U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
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29 October 1974
CABINET
T H E SIMONSTOWN A G R E E M E N T
M e m o r a n d u m b y the S e c r e t a r y of State for F o r e i g n and Commonwealth Affairs THE SIMONSTOWN A G R E E M E N T
1.
We h a v e r e c o g n i s e d and s t a t e d p u b l i c l y that the D e f e n c e R e v i e w
might have implications for the Simonstown A g r e e m e n t .
In m y s p e e c h a t
C a r d i f f a t t h e w e e k e n d I s a i d t h a t i f t h e r e w e r e an i m p o r t a n t B r i t i s h
s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t in maintaining the A g r e e m e n t then we m u s t do s o but that
i f w e w e r e m a i n t a i n i n g an A g r e e m e n t t h a t w a s p o l i t i c a l l y d a m a g i n g ( a s i t i s )
b u t o n l y m i l i t a r i l y m a r g i n a l l y u s e f u l i t s h o u l d b e b r o u g h t t o an e n d o r
allowed to wither,
I a d d e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t w e would b e l o o k i n g at the
Agreement.
2.
We a r e about t o m a k e d e c i s i o n s on the D e f e n c e R e v i e w affecting
d e p l o y m e n t E a s t of S u e z w h i c h w i l l m e a n t h a t t h e S i m o n s t o w n f a c i l i t i e s
are m u c h l e s s important to u s , certainly in peace t i m e , than they have
been hitherto.
On t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t w e d o s o d e c i d e , t h e w a y i s o p e n
f o r u s t o m a k e a n e a r l y d e c i s i o n a b o u t t h e f u t u r e of t h e S i m o n s t o w n
Agreement.
THE PRESENT
POSITION
3,
T h e S i m o n s t o w n A g r e e m e n t , w h i c h c o n s i s t s of l e t t e r s a n d
m e m o r a n d a e x c h a n g e d b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h a n d South A f r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t s
i n 1955, r e m a i n s in f o r c e ^until s u c h t i m e a s the two G o v e r n m e n t s d e c i d e
otherwise by mutual a g r e e m e n t " .
R e l e v a n t e x t r a c t s b e a r i n g on p u r
o b l i g a t i o n s t o u n d e r t a k e j o i n t t r a i n i n g and to p r o v i d e c o u r s e s and c e r t a i n
o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s a r e a t t a c h e d at A n n e x .
We have said in P a r l i a m e n t that
affected
the South A f r i c a n s w o u l d be c o n s u l t e d if t h e A g r e e m e n t w e r e to b
by the D e f e n c e R e v i e w .
(
e
1
4.
The i s s u e i s I think n o w f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
Our Party­
p r o g r a m m e i n 1973 s a i d w e s h o u l d " w i t h d r a w f r o m a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s
r e s u l t i n g f r o m the S i m o n s t o w n " A g r e e m e n t s " and all m i l i t a r y e x c h a n g e s ,
v i s i t s and t e c h n i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s w i l l b e t e r m i n a t e d " .
We did n o t e n t e r
i n t o a n y s p e c i f i c c o m m i t m e n t s i n o u r m a n i f e s t o s of F e b r u a r y a n d
S e p t e m b e r t h i s y e a r b u t i n t h e F e b r u a r y m a n i f e s t o w e u n d e r t o o k "a
d i s e n g a g e m e n t f r o m B r i t a i n ^ unhealthy i n v o l v e m e n t with apartheid",,
R e a c t i o n to the r e c e n t v i s i t s and t h e m e a s u r e of n a v a l c o - o p e r a t i o n that
w e n t w i t h t h e m , h o w e v e r e x p l i c a b l e on g r o u n d s of o p e r a t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y ,
m e r e l y s t r e s s e d the trouble this A g r e e m e n t h a s c a u s e d us for what l o o k s
like being a marginal benefit.
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ALTERNATIVE
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COURSES
5.
One c o u r s e of a c t i o n w o u l d b e t o m a k e a n a n n o u n c e m e n t a s s o o n a s
p o s s i b l e that w e intend to abrogate the A g r e e m e n t .
The Agreement itself
h o w e v e r d o e s n o t p r o v i d e f o r u n i l a t e r a l a b r o g a t i o n a n d , a s s u p p o r t e r s of
t h e r u l e of l a w a n d of r e s p e c t f o r t r e a t i e s , w e d o n o t w a n t t o a p p e a r t o a c t
illegally.
A u n i l a t e r a l g e s t u r e w o u l d a l s o a d d t o t h e a n t a g o n i s m of t h e
S o u t h A f r i c a n s a n d w e w o u l d r i s k j e o p a r d i s i n g o u r t r a d e and o t h e r
material interests.
We k n o w f r o m t h e i r aide m e m o i r e e a r l i e r t h i s
s u m m e r the i m p o r t a n c e that South A f r i c a a t t a c h e s to the A g r e e m e n t .
It
w a s at that t i m e that w e h a d e v i d e n c e that any f a i l u r e t o continue to m e e t
our obligations under Simon stown could affect the p r o s p e c t s for B r i t i s h
f i r m s competing in the public s e c t o r ,
6.
The a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o e n t e r into n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the South A f r i c a n s
w i t h a v i e w t o e n d i n g t h e A g r e e m e n t i n an o r d e r l y w a y .
That of c o u r s e
would m i n i m i s e the r i s k to our r e l a t i o n s but t h e r e i s n o guarantee that the
S o u t h A f r i c a n s w o u l d a g r e e a n d a t t h e e n d of t h e d a y w e m i g h t f a c e t h e
p r o s p e c t of h a v i n g t o a n n o u n c e t h a t h a v i n g a t t e m p t e d i n g o o d f a i t h b u t
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o n e g o t i a t e t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e A g r e e m e n t w e f e l t b o u n d
t o r e g a r d t h e A g r e e m e n t a s at a n e n d .
T h i s w o u l d l e a d to a c r i m o n y and
d i s a d v a n t a g e in the c o m m e r c i a l and other f i e l d s , but m a y be u n a v o i d a b l e .
7.
A p o s s i b l e further c o u r s e if the A g r e e m e n t i s still thought to have
s o m e m i l i t a r y value for u s , e g . in w a r t i m e , would be s i m p l y to allow the
A g r e e m e n t to w i t h e r by r e d u c i n g , in c o n s u l t a t i o n and a g r e e m e n t with the
S o u t h A f r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t , t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h w e m a k e u s e of t h e ,
facilities.
That in itself would bring u s little political advantage but we
could at l e a s t announce p u b l i c l y that w e should n o t a l l o w any further
e x t e n s i v e e x e r c i s e s t h o u g h w e m i g h t h a v e t o a c c e p t s o m e d e g r e e of j o i n t
t r a i n i n g on s o m e o c c a s i o n s i n o r d e r t o k e e p w i t h i n o u r l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s
under the Agreement;.
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TIMING
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8.
In a b o u t t e n d a y s t i m e w e s h a l l b e e m b a r k i n g u p o n c o n s u l t a t i o n s
with the A m e r i c a n s about the D e f e n c e Review,,
We k n o w they attach
i m p o r t a n c e to our contribution to the W e s t e r n p r e s e n c e in the Indian
Ocean a r e a , m o d e s t though it i s , and to p r e - e m p t our c o n s u l t a t i o n s by
a n n o u n c i n g s h o r t l y b e f o r e h a n d a d e c i s i o n to w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e
S i m o n s t o w n A g r e e m e n t w o u l d m a k e the r e s t of our t a s k m o r e difficult.
CONCLUSION
u
9.
I f a v o u r t h e c o u r s e s e t o u t i n p a r a g r a p h 6, n a m e l y t o e n d t h e
A g r e e m e n t i n an o r d e r l y w a y .
But w e cannot r e a c h a final conclusion
u n t i l w e h a v e h a d a m i l i t a r y a s s e s s m e n t f r o m t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r
Defence.
I recommend we proceed as follows:­
a.
A s k f o r t h e v i e w of t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D e f e n c e
o n t h e m i l i t a r y c o n s e q u e n c e s of c l o s i n g S i m o n s t o w n a n d t h e
alternative f a c i l i t i e s that w i l l be r e q u i r e d .
b.
C o n s i d e r w i t h t h e A m b a s s a d o r at C a p e t o w n t h e b e s t w a y
of r e d u c i n g t h e r i s k of S o u t h A f r i c a n - r e t a l i a t i o n .
c.
Have talks with the United States.
d.
A n n o u n c e o u r c o n c l u s i o n s in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s t a t e m e n t
that will b e m a d e on the D e f e n c e R e v i e w , or w h e n a s t a t e m e n t
o n t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e R e v i e w of p o l i c y t o w a r d s S o u t h e r n A f r i c a
is made.
L J C
F o r e i g n and C o m m o n w e a l t h
Office
MS-. 2 9 O c t o b e r 1974
3
Annex THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT Extracts from letters and memoranda dated 30 June 1955 exchanged between the Governments of the United Kingdom and South Africa. Agreement on Defence of the Sea Routes round Southern Africa. I A :1
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k. After the control and administration of the Simonstown Naval Base are handed over to the Union Government in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement relating to that subject, the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, will continue to fly the flag to which he is entitled by Royal Naval regulations in the Cape area outside Simonstown and to exercise command over any Royal Naval units in the Union. /Post is now that of CinC F l e e t ^ 5. He will also be designated for purposes of planning and operational command in war as Commander-in-Chief of a maritime strategic zone, the boundaries of which will approximate to those of the Royal Naval South Atlantic Station, and will include the Mozambique Channel. 9. In peacetime the Commander-in-Chief will be directly responsible
only to the United Kingdom Government and will have no executive authority over South African forces, establishments, dr services. He will, however, have as one of his primary functions the guiding of maritime war planning in the strategic zone, and will be free to confer on these matters, in consultation with the South African Naval Chief of Staff, with the Union Minister of Defence. 10. A joint maritime war planning committee will be set up, containing representatives of the Royal Navy and the South African Navy, one of whose functions will be to co-ordinate the use of all maritime facilities in British and South African territories in the strategic zone.
by periodic staff talks^/ Replaced
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12. Since on the transfer of the control of the Simonstown Naval Base in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement relating to that subject, Admiralty House, and the adjacent offices and residences will be transferred to the Union Government, the Union Government will in agreement with the United Kingdom Government provide headquarters in the Cape area, but outside Simonstown, with requisite communications and operational facilities, for use by the Commander-in-Chief in peace and war. /Ik. 14. It is agreed in principle that exchanges of officers and ratings between the two navies would be of advantage to both navies and should take place whenever practicable. Such exchanges will be effected by mutual agreement between the two Governments. 15. It is agreed that
definite programme for
training in the United
Officers in accordance
the South African Navy will introduce a the recruitment, as well as the subsequent Kingdom, of Engineering and Electrical with existing practice. Annex to the same letter. In Peace. 2.
The Commander-in-Chief will be responsible for:- ii
(a) the development of plans and the necessary preparations for the execution of his wartime tasks , (b) the organisation for and conduct of combined training
of such national units as are assigned or earmarked for assignment to his command in war - and which can be made available - so as to ensure that they can operate as an effective and integrated force (c) the establishment of an efficient organisation which .: will be the nucleus for expansion in war for ,the control of the strategic zone. .
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3. To fulfil his peacetime functions the Commander-in-Chief will be authorised:­
(a) to co-ordinate combined training of national maritime forces of the United Kingdom and of the Union earmarked for assignment to the zone in war (b) to call for reports based on inspections, carried out by
national authorities, concerned with the state of readiness and efficiency of forces earmarked for his command, but not under his control in peacetime. Agreement Relating to the Transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base ANNEX A Replacement of United Kingdom Personnel by South African Personnel 1. The replacement of personnel from the United Kingdom employed in the base by South African personnel must, it is agreed, be governed by the need to ensure that the efficiency of the base is maintained. Initially, and until South African personnel have acquired sufficient knowledge and experience, most of the posts at present filled by United Kingdom non-industrial or industrial staff will have to continue to be so filled.