T H I S D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' S G O V E R N M E N T
Printed
for the Cabinet.
C. (61) 184
21st November,
November
1961
Copy N o .
3 5
1961
CABINET
BERLIN
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
My colleagues will be aware that the further probes which it was hoped would
take place in Moscow following up the conversations with the Soviet Foreign
Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in the United States and in London have not materialised.
There are a number of reasons for this; in the first place the chance of fruitful
conversations in Moscow was prejudiced by the incidents on the sector boundary
in Berlin; a second cause was President Kennedy's reluctance to get involved in
discussions of substance with the Russians before a German Government had
been formed which could engage its responsibility and, finally, there was a reduction
of pressure by the Russians.
2. It seems clear that the idea of " probing " without getting into substance
is now depasse. In a manner of speaking the German Ambassador in Moscow,
Dr. Kroll, has already carried out the probe which we had in mind. H e suggested,
apparently on his own initiative, a formula which involved, amongst other things,
a Four-Power agreement covering the freedom and viability of West Berlin, access
to it and the presence of Western troops there as a prerequisite to an agreement
on negotiations for a German peace treaty and related questions and resumption
of negotiations on disarmament. There was nothing really new in this, but it had
never been put to the Russians in such a concrete form or in a way which offered
scope for wider ranging discussions if an arrangement could be reached over Berlin.
Mr. Khrushchev's reaction was that these proposals were workmanlike and he
agreed to them in principle. H e also made it fairly clear that, though he wants
negotiations, he is ready to wait a reasonable time for the Western position to be
cleared.
3. This gives us more time, but it also means that when the talks with the
Russians eventually take place, Mr. Khrushchev will expect to get straight into
questions of substance. The conclusion is, therefore, that we must try to reach
agreement with our Allies on a detailed negotiating position as soon as we can.
4. A good deal of work has already been done on this question, but mostly
of a preliminary nature. The Ambassadorial G r o u p in Washington have been
working for several weeks on a paper, largely of German origin, which sets out
the different points likely to arise in negotiations with the Russians. This paper
defines what negotiations should achieve, what is negotiable and what is not, and
also sets out the margin for negotiations. The paper will in due course be
supplemented by a paper on tactics and it is intended that both shall serve as
guidance in further talks with the Soviets and in eventual negotiations. The text
is annexed to this paper so that my colleagues may be aware of the issues around
which arguments are likely to turn. It has not yet been approved by Governments,
though it is largely in line with our views and those of the Americans. The attitude
of the German and French Governments towards it is not yet known.
5. In general, the sensitive points for the Germans on which the Russians
are likely to press very hard a r e :
(a) acceptance of the existence and authority of the Deutsche Demokratische
Republik;
(b) the political relationship between West Berlin and the Federal Republic;
60009
t
(c) recognition of the Oder-Neisse line;
(d) limitation of nuclear weapons for Germany.
In the discussions in the Ambassadorial G r o u p the Germans have shown themselves
aware of the need for increased practical dealings with the East Germans on the
part of the Western Powers as well as of themselves. We have brought home
to t h e m the need for some form of interim action by the Western Powers over
Geimany's eastern frontier, and I am hopeful that some acceptable formula can
be worked out to cover these two points. On the other hand they claim that
Berlin is constitutionally a part of the Federal Republic and it will be very difficult
to get them to agree to any attenuation of existing links. This is a matter on
which the Russians feel very strongly and we shall have to apply pressure in order
to make the Germans give u p some of the more obvious political links, such as
meetings of the Federal German Parliament in Berlin. Whether we shall get
them, to go far enough to satisfy the Russians is another matter. As regards the
question of limitation of nuclear weapons, we think that the Germans could
reaffirm their intention, which is already enshrined in the Western European
Union Treaty, not to manufacture atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons.
It might also be possible for the Americans and ourselves to declare our intention
not to transfer control over nuclear components of weapon systems to third Powers
not possessing them. T h e Germans might by separate declaration comply with
a United Nations resolution whereby non-nuclear Powers disclaim their intention
to claim control over nuclear warheads. The Germans regard these ideas with
suspicion since they fear they might help the Russians to achieve their object of
imposing an inferior status on the Federal Republic and weakening Germany
and the West militarily; but I d o not despair of getting the Germans to be reasonable
on this point, provided that the Russians do not pitch their demands unreasonably
high.
t
6. All these ideas will be discussed between President Kennedy and Dr.
Adenauer who is at present in Washington. T h e Presidents main purpose will
be to discover from Dr. Adenauer whether the basis of the Western position for
possible negotiations with the Russians is acceptable to the Germans. If so, the
next problem will be to persuade General de Gaulle to negotiate and to accept
this basis for negotiations. M u c h therefore depends on the result of the Presidents
meeting with Dr. Adenauer and also of the meeting which the Prime Minister
is to hold with General de Gaulle later this week.
7. General de Gaulle has a rooted opposition to negotiating with the Russians
so long as they refuse to take practical measures to reduce international tension
which they themselves have created. It may be therefore that he will oppose French
participation in any discussions with the Russians, regardless of Dr. Adenauer's
attitude. H e may stick to the view that we should simply stand pat and await further
Russian moves. If so, we must try to convince him that the Berlin situation cannot
be allowed to drift or deteriorate. Since 13th August it has changed radically for
the worse. West Berlin has now become a liability to the West and it is positively
necessary to try to improve it. If nothing is done there is a grave danger that the
life of the city will wither away under our eyes. T o some extent this is happening
already, but the trend will be aggravated if the Western Powers remain inactive. In
these circumstances Mr. Khrushchev cannot be expected to come forward with
proposals, as General de Gaulle apparently thinks he should. It is therefore a
Western interest to demand negotiations for the purpose of improving the situation
in Berlin by agreement. T o demand negotiations on this basis is quite a different
matter from acceding to pressure for negotiation because of threats to allied
communications with West Berlin. It would enable us, incidentally, to put forward
our own ideas as to the sort of arrangement we should wish to see enforced for
Berlin as an independent German city protected by allied forces, enjoying free
communications with the outside world and living a life of its own.
8. If General de Gaulle or Dr. Adenauer agree to negotiations, our aim must
be to finalise the Western negotiating position without delay. If not, a Western
Four-Power meeting will have to be held to resolve our differences.
H.
Foreign Office, S.W. 1, 20ih November, 1961.
ANNEX A
PAPER ON THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN WASHINGTON (Draft as at November 1L\)
This paper is intended to define: what negotiations should achieve; what is nonnegotiable;
and the margin for negotiations. This paper will be followed by a paper on tactics, and both
are intended to serve as guidance in further contacts with the
Soviets and in eventual negotiations.
Ac
SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
I. What Negotiations Should Achieve The aim of negotiations should be to achieve positive results
with regard to:­
1.
maintenance of Western rights concerning Berlin
- presence of forces and free access for military personnel and civilians; 2.
improvement of access facilities
- preferably by international highway or, at least, their maintenance on the same basis as at present; and 3o
assurance of West Berlin's freedom and viability
- including the Berliners rights to preserve freedom of choice as to their general way of life and to preserve their ties with the Federal Republic.( / 1
a
The scope of Western concessions must be determined by the degree of Soviet preparedness to give something - particularly with regard to the future stability of the Berlin situation. /II. (a) The German delegation desires a concerted interpretation of West Berlin's present legal situation on the assumption that it is considered to form part of the Federal Republic, but with full rights of a "Land" suspended hy virtue of occupation law. 1 1
-
194
The f o i l o w i n g a r e p o i n t s r e l a t i n g
o n which, t h e r e c a n h e n o c o m p r o m i s e :
1,
2 .
specifically
to
Berlin
(a)
the unchanged source of Western r i g h t s ;
'
p r o t e c t i o n of West B e r l i n by f o r c e s of the Three
Powers C b ) ( c )
a S o v i e t c o n t i n g e n t i n West B e r l i n i s d e f i n i t e l y
unacceptable;
v
3*
Freedom of a c c e s s t o t h e
g o o d a s i t now i s j
and
1+.
West B e r l i n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e West, and w i t h
Federal Republic in p a r t i c u l a r , a t l e a s t to remain
g e n e r a l as a t p r e s e n t .
The
relating
outside
world at l e a s t
as
the
in
following p o i n t s a r e formally agreed Western p o l i c y
t o Germany a s a w h o l e on w h i c h t h e r e c a n b e n o compromise&
lo
R e u n i f i c a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e m a i n s
t h e aim of t h e W e s t e r n P o w e r s .
The r i g h t o f t h e G e r m a n
p e o p l e to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n must be a s s e r t e d .
A Soviet
acknowledgement of t h e r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n would
g r e a t l y h e l p t o w a r d a modus V i v e n d i .
The W e s t e r n
Governments i n any c a s e must i n c l u d e i n a n y t h i n g they
s i g n a formula which keeps the door open.
2 .
Recognition
of
the
"GoDoR." r e m a i n s
unacceptable.
/3.
( a )
We c o u l d a c c e p t t h e v i e w t h a t a n e x p l i c i t c o n f i r m a t i o n o f
these r i g h t s i s not n e c e s s a r y u n l e s s doubts a r i s e as to
t h e i r v a l i d i t y , owing t o g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
See a l s o
paragraph I I I 3 a.
( b )
The W e s t e r n P o w e r s c o u l d n o t a c c e p t a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n
i n the l e v e l of t h e i r f o r c e s i n B e r l i n , as the S o v i e t s are
l i k e l y to demand.
They c o u l d , h o w e v e r , c o n s i d e r making a
d e c l a r a t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t they would:
( c )
1 )
freeze
their
2 )
make
3)
from t i m e t o
their forces
forces
at present
token r e d u c t i o n s
a contingent
in the
levels;
size
of t h e i r
t i m e , examine the p o s s i b i l i t y
i f developments permit.
of U.N.
forces;
of
reducing
troops
[might be acceptable i n a d d i t i o n
(particularly if there
w e r e some U N . i n s t i t u t i o n s h o u s e d i n t h e c i t y ) on t h e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e i r p r e s e n c e w i l l be symbolic a n d . w d l l
n o t l i m i t the powers cf the Western g a r r i s o n s ] .
0
[ i s n o t a c c e p t a b l e , w h e t h e r rex)lacirig W e s t e r n t r o o p s o r a s an
additional contingent;
same p o s i t i o n a s t o n e u t r a l t r o o p s
w i t h o u t a U.N. m a n d a t e .
(German D e l e g a t i o n ) .
3 .
The f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f Germany
/
must await a peace s e t t l e m e n t for t h e whole of Germany.^'
The q u e s t i o n o f E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y s h o u l d b e d e a l t w i t h o n l y
t h e c o n t e x t of a w i d e r German s e t t l e m e n t [ o r i n c o n n e x i o n
disarmament. ] ^ )
in
with
III.
The M a r g i n f o r
Negotiations
1.
The e s s e n t i a l o b j e c t i v e of an " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " p r e c e d i n g
t h e c o n c l u s i o n , of a s e p a r a t e t r e a t y b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t Union and
t h e "GoD.Ro" w o u l d be a p r a c t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t on a c c e s s a f t e r
t h e e n t e r i n g i n t o f o r c e of the t r e a t y .
They s h o u l d t r y t o r e a c h
an a g r e e m e n t l i m i t e d t o a c c e s s t o West B e r l i n , b u t see p a r a g r a p h
k below.
No u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s p o s s i b l e u n l e s s t h e S o v i e t s g i v e
a g u a r a n t e e t h a t i n p r a c t i c e f r e e a c c e s s t o West B e r l i n f o r A l l i e d
personnel [as well as f o r Germans](c) w i l l remain
a s i t i s now
or be improved a f t e r a peace t r e a t y .
I n order to r e a c h an agreement
we c o u l d c o n s i d e r :
a
)
An i ? . v b e r r i a t i o n a l
autobahn
We m i g h t p r o p o s e
jurisdiction.
a corridor
in accordance with Section
exempt from E a s t
I,
German
( i )
As a s t a r t i n g p o s i t i o n a " f r e e c o r r i d o r " , u n d e r
e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o f this t h r e e W e s t e r n P o w e r s ,
might be proposed.
the
( i i )
S e c o n d l y , t h e r e might be p r o p o s e d an I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Access A u t h o r i t y f o r B e r l i n which should, w i t h o u t
e x e r c i s i n g any s o v e r e i g n r i g h t
over the t e r r i t o r y
of t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c , t h e " G . D . E .
authorities,
o r t h e Government of West B e r l i n , and ?/hile p a y i n g
r e n t f o r u s e of f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e s e
a u t h o r i t i e s , keep the Helmstedt-West B e r l i n highway
open to t r a f f i c and i n good r e p a i r , and e n s u r e t h a t
no c h a r g e s a r e l e v i e d on t h r o u g h t r a f f i c u s i n g t h i s
highway e x c e p t by t h e A u t h o r i t y and o p e r a t e t h e
B e r l i n A i r S a f e t y C e n t r e and any f a c i l i t y i n West
B e r l i n , t h e o p e r a t i o n of which i s e s s e n t i a l t o
safe t r a v e l in the Berlin a i r c o r r i d o r s .
1 1
/(iii)
( a )
See I I I
1 c below.
( b )
An e x c e p t i o n f r o m t h i s p r i n c i p l e c a n b e e n v i s a g e d w i t h
r e s p e c t t o u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n s o f NATO a n d t h e W a r s a w
P a c t O r g a n i s a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g n o n - a g g r e s s i o n and r e n u n c i a t i o n
o f f o r c e [ a n d w i t h r e s p e c t t o p r o d u c t i o n o f ABC w e a p o n s
and t r a n s f e r of n u o l e a r w a r h e a d s ] .
See a l s o p a r a g r a p h I I I
k
d.
( c )
Unbraclceted l a n g u a g e does n o t c o v e r f r e e a c c e s s by Germans.
T h e p o s i t i o n t o b e t a k e n o n t h i s p o i n t r e m a i n s t o -be
c o n s i d e r e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e l a t i o n t o . f r e e and
u n c o n t r o l l e d p a s s a g e by a i r .
( i i i )
In both cases i t
has
t o be
decided
- w h e t h e r E a s t G e r m a n t r a f f i c s h o u l d b e c o m p l e t e l y
e x c l u d e d from t h i s a u t o b a h n ( e . g b y f e n c i n g o f f
t h e a u t o b a h n from E a s t German t e r r i t o r y ) o r
w h e t h e r mixed t r a f f i c m i g h t be a c c e p t a b l e ;
0
- w h e t h e r t h e
he used or
constructed
p u r p o s e of
Berlin;
e x i s t i n g a u t o b a h n from H e l m s t e d t c o u l d
w h e t h e r a new a u t o b a h n w o u l d h a v e t o b e
which would e x c l u s i v e l y s e r v e t h e
c h a n e l l i n g t h e f r e e t r a f f i c to and from
- w h e t h e r t h e a u t o b a h n w o u l d h a v e t o b e e n l a r g e d ( e . g .
t o e i g h t l a n e s ) o r t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a r a i l r o a d
o r m o n o r a i l and c e r t a i n a u x i l i a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s
(pipelines, powerlines, telephone cables etc.).­
( i v )
( v )
I n any c a s e , i t would he d e s i r a b l e t o p r e s e r v e
i n a d d i t i o n to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l autobahn, the
o t h e r e x i s t i n g a c c e s s r o u t e s f o r t h e u s e o f German
c i v i l t r a f f i c and under c o n t r o l s as p r e s e n t l y a p p l i e d
to this
traffic
Consideration could he given to a p o s s i b l e United
N a t i o n s r o l e i n c o n n e x i o n w i t h improvement of a c c e s s
p r o v i d e d t h e r e was O t h e r w i s e some UoN p r e s e n c e i n
Berlins
0
b)
j^Q-S^bili^ty^j/ith r e s p e c t
to access
procedures
T h e r e c a n b e no d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h t h e "GoD.Ro" on
A l l i e d access r i g h t s ,
[Provided this p r i n c i p l e is maintained,
t h e r e can be f l e x i b i l i t y i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e E a s t
G e r m a n s i n t h e p r a c t i c a l e x e r c i s e of t h e s e r i g h t s . ]
[in certain circumstances, representatives at the technical
l e v e l o f t h e " G ^ D t R . " , a n d o f t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c a c t i n g on
" b e h a l f o f t h e T h r e e P o w e r s c o u l d make a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r p r o c e d u r e s
and m o d a l i t i e s f o r the e x e r c i s e of A l l i e d r i g h t S c
The T h r e e W e s t e r n P o w e r s c o u l d s t a t e t h a t t h e i r e x p e r t s w o u l d
be p r e p a r e d t o d e a l on a n o n - p o l i t i c a l l e v e l w i t h E a s t Germans
on p r a c t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s * ]
T e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s of a c c e s s ( r a i l r o a d s c h e d u l e s , a u t o b a h n
e t c . ) c a n b e h a n d l e d o n t h e same w o r k i n g l e v e l b e t w e e n t h e
F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c a n d t h e "GoD.Ro" as n o w .
fee
We c a n g o a s f a r a s , b u t n o f u r t h e r t h a n , t h e f o r m u l a i n e x i s t i n g c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s f o r a c q u i e s c e n c e i n E a s t German i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of e x i s t i n g a u t o b a h n and r a i l p r o c e d u r e s .
This
w o u l d h o l d t r u e b o t h i n d i r e c t d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t s [or E a s t G e r m a n s ] a n d i n u n i l a t e r a l s t a t e m e n t s ( " S o l u t i o n C") c.
C e r t a i n amount of a c q u i e s c e n c e i n s t a t u s quo
The W e s t e r n P o w e r s c o u l d c o n s i d e r m a k i n g i t k n o w n t o t h e
S o v i e t s t h a t they would c o n f i n e t h e m s e l v e s t o p r o t e s t i n g a g a i n s t
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of the s e p a r a t e peace t r e a t y as a v i o l a t i o n of
f o r m e r a g r e e m e n t s and t o l a b e l l i n g t h e t r e a t y v o i d a s f a r a s
s t a t e s w h i c h do n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e " G . D . R . " a r e c o n c e r n e d o
/The
SiiCKET
The u n d e r t a k i n g o f t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c , " n e v e r t o h a v e
r e c o u r s e t o f o r c e t o a c h i e v e t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Germany
or the m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t b o u n d a r i e s of t h e F e d e r a l
R e p u b l i c " ( i n c l u d e d i n t h e P a r i s T r e a t i e s o f 195^!-) c a n b e
repeatedo
This u n d e r t a k i n g can be r e p e a t e d v i s - a - v i s the
S o v i e t Union [and g u a r a n t e e d by t h e t h r e e Western P o w e r s . ]
I f n e c e s s a r y , the u n d e r t a k i n g c o u l d be b r o a d e n e d i n o r d e r
to cover the Cder-Neisse lineo
[The t h r e e W e s t e r n G o v e r n m e n t s
in t h e i r formula about r e u n i f i c a t i o n (see Section I I ) could
s p e c i f y t h a t Germany s h o u l d b e r e u n i f i e d w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g
frontierso
T h e y c o u l d a l s o make a s t a t e m e n t t h a t w h e n G e r m a n y
was r e u n i f i e d a n d t h e t i m e f o r a p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t h a d come, t h e
Oder-l\Feisse l i n e would t h e n , i n t h e i r view., b e t h e e a s t e r n
f r o n t i e r of Germany,]
U n i l a t e r a l n o n - a g g r e s s i o n d e c l a r a t i o n s o f NATO a n d t h e
Warsaw F a c t O r g a n i s a t i o n w o u l d b e a c c e p t a b l e ( a f o r m a l t r e a t y
would h e e x c l u d e d )
s
^
Formula to s a t i s f y
sovereigntyj
Soviet
request for
respect
of
"GDR'
1
I f n e c e s s a r y , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d embody a f o r m u l a ,
a c c o r d i n g t o which the Western Powers would " r e s p e c t t h e r u l e s
a n d r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s Yirhich e x e r c i s e f u n c t i o n s i n
that area."(a)
Other formulas
under
[ " r e s p e c t the r u l e s
i n t h e G.D.R. -]
consideration:
and r e g u l a t i o n s
of
the
authorities
11
["respect
[Jrespect
the functions
the a u t h o r i t y
of
of
t h e GoD.Ro
authorities"]
the Government i n East
["respect the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
Germany" ]
of
the
authorities
Germany"]
in
East
2
An a l l - B e r l i n p r o p o s a l m i g h t b e p u t f o r w a r d i n t h e f i r s t
i n s t a n c e i n c l u d i n g removal of the w a l l and f r e e c i r c u l a t i o n i n
t h e whole of 3 e r l i n .
This might a l s o p r o v i d e f o r the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f c e r t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n B e r l i n
a
3*
In connexion with
West B e r l i n :
the
status
and t h e f a c t u a l
situation
a.? T h e s t a t u s s h o u l d l a s t u n t i l r e u n i f i c a t i o n .
n o t h i n g would be s a i d about duration.,
of
Alternatively
b.
The i m p r e s s i o n t h a t West B e r l i n i s b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o a " f r e e c i t y " i n t h e s e n s e of t h e S o v i e t demands must b e
avoided.
c.
E s t a b l i s h m e n t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s would
n o t be e x c l u d e d .
The p r e s e n c e o f t h e E u r o p e a n O f f i c e o f t h e U . N .
o r of s p e c i a l i s e d U.N. a g e n c i e s i n West B e r l i n can be a c c e p t e d
and might be a d v a n t a g e o u s .
/d.
(a)
This w i l l
require
description^
d.
No l i m i t a t i o n o r c o n t r o l o f a c t i v i t i e s i n W e s t B e r l i n
n o t a p p l y i n g e q u a l l y i n E a s t B e r l i n would be a c c e p t a b l e , ,
No
a g r e e m e n t w h i c h w o u l d g i v e a n y e x c u s e f o r S o v i e t o r "GDR"
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n , o r l i m i t e s s e n t i a l freedoms i n , West B e r l i n
would be acceptable..
(Only to be used i f the S o v i e t s r a i s e t h i s
question.,)
e*
T h e r e s h o u l d b e no S o v i e t g u a r a n t e e f o r West B e r l i n ' s
f r e e d o m and v i a b i l i t y w h i c h would p r o v i d e them o r t h e E a s t
Germans w i t h any b a s i
to interfere.
"We s h o u l d a v o i d i n a n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g any l a n g u a g e which m i g h t g i v e t h e S o v i e t Union o r
t h e E a s t Germans a n o b v i o u s p r e t e x t f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n .
I t would
be d e s i r a b l e to get a Soviet pledge not to i n t e r f e r e
and. n o t t o
l e t t h e "GBR" i n t e r f e r e .
U.
S h o u l d t h e S o v i e t s i n s i s t on b r o a d e n i n g t h e s c o p e of
n e g o t i a t i o n s , o t h e r q u e s t i o n s w i l l have to be c o n s i d e r e d .
a.
A p r o p o s a l f o r p l e b i s c i t e i n the whole of Germany,
p r e f e r a b l y p u t f o r w a r d n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g of E a s t - W e s t n e g o t i a t i o n ; ;
b-* A. r e q u e s t t o r e e s t a b l i s h
movement i n Germany.
the principle
of freedom
Co
The F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t s p r o p o s a l c o n c e r n i n g
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h r e e t e c h n i c a l c o m m i s s i o n s .
of
the
[d. Large-scale measures a g a i n s t surprise a t t a c k , for
i n s t a n c e t h e c r e a t i o n o f an i n s p e c t i o n zone r e a c h i n g from t h e
A t l a n t i c to the U r a l s .
However, S o v i e t p r o p o s a l s c o n c e r n i n g
zones with s p e c i a l m i l i t a r y s t a t u s ( e s p e c i a l l y zones free of
atomic weapons) s h o u l d be r e j e c t e d . J
[e.
Nontransfer
of atomic weapons and
rockets:
[The F e d e r a l Government i s o p p o s e d t o any
agreement between the United S t a t e s , the
Kingdom a n d t h e U . S , S . R ]
such
United
0
[British
suggested
response:
We c o u l d n o t a g r e e t o i n c l u d e l i m i t a t i o n s o n n u c l e a r .
and r o c k e t weapons i n t h e " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " b e c a u s e of t h e
i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h i s m i g h t g i v e t h e S o v i e t s an e x c u s e
for i n t e r v e n t i o n .
But t h e F e d e r a l Government might
i s s u e a new d e c l a r a t i o n r e a f f i r m i n g i t s r e n u n c i a t i o n
of t h e m a n u f a c t u r e of n u c l e a r , b i o l o g i c a l , and c h e m i c a l
weapons.
Some E a s t E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s m i g h t a l s o
r e n o u n c e t h e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e s e w e a p o n s .
The U n i t e d
S t a t e s , U n i t e d Kingdom, and S o v i e t Governments might
issue d e c l a r a t i o n s affirming t h e i r intention not to
r e l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l o f n u c l e a r weapons t o g o v e r n m e n t s
not already possessing such weapons.]