The Global Dominance System*
Notes on a theory of global political economy
HELGE HVEEM
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
1.
Introduction
T h e present paper is intended as a contribution
to the development of a t h e o r y of t h e global
political economy. It proposes to present global dominance relationships in t e r m s of a vertically integrated system of control a n d accumulation, production a n d distribution on a global
scale.
In so doing, we shall build on t h e o r e m s
developed by o t h e r s , giving evidence to support some of t h e m , reformulating others. As
this article should be seen as an ad h o c r e p o r t
on an ongoing research enterprise, we c a n n o t
claim to have reached t h a t stage of sufficient
specificity a n d comprehensiveness which an
'ideal' theory w o u l d d e m a n d . Despite m u c h
and heated discussion, there is at present considerable agreement on concepts, schemes, paradigms, and basic t h e o r e m s a m o n g scholars in
this field. W h a t is still needed is a better understanding of the concrete aspects - the
structural elements, actors a n d processes - that
fill in the framework. This is n o t to suggest
that we can ever encapsulate the T r u t h , once
and for all: by t h e time we think we have
reached it, reality has changed. But o u r understanding of the real world m a y c o m e closer to
this ideal t h a n it n o w is. T h e gap between the
practise of d o m i n a t i o n a n d the theoretical interpretation a n d t h e public u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it
is still too great. T h i s is true w h e t h e r t h e gap is
measured in time space or according to level
of sophistication of insight.
1
O n e w a y of closing this gap is to focus extensively on the dynamics of t h e system. A l t h o u g h
it develops dialectically a n d with m a n y contradictions, we can h o p on the b a n d w a g o n of
change by improving o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e
processes at w o r k and by u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e
expectations a n d actions of those w h o possess
1 - J. P. R.
the power to change: the Center, t h e M e t r o poles, t h e u p p e r class of t h e world. T h e n ,
hopefully, we shall also be able to help apply
the brakes as necessary.
T h e r e is a great need for a m o r e comprehensive a n d 'wholistic' or totalistic perspective
on international or global politics. S u c h a perspective will stress n o t t h e m a r k e t of political
or economic exchange a n d interaction, but
structure a n d patterns a n d processes conditioned by, and conditioning, the structure. It
will not focus on a priori s y m m e t r i c intergovernmental or inter-state relationships assuming t h a t units a r e by definition independent, but on asymmetric (as well as symmetric)
relationships of p e n e t r a t i o n a n d penetratedness.
T h a t current I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations or International Politics theories seldom meet such
d e m a n d s , to be specified in t h e following, is
evident. This does not m e a n t h a t there is no
longer r o o m for exchange or interaction analysis: rather, such analysis m o r e often t h a n not
misses t h e m a i n p o i n t .
2
T h e following claims relevance primarily for
what is generally considered the ' W o r l d Capitalist system'. T h e extent to which o u r scheme
has m o r e general applicability will need to be
further investigated in other contexts. We do
assume, however, t h a t o u r analysis of global
d o m i n a n c e relations represents a fruitful proposition for t h e study of t h e ' W o r l d Socialist
system'.
H o w e v e r , t h e global system of control a n d
a c c u m u l a t i o n is, as we will show, increasingly
one system. A l t h o u g h a concrete description of
t h e structure a n d its historical basis m a y reveal
several d o m i n a n c e systems a n d differing degrees of d o m i n a t i o n - 'world capitalism',
'the Soviet empire', etc. - t h e r e are trends
that increasingly point t o w a r d s one, global sys-
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Helge
Hveem
tem. This m a y be best seen if we conceive of
t h e w o r l d in t e r m s of a system of p r o d u c t i o n
a n d distribution. T h e 'Capitalist West' ' C o m m u n i s t East' conflict f o r m a t i o n is still
inherently competitive, if no longer aggressively antagonistic. At t h e same time, political contacts as well as concrete t r a d e deals - w h e t h e r
in w h e a t or in sophisticated technology - a r e
serving to integrate t h e t w o . T h a t such integration - as follows from the feudal c h a r a c t e r of
t h e East-West system - takes place at t h e t o p
of t h e competitive hierarchies entails the participation of the integrated units in t h e domination exercised by the o t h e r unit over s o m e t h i r d
unit(s).
2.
Some
conceptual
clarifications
We employ t h e t e r m domination, a n d t h e resultant situation of dominance, to represent a
social relationship w h e r e s o m e unit exercises
control over a n d accumulates value from s o m e
o t h e r unit. D o m i n a n c e , in this r a t h e r general
m e a n i n g , is a relatively p e r m a n e n t state w h e r e
the patterns of control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n systematically (if not on every single occasion
of an exchange) favor t h e d o m i n a n t unit. T h e
d o m i n a n c e relationship is not only asymmetric, b u t often exploitative. T h a t is, there a r e
processes t h a t w o r k t o w a r d s an u n e q u a l distribution a m o n g the units of t h e values p r o duced by (the relationship between) t h e m .
Obviously, d o m i n a t i o n takes m a n y forms
and the d o m i n a n c e relationship has different
consequences in geographical a n d social space.
F o r instance, it is necessary to s t u d y h o w
productive a n d distributive relationships are
related to forms of d o m i n a t i o n w h i c h belong
to the politico-diplomatic, military, a n d o t h e r
mechanisms of control. A n y historical analysis
of the development of t h e d o m i n a n c e system
will have to explain h o w , to which extent, a n d
in w h a t space t h e present vertically integrated
production system is a result of political organization, military conquest or threat, or
ideological-cultural penetration, a n d as such
has been conditioned by these.
T h e d o m i n a n c e system is entrenched a n d is
r e p r o d u c e d in a strictly hierarchical structure
of control a n d accumulation capacities. By
control we refer to t h e capacity to influence
s o m e social unit to a degree w h e r e it acts according to t h e wishes of t h e influencing unit
a n d w h e r e its behavior becomes highly predictable. Accumulation is t h e process of growth
t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the surplus value produced a n d distributed t h r o u g h o u t the system.
T h e political e c o n o m y of t h e global society
will have to be a theory of the relationship
between control a n d accumulation at t h e global level. F r o m t h e capacity to control, superior
a c c u m u l a t i o n capacity logically follows, as t h e
ability to a c c u m u l a t e value from o t h e r units
requires s o m e degree a n d form of control over
t h e other unit. But u n e q u a l accumulation, or
exploitation, does not always follow from an
a s y m m e t r i c control relationship; that is: t h e
capacity is not necessarily utilized.
T h e exact structure a n d form of control a n d
a c c u m u l a t i o n will be further explained in the
following. We shall employ s o m e r a t h e r simple
distinctions to describe the relationship between actors, actual concrete structures of
d o m i n a t i o n , a n d processes of control a n d accumulation. O n e distinction is between direct and
indirect control a n d accumulation. T h e direct
form, w h e r e control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n is established a n d exercised on the spot, within t h e
geographical a n d social space of t h e d o m i n a t e d
unit, we will t e r m the imperialist form of domination. Historically, this has m o v e d from t h e
stage of violent occupation a n d / o r r o b b e r y
a c c u m u l a t i o n where military force and trade
blackmailing
were
important
mechanisms,
t h r o u g h a stage of colonialist imperialism
where control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n became organized into protected domains of economic
activity u n d e r political and military supervision, to the stage of the immediate past, t h e
1950s a n d 1960s, where neo-colonialism has
p r o d u c e d bridgehead types of control mechanisms, local elites or 'sub-centers' performing
subordinate control functions in exchange for
shares in t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n exercised by t h e
controlling center(s).
T h e indirect form is control a n d accumulation via t h e system. W i t h o u t attempting to
cloud over t h e interests of actors a n d t h e pro-
Global Dominance System
cesses actually at work, we m u s t stress that
processes leading to u n e q u a l distribution in t h e
system are a function of the structure established and as such not entirely dependent
for their functioning on concrete actors a n d
interests. We would, however, give this perspective a rather restricted applicability. T h e
indirect or 'independent' processes are an
element of the functioning of the structure but
will have to be clearly specified a n d related to
the direct ones which are a c t o r - d e p e n d e n t .
3
T h e r e is, however, o n e observation, related
to the direct-indirect d i c h o t o m y , which is fundamental in o u r perspective: the structure is
decreasingly dependent on any particular set of
actors for its survival. T h e principle of substitutability is gaining ever-increasing applicability. T h e fall of the R o m a n e m p i r e left a structural v a c u u m . T o d a y , t h e fall of e m p e r o r s or
empires does not have the same effect. T h e y
are substitutable, the structure m a y remain.
Obviously, t h e structure can never do without actors actively establishing control. To the
extent there is still r o o m for expanding t h e system - for 'peripherization', to talk in t e r m s
of the center-periphery terminology - a n d to
the extent control must be reinforced to maintain t h e flows of value accumulation, the
actor-interest s y n d r o m e becomes fundamental.
Such expansion a n d reinforcement, that is recreation of t h e system, necessitates t h e active
penetration of the objects of control.
We shall distinguish between three types of
social units according to their position in t h e
production hierarchy and their corresponding
class status: actors, agents, a n d objects. T h i s
classification is b o t h an extrapolation a n d a
reformulation of the métropole-satellite a n d
the class models of the system, having relevance to the control a n d the a c c u m u l a t i o n hierarchies, respectively. Units typified by high
control and high accumulation capacities a r e
actors: they possess a degree of self-control
with control over other units. Units which possess little control capacity, at least in terms of
the total system, while also sharing highly in
the accumulation of value, are agents. M o r e
specifically, they have little general control
capacity (including self-control) in terms of t h e
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system, but p e r f o r m decentralized control
functions on behalf of the actors. T h e third
type of unit obviously is t h e object of control:
the peripheries, t h e underprivileged classes.
T h e p e n e t r a t i o n of the system a n d its vertical integration into differentiated multi-level
hierarchies of control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n result
in relationships of dependency. At a general
level, the most fundamental dependency is t h e
dependency on t h e hierarchical structure itself,
a point to be developed below. At a m o r e specific level, we wish to distinguish between
interdependence, which is a relationship between equals, between units having penetrated
each o t h e r symmetrically;
a n d dependency,
which is basically an a s y m m e t r i c relationship.
D e p e n d e n c y in this sense is of t w o kinds:
dominant
dependency,
which
represents
the
need of superior units to a c c u m u l a t e value
from s u b o r d i n a t e ones in o r d e r to meet own
aims (such as the need to extract cheap r a w
materials
from
periphery
units);
and
dominated dependency, which is t h e periphery's
position of being s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n d penetrated by the interests of other units controlling a n d a c c u m u l a t i n g surplus value from it.
4
O u r definition of value remains problematic,
as we have chosen to give it a m e a n i n g with
which it is generally not associated in the literature. W h a t we need is a concept which is
b r o a d , b u t also specific e n o u g h to represent
the different aspects of social, economic, and
ecological reality t h a t m a y a d d to the status
a n d wealth of social units. It must be b r o a d
because it should represent reality outside as
well as inside 'capitalist' systems of production. It m u s t be specific because we want to
relate it to a discussion to be m a d e in a n o t h e r
context, of alternative strategies to change
a n d / o r replace t h e d o m i n a n c e system.
5
T h e r e are five aspects of value in present
global society:
6
Fixed value which is: territory: 'nature' as 'fixed
capital': raw materials (geological)
Consumable value which is: food, shelter, goods
Social value (or intermediate value) which is: the
'rationality' of human beings ('human capital'):
education, organization and information: technology as creativity of the hand/machine
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Helge
Hveem
Ideological value which is: culture, ideas, creativity of the mind
Capital value which, as is most clearly seen under
capitalism, is both a separate aspect of the value
system, and at the same time an expression of
a way of ranking, the three other value aspects
(as will be shown in the following): money,
capital goods.
But also the four other aspects relate to each
other. Ideas (ideological) are related to nature
(fixed) and give good (consumable) or create organization and technology (social) which again
can transform nature (fixed) into new value (consumable, social, or capital) etc.
3. The new (cumulative) international division
of labor
T h e hierarchy of levels of control in t h e dominance system is manifesting itself in t h e
various separate aspects of t h e system: in the
organization of p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution in
t h e status system, even in t h e hierarchical differentiation of technology a n d p r o d u c t s found
in the processing of goods.
Extrapolating from t h e description of t h e
organizational structure of private business
developed by C h a n d l e r a n d Redlich (1961),
H y m e r (1972) has pointed o u t that t h e centralization a n d differentiation of control within
the business c o r p o r a t i o n corresponds to t h e
centralization of control within t h e global
e c o n o m y . A three-level structure is identified,
where t h e lowest level represents t h e day-today operations of the enterprise (the firm), a
m e d i u m level being e.g. the national c o r p o r a tion responsible for the c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e
activities taking place at t h e lowest level, a n d a
t o p level of t h e central decisionmakers w h o
do t h e planning a n d t h e goal-determination
a n d set the f r a m e w o r k within which lower
levels operate. Applying location t h e o r y to the
scheme - as will be d o n e below - a global
system of central m e t r o p o l i t a n decisionmakers, regional or national directors a n d local
satellite m a n a g e r s corresponds to a w o r l d of
superior rich units, t h e relatively well-off intermediaries a n d these in the peripheries performing the lowest, worst paid tasks of t h e system.
Different control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n opportunities obviously structure t h e world not only into
hierarchies of c o m m a n d a n d status, b u t also
(consequently) into conflict formations. O n e
such f o r m a t i o n - according to t h e n o r m s of
p r o d u c t i o n of t h e system - is found in t h e distinction between p r i m a r y a n d industrial production. Industrializing t h e e c o n o m y is widely
held as a necessary (and sufficient) condition
for obtaining higher a c c u m u l a t i o n capacities.
T h e r e a r e also objective factors inviting a
structural differentiation between p r i m a r y and
industrial (secondary) type of production, such
as wage differentials (groups of industrial
workers often constituting 'labor aristocracies'
in otherwise low-wage working class societies)
a n d differential socio-economic spin-offs.
As has been sufficiently p r o v e d by the terms
of t r a d e a n d u n e q u a l exchange critique of the
principle of c o m p a r a t i v e advantage, such differentials a r e not p r o d u c t s of the simple play
of m a r k e t forces, but are conditioned by the
very structure of hierarchical control and
accumulation. (Singer 1950; Prebisch 1950;
E m m a n u e l 1959; A m i n 1971; Palloix 1971.)
T h i s structure 'super-imposes' its 'law of
u n e q u a l development' on any relationship of
'natural' c o m p a r a t i v e p r o d u c t i o n advantage
a n d offers u n e q u a l r e m u n e r a t i o n for equal
productivity (or p r o d u c t i o n factors) depending
on the position in t h e structure. T h o s e higher
u p , the 'haves', receive a relatively bigger
share of t h e value distributed t h a n do those
lower d o w n , t h e 'have nots' - primarily
because they are s u p e r i o r / s u b o r d i n a t e to each
other. T h e structure is based on constant reinforcement of status differences.
T h e processing hierarchy, expressed formally
by t h e S t a n d a r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e Classification ( S I T C ) , represents at t h e same time the
classical division of labor - between p r i m a r y
a n d industrial, or non-processed a n d processed
c o n s u m a b l e value. Tariffs are one of t h e old
protectionist measures, of less i m p o r t a n c e t o day t h a n is often assumed, but still part of the
structure. In a study of 22 'primary p r o d u c t s '
subject to processing, Belassa has shown h o w
tariff protection increases with increasing level
of processing (Table I).
T h e m a i n conclusion t o b e d r a w n from T a b l e
I is t h a t t h e protective tariffs imposed by the
industrialized countries is part of a structure
Global Dominance System
Table I. Tariffs on goods imported from underdeveloped countries
Degree of
Weighted average
processing
tariff imposed:
of goods nominal )
real )
2
1
1
2
3
4
4.6
7.9
16.2
22.1
_
22.6
29.7
38.4
Percentage share
in the exports of
underdeveloped
71.2
23.8
2.9
2.1
1
) In percentage of the export value.
) In percentage of the sales value.
Source: Bela Belassa: The structure of protection,
UNCTAD TD/B/C.2/36 1970.
2
which hinders the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries. To conclude e.g. that
the latter a r e underdeveloped because they do
not industrialize would seem to be to t u r n reality upside down.
Even at the lowest level of processing the
protective m e c h a n i s m is at work. T h e US tariff
system is an illustrative example. F r e s h b a n a n a s
are imported tariff-free, dried b a n a n a s take a
6 % tariff (of export value), conserved b a n a n a s
a 13 % tariff w h e n imported. A n d whereas
crude iron ore evades i m p o r t tariffs, o r d i n a r y
sewing needles must j u m p a 20 % tariff. (Magdoff 1969.)
We wish to a d d the distinction between t h e
extractive (primary) a n d processing (secondary)
levels of production to the scheme presented
above. T h i s yields a four-level scheme of t h e
world of production a n d distribution:
(4)
the quanternary level, the highest level, where
the center of the center is located and where
all important decisions concerning the overall
functioning and development of the system
are taken; this is the T& I or directing level;
(3) the tertiary level, where overall management
and coordination of activities going on at
lower levels take place, and where supporting
control and accumulation is performed; this
is the management or service level;
(2) the secondary level, where day-to-day management is performed, where the actual operations take place in the transformation of fixed
value into goods that can be used for further
accumulation (processing, refinement); this is
the (industrial) processing level;
(1) the primary level, where day-to-day production of material for further processing and
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elementary consumable value i.e. extraction
of fixed value (food) is performed.
In t e r m s of o u r o w n conceptualization,
p r o d u c t i o n is the process by which fixed value
is t r a n s f o r m e d into c o n s u m a b l e , social a n d / o r
capital value u n d e r the guidance, or with the
assistance of, ideological value. In the real
world, each of the five aspects of value is
ranked in terms of the p r o d u c t i o n hierarchy.
T h e r e are hierarchized p a t t e r n s of c o n s u m p tion, as expressed by price differentials on cons u m e r goods a n d their corresponding distribution on class structure. Obviously, there is also
a hierarchical ordering of capital, as openly
expressed in the institutionalized currency
agreements k n o w n as the B r e t t o n - W o o d s
agreement a n d t h e currency zones, a n d is
also reflected in t h e I M F . ( A m i n 1971.)
Both the internal ranking of t h e value aspects as well as their ranking relative to each
o t h e r are functions of t h e historical developm e n t of the system. H o b s b a w m has shown the
qualitative, indeed
revolutionary,
system
changes that o c c u r r e d during t h e industrialization of capitalist E u r o p e . L a t e r revolutions
have been referred to as 'managerial' (Burnh a m 1960), ' c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l ' a n d 'technological' ones, etc. A l t h o u g h there is m u c h
over-simplification a n d a certain a m o u n t of
forced originality in t e r m i n o l o g y in such
concepts, t h e y do
reflect the
qualitative
changes that have taken place. In o u r scheme,
such major qualitative changes in the structure
a n d the conditions of p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution reflect t h e processes by which social (and
ideational) value h a v e been combined with
capital to create a system of efficient a n d centralized c o n t r o l a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n opportunities. In o r d e r to achieve steadily improving
a c c u m u l a t i o n , it has been necessary to spread
t h e control a p p a r a t u s to ever growing parts of
fixed value (the r u n for r a w materials and energy) a n d c o n s u m a b l e (the r u n for markets)
value.
7
Pre-industrial p r o d u c t i o n is m a r k e d by a
relatively stable relationship between fixed,
consumable, social, a n d ideational value - as
in a subsistence e c o n o m y w h e r e p r o d u c t i o n
centers on the creation of c o n s u m a b l e value
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Helge
Hveem
for the m e m b e r s of the c o m m u n i t y . T h e introduction of a capitalist-industrial m o d e of production m e a n s t h e introduction of capital a n d
production efficiency as determinants of t h e
c o m b i n a t i o n of the other aspects of value a n d
as centers of c o m m a n d of t h e p r o d u c t i o n p r o cess over a n d above, a n d also partly in contradiction t o , those other aspects.
O u r four level scheme reflects such a develo p m e n t . T h e qualitative changes in m a n a g e r i a l
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l abilities obviously h a v e
affected all levels of p r o d u c t i o n d o w n to prim a r y level agribusiness' p l a n t a t i o n work; b u t
they established themselves as control centers
at what is presently the t h i r d level, t h a t over
a n d above the m a n a g e m e n t of actual day-today p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution. A t present w e
are in t h e midst of - if not already past - t h e
most revolutionary element of a n o t h e r major
period of qualitative change: t h e revolution in
technology a n d information a n d the ascendance of these factors - at the same time b o t h
superior means of control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n
a n d increasingly the actual centers of control
a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n themselves - to t h e t o p of
the global hierarchical structure. T h e major
vehicles behind this m o s t recent revolution on
a global scale are
process of accumulating control opportunities,
where new ways a n d / o r actors of control are
superimposed, or a r e superimposing themselves, on existing ways a n d / o r actors. T h e
structure becomes a set of control layers, the
m o r e recent ones imposed on t h e past, but
without a b a n d o n i n g subordinate layers. This
structure is a growing organism, a process of
vertical extension of control. Still, old forms of
control m a y be indispensable to the efficient
functioning of the structure in some geographical a n d social space.
T h e u n e q u a l accumulation of value, w h e r e
those operating at superior levels in the p r o duction hierarchy can take a larger share of the
(surplus) value t h a n those working at lower
levels, is s u p p o r t e d by monopolistic structures
of control, demand-supply structures of the
m a r k e t , the pull of location forces, size (as indicated by the i m p o r t a n c e c o m m o n l y attached
to economies of scale) a n d - obviously - also
t h e use of power as the ability to blackmail or
otherwise enforce s o m e b o d y to give up surplus
value. All of these forces - as well as important a n d often decisive control mechanisms outside the system of p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution
as such (as t h e military a p p a r a t u s , etc.) - will
often, a l t h o u g h not always, w o r k in t h e same
direction. A n d this gives rise to competing
accumulation.
- the establishment of 'the technological basis for
a major advance in the conquest of the material
world and the beginnings of a truly cosmopolitan production' (Hymer 1972);
- the creation of highly sophisticated, highly
specialized, highly efficient means of sorting,
communicating, and controlling information on
a global scale - the emergence of information
on information as the decisive new means of
control;
- the formidable growth and superior efficiency
of the multinational corporation in organizing
the use of technology and information, creating
and recreating an even more efficient hierarchical structure on a global scale.
M o n o p o l y and location on a global scale is
indicated by concentration - t h e share of a
sector/activity of production/distribution. A list
of world-wide activities a n d s o m e d a t a on their
concentration on regions gives at least a surface picture of the geographical m a p p i n g of
t h e structure, cf. T a b l e I I . I n f o r m a t i o n available at present does not permit us to d r a w any
major conclusions from t h e Table. But we m a y
infer from t h e d a t a presented that o u r working
hypothesis seems a fruitful one.
Such an outline of the historical development of the structure, by necessity sketched
only roughly in the context of a short paper,
points to the cumulative character of t h e d o m inance
system. T h i s
'law of cumulative
hierarchy' m e a n s t h a t t h e present structure
(and any past or future one) is t h e result of a
These a r e the aggregate (regional) patterns
of distribution. Obviously, the geographical
location of activities need not correspond to
actual control over, n o r possession of, the value
created by these activities. 'Sectors of activity'
are increasingly vertically integrated - which
simply m e a n s that t h e center increasingly possesses or otherwise controls value located and
Global Dominance System
Table II. Shares of world activities at different levels
of the production process. In percentages
Shares of world activities
Sector of activity
R&D
Services:
Sea transport
Tourism
Trade (total world)
Production:
Manufactured goods
Energy (crude oil)
Minerals
Food
2
2
2
OECD
85
81
80
72
1
CMEA
13
UDC's
2
9
10
11
-
17
32
7
25
30
6
60
23
30
-
325
t h e p r o d u c t i o n h i e r a r c h y t h r o u g h indirect
m e a n s of control. As long as p r o d u c t i o n occurs for a m a r k e t a n d needs m a r k e t i n g services, as long as it needs technology a n d inform a t i o n a n d m a n a g e m e n t , a n d as long as these
'factors' a r e m o n o p o l i z e d at higher levels of
control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n , then t h e state of
d o m i n a t e d dependency m a y r e m a i n constant
despite the assumption of self-control over t h e
actual extraction-production. T h i s is t h e 'new
international division of l a b o r ' by d o m i n a t i o n
via t h e global structure - t h e opposite of the
'old' direct control t h r o u g h vertical integration of all c o m p o n e n t s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution. T h e two coexist in t h e present world,
but it is possible to envisage the 'new' struct u r e replacing the 'old' o n e , a n d that such a
development is in the interests of the center.
9
2
62
33
52
40
Notes:
1
Includes registrations in Liberia, Panama etc., the
'convenience flag' states.
Data from UN Statistical Yearbook, 1971.
Pierre Jalee, Le Tiers Monde dans Veconomie mondiale, Paris, Francois Maspero, 1968.
2
3
created in periphery areas. T h i s seems particularly true of the b a u x i t e - a l u m i n u m sector,
which is highly vertically integrated a n d strongly monopolistic in character. T w o big corporations, Alcan a n d Alcoa, control m o r e t h a n half
of world p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution at all
levels a n d are w o r l d 'price leaders' within
their sector.
8
In the case of a l u m i n u m , monopolistic control would seem to override or direct such factors as location concerns a n d t h e 'free play'
of demand-supply forces. T h u s , the completely
vertically integrated p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution structure, which this sector is approximating, w o u l d seem t h e most efficient control
structure. But is this necessarily true? Is t h e
nationalization of mines a n d energy supplies such as those now taking place in t h e copper
a n d p e t r o l e u m sectors a n d which r e m o v e metropolitan on-the-spot control of lower levels
of p r o d u c t i o n (extraction) - a threat a n d t h u s
a counter-strategy to the d o m i n a t i o n structure?
We would c o n t e n d that this is not necessarily so. In fact, it m a y be argued that t h e direct
penetration of t h e periphery, establishing s o m e
form of direct control over it, m a y be b o t h a
m o r e costly (and thus dis-accumulative) and at
the same time a not-more-efficient w a y of
having the periphery assume its p r o p e r place in
So far we have conceptualized an analytical
f r a m e w o r k for describing the present hierarchical structure of d o m i n a t i o n on a global scale,
a n d we have sketched o u t - in admittedly
r a t h e r r o u g h terms - a 'model' structure. Let
us end this section by describing t h e concrete
m a p p i n g of t h e structure on geographical and
social space. In t h e next sections we present
s o m e evidence on t h e proposition of an emerging 'technological' structure, t h e merger of
capital a n d social value into t h e latest stage of
d o m i n a t i o n , a n d we discuss in m o r e detail
s o m e of the processes at work.
Obviously, high c o n t r o l a n d accumulation is
for t h e few: t h e hierarchy preserves opportunities in a highly p y r a m i d a l structure. This pattern of centralization is also expressed in m o nopolistic a n d agglomerative patterns. T h e r e
will be a tendency for these patterns to reinforce each other, agglomerations of high-level
control developing into monopolistic structures
which again will reinforce agglomerative tendencies.
We have, literally speaking, placed the three
level c o r p o r a t e structure of control hierarchies
o n t o t h e surface of the real world: the p r i m a r y
level, w h e r e t h e structure is in direct confrontation with N a t u r e as fixed value a n d as elem e n t a r y c o n s u m a b l e value. H e r e at least half
of m a n k i n d - t h e great mass of p o o r , disadvantaged a n d often exploited people all over
326
Helge
Hveem
the d o m i n a n c e w o r l d - find themselves positioned m o s t if not all of their total (often very
short) life cycle. This is t h e periphery, at t h e
same time t h e satellite society a n d t h e lower
class of the world. It is m a d e up of peasants,
small tradesmen, industrial workers, miners.
They spend freely for their families and influence their company purchasing.
T I M E readers constitute an international community of the affluent and influential, responsive to new ideas, new products and new ways
of doing things.....
T h e center is equally easily identifiable. It
w o u l d be represented by t h e f o u r t h level decisionmakers, t h e actors, based in t h e m é t r o p o l e s
of t h e system in N o r t h A m e r i c a , E u r o p e , a n d
J a p a n (plus M o s c o w a n d Peking if t h e system
is extended). T h e sub-centers w o u l d be f o u n d
in the subpoles of decentralized (regional etc.)
control, the 'general agents' of t h e metropolitan center with s o m e local decisionmaking
p o w e r a n d with a degree of self-control.
This p r o b a b l y is a representative a n d therefore
indicative expression of how the center of the
system defines itself: as influential, innovative,
affluent, a n d integrated. 'Cosmopolitanism' is
a n o t h e r w o r d for the integration or assimilation of these persons; indeed they do constitute an international c o m m u n i t y .
W h e r e a s we see t h e métropole-satellite structure as t h e geographical expression of t h e
center-periphery scheme, t h e class structure of
the w o r l d does n o t c o r r e s p o n d so closely to the
scheme. At t h e m e d i u m level of t h e structure,
between t h e easily identifiable t o p a n d b o t t o m ,
clearly belonging to the u p p e r a n d lower classes, respectively, control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n opportunities often do not overlap. This is because t h e center - w h e t h e r as a 'consolation
prize' for giving up control, in o r d e r to stimulate productivity, or as a concession to labor
d e m a n d s for a higher share of the a c c u m u l a t e d
value, or a c o m b i n a t i o n of such motives - has
let social units, people, share in t h e accumulation in a p r o p o r t i o n higher t h a n their actual
share of control. This is true with t h e local
elites of periphery areas, in particular such subpoles as São P a u l o , K u w a i t , C a p e T o w n , a n d
Abidjan, but also for sub-poles closer h o m e , in
C a n a d a a n d Western E u r o p e . A n d it is t r u e of
a n u m b e r of m e d i u m status groups performing
service functions for the actors in a n d a r o u n d
the metropoles.
These units a n d people constitute t h e upper
class of t h e world, as described so well by Time
Magazine:
10
The fact is that T I M E ' s 24 million readers are
apt to have more in common with each other
than with many of their own countrymen. High
incomes. Good education. Responsible positions
in business, government and the professions.
A global middle class would include the relatively well-off w h o perform a variety of lower m a n a g e m e n t functions against a differentiated share of t h e value accumulated. T h i s is a
heterogeneous, mostly non-integrated class,
even in conflict with itself t h r o u g h the competition for a greater share. It consists of t h e
clerks, civil servants, m e r c h a n t s , industrial
m a n a g e r s at the factory level, a n d perhaps
even the 'labor aristocrats'. T h e y derive their
individual or g r o u p statuses from their positions as intermediaries at t h e global a n d / o r at
national levels: they are d o m i n a t e d a n d dominating, relatively deprived as well as relatively
well-off.
T h e s e structures penetrate a n d cut across
nations a n d nation-states, m a k i n g t h e m - in
highly differing degrees of hierarchization miniatures of the global system. T h i s does not
m e a n , however, t h a t t h e nation-state is finished
as unit in t h e real sense of an actor, actual or
potential. T h e c o r p o r a t e structure cannot, a t
t h e t o p level, t h a t is, free itself completely
from the w o r l d of nation-states, as s o m e analysts of the internationalization of capital as
well as the c o r p o r a t e PR-divisions will have it.
This is o n e of the m a i n contradictions of the
system: on t h e one h a n d , its tendency to struct u r e itself across national boundaries, from t h e
t o p a n d d o w n ; on t h e other, its need for recourse to 'safe bases' of protection, mobilization of s u p p o r t , a n d loyalty to the structure.
T h i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y tendency is
presently
being manifested in t h e increasingly competitive relationships between t h e U S , t h e E u r o pean, a n d t h e Japanese metropoles. T h e r e is
Global Dominance System
growing corporate interpénétration between the
metropoles, as witnessed by patterns of direct
investments. At the same time, m e t r o p o l i t a n
actors are feeling t h e need to protect themselves against the loss of c o n t r o l a n d accumulation opportunities which m a y result from this
interpénétration. T h e state still m a y offer t h e
best insurance opportunities, a n d it is still easiest to c o m m a n d t h e s u p p o r t of t h e nation, t h e
'home country', whenever mobilization of
popular support becomes n e c e s s a r y .
11
T h e nation-state as a base is p r o b a b l y also
the best prospect for a fourth, still relatively
rare unit in o u r scheme: former objects (perhaps even smaller agents) wishing to establish
themselves as actors. W i t h i n the system there is
a
category
identifiable
as
t h e '(new)
independents', or potential actors, still inferior
in their a c c u m u l a t i o n capacity, but in t h e process of achieving greater (self-) control. T h e y
are, at different levels, units such as peasant
movements, nationalistic local u p p e r classes, or
leaderships wanting to restructure t h e hierarchical society in which they live a n d i n t r o d u c e
equality. Invariably,
they
will find t h a t
the society is part of the larger, global structure a n d thus dependent on it. As they therefore will find it necessary to attack it, t h e y
become a potential threat, an opposition a n d
a potential break-away from t h e d o m i n a n c e
system. M o r e o v e r , they act in clear contradiction to t h e agents in terms of differing interests and class relationship - a fact which explains m u c h of the conflict dynamics of such
a t t e m p t e d groupings as the ' G r o u p of 77' a n d
the Conferences of Non-aligned states.
4.
The
'technocapital'
T h e new, still emerging, structure has been referred to a b o v e as the 'technocapital' structure. W h a t is the empirical evidence for such a
proposition? H o w does it relate to the concrete
world of d o m i n a t i o n ? A n d h o w does it relate
to mechanisms of d o m i n a t i o n n o t a direct,
constituent part of the c o r p o r a t e structure?
By technology we refer to t h e totality of
phenomena which m a k e u p m o d e r n industrial
production and which are t h e p r o d u c t of t h e
327
science of transformation. We m a y distinguish
between innovation, application, and t h e resultant m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n (reflecting ideational
a n d social value in o u r scheme). By information we refer to knowledge a b o u t t h e (total)
p r o d u c t i o n and distribution system, its various
c o m p o n e n t parts - m a r k e t s , p r o d u c t s , competitors - as well as t h e total structure and
the position of oneself a n d others in it. We are
referring to specialized knowledge - information which gives its possessor an advantage:
strategic knowledge, information on information. As we are dealing primarily with dominance relationships u n d e r 'capitalist' conditions, we refer to the t o p level of the control
structure a n d the merger of technology, inform a t i o n , a n d capital as t h e technocapital.
T h e evidence for such a proposition is found
partly according to qualitative, theoretical reasoning, partly in the empirical facts a b o u t the
functioning of t h e system. A n u m b e r of theoretical studies support, from differing points of
view, t h e crucial role of technology in dominance relationships a n d social development in
general. T h e r e is t h e G a l b r a i t h i a n 'technostructure' ( G a l b r a i t h 1967); new groups of
actors referred to as the 'technocrats'; technology as t h e driving force in the 'qualitative
a r m s race' (Senghaas 1973); technological capital (Karpik 1972), a n d there is a wholly new
type of 'technological society' which, according to Ellul, develops rapidly into a stage where
t h e technology as such, on its o w n m o m e n t u m ,
takes over control (Ellul 1965).
T h e global hierarchy of technological (self-)control
and
the
process
whereby
the
'technocapital' is imposed, or imposes itself,
o n t o t h e existing structure are indicated by
patterns of concentration or monopolization,
patterns of growth a n d rates of surplus accumulation. Superior d o m i n a t i o n occurs w h e r e
there is high concentration a n d at t h e same
time high g r o w t h a n d surplus rates.
At t h e global level, the U n i t e d States and
t h e Soviet U n i o n alone a c c o u n t for 61 % of
total w o r l d expenditure on R & D a n d 63 % of
all research personnel, t h e US alone accounts
for m o r e t h a n 50 % of each category. (Albertini 1967, p. 242.) As to the R & D p e r f o r m a n c e
Global Dominance System
- shows, most
countries or
areas outside these 'independents' are strongly dependent on the technology of t h e métropoles. T h e
trends a n d patterns s h o w n in T a b l e I I I bec o m e even m o r e d r a m a t i c when it is realized
that m a n y of the patents of domestic origin
registered in dependent countries a r e o w n e d by
subsidiaries of foreign firms.
T h e trading of patents, e.g. in t h e form of
licensing, has b e c o m e an i m p o r t a n t business.
This t r a d e is d o m i n a t e d by the U n i t e d States,
which alone accounts for 70 % of all t h e royalties d u e in respect of licences in t h e
'capitalist' world. T h r e e fourths of these royalties were earned t h r o u g h subsidiary p r o d u c tion of US corporations. T h e m o n e t a r y value
of this trade in 1970 a m o u n t e d to s o m e $ 3.5
billion. As US purchase of licenses a c c o u n t e d
for only 7 % of the world total, the net effect
of the licensing surplus to US c o r p o r a t e i n c o m e
and national balance-of-payments deficits was
considerable, in 1970 a m o u n t i n g to $ 2.3 billion. (Wolf 1973.)
T h i s is the visible structure. U n d e r t h e surface, there are even m o r e clearcut indications
of domination. Patents as a highly protected
value is a m e c h a n i s m which its possessor m a y
use, a n d in fact often does use, to control technology dependents, t h e licensees. S u c h control
takes the form of e.g. non-use of patents: t h e
patent taken out in a given c o u n t r y is not used
for productive purposes, but for protective
ones; and the prohibition of exports of products realized t h r o u g h t h e acquisition patents.
In Peru, out of the 4872 patents granted between 1960 a n d 1970, only 54 were later p u t
into production. T h e p r o p o r t i o n of foreign
technology contracts which contain prohibiting
or limiting clauses on exports has been estimated at 99 % in Peru, 97 % in M e x i c o , 93 % in
Chile, 83 % in Bolivia, 79 % in C o l o m b i a ,
75 % in E c u a d o r , and 43 % in I n d i a .
13
Technology has not only b e c o m e a c o m m e r cial goods, giving its seller high accumulation
capacities. It would seem to be the w a y of exploiting a position of m o n o p o l y a n d superior
bargaining power, of superimposing oneself
upon practically all aspects of t h e planning
and decisionmaking process on p r o d u c t i o n
329
a n d distribution policies of a subordinate
'buyer'. As examples of the opportunities
which are created, Wionczek mentions t h e following types of such impositions from a study
of technology i m p o r t contracts in Mexico:
Stipulations in the contract giving the seller
powers to fix the prices of the products, limiting
or preventing research by the recipient enterprise, forbidding the use of alternative technology, stipulating that the seller shall be the sole
purchaser of the product, appointing the technical staff, collecting royalties for patents or trade
marks which were not used, and obliging the
buyer to use patents or trademarks which did
not involve technical advances, acquiring the
exclusive agency for sales in Mexico. (Wionczek
1973)
T h e p a t e n t system is a g o o d indication of
the structure as well as t h e practice of control
a n d accumulation. It is, however, only p a r t of
it - a n d often a small part. F o r instance, UN
economists w o r k on a n u m b e r of such m e a n s
a n d mechanisms, s o m e of t h e m referred to as
'restrictive business practices'. T h e y represent
b o t h offensive a n d defensive, strategic as well
as tactical forms of control a n d accumulation.
Direct investments a n d overpricing are fairly
b r o a d examples of t h e offensive form of control a n d a c c u m u l a t i o n (strategic a n d tactical)
respectively. N o n - u s e of patents, export prohibition, a n d tariffs a n d t h e whole r a n g e of
'non-tariff b a r r i e r s ' a r e specific examples of
t h e defensive form. It is i m p o r t a n t to study
h o w these various forms help reinforce the
structure, as intended a n d clearly actor-dependent forms of d o m i n a t i o n . But only when their
integration into t h e total d o m i n a n c e structure
is fully t a k e n into account will we see correctly
t h e role which they are playing.
14
U N C T A D estimates show t h a t underdevelo p e d countries' p a y m e n t s for only two out of
six categories of 'transfer of technology' rose
at an a n n u a l yearly r a t e of 20 % in t h e
1960s. T h e y are estimated to increase sixfold from the end of the 1960s till the end of
t h e 1970s, from $ 1.5 billion to $ 9 billion
(1970 rates). If figures for all six categories of
p a y m e n t s were m a d e available, it w o u l d be
possible to s h o w a huge a n d rapidly growing
15
330
Helge
Hveem
flow of capital as p a y m e n t s for technology
a n d i n f o r m a t i o n a n d a corresponding depreciation of other aspects of value connected with it
(brain drain, enclavization of the e c o n o m y ,
exhaustion of resources, deterioration of balance of p a y m e n t s , etc.). If these flows a r e added to other types a n d processes of accumulation, it will not be difficult to s h o w an aggregate net flow of value from lower to higher
levels t h a t will, at least in part, be of a highly
exploitative character. A c c o r d i n g to one estim a t e , t h e 'invisible flow' of p a y m e n t s for
technology from underdeveloped countries at
present is between $ 5 a n d 9 billion a year.
(Maxwell 1973.) O n l y in isolated cases will t h e
positive effects of technology t r a d e - such as
higher productivity, k n o w - h o w , jobs, a n d infrastructure - balance t h e negative ones.
Overpricing, a typical case of tactical (shortt e r m ) offensive accumulation, has been the
subject of a n u m b e r of case studies. Vaitsos
(1970) studied a sample of foreign subsidiaries
in t h e p h a r m a c e u t i c a l sector in C o l o m b i a . He
found cases of overpricing on intermediate
p r o d u c t s of m o r e t h a n 6000 %, while average
overpricing was 155 %. If overpricing is comp a r e d t o two o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s o f w h a t m a y
be referred to as effective returns (or 'real'
profits), reported profits a n d royalties, again
the C o l o m b i a n case is revealing: on t h e average, r e p o r t e d profits m a d e up 3.4 %, royalty
p a y m e n t s 14 %, a n d overpricing 82.6 % of t h e
effective returns of t h e p h a r m a c e u t i c a l firms.
Similar, if not as d r a m a t i c , patterns of p u r e
exploitation have been f o u n d for o t h e r branches a n d areas, even areas close to the metropoles, as the H o f f m a n la R o c h e case in the
U n i t e d K i n g d o m shows. (Maxwell 1973.) It
seems that t h e branches generally yielding t h e
highest offensive a c c u m u l a t i o n opportunities
are t h e electronics, pharmaceutical, a n d chemical industries.
These are branches or sectors characterized
by high technology a n d information ingredients. T h e y show typically high real profit
and g r o w t h rates, t h e two obviously being
closely related. A n d they often control m a r k e t s
in highly monopolistic ways. An e x a m p l e
which seems to meet all these counts perfectly
is the electronic monopolist, IBM. It ranked
(1970) no. 5 on t h e Fortune list of corporate
size, according to sales; in terms of income, it
r a n k e d no. 2. In 1970 its sales were six times
larger t h a n in 1958 when its Fortune r a n k was
28 ( a m o n g US corporations). In other words, it
has g r o w n at an average a n n u a l rate of close
to 16 %, presently controlling some A of
world computer markets.
2
T h i s highly d y n a m i c image of I B M , however, is not t h e entire picture. T h e corporation
is t h e perfect expression of the 'technocapital':
a unit combining superior technology and information with a monopolistic position and a
high degree of self-sufficiency of capital.
It
p r o d u c e s the technology necessary to manipulate information, a n d with highly effective
o u t c o m e s in t e r m s of control a n d accumulation.
A n o t h e r 'specialist', despite its increasingly
c o n g l o m e r a t e character, is the I T & T , best
k n o w n for its monopolistic position in the telec o m m u n i c a t i o n s field a n d its recent uses a n d
abuses of p o w e r , notably in Chile. Its highly
sophisticated systems for supervising people,
p r o d u c t i o n , etc. have not only m a d e it a powerful part of the control structure. It is resented in the case of a Chilean g o v e r n m e n t trying
to modify the postition of its c o u n t r y in the
global structure a n d redistribute value domestically; it is actively c o u r t e d in the case of a
Soviet g o v e r n m e n t wishing - so it seems - to
utilize the superior c o r p o r a t e technology to
i m p r o v e its ability to c o n t r o l t h e state, the
population, a n d hence the p r o d u c t i o n apparatus.
T h e political purposes a n d / o r effects of such
technology deals belong to the field of a global
political economics theory. Is t h e Soviet-IT&T
deal simply business as usual; or does it entail
a modification or a strengthening of the dominance structure, at t h e global level, at the level
of the 'Socialist w o r l d ' a n d in West-East relations? W h a t m a d e I T & T have n o second
t h o u g h t s in m a k i n g a deal with the Soviet Union, while actively trying to topple the governm e n t o f Chile? W h a t m a d e U S technology
owners impose serious restrictions on the
French-German
TV
satellite
'Symphonie'
Global Dominance System
16
under the I N T E L S A T a g r e e m e n t , while they
seemingly h a d no hesitations a b o u t entering
into close space c o o p e r a t i o n with Soviet space
research p r o g r a m s a few years earlier? It seems
quite obvious t h a t such questions do n o t belong
solely
to
the
field
of East-West
'international polities', but to t h e development
of d o m i n a t i o n (also including possible corporate d o m i n a t i o n of Socialist countries) as well.
Working in positions as agents of t h e metropolitan actors, in close relationship to t h e m
a n d / o r as actors in their o w n right exercising
control over lower level m a n a g e r s , are information specialists like the consultancy ('think
tanks') (Gross 1972), a n d the marketing firms.
T h e consultants a n d m a r k e t e e r s a r e typically
specialists in i n f o r m a t i o n on i n f o r m a t i o n within p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution, respectively.
T h e y w o r k from t h e t o p levels of the system;
their role (to which we briefly r e t u r n ) is to have
units a n d areas outside t h e m e t r o p o l e s assume
production a n d distribution tasks at lower levels of the system.
Employing size, m o n o p o l y , growth, a n d
profit p a r a m e t e r s , it would be possible to locate a n d identify the actors of t h e system m o r e
precisely t h a n we have d o n e so far. S u c h an
identification would have to be carried d o w n
to the level of individuals, roles, a n d institutions, as they constitute the elements c o m m o n
to all the various denominations we are using:
Actor, U p p e r class, M e t r o p o l e , Center, t h e
'Technocapital'.
At t h e role-level, we have already specified
s o m e of t h e m : the taking of decisions, innovation of new goals a n d products, t h e dissemination of decisions, goals a n d p r o d u c t s , etc. We
imply a certain degree of role specificity a n d a
corresponding
institutionalized
specialization.
This specialization gives rise to a division of
power a m o n g controlling a n d accumulating
actors. T h e owners of capital, whether they
own in the f o r m a l sense ('financial capital',
the shareholders or t h e state) or in t h e sense of
managing a c c u m u l a t e d capital on behalf of
formal owners (as 'industrial capital' m a y be
said to be doing) are not independent of, a n d
in fact often not the same as, those w h o possess t h e keys to technological innovation a n d
331
information
on
information
as
e.g.
' o r t h o d o x ' Marxist t h e o r y would have i t .
Capital, in o u r opinion, can be directing technology according to s o m e m o r e or less specified goals, such as w h e n t h e state military establishment asks R & D divisions t o p r o d u c e
certain types of w e a p o n r y to achieve specified
degrees of destructive or protective capability.
A n d the capitalist (including the g o v e r n m e n t
w h o intends to export this w e a p o n r y ) m a y ask
the division to m a k e t h e w e a p o n r y as cheaply
as possible so t h a t he can r e c o u p his outlays
with correspondingly higher profits a n d / o r
with increased sales t h r o u g h mass production.
But neither of t h e m w o u l d seem to be able to
control and thus intervene with the specifics of
the R & D task as such; hence, neither can be
said to control t h e R & D institution completely.
17
If such an analysis is correct, a c t o r identification becomes m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c , but also
m o r e correct. It follows t h a t within a n d a m o n g
actors, even of t h e same m é t r o p o l e , there m a y
be conflict, as they all share in the control and
a c c u m u l a t i o n opportunities at the highest level.
'They' w o u l d include capitalists, t o p c o r p o r a t e
m a n a g e r s , g o v e r n m e n t or state leaders, military, a n d the t o p people of technology a n d inf o r m a t i o n institutions. W h a t joins t h e m together (and what m a y even contribute to structure
t h e relationships between these tops in hierarchical ways) a r e first of all the bonds of class
(the fact t h a t they belong to the same upper
class of c o m m o n interest), m é t r o p o l e (the fact
t h a t they a r e competing with other métropoles),
a n d of nationality or even 'race'.
As to t h e m é t r o p o l e s , we have implied
t h r o u g h o u t this article t h a t t h e r e exists a multiplicity of t h e m : in t h e U n i t e d States, E u r o p e ,
a n d J a p a n . T h i s , we believe, is m o r e a dynamic t h a n a synchronic view of t h e present world.
M u c h evidence points to a hierarchy even
a m o n g m é t r o p o l e s , with t h e US pole on t o p of
at least West E u r o p e a n ones, to a lesser extent
also on t o p of the Japanese. Such evidence
includes t h e well-known strong US leadership
in t h e electronics or in general high technology
sectors a n d branches, a n d the almost complete
US d o m i n a t i o n of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n sector. O n l y
4 % of t h e R & D budgets of US multinational
332
Helge
Hveem
corporations are spent outside t h e U n i t e d
States, a n d these satellite research centers a r e
established primarily to steer foreign technology to t h e US m e t r o p o l e a n d exploit local, foreign innovative capacity to t h e a d v a n t a g e of
t h e same. (Dunning 1970.) In t h e m a r k e t i n g
business, 23 o u t of t h e world's 25 biggest
public relations firms are US-based, t h e biggest
of t h e m , J. Walker T h o m p s o n , at t h e time
being the biggest one in t h e local m a r k e t s of
seven o t h e r industrialized, 'capitalist' countries. T h i s is indeed ' M a d i s o n A v e n u e Imperialism'. (Schiller 1972.)
It is not the p u r p o s e of this article to discuss
in further detail inter-metropole relationships
a n d t h e degree a n d n a t u r e of US supremacy.
We simply assume - primarily on t h e basis of
the comparatively high Japanese technological
a n d financial independence, and t h e size and
g r o w t h of its e c o n o m y a n d its external penetrative capacity - t h a t past a s y m m e t r i c intermetropole relations a r e at present being t u r n e d
into symmetric ones. T h a t the military, econ o m i c , a n d lately political turmoils in the foreign a n d domestic operations of t h e US m e t r o pole itself contribute to this development is a
fact t o o well k n o w n to need c o m m e n t here.
T h a t m e t r o p o l i t a n US corporations c a n n o t let
themselves physically loose from t h e geographical a n d social space on which they have been
based, a n d thus resolve p r o b l e m s of declining
US power, is a point to which we now turn.
sary to maintain a n d / o r establish a direct type
of control. T h e m a i n t e n a n c e of a military app a r a t u s in bases, alliances, a n d a r m s t r a d e obviously m a y be m o t i v a t e d by purposes only
p a r t l y related to the global p r o d u c t i o n and distribution system. A n d the same applies to the
political-diplomatic a p p a r a t u s . T h e y b o t h belong to a state-to-state threat, bargaining, and
exchange system with elements and structures
of its own. At t h e same time, there is considerable overlap, or symbiosis. A n d it is this
r a n g e of overlap which concerns us here.
If mechanisms of control, for analytical
purposes, m a y be referred to as 'political',
'economic', etc. ( G a l t u n g 1971), it is necessary
to show h o w they coexist, or overlap, a n d also
h o w one form m a y be transformed into another or be replaced by it. Military bases m a y still
be needed as protection against w h a t is perceived as a threat to the system of domination
from outside it. But t h e actual domination as
such m a y be exercised t h r o u g h forms n o t directly dependent on the support of this type of
physical force.
In conceptualizations of power and control
found in the literature there exist several proposals for classifications a n d distinctions, some
of little relevance to a m o r e concise definition
of these concepts. C o n t r o l m a y be derived
from physical force (military) or 'intellectual
force' ('achieved', e.g. technology and inform a t i o n ) or based on s o m e social institution
like private p r o p e r t y . Or it m a y entail 'tough'
or 'soft bargaining', e t c .
18
5.
Domination
old and new
In o u r discussion of the global hierarchy, we
have identified three types of control structures: t h e direct on-the-spot type of c o n t r o l
('complete vertical integration'); control via
agents - the bridgehead type; a n d control via
the structure. T h e s e types coexist in the present
world. At the same time, they represent stages
in the development of the d o m i n a n c e system.
It is assumed that the actors within t h e system
w o u l d be able to exercise control efficiently
t h r o u g h the t h i r d type a n d that they m a y consciously be working t o w a r d s t h a t stage.
H o w e v e r , there are also forces a n d processes
working in other directions, m a k i n g it neces-
We p r o p o s e to distinguish between three
forms
of
control:
enforcement,
assimilation,
a n d the demonstration effect. It is assumed
that they typically correspond to t h e direct, the
bridgehead, a n d t h e indirect types of control,
respectively. Enforcement is the use of physical
force including occupation, tough bargaining,
blackmailing, etc., to establish a relationship of
direct control over s o m e unit. Assimilation is
the process of having the social units over
which control is wanted behave in the interests
of the controlling unit through education,
p r o p a g a n d a , or socio-economic 'seduction'.
(Seduction m e a n s the inclusion of t h e controlled unit into privileged positions of accu-
Global Dominance System
mulation, similar or close to positions held by
the controlling unit.) We k n o w b o t h these
forms from the history of colonial rule - enforcement representing the establishment of
it; assimilation the subsequent policy of having
local elites assist in t h e exercise of c o n t r o l by
sharing the goals a n d values possessed a n d
p r o d u c e d by the colonial system.
Demonstration is the new form. Its p o w e r
lies in the existence of a global u p p e r class,
Time
Magazine's
community,
'the
affluent
a n d influential' w h o a r e 'responsive to new
ideas, new p r o d u c t s a n d new ways of doing
things' a n d in t h e m o d e r n c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l
facilities which m a y be used to spread these
ideas, p r o d u c t s , a n d ways. T h e process t h r o u g h
which t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n effect is obtained has
been called t h e 'trickle down' process.
T h e i m p o r t a n c e of 'trickle d o w n ' has been
pointed o u t by marketeers studying US h o m e
markets; but, as H y m e r (1972) has shown, it
m a y be a d a p t e d to t h e global society as well.
A new idea, or p r o d u c t , or m e t h o d of p r o d u c tion (technology) is first introduced at t h e métropole level into the world upper class - w h o
is h o m o g e n o u s , affluent, a n d receptive e n o u g h
to respond immediately to the new. O n c e accepted by this class, the new idea etc. spreads
or 'trickles d o w n ' to other groups or classes
t h r o u g h the d e m o n s t r a t i o n effect.
W h a t makes demonstration effectful from
t h e point of view of the m é t r o p o l e is the way
it corresponds to the hierarchical social structure. As Fallers has pointed out, 'trickle
d o w n ' is
a mechanism for maintaining the motivation to
strive for success, and hence for maintaining
efficiency of performance in occupational roles,
in a system in which differential success is possible only for a few. (Fallers 1966, p. 403)
Productivity and adaptability a r e increased by
having people, groups, a n d perhaps even whole
classes (such as t h e middle class of a periphery
area) w o r k h a r d in o r d e r to achieve a status
a n d income higher u p , closer to those
'demonstrating' m a x i m u m achievement from
the top. Social mobility is defined as something
which can take place within, and only within,
333
t h e system. H e n c e people a r e induced to accept
those tasks in t h e p r o d u c t i o n and distribution
system allocated t h e m by those controlling the
system, or into which they have been forced or
assimilated. T h u s , t h e hierarchical structure
becomes m o r e efficient, a n d it becomes legitimized. At the s a m e time, it becomes even m o r e
'entrenched'; mobility is a n d c a n only be for
the few, a n d the relative distance to the t o p of
the structure will be constant, or even increasing, even for those w h o m o v e u p w a r d s . As has
been pointed o u t a b o v e , this is d u e to t h e
cumulative hierarchization, t h e continuous development of new levels of c o n t r o l a n d accumulation. In relative terms, striving for status
a n d success from lower levels in t h e structure
m a y - for m o s t people - be an endless Sisyphos task.
T h e 'trickle d o w n ' process is increasingly
one global process, radiating c o n s u m p t i o n patterns a n d p r o d u c t i o n tasks o u t from t h e m e t r o pole. T h e multinational corporations with their
superior m a r k e t i n g a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n capacities, speed up t h e process, which is an important part of their offensive strategy. 'Trickle
d o w n ' is t h e creation of m a r k e t s , of d e m a n d .
It is turning objects into willing workers and
demanding consumers.
T h e structural constants - the principles of
hierarchy which do n o t c h a n g e over time are verticality in the differentiation of control
(the
'international
division
of
labor'),
unequality in the distribution of value, b o t h
having been discussed above, a n d feudality.
W h a t is changing are the actors a n d the mechanisms, t h e types a n d forms of control.
T h e constant feudal c h a r a c t e r of the system
m a y be illustrated in different w a y s . Feudality is a situation with high interaction at t h e
t o p of t h e structure, little or no cohesion and
interaction at t h e b o t t o m ; the b o t t o m level
g r o u p s (among other things, for lack of cohesion a m o n g themselves, for contact, information, a n d jobs) have to orient themselves - or
are being oriented to top levels. W h e r e a s t h e
t o p level has many alternative sources of contact (markets, energy, labor, etc.) supply, at
lower levels, t h e latter has practically no alternative. T h u s , feudality is an i m p o r t a n t element
19
334
Helge
Hveem
of the d o m i n a n t - d o m i n a t e d dependency relationship.
To the feudality element also belongs t h e
p h e n o m e n o n of sub-pole development or pocket
growth. T h i s refers to the p a t t e r n of developing parts of periphery areas, of having s o m e
sub-poles grow a n d b e c o m e agents or 'general
agents', often (but not necessarily) at the cost
of others. Such development is presently taking
place in the form of industrialization t h r o u g h
vertical, b u t in a few cases even horizontal integration, in sub-poles such as S a o P a u l o - R i o
and H o n g K o n g . S u c h sub-poles a n d their
upper and middle classes experience a growing
share of a c c u m u l a t i o n w h e t h e r i n t e n d e d or
u n i n t e n d e d by the m e t r o p o l e , w h e t h e r d u e to
economies of scale, to t h e existence of rich
resources, or to t h e role of such sub-poles as
crucial c o m m u n i c a t i o n nodes.
O n e related p h e n o m e n o n is the growing gap
between those belonging to t h e same nation or
c o u n t r y w h o are within, a n d those outside, the
sub-pole development. A n o t h e r related effect is
the potential for creating new conflict, as e.g.
between the regional sub-pole a n d the countries or nation-state objects in the regional hinterland of the sub-pole. T h i s effect will contribute, a n d is already contributing, to a d a m p ening of the antagonism that m a y be directed
against a dominating m e t r o p o l e a n d a reorientation of antagonism to be directed against t h e
regional agent, the sub-pole. T h i s process of
'envy y o u r neighbor first' m a y , intended or
not, function as a safety valve for the position
of the m e t r o p o l e a n d direct conflict potential
into clashes between groups a n d units at t h e
lower levels of t h e s y s t e m .
20
Protected colonial systems a n d the m o r e recent 'spheres of influence' a r e concrete expressions of t h e feudality principle. As shown
by e.g. the patterns of stocks of direct investm e n t a n d t r a d e in former colonial areas - t h e
'underdeveloped' countries - 'spheres of influence' policies still seem to be a protected
principle a n d at t h e same time a potential for
inter-metropole conflicts. O u r o w n study of
direct investment patterns has revealed strongly
monopolistic tendencies at t h e national and
regional levels a n d a consequent feudal struc-
ture at t h e global level: in 25 countries of the
u n d e r d e v e l o p e d category, t h e U n i t e d States
held m o r e t h a n 60 % of t h e total stock of direct private investment by foreigners as of
1967 (if a
60 % 'holding' m a y be considered a 'safe' m o n o p o l y position). T h e monopolistic position of the E E C as a whole is
'safe' in altogether 45 countries, of which 16
are the m o n o p o l y of F r a n c e , and 15 of United
K i n g d o m alone. Oligopolistic foreign investm e n t patterns a r e f o u n d in countries like Iran,
Brazil, A r g e n t i n a , K u w a i t , L e b a n o n , H o n g
K o n g , Singapore, a n d T h a i l a n d . A t present,
inter-metropole competition is, however, most
p r o b a b l y increasing - oligopoly not necessarily
m e a n i n g conflict, or m o r e conflict t h a n in one
m o n o p o l y case: oligopolistic rule m a y be coordinated in cartel-like agreements. This is mainly d u e to the recent r u n for energy a n d r a w
material supplies in which all the metropoles
have been involved.
21
It is o u r assumption that a perfect system of
control and accumulation might be obtained if
the d e m o n s t r a t i o n effect a n d the process of
'trickle d o w n ' could m a k e all parts and units
of t h e w o r l d accept t h e hierarchy and their
own position in it. As there is a degree of
inter-metropole conflict, as there is also an
actual or potential threat to the system from
outside ('socialism' as an alternative system),
a n d - p e r h a p s m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y - as there is
c o n t i n u o u s opposition a n d even threat-like action by s o m e parts of t h e system from within
it a n d from lower levels, the actors cannot
conceivably base their control and accumulation on t h e ' a u t o m a t i c functioning' of the system. It m u s t be constantly reinforced, protected, recreated.
This is w h e r e the direct, offensive, on-thespot a n d t h e intermediate, bridgehead types
a n d forms of c o n t r o l still m a y be crucial. T h e
new d o m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e global corporate
p r o d u c t i o n structure needs the support of the
old types a n d forms of control: imperialist
occupation, t h e possession of some strategic
r a w materials located in a periphery area, military bases, diplomatic pressure, etc. in m a n y
cases - a l t h o u g h not as a general rule - control functions m a y be transferred to the agents,
Global Dominance System
the local sub-poles of control. A r m s t r a d e a n d
aid a n d the provision of military k n o w - h o w
m a y be an equally efficient a n d less expensive
way to keep up control as m a y military bases.
Sub-pole military fortifications m a y p e r f o r m
not only local control functions, b u t regional
as well. T h e British retreat from East of Suez
is not leaving any major v a c u u m of metropolitan control. T h e U S m é t r o p o l e first, t h e n a n
Iranian sub-pole assisted by the m é t r o p o l e , fills
the vacant control post in the Gulf.
A l t h o u g h we suggest t h a t there has been,
over the past decades, a m o v e m e n t from metropolitan control t h r o u g h direct on-the-spot
presence to decentralized control via agent or
bridgehead relationships a n d - as t h e global
hierarchy became m o r e structured a n d stable
- an increasing trend t o w a r d s control via the
system, such a unilinear trend is a far t o o simplistic way of presenting changes in the system.
T h e r e are no d o u b t contradicting trends, largely due to changes in the forms of control: direct investments as m a r k e t p e n e t r a t i o n are taking over the role played by t r a d e via t h e international m a r k e t , representing at t h e same time
a m o r e offensive form of control. W h i l e physically omnipresent, the m e t r o p o l i t a n military
a p p a r a t u s as a form of control of t h e objects
of the d o m i n a n c e system is p r o b a b l y taking on
a m o r e decentralized structure: m e t r o p o l i t a n
bases are being replaced by sub-pole military
a p p a r a t u s . As e.g. the Peruvian and Libyan
military take-overs have shown, such decentralization m a y m a k e metropolitan control less
secure. T h e m é t r o p o l e m a y , a n d in fact does,
maintain control by making the sub-pole dependent on it for the supply a n d m a i n t e n a n c e
of the m e a n s of control. H o w e v e r , arms t r a d e
is no longer the exclusive m o n o p o l y of t h e
métropoles of the 'capitalist' w o r l d .
On t h e
other h a n d , these métropoles m a y c o u n t e r a c t
potential e x t r a m o n o p o l y purchases t h r o u g h
other m e a n s a n d forms of penetration. A n d
the duopolistic patterns of world control implicit in recent US-Soviet agreements w o u l d
seem to m a k e 'tough' competition between
dominating actors for control of the periphery
less p r o b a b l e .
22
23
Penetration of already peripherized p a r t s of
2 - J. P. R.
335
the system - t h e objects - is continuing, and
peripherization of new parts into objects of the
system is taking place. W h y ? T h e answer seems
r a t h e r simple: once c o n t r o l is established, it has
to be m a i n t a i n e d for a variety of reasons (including for its o w n sake); as g r o w t h is the goal
of m e t r o p o l i t a n , in particular c o r p o r a t e , interests, peripherization will a d d new value to t h a t
already accumulated; as profit is a goal in itself a n d a w a y of growing, it m u s t be
constantly sought in areas a n d a m o n g people
where there m a y b e new a n d / o r unexploited
opportunities.
Penetration aims at establishing control. Before we ask w h e t h e r s o m e active p e n e t r a t i o n is
(still) taking place a n d start trying to identify
the processes at w o r k in s o m e concrete geographical or social space, we m u s t assess the
state of penetratedness of an object. Is control
sufficient and a c c u m u l a t i o n at least satisfactory
- if n o t m a x i m u m of w h a t it m i g h t be - as
seen from t h e metropole? S u c h questions must
be asked before we start deriving any conclusions from observable trends in t h e patterns of
penetration. If there is a decline in metropolit a n economic aid to agents a n d objects, does it
m e a n less penetration a n d domination? Similarly, stagnation or relative decline in the
a m o u n t of new direct investments m a d e in periphery areas in recent years does not nocessarily indicate, as several a u t h o r s p r o p o s e , that
these areas have b e c o m e less i m p o r t a n t to metr o p o l i t a n accumulation. A s G o u x a n d Landeau (1971) have shown, r e p o r t e d repatriated
profits from US operations in 'periphery areas'
(underdeveloped countries) still comprise an
absolutely a n d comparatively larger share of
the global profits from direct investments than
do operations in areas closer to t h e metropoles,
Western E u r o p e a n d C a n a d a , b o t h of which
are at present taking a comparatively larger
share of new investments.
24
In order to show t h e multidimensional face
of present penetratedness, we developed an
additive index based on the following p a r a m e ters: stock of direct investments by metropoles,
imports from metropoles, and e c o n o m i c aid
received from metropoles (these three representing 'economic penetration'); military alli-
336
Helge
Hveem
ance co-membership with metropoles, a n d military aid received from m e t r o p o l e s (as 'military
penetration'). In addition, we include voting
agreement with the U n i t e d States i n t h e U N
G e n e r a l Assembly as an indicator of 'political
penetratedness'. On the o t h e r five p a r a m e t e r s ,
the m é t r o p o l e was defined as all O E C D ( D A C )
countries.
25
A detailed discussion of these p a r a m e t e r s a n d
presentation of t h e basic d a t a is m a d e elsew h e r e ( H v e e m 1973a). T h e overall state of
penetratedness should be sufficiently indicated
by this composite m e a s u r e , despite possible
weaknesses in t h e separate p a r a m è t r e s which
have been trichotomized in t h e index. At t h e
same time, they m a y point to s o m e of t h e
major variations in t h e types a n d forms of control, a l t h o u g h such variations can be fully seen
a n d u n d e r s t o o d only t h r o u g h a m o r e concrete,
disaggregate analysis.
While t h e index ranks periphery or underdeveloped countries in terms of overall penetratedness, r a n k is at t h e same t i m e indicative
of the degree of penetratedness, as a c o m p a r i son of t h e composite index a n d t h e ratios on
individual indicators
of ' e c o n o m i c
penetration' will show. A first analysis of the d a t a
offers t h e following conclusions:
1) T h e degree a n d extent of penetratedness in
periphery areas of t h e system is r e m a r k a b l y
high a n d indicates considerable, often complete
m e t r o p o l i t a n control over these areas.
2) T h e extent a n d degree of penetratedness
clearly justifies n a m i n g m o s t parts of t h e perip h e r y 'objects of domination'.
3) L a r g e parts of p e r i p h e r y areas are, as indicated by the degree and extent of 'economic
penetration', sufficiently p e n e t r a t e d a n d controlled by t h e system of p r o d u c t i o n a n d distribution (as expressed by direct investments a n d
trade, in particular). S u c h 'sufficiently economically penetrated' countries a r e C a m e r o o n ,
G a b o n , G u y a n a , J a m a i c a , K u w a i t , Liberia,
a n d Saudi A r a b i a , a m o n g others.
4) In certain areas, control by 'military
penetration' still seems to m a k e a difference.
S u c h countries are Brazil, C o l o m b i a a n d several o t h e r S o u t h a n d C e n t r a l A m e r i c a n countries,
Iran, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan,
a n d T h a i l a n d . S o m e of t h e larger of these
countries - like Brazil a n d I r a n - are important sub-poles, or regional 'prefects' of the
system.
5) O n l y a very few countries seem to represent
t h e position of potential or actual 'independents' at t h e level of nation-states: Afghanistan, B u r m a , C u b a , India, N e p a l , Syria, and
U A R . S o m e of these, however, are the objects
of alternative domination: C u b a , U A R , and
Syria by t h e Soviet system (cf. H v e e m & Willetts 1973); N e p a l by India; or they m a y be
bordeline cases - like e. g. India.
In t h e present p a p e r we have covered the
greater part of t h e global d o m i n a n c e system,
of the d o m i n a t e d . To that system also belong
areas, countries, a n d classes closer to the metropole, in positions that m a y be higher up but
a r e still d o m i n a t e d - as the cases of Spain and
Israel as well as the sub-pole Western E u r o p e
a n d C a n a d a show.
6.
Conclusion:
some
more
questions
M u c h research is still needed a n d a n u m b e r of
i m p o r t a n t questions a r e still open for discussion within t h e f r a m e w o r k of a t h e o r y of global political e c o n o m y . We have discussed only
s o m e of t h e m in the present context.
O n e obvious field for further research concerns the exact n a t u r e a n d degree of dep e n d e n c y relationships. An identification of
interest actor relations is equally important.
We have p r o v i d e d empirical s u p p o r t for the
existence of c o n t i n u e d a n d p r o b a b l y increasing
'objective-absolute' m e t r o p o l i t a n dependency
on resources of energy a n d r a w material (fixed
value) located in satellite areas. W h a t will be
further explored are t h e conditions under
which ' i n d e p e n d e n t s ' , or independence-inclined
objects, m a y extricate themselves from such
relationships of d o m i n a t e d dependency in
which they find themselves at present, and
h o w they m a y take advantage of the location
of strategically i m p o r t a n t fixed value on their
territory. We h a v e identified actors and interests in r a t h e r general terms. W h a t will have to
be further developed is the exact (albeit changing) relationship between actors a n d interest.
T h i s invites an analysis of 'capitalism' - a
Global Dominance System
concept employed t h r o u g h o u t this p a p e r in
rather unspecified terms, m o r e as a c a t c h w o r d
than an analytical tool. But - as indicated
above - the actor-interest analysis m u s t go
beyond 'capitalism' a n d t h e drives a n d m o tives related to a n y such m o r e or less identifiable m o d e of production.
It must include an analysis - mostly outside
the framework of t h e present study - of t h e
'socialist system'. We have a d v a n c e d the proposition that in general, this system shares the
purpose a n d basic types of d o m i n a t i o n of the
'capitalist' system. If it is less d o m i n a n t , that
is largely due to the fact t h a t W e s t e r n capitalist expansion a n d penetration has historically
been a frontrunner, a n d that Socialist competition has been less successful in catching up
with the West. T h e r e is clearly a difference in
scale, the West being far m o r e entrenched in
the global periphery. T h e socialist competition
suffers from having to o p e r a t e in a system already penetrated a n d controlled by t h e capitalist. In addition, the Socialist 'trickle d o w n '
a p p a r a t u s is probably less efficient, suffering
from such disadvantages as a technology inferiority. On t h e other h a n d , t h e Socialists m a y
compensate such disadvantages t h r o u g h their
politico-military a p p a r a t u s , by which they have
penetrated into the Middle East, C u b a , S o m a lia, etc.
337
Equally i m p o r t a n t is a further discussion of
conflict, its n a t u r e a n d dynamics, a n d its global as well as local potentials. If t h e continuation of the structure is not dependent on any
single a c t o r or a n y type or f o r m of control,
then the configuration of actors a n d types of
control, as well as the potential for rivalry a n d
open clashes between t h e m , m a y well b e c o m e a
major threat to the system. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t
conflict potential lies in t h e following p a r a d o x :
the m o r e efficient t h e process of 'trickle
d o w n ' a n d the m o r e efficient t h e demonstration effect, the m o r e p r o b a b l e is also a growing antagonism against the m é t r o p o l e upper
classes from groups a n d people w h o a r e growing m o r e relatively deprived at lower levels as
they discover they cannot ' m a k e it' to t h e t o p
- as promised by t h e system. T h e y m a y work
as h a r d a n d as perfectly as possible according
to the principles set d o w n by the system itself:
t h a t increased control a n d / o r a c c u m u l a t i o n is
taking place only within a n d according to the
functioning of t h e system itself. But because of
a n o t h e r rule set by t h e system - t h a t u p w a r d
mobility is for t h e few only, a n d that the selection of those few takes place according to the
current distribution of p o w e r a n d to bonds of
nationality, class, a n d race - they are with few
exceptions p r e d e t e r m i n e d never to r e a c h the
top.
Underdeveloped countries classified (ranked) according to 'overall control penetration' by 'capitalist' métropoles
(OECD)
Penetration
index score
Country:
12:
11 :
Bolivia, Peru
10:
Gabon, Honduras, Panama, Venezuela
9:
Centr. Afr. Republic, Congo K, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Chile, Costa Rica*.
8:
Libya, Zambia, Argentina, Colombia, Dominica*, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Nicaragua, Trinidad, Uruguay, Iran, Malaysia.
7:
Algérie, Cameroon, Congo B, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunesia, Brazil,
Guiana*, Jamaica, Paraguay*, Kuwait, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, (Turkey).
6:
Chad, Dahomey, Kenya, Malagasy, (South Africa*), Uganda, (Malta*), (Israel), Thailand.
5:
Gambia*, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone*, Tanzania, (Greece), Mexico*, Iraq,
South Korea*, South Vietnam*.
4:
Ethiopia, Somalia, Swaziland*, Upper Volta, Ceylon, (Cyprus*), Jordan, Laos*, Pakistan.
3:
Burundi*, Cambodia, Indonesia, Yemen*.
2:
Botswana*, Lesotho*, Mali, Rhodesia*, Rwanda*, Sudan, (Spain*), Burma, India, Singapore*, S. Yemen*.
1:
United Arab. Republic, Bahamas*, Bermuda*, Afganistan, Nepal, Syria.
0:
(Yugoslavia*), Cuba*.
* Data missing on one or more of the indicators.
338
Helge Hveem
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NOTES
* This is a much revised and much shortened
version of two papers intended as an introduction
to a project on The global dominance system. The
titles of these papers are The global 'technocapital': On a cumulative international division of
labor (Hveem 1973b) and Dependency, interdependence,
and independence in a dominance
system (Hveem 1973a) both mimeos, April 1973.
The present paper, which was presented in absentia at the IX Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Montreal, 19-25
August 1973, can be identified as PRIO publication no. 27-20.
1. We refer to the works of Hymer, Amin, Palloix, Murray, and Galtung, but also to earlier
'classical' works of e.g. Hobson, Bukharin, and
Schumpeter. See for references notes below and
the bibliography in Senghaas 1973.
2. F o r a similar view and a more detailed discussion of these points, see Senghaas 1973.
3. For a critique of the notion of 'independent
processes' as it is used by certain integration
theorists, see Hveem 1973c.
4. For further discussion, see Hveem 1973a.
5. Cf. Hveem forthcoming.
6. For further discussion of the concept, see
Hveem 1973b.
7. Hobsbawm 1969. See also Krippendorff 1973.
8. Cf. Financial Times, 8 Jan. 1971, and 3 Dec.
1970 for some information on the vertical integration of the bauxite-aluminium sector.
9. The Congolese (Zaire) nationalization of its
copper industry is a case in point. Taking over the
majority share in the Union Minière du Haut
Katanga, the Congolese government in order to
secure export and marketing outlets, let the former
majority-holders and some other foreign interests
take charge of these parts of the productiondistribution process.
10. In an advertisement in The Economist, 1623 May 1970.
11. We will discuss these aspects in more detail
in a forthcoming paper entitled 'Multinational corporations and the nation-state'. See also Palloix
1971.
339
12. O E C D Observer, No. 57, April 1972; figure
is for 1971.
13. UN/ECOSOC, Jan. 1973.
14. They include, according to the UN World
Economic Survey, 1963 (p. 191):
1) Foreign trade policies: Licensing requirements, Quota restrictions, Negotiated export limitations, Foreign exchange restrictions, State trading, Procurement policies favoring domestic products, Anti-dumping and similar regulations, Subsidies to exports.
2) Administrative practices: Classification of
goods for custom purposes, Documentary, marking
and packaging requirements, Incomplete or delayed publication of customs, information.
3) Internal economic policies affecting imports:
Internal taxes for revenue purposes, Taxes applied
to imports to compensate for indirect taxes borne
by comparable domestic goods, Pricing policies
and price control regulations, Restrictions on advertising of goods.
4) Internal health and safety regulations affecting imports: Similarity regulations, Technical specification requirements, Regulations applied for national security reasons.
The six categories referred to are:
(i) for the right to use patents, licences, knowhow, and trademarks;
(ii) for technical knowledge and know-how
needed both in the preinvestment and investment stage and in the operation stage;
(iii) through over-pricing of imports of intermediate products and equipment ('hidden' costs or
'price mark-ups');
(iv) through profits on capitalization of knowhow (acquisition of equity participation in
place of other means of payment for transfer
of technology); profits on these equity holdings are therefore to be regarded as, in part,
payments for the transfer of technology;
(v) through a portion of repatriated profits of the
wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures
which do not make specific provision for payment for the transfer of technology;
(vi) through imports of capital and other technical
equipment, the price of which usually allows
for the exporter's valuation of the cost of
technology.
16. Cf. Riegel 1971. The INTELSAT agreement
meant that the French/West German TV satellite
only could be allowed to be put into the orbit by
American rockets (the US technological advantage
340
Helge Hveem
in this case) on condition that it be used for experiments, not ordinary TV transmissions.
17. F o r a representative example and an argumentation in sharp contradiction to our own, see
Janco & Furjot 1972.
18. See Backrach & Baratz 1970; Emerson 1962.
19. F o r a discussion, see Galtung 1971.
20. This process of 'intra-periphery' conflict due
to perceived status differentiation was causing
much concern - and was to some extent purposely exploited - at U N C T A D III in Santiago. See
Hveem 1972.
21. For a detailed presentation of the data, see
Hveem 1973a. For an empirical analysis of spheres
of influence in international trade, see BarrattBrown 1972.
22. Cf.
World Armaments and Disarmament.
SIPRI Yearbook, 1973 and earlier issues; cf. also
SIPRI: Arms Trade with the Third World, 1971.
23. Recent reports indicate that there is a high
degree of mutual understanding and in fact a
'division of labor' between the United States and
the Soviet Union in parts of the global periphery.
In the case of Bangla Desh, the United States has
been providing arms to the army, while the Soviet
Union has equipped the police force. Another
recent case of joint Soviet-US venture is the plan
for a (banana) production unit to be set up in
Colombia by Soviet state organs and United
Brands. See Transnational Monitor, I, 1973.
24. We are referring to observations in numerous studies by I M F World Bank or UN organs,
and to e.g. Schuler 1968 and Barratt-Brown 1970.
25. This is not fully compatible with our own
line of argument - that parts of the so-called developed capitalist world (OECD) belong to lower
levels of control and accumulation, not to the
metropole. As those parts belonging to metropolitan levels, however, make up for most of the
actual penetration, this weakness in the empirical
analysis of aggregates does not represent any serious problem. An offprint of the basic data on
penetratedness is obtainable from PRIO.
SUMMARY
The article is a contribution to the development
of a theory of global political economy. Its main
aim is to develop further the conceptual basis for
such a theory and to reformulate some central
theorems. While proposing that the world is increasingly becoming one system with globalized
patterns of domination, the article builds mainly
on the 'world capitalist system'.
The author describes and explains the cumulative character of the system: the development of
an international 'hierarchical division of labor'
where new levels and centers of control and accumulation are developed whereas the structural
constants - vertically, inegality, and feudality are retained. Four such levels are identified, corresponding to the levels of control in the multinational corporation. To these levels also correspond differential control and accumulation opportunity: a power structure of actors, agents, and
objects; its geopolitical mapping into métropoles,
subpoles, and satellites; and a global class structure. In the very center is found the 'technocapital' - the combination of capital and politicalmilitary power with superior technology and information. Data on the functioning and the growth
of this structure are given. Processes of penetration and relationships of domination-dominated
dependency are also given.
Finally, the author discusses the relationship
between the various types and mechanisms of control. Several problems necessitating further research are identified, mainly bearing on the processes of creation and recreation of dominance
relations and the interests of, and conflicts between, the actors of the system.