OLLETORNQUIST*
Movement,Politics and Development:
The case of Kerala
What is the significance of the new popular efforts in Kerala at
developmentthroughdemocratisationfrombelow?This is an attempt
to carve out some of the conclusions on the basis of a not yet
summarised programme during the 90s on popular movements,
developmentand democracybased on repeatedcase studies in the
very differentcontexts of Kerala,Indonesiaand the Philippines.
In the first part of the essay, I begin by by relatingKeralato the
mainstreamdiscourseon developmentand democracy.Next I suggest
some alternativepropositions, discuss their fate in the context of
Keralaand relate this to the generalproblemsof popular efforts at
democratisation,includingin as contrastingcases as Indonesiaand
the Philippines. Hence it is possible to identify how and why the
Kerala activists have pioneered vital attempts at solving common
problems,but yet have some way to go. The second and main part of
the essay,then, is to substantiatetheseconclusions.Aftersome critical
notes on the mainstreamstudies of third world democratisation,I
suggest that we need to focus instead on problems of substantial
democratisationand propose an analytical frameworkfor this. By
applyingthe frameworkto the concretecasesof Indonesiaand Kerala,
I summarise, finally, the analytical and empirical basis for the
conclusions in part one.
PART I: POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND CONCLUSIONS
THE MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY ARGUMENTS
To begin with, Keraladoes not confirm the mainstreamthesis
about democratisation.Accordingto this thesis,the riseof democracy
is a result of social and economic developmentof capitalism,middle
classes (in particular)and theircapacityof organisingthemselvesand
* Professor, Centre for Development and the Environment
(SUM), University of Oslo,
Norway
Social Scientist, Vol. 29, Nos. 11 - 12, Nov. - Dec. 2001
58
SOCIALSCIENTIST
communicatingwithina civil societyof 'good'citizenswith increasing
trust in each other (social capital). In this perspective,moreover,the
currentdynamicgrowth of third world late capitalismand, with it,
increasinglyindependentand astute citizens, will underminethe old
kind of class contradictionsthat, many say,generate'threatsagainst
democracy and development' in terms of 'overpoliticisation',
authoritarianandhugestates,and'top-down'traditionalleftistparties
and unions.
If the thesis had beencorrectin the context of Kerala,this would
have implied, first, that Kerala'sunderdevelopedeconomy should
not, as it were, have produceda democraticpolity in the first place.
Furthermore,in accordancewith the thesis, the long and outstanding
importanceof Leftist politics would have diminishedafter the land
reformand furtherdemocratisationwould primarilyhavecome about
in the southern areas where market and middle class civil society
driven modernisationwas most important. However, as we know,
the results from one of the World'smost impressivecampaignsfor
democratic decentralisation, alternative popular planning and
development work from below, the People's Planning Campaign
indicate that generally speaking Left politics is alive and renewed
while the campaign has done least well (in terms of democratic
development projects) in the areas with most of the market- and
middleclass civil society drivenmodernisationthat the conventional
argumentinstead relatesto democratisation.
TENTATIVEALTERNATIVE
THESES
In contrast to the mainstreamperspectives- and aside from the
fact that most democracieshave actuallycome about much 'thanks'
to 'enlightened'top-down leaders,war, and other catastrophes- the
inital hypothesisin my own programmewas, that even though it is
true that third world late capitalismdiffersa lot from the European
and Americanpaths, it may generate instead other characteristics
that mightactuallyspurboth a renewedLeftand a radicaldemocracy.
Why would that be?First,no matterwhat we thinkof thirdworld
capitalism,it is no longerheldback(as undercolonialism)in countries
like India. So the basic rationale for the old communist argument
about the need for authoritarianshortcutsto progress is no more.
While the old Left would thus diminish, radical movementswould
instead becomemore interestedin gradualand democraticpathways
from below and abandon enlightened authoritarianism.Similarly,
second, therewould also be less fertilegroundfor the old thirdworld
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
59
social-democratic middle class coups against 'threateningradical
masses'- as the dynamiccapitalistdevelopmentwould now produce
a criticalmass of middleclass and 'educatedworkers'that might be
more easy to mobilise in peacefulelections. In Kerala,centre-leftists
would thus becomemore interestedin work among 'the masses'and
also engage in joint projectswith groups and people that previously
were looked upon as communist-pariah.Third,while it may well be
thatthis thirdworld latecapitalismgeneratesless unifiedsubordinated
classes than early European capitalism, the increasingly many
movements that reflect the many differentconflicts, would instead
have to give more emphasisto variousinstitutionalarrangementsto
promoteco-operationin orderto reachreasonableresults- which in
turn might promote democraticmethods. If this proved right, there
would thus be concurring and even unifying tendencies among
differentmovements,NGOs, and so on. Fourth,and probablymost
important,the specialkindof politicallydominatedsymbiosisbetween
politics and economy in thirdworld late capitalism,I argued,would
make it necessaryfor subordinateclassesto not just stand up against
privatecapitalistsbut also againstthe monopolisationof politically
controlledresources.Hencetheremightbe preconditionsfor a similar
powerfulcombinationof interestsof classandradicaldemocratisation
against political-cum-economic rulers as previously between
nationalism and the struggle against landlordism plus foreign
capitalism.In Kerala,then,one likelytrendafterthe landreformwould
be more focus on the control of variousresourcesbeyond land (such
as inputs) throughwhich one would be able to appropriatesurplus
indirectly through the market. This, in turn, would then spur cooperationamongrealproducersin termsof joint managementof, for
instance,irrigation,the buyingof inputs, and the marketingof their
products.Further,therewould be moreneed for co-operationamong
fragmentedlabouragainstmobilecapital- whichcalledfor democratic
political co-ordinationamongthe formerand negotiationsand pacts
between the two. Finally,therefore,democraticgovernanceon both
local and central levels would become a new main issue after the
previousstruggleover fixed resourcessuch as land.
THE OUTCOMEIN KERALA
Of course we can not go into details here (in terms of
operationalisations,indicators,and empiricalresults),but with a few
importantexceptionsthe above alternativehypothesesfrom the mid/
late-80s have provedreasonablycorrectin Kerala.
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First,as alreadyindicated,the resultsfrom the People'sPlanning
Campaignindicate that the democraticdevelopmentprojects have
done least well in the areas with most of that market-and middle
classcivil societydrivenmodernisationthattheconventionalargument
relatesto democratisation.Successratherseemsto go with less market
modernisation,the presenceof knowledgeableradical activists and
well organisedco-operationamong voluntaryorganisationsas well
as between them an the local public administrators.In other words:
the campaign rests with much of the previous popular efforts,
especiallywithin the frameworkof the Left.
However,as this is a still ongoing process,let us also look at the
background.Generallyspeakingseveralof the alternativehypotheses
have beenconfirmedfromabout 1987. This was when the LeftFront
managed to get voted back into power. Its policy had become less
fixed to the then ratheroutdatedconflicts over land reform.Instead,
sections of the Frontbeganrespondingto new challengesin termsof
developmentof production,mismanagement,corruptionand, thus,
the need for more democracy.Furthermore,as we know, much of
this reformwork had grown out of broad voluntaryand non-party
political cooperation among centre and left oriented activists in the
educationalPeople'sScienceMovement (KSSP).With the successful
struggle against a huge power plant in Silent Valley in the 70s, the
KSSPbecameincreasinglymass based. And when the Left Frontgot
back into power in 1987, the KSSPbecame a vital basis for those
trying to adapt and revitaliseKerala'sradical developmentproject
on the basis of local popular democracy and environmental
sustainability.The first of the celebratedcampaignswas on literacy.
While this was then followed up in other parts of India as well,
additionalcampaignsfollowed on group farmingand local resource
mapping.The basic idea was to engageall people in joint productive
and sustainable efforts beyond the social, economic and political
conflictsduringthe strugglefor landreform.Democraticco-operation
between people and various civil society organisationsat the local
level became increasinglyimportant in order to handle the new
productivetasksandbe ableto mobilisepeople,sociallyandpolitically,
in accordancewith the new conflictsrelatedto them - ratherthan old
ones relatedto land reformand special union issues.
Despite all those positive conditions being present,however,the
outcome was rather frustrating. There was little spontaneous
convergence of various groups and interests in favour of actual
productiveco-operation and democratisation.Special interestsand
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
61
divergingviews of specificissuesoften persisted,which sustainedthe
dominanceof old politicalandat timescommunalloyalties.Moreover,
severalestablished(especiallytradeunion-)sectionsof the LeftFront
partieswere very scepticalof the new initiatives.In fact, much of the
initiativesrestedinsteadwith supportfrom some well-wisherswithin
the state government.So when the Left lost the next election, the
campaigns lost steam. And by the early-90s it became increasingly
clear,thus, that if an effectivenew social movement(beyondthe land
reform movement) would stand a chance, there was a need for a
moredecentraliseddemocraticpolityto createframeworkfor dynamic
developmentalwork, democraticco-operation, and fresh political
mobilisation for alternative development. The major problem,
however, was how it would be possible to create enough popular
pressureto get the still dominatingcentralistpoliticiansto implement
such a decentralisation.
One of the most excitingdevelopmentsamongradicalthirdworld
popularmovementsthat I know of, is thatthe Keralaactivistsactually
managedto get out of this trapand to launchin 1996 the new People's
PlanningCampaign.What is more, this was muchdue to very skilful
activistpolitics:by enhancingthe activists'hegemonyin termsof the
only exciting and realistic ideas about a new popular political
development project (including through a similarly huge and
impressiveconferenceas the presentone); by effectivelycampaigning
for political decentralisationto the extent that Left front politicians
committedthemselvesto such policiesfor the future;by contributing
to the 1996 electoralvictory of the Left;and by then rapidlygaining
dominatinginfluencewithin the StatePlanningBoardfor a clear cut
and ready made development strategy - the People's Planning
Campaign. This, of course, does not mean that all problems are
solved. I shall returnto this. But as in my othercases it testifiesto the
vital importance of movement politics - and for a conceptual
frameworkto analyseit.
It is true, of course, that we could expand on additional
explanatoryfactorsin termsof contextualisedopportunitystructures.
But no matterwhetherthe fashionablevariablesof civil society and
social capital signal high or low propensityfor democratisation- we
would most probably still have to find other explanations for the
common general problem that runs against our initial optimistic
hypotheses:in Keralaas well as in the contrastingcases of Indonesia
and the Philippines the lack of substantial convergence on
democratisationbetweenvariousfragmentedinterests,ideas, groups
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and actions,and the largevariationin termsof moreor less successful
contributionto democratisation.
THE CONCLUSIONS!
To handle this, we need to also take a close look at how the
movements themselves read the conditions and thus find it most
reasonable to work and go about with their actions - or in other
words, to discuss popular politics of democratisation.Since we are
short of time (and impatient), let us begin with some of the more
excitingconclusionsand only thereafterdiscusshow we have arrived
at them. To underlinewhat I like to say about Kerala,the conclusions
also include some comparisons, primarily with Indonesia. Two
processes, one interpretation,and one policy conclusion seem to be
especiallyvital for an understandingof the generallack of substantial
convergence (despite 'our' pro-democratic factors) between
fragmentedinterests,ideas,groupsand actions,and the verydifferent
outcome of pro-democraticpolitics.
1. Single issues and special interests:In Indonesia,no sphere of
activity and way of mobilisingpeople proved especially favourable
with regardto democratisation.The students were very important
but 'only'did awaywith Suharto.Rather,the commonproblemseems
to be the focus on politicisingsingleissuesand specialinterests,within
explicitly political activities, civil-political organisations and in civil
society work; and both centrallyand locally.Therewere similarbut
not as seriousproblemsin Kerala.
Further,when attempts were made in Indonesia to deepen the
politicisation by picking a strategic issue like corruption and then
broadenit to otherareas,manyvital questionsand social forcescould
not be includedanyway.Alternatively,when explicit attemptswere
made to bringtogetherissues and special interests,they were mainly
added to, but not integrated or prioritised between, within an
ideological and collectiveframework.Therefore,therewas no focus
on an alternativeproject in terms of government,governanceand
developmentof the society as a whole at differentlevels - only on
promotingor resistingthis or that.
In Kerala,however,thereformistswereexplicitlyup againstspecial
interests,made increasingefforts to integratesingle issues in general
frameworksof 'popularsustainabledevelopment'and 'decentralised
democraticgovernance',and finally,co-ordinatedit all in relationto
the local societal problems and new institutions of democratic
government through the 'People's Campaign'. A remaining key
MOVEMENT, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT
63
problem is instead the identificationof what collective intereststo
fight or favour without causing divisions in a hamlet or a village or
an electoral front - in addition to the need to implement and
institutionaliseefforts and plans and especiallyto handletraditional
bureaucratsand politicians- and parties.
2. Civilvs. politicalsociety;centralvs. local levels:A fundamental
problem in both contexts was the lack of co-ordination between
actions in the civil, civil-political,and explicitly political society, as
well as betweenthe centraland local levels.Evenat timesof intensified
pro-democraticwork - as when tryingin Indonesiato form a broad
front in early-1996, or going aheadfrom the fall of Suharto,or when
trying in Keralato proceed after the literacycampaign-; even then
was it possibleto see how politicalandcivil societyactivistson various
levels, usually perfectly understandably,tended to follow different
logic and agendas, not combining each others strengths and
compensatingfor each others weaknesses.
This remainsa major problemin Indonesia.Actually,while the
democracy movement was and is unable to link work in political,
civil-political, and civil society, and between the central and
increasingly important local level, this was and is done quite
'efficiently'by so calledmoderatesthroughpopulismand clientelism,
and on the basis of, on the one hand, religious, and to some extent
ethnic,communitiesand,on the otherhand,politicalclout. The result,
of course, is even more divisiveness, dangerous conflicts between
various communities,patrons, bosses, thugs and followers - and an
even weaker democracymovement.
The typical way out, therefore,has been for the activiststo look
for shortcuts (as alternativesto the seeminglyhopeless attempts at
integrating people) by way of alternative patronage, if possible
charismatic.Whenthereis no closelyorganisedand hierarchicalparty,
as in WestBengal,it has mainlybeena questionof finding'TheLeader'
- or a powerfulNGO - and 'The Loyalties'that can be used as a node
and an entry point.
E.M.S Namboodiripad,of course, was a bit of a patron, but in
the main the Keralitesand their movementsare too independentfor
such a policy. This may prevent authoritarianism, but the
fragmentationremainsto be fought.Indeed,the politicalopportunities
in Kerala are more favourablethan in Indonesia, but the activists
havealso beenremarkablyinnovativeand successfulin creatinglinks,
based on concrete work and action, between various activities and
levels. The KSSPhas abstainedfrom the otherwise 'normal' NGO
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patternof negatingradicalpolitics and the establishedLeft. Instead,
the activists have realised their own incapacity to co-ordinate,
generalise,and institutionalisevariousprojects,as well as to 'enforce'
a powerfullocal politicalsocietyand civil-politicalmovementswithin
which this could be handled.Hence they have rathergiven priority
TOWARDSA THIRDWAY:SUBSTANTIAL
DEMOCRATISATION
For whateverthey might be worth, my results indicate, instead,
that thereis a needto proceedalonga thirdway,betweendeterminism
and idealism. This implies the specifyingof the minimummaterial
social, economic and political preconditionsthat must be promoted
in addition to the currentcrafting of basic rights and institutions.
Preconditionsthat are necessaryin order for ordinarypeople to be
able to use the rightsand institutions,and thus introduceand develop
a substantialdemocracy.A substantialdemocracywhich is no utopia
but 'only' implies that the conventionalrules of the game are both
fair and applied, and that all the players are both grantedpolitical
equality and have an actual capacity to take part and win. A
democracy,therefore,which is likely to make sense for most people
concerned. Not because its outcome is always to their advantage.
(The result is an open question and another matter,as long as the
democratic fundamentalsare not undermined.)No, a substantial
democracywhich is likelyto be meaningful(andsolid)simplybecause
the people at large(and not justthe elite) has both the possibilityand
the capacity to make use of conventionaldemocraticprinciplesand
institutionsat work in orderto handletheirproblems- by influencing,
controlling,and participatingin equal and peacefulgovernmentand
administrationof their societies.
How would it be possible,then,to startidentifyingsuchminimum
preconditionsthat shouldbe addedto the currentcraftingof minimum
rightsandinstitutionsin orderto introduceand promotea democracy
that makes sense? What are the rightsand institutionalmechanisms
that must be both fair and applied? And what kind of rights,
institutionsand popularcapacitiesare neededfor peopleto introduce
democracywith as democraticmeansas possibleand to be both equal
and capable to take part in an existing democraticframeworkand
win?
While the democraticprinciplesof popularcontrol and political
equality with regardto collective bindingdecisions are universalin
terms of the democratic aim, their substance and implementation
through various means, are not. Hence our questions should be
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
65
to the verylinks betweenwork in civil and politicalsociety,and action
on local and central levels. Civil-politicalwork as well as explicit
civil society efforts related to self-government are carried out
independentlyof but in associationwith local governments,political
organisations,and interest based mass movements;there are many
similaritieswith the old Scandinavianpractices. Alternativeideas,
good voluntary expertise, and the ability to get things done are
developedlocallyas well as centrallyin civil-politicalandcivil societies
and drawn upon to influence parties, local governments,the state
planningboardetc. Thusgeneratedpopularexpectationsandpressure,
combined with influencewithin parties and authorities,are used to
gain political acceptanceand funds, to generaliseand co-ordinate
programmes,and, strategicallymost importantly,to institutionalise
new practicesand get the establishedpoliticiansto adaptthemselves
and/or allow the reformiststo advance,at least locally.
In this respect,the majorproblemsso far are the lattertwo - the
institutionalisationof the positive gains of the 'People's Plan' for
decentraliseddevelopmentand to get the establishedpoliticians to
follow suit. By now - and despite the very impressiveand powerful
efforts- it does not seemas if the Keralareformistshavebeensuccessful
enough in these respects.The late-2000 local elections were close to
a failurefor the LeftFront.A majorexplanationseemsto be, that the
reformistswere not strong (and willing) enough to make an impact
on the formalpolitical level, includingto run in local elections (with
partysupport)- while the establishedpoliticianskept controllingthe
parties as before and only tried (but largelyfailed) to harvestmore
votes for themselvesin returnfor supportto the campaign. During
the Spring2001, the Leftis likelyto makelosses in the StateAssembly
Elections as well, and perhapseven to lose them. If so, it will again
be difficult to uphold the momentumwithin the reform movement,
though there have been substantialadvancessince last time a more
conservativestate governmenttook over, in 1991.
3. The missinglink:One way of readingtheseconclusionswould
be to relate them to the Latin American (and perhaps also South
African)dilemmaamongnew pro-democratsanddichotomybetween
those who have opted for substantial social change and radical
organising on the grass-roots level, on the one hand, and the
pragmatistswho have adjustedto the need for smooth transitions
fromauthoritarianrule,the needto take partat the negotiationtables,
and the need to win popularvotes in generalelections, on the other.
But that only makes sense partly.For one, in Indonesiaand Keralait
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has insteadoften beenradicalsthathavegivenpriorityto the explicitly
politicalwork, whilethoseemphasisingthe morelocal andcivil society
oriented activities have been less voluntaristic and less eager to
promote political shortcuts. At least, one may doubt that what is
reportedto be a Latin Americandilemma is an always universally
applicableand fruitfuldichotomy.Actually,I think we even need to
challengethe kind of inbuilt idea that there is an inevitableconflict
between these two trends, and in particularthat one has to strike a
balance between the substantialand radical, on the one hand, and
the vote-catchingand more accommodating,on the other,in orderto
promote a so-calledconsolidationof democracy.Whateveris meant
by that consolidation,I would suggestit is wrong (and ideologically
biased) to put up the two against each other.For whateverthey are
worth, my results indicate instead, that there must be synergies
betweenlocal and central,and civil society and political, in orderfor
the new democratsto make a difference.Moreover,there are clear
indications that democratic sustainability rather calls for more
substantialdemocratisation.That substantialityrelatesto the quality
and extent of democracy,not to the output of democracy.The result
(the instrumentalaim of the actors)is vital, of course.Butwhat really
mattersis not primarilywhetherthe outcome is more or less radical.
The bottomline is ratherif democracymakes sense to people - not
because they always get what they want, but because they stand a
fair chance and have actual capacities to make use of and further
improvedemocraticrightsand mechanismsto handletheircommon
problemsand conflicts.
In my understanding,therefore,the more importantmessage is
that both the majorconcludingtheses - about the weak link in terms
of (a) aggregationof interestsand ideas and (b) synergiesbetween
central and local action as well as the explicitly political and civil
society work on the other - point to a majormissinglink that use to
be institutionalisedin the formof interest-andideologybasedpopular
parties which are able to articulateand combine various demands
and actions.
It is true, of coursethat one may locate severalstructuralreasons
for why this have been particularlydifficult. One is the increasingly
complicatedand fragmentedrelationsof production,subordination
and exploitation- furtherenhancedby the global wave of neo-liberal
atomisationof people. Thus, one might add in this case, against the
Marxist dictum, the dynamicsof capitalismhas not reallygenerated
its own counter force.
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
67
However,to put the blame on such basic structuralfactors only
does not seem to be a very convincing proposition, given the few
consciouspoliticalattemptsto makea differencethat havebeenmade.
In the case of Indonesia, to begin with, the liberal west rather
contributedto the destructionof theentirearsenalof (atleastpartially)
interest and ideology based popular mass organisationsthat grew
out of the independencemovementas well as the third largest and
democraticallyvery successfulcommunistparty- widely regardedas
Indonesia'sonly modern party at the time. And absolutely nothing
has replacedthis. Thereis a democraticvacuum.Furthermore,since
the collapse of the 'New Order',as we know, there has hardlybeen
any attempt - not even on part of the western democracy-makers - to
support the emergenceof any kind of interest and ideology based
popular mass movementsand parties. On the contrary,in fact, top
priorityhas beengiven to the developmentof a kind of Americanised
system of political machines, the election of personalities,and the
promotion of various issue based NGOs and lobby groups.
In Kerala, secondly, the major restrictionis rather the next to
monopolisation of the political scene by established parties, mass
organisations, and election fronts that are characterisedby earlier
struggle against colonialism and 'feudal-like' landlords, partly
undermined by boss-rule, commercialism, and populism, and
threatenedby leadersexploiting religiousand nationalchauvinism.
On top of that is the sometimeseven active disinterest,and next
to ideology, among several of the new pro-democraticactivists to
distancethemselvesfromdirtypoliticsin generalanddisgustingpartypolitics in particular.To begin with, in this respect, both Indonesia
and Keralaare a bit differentand ratherunique.The generalpattern
is otherwise - like in the Philippines - that the new pro-democrats
take an activestandagainstnot justLeninistandMaoistorganisations
but whatever kind of programmatic party with a fairly good
organisationand effectivecentralleadershipandorganisations- either
becauseof bad and sad and frustratingexperiences,or becauseit has
simply been fashionable.In fact, in the Philippinesit is only during
the late-90s that pro-democrats have given real priority to and
managedto enforce certain minor changes of the electoral laws (in
terms of minorparty-listsystemattachedto the otherwiseAmerican
model) and then also began to take advantagethereof by building
related
new popularmovementrelatedbut electoral-cum-governance
of
the
which
Citizen's
Action
Party Akbayan (that I have
parties,
studied)is the most principledone and also the pioneer.In Indonesia,
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SOCIALSCIENTIST
however,suchorganisationsweredestroyedin the mid-60sand several
young pro-democratseven look back at them with some romantic
excitement.In Kerala,moreover,the new democraticreformershave
been matureenough to refuse the abandoningof previousforms of
progressivecivil society and political organising,opting instead for
tryingto balanceand furtherdevelopthem. In both cases, however,
there are strong influences of the world wide euphoria over the
democratic capacity of decentralisation,the strengtheningof civil
society against state and so-calledtop-down politics, the promotion
of 'social capital', and the capacityof social movements.And again,
of course, this has been enhanced by the mainstreamemphasis on
turn key elections-plus-rightspackages- within which any rational
NGO or cluster of activists would have to situate themselves not
primarilyto get ideas of good governmentbut good connectionsand
good money. In Kerala, finally, even the very stimulating and
impressiveattempt to go against the stream and develop new and
independentpopular based politics in order to reform and further
develop old mass movements and parties also seem to have lost
momentum.The activistswere strong (and skilled)enough to shape
and develop a favourable local space for alternative politics and
development.In the end they even got the supportof the leadingCPIM party of the ruling Left Front. But they were not powerful (and
focused)enoughto institutionalisethe new practicesand to forcefully
make an impact within politics and to really reformthe established
progressiveparties. Rather,as already hinted at, the latter tried to
take advantageof the popularefforts in elections, lost the game and
have now put the entire reformmovementat risk.
3. Policy implications:If thereis somethingto these results,then,
there should be more focus on popularpolitics of democratisationespecially to promote ways of aggregatingsingle issues and special
interests,and linkingcentral and local levels, and civil and political
societies. International support for third world democratisation
should be redirectedfrom the inconclusive promotion of various
formalrights,superficialelections,civil societyand socialcapital(that
to specificsupportof politicallyoriented
mayevenspurfragmentation)
and civil society based actors in processes of substantial
democratisation.To make it very clear:one need to focus exactly on
how it would be possible for common people to make use of
democracy under specific conditions and opportunities in various
settings.Whataretheircapacitiesandopportunities?How can people
improve them? How can they make use of rights and institutions?
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
69
How could these in turn be alteredin favour of people'schances to
use them?
One of the mainpuzzlesto me is why the mostpositiveandmassive
example of attempts to promote new democratic politics and
development,in Kerala,has been so internationallyneglected,even
by northernEuropeanswho should know better;and why in a case
like Indonesiathe samenorthernEuropeans,for instance,come down
so floppily, and suppresstheir own historical experiences - of the
need for social and economic preconditionsand popularorganising
in processes of democratisation - in face of the predominant
ambivalence between elitist modernisation and idealistic, rather
shallow and personalisticbettingof civil rightsandelectionpackages.
PARTII:BEHINDTHE CONCLUSIONS
Backthen to how we arrivedat those results.Firstthe analytical
framework. In contrast to mainstream studies of third world
democratisation,I suggest that we need to focus on problems of
substantialdemocratisation.It is the applicationof such an analytical
frameworkto concretecaseslikeIndonesiaandKeralathathas shaped
the just summarisedconclusions.
SOMECRITICALNOTES
ANALYTICALPOINTSOF DEPARTURE:
The missing societal dynamics:As we know, much of the earlier
structuraland institutionalapproachesto the problemsof thirdworld
democratisation was based on the assumption that democracy,
accordingto the establishedscholars,would only come about if there
were more modernisation,or, as their critics retorted,if there were
less internationaldependency.Just about the only thing they had in
common, then, was that both were wrong. The third wave of
democracyreachedthe thirdworld despiteinsufficientmodernisation
and despite more dependency.
An initial problem with the new approches that emerged in
response to those unexpectedchanges, then, was that they mainly
turned out to be supplements.The mainstreamscholars (including
Huntington, Lipset, Diamond, Linz et. al.) did away with much of
their outdated hard-coremodernisationtheories, turned almost allinclusive (just about everythingmattered)and congregatedinstead
aroundan increasinglynormativefocus on westernliberaldemocracy
and the role of middle-classelites. For instance, even the very best
book in this tradition,by Linzand Stefan(1996), combinesstructure
and actor approchesby looking at the constraintsthroughthe prism
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of normativelyidentifiedand empiricallylocalised elite-actors(and
endingup, moreover,with a myriadof partlyunrelatedandemprically
generalised grand theses). Meanwhile, the (former) dependency
scholars, like O'Donnell et.al (1986), simply set aside the structural
and institutionaldynamics- whichaccordingto theirpreviousanalyses
could not generatedemocracy- and focusedon the elite-manoeuvres.
Hence, both major approaches to the new democratisation
sufferedfroman unclearand often even absentrelationto the broader
societaldynamics.Theobviousway to get out of the impasse,I suggest,
is to substitutethe citizens for the elite. This is not just becausethe
basic principlesof democracyrelateto the people ratherthan to the
elite. Equallyimportantly,this would allow us to considerthe broader
societal and structuraldynamicse.g. by supplementingLinz et. al's
analysesof the constraintsthroughthe prismof the elite with studies
of how popularactors relateto such preconditions.
The lack of historicaland contextualperspectives:An additional
problemwith the predominantapproches(alreadyhinted at) is that
they tend to analysedemocracyon the basis of definitionsthat build
on specificand contextualand historicallystatic meansof democracy
ratherthan on the universalends, the principlesof democracy.(Cf.
Beetham 1999) First, therefore, we are constrained by definitions
that are based on the implementation of certain institutional
arrangements,even though most of us know that they are based on
(static)empiricalgeneralisationsfromthe west and actuallyvaryover
time and contexts and with the balanceof power.
Moreover, we are enclosed by static and normatively based
analysesof stagessuchas transitionto andconsolidationof democracy.
What universiallyand once and for all definied democraticmeans
aresupposedto be consolidated?Whatif we would ratherbe interested
in the dynamcsof democratisationin termsof the forces at play and
theirinterestsin beingable to shapeand use the democraticmeansto
reach the democraticends? What if that, perhaps, is the key to the
sustainabilityof democracy?
Beyond the elitistperspectives:In short, therefore,thereis a need
to go beyond the elitist, often normativeand ahistoricalperspectives
- no matterwhetherthey have a structural-determinst
base (like the
or
an
idealist
on
the
of
focus
crafting democracy.First
modernists)
the determinists,then the idealists.
In an almost touchingway, to begin with, activist scholars (like
many followers of Huntingtonand Lenin)who referredto the socioeconomic reality agreed on the need to combine elitist political
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
71
intervention with rapid modernisation. We all know of the
authoritarianoutcome. Hence there is a special need for analysesof
the additional factors, dynamics and checks and balances that are
needed to generatedemocracy.
Despitetheirpreoccupationwith structuralimperatives,moreover,
none of these kind of perspectivesconsideredthe special importance
of authoritarian political monopolisation in the process of late
primitiaveaccumulationof capital. This monopolisationfirst called
for strugglefor national independenceand then for quests for more
individual freedom and liberalisationwell before anything like the
Europeanconstitutionalarrangements(recht-staat)had taken root.
Hence, this monopolisation may well have given birth to a new
formidablecombination of class struggle against exploitation and
national-citizendemandsfor freedomand democracy,secondonly to
the anti-colonial combination of class and nationalism. But no
mainstream perspective addressed it. The partial exception - the
studentsof the dynamicsof the late developmentalstate - primarily
focused on the mechanismsof growth ratherthan the potentials for
democratisation.Generallyspeaking,therefore,it was ratherthe neoliberal ideas and vested interestedthat capturedand expressed the
new demandsfor freedom/liberalisation
againstauthoritarianpolitical
monopolisation.Theendresult,at worst,was ratherdespoticliberalism
(as in Suharto'sIndonesia)than even very limitedliberaldemocracy.
And the reaction against this, in turn, may now, at worst, be
manipulationwithina formaldemocraticframework(of electionsand
civil government)of nationalistpoliticalbossesthatmakeuse of ethnic
and religiousloyalitiesand brokerbusinessand militaryinterests.
On the other hand, however,the pro-democratswho really did
focus on the special need to promotedemocracy(since it would not
grew out automaticallyfromelitistmodernisation,no matterif guided
by Huntingtonor Leninist)took to the opposite and idealistextreme
by almost entirely neglecting even the most basic social, cultural,
political and institutionalprerequisites.
The historical failure to promote the emergenceof the world's
third largest democracy in Indonesia is probably the best recent
illustration.Here it was not the developmentof modernisationbut a
politicalcrisis of despoticliberalismthat gave Indonesiandemocracy
a secondchange(havingbeenseverelyunderminedin 1959 andtotally
destroyed in 1965/66). Hence, the institutionscrumbledand there
were few independentand forcefulactors that could take command
and propelchange;economically,administratively,politically.While
72
SOCIALSCIENTIST
the deterministswere rightin stressingthe insufficientpreconditions
for democracy,the idealistshad a point in sayingthat one should not
miss the chanceto promoteit. Butto craftdemocracyby only betting
on elementarycivil andpoliticalrightspluselectionswithin a vacuum
of supportive mechanisms, forces and organisations - which was
exactly what happened - was doomed to fail. The country's most
severeproblemsturnednon-issuesin elections that avoided the very
local level. Only the military,political and religious elite with old
organisations and loyalties stood a chance. Aside from informal
contacts and networks,much of state and politics remainsclosed for
those who thus lost out, and has turned non-operative and
disintegratedin the processof fragmentationandlocalisationof power.
Boss politicians have taken over - brokering religious and ethnic
leaders with mass following, businessmenand administratorswith
resources, and military and militias with weapons. While prodemocraticNGOs are (rather)well fundedbut marginalised,the new
attempts at popular organisations and parties are poor and
fragmented.Beyondthe limited elections, there are few chances for
peopleto influencethe systemotherthanto returnto informalcontacts
or resort to pressurepolitics. The decisive public sphere that had
evolvedamongpro-democratsrarelyexpandedlocallyandto ordinary
people. With liberalisation,speculativemedia has instead filled the
emptyspaces. Foreignsupportfor open and accountablegovernment
is usually non-transparentand unaccountable to the Indonesian
population,and limitedto urbanelite circleswith good international
connections.The vital liberalisationof civil and politicallife remains
of limited significancefor major parts of the population. Political
violence is localised, semi-privatised,and nourished by instigation
and manipulationof ethnic and religiousloyalties.The lack of social
and cultural rights is part of the problem.This became established
state policy alreadyduring the massacresin the mid-60's but is no
longer controlled by a supreme godfather. Truth and justice is a
preconditionfor reconciliationbut primarilyremaina topic for NGO
seminars.The elementsof a democraticculture,and the interestand
ideology-basedpopular organisingthat grew out of the strugglefor
freedom and national liberationhave been thoroughly undermined
by decades of 'floating mass politics' and boosting of feudal-like
customs. In fact it has even affected the pro-democracymovement
which continue to suffer from divisive elitism while many people
have to weather the crisis before they can make use of the new
democratic options.
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
73
So the Indonesian picture is quite clear. There are important
freedoms, but the civil and democraticrights and institutions are
poor, often malfunctioning,and usuallydifficultfor ordinarypeople
to makeuseof. The politicallymarginalisedbutresourcefulelitewould
probablyhaveturnedto non-democraticmethodsanyway.Butwhat's
reallywrongwith Indonesia'sdemocratisationis that it does not make
much sense even to its major potential pro-democraticforce - the
people at large- as a way of promotingideas and interestsand agree
with others on how to handle issues of mutualconcern. Ratherthey
usually have to find non-democraticand anti-democraticmethods
and avenues.For instance,they haveto pay or bargainfor protection
and influential positions and contacts within administration,
governmentand elite circlesas well as ethnicand religiousnetworks.
And if nothing helps, they may have to take to the streetsor end up
burningdown a police station.
Beyond defeatism:This critique, however, is not to agree with
the fashionable counter-argumentthat pro-democratic efforts in
general are naive and almost ridiculous.The message, then, is that
patrimonialculturesand systemsare so old and strongthat they will
capturewhatever element of democracythat is introduced.But the
role and importance of these elements of patrimonialism and
clientelismrarelyhave that deep and strongroots. In Indonesia,they
primarilygainedimportanceas a resultof the authoritarianrule and
exploitation from the late 50s and onwards.So if one focuses on that
enemy- not some seeminglyirrevocableculturaltraits- the favouring
of democracycease to be impossible. But of course, that calls for
more than idealistic promotion of shallow rights and election
packages.
TOWARDSA THIRD WAY:SUBSTANTIAL
DEMOCRATISATION
For whateverthey might be worth, my resultsindicate, instead,
that thereis a needto proceedalonga thirdway, betweendeterminism
and idealism. This implies the specifyingof the minimum material
social, economic and political preconditionsthat must be promoted
in addition to the currentcrafting of basic rights and institutions.
Preconditionsthat are necessaryin order for ordinarypeople to be
able to use the rightsand institutions,and thus introduceand develop
a substantialdemocracy.A substantialdemocracywhich is no utopia
but 'only' implies that the conventionalrules of the game are both
fair and applied, and that all the players are both grantedpolitical
equality and have an actual capacity to take part and win. A
74
SOCIALSCIENTIST
democracy,therefore,which is likely to make sense for most people
concerned. Not because its outcome is always to their advantage.
(The result is an open question and another matter,as long as the
democratic fundamentalsare not undermined.)No, a substantial
democracywhich is likelyto be meaningful(andsolid) simplybecause
the people at large(and not justthe elite) has both the possibilityand
the capacity to make use of conventionaldemocraticprinciplesand
institutionsat work in orderto handletheirproblems- by influencing,
controlling,and participatingin equal and peacefulgovernmentand
administrationof their societies.
How would it be possible,then,to startidentifyingsuchminimum
preconditionsthat shouldbe addedto the currentcraftingof minimum
rightsand institutionsin orderto introduceand promotea democracy
that makes sense? What are the rightsand institutionalmechanisms
that must be both fair and applied? And what kind of rights,
institutionsand popularcapacitiesare neededfor peopleto introduce
democracywith as democraticmeansas possibleand to be both equal
and capable to take part in an existing democraticframeworkand
win?
While the democraticprinciplesof popularcontrol and political
equality with regardto collective bindingdecisions are universalin
terms of the democratic aim, their substance and implementation
through various means, are not. Hence our questions should be
thoroughlycontextualised.Butfor the lack of space,let us be shallow
and stick to the general categories.There is no mysteriouscultural
relativisminvolved.
In my own writings, I have separatedthe contents (in terms of
the results of democraticdecisions) and pointed to different scope
(reach,extension)andforms(civilandpoliticalrightsand institutions)
of democracyas well as their preconditionsin terms of other rights
and institutions,balanceof power,and citizen'saims, strategiesand
capacities.To avoid unnecessaryconceptualdisputeswith mainstream
colleagues,however,let us ratherpoint to what should be coveredby
drawing on the four basic criteria that have gained rather wide
acceptancein the Europeandiscussionabout 'auditingdemocracy'.
(Beetham1999) Those criteriamayapplyfor the introductionas well
as further development of democracy and include the three
'conventional'meansto promotethe democraticprinciplesof popular
control and politicalequality,some of the additionalconditions that
are necessaryto enablepeople to make use of those instruments,and
the specificationof the quality and extent of it all.
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
75
The first instrument,according to Beetham,is what use to be
called 'free and fair elections' - to which we add their substanceand
scope. The second instrumentis open and accountablegovernment
(politically,legally,and financially)- which also requireindependent
public knowledge, movement, organisation, and government
responsivenessto publicopinion.The thirdis the conventionalcluster
of civil and political rights, includingto what extent that they are
real and useful for ordinarypeople. The fourth factor is the set of
additionalbackgroundconditionsthat are neededto make the other
factors real - includingdemocraticgovernanceof not just state and
local governments but also the society at large (at least civic
associations) to shape a democraticculture as well as basic needs,
social and culturalrights,and educationto makecitizensreasonably
self-confident.
What I have labelledsubstantial(and thereforealso sustainable)
democratisation(in terms of actual political equality and popular
control) would then rest with certainequallysubstantialrights (civil
and political), institutionalmechanisms(free and fair elections plus
open and accountablegoverment),certainsocietalbackground-factors
along each of these dimensionsand - which Beethamdoes not specify
- the chancesandcapacityof the citizensto makeuse of (andimprove)
these rights and mechanisms.See figure 1.
So if democracy(anddemocraticstrugglesfor democracy)makes
sense to the citizens, they would try to promote their instrumental
aim by supportingthe principlesof democracyand by makinguse of
the democraticrights and institutions.In other words, they would
make their way through the various steps in the model (figure 1)
ratherthan tryingto bypassthem and findingother non-democratic
or even anti-democraticavenues (such as paying or bargainingfor
protection and influential positions and contacts within
administration,governmentand elite circles as well as ethnic and
religious networks - and if nothing helps, take to the street or burn
dow a police station).
POLITICS OF DEMOCRATISATION
Havingexaminedif and when popularorganisationsgive priority
to democraticaims and means, the major task remains:to analyse
how they have tried to go about it - by way of popular politics of
democratisation.In relationto figure 1, that, of course, is primarily
to focus on how citizens have tried to strengthentheir capacity to
make use of and improvethe democraticmeansand thus make their
76
SOCIALSCIENTIST
Figure1
Elements of Substantial Democratisation (and a way to get around it)
Citizen's instrumental aims
-
-
-
-
Democraticaims
*
Popular control
*/Politicalequality
Re.bindingcollectivedecisions
A
Civil & political rights
Means
Means C
A democraticsociety
Means B
Free& fair elections and open
& accountablegovernment
Means C
A democraticsociety
Citizen'scapacityto make use of
and improvethe democraticmeans
j
the usage of undemocratic means
relationsbetweenand the usageof democraticmeans
way upwords in the model - via and in relation to the rights and
institutions.
In analysingthis politics of democratisation,I have focussed on
three dimensions:(a) where in the political terrain that the actors
have choosen to work, given the political opportunitiesand their
readingof them (see figure2); (b) what issues and intereststhey have
focused on and thus politicised(see figure3); and (c) how they have
tried to rally wider popularsupportfor this (see figure4).
Allow me now to briefly presentthese three aspects of how the
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
77
Figure2
Actors in the Political Terrain
I
78
SOCIALSCIENTIST
Indonesianand Keralaactors have tried to enhancetheir capacities
to promote their instrumental aims by way of favouring
democratisation. My general thesis is, that not just the already
criticisedelitist idealistsbut also much of the new popularefforts at
promotingand 'deepeningdemocracy'haveneglectedbasicstructural,
institutional and political prerequisitsfor citizens to be able to use
and promote democraticmechanismsto handle their problems. As
alredyhinted at, a majorfacor relatesto the missinglink in terms of
aggregationof interestsand ideasand linksbetweencentraland local,
on the one hand, and the explicitlypoliticalandcivil societywork on
the other.
POLITICALSPACE
Given that organisationsaim at some kind of democratisation
(to thusalso promotetheirinstrumentalaims),the firstmajorquestion
in any discourse on how they try to go about this concerns the
preferredterrainof struggle.In the main, this restswith the political
opportunitystructureand the political implicationsof the discourse
on how to read it, includingthe activistsown conclusions.
The first aspect relatesto the three majorand often overlapping
ways in whichsocietalactivityis organisedon andin-betweendifferent
levels (centraland local): (a) collective and bindinggovernmentand
administration(stateand local government);(b) self-governmentand
management(e.g.voluntaryneighbourhoodmanagementassociations
and non-profit foundations or co-operatives,but also more or less
non-voluntaryunits such as ethnicand religiouscommunities,clans,
and families);(c) businessunits (evensmallones). (Seethe big circles,
on the centraland local levels, in figure 1, below!)
The second aspectbuildson the assumption,that while the actors
work in and in-betweenthese spheres,they may also be activewithin
a relativelyautonomouspublicspace.(Seethe spacewithinthe triangle
in-betweenthe big circles in figure 1, below!) A public space where
actors come together to affect, directly or indirectly,the various
activities in society (i.e. in the three spheresmentionedas well as in
the public space itself). Within the public space, the actors tend to
form differentsocieties (i.e. movements,organisations,clubs). One
may distinguishthree main tendencies- on differentlevels as well as
in-betweenthose levels:(a) Politicalsocieties, which mainlyattempt
at directly influencing collectively binding decisions and
administration (e.g. political parties, political pressure groups,
lobbying groups); (b) Civil societies, (actual associations, not just
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
79
ideal 'free and non-primordial'ones) which relateto either business
units(e.g.tradeunionsor peasantorganisations)or to self-government
and management(e.g. volunteersin support of victims of violence
that turn to an independentlegal aid bureau,studycirclesthat relate
to a collective library,religious movements that relate to various
churches,or women'sorganisationsagainstdomesticviolence)which
only indirectly may affect collectively binding decisions and
administration;(c) Civil-politicalsocieties that combine or link the
activities that relate to state/localgovernmenton the one hand and
self-managementon the other, (e.g labour movementswith a party
plus broad popular unions, youth and women groups, and
cooperatives; human-rights groups.that both support victims of
violenceandtry to influencerelatedstatepolicies;peasantmovements
that do not just fight landords on their own but also campaign for
public land reforms).
The third aspect is simply,that the actors may choose or have to
be active in non-authorisedforms- with regardto state, businessand
self-managedunits as well as within the public field, (indicatedwith
shades in figure2).
Keralais characterisedby a non-repressiveand open system but
also by a deep-rootedbipolar party-politicisationof various socioeconomic as well as caste and religious pillars, within which
movements and their leaders can relate to factions of the elite.
Unrecognisedavant-gardepolitics on top of the figure is now (with
hardlyany Naxalitesleft) limitedto a few actiongroups,while certain
NGOs promoting community organisationcontinue work in nonestablishedpartsof civil society.Most of the democratisersare rather
within the established political forces of the Left Front and/or
associatedwith movementslikethe autonomousKSSPin civil-political
society and outright civil society. In the latter case they try to
complement and reform progressive parties and party-politicised
popularorganisations,as well as governmentand panchayatpolitics
through relatively independentactions related to self-government,
constantlybenefitingfromclose contactswith sectionsof the political
and administrativeelite.
In comparisonwith Indonesia,of course, politics in Keralais less
centralised,especially in the sense of encompassingmore vital and
dynamiclocal organisations.Whenit comes to local governmentand
administration,however,and leadershipof localpoliticalorganisations
and struggles,it has remainedcentralised,despite a lot of rhetoric
and efforts by civil-politicalmovements- until the very dynamicand
80
SOCIALSCIENTIST
forcefulcampaignsince1996 on decentralisedpopularplanningbegan
in 1996.
POLITICISATION
OF INTERESTSAND IDEAS
Having discussedwhere activistsconsiderit meaningfulto carry
out pro-democracy work, the second major issue concerns why
democracymakessense.Thisrefersto what kindof issuesand interests
they choose to bringup on the politicalagenda,politicise,in orderto
promote democratisationand thereby also further the issues and
interests.
While the interestsand issues as such are fundamentalof course
- and also signal what kind of propellingsocial forces such as class
that various movementsrelate to - politicisation may primarilybe
analysedin termsof its basis. First,the kind of ideas and/orinterests
around which people come together and which they consider in a
societal perspective.Here we may distinguishbetween on the one
hand single issues and/or specific interests, and on the other hand
ideologies and/orcollectiveinterests.Moreover,I previouslythought
that at least when analysingpro-democracymovementsit would be
possible to avoid a special category for ideological thinking on the
basis of moral and spiritual values and principles with attached
communal loyalties and symbolic personalities.But Gus Dur et. al.
in Indonesia disclosed my naivety, so now that category has been
added.
Figure3
Basisof Politicisation
I. Singleissuesor specificinterests
II. Ideologyor collectiveinterests
III.Moral & spiritualvalues & communalloyalities
In addition to this, of course, one must analyse the basis of
politicisationwithin the previouslydiscussedframeworkof where in
the political terrainthat the actorsposition themsleves- for instance
in relation to the state or self-managemant.(Lateron we shall also
add how they try to mobilise support.)
In contrast to Indonesia there is a long tradition in Kerala of
strong institutions and broad and mass based politicisation related
to collective interestsand ideology,quite frequentlyin termsof class.
Moreover,and in many ways like in Scandinavia,there has been a
rather unique combination of demands for various government
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
81
policies (suchas the exceptionalland reformand the famouswelfare
schemes despite low gross national product) and self-management
of, for instance,co-operativesand pension programmes(often with
partial government support). However, interests and issues are
frequentlyassociatedwith specialcaste and religiousgroup interests
as well. And over the years, the 'old' class and ideology based Left
Frontorganisationshavealso beenaffectedby privatisedandatomised
activities and interests. So even though many now talk of
'overpoliticisation', this is only true in the sense that atomised
economic actors often make selfish and unproductiveuse of state
and conventionalpolitics.
Those tendencies have been fought most decisively by the new
generation of civil society organisationswith the People's Science
Movementin the forefront.Initially,theircampaignsfor civic action
and community co-operation to produce sustainable development
were ratherconventionalNGO-cum-actiongroup single-issueones.
But over the yearsthey have becomemore and morecomprehensive.
Already,their famous massive literacy campaign in the end of the
eightieswererelatedto severalotherquestionsanda broadperspective
on social and political change. Even more so, of course, were the
following efforts at resourcemapping, which formed the basis for
collectivemulti-purposedevelopmentactions.Andmorerecently,with
the campaignfor decentralisedplanning,the activists have even coordinatedmost of theirinitiativeswith those of the empoweredlocal
governmentsand the StatePlanningBoard.Finally,the activistsalso
continued the old tradition of combining popular pressurepolitics
and popular self management.But while the old organisationsused
to start with the demands, the new generation often began with
people's own practical initiatives. A serious remaining problem,
however, is that the materialist-reductionistperspectives of the
movement activists, and/or their political considerations, have
preventedthem from speakingup aboutwhat kind of new basicclass
or otherintereststheyarepromotingandfightingwith theircampaigns
as the land reform (in particular)has been carried out. While one
obvious aim, for instance, is to promote sustainableproductiveuse
of land, even that may mean a problemas so many Left Frontvoters
are also involved in petty rent-seeking.
POLITICAL INCLUSION (MOBILISATION)
Politics, essentially, is about people coming together on what
should be held in common by all citizens (not just by membersof
82
SOCIALSCIENTIST
various associations) and how this should be governed jointly. So
given the chosen arenasof operationfor the pro-democracywork of
the movements,and the kinds of politicisationof ideas and interests
that they give priorityto, how do they try to bring people together,
'politicisethem', by includingtheminto politicsthroughmobilisation
and organisation?Wemaylabelthisfinaldimensionpoliticalinclusion
- and operationaliseit in three step.
Of course,political inclusionis relatedto SidneyTarrow's(1994)
'mobilisationstructures'.Butin my experience,and especiallyin third
world contexts, we should startwith a wider perspective.First- and
in generalaccordancewith Nicos Mouzelis (1986) - it is possible to
distinguishhistoricallybetweenthe integrationof people into politics
on the basis of relatively autonomous broad popular movements
generated by comprehensiveeconomic development (like in many
partsof WesternEurope),and the elitist incorporationof peoplewith
less solid organisationsof their own into comparativelyadvanced
polities in economicallylate-developingsocieties (like in the Balkans
and many third world countries).
Second,and againfollowingMouzelis,one may separatebetween
two ways of incorporatingpeople: clientelism and populism. The
concept of clientelism is not confined to Weber-inspiredideas of
patrimonialismbut more generaland associatedwith what one may
call patrons or bosses on differentlevels with their own capacity to
deliver some protection in return for services and votes. In many
cases, I would add, clientelism is also 'modernised'in the form of
state-corporatism.Populism,on the other hand, generallygoes with
charismaticleaderswho areableto expresspopularfeelingsand ideas,
and sometimes, but not necessarily,interests, and whose positions
are essential to the stability of adjoiningleadersand their ability to
patronisefollowers.
In addition to this, I would argue, political leaders aiming at
integratingpeople into politics have often tried short cuts by adding
elements of clientelismand populism - thus usually ending up with
strong elements of incorporation- which we may label alternative
patronage.
Third, one may distinguish,and now in accordancewith Sidney
Tarrow (1994), between two basic methods of trying to integrate
people into politics: one emphasisingautonomous collective action
and another focusing upon the internalisation of actions and
movementsin organisationwith some leadership.The key-factoris
the 'mobilisationstructure'that helps movementsto co-ordinateand
MOVEMENT, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT
83
persistovertime by linkingthe 'centre',in termsof formallyorganised
leadershipidentifyingaims and means,and the 'periphery',in terms
of the actual collective action in the field. Historically,accordingto
Tarrow,there have been two kinds of solutions: to trust people's
naturaland spontaneouswillingnessand ability to resist repression
and exploitation through linked networks and federations of
autonomous associations (in reality, however, through instigating
organic leaders as spearheads),or to stress the need for political
ideology,organisationand interventionthroughintegratedstructures
of parties, unions and self-helporganisations(which in reality may
hamperdynamiccollectiveaction). In the Westthose have often been
rooted in anarchistand democraticsocialist thinking, respectively.
To avoid biased connotations, I shall instead talk of networks and
organisedintegration.
Figure 4
Key ways of including people into politics (in relation to politicisation)
Inclusion/mobilisation
Politicisation
Incorporation
Alternative
Patronage
Integration
Singlel
Special intrests
Populism-Clientel.
Incorp.Integration
NetworksOrg.integr.
Ideological/
Collectiveintrests
Populism-Clientel.
Incorp.Integration
NetworksOrg.integr.
Values/
Communalloyalt
Populism-Clientel.
Incorp.Integration
NetworksOrg.integr.
For this to make sense, however,we need to analysethe inclusion
of people, as well as the politicisationof interestsand issues, within
the spaces that the movements have given priority to within the
political terrain.The we would get an answer to both 'where' and
'how'. So please recall figure 1, imagine that the actors (and their
transformationover time) are identifiedwithin the political terrain,
and then apply figure3 to put a stampwith regardto characteristics
on each and every actor (at differentpoints of time).
Populismand clientelismwere also found among the Keralaprodemocratson the Left and some of the radicalcivil society oriented
organisations.But generallyspeakingthis has more been confinedto
the Congress-ledfrontand the manycivic associationsrelatedto caste
and religion. As compared with the alternativepatronage of their
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SOCIALSCIENTIST
leftist comradesin West Bengal,the Keralacommunistsare subject
to many more checks and balances.Theirpartygrew out of popular
organisationsand their land reformwas more consistent in turning
so manydowntroddenpeopleinto comparativelyindependentcitizens.
The LeftFrontand especiallythe leadingCPI-Mpartystill dominates
politics and general organising.The 'leftist-clientelism'of today is
mainly a question of commerceand semi-privatisationhavingcrept
into political and interest organisations as well as co-operatives,
though the official picture remains a clear-cut one of historical
traditions of focusing upon collective interestsand ideology. Partypoliticisation,by now, is often associatedwith the favouringof special
interestsand vestedinterestsrelatedto political-cum-socio-economic
pillars (occasionallyshaped by caste and religion as well), and with
the settingaside of broadsocietalinterestsin promotingboth human
and economic development. When, therefore, civil society based
movementslike the KSSPoppose this and proclaimthe need for 'depoliticisation', the latter expression is in fact misleading since the
reformistsfavourlocal organisationfor commonsocietalaims instead
of privateand groups specific ones.
In Kerala,thus,those activistsarefarfromIndonesia'snetworking
instigators and rather constitute a new generation of 'integrators'
that build fromcivil society and local level politics.Till recently,their
majorproblemwas the mobilisationfor democraticdecentralisation
- which was deemed necessaryto implementtheir otherwise rather
scatteredinitiatives.Thistaskwas mainlyleft to the authorisedparties
and the specialintereststhat they harbour.Andwhen little happened
the alternativedevelopmentpolitics only provedpossible in isolated
showcase villages.
During recent years, however,there has been a decisive gradual
shift of many KSSP members and actions from developmental,
'independent' grass-roots work to greater promotion of local
organisingand co-ordinationamong the people. The aim is thus to
promoteboth universalisticpopularpolitics(as againstparticularistic
politics related to separate pillars) and to change from below the
established parties and their priorities. In the recent process of
decentralisation and popular planning from below - with the
synchronisationof forceful work from above, pressurefrom below
and movements'capacityto reallyget campaignsoff the groundand
projects implemented - one can visualise ways of tackling these
dilemmas. But there remain the uphill tasks of specifying what
collective interests are really at stake and well as of handling
MOVEMENT,POLITICSAND DEVELOPMENT
85
bureaucratsand politicianswith vestedinterests,and pushingfor the
institutionalisation and actual implementation of the plans and
projects.The latter was clearly indicatedby the poor results for the
traditional Left Front politicians in the recent local elections who
thought that they would be able to harvest what the consistent
reformistshad sowed.
TOWARDSTHE CONCLUSIONS
The analytical point, of course, is that the character and
combinations of the factors discussed above regarding space,
politicisation,andmobilisationwould both helpus describemovement
politics of democratisationand explain some of its dynamics.Time
and space only permitus, however,to point to two processesand one
policy conclusion - the ones that have alreadybeen presentedin the
first part of the essay.
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Ns_-
I:|_=r_yi
TheUnfinishedAgenda
Editedby Mushirul
Hasan&NariakiNakazato
Thisvolumeprovidesmultidisciplinary
perspectiveson nationbuildingin SouthAsia.Itresultsfroman
in a
interchangeof viewsand perspectivesbetweenIndianandJapanese scholarswhoparticipated
conferenceheldat the Instituteof OrientalCulture,Universityof Tokyo.
The essays are closely interlinked
a
thematicallyand yet each is self-contained.The contributors,
themesandtheirramifications
judiciousblendof academicsandsocialactivists';discusswide-ranging
withintheframework
of colonialsocietyandthe post-Independence
IndianState Theyalso attemptto
historicisethe nature,scale and depthof the changes usheredin by the transferof power.
MushirulHasan(bornin1949)teachesModernIndianHistory
at theJamiaMilliaIslamia,NewDelhi.His
most recent publication is John Company to the Republic: The Story of Modern India.
NariakiNakazato(bornin 1946) belongs to the Departmentof South Asian Studies, Instituteof
OrientalCulture,University
of TokyoHe has an Englishbookon economichistory.Agrarian
Systemin
Eastern Bengalc. 1870-1910.
ISBN81-7304-379-5
2001
Demy8vo
536p.
Rs. 800
IndiaandAsean
Editedby FredericGrare&AmitabhMattoo
Can international
relationsbe explainedby geopoliticsalone? Moreprecisely,does geographical
Theprincipal
concernsof the presentvolume
necessarilylead to intenseinterconnections?
proximity
on the India-ASEAN
securityrelationshipsare rootedin these questions.India'sassociationwith
South-EastAsiagoes backin history,and it has hadgreatinfluenceon the region,bothlinguisticand
cultural.As is wellknown,economicand culturalrelationsflourishedin the pre-colonialera, onlyto
declineovertime.Atthe beginningof the 1990s, economicandpoliticalrelationsbetweenSouthand
South-EastAsiawere minimalandoftenantagonistic.
The situationchangedconsiderablywiththe collapseof the SovietUnionandthe subsequentreductionof the Americanforcesinthe region.Therewerefearsin mostASEANstates oft.a powervacuum
thata politically
andeconomicallydynamicChinacouldeasilyfill.Indiatoo facedgrowingconcernsat
thepossibility
of a potentially
hegemonicChinawantingto dominatethe region.Thissharedperception,
togetherwithIndia'sownliberalizedeconomicpoliciescompelledNewDelhito lookEast
Fre6dricGrareis Directorof the Centrede Sciences Humanies,NewDelhi.
AmitabhMattoois Director,CoreGroupforthe Studyof NationalSecurityandAssociateProfessorof
International
Relationsat Jawaharlal
NehruUniversity,
NewDelhi.
ISBN81-7304-330-2
2001
Rs. 500
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