR161.
Assessing Stop-Loss Policy Options Through Personnel
Flow Modeling, Stephen D. Brady, DB-573-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/DB573.
Assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Training Activity,
Brad Martin, Thomas Manacapilli, James C.
Crowley, Joseph Adams, Michael G. Shanley,
Paul S. Steinberg, and David Stebbins, RR-421OSD, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR421.
Authorities and Options for Funding USSOCOM
Operations, Elvira N. Loredo, John E. Peters,
Karlyn D. Stanley, Matthew E. Boyer, William
Welser IV, and Thomas S. Szayna, RR-360SOCOM, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR360.
Authority to Issue Interoperability Policy, Carolyn
Wong and Daniel Gonzales, RR-357-NAVY, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR357.
Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities,
Martin C. Libicki, RR-175-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR175.
Building Democracy on the Ashes of
Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Workshop
Summary, Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini,
CF-312-RC, 2013, www.rand.org/t/CF312.
Democratization in the Arab World: A Summary of
Lessons from Around the Globe (Arabic translation),
Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini, MG-1192/1RC, 2013, www.rand.org/t/MG1192z1.
China’s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored
Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations,
and Implications, Charles Wolf, Jr., Xiao
Wang, and Eric Warner, RR-118, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR118.
The Deployment Life Study: Methodological
Overview and Baseline Sample Description, Terri
Tanielian, Benjamin R. Karney, Anita Chandra,
and Sarah O. Meadows, RR-209-A/OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR209.
Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions,
and Implications for U.S. Policy, Larry Hanauer,
and Lyle J. Morris, RR-521-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR521.
Developing and Assessing Options for the Global
SOF Network, Thomas S. Szayna and William
Welser IV, RR-340-SOCOM, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR340.
A Computational Model of Public Support for
Insurgency and Terrorism: A Prototype for
More-General Social-Science Modeling, Paul K.
Davis, and Angela O’Mahony, TR-1220-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/TR1220.
Developing Navy Capability to Recover Forces
in Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazard
Environments, Adam C. Resnick, and
Steven A. Knapp, RR-155-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR155.
Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding U.S.
Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context,
Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B.
Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, and Sarah H. Bana,
RR-513-SRF, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR513.
The Development and Application of the RAND
Program Classification Tool: The RAND Toolkit,
Volume 1, Joie D. Acosta, Gabriella C. Gonzalez,
Emily M. Gillen, Jeffrey Garnett, Carrie M.
Farmer, and Robin M. Weinick, RR-487/1-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR487z1.
Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early
2013 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II,
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill,
and Molly Dunigan, RR-396-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR396.
Data Flood: Helping the Navy Address the Rising
Tide of Sensor Information, Isaac R. Porche III,
Bradley Wilson, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, Shane
Tierney, and Evan Saltzman, RR-315-NAVY,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR315.
The Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center Care
Coordination Program: Assessment of Program
Structure, Activities, and Implementation, Laurie T.
Martin, Coreen Farris, Andrew M. Parker,
and Caroline Epley, RR-126-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR126.
Democratization in the Arab World: A Summary
of Lessons from Around the Globe, Laurel E.
Miller and Jeffrey Martini, MG-1192/2-RC,
2013, www.rand.org/t/MG1192z2.
Development and Pilot Test of the RAND Suicide
Prevention Program Evaluation Toolkit, Joie D.
Acosta, Rajeev Ramchand, Amariah Becker,
and Alexandria Felton, RR-283-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR283.
DoD Depot-Level Reparable Supply Chain
Management: Process Effectiveness and Opportunities
for Improvement, Eric Peltz, Marygail K. Brauner,
Edward G. Keating, Evan Saltzman, Daniel
Tremblay, and Patricia Boren, RR-398-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR398.
Effects of Military Service on Earnings and Education
Revisited: Variation by Service Duration,
Occupation, and Civilian Unemployment, Paco
Martorell, Trey Miller, Lindsay Daugherty,
and Mark Borgschulte, RR-342-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR342.
* Through June 2014
30
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
Elements of Success: How Type of Secondary
Education Credential Helps Predict Enlistee
Attrition, Susan Burkhauser, Lawrence M. Hanser,
and Chaitra M. Hardison, RR-374-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR374.
Fixing Leaks: Assessing the Department of
Defense’s Approach to Preventing and Deterring
Unauthorized Disclosures, James B. Bruce
and W. George Jameson, RR-409-OSD, 2012,
www.rand.org/t/RR409.
Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition,
Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of
United States Forces-Iraq, Richard R. Brennan, Jr.,
Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable,
Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney,
Stephanie Young, Jason H. Campbell, and
K. Scott McMahon, RR-232-USFI, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR232.
From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for
Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies That Have
Been Resolved Through Negotiations, Colin P.
Clarke and Christopher Paul, RR-469-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR469.
Ensuring Language Capability in the Intelligence
Community: What Factors Affect the Best Mix of
Military, Civilians, and Contractors? Beth J. Asch
and John D. Winkler, TR-1284-ODNI, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/TR1284.
Evaluating the Impact of the Department of Defense
Regional Centers for Security Studies, Larry
Hanauer, Stuart E. Johnson, Christopher Springer,
Chaoling Feng, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie
Pezard, and Shira Efron, RR-388-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR388.
An Evaluation of the Implementation and Perceived
Utility of the Airman Resilience Training Program,
Gabriella C. Gonzalez, Reema Singh, Terry L.
Schell, and Robin M. Weinick, RR-655-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR655.
An Excel Tool to Assess Acquisition Program
Risk, Lauren A. Mayer, Mark V. Arena, and
Michael E. McMahon, TL-113-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/TL113.
First Steps Toward Improving DoD STEM
Workforce Diversity: Response to the 2012
Department of Defense STEM Diversity Summit,
Nelson Lim, Abigail Haddad, Dwayne M.
Butler, and Kate Giglio, RR-329-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR329.
Fiscal Performance and U.S. International
Influence, C. Richard Neu, Zhimin Mao,
and Ian P. Cook, RR-353-RC, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR353.
Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the
Cybersecurity Labor Market, Martin C. Libicki,
David Senty, and Julia Pollak, RR-430, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR430.
Health and Economic Outcomes Among the
Alumni of the Wounded Warrior Project: 2013,
Jennifer L. Cerully, Mustafa Oguz, Heather
Krull, and Kate Giglio, RR-522-WWP, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR522.
Health and Economic Outcomes in the Alumni
of the Wounded Warrior Project: 2010–2012,
Heather Krull and Mustafa Oguz, RR-290-WWP,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR290.
Hidden Heroes: America’s Military Caregivers,
Rajeev Ramchand, Terri Tanielian, Michael P.
Fisher, Christine Anne Vaughan, Thomas E.
Trail, Caroline Epley, Phoenix Voorhies,
Michael William Robbins, Eric Robinson, and
Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar, RR-499-TEDF, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR499.
Hidden Heroes: America’s Military Caregivers—
Executive Summary, Rajeev Ramchand, Terri
Tanielian, Michael P. Fisher, Christine Anne
Vaughan, Thomas E. Trail, Caroline Epley,
Phoenix Voorhies, Michael William Robbins, Eric
Robinson, and Bonnie Ghosh-Dastidar, RR-499/1TEDF, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR499z1.
How Do We Know What Information Sharing Is
Really Worth? Exploring Methodologies to Measure
the Value of Information Sharing and Fusion
Efforts, Brian A. Jackson, RR-380-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR380.
Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist
Threats and the Continuing Challenges of
Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information
Sharing, Brian Michael Jenkins, Andrew M
Liepman, and Henry H. Willis, CF-317, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/CF317.
Implementation of the DoD Diversity and Inclusion
Strategic Plan: A Framework for Change Through
Accountability, Nelson Lim, Abigail Haddad,
and Lindsay Daugherty, RR-333-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR333.
Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of
Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, Amy G.
Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, RR-322-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR322.
Improving Interagency Information Sharing
Using Technology Demonstrations: The Legal Basis
for Using New Sensor Technologies for Counterdrug
Operations Along the U.S. Border, Daniel
Gonzales, Sarah Harting, Jason Mastbaum,
and Carolyn Wong, RR-551-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR551.
Increasing Flexibility and Agility at the National
Reconnaissance Office: Lessons from Modular Design,
Occupational Surprise, and Commercial Research
and Development Processes, Dave Baiocchi,
Krista S. Langeland, D. Steven Fox, Amelia
Buerkle, and Jennifer Walters, RR-336-NRO,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR336.
Internet Freedom and Political Space, Olesya
Tkacheva, Lowell H. Schwartz, Martin C.
Libicki, Julie E. Taylor, Jeffrey Martini,
and Caroline Baxter, RR-295-DOS, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR295.
Iran After the Bomb: How Would a Nuclear-Armed
Tehran Behave? Alireza Nader, RR-310, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR310.
Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications
for the U.S. Drawdown, Alireza Nader,
Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani,
Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, RR-616,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR616.
31
Publications (2013–2014*) continued
Leadership Stability in Army Reserve Component
Units, Thomas F. Lippiatt and J. Michael Polich,
MG-1251-OSD, 2013, www.rand.org/t/MG1251.
Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief
Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region, Jennifer D. P.
Moroney, Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller,
Jeffrey Engstrom, and Abby Doll, RR-146-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR146.
Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the
Future, Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini,
RR-577-SRF, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR577.
Management Perspectives Pertaining to Root Cause
Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, Volume 4:
Program Manager Tenure, Oversight of Acquisition
Category II Programs, and Framing Assumptions,
Mark V. Arena, Irv Blickstein, Abby Doll, Jeffrey
A. Drezner, James G. Kallimani, Jennifer
Kavanagh, Daniel F. McCaffrey, Megan
McKernan, Charles Nemfakos, Rena Rudavsky,
Jerry M. Sollinger, Daniel Tremblay, and
Carolyn Wong, MG-1171/4-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/MG1171z4.
Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data:
Hackers’ Bazaar, Lillian Ablon, Martin C.
Libicki, and Andrea A. Golay, RR-610-JNI, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR610.
Mental Health Stigma in the Military, Joie D.
Acosta, Amariah Becker, Jennifer L. Cerully,
Michael P. Fisher, Laurie T. Martin, Raffaele
Vardavas, Mary Ellen Slaughter, and
Terry L. Schell, RR-426-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR426.
Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical
Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent
Drug-Trafficking Organizations, Christopher Paul,
Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena, RR-548/1,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR548z1.
Modeling, Simulation, and Operations Analysis in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Operational Vignettes, Lessons
Learned, and a Survey of Selected Efforts, Ben
Connable, Walter L. Perry, Abby Doll, Natasha
Lander, and Dan Madden, RR-382-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR382.
National Intelligence University’s Role in Interagency
Research: Recommendations from the Intelligence
Community, Judith A. Johnston, Natasha
Lander, and Brian McInnis, RR-243-NIU, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR243.
New Approaches to Defense Inflation and
Discounting, Kathryn Connor and James Dryden,
RR-237-OSD, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR237.
A New Tool for Assessing Workforce Management
Policies Over Time: Extending the Dynamic
Retention Model, Beth J. Asch, Michael G.
Mattock, and James Hosek, RR-113-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR113.
North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the
U.S. Policy Response, Christopher S. Chivvis
and Andrew M Liepman, RR-415-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR415.
Out of the Shadows: The Health and Well-Being of
Private Contractors Working in Conflict
Environments, Molly Dunigan, Carrie M.
Farmer, Rachel M. Burns, Alison Hawks, and
Claude Messan Setodji, RR-420-RC, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR420.
Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An
Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits,
Michael J. Lostumbo, Michael J. McNerney, Eric
Peltz, Derek Eaton, David R. Frelinger, Victoria A.
Greenfield, John Halliday, Patrick Mills, Bruce R.
Nardulli, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jerry M. Sollinger,
and Stephen M. Worman, RR-201-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR201.
Mexico Is Not Colombia: Alternative Historical
Analogies for Responding to the Challenge of Violent
Drug-Trafficking Organizations, Supporting
Case Studies, Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke,
and Chad C. Serena, RR-548/2, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR548z2.
Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies,
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill,
and Molly Dunigan, RR-291/2-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR291z2.
Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies,
Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill,
and Molly Dunigan, RR-291/1-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR291z1.
Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread
of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses,
Richard H. Speier, K. Scott McMahon,
and George Nacouzi, RR-378-DTRA, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR378.
A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ ida and
Other Salafi Jihadists, Seth G. Jones, RR-637-OSD,
2014, www.rand.org/t/RR637.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the
Earnings of Military Reservists, David S.
Loughran and Paul Heaton, TR-1006-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/TR1006.
Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean
Collapse, Bruce W. Bennett, RR-331-SRF, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR331.
A Program Manager’s Guide for Program
Improvement in Ongoing Psychological Health
and Traumatic Brain Injury Programs:
The RAND Toolkit, Volume 4, Gery W. Ryan,
Carrie M. Farmer, David M. Adamson, and
Robin M. Weinick, RR-487/4-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR487z4.
Prolonged Cycle Times and Schedule Growth
in Defense Acquisition: A Literature Review,
Jessie Riposo, Megan McKernan, and Chelsea
Kaihoi Duran, RR-455-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR455.
Providing for the Casualties of War:
The American Experience Through World War II,
Bernard D. Rostker, MG-1164-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/MG1164.
* Through June 2014
32
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
The RAND Online Measure Repository for
Evaluating Psychological Health and Traumatic
Brain Injury Programs: The RAND Toolkit, Volume
2, Joie D. Acosta, Kerry A. Reynolds, Emily M.
Gillen, Kevin Carter Feeney, Carrie M. Farmer,
and Robin M. Weinick, RR-487/2-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR487z2.
The RAND Security Cooperation Prioritization
and Propensity Matching Tool, Christopher Paul,
Michael Nixon, Heather Peterson, Beth Grill,
and Jessica Yeats, TL-112-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/TL112.
RAND Suicide Prevention Program Evaluation
Toolkit, Joie D. Acosta, Rajeev Ramchand,
Amariah Becker, Alexandria Felton,
and Aaron Kofner, TL-111-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/TL111.
Recruiting Older Youths: Insights from a New Survey
of Army Recruits, Bernard D. Rostker, Jacob Alex
Klerman, and Megan Zander-Cotugno, RR-247OSD, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR247.
Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms
Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner
Capacity, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E.
Thaler, and Joe Hogler, RR-413-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR413.
A Risk Assessment Methodology and Excel Tool for
Acquisition Programs, Lauren A. Mayer, Mark V.
Arena, and Michael E. McMahon, RR-262-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR262.
The Role and Importance of the ‘D’ in PTSD,
Michael P. Fisher and Terry L. Schell, OP-389OSD, 2013, www.rand.org/t/OP389.
Satellite Anomalies: Benefits of a Centralized
Anomaly Database and Methods for Securely Sharing
Information Among Satellite Operators, David A.
Galvan, Brett Hemenway, William Welser IV,
and Dave Baiocchi, RR-560-DARPA, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR560.
Sea Power and American Interests in the Western
Pacific, David C. Gompert, RR-151-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR151.
Soldier-Portable Battery Supply: Foreign Dependence
and Policy Options, Richard Silberglitt, James T.
Bartis, and Kyle Brady, RR-500-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR500.
Understanding the Cost and Quality of MilitaryRelated Education Benefit Programs, Paco
Martorell and Peter Bergman, RR-297-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR297.
Support for the 21st-Century Reserve Force:
Insights to Facilitate Successful Reintegration for
Citizen Warriors and Their Families, Laura Werber,
Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Karen Chan Osilla,
Elizabeth Wilke, Anny Wong, Joshua Breslau,
and Karin E. Kitchens, RR-206-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR206.
Using Behavioral Indicators to Help Detect
Potential Violent Acts: A Review of the Science Base,
Paul K. Davis, Walter L. Perry, Ryan Andrew
Brown, Douglas Yeung, Parisa Roshan,
and Phoenix Voorhies, RR-215-NAVY, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR215.
Supporting Employers in the Reserve Operational
Forces Era: Are Changes Needed to Reservists’
Employment Rights Legislation, Policies, or
Programs? Susan M. Gates, Geoffrey McGovern,
Ivan Waggoner, John D. Winkler, Ashley Pierson,
Lauren Andrews, and Peter Buryk, RR-152-OSD,
2013, www.rand.org/t/RR152.
Surprise! From CEOs to Navy SEALs: How a Select
Group of Professionals Prepare for and Respond to the
Unexpected, Dave Baiocchi and D. Steven Fox,
RR-341-NRO, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR341.
A Systematic Process to Facilitate Evidence-Informed
Decisionmaking Regarding Program Expansion:
The RAND Toolkit, Volume 3, Laurie T. Martin,
Coreen Farris, David M. Adamson, and
Robin M. Weinick, RR-487/3-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR487z3.
Toward a Secure and Stable Mali: Approaches
to Engaging Local Actors, Stephanie Pezard and
Michael Shurkin, RR-296-OSD, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR296.
Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle
East, F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader,
RR-258-NIC, 2013, www.rand.org/t/RR258.
U.S. Navy Employment Options for Unmanned
Surface Vehicles (USVs), Scott Savitz, Irv Blickstein,
Peter Buryk, Robert W. Button, Paul DeLuca,
James Dryden, Jason Mastbaum, Jan Osburg,
Philip Padilla, Amy Potter, Carter C. Price, Lloyd
Thrall, Susan K. Woodward, Roland J. Yardley,
and John M. Yurchak, RR-384-NAVY, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR384.
Using EPIC to Find Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and
Gaps in Department of Defense Policies, Carolyn
Wong, Daniel Gonzales, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric
Landree, and John S. Hollywood, TR-1277NAVY, 2013, www.rand.org/t/TR1277.
Venture Capital and Strategic Investment for
Developing Government Mission Capabilities,
Tim Webb, Christopher Guo, Jennifer Lamping
Lewis, and Daniel Egel, RR-176-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR176.
Why Is Veteran Unemployment So High?
David S. Loughran, RR-284-OSD, 2014,
www.rand.org/t/RR284.
Wireless Emergency Alerts: Mobile Penetration
Strategy, Daniel Gonzales, Edward Balkovich,
Brian A. Jackson, Jan Osburg, Andrew M. Parker,
Evan Saltzman, Ricardo Sanchez, Shoshana R.
Shelton, Chuck Stelzner, and Dulani Woods,
RR-174-OSD, 2014, www.rand.org/t/RR174.
Workforce Planning in the Intelligence
Community: A Retrospective, Charles Nemfakos,
Bernard D. Rostker, Raymond E. Conley,
Stephanie Young, William A. Williams,
Jeffrey Engstrom, Barbara Bicksler, Sara Beth
Elson, Joseph Jenkins, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali,
and Donald Temple, RR-114-ODNI, 2013,
www.rand.org/t/RR114.
33
RAND National Defense Research Institute Advisory Board
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Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
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Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
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Deputy Director for Program Evaluation, Office of Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, Office of the
Secretary of Defense
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Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
Mona Lush,
Deputy Director, OSD Studies and
FFRDC Management, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Brad Millick,
Deputy Director for Defense Analysis
and Senior Advisor for Analysis and
Warning, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence
34
Virginia Penrod,
Chief of Staff, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness
Alan Shaffer,
Principal Deputy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering
Nancy Spruill (Executive Agent),
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of
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and Logistics
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(As of August 2014)
R A N D N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y R E S E A R C H D I V I S I O N • A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 13 – 2 0 1 4
RAND Board of Trustees
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the Navy
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Chair, Systemic Risk Council;
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for International Studies, Center on
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Former Chairman, The Carlyle Group;
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Co-Chief Executive Officer, Westfield,
LLC
35
Photo credits
By Diane Baldwin: Michael Rich (p. i); David Gompert, Eugene C. Gritton
(p. ii); Jack Riley (p. iii); all photos (page 1); bottom (p. 2); Seth Jones (page 4);
Bruce W. Bennett (p. 6); Colin P. Clarke and Christopher Paul (p. 8), Eric Peltz
and Marc Robbins (p. 12), Scott Savitz (p. 14), John D. Winkler (p. 16),
Beth J. Asch, James Hosek, and Michael G. Mattock (p. 18), John V.
Parachini (p. 22), James B. Bruce (p. 24), David Baiocchi (p. 26)
By Win Boerckel: top photo (p. 2)
By Carol Earnest: middle photo (p. 2), Cynthia R. Cook (p. 10)
By Dori Walker: Joie D. Acosta (p. 20)
p. ii. Photo of Jeffrey Isaacson courtesy Sandia National Laboratories
p. 4. U.S. Air Force/SSgt Jonathan Snyder
p. 5. U.S. Army/Cpl. Jordan Johnson
p. 6. AP Photo/Jean H. Lee
p. 8. U.S. Army/Spc. Phillip McTaggart
p. 10. U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman Julianne Showalter
p. 11. U.S. Navy/Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Richard J. Brunson
p. 12. U.S. Air Force/Master Sgt. Jon Nicolussi
p. 14. U.S. Navy
p. 17. Shutterstock
p. 18. U.S. Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Michelle S. Mattei
p. 20. Fotolia/custom image
p. 23. U.S. Army/Sgt. Benjamin Tuck
p. 24. U.S. Marine Corps/Sgt. Richard Blumenstein
p. 26. Thinkstock/Wavebreakmedia Ltd.
Timeline photo credits
Front cover
Fotolia©veneratio
Inside fold out front cover
Top, left to right
AP Photo/Sadayuki Mikami
DoD photo/PH2 Dee Parlato
DoD photo/Senior Master Sgt. David H. Lipp via flickr
Bottom, left to right
U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon II
DoD photo/A1C Greg L. Davis
Fotolia©yossarian6
DoD photo/PH2 Matthew J. MaGee
Inside fold out back cover
Top, left to right
AP Photo/Richard Drew
U.S. Navy photo # O-0000X-003 courtesy of Northrop Grumman,
courtesy of news.navy.mil
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs
Bottom, left to right
DoD photo/Staff Sgt. Samuel Bendet, U.S. Air Force
DoD photo/MSgt Rose Reynolds, USAF
F-22A System Program Office
Communications Analysts
James Chiesa (lead)
Barbara Bicksler
Chandra Garber
Kate Giglio
Clifford Grammich
Paul Steinberg
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Lauren Skrabala
Production Editor
Steve Oshiro
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