JHAZ
Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
An official publication of the National Institute of Building Sciences
Multihazard Mitigation Council
National Institute of Building Sciences: An Authoritative Source of Innovative Solutions for the Built Environment
Spring 2011
Building to
Mitigate Risk
Jhaz
Published For:
The National Institute of Building Sciences
Multihazard Mitigation Council
1090 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005-4905
Phone: (202) 289-7800
Fax: (202) 289-1092
nibs@nibs.org
www.nibs.org
PRESIDENT
Henry L. Green, Hon. AIA
Chief operating Officer
Earle W. Kennett
Published By:
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Karen Kornelsen
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Contents
Features:
Learned from Recent
08Lessons
Damaging Earthquakes
Building Practices for
12Green
Residential Construction and
Natural Hazard Resistance:
How Are They Linked?
Updates Safe Room
18FEMA
Publications
25
Motivating Public Mitigation
and Preparedness for
Earthquakes and Other
Hazards
12
Green Building
for Natural
Hazard Resistance
8
Lessons
Learned
Tunnels and
32Buildings,
Mass Transit Stations: DHS
Releases Integrated Rapid
Visual Screening Tools in 2011
18
Safe Room
Updates
Messages:
05Message from Institute President Henry L. Green
from James Lee Witt, Guest Author and
07Message
Chief Executive Officer of Witt Associates
Director of Marketing &
Circulation
Shoshana Weinberg
JHAZ
Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
An official publication of the National Institute of Building Sciences
Multihazard Mitigation Council
National Institute of Building Sciences: An Authoritative Source of Innovative Solutions for the Built Environment
Spring 2011
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©2011 Matrix Group Publishing Inc. All rights
reserved. Contents may not be reproduced by
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expressed in JHAZ are not necessarily those of
Matrix Group Publishing Inc. or the National
Institute of Building Sciences Multihazard
Mitigation Council.
Building to
Mitigate Risk
32
IRVS Tools
On the cover: Tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes and floods—these
threats put millions of Americans
at risk each year. The Multihazard
Mitigation Council (MMC) is working
to reduce the total costs associated
with these disasters and other related
hazards to buildings by fostering and
promoting consistent and improved
multihazard risk mitigation strategies,
guidelines, practices and related
efforts.
Spring 2011 3
Message from the National Institute of Building Sciences
Henry L. Green, Hon. AIA
The National Institute of Building
Sciences is proud to launch the first edition of the Journal of Hazard Mitigation
and Risk Assessment (JHAZ).
We at the Institute are committed to
improving the nation’s resiliency and
providing guidance on how to mitigate
losses from natural and manmade disasters. JHAZ is published under the
sponsorship of our Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC), with MMC Board
members among the article writers and
reviewers. The journal focuses on decreasing the nation’s losses from disaster
events while also promoting community preparedness, sustainability and
resilience, as well as other national goals
such as energy efficiency.
In tandem with this publication, the
National Institute of Building Sciences
is reconstituting the MMC with a new
mission and broader membership base.
The updated MMC will be a focal point
for the dissemination of credible information and counsel on major policy
issues involving multihazard disaster
resilience. It will promote increased allhazard (man-made and natural) disaster resilience in homes and commercial
buildings as part of a whole building
strategy that incorporates sustainability,
security and use of GIS and other technological tools. This expansive approach
is directed to homeowners, businesses,
schools, communities, public- and private-sector building portfolio managers
and many others.
Membership in the reconstituted
MMC is voluntary and open to publicand private-sector architects, engineers,
contractors, emergency managers and
risk assessment practitioners, as well as
trade and professional associations, materials interests and others from communities across the United States. The
Council will provide a forum for disaster
professionals to exchange valuable information on emerging trends in building technology and federal policy, and to
address building systems and software
applications that play a critical role in
disaster resilience and sustainability.
Please consider joining the MMC and
becoming a part of this broad-based
initiative. For more information, visit:
www.nibs.org/mmc.
In this inaugural issue of JHAZ,
we have some great articles. The authors provide guidance on how to gain
the safest protections from disasters
(earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes
and tornados) that pose risk to our infrastructure and well being. This issue
examines advancements in materials,
design concepts and codes to provide
safer environments for our daily lives.
Using their wealth of experience and
knowledge in the field of standards development, research, investigation and
application, the authors provide a look
into safe strategies and the underlining
research.
Among the potential risks, earthquakes pose a significant hazard. Author
Bill Holmes examines recent earthquakes around the world. A second article, written by a group of four authors,
addresses the importance of motivating
the public to take steps to protect their
homes from hazards.
Identifying risks is an important
component. The Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) article, co-written
by six authors, offers a look at how this
advanced tool can assist in identifying
potential threats and, through the application of quantifiable methods and
professional judgment, yield building
solutions to resist threats from manmade and natural hazards.
John Ingargiolo’s article presents
a look inside safe rooms. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) provides numerous publications
relating to shelter and offers a repository
of information on safe rooms. During
high wind events such as tornados and
hurricanes, a safe room can provide the
shelter a family needs for survival.
Can green building practices work in
harmony with resiliency provisions and
hazard mitigation? This is the question
posed by a trio of authors who examine
how these building practices are linked.
With lessons learned, we can provide for a more resilient America. Time
often has a way of damping our edge in
anticipation of events to come. We must
remain vigilant in our effort to address
the ever-present threat of a disaster. Our
homes and communities are not immune. JHAZ can provide information to
assist in our discussions and thinking on
how to manage our resources and mitigate losses.
I want to thank the publication team
for their efforts to give birth to this first
edition. On a personal note, I would like
to thank James Lee Witt, who provided
our guest column, for his support of this
effort.
I hope you enjoy this publication.
After reading this first issue of JHAZ, we
would like your input. Please provide
us with your comments and suggestions. We also invite the submission of
articles. Thank you for your interest in
improving the resiliency of our nation’s
buildings.
We look forward to hearing what you
think.
In safety,
Henry L. Green, Hon. AIA
President
National Institute of Building Sciences
Since authoring this article, the biggest earthquake to strike Japan since
the late 1800s has struck this island nation. The resulting tsunami has caused
immense damage. This should be a reminder that we are also vulnerable. We
must learn from this event and improve
our risk assessment through a greater examination of our readiness in the United
States. Now is the opportunity to assess
our existing building infrastructure, determine the needs to retrofit buildings
and structures and improve our resiliency in susceptible areas of the country.
Spring 2011 5
Message from Guest Author and Chief Executive Officer of Witt Associates
James Lee Witt
I am pleased to be asked to
write an article for this new journal,
the Journal of Hazard Mitigation and
Risk Assessment (JHAZ), focusing specifically on reducing the loss of life and
property by lessening the impact of disasters on buildings and related infrastructure. In the disaster field, we have
been trying to bring mitigation to the
forefront for community officials, policy makers and emergency managers.
This is why it is so exciting to see that
construction experts, researchers and
federal agencies have begun to focus
their mitigation efforts on addressing
not just specific hazards one at a time,
but all hazards, both natural and manmade, with integrated design.
This summer, more than one million
homeless Haitians will face the second
hurricane season since the devastating
7.0 earthquake. This natural disaster
has had a profound and catastrophic
impact on the people, economy and
government of Haiti—an impact that
will continue to be felt for years, if not
decades, to come.
The United States too, has experienced catastrophic natural and manmade disasters. We have learned from
these disasters in history—the San
Francisco earthquake and fire (1906),
the Chicago fire (1871), the Northridge
earthquake (1994), the September
11 attack on the World Trade Centers
(2001), Hurricane Andrew (1992), the
flooding of the Mississippi River (1993),
and Hurricane Katrina (2005). The
good thing is that lessons have been
learned from these events and have
had an enormous impact on the safety
of our communities today.
The result of these major crises is the
improvement in design and construction. Many of the major advancements
in these methods (especially related to
seismic and wind) and improvements
in life safety protection (particularly
fire safety and egress) resulted from
studying and analyzing these tragic
circumstances.
I commend the National Institute
of Building Sciences for their efforts
to assist Haiti in the establishment of
a safety-minded building culture after most of the nation’s building stock
was reduced to rubble following last
year’s earthquake. They are working
with U.S. and international experts to
bring together a toolkit of best practices for safe and resilient construction
and the establishment of a center in
Haiti where these practices and strategies can be shared. When rebuilding
it is imperative that the construction
methods take into account a range of
risks, particularly wind, flood, seismic
and even manmade events. Haitians
are no strangers to risk—they have
long experienced the impacts of hurricanes—but the long periods between
earthquakes wiped the concern from
their memories.
We know that mitigation saves lives.
The report, Natural Hazard Mitigation
Saves: An Independent Study to Assess
the Future Savings from Mitigation
Activities, concluded that every dollar
spent on mitigation saves four dollars
in avoided future losses. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) commissioned the National
Institute of Building Sciences’ Multihazard Mitigation Council to conduct
this study for Congress in 2005.
Those mitigation dollars can be used
more effectively by addressing multiple
threats (all hazards) at one time. In Haiti and in our very own United States,
we need to promote hazard mitigation
that takes into consideration the multiple risks of a region. An area at high
risk of earthquakes and moderate risk
of wildland/urban fires will have different considerations from an area with a
high-risk of flooding and moderate risk
of heavy snowstorms. We cannot focus
on just the highest risk because power
outages and severe weather might be
more likely than an earthquake. We
need to communicate the nature of
combined risks so that communities
can adjust their design and construction methods to ensure that reinforcing against one potential threat doesn’t
increase the potential damage from
another.
Just as the green movement has encouraged the construction industry
to integrate energy efficiency into the
design of a building, we, as mitigation
experts, need to encourage integrating
an all-hazards approach into buildings.
The focus needs to be on a combined,
high-performance approach for safety
(including protection against natural
and manmade threats), as well as energy efficiency, aesthetics and other
owner and occupant requirements.
I commend the National Institute of
Building Sciences, through their Journal of Hazards Mitigation and Risk Assessment, for taking a unique approach
and addressing the design and construction viewpoint. Other mitigation
magazines approach hazards from an
emergency management or social perspective. Through this new journal and
the new Multihazard Mitigation Council, the National Institute of Building
Sciences is helping to bring together
the expertise to incorporate this integrated, all-hazards and whole-building
strategy.
These efforts are the key in the way
that we look at rebuilding after disasters as well as looking at construction
BEFORE disaster. The forum that the
Institute is providing through this new
periodical is much needed and I look
forward to reading future issues.
James Lee Witt
Chief Executive Officer
Witt Associates
Witt Associates is a public safety and
crisis management consulting firm.
James Lee Witt was the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency from 1993-2001, under President
Clinton.
Spring 2011 7
Feature
Lessons Learned
from Recent Damaging Earthquakes
By William T. Holmes
According to the United States
Geological Survey (USGS), there were
22 major earthquakes—defined by seismologists as magnitude 7.0 or greater—
in 2010. Several of these events caused
significant damage, deaths and injuries. In particular, two events stand out:
the magnitude 7.0 Haiti earthquake of
January 12 and the magnitude 8.8 Chile
earthquake of February 27. Was this
seismic activity unusual? According to
the USGS, statistically it was not (USGS,
2010).¹ However, USGS data presented
in Table 1 indicate that the occurrence
of 22 major events in one year is considerably above average and is the highest
number of annual occurrences in any of
the past 10 years.
The magnitude scale that is currently used, designated Mw and called
moment magnitude, is based on the
area of the fault slip and the distance
moved. It is a measure of energy released. The moment magnitude is
similar to the more commonly known
Richter magnitude but is a scientifically superior measure, particularly for
larger events. Major events with magnitudes of 7.0 or more release a high
level of energy and are significant to
geologists and seismologists. However,
if they occur in remote areas where
little or no damage is done, they may
not be significant to seismic mitigation
professionals, which includes engineers, emergency planners and social
scientists.
Worldwide, earthquakes garner the
attention of U.S.-based seismic mitigation professionals based on a combination of the following three interest
factors:
• The extent of damage and losses;
• The similarity of the buildings and
infrastructure in the area where the
earthquake occurs to the U.S. building inventory; and
• A location in the United States or
with reasonable access.
Several of the 2010 events are assessed in Table 2 using these factors.
Although the rating scores shown are
judgmental, the Baja, California, and
Canterbury, New Zealand, events are of
high interest due to the accessibility and
applicability of scientific lessons, even
though they were of relatively low consequence. Conversely, the earthquakes in
Qinghai, China, and Papua, Indonesia,
are of less interest due the inaccessibility
of the regions and the lack of similarity
to U.S. infrastructure and culture.
It is therefore no surprise that U.S.
seismic mitigation professions have
been involved in post-event reconnaissance missions not only to Haiti and
Chile but also to the Baja, California,
area (on both sides of the U.S./Mexico
border) and the Canterbury area of the
south island of New Zealand. Pertinent
data from these four events are shown in
Table 3.
By far, the remarkable destruction
in Haiti stands out as the most significant consequence of seismic activity
in 2010. The official number of deaths
ranks somewhere between the fourth
and seventh highest in recorded history (depending on the source of statistics) but the actual number is probably
even higher. A long history of ineffective
governments not only created a largely
impoverished population but also an
impoverished building stock and infrastructure. The result was buildings that
were highly vulnerable to seismic damage due to the lack of modern building
codes and practices.
Perhaps more significantly, the
earthquake in Haiti reflects the growing recognition that the lack of effective
Table 1: The Number of Earthquakes Worldwide
Longer
Term
Magnitude 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annual
Average
8.0 to 9.9
1
1
0
1
2
1
2
4
0
1
1
11
7.0 to 7.9
14 15 13 14 14 10
9
14 12 16 21
151
6.0 to 6.9 146 121 127 140 141 140 142 178 168 141 148
1342
1
Since 1900
2
Since 1990
Table 2: Comparison of U. S. Interest Factors for Several
Major 2010 Earthquakes
Events1
U. S. Interest Factors: 1 low, 5 high
Locations
Date MW Deaths Location Extent
Haiti
1/12 7.0 222,570
4
Chile
1/30 8.8
577
Baja,
California
4/4
7.2
Qinghai, China 4/13 6.9
Applicability
Total
5
1
10
4
5
4
13
2
5
2
5
12
2,968
1
4
1
6
Indonesia
6/16 7.0
17
1
2
1
4
Canterbury,
New Zealand
9/4
0
4
2
4
10
7.1
1
Data from USGS, Deaths from Earthquakes in 2010:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/year/2010/2010_deaths.php
8 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Table 3: Comparison of Four Selected 2010 Events1
Haiti
1/12
7.0
4:53 pm
222,570
5,000,000
Economic Loss
(in millions)
$7,800
Chile
1/30
8.8
3:34 am
577
12,000,000
$30,000
2
1,000,000
$425
0
0
90,000
375,000
$91
$3,000
Location
Date
MW
Local Time
Deaths
Baja, CA
4/4
7.2
3:40 pm
(Mexico)
Baja, CA (US)
4/4
7.2
3:40 pm
Canterbury, NZ
9/4
7.1
3:40 am
1
All data from (EERI, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d)
governance in a country will prevent
or significantly delay effective recovery
despite all efforts of assistance from the
rest of the world. If the world community is to be better prepared to assist after
future disasters, the mitigation community needs to focus attention on identification of other countries with similar
governance issues. A more detailed description of the specific damage in Haiti
can be found in EERI, 2010² and 2010a.³
The emergence of
performance-based
design, a procedure for
designing buildings for
specific performance
rather than mere code
compliance, eventually
may facilitate improved
communication between
owners and engineers.
On the other hand, the largest magnitude event of the year, the massive 8.8
earthquake in Chile, caused damage over
an area approximately 62 miles (100 km)
wide and 310 miles (500 km) long (FIGURE 1). This led to strong ground shaking for a period of 60 to 120 seconds but
only caused 577 deaths, many from the
accompanying tsunami. In Chile, strong
governance led to general compliance
with seismic codes and standards and
facilitated effective emergency response
and more rapid recovery. Although there
were highly publicized failures of midrise concrete buildings, including one
collapse, the very large overall inventory
of these buildings generally protected
the life safety of the occupants.
Population Exposed
However, marginally or completely
irreparable damage to a few of these
buildings highlighted the issue of identifying acceptable damage from rare
events (Figure 2). Codes in the United
States are primarily intended to protect
life safety in rare events with no specific goal related to control of damage
or economic loss. Is this life safety goal
acceptable or is the public expecting low
economic loss as well? Except in special cases of buildings with occupancies
critical to the public or to the building
owner, it is probably not cost-effective
to provide seismic protection to achieve
low economic losses for rare events.
A concise definition of the expected
performance of buildings designed to
meet U.S. seismic code requirements
has been difficult to define due to the
large number of building types used and
the wide range of potential earthquake
shaking intensities. The emergence of
performance-based design, a procedure
for designing buildings for specific performance rather than mere code compliance, eventually may facilitate improved
communication between owners and
engineers.
The shaking in Chile was strong, covered a huge area and produced a wide
array of damage, including collapsed
bridges, damaged freeways, closed
hospitals and universities, damaged
wineries and other businesses, and destruction of older, sometimes historic,
adobe and masonry villages and neighborhoods. The results of the earthquake
were also a reminder of the devastating
effects of the tsunami. This earthquake
was a subduction zone event similar
to that expected somewhere along a
similar subduction zone in the Pacific
Northwest of the United States. Detailed
Figure 1. A comparison of the areas affected by the 2010 earthquakes in Chile (large
diagram) and Haiti (inset).
Spring 2011 9
Figure 2. (Left) A toppled building in Concepcion, Chile. This failure is clearly unacceptable performance. But is the damage
shown in the image on the right acceptable? It did not cause a collapse but the building is possibly unrepairable.
studies of the characteristics and consequences of such an event should be
applied for planning purposes in this region. A more detailed description of the
specific damage in Chile can be found in
EERI, 2010b.4
The April 4, 2010, earthquake in
northern Mexico, just 31 miles (50 km)
below the U.S. border, created strong
ground motion over a large area in the
Southern California region that was
previously struck by several earthquakes (El Centro, 1940 and Imperial
Valley, 1979). Therefore, many of the
worst buildings in this area may have
been previously damaged and either
removed or strengthened. In general,
the existing building stock in the region
protected life safety (there were no U.S.
deaths), but it was again demonstrated
Figure 3. A portion of this unreinforced masonry wall in Christchurch, New
Zealand fell onto an outdoor café. Fortunately, no one was there. The U. S. has
many buildings like this.
10 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
that damage to the nonstructural components and systems in buildings can
be costly to repair. Large-scale liquefaction and warping of the ground surface was noted in farmlands, mostly
in Mexico. Some have voiced concern
that not only have certain crops been
ruined but the fertility of the land may
have been affected and the irrigation
patterns changed. Similar patterns
were noted in the farmlands on the
Canterbury Plains in the New Zealand
earthquake in September. More detailed descriptions of specific damage
from the Baja, California event can be
found in EERI, 2010c.5
By the standards of 2010 seismic destruction, the earthquake of September
4, 2010, near Christchurch, New Zealand
was relatively minor. However, the similarity of seismic construction standards
for both infrastructure and buildings to
those used in the United States made
the event of high interest to U.S. seismic
mitigation professionals. Although overall damage was moderate, two vulnerabilities were highlighted.
First, older and unreinforced masonry buildings, very much like many
older U.S. buildings, are extremely
vulnerable to damage, even in moderate shaking. The exterior walls of these
buildings tend to fall away from the
floors and roofs onto adjacent streets,
sidewalks and buildings, creating severe life safety risks. No one was killed
in this event because it occurred at 3:30
a.m., when no one was on the streets or
sidewalks or in commercial buildings.
Dozens of life threatening situations
were noted and one significant injury
was reported—from a masonry chimney falling into a residence (Figure
3). Many areas of high and moderate
seismicity in the United States should
study ways to reduce the hazard from
this building type.
The second vulnerability highlighted in New Zealand is the potential
economic loss caused by liquefaction
and other soil failures related to earthquake shaking (Figure 4). Liquefaction
occurs when certain water saturated
sands “liquefy” during shaking. Buildings, bridges, pipelines and other infrastructure supported on such materials
may move downwards (sinking into the
liquefied soil), upwards (floating on the
liquefied soil) or slide sideways (when
near a slope). The movement normally
causes damage to the structure and
often creates secondary problems. For
example, if a house sinks 6 inches (15
cm) or more into the ground, surface
water that originally ran away from the
building will now flow into the building. Similarly, gravity flow sewers or
storm drains may flow the wrong way
or have high points that prevent normal
drainage.
As previously noted regarding the
Baja, California, event, grade changes
occurred near the fault line in New Zealand. They caused changes in stream
flows and will probably disrupt irrigation patterns in farm land. In the future,
this possibility should be built into U.S.
regional seismic loss studies for areas
where fault movement or liquefaction
could effect farm land. More detailed
descriptions of specific damage from the
Canterbury, New Zealand, event can be
found in EERI, 2010d.6
In summary, there were an above-average number of damaging earthquakes
in 2010 but not a statistically unusual
number. The tragedy in Haiti stands out
as a historically high killer and points
out the need for the world community
to find a better way to offer assistance
in such situations. For the United States,
few new lessons were learned but many
were re-emphasized.
Figure 4. Subtle but expensive damage from liquefaction in Christchurch, New
Zealand. The house, relatively undamaged, has settled about eight inches, which
will cause storm drainage from the entire lot to run to the house. Regrading the lot
is not always an option due to the adjacent street elevations.
Earthquakes are still a serious threat
to life safety in many communities with
older, vulnerable buildings. Economic
loss to individuals can be significant due
to damage repair or the loss of the use of
buildings. Economic loss to institutions
or regions can be significant if important
infrastructure is lost or weakened. Communities and regions can be made more
resilient by combinations of mitigation
and planning. But first, local vulnerabilities must be identified and recognized
through educational programs and regional loss studies.
n
William T. Holmes has more than 40
years of practical experience in structural
engineering. Since most of his work has
been in California, seismic design has become his specialty. Holmes has also been
active in local, national and international professional committees and workshops and in research and development
in seismic engineering. He is currently
Chair of the Institute’s Building Seismic
Safety Council.
Editor’s note: This article was written before the 6.3 magnitude earthquake
that struck Christchurch, New Zealand,
on February 22, 2011, and the massive
8.9 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami that occurred in Japan on
March 11, 2011.
References
1. United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2010, Is Recent Earthquake Activity Unusual? Scientists Say No, USGS Newsroom. URL: www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2439, April 14, 2010.
2. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), 2010, The MW 7.0 Haiti
Earthquake of January 12, 2010: Report 1, EERI Newsletter, Volume 44, Number 4, April, 2010.
3. EERI, 2010a, The MW 7.0 Haiti Earthquake of January 12, 2010: Report 2, EERI
Newsletter, Volume 44, Number 5, May, 2010.
4. EERI, 2010b, The MW Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010, EERI Newsletter,
Volume 44, Number 6, June, 2010.
5. EERI, 2010c, The MW El Mayor Cucapah (Baja California) Earthquake of April
4, 2010, EERI Newsletter, Volume 44, Number 7, July, 2010.
6. EERI, 2010d, The MW 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) New Zealand Earthquake of
September 4, 2010, EERI Newsletter, Volume 44, Number 11, November, 2010.
Spring 2011 11
Feature
Green Building Practices
for Residential Construction and
Natural Hazard Resistance:
How Are They Linked?
By Philip Line, PE; Omar Kapur, EIT, LEED Green Associate; and Samantha Passman, EIT
Building green has become
more common as the nation focuses
on achieving energy savings and other
environmental goals. As such, green
building practices are increasingly being incorporated into residential building design and construction. As green
building continues to gain popularity in
the residential market, home designers,
builders and code officials will increasingly be faced with making decisions
concerning how to apply green building practices while not compromising
other performance goals, including resistance to natural hazards.
For some house components and
in some areas especially susceptible
to natural hazard events (for example,
coastal regions where hurricane winds
are likely), decision makers will need to
balance the benefits of green practices
and the associated green building rating system points with practices that
can improve house performance in a
disaster event but do not garner points.
Designers will also need to determine
whether a green practice under consideration warrants a re-evaluation of the
home’s structural design or detailing to
ensure that natural hazard resistance is
maintained.
This paper provides only a cursory
overview of the relationship between
green building practices and natural
hazard resistance. A more detailed discussion is presented in a new publication
by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), entitled Natural Hazards and Sustainability for Residential
Building, FEMA P-798 (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Natural Hazards and
Sustainability for Residential
Construction, FEMA P-798.
Figure 2. The National Green Building
Standard (ICC 700).
Green Building Rating
Systems for Residential
Construction
Several nationally recognized green
building rating systems used in the
12 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
United States apply to residential construction. The two most recognized systems are the National Green Building
Standard (ICC 700), which is circulated
jointly by the National Association of
Home Builders (NAHB, 2008a and b)
and the International Code Council
(ICC) (Figure 2), and the Leadership
in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) for Homes rating system, which
is circulated by the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC, September 2010)
(Figure 3). A variety of local and regional residential green building programs are also in use today (described
by Bowyer, 2010). These rating systems
are often used voluntarily and are not
incorporated as reference standards in
the model codes, such as the International Residential Code (IRC) or the International Building Code (IBC).¹
This article focuses primarily on
green building practices, as described
Figure 3. Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) for
Homes rating system, Version 3.
in ICC 700. Its use here is not intended
to indicate a preference for ICC 700 relative to either LEED for Homes or any
other green building rating system.
Green building categories
Green rating systems commonly
group specific practices into broad categories, as shown in Figure 4, for both
ICC 700 and LEED for Homes.
For example, the “Resource Efficiency” category in ICC 700 includes specific practices, such as using framing
techniques that optimize material use
and installing roof overhangs or awnings that protect the building from the
effects of precipitation and solar radiation. Other green rating system categories include a similarly-detailed list of
specific practices.
Green building performance levels
As noted earlier, a number of rating
points are generally assigned to each
specific green building practice. For example, under ICC 700, a specific number of points qualifies a building design
as achieving a bronze, silver, gold or
emerald performance-level, where emerald represents the highest level. LEED
for Homes uses a similar points-based
approach. Implicit in the rating system
approach is that the final as-built construction will provide natural hazards
resistance commensurate with other
applicable laws, codes and ordinances
that regulate building construction.
The benefits of hazard resistance are
not explicitly identified by the green rating
systems in their current form but may be
taken into account indirectly in some categories. For example, ICC 700 gives credit
for performing a life-cycle analysis (LCA)
of a building design. By implementing
LCA concepts, designers can demonstrate
avoided damages—specifically, avoided
materials loss that would otherwise be required for repair or reconstruction—and
show measurable environmental benefits
for a stronger home.
Green Building Practices and
Hazard Resistance: What’s
Missing?
While many common green building practices have minimal interaction
with structural performance, others
may require reevaluation of the building’s structural design or detailing to retain its integrity during natural hazard
events. The proper implementation of
a new green building practice for residential construction can be particularly
challenging because designer participation is often limited and prescriptive
design methods are prevalent. Many
considerations involved in ensuring
successful implementation of new
building practices are not specifically
covered by the requirements of the IRC.
The following are some of the questions to ask before implementing a
green building practice or, for that matter, any new building practice:
• Are any design changes required to
maintain compliance with codes
related to hazard mitigation specific to the region or to other aspects of structural performance and
durability?
• Are there any special building detailing issues that must be addressed?
• Will any special installation and
maintenance instructions need to be
developed and communicated in the
field?
Examples of green building practices not specifically addressed by the
prescriptive requirements of the IRC
include large roof overhangs for solar
shading, attachment of rooftop solar
photo-voltaic panels and attachment
of exterior siding products over exterior
insulation on exterior walls.
Examples of Special
Considerations to Maintain
Hazard Resistance
TABLE 1 is found on pages 14 and 15.
It is derived from FEMA P-798 and describes the interaction between green
Footnote
1. ICC 700 was referenced in Version 1.0 of the International Green Construction
Code (IgCC) but was dropped from Version 2.0. The IgCC is currently under development, with publication targeted for March 2012.
Figure 4. ICC 700 and LEED for Homes green building categories (FEMA 2010).
Spring 2011 13
Table 1. Green Building Practice Natural Hazard Sensitivity Matrix
14 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Source: FEMA P-798, Natural Hazards and Sustainability for Residential Buildings, 2010.
Spring 2011 15
building practices and the need for
natural hazard resistance for several
ICC 700 categories. In addition, it illustrates potential effects and is intended
to encourage further thought and consideration of improved design, detailing and installation techniques.
Lot design, preparation and
development
Beneficial interactions: Green building practices that minimize slope disturbance, soil disturbance and erosion
can also significantly improve the resistance of a neighborhood to some
natural hazards (such as earthquakes,
some types of flooding and wildfires).
Further, development of stormwater
management plans, hydrologic analyses, soil studies and other such actions
that garner points under ICC 700 can
also guide the designer to solutions
that increase a building’s resistance to
natural hazards.
Special considerations: Site selection decisions, made in order to qualify
for green rating system points, should
also take into account the dominant
natural hazards in a region. For example, the decision to build on an infill
site should include consideration of
floodplain and stormwater management issues.
Energy efficiency
Beneficial interactions: Green building practices that improve energy-efficiency by using thermal mass can also
increase resistance to certain natural hazards. For example, the use of
properly detailed concrete or masonry
walls can improve resistance to windborne debris in high-wind events.
Special considerations: Increasing
thermal mass also increases the loads
imparted on a building in an earthquake. The use of heavier walls requires increased bracing to withstand
the higher earthquake loads. Additionally, energy-efficiency practices that
reduce the number of framing connections or their effectiveness (due
to increased framing spacing [see the
example under Resource Efficiency]
or wider spaces between structural
framing and sheathing or siding) require special attention to detailing.
For example, thick exterior insulating sheathing in a high-wind region
may require non-standard attachment
and flashing to maintain resistance to
wind suction and wind-driven rain intrusion into wall cavities.
Resource efficiency
Beneficial interactions: The green
building practices that optimize building framing (as per ICC 700, Section
601.2) can have a significant effect on
structural performance. When this design accounts for the dominant natural
hazards in a given region, optimization
can improve structural robustness. For
example, optimization in a high-wind
region often includes reinforcing highly-stressed connections.
Special considerations: The Commentary to Section 601.2 of ICC 700
(NAHB 2008b) encourages advanced
wood framing techniques that use
less material in the building while
complying with applicable structural
requirements. In some cases, the optimization of framing creates additional
challenges for designers to maintain
load paths and other aspects of structural capacity.
Unless these techniques are carefully implemented, some parts of the
structure may be compromised. For
example, increasing framing spacing from 16 inches (40 cm) on center
(o.c.) to 24 inches (60 cm) o.c. earns
credits in the ICC 700 rating system
but provides fewer points of connectivity within walls and between the
walls and the roof. If the optimized
framing system is used, proper installation of each connection is more important than it would be in the more
redundant 16 inches (40 cm) o.c. situation, simply because there are fewer
connections.
Operation, maintenance and building owner education
Beneficial interactions: ICC 700
provides credit for communicating important building operation
and maintenance information to the
homeowner. This information can
help the homeowner to maintain critical areas in the exterior building envelope, thus minimizing long-term water
intrusion and associated building degradation. Well-maintained buildings
are better equipped to resist wind and
seismic hazards.
16 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Added Benefits of
Maintaining Natural
Hazard Resistance
FEMA P-798 defines sustainable
building design as “building design
that addresses fundamental sustainability principles by optimizing the use
of land, materials, energy and water
for human occupancy and ecosystem
health while considering the ability of
the building to resist natural hazards.”
Buildings that incorporate green
building practices and provide needed resistance to natural hazards have
distinct advantages and offer considerable sustainability benefits, even
though these benefits are difficult to
quantify. For example, every home
that survives a hurricane:
• Provides post-disaster shelter for
the home’s occupants;
• Minimizes windborne debris to
downwind homes;
• Removes the need for one additional temporary housing structure; and
• Provides post-disaster sustainability benefits (less material sent to
landfill and less new material needed for reconstruction).
If a home has self-sufficiency attributes (also known as “passive survivability”), it can shelter occupants after
a disaster without relying on outside
infrastructure. Consider, for example, the use of solar power for on-site
electric power generation. Numerous
design and detailing considerations
are needed for such a system to function after a disaster, including coordination with the local utility, actively
planning for what power generation
is achievable and matching that to the
more important electrical loads. These
all may be of value to the homeowner. Sizing the system to supply critical loads will also help a homeowner
respond to natural hazard events (for
example, ice storms, hurricanes or
floods), all of which can interrupt utility power for extended periods.
Balancing Green Building
Practices and Increased
Resistance to Natural
Hazards
The desire of a homeowner, builder or designer to achieve improved
environmental performance creates a
preference for building practices recognized by green rating systems. In
some cases, this may create the need to
decide between practices that increase
efficiency and garner green rating system points or use of practices that increase resistance to natural hazards
without garnering green rating system
points.
The proper
implementation of a new
green building practice for
residential construction
can be particularly
challenging because
designer participation
is often limited and
prescriptive design
methods are prevalent.
Consider, for example, the use of advanced framing options that earn points
for resource efficiency versus framing options that increase resistance to
wind hazards. Use of the green building
practice that will garner points toward a
higher green-performance-level rating
often will be preferred. However, benefits associated with increased resistance
to natural hazards may not be fully understood because they are often difficult
to quantify and specific guidance concerning their consideration is not presented by today’s green rating systems.
Quantifying Benefits of
Natural Hazard Resistance in
the Green Rating Systems: The
Challenge for Designers
As noted earlier in this article, by
implementing LCA concepts, designers can demonstrate avoided damages
and show measurable environmental
benefits for a stronger home. Conducting such an analysis requires designer
involvement, considerable information
about the materials of construction and
specialized calculation tools.
FEMA P-798 provides one example
of how such an analysis can be used
to identify avoided environmental
impacts associated with two failure scenarios: the partial failure of a house (for
example, the loss of a roof) and complete structural failure (for example,
the loss of the entire home). Both are
determined and compared to the environmental costs of improving the initial
construction to avoid such losses.
For the example building, the analysis shows that the environmental benefits associated with avoiding either
failure scenario far outweigh the negligible environmental cost of actions taken to strengthen the building. Although
avoided environmental impact analysis
is not specifically defined in green rating systems, it is one tool that can be
used to show that the relative environmental benefits associated with avoiding premature failure can far outweigh
the environmental cost of actions taken
to strengthen the building to avoid such
failures.
Conclusion
Some green practices for residential
construction provide improved environmental performance without any
effect on structural performance. By
comparison, others may require a reevaluation of the entire design in order
to retain the home’s integrity and building functions in natural hazard events.
As home designers, builders and code
officials make decisions about how to
implement new green building practices in compliance with requirements
of applicable building codes, they must
consider how the new practices affect
resistance to natural hazards.
This message is particularly useful
in residential construction that relies
heavily on prescriptive design and construction requirements that may not
specifically address the most current
building practices.
Building practices that provide increased resistance to natural hazards
can have significant and measurable
green benefits without being recognized as a green building practice and
without accruing points in common
green rating systems. While life-cycle
analysis provides opportunities to
demonstrate the green benefits of hazard-resistant buildings, the complexity
associated with demonstrating benefits
is a potential barrier to its use for this
purpose.
n
The information presented in this
article is largely derived from FEMA
P-798, Sustainability and Natural Hazard Resistance for Residential Construction, which provides a more detailed
explanation of green rating systems in
the broader context of sustainability.
Visit www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.
do?fromSearch=fromsearch&id=4347
to download or order FEMA P-798.
Philip Line, PE, is Senior Manager,
Engineering Research for the American
Wood Council of the American Forest &
Paper Association (AF&PA).
Omar Kapur, EIT, LEED Green Associate, is a Structural Engineer at URS
Corporation.
Samantha Passman, EIT, is also with
URS Corporation.
Additional resources
Bowyer, Jim L. (2010). Green Building and Implications for Wood Markets, Wood Design Focus. Vol. 20, No.
1, pp. 3-7. Forest Products Society,
Madison, WI. www.forestprod.org.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (2010). Natural Hazards and
Sustainability for Residential Buildings. FEMA P-798.
International Code Council (2009).
International Residential Code (IRC).
International Code Council (2009).
International Building Code (IBC).
International Code Council (2010).
International Green Construction
Code Public Version 1.0. www.iccsafe.
org. Date accessed September 2010.
National Association of Home
Builders (NAHB) (2008a). National
Green Building Standard. ICC 700.
Washington, D.C.
NAHB (2008b). National Green
Building Standard Commentary. ICC
700 Commentary. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Green Building Council.
Green Home Guide. http://greenhomeguide.com/program/leed-forhomes. Date accessed September
2010.
Spring 2011 17
Feature
FEMA Updates
Safe Room Publications
By John Ingargiola, CFM; Tom Reynolds, PE; and Scott Tezak, PE
Introduction
In August 2008, FEMA released the third edition of FEMA
320 and the second edition of FEMA 361. First released in 1998
and last revised in September 2000, FEMA 320 is the benchmark publication that provides prescriptive designs to be used
in the design and construction of residential and small community shelters, now classified by FEMA as safe rooms. These
structures are intended to protect occupants from wind and
debris associated with hurricanes and tornadoes. Originally
released in July 2000, FEMA 361 provides technical guidance
for the design and construction of community safe rooms intended to protect larger groups of occupants from wind and
debris associated with hurricanes and tornadoes.
Since the publication of FEMA 320 in 1998 and FEMA 361
in 2000, thousands of safe rooms have been built using FEMA’s
criteria, many funded partly by FEMA. A growing number of
these safe rooms have saved lives in actual events. Since the
initiation of its safe room program, FEMA has provided federal
funds through its Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program, totaling over $385,000,000, for the design and construction of more
than 800 community safe rooms.
Through residential safe room initiatives over the same period, support for the design and construction of over 20,000
residential safe rooms occurred with federal funds totaling
more than $75,000,000. These projects were completed in both
tornado-prone and hurricane-prone regions of the country.
FEMA 320 and 361 were used as the basis for developing the
new International Code Council/National Storm Shelter Association (ICC/NSSA) Standard for the Design and Construction
of Storm Shelters (ICC 500) released in August 2008 (Figure 3).
Figure 1. FEMA 320.
Figure 2. FEMA 361.
This article is a condensed presentation of the
updates in the latest versions of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) safe room publications, FEMA 320, Taking Shelter from the Storm: Building a Safe Room for Your Home
or Small Business, and FEMA 361, Design and Construction
Guidance for Community Safe Rooms, both dated August 2008
(Figure 1 and Figure 2).
Specifically, this article concentrates on the design updates
for safe rooms constructed out of reinforced concrete and masonry. For more information, please contact FEMA directly via
the information provided at the end of this article.
18 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
FEMA continues to support the development of consensus
codes and standards that provide minimum acceptable requirements for the design and construction of hazard-resistant
buildings. The ICC 500 successfully took many of the design
and performance criteria presented in the earlier editions of
FEMA’s safe room publications, updated them and codified
them through the consensus standard process.
Although most of the ICC 500 criteria are the same as the
FEMA criteria (the documents share the same design wind
speed maps), important differences exist with respect to design assumptions, windborne debris impact protection for the
hurricane hazards, designing for flood hazards and emergency
management guidance. Some highlights of the FEMA criteria
are presented in the following section.
Levels of Protection: Defining A “Safe Room”
“Safe room” and “shelter” are two terms that have been used
interchangeably in past publications, guidance documents and
other shelter-related materials. However, with the release of the
ICC 500, there is a need to identify shelters that meet the FEMA
criteria for life safety protection versus those that meet the ICC
500 standard.
FEMA refers to all shelters constructed to meet their criteria
(whether for individuals, residences, small businesses, schools
or communities) as safe rooms. All safe room criteria, as set
forth in the FEMA publications, meet or exceed the shelter requirements of the ICC 500.
Safe rooms designed and constructed in accordance
with guidance in FEMA 320 and 361 provide “near-absolute
Figure 3. ICC 500.
protection” from extreme-wind events. FEMA 361 defines
near-absolute protection as follows: “near-absolute protection
means that, based on our current knowledge of tornadoes and
hurricanes, the occupants of a safe room built according to this
guidance will have a very high probability of being protected
from injury or death. Our knowledge of tornadoes and hurricanes is based on substantial meteorological records as well as
extensive investigations of damage from extreme winds.”
By comparison, the purpose of the ICC 500 standard was
set forth as: “ICC 500, Section 101.1 Purpose. The purpose of
this standard is to establish minimum requirements to safeguard the public health, safety and general welfare relative to
the design, construction and installation of storm shelters constructed for protection from high winds associated with tornadoes and hurricanes. This standard is intended for adoption by
government agencies and organizations for use in conjunction
with model codes to achieve uniformity in the technical design
and construction of storm shelters.”
Further, FEMA 361 defines a community safe room as a shelter that is designed and constructed to protect a large number
of people from a natural hazard event. Specifically, the number
of persons taking refuge in the safe room will be more than 16
and could be up to several hundred or more. Safe rooms for 16
or fewer occupants are addressed by the prescriptive designs
for residential and small community safe rooms, presented in
FEMA 320.
It is important to note, however, that the FEMA criteria for
safe rooms are presented in a guidance document. It is up to
a community or jurisdiction to determine if the level of protection they desire is that of a safe room, an ICC 500 shelter
or another shelter that may provide some level of protection
between that of an engineered building and the FEMA or ICC
500 levels of protection.
The 2009 International Building Code (IBC) and the International Residential Code (IRC) have adopted the ICC 500 as the
code minimum requirements for the design and construction
of tornado and hurricane shelters. As such, permits issued for
a “shelter” in communities or jurisdictions that adopt the 2009
IBC and IRC will need to be in accordance to the requirements
of the ICC 500.
The adoption of the ICC 500 is a significant step forward in
improving the level of protection provided by shelters. Prior to
the 2009 IBC and IRC, the codes and standards for the design
and construction of buildings contained no provisions for providing life safety protection for building occupants during tornado and hurricane events.
FEMA Publication Updates
The new third edition of FEMA 320, Taking Shelter From the
Storm: Building A Safe Room For Your Home or Small Business,
2008, presents updated hazard evaluation, prescriptive safe
room designs and consumer guidance. The new second edition of FEMA 361 presents updated and refined design criteria
for safe rooms when compared to the first edition’s 2000 criteria. The changes to the prescriptive designs of FEMA 320 and
the design criteria (for both tornado and hurricane hazards) of
FEMA 361 are the result of post-disaster investigations into the
Spring 2011 19
performance of safe rooms and shelters after tornadoes and
hurricanes.
Further, the changes in both documents also consider the
new consensus standard from the ICC 500. The criteria presented in the publications address how to design and construct
a safe room that provides near-absolute protection for groups
of individuals sent to a building or structure expecting it to be
capable of providing them life safety protection from wind,
windborne debris and flooding.
FEMA 320 continues to provide prescriptive designs for safe
rooms using concrete, masonry or wood. Essentially, the design parameters remain unchanged, with the prescriptive designs being developed for the most restrictive of criteria so they
may be used for any hazard, anywhere in the country.
The safe rooms are designed to resist wind forces generated
from a 250 mph (402 km per hour) wind (3-second gust) and
debris impact from a 15 lb, 2x4 projectile traveling horizontally
at 100 mph (160 km per hour). Refinements in the design criteria include the use of the “partially enclosed” value for internal
pressure so that these designs can be used for both residential
and small community safe room applications. The flood hazard
design criteria have also been refined to provide more detailed
guidance when flood hazards are present.
FEMA 361 sets forth the detailed criteria for designing and
constructing a safe room. The focus of FEMA 361 is to guide
designers through the design of a community safe room but
the details of the FEMA 320 prescriptive design criteria are now
provided as well.
The design process is outlined in FEMA 361, along with the
criteria. One of the primary differences in a building’s structural system designed for use as a safe room, rather than for conventional use, is the magnitude of the wind forces it is designed
to withstand. Conventional (normal) buildings are designed to
withstand forces associated with a certain wind speed (termed
“design [basic] wind speed”) presented in design standards
such as the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7-05,
Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures.
The highest design wind speed used in conventional construction, near the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, is in the range of
140 to 150 mph (225 to 240 km per hour), 3-second gust. By
contrast, the design wind speed recommended by FEMA for
safe rooms in these same areas is in the range of 200 to 225 mph
(321 to 362 km per hour), 3-second gust, and is intended to ensure that safe rooms can provide “near-absolute protection” for
occupants.
Figure 4 presents the two wind speed maps from FEMA
361. Two wind speeds maps are provided in the publication
to address both tornado-specific and hurricane-specific
hazards.
For envelope or cladding systems, the governing design criterion is windborne debris, commonly referred to as missiles.
Windows and glazing in exterior doors of conventional buildings are not required to resist windborne debris, except when
the buildings are located within windborne debris regions
where openings must have impact-resistant glazing systems
or protection systems. These systems can be laminated glass,
polycarbonate glazing, shutters or other products that have
been tested per requirements set forth in the building code and
standards.
The ASCE 7-05 missile criteria were developed to minimize
property damage and improve building performance. They
were not developed to protect occupants and notably, do not
require walls and roof surfaces to be debris impact resistant.
To provide occupant protection for a life safety level of protection, the criteria used in designing safe rooms include greater resistance to penetration from windborne debris. Sections
3.3.2, 3.4.2 and 3.5.2 of FEMA 361 present the debris impactresistance performance criteria for the tornado, hurricane and
residential safe rooms, respectively.
In general, the tornado debris impact protection criteria are
to resist a 15 lb, 2x4 projectile traveling at 80 to 100 mph (128
to 160 km per hour), depending on the safe room design wind
speed. Similarly, the hurricane debris impact protection criteria are to resist a 9 lb, 2x4 projectile traveling at 80 to 128 mph
(128 to 205 km per hour), depending on the safe room design
wind speed.
The technical differences between updated FEMA 361/320
and the ICC 500 are based on the different levels of protection
offered by the FEMA safe rooms and the emergency management guidance that are part of the FEMA criteria. As such,
Figure 4. Tornado and hurricane safe room design wind speed maps from FEMA 361 (2008).
20 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Table 1: Differences in Design Criteria Between FEMA 361 and the ICC 500
FEMA 320/361
Use Exposure C only.
Partially enclosed design, strongly encouraged for:
• Tornado safe room; and
• Hurricane safe room.
Hurricane debris impact criteria 0.5 x safe room design wind
speed.
Flood design criteria restricts placement of safe rooms.
Peer review triggered at 50 occupants.
FEMA maintains more stringent criteria than ICC 500. Table 1
highlights a few of the key differences between the FEMA and
ICC 500 guidelines. For additional information, see Chapter 3
of FEMA 361.
FEMA provides up-to-date best practices and design guidance on all types of hazard resistance construction (from
residential buildings to critical facilities). The information developed for FEMA’s various guidance documents was used to
update FEMA 320/361. Therefore, if safe room designers, operators and emergency managers implement FEMA criteria in
their projects, they can feel confident that they’ve used the best
available information to guide the design and construction
of a safe room (public or private) that provides near-absolute
protection from the deadly winds and debris associated with
extreme-wind events.
Concrete and masonry
The inherent physical characteristics of properly reinforced
concrete and masonry make them ideal for withstanding high
pressures and windborne-debris impacts. With the addition
of an exterior finish capable of preventing water infiltration
during flood events, these systems can provide exceptional
protection under design events. It is for these reasons that
concrete and masonry are among one of the most preferred
ICC 500 Standard
Use Exposure C, with some Exposure B.
Enclosed or partially enclosed design, allowed for:
• Tornado may also use Atmospheric Pressure Change
(APC) calculation; and
• Hurricane may be designed as enclosed.
Hurricane debris impact criteria 0.4 x shelter design wind
speed.
Flood design criteria allows placement of shelters anywhere.
Peer review triggered at 300 occupants.
construction materials for safe rooms. Most safe rooms are
typically constructed with conventional cast-in-place concrete
and concrete masonry units (CMUs).
A few examples of how concrete and masonry can be used
in the construction of residential and small community safe
rooms are provided in the following descriptions. For safe
rooms, other than the prescriptive designs in FEMA 320, the
design criteria in FEMA 361 should be followed. FEMA 361
(2008) criteria include improved design wind speeds, design
factors and missile impact resistance criteria.
Cast-in-place concrete and precast
FEMA 320 provides prescriptive solutions for safe rooms using both of these construction methods. In the updated publication, the cast-in-place concrete and precast concrete details
remain very similar to the previous publication. For a standard
8 x 8 ft (2 x 2 m) safe room, the wall thickness is 6 inches (15 cm)
minimum with #4 vertical bars at 12 inches (30 cm) on center.
However, FEMA 320 now provides prescriptive solutions for a
14 x 14 ft (4 by 4 m) residential or small community safe room
(Figure 5). See Drawing AG-01 in FEMA 320 for more details.
Insulating concrete forms
In an effort to assist homebuilders and homeowners with
building economical safe rooms for new and existing homes,
the Portland Cement Association, American PolySteel and
Figure 5. A cast-in-place concrete safe room from FEMA 320.
Spring 2011 21
Lite-Form International worked together to develop safe room
plans specifically for insulating concrete forms (ICFs).
Like the forms used for cast-in-place concrete, ICFs are
forms that hold the concrete during placement. The difference
is that the ICF forms stay in place as a permanent part of the
wall assembly. Made of foam insulation or other insulating material, the forms typically have one of two basic configurations:
• Pre-formed interlocking blocks into which the concrete is
placed; or
• Individual panels with plastic connectors that form cavities
into which the concrete is placed.
Thanks to the efforts of these industry partners, FEMA 320
provides prescriptive solutions using ICF. Drawing Numbers
AG-08 and AG-09 include details for waffle grid and flat wall
ICF systems (Figure 6). The sections provided in the FEMA
320 plans have all been tested and shown to resist the 15 lb,
2x4 projectile traveling at 100 mph (160 km per hour). It is important to note there are some ICF products, called screen grid
forms, shaped similar to waffle grid forms. These ICF products
create a discontinuous concrete infill (voids) and should not be
used in safe room construction.
Concrete masonry units
The inherent physical characteristics of properly constructed reinforced masonry make it ideal to withstand windinduced pressures and windborne-debris impacts. With the
addition of an exterior finish capable of preventing water infiltration during events with wind-driven rain, these systems
Figure 6. ICF safe rooms from FEMA 320.
22 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
can provide exceptional protection under design events. It is
for these reasons that masonry is one of the most preferred
construction materials for a safe room. Many safe rooms are
typically constructed with CMUs.
Examples of how concrete masonry can be used in the construction of residential and small community safe rooms are provided in FEMA 320 (Figure 7). When designing safe rooms, the
prescriptive designs in FEMA 320 may be used or the design criteria in FEMA 361 should be followed. FEMA 361 criteria provide
all the necessary information to design a safe room to provide
near-absolute protection using reinforced concrete masonry.
It is relatively straight-forward to construct a safe room
from reinforced masonry. Advances in the industry include the
addition of water repellant in the block mix, additional sealers and flashing applied on-site and foam installation used
as moisture repellant. Concrete masonry can be used in new
construction, existing homes and in stand-alone safe rooms.
The most critical aspect of constructing a safe room using reinforced masonry is that all cells must be filled with concrete
or grout. This provides resistance to glazing, shutter or other
products that have been tested per requirements set forth in
the building code and standards.
After the initial FEMA 320 publications were developed in
1998 and 2000, the National Concrete Masonry Association
(NCMA) continued to investigate the use of reinforced masonry in safe room construction. Through their own research,
development and testing, NCMA refined the safe room designs
to better utilize materials. As a result, NCMA was able to provide new design details to FEMA when the publications were
updated in 2008. These new details now allow masonry wall
designs that will not require vertical reinforcing steel in every
vertical “stack” of cells.
FEMA 320 provides options for constructing an 8 x 8 ft (2 x 2
m) and 14 x 14 ft (4 by 4 m) safe room (Figure 8) of reinforced
masonry (in addition to designs using reinforced concrete and
wood systems). New for the 2008 designs, the reinforcing details have been modified and reinforcing steel is no longer required in every vertical cell. In the new designs for the 8 x 8 ft
(2 x 2 m) CMU safe room, the vertical reinforcing steel is now
#5 bars at every corner and 48 inches (121 cm) on the center.
As mentioned previously, it is very important to remember that
each cell is still fully grouted.
Reinforced CMU safe room designs are now provided for
rooms that are 14 x 14 ft (4 by 4 m). Vertical reinforcing steel
used for these larger safe rooms is now #6 bars at every corner
and 40 inches (101 cm) at the center. Another addition provides
better details on the CMU roof design and connections to other
materials used for safe room roof construction. See Drawing
AG-01 in FEMA 320 (2008 edition) for more CMU safe room design details and a reinforcement schedule. Figure 6 presents
the CMU reinforcement schedule for the safe rooms presented
in the FEMA drawings.
With a constantly-evolving industry, new technologies and
adaptations are on the horizon. In addition to modified mix designs, the market is already seeing advances in the use of Kevlar, in conjunction with concrete, to resist debris impact. As the
industry advances, new materials and construction methods
Figure 7. A CMU safe room from FEMA 320.
Figure 8. A CMU reinforcement schedule from FEMA 320.
Spring 2011 23
will be developed to enhance the durability, feasibility and robustness of FEMA safe rooms.
Conclusion
The August 2008 release of the FEMA 320 and 361 safe
room guidance documents and the ICC 500 storm shelter
standard were significant milestones in the standardization of
criteria for structures to be used to provide life safety protection from tornadoes and hurricanes. With the incorporation
of the ICC 500 into the 2009 IBC and IRC, the majority of the
FEMA safe room criteria that have been used since the 1990s
is now codified.
It is now the challenge of designers, emergency managers,
owners/operators and industry groups and participants to
strive towards producing quality safe rooms that meet the new
criteria.
While it is true that few, if any, shelters constructed to the
criteria and standards presented in this paper have experienced a design event, in time this will occur. Tornadoes and
hurricanes will happen and will inevitably impact a safe room.
When this happens, investigations of the effect of the event on
the safe room will take place and these criteria and standards
will be reviewed and improved.
There is debate in the architectural and engineering communities about some of the design values chosen for safe rooms and
shelters, particularly the internal pressure coefficients, exposure categories and debris impact criteria. The criteria set forth
in FEMA 361/320 and ICC 500 are based on the best available
research, from both the field and laboratory, at the time these
documents were produced. As opportunities arise to further investigate and research these criteria, both FEMA and ICC should
work together to investigate and update the design guidance
and requirements of the standard, respectively.
n
For more information on FEMA safe rooms, see www.fema.
gov/plan/prevent/saferoom, contact the FEMA Safe Room Help
Line at saferoom@dhs.gov, or call (866) 222-3580 and select “2”
from the help menu.
John Ingargiola, CFM, is a Senior Engineer and Team Leader
in the Building Science Branch of the Risk Reduction Division
at FEMA’s Mitigation Directorate Headquarters in Washington,
D.C.
Tom Reynolds, PE, has 12 years of experience as a structural engineer with URS Corporation. He has a wide variety of experience
dealing with high-wind hazards mitigation for natural hazards.
Scott Tezak, PE, is a Project Manager with URS Corporation.
He was the consultant project manager for the update to the
FEMA publications in 2008 and is the Vice-Chairman of the ICC
500 Standard Committee.
Write for JHAZ
The publishers of the Journal of Hazard
Mitigation and Risk Assessement (JHAZ) are
looking for expert industry articles for the next
edition to be released in early September. If you
have a topic related to hazard mitigation or risk
assessment that you’d like to write about, email
your abstract to nibs@nibs.org by May 1, 2011.
Abstracts Due
5/1/2011
Articles are generally around 3,000 words and
photos are welcome. All abstracts and articles
are subject to approval and editing to fit space
available. Final articles are due June 15, 2011.
Questions? Contact:
Final Articles Due
6/15/2011
24 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Philip Schneider, AIA, Program Director
Multihazard Mitigation Council
National Institute of Building Sciences
pschneider@nibs.org
Feature
Motivating Public Mitigation
and Preparedness
for Earthquakes and Other Hazards
By Dennis S. Mileti; Linda B. Bourque; Michele M. Wood; and Megumi Kano
Many social science research publications
report on findings from research about what correlates
with public preparedness and mitigation actions across a
range of different hazards in different places and locations
(cf. Lindell and Perry 2000). By far, most of these report on
the results of studies conducted in California on the earthquake hazard. FIGURE 1, adapted from Wood et al., 2009,
lists the categories of public actions that people can take
to get ready.
Even more publications report on other societal earthquake-related topics studied in California, for example, the
public response to actual earthquake disasters, household
and organizational responses by public and private organizations to earthquake predictions and forecasts, and much
more. The references provided in this document refer to
some of these publications but not to all of them.1
The Research Record
Earthquake research in California
Social science research on the correlates of public responses to “actual” earthquakes in California began in 1971
(Bourque et al., 1973). While many of these studies did not
focus on public preparedness and mitigation for future
earthquakes, most were cross-sectional surveys that enabled
researchers to generalize findings to larger populations. Some
of these did report on a few factors that were found to correlate with a few public preparedness and mitigation actions.
For example, some studies examined how actual exposure
to shaking, damage and injury in a recent earthquake (cf.
Dooley et al., 1992; Russell et al., 1995; Nguyen et al., 2006)
impacted respondents’ estimates of the probability of a future earthquake and how subsequent expectations of damage and injury (DeMan and Simpson-Houseley 1987; Palm et
Figure 1.
Spring 2011 25
al., 1990; Mileti and O’Brien 1992) influenced some preparedness and mitigation action-taking.
Earthquake information research in California
The first social science research to clearly focus on the
correlates of public preparedness and mitigation actions
in response to “information” about possible future earthquakes in California, and the need to prepare for them,
began in 1976 (Mileti, Hutton, and Sorensen 1981; Turner,
Nigg, and Heller-Paz 1986). The studies that were performed
covered a range of different contexts in which the dissemination of public earthquake and earthquake preparedness
information occurred. These include immediately after an
earthquake (Mileti and O’Brien 1992); after the prediction/
forecast of a particular earthquake (Mileti and Darlington
1997); and during more “general times” when no specific
event had just occurred or had been forecasted/predicted
(Bourque et al., 2009).
These California-based studies include the study of populations in small rural communities such as Paso Robles,
Coalinga and Taft (Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992), large urban
populations in southern California, such as Los Angeles
(Turner, Nigg and Heller-Paz 1986) and large urban populations in northern California, including different populations
in the greater Bay Area (Mileti and Darlington 1997; Mileti
and O’Brien 1992).
Research in other places and on other hazards
Social science research on this topic, however, has not
been limited to studies performed just on Californians or
Table 1.
26 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
just on the earthquake hazard. The effect of information to
encourage public preparedness and mitigation actions has
also been studied in other places and for other hazards.
Some of these include terrorism (Bourque et al., 2010), an
earthquake prediction in the central United States (Farley et
al., 1993), tsunamis (Haas and Trainer, 1974), floods (Waterstone 1978) and hurricanes (Ruch and Christenson 1980).
Perhaps, the most elaborate study ever performed on
the correlates of public response to information in education programs, in order to motivate the public to take preparedness and mitigation actions, has only recently been
completed. It examined the effect of distributed educational
information and many other factors on encouraging personal readiness for terrorism as well as for “any reason.”
This research was conducted on the population of the 48
contiguous states in the United States, the populations of
three different major cities in the nation, including Los Angeles, New York City and Washington, D.C., and on different U.S. racial and ethnic groups (Bourque and Mileti 2008)
(Table 1).
A thorough reading of the results leads to many conclusions. The most general conclusion is what motivates the
public to prepare is relatively the same regardless of differences in the geo-political location of the people being
examined or the type of hazard being investigated. Perhaps
this is because each study examined the same phenomenon: What motivates people to get ready for future hazardous events?
What is known about motivating public
preparedness and mitigation?
Where we are today, based on the conclusions from the
cumulative social science research record, is that relatively
strong, conclusive and replicated science-based evidence
exists regarding what it takes to teach members of the public what they need to know and how to motivate them to take
actions to better ready them for possible future hazardous
events (cf. Mileti and Bourque 2010). This empirical record
of social science research evidence may provide a more effective basis for increasing public knowledge and motivating
public preparedness and mitigation than alternative popular
approaches (for example, those based on good intentions, intuition and limited personal experience).
A synthesis of what is known based on the social science
research evidence accumulated to date is presented in this
section. The key question is behavioral: How do you help
people to stop, listen, learn and get ready for future disasters
that most of them think won’t really happen, and, if they do,
will happen to other people and not them? Most people think
this way because they think they are not at risk to high consequence, low probability events. This perception of being safe
is reinforced every day that a disaster does not occur.
The strongest motivator is experiencing a disaster
Perceptions of “being safe”, however, change to perceptions of “being at risk” immediately after a disaster. In fact, experiencing an actual disaster has the strongest effect among
all factors to motivate people to prepare for future disaster
events. Research on what has been popularized as “the window of opportunity” has found that the strong effect of experiencing an actual disaster on motivating victim preparedness
and mitigation declines as time from the event passes. This
is because perceptions of safety re-emerge and rise to pre-disaster levels, typically within an approximate two-year period
after the event (Burton et al., 1993; Weinstein 1989; Sims and
Bauman 1983).
Three strong information motivators also exist
In the absence of an actual disaster, the social science research record identifies three other factors (Table 2) as the
strongest motivators, by far, of household preparedness and
mitigation action-taking. The first of these is “information
observed” (Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992; Bourque and Mileti
2008). The impact of seeing what other people have done to
prepare and mitigate is a stronger motivator for taking action
than receiving information about the need to take actions.
The second and third factors both have to do with preparedness and mitigation information received from, for example, governments and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Second, “dense information” works better to motivate than less dense information. Information is dense when
it comes from multiple sources (Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992;
Bourque and Mileti 2008) and is communicated over multiple
diverse channels of communication (Mileti, Fitzpatrick, and
Farhar 1992; Bourque and Mileti 2008).
Third, the “content” of the information received works
to motivate when it is clearly focused on what actions to
Table 2.
Spring 2011 27
take (Mileti and Darlington 1997; Bourque and Mileti
2008), explains how those actions cut future losses (Dynes
et al., 1979; Bourque and Mileti 2008) and is consistent
(says the same thing) across the messages received from
different sources (Turner et al., 1981; Mileti, Fitzpatrick
and Fahar 1992).
How people convert information received into actions
The recently completed national study of motivating public action-taking (Bourque and Mileti 2008) provided two major contributions to social science knowledge. First, the study
sample was representative of all households in the country
and the findings confirmed those of previous studies that were
performed on much smaller sub-populations in unique parts
of the country. This lends increased validity to the conclusions
of those other studies. Second, it clearly identified the general
social processes (Figure 2) that people experience to convert
received preparedness information into actual household
preparedness actions.
This process can be described as follows. The factors of
information observed, information density and information
content are the key factors that motivate the pubic to prepare
and mitigate. Each of these factors has direct effects on increasing household action-taking. The more people hear, read
and see, the more they do to get ready.
These factors also indirectly affect household preparedness. They do this by increasing people’s knowledge and their
perceived effectiveness or efficacy of recommended actions
and by increasing discussions (sometimes called milling) with
Figure 2.
28 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
others about preparedness and mitigation. These factors,
knowledge, perceived effectiveness and milling, in turn, also
increase household preparedness and mitigation.
The Importance of Providing Information
These findings are very good news. In the absence of an
actual disaster (which is the strongest way to get people’s attention and motivate preparedness actions), the three major
determinants of household preparedness are pliable. Policies
and programs can be developed that increase information
dissemination in ways that increase people’s preparedness
and mitigation behavior.
Moreover, the pathway from information to action-taking
is such that the more information that is disseminated to
households, the more they will prepare and mitigate; the less
information, the less preparedness and mitigation.
In comparison to information received and observed,
most other factors do not matter much (Bourque and Mileti
2008; Bourque et al., 2010). These other factors include the increased probability of a future event (which is certainly useful
to know about for other reasons), risk perception and demographic characteristics (which can constrain what people can
afford but has little effect on readiness motivation).
They are either not related to household preparedness and
mitigation or their effects remain but are reduced to insignificant levels when the information factors just described are
taken into account (for example, included and controlled in
multivariate statistical models).
Implications for Practice
For practitioners, the current state of social science knowledge suggests several clear and low-cost pathways forward on
how to better present information to motivate public prepared
ness and mitigation for future disaster losses (FIGURE 3).
There certainly is no shortage of public information being
presented in our nation by a multitude of federal, state and
local government agencies and NGOs. Each of these organizations largely provides the public with unique information
that has been invented and is disseminated independent of
each other.
The social science research record suggests, however, that
regardless of what agency is providing public preparedness
and mitigation information, no single agency can do so very
effectively. Partnerships between information-providing organizations are critical to maximize effectiveness, and leadership (much like an orchestra leader) is needed to weave the
actions of partners together.
Here is what such an approach might seek to accomplish
if it were based on the current state of knowledge in the social sciences about how to maximize public preparedness and
mitigation:
1. Deliver messages to the public from multiple and different
information sources and through many different channels
of communication;
2. Improve coordination among the many different message
providers to craft and then deliver consistent messages
rather than multiple unique messages;
3. Coordinate message distribution across organizations so
that there is an ongoing flow of information across time
rather than delivery in discontinuous “lumps and bumps”;
4. Focus the message on the actions people might take (rather than on the horrors of disasters and their probabilities)
and how taking actions might cut actual future losses;
5. Invent innovative ways to motivate those who have already
prepared and mitigated to share what they have done with
other people in their lives who have done less or nothing;
and
6. Evaluate and revise programs to motivate public preparedness and mitigation not in terms of the number of products
or processes an agency delivered or engaged in but rather
in terms of actual preparedness and mitigations outcomes.
Over the past several decades, the social science research
literature has amassed on how to increase the likelihood that
members of the public will take action in response to preparedness and mitigation information. This literature provides clear guidance about how such messages can best be
composed and delivered. If helping members of the public
become better prepared for disasters is truly a national priority, then designing public education campaigns, not in a vacuum but rather based on the accumulated research literature,
must be a priority as well.
n
The research on which this manuscript is based was supported, in part, by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the National Consortium for the Study of
Figure 3.
Spring 2011 29
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland at College Park, grant number N00140510629
to the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); grant
number SES-0647736 from the U.S. National Science Foundation to UCLA; and grant number 1543106 from the U.S. National Science Foundation to UCLA through the University of
Colorado at Boulder.
However, any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of DHS, the National Science
Foundation or START.
Dr. Dennis S. Mileti is Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado at Boulder where he served as Director of the
Natural Hazards Center and as Chair of the Department of
Sociology.
Dr. Linda Bourque teaches courses in research methodology
with particular emphasis on the design, administration, data
processing and analysis of data collected by questionnaires and
interviews in community surveys. She is the Associate Director
of the Center for Public Health and Disasters, and the Associate
Director of the Southern California Injury Prevention Research
Center, both located in the UCLA School of Public Health.
Michele M. Wood is Assistant Professor of Health Science at
California State University, Fullerton where she teaches courses
in program design and evaluation, statistics, public health administration and substance abuse.
Megumi Kano received her Masters and Doctorate degrees
from the Department of Community Health Sciences of the
School of Public Health at the University of California, Los
Angeles. She majored in community health sciences with
a concentration in disaster public health and a minor in
epidemiology. Reference
1. Eighteen data sets from California-based social science
earthquake research conducted between 1971 and 1994
are available at: www.sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/da/earthquake/erthqstudies2.index.htm
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Additional RESources
Bourque, L.B., Mileti, D.S., Kano, M., and Wood, M.
M. 2010. Who Prepares for Terrorism? Environment and
Behavior, published online December 2, 2010, DOI:
10.1177/0013916510390318.
Bourque, L.B., Kano, M., and Wood, M.M. 2009. The State of
Public Readiness in California and How to Increase It. Submitted to the Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission and the
California Emergency Management Agency. Los Angeles, California: University of California.
Bourque, L.B., and Mileti, D.S. 2008. Public Readiness for Terrorism in America: A Briefing on the Results of a National Survey.
National Press Club Briefing, Washington, D.C.: October 24.
Bourque, L. B., Reeder, L.G., Cherlin, A., Raven, B.H., and
Walton, D.M. 1973. “The Unpredictable Disaster in a Metropolis: Public Response to the Los Angeles Earthquake of February 1971.” Los Angeles, California: Civil Defense Preparedness
Agency, UCLA Survey Research Center.
Burton, I, Kates, R.W., and White, G.F. 1993. The Environment as Hazard. 2nd Edition. New York: The Guilford Press.
Demand, A., and Simpson-Housely, P. 1987. Factors in Perception of Earthquake Hazard, Perception and Motor Skills. 64:
185-820.
Dooley, D., Catalano, R., Mishra, S., and Serner, S. 1992.
Earthquake Preparedness: Predictors in a Community Survey.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 22(6): 451-470.
Dynes, R.R., Purcell, A.H., Wenger, D.E., Stern, P.E., Stallings,
R.A., and Johnson, Q.T. 1979. Report to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force from Staff Report to the President’s
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. Washington,
D.C.: President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile
Island.
Farley, J.E., Barlow, H.D., Finkelstein, M.S., and Riley, L. 1993.
Earthquake Hysteria, Before and After: A Survey and Follow-up
on Public Response to the Browning Forecast. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 11: 305-322.
Haas, J.E., and Trainer, P. 1974. Effectiveness of the Tsunami
Warning System in Selected Coastal Towns in Alaska. Proceedings of the Fifth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering.
Rome, Italy.
Lindell, M.K., and Perry, R.W. 2000. Household Adjustment to
Earthquake Hazard: A Review of the Research. Environment and
Behavior. 32(4): 461-501.
Mileti, Dennis S., and Linda B. Bourque. 2010. The State of
Knowledge in the Social Sciences about Motivating Public Preparedness for Earthquakes. Appendix C: Research Summary. In
California Emergency Management Agency, California Earthquake and Tsunamis Communications and Outreach Plan.
Sacramento: California Emergency Management Agency, May
2010.
Mileti, D.S., and Darlington, J. 1995. Societal Response to Revised Earthquake Probabilities in the San Francisco Bay Area.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 13(2):
119-145.
Mileti, D.S., and Darlington, J. 1997. The Role of Searching
Behavior in Response to Earthquake Risk Information. Social
Problems. 44(1): 89-103.
Mileti, D.S., and Fitzpatrick, C. 1992. The Causal Sequence
of Risk Communication in the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction
Experiment. Risk Analysis. 12(3): 393-400.
Mileti, D.S., and Fitzpatrick, C. 1993. The Great Earthquake
Experiment: Risk Communication and Public Action. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press.
Mileti, D.S., Fitzpatrick, C., and Farhar, B.C. 1992. Fostering Public Preparations for Natural Hazards: Lessons from the
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36-39.
Mileti, D.S., Hutton, J., Sorensen, J.H. 1981. Earthquake Prediction Response and Options for Public Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Institute of Behavioral Science.
Mileti, D.S., and O’Brien, P.W. 1992. Warnings During Disaster: Normalizing Communicated Risk. Social Problems. 39(1):
40-57. Reprinted in U.S. Geological Survey (Ed.). 1993. The
Loma Prieta Earthquake of October 17, 1989. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Nguyen, L.H., Shen, H., Ershoff, D., Afifi, A.A. and
Bourque, L.B. 2006. Exploring the Causal Relationship between Exposure to the Northridge Earthquake and Pre- and
Post-earthquake Preparedness Activities. Earthquake Spectra.
22: 659-587.
O’Brien, P., and Mileti, D.S. 1992. Citizen Participation in
Emergency Response Following the Loma Prieta Earthquake.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 10(1):
71-89. Reprinted in U.S. Geological Survey (Ed.) 1993. The
Loma Prieta Earthquake of October 17, 1989. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Palm, R., Hodgson, M. Blanchard, R.D., and Lyons, D. 1990.
Earthquake Insurance in California. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Ruch, C., and Christensen, L. 1980. Hurricane Message Enhancement. College Station, Texas: Texas Sea Grant College Program, Texas A & M University.
Russell, L.A., Goltz, J.D., and Bourque, L.B. 1995. Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation Actions before and After Two Earthquakes. Environment and Behavior. 27(6): 744-770.
Sims, J.H., Bauman, D.D. 1983. Educational Programs and
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Turner, R.J., Paz, D.H., and Young, B. 1981. Community Response to Earthquake Threat in Southern California. Parts 4-6
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University of California Press.
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Readiness: The Get Ready Pyramid. Journal of Emergency Management. 7(4 July/August): 25-37.
Spring 2011 31
Feature
Buildings, Tunnels and Mass Transit Stations:
DHS Releases Integrated Rapid Visual
Screening Tools in 2011
By Michael Chipley, Mohammed Ettouney; Milagros Kennett; Terry Ryan; Philip Schneider; and Richard Walker
To quickly and reliably assess
the vulnerability of our nation’s critical
infrastructure, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate’s Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division (IDD) has developed
a unique set of Integrated Rapid Visual
Screening (IRVS) tools for buildings,
tunnels and mass transit stations.
These next-generation tools are
based on FEMA 452¹, which provides
a preliminary procedure for architects
and engineers to assess the risk of
terrorist attacks, and FEMA 455², in
which the concepts for rapid visual
screening are combined with a riskbased procedure for manmade threats
defined in FEMA 452 and FEMA 426.³
The new IRVS screening tools provide
the following information:
1. Quantification of resilience;
2. Quantification of risk;
3. Assessment of explosive, chemical,
biological and radiological attacks;
4. Assessment of earthquakes, floods
and high-wind hazards;
5. Assessment of fire hazards;
6. Assessment of different building
types;
7. Assessment of mass transit stations;
and
8. Assessment of tunnels.
This is the first set of tools that
uniquely computes and quantifies
scores for resiliency and risk and combines that with a multihazard assessment for a given building.
IRVS for buildings is a simple and
efficient visual procedure for obtaining risk and resiliency scores and multihazard assessments for a variety of
general building types. On the other
hand, IRVS for mass transit and tunnels
uses the same risk methodology but is
more unique, attribute-specific and it
predominantly calculates man-made
threats.
Results obtained from the rapid visual screening process can be used for
various applications. They include:
1. Prioritizing for further evaluation;
2. Developing emergency preparedness plans in the event of a highthreat alert;
3. Planning post-event evacuations,
rescues, recoveries and safety evaluation efforts;
4. Prioritizing mitigation needs; and
5. Developing specific vulnerability
information.
The results are especially useful for
identifying a specific asset for more
detailed study, verifying results and
developing mitigation measures that
will reduce the risk ratings to a more
acceptable level. Table 1 summarizes
the key details about each of the tools.
Features and benefits of the
DHS S&T IRVS tools
IRVS is a quick and simple tool that
determines the risks, resiliency and
multihazard interactions of a building.
The IRVS methodology can effectively
and powerfully compute the level of
risk associated with a building from
both natural and man-made hazards.
For buildings (and largely for tunnels
and mass transit stations), it specifically can:
• Obtain numeric risk and resiliency
score that produces a quantification of risks, relative risks and an understanding of the most dominant
features of the building controlling
overall risk.
• Identify, collect and store vulnerability data that can then be re-examined after protective measures have
been put in place or are considered
to be put in place.
• Rank vulnerabilities and consequences within a community, indicating which buildings are more at
risk and require higher protection.
• Determine and rank risk within a
particular building in order to allocate potential resources (such as
Table 1
IRVS Tool
IRVS for
Buildings
IRVS for
Mass Transit
Station
IRVS for
Tunnels
Screening Time
2 assessors
2 buildings per day
2 assessors
1 station per day
2 assessors
1 tunnel per day
Field Validation
Arlington, Virginia, Albany, New York, New York City, New York
Jointly with the Department of Veteran Affairs in Washington, D.C.
Jointly with the Transportation Security Administrations in Boston,
Massachusetts, Houston, Texas, Cleveland, Ohio and St. Louis, Missouri
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ)
Jointly with the Transportation Security Administration in Boston,
Massachusetts, Houston, Texas, Cleveland, Ohio and St. Louis, Missouri
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ)
32 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
Release Date
Summer 2011
Spring 2011
Spring 2011
grant money) in an effective manner
to reduce, in a cost benefit way, major vulnerabilities.
• Establish building inventories that
characterize a community’s risk
to terrorist attacks and/or natural
disasters.
• Understand potential cascading effects to the community by assessing
a group of buildings and prioritizing
a community’s mitigation needs.
• Understand resilience, potential
down time and economic and social
implications if a building is affected
by a catastrophic event.
• Help to identify which security
measures should immediately be
put in place during high alerts or
develop emergency preparedness
plans in order to reduce anticipated
risk.
• Understand the risks in anticipation
of special events that affect the peak
occupancy of the building in order
to plan properly and introduce protective measures.
By adopting an all-hazard approach,
cost-savings, efficiency and better performance can be achieved when assessing a building.
In addition, the methodology includes updates to the building characteristics assessed, an evaluation of the
building types and the addition of critical functions. Furthermore, the tool is
supported by a digital interface that is
supported by database software, which
allows for easy storage, retrieval and
data management.
Figure 1.
Understanding the Risk and
Resiliency Score for THE DHS
S&T IRVS Tools
Overall risk is determined by evaluating the key characteristics of buildings,
mass transit stations or tunnels, based
on the formula R = C x T x V, where:
• R = Risk.
• C = Consequence (an impact caused
by the incapacity or destruction of
an asset important to building operation, the owner and the locality).
• T = Threat (any event, including a
blast, chemical, biological and radiological weapon, or natural hazard,
with the potential to cause damage
and loss to an asset).
• V = Vulnerability (any weakness that
can be exploited to make an asset
susceptible to damage, casualties
and business interruption).
Resiliency is computed using
three basic components: robustness,
resourcefulness and recovery (known
as the three R’s). These are based on
downtime and operational capacity.
According to the DHS National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP),
resiliency is the ability to resist, absorb,
recover from or successfully adapt to
adversity or change in conditions.4 In
comparison, the President’s National
Infrastructure
Action
Committee
(NIAC) defines resilience as the ability to
reduce the magnitude and/or duration
of disruptive events. The effectiveness
of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise
depends upon its ability to anticipate,
absorb, adapt to and/or rapidly recover
from a potentially disruptive event5
(FIGURE 1).
Scoring for risk and resiliency is
based on a methodology that uses builtin weights and pre-defined algorithms.
Scores are prepared for:
• Building characteristics and options that include physical components, functionality and operations
pertaining to risk and resiliency of
buildings.
• Attribute options or ranges and
choices that the assessor may have
when evaluating each building characteristic for both risk and resiliency.
Risk and resiliency ratings are
represented by opposing, but not
reciprocal, numbers. Low risk is
accompanied by high resiliency and
vice-versa.
In addition to risk and resiliency
ratings, a matrix of threats and hazards
is used to quantify interactions among
hazards on a scale from 0 to 1, based
on built-in weights and building
characteristics.
The higher the resulting number, the
higher the interaction between hazards.
The interaction numbers can be used
in decision-making to readily reduce
vulnerabilities and improve resiliency
in a cost-effective manner.
Technical specifications of
the DHS S&T IRVS tools
One or two assessors can conduct
and complete a screening in one to five
hours. The IRVS tool operates on Microsoft (MS) Access 2007 with support
from MS Excel 2007, MS Word 2007 and
PDF files. The software tools facilitate
data collection and functions as a data
management tool. Assessors can use
the software tools on a personal computer tablet or laptop to systematically
collect, store and report screening data.
The software tools can be used during all phases of the IRVS procedure
(pre-field, field and post-field). Data
collected from the screening can be
transferred to a database to compute
the risk score and store records.
Each of the three IRVS tools contains:
• Digital catalogues and forms;
• Field data collection and storage;
• Automatic risk and resiliency
scoring;
Spring 2011 33
Tornado winds caused severe damage to this family home.
•
•
•
•
Printable reports;
The ability to add photos;
Export capabilities;
Interaction with Hazards U.S.
(HAZUS), a powerful risk assessment
software program for analyzing potential losses from floods, hurricane
winds and earthquakes;
• The Google Earth application;
• A fast-running air blast tool; and
• Chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) plume modeling.
The digital catalogue provides
guidance to the user on each of the
assessment questions in the screening
and includes background information
to assist with answering questions.
Assessors will need to become familiar
with the catalogue in order to maintain
accuracy and consistency from one
screening to another.
Standardized IRVS Screening
Process
The process for performing a rapid
visual screening is comprised of three
steps:
1. Assemble a team and mobilize:
– Fill out pre-field data on the data
collection form.
2. On-site assessment:
– Conduct a visual assessment (consequence, threats and vulnerability
module).
–Perform an on-site field evaluation of exterior features, publicly
accessible internal areas and other
internal areas accessible only with
permission.
3.Interpret and use the results for
decsion-making:
– Quantify a risk and resiliency score.
– Quantify a multihazard score (IRVS
tools for buildings only).
– Provide information for further prioritizing evaluations or mitigation.
The reliability and quality of the
screening depends on the time that is
devoted to the collection of information
and field inspections. The quality can be
increased if structural, mechanical and
security features are verified, interior
inspections are carried out, interviews
with security and other key personnel
take place, and drawings and security
operation manuals are reviewed.
Intended users
The IRVS tools were designed by and
intended for use by:
• Engineers, architects and other design professionals;
• City, county and state officials;
• Emergency managers;
• Law enforcement agencies;
• Lenders;
• Insurers;
• Building owners and operators;
• Facility managers; and
• Security consultants.
Specific unique features of
each IRVS tool
IRVS for buildings
The IRVS buildings tool is the
first and only software to quantify a
building’s overall risk, resiliency and
multihazard risk scores. The screening
34 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
process takes a few hours guided by the
IRVS tool.
• Risk and resiliency scores: The building’s risk and resiliency scores are
based on 16 building types in the
18 critical sectors affected by manmade threats (explosive and CBR
attacks), natural hazards (earthquakes, floods and high wind) and
fire hazards, all with the potential
to cause catastrophic losses (fatalities, injuries, damage and business
interruption).
• Multihazard risk score: IRVS methodology determines the compound
level of risk to a building from both
natural and man-made hazards. A
list of these hazards is provided in
Table 2.
The 16 building types addressed by
the IRVS tool are:
1. Wood frame;
2. Steel moment frame;
3. Steel braced frame;
4. Steel light frame;
5. Steel, pre-engineered metal;
6. Steel frame with cast-in-place concrete shear walls;
7. Steel frame with unreinforced masonry infill walls;
8. Concrete moment frame;
9. Concrete shear walls;
10.Concrete frames with unreinforced
masonry infill walls;
11.Precast concrete tilt-up walls;
12.Precast concrete frames with concrete shear walls;
13.Reinforced
masonry
bearing
walls with wood or metal deck
diaphragms;
14.Reinforced masonry bearing walls
with precast concrete diaphragms;
15.Unreinforced masonry bearing
walls; and
16.Manufactured homes.
The analysis of man-made threats
takes into account the following
characteristics from the perspective of
the perpetrator:
• Occupancy use;
• Number of occupants;
• Site population density;
• Visibility/symbolic value (not recognized to internationally recognized);
• Target density at 100, 300 and 1,000
feet (30, 92 and 304 meters);
• Overall site accessibility; and
Table 2
Threat
Type
Threat Scenario
Internal
Internal explosive attack.
Internal CBR release.
External External Zone 1 explosive
Explosive attack.
External Zone 2 explosive
Attack
attack.
External Zone 3 explosive
attack.
External External Zone I CBR
release.
CBR
External Zone II CBR
Release
release.
External Zone III CBR
release.
EarthGround shaking.
quake
Ground failure.
Flood
Stillwater.
Dynamic velocity surge.
Wind
Hurricane (wind and water).
Tornado.
Other high winds.
Landslide Rainfall.
Fire
Resulting from
earthquake.
Resulting from blast.
Arson or accidental.
• Target potential.
Based on both man-made threats
and natural hazards, consequences
are analyzed from the point of view
of the owner to determine the effect
on continuity of operations and the
debilitating impact that would be
caused by incapacity or destruction
of the building. Characteristics for
consideration include:
• The locality type;
• The number of occupants;
• The replacement value (based on
use type and material, as well as R.S.
Means and HAZUS databases);
• The historic registry;
• Business continuity; and
• The physical loss impact.
Vulnerability is the existence of
weaknesses that can be exploited to
make an asset susceptible to damage.
An evaluation of potential damage
and the loss of visually dominant
characteristics can be conducted to
indicate overall performance:
• Site;
• Architecture;
• Building envelope;
• Structural components and systems
for the 16 structural types;
• Mechanical, electrical and plumbing
systems;
• Fire;
• Security;
• Cyber;
• Continuity of operations; and
• Operational resilience.
Analysis of continuity of operations
and operational resilience is the
key to determining the resiliency of
the building. Table 3 lists the basic
operations considered to be critical to
all buildings.
IRVS screening facilitates the comparison of the national building inventory independent of the region,
multihazard exposure and type of
building. These results can be used to
prioritize buildings for further assessment or mitigation, allowing for an efficient allocation of resources. IRVS is
also intended to be used to identify the
level of risk and resiliency for a facility,
as a basis for prioritization for further
risk management activities and to support higher-level assessments and mitigation options by experts.
To further refine the methodology and to verify its accuracy, the IRVS
building tool has been alpha-tested
with multiple public and private users
in Arlington, Virginia; Albany, New York;
New York City; and jointly with the Department of Veteran Affairs.
IRVS for mass transit stations
To effectively use limited resources,
the goal for the IRVS mass transit station tool is to identify stations as having either relatively high or low levels of
potential risk based on the potential of
a damaging terrorist attack or related
hazard. The types of hazards assessed
with this tool are described Table 4.
As with buildings, analysis of manmade threats takes into account the
following main characteristics from the
point of view of the perpetrator: the significance of the mass transit station, its
location and the protective deterrence
measures already in place at the station.
The consequence analysis for a mass
transit station rating is based on the
degree of impact that would be caused
by its incapacity or destruction. Transit
station characteristics are evaluated
from the owner/operator perspective
and include:
• Use;
• Occupancy;
• Economic impact of physical loss;
• Number of vehicles/trains per day;
• Target density; and
• Replacement values (costs).
The vulnerability rating is based
on the likely damage and loss. The
following is a sample of characteristics
of systems that are evaluated at a transit
station that could improve or hinder its
performance under terrorist attack:
• Site:
–Elevation;
– Approaches; and
–Concourses.
• Architecture:
– Service entrances;
– Retail space; and
– Plaza size/public areas.
Table 3
Continuity of Operations
Critical Support
Water supply/Storages
Power supplies
Heating/Cooling
Generator/ Backup power (ups)
Waste water systems
0 days
Interruption of Operations (Length)
2 to 5
5 to 7
7 to 14
More than 14
Spring 2011 35
Table 4
Threat
Type
Blast
CBR
Fire
Other
Threat Scenario
Internal
External (Direct)
External (Collateral)
Internal (Platforms/
Plaza/etc.)
Internal (Tunnel)
External
Internal
External
Tunnel/Track/Smoke
Flood
Collision(Grade/Tunnel/
Elevated)
Cyber
• Ventilation systems:
– Degree of protection; and
– Ventilation hardware exposure.
• Fire systems:
– Quality of systems.
• Operations:
– Power supply;
– Surveillance and control; and
– Public notifications and general
awareness.
• Structural:
– Construction material; and
– Overall structural conditions.
• Non-structural:
– Security booths; and
– Barriers and curbs.
• Physical security:
– Blast threat detection and security; and
– CBR threat detection and security.
• Cyber:
– Security of communications, signals, and power systems.
• Operational security:
– Emergency plans; and
– Security plans.
The IRVS tool for mass transit
stations is nearing release. It has
been reviewed and validated by the
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) together with transit personnel
at the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey (PANYNJ) and in the cities
of Boston, Massachusetts; Houston,
Texas; Cleveland, Ohio; and St. Louis,
Missouri. The tool is expected to be
widely used by the TSA.
Transit authorities can prioritize
mass transit stations for improvements
based on the scores generated using
the tool.
IRVS for tunnels
The tunnels methodology is similar
to that of the mass transit station tool
and can be used as a complementary
model or as a stand-alone tool.
The tunnel model is tailored as
follows:
different
characteristics
for
consequences,
threats
and
vulnerability modeling, and different
threat scenarios.
To effectively use limited resources,
the goal for the IRVS tool is to identify
tunnels as having either relatively high
or low levels of potential risk based on
the potential of a damaging terrorist
attack or related hazard. The types
of hazards assessed with this tool are
listed in Table 5.
The IRVS tool for tunnels also is
nearing release and has been also reviewed and validated by the TSA together with transit personnel at the
PANYNJ, and in the cities of Boston,
Houston, Cleveland and St. Louis.
This tool also is expected to be widely
used by the TSA.
Transit authorities can prioritize
tunnels for improvements based on the
scores generated using the tool.
IRVS for bridges
Looking forward to the future of rapid visual screening, a new tool to access
bridges is planned to begin in 2011, following this same approach.
n
Michael Chipley is President of The
PMC Group LLC, a principal author of
FEMA 426 and 452 and a subject matter
expert in risk, sustainability and energy.
Mohammed Ettouney, a Principal of
Weidlinger Associates, Inc., focuses his
professional work on infrastructure aging,
security and health, and has introduced
many concepts, guidelines and theories on
hazards, experimentation and progressive
Table 5
Threat
Type
Blast
CBR
Fire
Other
Threat Scenario
Internal
External (Direct)
External (Collateral)
Internal
External (Direct)
External
Tunnel/Track/Smoke
Flood
Collision (Grade/Elevated)
Cyber
Snow that melted too fast caused this home to flood in 2008.
36 Journal of Hazard Mitigation and Risk Assessment
collapse. He was awarded the Homer Gage
Balcom life achievement award by the
MET section of ASCE (2008). He also won
the Project of the Year Award, Platinum
Award (2008), and the Project of the
Year “New Haven Coliseum Demolition
Project” (ACEC, NY).
Milagros Kennett is an Architect/
Program Manager for the Infrastructure
Protection and Disaster Management
Division of the Science and Technology
Directorate in the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
Terry Ryan is a Program Manager
in the Mission Assurance Division of
Raytheon UTD. Previously, he served
22 years in the army and as Director of
Security and Counter Intelligence in the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Philip Schneider is the Director
of the Multihazard Loss Estimation
Program for the National Institute
of Building Sciences. He previously
directed the development of FEMA’s
HAZUS earthquake, hurricane and
flood loss estimation models and
currently conducts IV&V (Independent
Validation and Verification) for the
HAZUS Program.
References
1. Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Risk Assessment, A How-To
Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. FEMA
452 / January 2005.
2. Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Handbook for Rapid Visual
Screening of Buildings to Evaluate
Terrorism Risks. FEMA 455 / March
2009.
3. Federal Emergency Management
Agency. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
Against Buildings. FEMA 426 / December 2003.
4. Department of Homeland Security.
National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency. 2009, p. 111.
5. National Infrastructure Advisory
Council (NIAC), Optimization of
Resources for Mitigating Infrastructure, Disruptions Working
Group, October 19, 2010, p. 4
Richard Walker Jr. is an Engineer-InTraining (EIT) for URS Corporation.
Firefighters couldn’t stop the flames that swept through this family home.
Additional REsources
ASIS International, Information Asset Protection Guideline, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security,
Commercial Facilities, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources SectorSpecific Plan as Input to the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, May
2007.
Department of Homeland Security,
Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk
Lexicon, September 2008.
Department of Homeland Security, Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard,
2008.
Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD
1), Federal Executive Branch National
Continuity Program and Requirements, February 2008.
Department of Homeland Security,
Government Facilities, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources SectorSpecific Plan as Input to the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, May,
2007.
Department of Homeland Security,
Handbook for Rapid Visual Screening
of Mass Transit Stations, publication
pending.
Department of Homeland Security,
Handbook for Rapid Visual Screening
of Tunnels, publication pending.
Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, Partnering to Enhance Protection
and Resiliency, 2009.
Department of Homeland Security, Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities, An Interagency Security
Committee Standard, April 12, 2010.
Department of Homeland Security,
The Design-Basis Threat (U), An Interagency Security Committee Report,
April 12, 2010.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Handbook for Rapid Visual
Screening of Buildings to Evaluate Terrorism Risks, FEMA 455, March 2009.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Rapid Visual Screening of
Buildings for Potential Seismic Hazards, A Handbook, FEMA 154, Edition
2, March 2002.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Reference Manual to Mitigate
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against
Buildings, FEMA 426, December
2003.
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Risk Assessment, A How-To
Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist
Attacks Against Buildings, FEMA 452,
January 2005.
National Fire Protection Agency,
NFPA 1600®, Standard on Disaster/
Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs, 2010 Edition.
National Infrastructure Advisory
Council (NIAC), Optimization of Resources for Mitigating Infrastructure
Disruptions Working Group, October
19, 2010.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Internet Security Essentials for Business,
2010.
Spring 2011 37
Reducing Losses from Disasters
Multihazard Mitigation Council
Natural disasters cause tremendous damage to property.
They disrupt families, businesses and government
operations. They also cause government agencies to incur
significant expenses for disaster assistance and emergency
services. The Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC)
works to reduce the effects of natural disasters and other
extreme events. The Council seeks ways to anticipate
and minimize the losses that result from these events and
promotes active pre-disaster mitigation activities at the
community, state, regional and national levels.
The MMC disseminates credible information and
counsel on major policy issues involving multihazard
(man-caused and natural) disaster risk and resilience.
The Council promotes increased disaster resilience and
reduced risk in homes and commercial buildings as part
National Institute of
BUILDING SCIENCES
of a whole-building strategy that incorporates sustainability,
security and use of GIS and other technological tools.
Membership in the MMC is voluntary and open to
public and private sector architects, engineers, contractors
and risk assessment practitioners, as well as trade and
professional associations, materials interests and others from
communities across the United States. The Council provides
a forum for disaster professionals to exchange valuable
information on emerging trends in building technology and
federal policy and to address building systems and software
applications that play a critical role in disaster resilience
and sustainability.
Join MMC and help us reduce losses from natural
and man-caused disasters while promoting community
preparedness, sustainability and resilience.
Become a part of the Multihazard Mitigation Council
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www.nibs.org/mmc