Q V A c5
9
if p-gIS D O C U M E N T 13 T H E P R O P E R T Y O F K J B R I T A N N I C i , - i A J E S T Y !
S G O V E R N M E N T )
C . ( 6 5 ) 131
11th O c t o b e r , 1 9 6 5
: O P Y N O .
6 0
C A B I N E T
R H O D E S I A
N o t e b y t h e . t - ' r i m e M i n i s t e r
I w i l l g i v e m y c o l l e a g u e s , a t o u r n e x t m e e t i n g , a f u l l a c c o u n t of t h e d i s c u s s i o n s w h i c h t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h S e c r e t a r y a n d I h a v e h a d w i t h t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r of R h o d e s i a , M r , I a n S m i t h . M e a n w h i l e ,
M i n i s t e r s m a y l i k e t o h a v e t h e a t t a c h e d c o p i e s of t h e r e c o r d s of m y t a l k s w i t h M r . S m i t h . I n e e d n o t e m p h a s i s e t h e s e c r e c y of t h e s e r e c o r d s o r t h e d e l i c a c y of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h w e n o w f i n d o u r s e l v e s a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h w e a n d t h e R h o c l e s i a n s h a v e f a i l e d t o a g r e e b u t t h e y h a v e n o t y e t c o m m i t t e d t h e m s e l v e s T G a n y i l l e g a l a c t i o n a n d w e h a v e n o t , t h e r e f o r e , f i n a l l y b r o k e n off r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e m . I n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t i s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t w e s h o u l d r e f r a i n f r o m a n y p u b l i c a c t i o n o r s t a t e m e n t w h i c h t h e y c o u l d r e g a r d a s p r o v o c a t i v e ; a n d I t h e r e f o r e a s k a l l M i n i s t e r s t o a b s t a i n f r o m a n y p u b l i c r e f e r e n c e t o t h e R h o d e s i a n p r o b l e m i n t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e .
H , 'V7.
.10, D o w n i n g S t r e e t , S . " V 7 . 1 .
I 1 & O c t o b e r , 1965

AG-REED NOTE of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W
.1 at 3.00 p.m. on THURSDAY, 7th OCTOBER, 1965
Tho Prime Minister
The Lord Chancellor
The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations
The Minister of State for
Commonwealth Relations
Sir Burke Trend
PRESENT:
The Hon. I.D. Smith,
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia
The Hon. W.J. Harper,
Minister of Internal Affairs
The Hon. D. Lardner-Burke,
Minister of Justice
The Hon. J.J. Wrathall,
Minister of Finance
Mr. G.B. Clarke,
Secretaryto the Cabinet
THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it might be most convenient to begin by summarising the position -which had been reached as a result of the discussions between Mr, Smith and the Commonwealth Secretary on
5th and 6th October.
ICR.
SMITH said that it was now essential to bring matters to the point of final decision, not least in view of the damaging impact of uncertainty on the Rhodesian economy. The Government of Southern Rhodesia, as it then was, had agreed to attend the Victoria Falls Conference two years before on the assumption that the question of Rhodesian independence would be settled as soon as, or perhaps even before, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. He understood that the United Kingdom Government did not accept this contention. But, however,that might be, the Rhodesian hopes had been disappointed; and tho Rhodosian Government had now reached a point at which they could not afford to wait any longer.
The discussions which ho and his colleagues had had with the
Commonwealth Secretary on the previous two days appeared to have set things baok rather than to have advanced them, For example, it seemed that the
United Kingdom Government no longer regarded the 196l constitution as an acceptable basis of Rhodesian independence - whereas it was widely assumed throughout Rhodesia that, when this constitution was negotiated in I 9 6 I , it constituted the basis on which the country would proceed to sovereign independence. Again, the Rhodesian Government had been allowed to believe

that the United Kingdom insistence on a blocking mechanism related to the entrenched clauses in the constitution (where it would replace the existing provision for a. referendum); but it now appeared that this mechanism was required for the type of normal constitutional amendment which the
Government could effect at present by means of a two-thirdsmajority in the
Legislature. In other words, the United Kingdom Government appeared to be imposing, as conditions of independence, fresh stipulations in relation to the management of the internal affairs of Rhodesia as well as to the conduct of her external policy. Whether the 196l constitution had implied sovereign independence or not, it had certainly implied that the Government of Rhodesia would be free to manage their own internal affairs as they saw fit; but the changes which were now being proposed would give them less internal freedom than they had at present.
The United Kingdom Government seemed to be concerned only with the
Africans in Rhodesia, not with the Europeans. If so, they were proceeding on purely racial lines. The proposal for a blocking mechanism in the form now put forward was clearly tailored to African needs; and, since oven the blocking third (if the Rhodesian Government were prepared to concede it) would provide only a narrow margin of safeguard, it must be increased
African representation which was the United Kingdom Government's real objective. But this was a quite different matter.
As an alternative to the referendum for the entrenched clauses the
Rhodesian Government had offered a Senate which, although they had originally conceived it as consisting partly of Africans and partly of Europeans, they were now prepared to envisage as composed wholly of Africans, provided that they were Chiefs. In the two Houses sitting together these twelve Chiefs, with the fifteen African 'B' Roll members of the Legislature, would constitute a blocking third.
In addition, the Rhodesian Government were prepared to concede virtually universal adult suffrage on the 'B* Roll itself, to the extent of adding about 1 million African voters to that Roll. These, from Rhodesia's side, were read concessions.
The United Kingdom Government had felt unable to accept any of these proposals; and the Rhodesian Government had now to ask themselves, therefore, how this gulf, which was widening rather than contracting, could be bridged.
They could not go on as they were. They realised that unilateral action would constitute a very grave decision and they had analysed the consequences very carefully. But it could cut both ways; and, in any event, it would be better, whatever its implications than merely acquiescing in a pro­ gressive decline of European standards. This was a matter of life and death
-2­

£5 G fe f o r t h e E u r o p e a n s i n R h o d e s i a s i n c e t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t h e y saw t o i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s t h e i r e v e n t u a l d e p a r t u r e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t t h e d e c i s i o n w h i c h t h e y f a c e d w a s n o t w h o l l y u n l i k e t h e d e c i s i o n w i n c h t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m h a d f a c e d i n S e p t e m b e r , 1939.
THE PRIME MINISTER t h a n k e d Mr S m i t h f o r s p e a k i n g s o f r a n k l y . He w o u l d t r y t o b e n o l e s s c a n d i d . I t w o u l d b e p r e m a t u r e , h o w e v e r , t o d i s c u s s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n a t t h i s p o i n t , s i n c e i t w a s s o m e t h i n g w h i c h we m u s t a l l s e e k t c a v o i d . B u t a s r e g a r d s t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h S e c r e t a r y s h o u l d n o w p u t t h e c a s e a s t h e U n i t e d
THE COMOHsflSALTH SECRETARY s a i d t h a t h i s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h M r . S m i t h a n d h i s c o l l e a g u e s he.d b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n a f r a n k a n d c o r d i a l s p i r i t o n b o t h s i d e s . B u t t h e y h a d r e v e o d e d t w o b a s i o d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t s : ­
1 .
On t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e t h e R l i o d e s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r c l a i m t h a t t h e 1961 c o n s t i t u t i o n w a s , i n e f f e c t , a n i n d e p e n d e n c e c o n s t i t u t i o n . B u t t h e f a c t s c o n t r a d i c t e d t h i s c l a i m . I t ' w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e t o v e r i f y , b y m e a n s o f a r e f e r e n d u m o f t h e f o u r r a c i a l g r o u p s a s p r o v i d e d f o r i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h e t h e r a n y p a r t i c u l a r s o t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o p o s a l s w a s a c c e p t e d b y t h e p e o p l e o f R h o d e s i a a s a b a s i s f o r i n d e p e n ­ d e n c e ; b u t t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f R h o d e s i a , w e r e a n x i o u s t o e l i m i n a t e t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o c e d u r e o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t w a s t o o c u m b r o u s a n d l a b o r i o u s a n d p r o p o s e d , i n s t e a d , t o i n s t i t u t e a S e n a t e a s a n a l t e r n a t i v e s a f e g u a r d f o r t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t w a s c l e a r t o t h e U n i t e d
K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h i s S e n a t e , i n t h e f o r m p r o p o s e d , w o u l d n o t s u f f i c e a s a. s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n a f f o r d e d b y t h e e x i s t i n g m a c h i n e r y . I n r e t u r n f o r a t r a n s f e r e n c e o f p o w e r t h e y w o u l d r e q u i r e a d e q u a t e s a f e g u a r d s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e
I96I
c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e m o a n s o f m a k i n g t h a t u n i m p e d e d p r o g r e s s t o m a j o r i t y r u l e w h i c h w a s o n e o f t h e f i v e p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m G o v e r n m e n t w e r e b o u n d t o i n s i s t . M o r e o v e r , o r d i n a r y c h a n g e s I n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n ( a s d i s t i n c t f r o m a n y a m e n d m e n t o f t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s ) w o u l d , i n t h e i r o p i n i o n r e q u i r e a d e q u a t e s a f e g u a r d s a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e ; a n d i t w a s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t h e h a d s u g g e s t e d a b l o c k i n g t h i r d . B u t o n t h i s p o i n t , t h e R h o d e s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d f e l t u n a b l e t o a g r e e .
2 , I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e w a s t h o d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
I n o n e s e n s e o n l y f u l l a d u l t s u f f r a g e w o u l d s o l v e t h a t p r o b l e m ; i n i t s a b s e n c e i t w a s e s s e n t i a l t o b e a b l e t o p o i n t n o t o n l y t o a d e q u a t e c o n s t i ­ t u t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s b u t a l s o t o s o m e d r a m a t i c f o r w a r d move i n r e l a t i o n
"to e . g . t h e L a n d A p p o r t i o n m e n t A c t . B u t t h e R h o d e s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d f e l t u n a b l e t o m a k e a n y s i g n i f i c a n t c o n c e s s i o n o n t h i s p o i n t .
- 3 ­

9 o n
3 0 d
THE PRIME MINISTER said that those were serious differences of view.
The whole of the United Kingdom's record of de-colonisation illustrated and confirmed their insistence on majority rule as a condition of independence.
In interpreting this, in the case of Rhodesia, as reasonably speedy progress towards majority rule they had already made a major concession to the
Rhodesian Government; and they could have little hope of satisfying public opinion, not only in the House of Commons but also in the rest of the
Commonwealth and in many foreign countries, unless they could demonstrate that the final settlement was consistent with the five principles in which they had sought to summarise the basic conditions of Rhodesian independence.
It vrould be difficult enough to justify these principles to world opinion; but it should not be impossible to present them convincingly, provided that they were fully observed. How did we now stand in this respect? For example, the first principle required that "The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, rlroady enshrined in the 1961 constitution, vrould have to be maintained and guaranteed". But how far ahead, in the opinion of the Rhodesian Government, did majority rule lie?
And how long v/ould it be before it was achieved?
MR. SMITH replied that the principle of progress towards majority rule was indeed enshrined in the 1961 constitution. The Rhodesian Government accepted this and did not wish to detract from it. But, if the Africans continued to boycott the constitution, it was impossible to say how long it would be before the principle was realised. Indeed, he was bound to say, speaking frankly, that this would be a lengthy process; it was something which it would be dangerous to rush. Nevertheless, if tho Africans would embrace the opportunities which the 1961 constitution offered them, they would ultimately achieve majority rule.
THE PRIMS MINISTER said that if the Africans did co-operate in working the constitution, the rate of their political advance would presumably depend on the speed of their progress in acquiring the necessary educational and economic qualifications. Could Mr. Smith predict how quickly the educational and economic betterment of tho Africans would yield majority rule?
MR. SMITH replied that several estimates on this point had been made, varying from fifteen to fifty years. No one could be dognatic. He was not prepared to hazard an opinion. The Rhodesian Government would think it wrong to accelerate the educational advance of the Africans simply in order to improve their political status in the community, Tho question of their economic position different matter.

THE MINISTER OF STATE enquired about the facilities for the secondary education of Africans.
MR. SMITH replied that there was no problem here; indeed, there were more vacancies in African secondary schools than in their European counterparts.
MR. VffiATHALL added that it was untrue that the Rhodesian Treasury provided loss finance for African than for European secondary education.
It night not be possible to give either all that it asked for; but, insofar as abatements had to be ma.de, there was no question of cutting the African provision more severely than the European.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that it appeared to be clear that, on the basis of the 196I constitution, the rate of African educational advance at present envisaged by the Rhodesian Government would not yield majority rule within the next few years.
MR. SMITH agreed; indeed, the Rhodesian Government would oppose any deliberate acceleration for this purpose.
MR. HARPER added that it was European enterprise which basically financed African education; and the type of constitutional change which would alarm the former would therefore harm the latter.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if this was so and if the same considera­ tions applied as regards the economic qualifications which on African must acquire before being entitled to the vote, would the Rhodesian Government consider adopting a more direct route towards majority rule by means of a simple widening of the franchise?
MR. SMITH rejected this suggestion because it would imply reverting to the position which had obtained a few years ago when. European sentiment had become thoroughly alarmed and Europeans had begun to leave the country in significant numbers. Ho must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule. They accepted that the 1961 constitution would eventually bring it about; but they would not take any action to hasten this process. The criterion of fitness for majority rule must be a criterion of merit, i.e. a criterion in' terms of those standards of civilised behaviour r.which other independent African countries were not succeeding in observing.
3 1 5 R E T

Q
Q K
O *?
THE HUME MINISTER o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e R h o d e s i a n G-overnment must n o t s u p p o s e t h a t t h e U n i t e d Kingdom G-overnment w e r e n o t a s c o n c e r n e d t o s a f e g u a r d t h e E u r o p e a n s a s much a s t h e A f r i c a n s . B u t how d i d we s t a n d a s r e g a r d s t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , n a m e l y t h a t " T h e r e w o u l d a l s o h a v e t o b e g u a r a n t e e s a g a i n s t r e t r o g r e s s i v e amendment o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n " ?
ME. SMITH s a i d t h a t , a s r e g a r d s t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s , t h e p r o v i s i o n w h e r e b y a n amendment c o u l d b e a p p r o v e d b y The Queen on t h e a d v i c e of t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d , o f c o u r s e , l a p s e on i n d e p e n d e n c e , The a l t e r n a t i v e - i . e . amendment b y r e f e r e n d a of a l l f o u r r a c e s - was a c l u m s y p r o c e d u r e a n d was o p e n t o t h e f u r t h e r o b j e c t i o n t h a t i t i n v o l v e d a h i g h l y i n v i d i o u s p r o c e s s o f a s s i g n i n g i n d i v i d u a l s t o d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l g r o u p s .
M o r e o v e r , a l l f o u r g r o u p s must v o t e i n f a v o u r of any amendment; b u t , g i v e n t h e r a c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n R h o d e s i a , t h i s i m p l i e d t h a t 1 p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n ( e . g . t h e A s i a n g r o u p ) c o u l d b l o c k an amendment w h i c h t h e o t h e r 99 p e r c e n t m i g h t r e g a r d a s d e s i r a b l e . I t was f o r t h e s e r e a s o n s t h a t t h e R h o d e s i a n Government h a d p u t f o r w a r d t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s u g g e s t i o n o f a
S e n a t e .
THE PRIME MINISTER a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e S e n a t e was e n v i s a g e d a s v o t i n g s e p a r a t e l y from t h e L e g i s l a t u r e a n d , t h e r e f o r e , a s e x e r c i s i n g i n some s e n s e a v e t o . '
MR. SMITH r e p l i e d t h a t i t w o u l d b e p r e f e r a b l e t h a t b o t h H o u s e s s h o u l d v o t e t o g e t h e r a n d t h a t a, t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d f o r a n amendment. The S e n a t e of 12 A f r i c a n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e 15 A f r i c a n ' B ' R o l l m e m b e r s , w o u l d t o t a l 27, i . e . an e f f e c t i v e b l o c k i n g t h i r d .
THE PRIME MINISTER a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e A f r i c a n members of t h e S e n a t e w o u l d b e e l e c t e d ,
MR. SMITH s a i d t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t . They would b e C h i e f s , a p p o i n t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e t r i b a l s y s t e m .
THE PRIME MINISTER o b s e r v e d t h a t , i n t h a t c a s e , i t c o u l d n o t b e s a i d t h a t t h e r e w o u l d b e a n y d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d b l o c k t o p r e v e n t r e t r o g r e s s i v e amendment o f t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s . T h i s was n o t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d j u s t i f y e i t h e r t o t h e House of Commons o r t o i n t e r ­ n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n .
- 6 ­

SECRET
1 3 8
MR. LARDNER-BURKE s a i d t h a t t h e R h o d e s i a n Government h a d r e a c h e d t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t t h e s i z e a n d c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s e d S e n a t e a f t e r a v e r y c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e v i e w o f S e c o n d C h a m b e r s , w h i c h t h e y h a d c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e L e g a l A d v i s e r , I t h a d become c l e a r t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n s t o b e e x e r c i s e d b y t h e S e n a t e w o u l d tie r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d , p a r t l y b e c a u s e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a d y p r o v i d e d a s a f e g u a r d f o r n o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments ( b y m e a n s of t h e t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y p r o c e d u r e ) and p a r t l y b e c a u s e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u n c i l would r e m a i n a s a n a c t i v e e l e m e n t i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t f o l l o w e d t h a t t h e o n l y f u n c t i o n of t h e
S e n a t e w o u l d b e t o p r o v i d e , w i t h t h e *B' R o l l m e m b e r s , a b l o c k i n g s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t r e t r o g r e s s i v e amendment of t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s ; a n d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e a S e n a t e o f 12 A f r i c a n s a p p e a r e d s u f f i c i e n t .
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h Government c o n s i d e r e d t h e e n t r e n c h e d c l a u s e s t o b e p r o t e c t e d by t h e r e f e r e n d a o f t h e f o u r r a c i a l g r o u p s . T h e y w a n t e d t h e b l o c k i n g t h i r d a s a n a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r o t h e r c l a u s e s .
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t , i f t h e S e n a t e was e n v i s a g e d a s a b a l a n c i n g f a c t o r i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e Lower H o u s e , t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e l a t t e r was i t s e l f d e m o c r a t i c a l l y e l e c t e d was v e r y r e l e v a n t . He a p p r e c i a t e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h t h e R h o d e s i e n Government saw i n t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o c e d u r e . B u t , i f some o t h e r f o r m of s a f e g u a r d was t o b e s u b s t i t u t e d f o r i t , e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d d e p e n d on t h e m e t h o d by vdiich t h e i n d i v i d u a l s who w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e t h e b l o c k i n g f a c t o r w e r e s e l e c t e d .
THE LORD CHANCELLOR a d d e d t h a t i t would b e i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom Government t o a c c e p t f o r t h i s p u r p o s e i n d i v i d u a l s who, l i k e t h e
C h i e f s , w o r e n o t e l e c t e d b u t w e r e p a i d s e r v a n t s o f t h e R h o d e s i a n G o v e r n m e n t .
Why c o u l d n o t t h e R h o d o s i a n G o v e r n m e n t a c c e p t , f o r o r d i n a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s , a s i m p l e b l o c k i n g t h i r d i n t h e f o r m o f 26 ' B ' R o l l s e a t s - a s t h e y h a d a p p e a r e d r e a d y t o d u r i n g t h e v i s i t w h i c h h e and t h e Commonwealth
S e c r e t a r y h a d p a i d t o R h o d e s i a e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r ?
-7­

MR. SMITH replied by pointing out that the existing constitution already required a two-thirds majority for ordinary constitutional amendments.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR agreed but emphasised that Rhodesia was not yet independent.
MR. SMITH asked why the United Kingdom Government could not accept a blocking quarter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR said that tho reason was that there must surely be some increase in African representation.
MR. SMITH said that that was a different question. The Africans had already rejected the opportunities of representation which the existing constitution provided; and there was therefore no ground for enlarging these opportunities,
THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the Rhodesian Government would change their view if the Africans were disposed to co-operate in working the
1961 constitution.
MR. SMITH said that the Africans would first have to prove that they were ready to do so; and this could only happen after independence when they had been given a chance.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could see some merit in the concept of a Senate; but it must be more elective in character.
MR. SMITH replied that, if so, it was for the United Kingdom
Government to show how this was to be achieved.

SECRET Q
J b o
THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that the Senate must he capable of being regarded as one element in a blocking safeguard which was essentially elective in character,
THE MINISTER OP STATE added that what was at issue was something which would replace the referendum. It must therefore be something which was at least as "strong" as the referendum itself.
MR. HARPER replied that the referendum was too cumbersome a procedure.
The alternative must be something which essentially provided a basis of reasoned discussion among informed people and did not put at the mercy of political considerations changes in the constitution which might, on merits be desirable.
THE PRIME MINISTER ebserved that the concept of the Senate -was an ingenious one; but, if it was to go forward at all, the Senate would have to be elected on something like the *B* Roll. He suggested that discussion should next turn to the third principle, namely that "There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population".
MR. SMITH said that the implementation of this principle depended on whether the Africans would take advantage of the opportunities already provided by the 1961 constitution. It was impossible to go further without a lowering of the franchise - although the Rhodesian Government would be prepared to put the *B* Roll virtually on the basis of "one man, one vote" by adding nearly a million Africans to the Roll.
THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that this would not give the Africans any more seats in the Legislature.
MR. SMITH said that, nevertheless, cross-voting, which the Rhodesian
Government were no longer pressing to eliminate, would allow the inoreased
, t B Roll element to influence !
A ' Roll voting, at least in marginal cases.
THE MINISTER OP STATE pointed out that the second and third principles should be considered together, in the sense that, if the Rhodesian
Government were prepared both to envisage an increased number of African seats in the Legislature and to constitute the proposed Senate from elected
Africans, the result would not merely be improved safeguards against retrogressive amendment of the constitution but a.lso an increase in African representation as well.
MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government had considered these issues very carefully but could make no further concessions.
SECRET N ­
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THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY pointed out that the United Kingdom Government were prepared to contemplate the grant of independence before majority rule was actually achieved. This was a very major concession. Would not the .
Rhodesian Government make some parallel gesture?
MR, HARPER said that the United Kingdom concession was not new. It had been made not by the present Government but by their Conservative predecessors.
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that this might be so; nevertheless, it vra .3
the present Government who would have to meet the domestic and inter­ national criticism if they conceded independence to Rhodesia on an indefensible basis.
He suggested that they should now consider the fourth principle, i.e. that "There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination".
In this context the future of the Land Apportionment Act was clearly a critical issue.
MR.
SMITH said that, as regards this Act, things were moving continuously. Already 3 million acres of land which had formerly been
European had been made available to the Africans; but only a small part had as yet been taken up by Africans. The Act was of yalue in protecting the
Africans from exploitation. Africans were grateful for this, and its repeal would harm them more than the Europeans. As regards racial discrimi­ naticn in the towns, the Rhodesian Government were presently considering several multi-racial areas. It was significant that the objection in one case had been made by a Coloured Rhodesian, not a European; nevertheless, the Government intended to go ahead.
THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that the Land Apportionment Act had been criticised by the Constitutional Council. Could not the Rhodesian
Government at least admit publicly that its repeal was desirable in principle?
MR. SMITH replied that they had already said that they would be ready to consider withdrawing certain parts of it as and when it seemed desirable to do so.
THE MINISTER OP STATE asked whether more could be done to open
Salisbury to the Africans?
MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government were currently examining whether that part of the Salisbury trading area which was adjacent to the Kopje could be made a multi-racial area.

THE COMQNVffiALTH SECRETARY asked whether the attitude of the Bhodesian
Government in relation to e.g. the University, the Medical School, the private r-ohools, etc. was defensible in terms of progress towards a multi­ racial society.
MR. SMITH said that, as regards the schools, it had been brought to notice that they had been breaking the law in admitting African pupils without the permission of the Minister. The Government were now considering the position; and, in any event, there was evidence that this type of change made for a worsening of racial relations rather than for their improvement.
MR. HARPER added that it was up to those who wanted multi-racial education to provide it; nothing would be done to prevent them. But it was unreasonable that existing private schools for one race should be turned into multi-racial schools without the consent of the parents concerned.
MR. LARDKER-BURKE said the Rhodesian Government had just approved the creation of a multi-racial teachers' training college, run by a group of missions in Pulawayo.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, even so, the Rhodesian Government*s attitude seemed to raise the same issues as those which had just been fought out in Alabama.
MR. SMITH replied that the circumstances were not the same. There were greater differences between European and African standards in Rhodesia than in the United States.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if so, this might perhaps be thought to be a reflection on the ex-tent to which Rhodesian Governments had provided facilities for African education.
MR. SMITH replied that the Europeans had been in North America at least six times as long as they had been in Rhodesia. Even so, the standard of African education in Rhodesia was higher than ii many other
African countries.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United Kingdom had neverthelesa felt justified in granting independence to those other African countries.
MR, SMITH replied that the consequences spoke for themselves.
Tanzania was now little more than a Chinese puppet.
. 1 1 -
SECRET N

MR. LARMER-BUTtKE asked whether, if the Rhodesian Government repealed the Land Apportionment Act, the United Kingdom Government would agree that they should also throw open the Tribal Trust Areas which had been entrenched in the 1961 constitution?
THE COMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that what mattered was that the general impression of racial discrimination within Rhodesia must be removed by some positive signs which vrould convince international opinion that discrimination was really being progressively reduced.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that there remained the fifth principle, namely that "The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole". The Conservative Government had felt unable to accept the concept of an indaba, which Mr. Smith had proposed in September, 19 &f; and that concept was equally unacceptable to the present Government of the
United Kingdom, Could the Rhodesian Government offer an alternative?
MR. SMITH suggested that it was necessary to settle the first four principles before dealing with the fifth, i.e. to decide the content of the proposals to be submitted to the people of Rhodesia before deciding how they should be consulted. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian Government continued to think that the proposals which they had made in 19,64 were adequate; and there was some reason to believe that the Conservative Government would have accepted them if the Rhodesian Government had felt able to enlarge the scope of consultation to include not only the Chiefs and Headmen but also the Kraal heads of whom there were 30,000 - a step which, on further consideration, they had felt unable to take on the grounds that it would tend to undermine the authority of the Chiefs themselves. What alternative could the United Kingdom Government suggest?
THE PRIME MINISTER asked why the referendum procedure in the constitution should not be used? If a referendum had been regarded, in the context of the 1961 constitution, as essential for the amendment of one entrenched clause, it was a little difficult to see why anything less should be thought to be adequate to ascertain the vri.shes of the people as regards the constitution as a whole.
MR. SMITH replied that the reason was simply that, as he had already pointed out, 1 per cent of the population could nullify a referendum. In addition, he must repeat that it was an extremely cumbrous process to implement; and the assignment of individuals to their racial groups was a most invidious business.
- 1 2 -
S EC RET
N

9
Q
9
S E C R E T o d
MR. HARPER added t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t the 1961 c o n s t i t u t i o n had incorporated t h e concept of an appeal to The Queen as an a l t e r n a t i v e to a referendum was a t a c i t admission of the defects of the referendum procedure. I t had had to he embodied i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n for p o l i t i c a l reasons; but the a l t e r n a t i v e of an appeal to The Queen had also had to be included, since everyone had known t h a t a referendum was in f a c t unworkable.
THE PRIHE MINISTER said t h a t , although a referendum might be d i f f i c u l t t o work, i t could not be l i t e r a l l y unworkable since i t had been accepted elsewhere in Africa i n r e l a t i o n to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance and the same p r i n c i p l e would s h o r t l y be put i n t o effect i n t h e case of the changes i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of Mauritius. How could the United Kingdom Government j u s t i f y conceding independence t o Rhodesia on t h e b a s i s not only of a c o n s t i t u t i o n which v/as l e s s l i b e r a l than other independence c o n s t i t u t i o n s but also of a means of verifying I t s a c c e p t a b i l i t y which was l e s s l i b e r a l than the methods adopted i n other eases?-
MR, HARPER said t h a t i t must not be forgotten that a l l the c i t i z e n s of
Rhodesia were members of one community; and the f a c t t h a t only some of them enjoyed t h e vote did not d e t r a c t from t h i s b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of u n i t y , which was exemplified by a common v o t e r s ' r o l l . Allowance had to be made for two d i s t i n c t standards i n Rhodesia,
THE PRIME MINISTER r e p l i e d t h a t i t remained t r u e t h a t only some of them had the vote,
MR, HARPER said t h a t t h e reason for t h i s was simply t h a t the Africans were not as advanced as the Europeans. But the Rhodesian Government were making great e f f o r t s to improve t h e s t a t u s of Africans.
THE PRIME MINISTER said t h a t t h i s merely meant t h a t , although the country was alleged t o be ready f o r independence, i t was apparently not ready for democracy.
MR, SMITH r e p l i e d t h a t the United Kingdom did not have f u l l democracy u n t i l the twentieth century; and by t h a t time education was u n i v e r s a l ,
THE MINISTER OP STATE asked whether, i f some 1 million Africans were t added t o the !
B R o l l , and t A* and r B ' Rolls together might provide the b a s i s of a referendum?
MR, SMITH said t h a t he could not accept t h i s proposal. The simple choice between two candidates, which v/as a l l t h a t a voter had to exercise i n an ordinary e l e c t i o n , was one t h i n g ; and I t was something which was within the compass of the average African. The decision on the complex issues of an independence c o n s t i t u t i o n was a very different t h i n g ; i t involved sophisticated judgments whiph^he ordinary African could not comprehend.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, nevertheless, the ordinary African could
1 surely say ^ e s or ^ o ' .
MR. SMITH replied that the ,ordinary African simply would not understand what he was being asked to decide. This fact had been tacitly recognised in the 196d constitution, when the vote had been granted to the Chiefs but not to the other Africans.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United Kingdom Government could not accept this view. It was now clear, therefore, that the two sides were very far apart on all five principles. Only the concept of a Senate offered some possibility of advance, although even here there was still a great gulf between the opposing views.
MR, HARPER said that the United Kingdom Government must remember that the 1961 constitution gave the Rhodesian Government powers in relation to those elements in the population about whom United Kingdom opinion was now exercised. The Rhodesian Government already had those powers; and the final step of conceding sovereign independence would not really make so very much difference as regards the realities of political and constitutional advance within Rhodesia.
MR, SMITH added that the United Kingdom Government's effective decision could be argued to have been taken even earlier - in 1923, when they gave
Southern Rhodesia the option (on the basis of the European vote alone) of becoming a self-governing Colony or joining an independent South Africa.
But what was to be done now?
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the position -was now very critical ­ and its implications extended far beyond "Rhodesia itselS. He suggested that both sides should reflect on the exchanges of the day and resume the discussion tomorrow.
MR. SMITH said that he did not object but he would like to have the
United Kingdom Government l s considered views and their proposals on how the situation should be resolved. It was clear that the two Governments were drifting apart rather than narrowing the gap between them; and there was no advantage in any further delay. The Rhodesian Government had learnt this lesson as a result of the Victoria Palls Conference; if they had refused to attend that Conference, they would have had their independence by now.
- 1 4 ­

6 9
[ A
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed t h a t we should avoid any unnecessary delay.
Nevertheless, i t would be wise for both s i d e s to r e f l e c t on t h e i r p o s i t i o n s before they considered what t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s should be i f i t prored impossible t o reach agreement.
I t was agreed t h a t the discussion should be resumed at 2.30 p.m. on
Friday, 8th October, 1965.
London, S .W
.1
October, 1965.
- 1 5 ­

AGREED NOT E o M(
10, Downing S t r e e t , S.W
a t 2.30
p . i n . on FRIDAY, 8th OCTOBER, 1965
.1
The P r i m e M i n i s t e r
The L o r d C h a n c e l l o r
The S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r
Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s
T&o M i n i s t e r of S t a t e f o r
Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s
S i r Burke T r e n d
Mr. P . R o g e r s
Mr. K . J . N e a l e
PRESENT
T h e Hon. I . D . S m i t h ,
P r i m e M i n i s t e r o f S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a
T h e Hon. W . J . H a r p e r ,
M i n i s t e r of I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s
The Hon. D. L a r d n e r - B u r k e ,
M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e
T h e Hon. J . J . W r a t h a l l ,
M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e
M r . G . B . C l a r k e ,
S e c r e t a r y t o t h e C a b i n e t
THE PRIME MINISTER opened t h e d i s c u s s i o n b y s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e h a d , i n h i s v i e w , b e e n a t t h e p r e v i o u s m e e t i n g a v e r y c l e a r e x a m i n a t i o n b y b o t h s i d e s o f t h e f i v e p r i n c i p l e s . He w o n d e r e d i f , a f t e r f u r t h e r r e f l e c t i o n R h o d e s i a n
M i n i s t e r s h a d a n y t h i n g t o a d d .
MR. SMITH s a i d t h a t h e had b e e n d i s t u r b e d t o r e a d i n t h e B r i t i s h P r e s s r e p o r t s w h i c h s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e R h o d e s i a n s w e r e t o b l a m e f o r r e f u s i n g t o meet t h e B r i t i s h Government on a n y of t h e f i v e p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s was a d i s t o r t i o n o f t h e f a c t s .
THE PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t P r e s s b r i e f i n g on t h e B r i t i s h s i d e had n o t gone f u r t h e r t h a n a n a d m i s s i o n t h a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s h a d b e e n c o r d i a l and f r a n k b u t t h a t t h e two s i d e s were v e r y f a r a p a r t .
MR. SMITH s a i d t h a t h e had n o t much t o a d d a b o u t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n s . The R h o d e s i a n M i n i s t e r s h a d made most o f t h e r u n n i n g a n d h e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r p o s i t i o n was c l e a r . He h a d h o p e d t h a t , a s a r e s u l t of t h e a d j o u r n m e n t , t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r f o r h i s p a r t would b e a b l e t o c l a r i f y h i s own p o s i t i o n .
-1­

*m
r.\ ft
Q b 0
THE PRIME MINISTER sail, that the United Kingdom Government had made their position clear. They had spoken frankly on each of the five principles; and on each the gap v/as still very wide. He had said, in summing up on the previous day that a basis had not been found on which the United Kingdom G-overnment could recommend Parliament to grant independence to Rhodesia. He had felt that the distance between the two sides might b e a little less on the third principle (about racial discrimi­ nation) than on the others, since, although there was apparently no question of the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act, Mr. Smith had indicated certain proposals which might offer the prospect of some progress.
His impression, therefore, was that disagreement on this point was not as absolute as on the others, where the differences were very wide indeed.
There was clearly no early prospect of majority rule; and, in so far as the matter lay in the Rhodesian Government's hands, there was no intention to do anything to accelerate the education of the Africans for this purpose.
Rhodesia might be pressing on with education for Africans generally; but this v/as not for political reasons but in recognition of the intrinsic desirability of education. The United Kingdom G-overnment could not countenance a transfer of sovereignty on the basis of so slender a guarantee of early majority rule. So far as safeguards were concerned, the concept of the Senate was the result of a good deal of thought and reflection; but it did not incorporate the principle of a Vlooking safeguard constituted from elected representatives of the majority raco. In order to satisfy this requirement all 12 members of the Senate would have to be elected.
Without that guarantee the safeguard would b e inadequate; and even on that basis it would be difficult to justify to the House of Commons and inter­ national opinion, including the rest of the Commonwealth (which did not mean, in this context, only the African members). At the recent Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' Meeting there had boon a lnng end serious discussion on this problem. The views expressed had been strongly and sincerely a felt; and he had been pressed very herd by H mdmbers of the
C omnom/ealth.

On t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of A f r i c a n s t h e 0 1 0 e
R h o d e s i a n p r o p o s a l s w e r e , a g a i n , i n s u f f i c i e n t . The s u g g e s t i o n w h i c h t h e R h o d e s i a n M i n i s t e r s haft p u t f o r w a r d f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n of t h e f B l t was n o t d e c i s i v e and. w o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a n y more s e a t s f o r A f r i c a n s . As r e g a r d s t h e f i f t h p r i n c i p l e i t h a i t o h e r e c o g n i s e d , t h a t w h a t was i n q u e s t i o n was l e g i s l a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e vfhich w o u l d n o t h e on t h e b a s i s o f i m m e d i a t e m a j o r i t y r u l e . T h i s made i t a l l t h e more e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e p e o p l e of R h o d e s i a a s a w h o l e s h o u l d b e c o m p l e t e l y f r e e t o s a y w h e t h e r t h e v w e r e c o n t e n t w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d b a s i s of i n d e p e n d e n c e .
I n e v e r y c a s e i n w h i c h i n d e p e n d e n c e h a d b e e n g r a n t e d i n r e c e n t y e a r s t h e v i e w s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a s a w h o l e h a d b e e n a s c e r t a i n e d on c l e a r l y - s t a t e d t e r m s o f i n d e p e n d e n c e ; a n d i n e v e r y c a s e t h i s h a d b e e n on t h e b a s i s of m a j o r i t y r u l e . When, i n t h e u n i q u e c a s e of
R h o d e s i a , t h e r e was a p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i n d e p e n d e n c e s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d b e f o r e m a j o r i t y r u l e was a c h i e v e d i t was d o u b l y n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e m e t h o d employed s h o u l d e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e e x i s t i n g e l e c t o r a t e , e v e n i f e n l a r g e d b y t h e a d d i t i o n of one m i l l i o n A f r i c a n t a x p a y e r s t o t h e T B l R o l l a s h a d b e e n s u g g e s t e d b y Mr. S m i t h . B u t h e h a d u n d e r s t o o d f r o m Mr. S m i t h t h a t i t would b e u n a c c e p t a b l e e v e n t o e x t e n d t h e f r a n c h i s e a s f a r a s t h a t f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of a r e f e r e n d u m . He d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t a n y B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d recommend i n d e p e n d e n c e on t h e b a s i s of t h e m e t h o d s s o f a r s u g g e s t e d . T h a t , i n s\immary, was t h e p o s i t i o n a s h e saw i t . THE COffiONWEALTH SECRETARY a n d THE LORJ
CHANCELLOR i n d i c a t e d t h e i r a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s summing up of t h e p o s i t i o n .
MR. SMITH r e m a r k e d t h a t what t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d s a i d m i g h t b e a c c u r a t e i n t e r m s of a p u r e l y a c a d e m i c a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n ; b u t t h e R h o d e s i a n s h a d t o b o p r a c t i c a l a n d r e a l i s t i c . They l o o k e d a t t h e c o u n t r i e s t o t h e n o r t h which h a d r e c e i v e d t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e ; and t h e y saw t h a t t h e r e was now no s u c h t h i n g a s d e m o c r a c y . I n Ta.nz.onia t h e r e had b e e n o n l y one c a n d i d a t e f o r P r e s i d e n t and o n l y one p o l i t i c a l P a r t y a t t h e r e c e n t e l e c t i o n . I n Z a m b i a , w h e r e t h e U n i t e d Kingdom Government h a d t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y h a d p r o v i d e d f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of E u r o p e a n i n t e r e s t s b y t h e p r o v i s i o n of 1 r e s e r v e d ' s e a t s f o r E u r o p e a n s , t h o s e w e r e now b e i n g c a l l e d i n q u e s t i o n . R h o d e s i a n s wore l i v i n g c h e e k b y j o w l w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of t h i s k i n d . He u n d e r s t o o d t h e B r i t i s h Government *s d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d p r o b l e m s ; b u t , from w h a t t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r h a d s a i d , t h e t w o s i d e s wore f u r t h e r a p a r t t h a n o v e r . They now hod t o f a c e u p t o t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of what l a y b e f o r e thorn. He f e l t t h a t t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom Government w e r e new n o t r e a d y t o go e v e n a s f a r a s t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s h a d g o n e ,
THE PRIME MINISTER r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s was n o t s o . The p r e v i o u s
Government h a d n e v e r a c c e p t e d t h e m e t h o d of c o n s u l t i n g t h e p o p u l a t i o n of R h o d e s i a a s a whole w h i c h t h e R h o d e s i a n M i n i s t e r s h a d p r o p o s e d .

S E C R E T i ^ o r
THE COMQJWEALTH SECRETARY said that, as regards the one method which had been suggested, namely the Indaba of Chiefs, and Headmen, the previous
Government had said "no" and so had the present Administration.
MR. SMITH replied that at any rate the two sides were clearly as far apart as ever. When he and his colleagues returned to Rhodesia they could do nothing but face up to what they considered the only alternative.
The question, therefore, was how this could be implemented in a way which would cause the least trouble to both parties.
THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be tragic if an irrevocable decision was taken without full realisation of all the facts. So many tragedies in world hi story had been caused by a failure fully to appreciate in advance the possible consequences of particular courses of action.
MR. SMITH said that his Government were not unmindful of the implications for Rhodesia. It was unnecessary to rehearse them again or to embark on an argumemt about which side could do more harm to the other. He was anxious to avoid bitterness.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that there was no need to exchange threats and that he need not go in detail through all the statements which had been made by the United Kingdom Government; but it was essential that the Rhodesian Government should realise that they had been made not merely for the record but in all seriousness. Last October*s statement still represented, clearly and categorically, the position of the United
Kingdom Government. But it was not merely a question of the action which the United Kingdom Government might take in circumstances in which a
Rhodesian Government was purporting to rule without legal authority; it was also a question of the consequences in a wider international context, which the United Kingdom Government might be powerless to prevent. These might be far graver than anyone realised. The United Kingdom Government had maintained in the United Nations that they were responsible for Rhodesia
(despite the fact that the country had had internal self-government since
1923); but, if the Rhodesian Government took action which implied that they were purporting to govern the country illegally, there was no saying what other Governments and the United Nations might do, regardless of the
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SECRET ­ 3 9 9
United Kingdon attitude. The Rhodesian Government night set relatively little store by the United Nations; but they nust reckon with the fact that, in the present state of feeling, that Organisation night take irmiediate action, which night not be confined to econonic neasures. The
United Kingdom Governnent had their own views as regards the adrdssibility of the use of nilitary force by the United Nations. Nevertheless this possibility could not bo ruled out; nor would it necessarily be merely a matter of the Afro/Asian reaction. In that event other countries might also become involved. Efforts right, and no doubt would, be made to prevent this from happening. But we could not be sure that these would succeed, however much we might deplore it. He begged Mr. Snath to consider the situation which might develop if pressures for military action proved irresistible. Mr. Smith had no doubt formed his own assess­ nent of what night happen in Rhodesia. He had seen Mr. Smith 1 s television broadcast on the previous evening; but ho had also seen the Lord Chancellor's broadcast, in the course of which the Africans talcing paid; had said that they would fight. No doubt Mr. Smith had considered this possibility; but such action might eventually set tho whole of southern Africa, and even a wider area, ablaze. The Rhodesian Government night not desire this; but there night be no means of preventing it. Moreover, the passions which night be aroused right imperil the position of Europeans in other African countries. The British people had kith and kin'in those countries; and the terrible things which might happen to then in a situation which night becone one of genocidal strife wore a natter of very grave concern. The United
Kingdom Govemnent would be bound to throw their whole weight against anybody who provoked a situation of this kind. This was not merely his view; all his colleagues shared it strongly. It was a dangerous illusion to think that the situation could be contained within the borders of Rhodesia, whether or not there was violence in the country itself. Mr. Smith had perhaps been right in saying that the United Kingdon Government were remote fron realities of the position in Rhodesia; but perhaps the Rhodesian Government themselves were not as closely in touch with international opinion as the
United Kingdor.. They did not seen to realise the irresistible passions
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which might be aroused, whether as the result of what might be described as an orderly intervention by the United Nations or otherwise. The
Rhodesian G-overnment had no doubt considered the position in which they would find themselves if they were denied recognition by some ninety nations; but had they considered the more indefinable consequences if wide areas of Africa were opened up to conflict? The situation in the
Congo had been dangerous; but at least the United Nations had been able to prevent the country from becoming a cockpit for the major Powers.
But would this be true a second time? Mr. Smith would be aware of the determined attempts being made by China to penetrate Africa. It had been realised at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting that a groat struggle was in progress between the Soviet Union and China for influence in Africa. Both these countries would be under strong temptation to intervene in Rhodesia, with incalculable consequences. Here lay a great danger - almost, perhaps, a probability. He feared a terrible conflict and bloodshed. ibid, however much we might hope to prevent it, there could be no guarantee that we should succeed. He apologised for having to speak so frankly; but it was better to speak now than to wish later that he had.
MS.. SMITH said that he was grateful to the Prime Minister for being so frank; and he appreciated the Prime Minister's concern for Rhodesia.
The Rhodesian Government had, of course, considered every aspect of the situation, even if the worst should happen; but they had concluded that there was no other alternative for them. Their country and their lives were at stake. If Britain had considered all that might happen to her in 1 9 3 9 , she might not have gone to war. Rhodesia might be relatively insignificant; but the issues were just as important for her people.
If they did not obtain independence, they would ha.ve to leave Rhodesia..
They would rather fight it out than go voluntarily. The consequences to which the Prime Minister had referred might, or might not, happen. Tho
Rhode si an Government would take the chance. They had analysed the situation over and over again and always reached the same answer. It was quite simple; they had no option,
THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that, when Britain had decided to fight in 1 9 3 9 , and to fight on alone in 1 9 4 0 , she had not boon without friends and the whole of the rest of the world had not been against her. This was the difference from the Rhodesian situation. They would find that they were opposed not only by those who disagreed with them but by friendly countries, including members of the old Commonwealth, who would be in sympathy with them in many other respects.

MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that surely the consequences which the
Prime Minister had described would stem from the action taken by the
United Kingdom; it would be the United Kingdom whose lead would be followed.
If the United Kingdom did not take action of the kind in question, the adverse reactions would be unlikely.
THE PRIME MINISTER said ho did not agree. Even if we were to take no action of the kind which we nevertheless thought it inevitable that we should have to take, he feared that others would and that the demands for some form of sanctions would be overwhelming. We were on record against the use of economic sanctions by the United Nations in the case of South Africa; but this situation would be regarded differently in the United Nations.
Proposals for military intervention might become equally irresistible, regardless of the United Kingdom's attitude. He was in close personal touch with the Foreign Secretary, who was now in Now York and had formed his own estimate of the feeling in the United Nations.
MR. SMITH said that, if it were proved that any such action by the
United Notions would do more harm to Africans than to Europeans, logic and commonsense would surely prevail. THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was not a question of logical proof. However eloquently the case was argued or however strong the evidence, the sovereign nations who were the members of the United Nations would take their own decisions. They -would take the same view as the Europeans in Rhodesia in the sense that they would regard it as a choice between two evils. Pie asked Mr. Smith to consider the possible effect on Europeans in Africa outside Rhodesia, whatever might, or might not, happen in Rhodesia itself. He hoped he was wrong but he feared that there might be many innocent victims.
MR. LARDHER-BURKE said that the right way to look at the problem was to maintain that the time for action against Rhodesia would come only if, and -when, retrogressive laws were actually enacted. Such action should not be taken on the mere assumption that this would happen. MR. SMITH added that the
Rhodesian people were being denied independence because the United Kingdom
Government thought that they might adopt policies harmful to the Africans, not because they had actually taken such steps. Would it not therefore be logical to reserve action against Rhodesia until some damage was in fact done to African interests? He believed that the action of the United Kingdom would give a lead to the rest of the world. It must be obvious that, if pressure were brought to bear on the Rhodesian Government, they might have to do unpleasant things. If economic measures created a recession, they would first get rid of the half million alien Africans in the country. In such circumstances Europeans could pull in their belts; but Africans would lose their livelihood and might even be without food. External opinion should consider these harmful effects which might follow action.against
Rhodesia. He wondered whether the United Kingdom Government had asked themselves whether what they were oroposing to do was right, s SECRET '

THE PRIHE MINISTER said that action by the United Kingdom would bo dictated by the fact that the Rhodesian Government would have seized power illegally. But the United Kingdom could not control what action might bo taken by others, including tho United Nations. Indeed, if the United Kingdom did not react the rest of the world would probably react more strongly. The situation would be explosive; and the results -would not depend on
United Kingdom action. If there was violence in Rhodesia, it would spread.
Measures taken to suppress violence in Rhodesia might themselves trigger off external action against Rhodesia,
MR. SMITH said that there would be no violence. There might bo other problems; but there would be no violence.
MR. HARPER said that, basically, both sides wore facing the sane difficulty in relation to one course of action or another. People wanted to protect themselves in advance against something which they thought might happen.
But it was wrong to try to poet a problem before it had arisen. If
Rhodesia failed to fulfil its promises the position v /ould be different.
Given independence, the checks and balances within Rhodesia v /ould ensure that tho Rhodesian people would behave well. It was wrong to assume in advance that they would not and so prejudge the issue.
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that, even if this view were accepted, what was at issue was not what people's motives were, but what action they v /ould toko. On Mr. Harper's argument it could equally well bo maintained that the actions of the Rhodesian Government wore dictated not by any current throat to the Rhodesian way of life but by their belief that such a threat night arise in tho future. Similarly, other nations v /ould take action, even if only as a result of fears which tho Rhodesian Government believed to bo ill­ founded. Events night then evolve in ways beyond the capacity of either side to control; and the repercussions might extend even beyond
Southern Africa.
MR. HARPER said that the Rhodesian Government were seeking independence because of the increasing pressures on the economy. Development and further investment in Rhodesia would bo withheld until independence was granted.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR replied that the reason why further investment was not talcing place now was because of the throat of a unilateral declaration of indpondonce.
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MR. SMITH said that, so far from the threat of independence constituting a deterrent to investment, the facts were that since M s Party came to power throe years before and began to campaign for independence, investment had substantially increased, even though it was still insufficient.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR replied that investment might have increased when there was a prospect of independence on an agreed basis but that the uncertainty which would inevitably arise from any unilateral declaration would deter investors.
THE PRIME MINISTER added that the City of London were historically friends of Rhodesia but unsettled conditions would not reassure thorn.
MR. SMITH said the rate of expansion in Rhodesia was still not adequate for the expanding population. Tho more his Government had pressed the case for independence, the more business confidence had increased. Rhodesia had groat resources and the Rhodesian Government had evidence that substantial capital would flow to the country when investors wore certain of the future.
Many who were deterred from establishing thensolves in Rhodesia at present would come of tor independence.
Moreover, independence was needed not only for economic reasons but also for political reasons. There would never be unity in Rhodesia until after independence. At present the African Nationalist loaders looked to tho
United Kingdom, since the Government of the United Kingdom still had some say in Rhodesian affairs. But after independence they would realise that they could not appeal to any external support but must seek a solution with the
Government of tho country. The present political situation was unhealthy, with some African leaders under restriction; only independence would enable this to be resolved.
THE COMHOI-MSALTH SECRETARY said that it had boon the uncertain future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which had deterred investment in the period before Mr. Smith's Party came to power; similarly business confidence would now bo adversely affected by the threat of a unilateral declaration.
MR. SMITH said that his Government had hitherto assumed that independence was the only possible outcome of their negotiations, whether by agreement or by unilateral declaration. Was this correct or did the
United Kingdom Government believe that an alternative lay in the maintenance of the status quo?
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THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he certainly did not believe that, if terns could not be immediately agreed for independence, the only other course of action v/as a unilateral declaration. Ho -and his colleagues would be happy to discuss means by which it would be possible to move forward from the status quo. For example, while the proposals for a Senate put forward by
Mr. Smith were not acceptable in their present form, the United Kingdom
Government would be ready to consider them further, even though the gulf to be bridged was a wide one. Moreover, they recognised the difficulties with which the Rhodesian Government were faced as a result of the attitude of
African extremists. The United Kingdom Government, for their part, would do anything in their power to induce African Nationalist leadership to accept that their future depended on political co-operation. It might perhaps be possible to contemplate an arrangement whereby African Nationalists, who wore able to show that they enjoyed, popular support, would be brought into the
Government in a junior- capacity, perhaps as' Parliamentary Secretaries and so obtain over a period experience of the responsibilities of administration.
At the sane time there might be a farther drive, in which the United Kingdom
Government would be ready to help, to expand African education in its widest sense; and Africans of a suitable standard of education night receive special training in administration. The United Kingdom Government would bo ready to seek to persuade other African Governments to provide similar assistance. By such means as these it might be possible to foster a genuinely multi-racial approach to political affairs more rapidly than would be possible on the basis of the operation of the 196d Constitution on existing linos. Those proposals night seem visionary at present; but it was no less visionary to contemplate a successful outcome to a unilateral declaration of independence,
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MR.,SMITH replied that it would not be possible for the Rhodesian
Government to contemplate an agreement on the terms which the Prime Minister had suggested. They believed that thoy had boon promised independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution; and they had boon misled. The only alternative to independence was that the Europeans would seek to entrench themselves in their present position. For himself rather than adopt this alternative, he would probably not remain in public life and might leave
Rhodesia. Those who stayed would be driven to pursue other policies leading to increasing hostility between the races. A unilateral declaration of independence would be bettor than this,
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S E C R E T , A n K
THE PRIME MINISTER asked that Mr. Smith and his colleagues should consider further what he had said and should "bear in mind that the views which ho had just put forward were those which ho had also expressed at the
Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers earlier that year. Having regard to the serious consequences which might stem from a unilateral declaration of indpendence, would it not he preferable, despite the difficulties, to consider cadling a Constitutional Conference? While its outcome might not be wholly pa.lata.blo to Mr. Smith and his Party, neither was it likely to bo wholly palatable to those who desired a consitution based on ir.tf.iediato universal suffrage.
MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian G-overnment was not prepared to contemplate such a Conference. If Rhodesia could not obtain independence, he would not seek to rer.ia.Inj and there wore many like him. He felt that they now had no option but to talco their independence; and there might bo advo.ntage in discussing how a unilateral declaration might be implemented. If the United Kingdom Government felt bound to take certain action, the Rhodesian
Government would have to place themselves in the most favourable possible position to counter it. The extent of their action would depend on the extent of the action taken by the United Kingdom Government; and they wore ready to discuss those questions now.
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was not possible for the
United Kingdom Government to discuss how an illegal act might bo carried out.
MR. SMITH said that ho had expected such a reply but had felt it right to nake the offer.
THE COIffipNWEALTH SECRETARY asked whether the Rhodesian Government must finally reject the proposals put forward by the Prime Minister. Was there not some advantage at least in trying this course?
MR. SMITH replied that the Rhodesian Government had given the matter very careful thought and did not now fool able to change their mind.
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4 ft fi
MR.
HARPER said that it must be borne in mind that, just as the
United Kingdon Government had their own political and Parliamentary difficulties, so had the Rhodesian Government on their side. If they went too far to meet the United Kingdom view, they would not be able to cany their own Parliament and public opinion with them. It was the llhodosian Government who had the very much more vital difficulties and should therefore be given the benefit of the doubt. It was their misfortune that ' they had forfeited earlier opportunities to gain their independence; and, even if they now appeared to be something of an anachronism, it should not be held against then that they could not change their way of life at short notice to adapt themselves to tho views and beliefs of other countries.
THE: PRUjE MINISTER interjected that it was not a natter of his
Government being unwilling to face criticism, with which they would, indeed, inevitably be faced both fron the Opposition and to some extent from within their own Party. But they were not prepared to face Parliament with proposals which they did not boliove to be right.
MR. HARPER said that tho proposals which the Rhodesian Ministers had put forward had exceeded the mandate which they had been given in Rhodesia,
Yet they had not found that those brought then any closer to tho views of the United Kingdom Government. The objections which United Kingdom
Ministers had expressed did not derive fron their own independent convictions but appeared to have boon inherited fron the previous Administration.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that ho must make it clear that the attitude which tho United Kingdom Government had maintained was not a natter of Party politics; nor was it inherited fron the Conservative Government. When in opposition his Party had supported the action taken by tho previous
Administration in respect of Rhodesia at the 1 9 6 4 Meeting of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers; and they adhered to that view now because thoy believed it to be right.
MR.. SMITH said that in those circumstances there was no prospect of agreement and the discussions would have to be broken off. Presumably there should be an agreed communique, which would make this clear.
1 2 ­

MR. HARPER said that it must ho "borne in mind that, just as the
United Kingdom G-overnment had their own political and Parliamentary difficulties, so had the Rhodo3ian Government on their side. If they went too far to meet the United Kingdom view, they would not be able to carry their own Parliament and public opinion with them. It was the
Rhodesian Government who had the very much more vital difficulties and should therefore be given tho benefit of the doubt. It was their misfortune that ' thoy had forfeited earlier opportunities to gain their independence; and, even if they now appeared to be something of an anachronism, it should not bo held against thorn that they could not change their way of life at short notice to adapt themselves to tho views and beliefs of other countries,
THE: PRIME MINISTER interjected that it was not a matter of his
Government being unwilling to face criticism, with which they would, indeed, inevitably be faced both from tho Opposition and to somo extent from within their own Party. But thoy wcro not prepared to face Parliament with proposals which thoy did not believe to be right.
MR. HARPER said that the proposals which tho Rhodesian Ministers had put forward had exceeded the mandate which they hod been given in Rhodesia.
Yet they had not found that those brought thorn any closer to the views of tho United Kingdom Government. The objections which United Kingdom
Ministers had expressed did not derive from their own independent convictions but appeared to have been inherited from the previous Administration.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that ho must make it clear that the attitude which the United Kingdom Government had maintained was not a matter of Party politics; nor was it inherited from the Conservative Government. vflicn in opposition his Party had supported the action taken by tho previous
Administration in respect of Rhodesia at the 1964 Meeting of Commonwealth
Prime Ministers; and they adhered to that view now because they believed it to be right.
MR. SMITH said that in those circumstances there was no prospect of agreement and the discussions would have to be broken off. Presumably there should be an agreed communique, which would make this clear.
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THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and suggested that the connunique might frankly describe the scope of the discussions and indicate what had been said by each side on the five principles. Beyond that each side would be free to explain publicly the line which they had taken.
MR. SMITH said that a lengthy communique of this kind would take a considerable time to draft; and it would therefore be preferable to confine it to a short statement to the effect that the two Governments had been unable to reconcile their differences on the conditions of independence.
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The meeting then adjourned while a communique was drafted. When the meeting reassembled - THE PRIME MINISTER proposed, and MR. SMITH agreed, that it would be preferable to omit the reference in the draft communique to the consideration which had been given to the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence.
Certain textual amendments were agreed, and the communique was approved in the form annexed to this record.
THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether it was agreed that the discussions
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. . . . . .
. . . . . henceforward be free to report to Parliament and to the public on the views which had been expressed and to give a full account of the negotiations.
MR. SMITH agreed.
. MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that the Rhodesian Government would probably wish to publish as a White Paper the correspondence which had passed between the two Governments since the previous Rhodesian White Paper, -which had carried the exchanges to June, 1963.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, if it were proposed to publish the correspondence which the Rhodesian Government had had with the previous
Administration, it would be in accordance with constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom that he should seek the agreement of his predecessors who had been the Prime Ministers of the day. This he would now do.
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MR. SMITH proposed that there should he no publication of any record of confidential exchanges during the negotiations, principally his own oral exchanges since February with United Kingdom Ministers through the
United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury.
THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that short of any unilateral declaration of independence 3uch records should remain confidential.
In further discussion it was agreed, that the White Papers should be confined to the relevant correspondence. It would bo preferable that the same correspondence should be published in white Papers in each country and that this should bo done simultaneously. There would bo consultation between the two Governments to that end. Subject to this understanding, each side would be free to comment publicly on the course of the discussions which had been held during that week, provided there was no attribution of statements to individuals or direct quotation.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that ho much regretted the outcome of the discussions; but he wished to thank Mr. Smith and his colleagues for the frankness and courtesy with which they had expressed their views.
MR. SMITH replied that he also was grateful to the Prime Minister and the other United Kingdom Ministers for the frank and straightforward manner in which they hod conducted the discussions. Ho, too, regretted that they hod failed in the purpose for which they had. cone to London.
London, S.W.1 .
October, 1 9 &5

AG-KEEP COMMUNIQUE
The Frine Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary have held during this week a series of discussions with the Prime Minister and other
Ministers of Rhodesia, during which they have examined frankly and thoroughly all aspects of the question of Rhodesia's independence. The British
Ministers have described the constitutional principles which the British
Government would regard as the essential basis on which they could recommend to Parliament the grant of sovereign independence to Rhodesia; and the
Rhodesian Ministers have indicated the reasons for which they feel unable to accept these principles in the measure required by the British
Government. Despite intensive discussion, no means have been found of reconciling the opposing views. No further meeting has been arranged.
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AG-REED NOTE of-a-Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.Yv.1 on MONDAY, 11th OCTOBER, 1965 at 10.45 a.m.
The Prime Minister
The Lord Chancellor
The Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations
Sir Burke Trend
Mr. P. Rogers
Mr. K.J. Neale
P R E S E N T
The Hon. I.D. Smith,
Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia
The Hon. D. Lardner-Burke,
Minister of Justice
Mr. G-.B. Clarke,
Secretary to the Cabinet
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to clear up any possible misunderstandings on either side before Mr. Smith and his colleagues returned to Rhodesia, The previous evening he had had discussions with the leaders of the Opposition, from which it emerged that there might be one misunderstanding relating to the fifth of the five principles i.e. the need to satisfy the United Kingdom Government that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
At a previous meeting it had. appeared that Mr. Smith was concerned lest a referendum on the basis of four separate electoral rolls would enable a small minority of the population to veto a change; and he had explained that the Rhodesian Government therefore wished to seek an alternative blocking safeguard for the entrenched clauses (i.e. other than the final approval of The Queen, as at present, or what v /ould amount to four separate referenda). The Prime Minister v /ished to make it clear that the United Kingdom Government had not so far expressed a view on the question of separate referenda and that they did not in fact contemplate what might amount to four separate electoral colleges. They had not pursued the issue in discussion because they recognised that Mr. Smith was in any event opposed to procedure by referendum. But, in case there was a misunderstanding, he wished Mr. Smith and his colleagues to know v/here the United Kingdom Government stood on this point, namely that, on the whole, they v /ould be inclined to support a single referendum.

MR. SMITH said that he recognised the position of the United
Kingdom Government in this matter. It appeared that there might have been some misunderstanding about what he had said to the leaders of the Opposition.
He had made it clear to them that he could not accept four separate referenda; hut he had never supposed that this was what the United Kingdom Government were proposing. He understood that they believed that a referendum on what v/ould be virtually "one man one vote" would be appropriate. In their earlier discussions the Prime Minister had referred to the procedure in relation to the grant of independence in the countries to the north of Rhodesia, where the United Kingdom Government had insisted on what amounted to a referendum on the basis of universal suffrage even for the achievement of independence on the basis of majority government. It followed that they must be all the more insistent on a similar safeguard for the achievement of independence on the basis of minority government.
IKE PRIME MINISTER said that this procedure was not confined to other countries in Africa but represented the general practice of the
United Kingdom in all previously dependent territories when they achieved independence. He v/anted to be quite sure that the view of the United Kingdom Government on this issue was fully understood, since in their discussions on a blocking safeguard they had confined themselves to considering the proposal for a Senate.
MR. SMITH replied that he too was concerned that there should be no misunderstandings. He had been completely frank in his talk with the leaders of the Opposition and had made the same points to then as he had made in his discussions with the Government and, subsequently, in his Press Conferences. He recognised the sincerity of the United Kingdom Government 1 s views; but he must nevertheless make it clear that he and his colleagues believed that the United
Kingdom Government had moved away from their original position and that the two sides were now further apart than when they started.

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THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was not the oase that the
United Kingdom Government had moved away from their original position; but it was true that they had now been more precise than their predecessors about the way in which the general principles of a settlement should be put into effect.
One further point had emerged from his own discussions with the leaders of the Opposition on the previous evening. This was that there had been some reference, when Mr. Smith saw them, to an alterna­ tive way of instituting guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, namely that there might be a solemn treaty between the United Kingdom Government and the Rhodesian Government which would be registered with the United Nations, and, perhaps, subject to ajudication by the Privy Council.
MR. SMITH said that he would be prepared to accept such a treaty as an additional guarantee (i.e. additional to the guarantees in the
Constitution itself) that the Rhodesian Government would honour the spirit of the 1 9 6 1 Constitution. They had no intention of going back on this; but it would not be acceptable to them that the treaty should incorporate reservations going further' than the Constitution itself.
If it were simply to reinforce the Constitution, they would be happy to accept it.
THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether this was not a new suggestion, which had not previously been put forward in their discussions.
MR. Li*iPJJNER-BURKE replied that there might have been some general reference to it in previous discussions with the Commonwealth Secretary, although possibly not in the form of a precise proposal for a treaty.
The idea was conceived as a way of meeting the fear of the United
Kingdom Government that the Rhodesian Government might, after independ­ ence, go back on their undertakings. He had suggested in tho earlier discussions that it would be more appropriate that the United Kingdom
Government should wait until the Rhodesian Government defaulted on their obligations than that they should try to anticipate misbehaviour of this kind. The concept of the treaty was consistent with this thought.
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THE PRIME MINISTER asked what sanctions might he provided in such a treaty.
MR. LARDNER-BURKE replied that these night he whatever the United
Kingdom G-overnment wished. For example, it might tie the action contemplated in their statements of October, 1964 and April, 1965.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the action contemplated in those statements was appropriate as the immediate response to on illegal act; but it would not necessarily be appropriate as a sanction for a treaty, where alleged breaches of the treaty some years hence (if referred to the Privy Council) would be a justiciable issue, "which could involve a lengthy process of argument.
MR. LARDNER-BURKB replied that, nevertheless, what would be in question would be a legod issue (on which, therefore, the Privy Council could appropriately adjudicate), just as it would be if the Rhodesian Government node a unilateral declaration of independence.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR agreed that the proposal for a treaty might deserve further consideration since it had not previously boon put forward in the discussions.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the only former British territory where the United Kingdom Government had entered into a treaty of guarantee as part of the process of granting independence was Cyprus; and the precedent was not entirely a happy one. Nevertheless, the idea might merit further discussion.
MR. SMITH said that, oven so, the treaty would represent a possible neons of meeting the difficulties in relation to only one of the United
Kingdom Government' 3 five principles. The difficulties in relation to the other four principles would remain.
THE PRIME MINISTER accepted this but said that further examination of the proposal for a treaty night enable progress to bo made on at least one of the five points. He enquired whether there were any other issues on which there might be misunderstanding.
MR. SMITH replied that he did not think so.
MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that there was one point relating to the proposal for a Senate which might call for elaboration. He understood that the
United Kingdom Government hod felt that there was objection to the proposal

'I 1
3 put forward by the Bhodesian Government for the African representation on the Senate to be selected from the Chiefs, on the score that these Chiefs were not elected. It night be possible to neet this difficulty by arranging that a panel of candidates for six of the twelve seats night be nominated by the Chiefs while a panel of candidates for the regaining six seats night he put forward by the electoral college for the Constitutional
Council. The actual elections night then be made by the electorate on the
'B' Roll or, perhaps, by the conbined electorate on the 'A' and 'B f Rolls.
This procedure would ensure - and this was what nattered - that candidates for the Senate would bo responsible individuals,
THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether Mr. Lardner-Burke contemplated this proposal, as representing a. blocking safeguard but one which would depend ultimately on the ' B' Roll electorate rather than on nomination by the Chiefs,
The United Kingdom G-overnnent were more concerned with questions of substance than of form and would be prepared to examine this proposal.
MR.
LARDNER-BURKE observed that, even if further discussion led to agreement on this question, it would not remove the difficulties in relation to the other principles. MR. SMITH added that the proposal v /as a. safeguard for the entrenched clauses of the Constitution; it would not overcone the difficulty about the blocking mechanism in relation to normal constitutional changes. This latter point represented a serious stumbling block and one which the United Kingdom G-overnment had only introduced at a late stage of the discussions.
THE COMOITWEALTK SECRETARY said that, in his earlier discussions with
Mr. Snith in the previous February, he had raised the question of a blocking third for normal constitutional changes and had understood that Mr, Snith had accepted the principle involved but had suggested that it should be satisfied by a blocking quarter. MR. LARDNER-BURKE said that the idea of a blocking quarter had been explored in the discussions; but it was not a specific offer by Rhodesian Ministers since they had no mandate to present it as such.
MR. SMITH added that one of the objections put forward by the
Commonwealth Secretary to the proposal had been that the additional seats should be filled by Chiefs but he understood that this proposal was less acceptable to the United Kingdom Government than the idea of a Senate.
THE PRD.CS MINISTER said that in his discussions with leaders of the
Opposition he had mentioned the proposal that a White Paper might be published, which would include all the relevant recent correspondence between the
United Kingdom and Rhodesian Ministers. Sir Alec Douglas-Home had accepted
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/& 4 r* this proposal so far as his Administration was concerned: but the Prime
Minister had not yet spoken to Mr. Macmillan whoso concurrence would have to be obtained in respect of correspondence exchanged during his adminis­ tration. In considering this question of publication it appeared that the correspondence by itself would not be meaningful unless it was linked by a brief historical narrative summarising developments between successive stages in the correspondence. He proposed, therefore, that the White Paper should inolude a record of this kind, on the understanding that it would give no indication of the content of the exchanges which might have taken pla.ce between one letter and the next but would merely refer to their having taken place.
MR. SMITH agreed that this would be acceptable, He enquired whether the Prime Minister contemplated that the minutes of the current discussions might be published.
THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in certain circumstances (e.g. if there were a unilateral declaration of independence) the United Kingdom G-overnment would feel free to publish them.
MR. SMITH said that he had been disturbed that morning to see a statement in the Press of what the Foreign Secretary had said in New York when he had been asked why Rhodesia wanted independence. Mr. Stewart was reported as having answered that this was because the Rhodesian Government wished to perpetuate white domination. This was an unfortunate and provocative statement. On the contrary, the Rliodesian Government accepted the- principle of tho 1961 Constitution which ensured an ultimate African majority; and they were willing to agree to safeguards for its continuation.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that, before commenting, he would wish to see the precise text of -what the Foreign Secretary had said, since a misquota.tion or a much abbreviated version of what had been said frequently led to misunderstanding. He accepted that the differences between the United
Kingdom and Rhodesian Governments related not to the question whether there should be perpetual minority rule but to the question how quickly minority rule might come to an end. But, if Mr. Smith contemplated - as he had said in public - that minority rule should last for at least as long as his own lifetime, this would amount to a difference of principle rather then of timing and might justify what the Foreign Secretary had said.

MR. SMITH said that he could not accept this viev/ and hoped that the
Prirae Minister would excjaine the text of what the Foreign Secretary had said.
He agreed, however, that misunderstanding could arise as a result of incorrect quotation by the Press. Indeed, the Rhodesian Government had themselves suffered in this respect in that there had been a Press statement that
Mr. Harper, on his return through Johannesburg to Southern Rhodesia, had said that a unilateral declaration of independence was inevitable. In fact, what he had said was that such a declaration was not inevitable,
THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that at least the United Kingdom Press had not given an incorrect impression of what had been said by both sides during the recent discussions.
MR'. SMITH agreed that the position was quite clear and that one thing which had emerged from the discussions was that both sides now knew where they stood.
London, S.W.I.,
October, 1965.
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