Domesticating PES:
Payments for Agrobiodiversity Conservation Services
and the Use of Competitive Tenders
Adam G. Drucker
Senior (Ecological) Economist, Bioversity International
PACS and Institutions of Collective
Action
• Assess potential for ABD-related PES (=PACS) schemes to
create incentives for conservation of agrobiodiversity and
improve indigenous farmer livelihoods.
• Assess impact of PACS schemes on institutions of collective
action and social-equity issues
PACS Implementation Steps
A. Define the conservation strategy (what do we want to
conserve?)
B. Define the conservation goal (how – at what level – do we
want to conserve it?)
C. Assist individual farmers or communities to develop a
conservation service offer
D. Assess farmer Willingness to Accept (WTA) rewards to
undertake conservation
E. Identify how rewards can be financed by the project (i.e.
sources of rewards/funding)
Weitzman-type Prioritisation Tool
(Noah’s Ark Question)
Bolivia/Peru Tender Process
•
9 varieties of quinoa identified as “at risk” :
–
•
•
•
•
Chillpi Blanco, Huallata, Hilo, Kanchis, NovetonMisa quinua, Chullpi anaranjado,
Janko witulla, Cuchi wila.
Based on expert opinion of area planted, # of farmers, degree of traditional
knowledge, quantity of seed available, dissimilarity of the varieties)
39 organisations invited to submit a conservation service offer. Offers received
from 25.
Total conservation budget available = $4,000 in each country (but goal should
be to reach a safe minimum standard of conservation)
Single round, sealed-bid reverse auction. Offers needed to specify:
–
–
–
–
–
Area to be planted for each variety
Number of farmers to be involved
Availability of seed
Compensation required
Participation condition (conditional on only full offer being accepted or not)
Conservation Goals and ABD-relevant
Ecosystem Service Provision
• Conservation area under specific landraces
– proxy for genetic diversity & future option value maintenance
• Number of farmers conserving such landraces
– proxy for traditional knowledge and cultural practices
maintenance
• Maximizing the number of targeted farming
communities
– proxy for maintenance of resilience at the landscape scale
– proxy for seed system functionality
Peru/Bolivia Tender Process (Insert Video Here)
Video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v
=gJ6AOaqBwsU
Exploring PACS:
Initial Findings from Peru and
Bolivia
Supply schedules
(P)
qu
inu
a
Cuchi Wila (P)
Chullpi Anaranjado (P)
350
Huallata (B)
300
B)
B)
Hi
lo
US$/farmer
(B
Misa quinua (P)
Kanchis (B)
250
Chullpi Anaranjado (P)
Chillpi Blanco (B)
Kanchis (B)
Noveton (B)
Cuchi Wila (P)
200
)
(
lla
ta
Hu
Chillpi Blanco (B)
No
ve
to
n(
5000
4000
Mi
sa
8000
7000
6000
Hilo (B) Janko Witulla (P)
400
Janko Witulla (P)
3000
2000
150
100
50
1000
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
10
20
30
hectares
40
Janko Witulla (P)
1800
1600
Cuchi Wila (P)
Hilo (B)
1400
1200
Misa quinua (P)
1000
Chullpi Anaranjado (P)
Huallata (B)
800
600
Chillpi Blanco (B)
400
Kanchis (B)
Noveton (B)
200
0
0
50
no of farmers
2000
US$/CBO
US$/ha
11000
10000
9000
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no of CBOs
8
9
10
11
12
60
70
80
Example of trade-offs (Bolivia)
Selection Aim 1:
criteria Max avg
(aim) (across
landraces) cost
effectiveness
($/ha)
Aim 2:
Max. avg cost
effectiveness
($/farmer)
Aim 3:
Max. avg. cost
effectiveness
($/CBO)
Aim: Max.
Weighted avg.
cost
effectiveness
across criteria
(e.g., 0.4, 0.4,
0.2)
Outcome
Total area
(outcome)
2.9 ha
0.6 ha
2.6 ha
2.6 ha.
Total n.
Farmers
(outcome)
12 farmers
25 farmers
16 farmers
16 farmers
4 CBOs
5 CBOs
8 CBOs
7 CBOs
Total n. CBOs
(outcome)
MAX
EFFICIENCY
MEDIUM
EFFICIENCY
MIN
EFFICIENCY
Quinoa Tender and Equity
Between Communities
GINI
0.375
Bolivia
C
Most equal
O
0.390
F
0.752
Most unequal
A
0.588
Medium equality
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
US$
0.575
C
Peru
Most equal
O
0.577
F
0.594
A
0.803
0
1000
2000
US$
3000
4000
Medium equality
Most unequal
Equity framework: targeting approaches
and targeting performance indicators
targeting approaches
targeting
performance
targeting rule
proportionality
nondiscrimination
procedural
fairness
area
AD
AU
AP
efficiency
conservation
farmers
FD
FU
FP
collectivism
goal
CBGs
GD
GU
GP
inclusiveness
combined
CD
CU
CP
equality
Note: Equity principles in italics
Efficiency and equality can be improved
at the same time (Bolivia case)
3
2.8
2.6
GD
CD
2.4
1/gini
2.2
GP
GU
2
1.8
CU
AD
1.6
1.4
FD
FP
FU
1.2
1
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
AU
CP
AP
0.40
0.50
area share
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Conservation outcomes and distributional
equality under the payment rules
Bolivia
Peru
discriminatory uniform
conditional discriminatory uniform
conservation area in ha 13.23
no of targeted farmers 47
no of targeted groups 10
1/gini
2.67
8.61
33
7
1.75
8.00
42
6
1.39
1.46
68
8
1.74
1.34
63
7
1.61
conditional
1.45
41
6
1.55
Equity Trade-offs by Type of Participant
Bolivia
• Group and combined goal approaches favour groups with
significantly older farmers
• Almost all targeting approaches result in groups represented
by more women being selected.
• Area goals target groups with smaller quinoa areas.
Peru
• Area goals lead to more male-dominated and poorer groups
in terms of agricultural assets being selected.
Financing PACS (What kind of Rewards?)
Impact of External Rewards (Bolivia/Peru
Farmer Experimental Games)
'Good policies are those that support socially valued ends not only by harnessing
selfish preferences to public ends but also by evoking, cultivating, and
empowering public-spirited motives.‘ (Bowles, 2008)
• Undergraduate students tend to be WEIRD
– (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic).
• Collective vs. Individual Rewards
– Different hypothetical land allocations (endowments)
– Participant groups land units may be invested in a private good (e.g.
commercial variety production) or a impure public good (traditional variety
conservation)
– With/without communication
– With/without knowing who your group members are
• Potential to crowd out or crowd in pro-social behaviour
– Different reward systems interact with social preferences in different and
complex ways and thus may differ in their effectiveness depending on the
market context
Payoffs under alternative land
allocations
Summary of Contribution to the Wider
PES Literature
• Potential trade-offs between ecological effectiveness,
economic efficiency and social equity considerations need to
be carefully evaluated
• Distribution of rewards is very sensitive to the selection
approaches used.
• Equity may need to be sacrificed if cost-efficiency is the
overarching goal. But this may impact likelihood of long term
success.
• Cannot generally assume that external reward mechanisms
will unequivocally provide resource user groups with the
incentives to increase conservation
Thank You
•
For more information about the PACS project, factsheets, publications and
video, see www.bioversityinternational.org
•
Acknowledgements: Original PACS case study research carried out in
partnership with Wilfredo Rojas and Milton Pinto (PROINPA Bolivia), Enrique
Valdivia and Jose Luis Soto (CIRNMA, Peru), and Unai Pascual (University of
Cambridge, UK & Basque Centre for Climate Change, Spain) and Ulf Narloch
(University of Cambridge, World Bank).
•
Publications Cited: Narloch (2011); Narloch et al. (2011a&b); Narloch et al.
(2012)); Narloch et al. (2013)