Chapter Two
A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT
The conflict hypothesized involves a small island country facing a
large hostile neighboring nation determined to annex the island. The
fact that the primary attack routes are over water, along with the
small island country’s dependence on sea lines of communications
(SLOCs) and air lines of communications (ALOCs), implies a significant naval component. Setting the conflict 10 years into the future
provides time to implement emerging NCW concepts as well as some
new Navy systems.
THE ENEMY’S PLAN
The scenario begins early in 2009, as the hostile nation prepares to
attack the nearby island nation. By May 2010, planning is complete
and the enemy is ready to initiate operations against the island.
From the enemy’s perspective, the most favorable outcome would be
for the island to capitulate before the United States intervenes—as
the United States has promised to do in the event serious hostile acts
are initiated. An intense initial attack will further the enemy’s goal.
Attacking before the island’s main supporter (the United States) can
assist in its defense will maximize the effectiveness of the strike.
Simultaneity
A primary effect of the attack is to degrade the island’s airfields and
command and control facilities. The operational objective is to overrun island air defenses early. The goal is to maintain constant pressure, thus preventing the island from reconstituting air superiority.
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Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy
Simultaneously, an attempt is made to cut the island’s SLOCs. This
is seen to be useful in weakening the island as the conflict continues,
even if the tactic were unsuccessful in forcing capitulation. The
island is particularly dependent on its SLOCs for fuel. The aggressor
plans to declare an interdiction and launch an effort to destroy
several merchant vessels before the United States can intervene. In
the (likely) event capitulation does not occur early, the interdiction
will be extended as part of a war of attrition.
Capitalizing on Asymmetries
Although the aggressor’s air force is numerically superior to the island’s air force in 2010, the aggressor cannot bring all of its aircraft to
bear in any reasonable period of time. The problem is that the aircraft are widely dispersed and the command and control capability is
undeveloped. The aggressor’s only leverage is that, unlike the island,
it can replace losses from out-of-theater. The island’s qualitative advantages in aircraft and crew training offset the numeric disadvantage.
The aggressor plans to employ asymmetric warfare techniques developed in the last decade of the twentieth century. Key to its strategy is its relatively large and capable submarine force, its missile
force (especially ballistic missile), and a limited electronic warfare
(EW) capability.
The Aggressor’s Asymmetric Advantages
Submarine Warfare: Beginning in the 1990s, partly as a result of the
high-tech Iraq war, the enemy recognized the value of modern, capable forces, including submarines, and has since devoted considerable resources to modernize its forces. The submarine force, however, has been optimized for attacks against surface ships and not for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW). In 2010, the island still cannot
counter the enemy submarines with other submarines, surface ships,
or aircraft. As a result, the enemy nation can apply pressure to the island nation’s SLOCs for long periods without significant risk to its
own submarine forces.
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9
Missiles: The enemy nation has developed a daunting missile challenge in 2010 built on conventional theater ballistic missiles and
land-attack cruise missiles. They offer a means to attack early those
assets most directly relating to the island nation’s ability to sustain
defensive operations. Defense of more than a small fraction of the
island nation against this threat is infeasible. Used in large numbers
at the outset of a conflict, these missiles could gain the enemy country early air superiority over the island nation.
Electronic Warfare: The enemy nation has developed a significant
EW capability against the island nation’s warning radars, without
which it cannot intercept attacking aircraft efficiently. Along with
the aforementioned missile advantage, this capability could help the
enemy nation achieve air superiority early in a conflict.
The Enemy View
A key problem for the aggressor in 2010 is the dispersion of its air
forces and the lack of a modern command and control structure that
can effectively mass airpower in a timely manner. It must also anticipate U.S. involvement in any conflict with the island. Once in the
fight, U.S. forces can threaten much of the aggressor’s navy. The aggressor, therefore, plans to move its navy into a defensive bastion to
protect all of its high-value ships.
We assume U.S. forces are located just a few hundred miles from the
enemy nation, and less than a thousand miles from the threatened
island. U.S. Navy forces can be on the scene in about a day after getting under way. The fact that the United States can become involved
this quickly influences the enemy’s strategy.
RESISTANCE TO ANNEXATION
The island’s strategic objective is to “hold on” against an anticipated
massive enemy application of force early in any conflict. The aggressor hopes that its massive application of force will result in an early
capitulation. This would be the worst possible outcome for the island as a nation, and therefore it must be prepared to weather such
an attack. At a minimum, the island nation must plan to hold out
until the United States intervenes.
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Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy
Although the island cannot hope to defeat its enemy militarily, it can
strive to fight to a draw, with the aggressor tiring of the conflict and
seeking peace. At best, the aggressor will decide that the cost of continuing the conflict (a war of attrition) would outweigh any possible
gain, thus ending the conflict under favorable terms for the island
nation.
Operational Objectives
The island nation’s primary objective is to maintain air superiority
over its contiguous waters—at least up to the limits of the enemy’s
surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelope. This is paramount. It is vital
to protecting SLOCs and ALOCs and deterring or defeating enemy assaults by sea or air.
An important weapon for maintaining air superiority in the island
nation’s arsenal is the F-16 fighter aircraft. Their pilots have been
trained in the United States, and they get considerably more flight
hours than their enemy counterparts. Consequently, the island has
superior air force operational proficiency. This strength is enhanced
by command and control capabilities considerably superior to the
enemy’s uncoordinated air force.
Geographically, the island’s air superiority will cover all of the island
and much of the waters between itself and the enemy, but it will not
extend to the enemy coast. Aircraft attacking the island must emerge
from overlapping SAM coverage areas before they can be engaged.
However, the ALOCs on the island and lesser combatants can be
protected against enemy surface attacks on shipping near the island.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the situation facing the island as it prepares to
defend against an anticipated attack.
THE U.S. ROLE
U.S. naval forces are positioned to help the island improve its defensive posture against enemy missile attacks by intercepting missiles in flight. There is no desire for the United States to attack the
enemy’s territory. U.S. aircraft will position themselves to fill the
gaps in the island’s defense and thereby help ensure that the island
A Future Maritime Conflict
11
RANDMR1449-2.1
Aggressor Nation
ALOCs
SAM
coverage
Island
Nation
SLOCs
Figure 2.1—Theater of Operations
nation achieves its primary objective of maintaining air superiority
over the island and much of the waters between itself and the enemy.
A consequence of the U.S. involvement will likely be to force the aggressor into a defensive posture, thus limiting its offensive options.
U.S. Air and Sea Operations
Initially the carrier battle group (CVBG) operating nearby will be
positioned east of the island with MODLOC position placing it out of
enemy reach. 1 It is joined by a second CVBG before the outbreak of
hostilities.
Aegis cruisers will be assigned to ballistic missile defense duty off the
island’s two major ports, and SSNs will be assigned to attack enemy
interdiction submarines. Figure 2.2 illustrates the disposition of a
portion of U.S. naval forces in the theater at D-day.
______________
1 “MODLOC” stands for Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations: fixed,
geographically defined operating areas.
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Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy
•
Air Superiority: U.S. forces will help defeat raids across the waters between the island and the aggressor and kill leakers over
the island either directly using its fighter aircraft or indirectly by
providing command and control support.
•
Missile Defense: Early on, the Aegis cruisers will provide Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) over critical ports and airfields.
Later in the conflict, U.S. forces will attack surface combatants
who are equipped with Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs).
The aggressor’s intent to use its missiles early lends urgency to
the latter mission.
•
Breaking the Blockade: Enemy surface ships operating outside
ports and bastions can be eliminated quickly. Nevertheless,
these ships collectively threaten U.S. Navy forces in the area. A
large, saturation ASCM attack would be particularly attractive to
the aggressor. It would be difficult to coordinate such an attack,
but it could succeed through force of numbers. The aggressor’s
interdiction effort will give its submarines freedom of operation.
RANDMR1449-2.2
SSN
CG
CG
Aggressor Nation
Island
Nation
SSN
CG
CG
CV
CVN
Figure 2.2—Disposition of U.S. Naval Force
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Conditions around the island are expected to be poor for ASW,
so relatively advanced threats like the improved Kilo will be hard
to find.
•
Placing the Enemy on the Defensive: U.S. presence in the conflict will force the enemy navy into a defensive posture. In 2010,
the aggressor will have no counter for U.S. nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs), for example. At sea, the best
destroyers available to the aggressor will be easy targets for a Los
Angeles-class SSN. Consequently we would expect that enemy
surface combatants would retreat to ports or bastions, thus
preventing their certain destruction in open waters. The
aggressor’s surface, subsurface, and air platforms will be largely
ineffective against modern U.S. SSNs. Consequently, defense in
depth is the enemy’s only option. It could interpose minefields,
ships with active sonar, and submarines to try to stop a U.S. SSN.
With surface combatants forced to retreat for self-protection and
with forces committed to the defense of high-value units and
systems, fewer capable combatants will be available to the
aggressor for use against the island.
THE BASIS FOR ANALYSIS
Central to the analysis of vignettes derived from this and other scenarios is the effect of changed command and control systems and
procedures on the outcome of the battle. Network-centric operations purport to improve combat operations. However, this is merely
an assertion and therefore must be regarded as a hypothesis. However plausible it may sound, it requires rigorous assessment, and, to
do that, a credible link between command and control systems and
procedures and combat outcomes needs to be established.
In the next two chapters we attempt to do just that. We focus on the
development of mathematical relationships that link network-centric
operations, command and control, combat operations, and combat
outcomes in the context of the scenario just described. In assessing
network-centric operations and command and control procedures,
we develop measures of performance. Assessing combat operations
and combat outcomes is generally accomplished through the development of measures of combat effectiveness. In this work we have
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Measures of Effectiveness for the Information-Age Navy
linked the two so that the effects on combat outcomes of variations
in C4ISR procedures and processes can be assessed.
In developing the combined metrics, we rely on graph theory to assess the value of connectivity, information theory to assess the value
of collaboration and the effects of knowledge, and traditional measures of combat to assess the value of combat power. It is important,
however, that we emphasize that no claims are made concerning the
“correctness” of these formulations. They must be treated as hypotheses subject to testing, validation, and calibration.