PHIS D O C U M E N T
IS T H E
PROPERTY
O F HEM BRITANNIC' MAJESTY'S
GOVERNMENT
T h e circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of.. .Vlfeiqwfg*vrr^£r,^
T O P SECRET
Copy N o , . M r . . . .
C , [61^194.
28th November
^
1961
CABINET
BERLIN
Note by the P r i m e
Minister
T h e s i m p l e s t m e t h o d of e x p l a i n i n g t o t h e C a b i n e t t h e
s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g o u t of m y t a l k s w i t h P r e s i d e n t d e G a u l l e a t t h e
w e e k - e n d is to a s k M i n i s t e r s to r e a d the two attached t e l e g r a m s
t o P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y : t h e f i r s t a f a c t u a l a c c o u n t of t h e m e e t i n g s ,
the second m a k i n g p r o p o s a l s on h o w to deal with the situation.
2.
A l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h P r e s s a n d , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of
Le Figaro, the F r e n c h P r e s s have taken a friendly and constructive
l i n e , the t a l k s , a l t h o u g h v e r y f r i e n d l y , w e r e in effect not v e r y
fruitful.
I t h e r e f o r e attach c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e to M i n i s t e r s
s h o w i n g g r e a t r e t i c e n c e on t h i s s u b j e c t .
M o r e o v e r , it w o u l d b e
p r e m a t u r e to d e s p a i r since P r e s i d e n t de Gaulle, like other g r e a t
An
m e n , n e v e r yieldn t o a r g u m e n t b u t o c c a s i o n a l l y t o f a c t s .
a r g u m e n t w h i c h a p p e a r s to b e r e p e l l e d at t h e m o m e n t m i g h t sink
in later.
H.M.
Admiralty House,
27th N o v e m b e r
S . W . 1.
1961.
TOP SECRET
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
Cypher/OTP
No.
PRISEC
8711 ' ;
November 2 7 , 1 9 6 1
D. 6 . 3 5 p . m . November 27,
1961
IMMEDIATE
TOP-SECRET
Addressed t o Washington ^ t e l e g r a m N o . 8711 of
November 2 7 .
Repeated f o r
i n f o r m a t i o n ( P e r s o n a l f o r Ambassadors)
Paris
Moscow
U . K . D e l . N.A.T.O..
tor-
Bonn
( P e r s o n a l f o r S i r P. Mason)
My i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g
[Immediate t o
all]
c
telegram.
.*
F o l l o w i n g i s f a c t u a l account o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n - between
t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r and m y s e l f and G e n e r a l de G a u l l e ^ a b o u t B e r l i n .
*\ W h i l e P r e s i d e n t de G a u l l e was s t a y i n g a t B i r c h Grove
t h e r j ^ w e r e t h r e e p e r i o d s o f " t a l k s o f w h i c h two were m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d
w i t h B e r l i n . & I I was p r e s e n : a t t h e second o f t h e s e .
2.
-above a l l
P r e s i d e n t . , de. G a u l l e e x p l a i n e d t h a t F r a n c e was c o n c e r n e d
a n d n e r h a n s ..even,^iQre thmi...he.r, B r i t i s h an4,American......
A l l i e s , t o e n s u r e t h a t ^Germany- was t i e d i n t o t h e W e s t . i ^ . F r a n c e
l o o k e d on B e r l i n as one p a r t o f t h i s . p r o b l e m , and n o t i n i t s e l f o f
T
capital J^j^rjance.
cfirrfcempiaig^j^
P oxansgLlpr
Adenauer..mieht^nQw^be^ ready
to
although
;
P r e s i d e n t de' G a u l l e
shed 'fro see. J^r,,,, ^ a p a i i e r . j f i r s ^ - ^ e f o r e . : he
cmlfl- b e j s u r j e ^
c o n c e s s i o n s fro JKQJCJI^j^^
s a t i s f y . t h e ; R-ug,s ians, .
r
t
maximum
enough, t o
6 CLtxJ^^jd^^
oegan t h e A U i e i L , B Q j ^
circumstances he-saw no advantage^in ,ejabjirking-on n e g o t i a t i o n s
t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . r% J y j y i ^ . ^
0
at
.
d a y , , a c c e p t e d the p o n c e s s i o n s , ^ w h i c h w o u l d .he asked, of^jffiemt^ t h e
German gejople w o u l d be l e f t w i t h a sense of' b e t r a y a l . ^ ^ W h a j b e j r e r ^ . . , , . . ,
t h e . , U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e l ^ t e j J ^ K ^ ^ o m ^ ^ g h t ' dp " F r a n c e , a l t h o u g h
npjcprppj)s^
n o t be a p a r t y t o s u c h an a r r a n g e m e n t ' .
JfjrheLGermans
t h e f u t u r e f e e l t h a t a t l e a s t t h e y h a d one f r i e n d
"
"
- " " " " "
TOP SECRET "
would then i n
left
/3.
i n the West.
-
2
­
3.
On the substanceof a possible negotiating position,
I indicated, that a possible formula might^cover:­
dealings with East Germany; .
(i)
( i i ) . f r o n t i e r a . ^ ...
.
( i i i ) l i n k s between Berlin and the Federal Republic;
( i v ) nuclear weapons.
/-President "de Gaulle - f i r s t questioned.' the single -"basis /of such an
. arrangement which he said involved unnecessary concessions to the
^*W3*w^t*,Aw^..^^^
^
/ ........ vBussians-*j^f.H.e agreed that....th,e division^ of Germaajr and the Oder­
Neisse frontier were facts which could not be altered at least for
the time b e i n g s and abc:v4^gb4 cjh^
one day
be reached ^with.^ the,,Russians . w Q3,ut.-^Ml&SMsS&Q,£W5^..,..a.ll more or
l e ^ . ' f a v o u ^ b l e , -to. the 'Russians and there was no need to accept
them unless at the same. time...the.. Russians would accept the
3ituation....in..Berlin...as.,it,.ha(l existed since the War; this was a
^fact favourable .to the J e s t M 4lowever to. raise a l l thefe^que st ions
Would -mean embarking, on';a very wide negotiation and i t was
inaoncjgjiy&big^
in the present
tyjsituationwhen^the
,Rris s ^
their wall i n B e r l i n ,
East G e r i i ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ c i i i g ^
vthrea.teriing^tP, m
E.in^
arguable that^^Jg^sAjalgfet..offer the Ru,ssians a wide negptiation
a t t i t u d e , but
con c ond i t ion tha t ^
thaJEejtt Jgh^
tha t i f the Rus sians
r e^use^ ^J&e^;., wauId-.no^nego^^iig^e^i^all. ' F S x L l £ e French view the
Russlans,,^^
of substance t o the Western point
of view in recent months and the time to negotiate had. therefore
not yet come.
u
!
;
m
u
;
i
i
i,..
We asked President de Gaulle how one could be sure what
o
n
e
w
a
s
n o
p r e p
r
t o
^ B z ^ I ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^
^ ^ ^ ' discuss^ the
matt^
not object to further
soundings,, QjLJih&^Sjto
out by B r i t i s h or
American., o f f i c i a l s - - i n order^to v e r i f y the basis on which
negotiations could begin. $ die accepted.,j h ^ J ^ such
would
now soon get i nto . . s l 2 S t ^ e P . c ^ ^
representatiyej^to^tajke. £art i n .such exploratory exchanges nor
/would
- 2 ­
3.
On the substance of a possible negotiating position, I indicated that a possible formula might cover:­
(i)
dealings j/rith East Geraiany;
( i i ) ^frontlexa;^
j,
U
( i i i ) l i n k s "between Berlin and the Federal Republic;
(iv) nuclear weapons.
'X^PXf.siden\ d e ^ G a ^
an
.arrangement which he said involved unnecessary concessions t o the
Jftissiaris..i&He..agreed ,.£ha:tL..ikh.e.. flivision.of Germany and the Oder­
Neis.se frontier were facts j/hich^could not be altered at least for
the time being and about .whj^h .. an agreement. could perhaps one day
be reached with, -the Ru^
more o r
legs, favourable t o the Russians and t h e r e was n o need to accept
them unless a t z h s same tine, the Russians would accept the
situatiQn,..in ,^
the War; t h i s was a
Jgapt favourable to the.,,West
"However... to raise a l l these cnie s t ions
would mgan embark^rj^on^ a. .ye.iy, wide negotiation and i t was
i r a a Q n c e i v a o l e to. e m b a r k on ..a wide Jiegotiation in the present
tel situation when the Russians were/building their wall in Berlin,
t threatening to, sign .a, p&ace treaty with East Germany ]LDienac,ing,....
F i n l a n d . . a h d i g e . n e r a l l y behaving in aggressive w a y ^ c X t was quite
arguable that tha^lie^^^jnlght,,q,ffpr the Russians a wide negotiation
c o n condition that they firs..t,-changecl this aggressive attitude but
theJasijsj^
i f the Russians
refused,,^the,v^would,,not::.negotiajte at a l l . 'f*bjxj&&
French view the
Rus.slajas.Jiad.JiiadeiJiOiiconceissioris of substance t o the Western point
of view in recent months and the time to negotiate had therefore
not yet come.
fe
s
iar
;
:
it..
We asked President de Gaulle how one could be sure what
'
.........
J*saaasMwiM*ai8^na*"*^to
the. Soviet a t t i t u d o was if. one was not prepared to discuss the
matter with J l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e p X i e ^ ^ a t he would not object to further
soundings of.Ahe,Soviet position being uarried out b y British or
American o f f i c i a l s ' in order , t o verify the b a s i s on. which
S 2 i i a ^ f O n ^ ^ o u l u ' begin.^CH^acc^pted that such soundings would
now, soon-get ;lnt£L^iibstanceQ,L,.He would^^t be prepared for French
representatives t o take part in such exploratory exchanges nor
/would
ne
- 3 ­
would he agree publicly t h a t these could gradually take on the
cha.53^
not^34eo--inconveriient - for the Americans and ourselves since we
were a l ^ a ^ e j c ^ r ^
and disarmament without French participation,,
Gaulle agreed t h a t
the^Ruasjj&ns... could always,...s.quee^JI^st...^erl,m,..but he addecT
5.
^ n ^ i e p l j L J f c ^
"
.....1If e^ in J ^ ^ ^
mor e
t
h
a
t
so.
(He did not
the view t h a t an agreement with
Russians
would, give x & n e y t e A M o r ^ l ^ ^ p ^ J i & J i h e , . M e . s t B e r l i n e r s . j $ H e had no
oT^iecrMQrli'to t.ha - A T h t ^ ^ i i q x ^ Q i v Q f ^ United Nations agenc ies into
Berlin but the United Nations would-not r e a l l y affect the r e a l i t i e
a
c
c
e
p
t
t
h
e
6.
I n . yiew^of, the. - general French a t t i t u d e we did not have a
very d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s ion. a b o u ^ t h ^ j s o s s i b l e elements in an
arrangement. '4ffHowever. President de Gaulle did make the^fol-lov/ing
points:
(
r
(a) thgJD.D.R. should not -be .recognised i n any way.
ft,)..A1.,1. Jshat c j m l d n b j ^
that
one p a r t of Germany was, under t h e r e o n t r o l of the
t
t h e West should re
(b)
w e r e
on record as
s t a t i n g t h a t Berlin was j f f t - a p a r t of the Federal
Republl^-/n^^^
c
p
g
S
ftllihftflffft-^^^Q ^ ^4fi .-£9L!J[%
greeted i n ^ e r l i n ^aj^C^ncellor. a n o ^ g j ^ ; Brandt
was leader of the German S o c i a l i s t Party:
(c)
t h e -idea of an_.agr.ae.ment about nuclear weapons
f or^fiermany,' was. ..a,, gratultQlis. .'.presen.t,...to t h e
r
R u s s i a n s L l ) , J E t ^ j ^ , J ^ ^ d ^ S t a t e s j M D l i c y not to
v s u p p l y nuni\e^.r . ^rjp^/^ip^^o^t-her- countries
But
r
i
r
although. France had no present i n t e n t i o n of
sharing.,nuclear knowledge with the Germans the
;
FreaaotoQ&y^
the case J^pEh^^lt^-sian .j^rmcejms too great^and
/the
-
I
­
t h e R h i n e was t o o c l o s e t o t h e E l b e f o r
France t o g i v e any such b i n d i n g a s s u r a n c e .
7.
As r e g a r d s ,.the ,lmmediate,.,futlur.e . P r e s i d e n t de G a u l l e
;L
1
wished j i b , h e a r D r . Adenauer s views/l^,,J$eanwhile
not s p e c i f i c a l l y object
w h i l e he
t o t h e p r o p o s e d programme o f
did
meetings
F
i n ^ P a r i s . . . n e x t . . . m o n t h , J £ L . 9 - f f £ i g . . 9 r e i g n Ministers
of
the four^estern^GovernmentSj^ihe. m a d e . . i t , p l a i n t h a t t h e French
r e p r e s e i i t a t i v e s , . msuM
- n o t b e ,aQle,,tp^,make j a n y n o s i t i y e
c o n t r i b u t i o n - J o ^ t h e , m e e t i n g s and t h a t he h i m s e l f was
s t r o n g l y ooposed t o n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h t h e R u s s i a n s a t
[Copies sent t o Prime M i n i s t e r ' s
EEEEEEE
TOP SECRET Office]
still
this
sfeg
FROM FOREIGN - OFFICE. TO -WASHINGTON
Cypher/OTP
.
PRISEC
No.8712 ' November 2 7 , 1961
.
D. 6 A 5 . p . m . November 2 7 , 1961
IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
Addressed t o Washington t e l e g r a m No.8712 of November 2 7 ,
Repeated f o r i n f o r m a t i o n P e r s o n a l f o r Ambassador t o : Bonn,
Moscow,
Paris
and U.K. Del N.A.T.O. ( P e r s o n a l f o r S i r P. Mason)
P e r s o n a l f o r Ambassador.
My t e l e g r a m No.8710: B e r l i n .
F o l l o w i n g i s message £p., Pr,.e.sideni,, £^^ w
I
1
' My comments on my c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h General de Gaulle on B e r l i n a r e a s f o l l o w s : -
j t
%
.
$7
1
* On B e r l i n t h e French have, n o t moved a t a l l . ;Their p o s i t i o n
is that^at present^t^
n e g o t i a t i o n could be conducted; i n o t h e r words t h e minimum. S o v i e t
demands a r e g r e a t e r t h a ^
"ag.e.s,.iiot ob.ie.ct.. to.. f . r i r . . 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ l o r a t i o n s by t h e B r i t i s h and American
Ambassa.dor.s,,...in^Moscow f o r m a l l y " t o v e r i f y t h e b a s i s on which a
n e g o . t i a t l c n might .,b,e... possible "f/and h a s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e e x p l o r ­
a t i o n s b e i n g t a k e n w e l l i n t o q u e s t i o n s o f s u b s t a n c e ^The French
.
Amhassador^liowever y.. .wouM^
this. y/De
Gaulle'.s- object,.-is.,in f a c t , t o keep h i s f i n g e r s c l e a n . J i T h i s i s bad
and,makes i t i n d i s p e n s a b l e ,f o r u s t c t r y and make sure t h a t t h e
German Gojernment f u l l y s h a r e t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r our e x p l o r a t i o n s ;
o t h e r w i s e ^ ^ e r e ^ i l l b e t h e b e g i n n i n g of a myth about an AngloAmerican s e l l - o u t .
2. The F r e n c h / d i d n o t , , g i v e the^impr e s s i o n t h a t Adenauer' s l e t t e r
g e n t ; Via" C&st en/s,' had- be^n^s-^ericouraging about ^uvgo^iations' a s "you
had ^g:xp,eiB&ejfe^^
the
p o s i t ion he; h a d ^ ^
the vital
paragraph 1 of your message t o me of November 23 where you s a i d t h a t
Adenauer " i s c l e a r l y i n f a v o u r ""of'' tiego t i d t lofr^" ^ o T ^ a S S s j ^ J A l w U a e
p l a n - f o r an e f f o r t t o c o n c e r t an agreed p o s i t i o n - a t a m e e t i n g of
Western F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r ^ i n December "in P a r i s , i n p r e p a r a t l o i a l f o r '
t a l k s w i t h t h e S o v i e t s e a r l y i n t h e New f e a r , p r o b a b l y a t t h e F o r e i g n
Ministers. l e v e l " .
^^^^^^T^^!^
'
/ 3 . With " r e g a r d
iri
H
ir
r
M
v
:
9K0
3.
With regard-to s u b s t a n c e ,
trutUliJ^^^
omits
2 ­
not without
some
what,, .,t.he,,,G:ermans,v s e e m , now r e a d y t-Q; a c c e p t some o f t
successful
t h e French f e e l ,
^
deal with
(a,) t h e d e g r e e
the Russians,
of de facto
t h e t w o - main... p o i n t s b e i n g : recngnition
O d e r - N e i s s e linew..They a r g u e from t h i s
of, t h e D ...D .R-. a n d ( b ) t h e that
negotiations
would.:ba useless.
1
Fjl^VJjnOljilli il IJL[ jiiww^irjimi:ii, u* '
i)... T h e , m e e t i n g i h November 3 0 , b u t i j ^
not
a
a l l o w t h e .iourney^?fp,e; G a u l l e w i l l
c e r t a i n l y , n e t urge^iidenauer t o s t i ^ ^ t o . , . , ; w h a t , - . h e . a g r e e d , w i t h ypjil?' 2 ^ j o i ^ t r y ,
indir.e.ct.ly -t^
retreats
r
backwa^d.s4 J!^en^f-^^^a..nQi^ I
w
/
doubt
either directly or ;
S o t h e G e r m a n s may g o i f de Gaulle w i l l
willingly
move- -f-r o m - h i s , , p o s i t i o n 5,
then d o j w g d o ? T h e r e a r e o n l y t w o w a y s o f p l a y i n g i t . t o c a r r y on w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e we h a v e i n MndT^^aT^rsl" lhat
One i s
( a )
A meeting-..^.off,ieia^
in- P a a ? 4 s w ^ ^ . ^ o o n ^ 4 ^ t h i s . . p r o b a b l y t h e F r e n c h
jyill,.reserve
(b)
representative
h i s pos i t i o n .
A.jfn^a^4.rtg'.:.of,jf our ;Western F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s i n P a r i s
a&putJDecember^j/lj^cijve"wlTl*probabTy"continuTwith a
negative
line./? ^jmighl^.however.
a
two m e e t i n g s on t h e o u t l i n e s
fcthese
be possible^jt^jigre^
of w h a t - s h o u l d b e
tlae-WesiemjQe^o^
subsequently agreed' t h a t
such n e g o t i a t i o n s
should
take
place.
( c )
Putt.ing,.,ihe^
t o t h e N.A.T.O.
- - m e e t A n g ^ B ^ & G ^ b e r 1 3 ::,l-gfo?he^cjher N . A . T . O . Powers
' w i n b e i n favour of n e g o t i a t i o n and^will b r i n g considerable
....pre s s u r e -^sdriti^^
,
Powers, s h o u l d n o t g o . i n t o t h e d e t a i l
^nsliion^bui-theyJill
i n d i c a t l p n of what
unlikely,
th?t'in
want t o
would be
^SSSLSmSU^sm^
itLwin b e C 7 i t i s
:
conceivable,
though
t h e face of a i l t h i s pressure^^de .Gaulle
might -change h i s mirid^
6. 4 f e o t h g c - p l a n
of t h e n e g o t i a t i n g
'M"follow
-
' ­
something^ke
your
original
i d e a w h i c h we d i s c u s s e d i n o u r t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n a n d h a v e ,a
m e e t i n g - - i n . . - P a ^ i - s ^ f ^ ^ - - - - d e JiauUa^and- m y s e l f
b e a s k e d t o a t t e n d a t s o m e ' s t a g e / 7 A t t h i s . ' .
'
"""T^-SEGRET.....
which- A ^ n a ^ e r ^ u l d
TO...,cQuid^c'pte-ont'
/
with"
Adenauer
- 3­
with^&Jjaulle'aM.t^^
Gauliejto
accept our point
o f - v i e w o B u t "I""do n o t t h i n k w e ' s h a l l s u c c e e d f o r - d e G a u l l e ' s p o l i c y
is,..based n o t on t h e immediate n e e d s of t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n b u t on
' a;.picture of .the f u t u r e of,Franco-German r e l a t i o n s . ^ S i L . . a t l e a s t
h a v i n g Adenauer c o n f r o n t e d - w i t h d e G a u l l e w i l l f o r c e t h e former t o
t a k e a d e f i n i t e l i n e a n d . p r e v e n t ' hin: s o f t e n i n g i t down a s h e c a n
dp.- i n b i l a t e r a l ^ t a l k s - . '' -"And i f d e . G a u l l e i s . . . s t i l l o b s t i n a t e we s h a l l . . .
then--be.,.in. a . . p p , s i t ^
or. n o t t o g o ahead without
him.
I t may b e t h a t
a combination of these
w a y A s ^ t Q - j g a x ,
fJJ!^^tP lel.J3r-.essure
7.
f
M
c w oplans
up i n N.A.T.O.
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meeting of t h e four Western..Heads o f G ^ e r n m e n t
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8. The objections t o . . t h e . . f i r j 5 l ^ j ^ ^
O D i n i o n ^ i n t h e
. w o r l d w i l l b u i l d . .up, J i L j a j s t f a j ^ ^
/from t h e m e e t i n g s "
in P a r i s o f t h e four Jf.est.em^Enreign,..JIinisters a n d o f K.A..T.0.
T h e r e w o u l d b e g r e a t imp i t i e n c e a s t o why n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e n o t a g r e e d
u p o n a n d t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e a l l i e s w i l l b e c o m e , c l e a r . j^We m i g h t
i
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possibly hold
v h e j i ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ e w e r e
t h i s ^ j p o s i t i p n
nowhejie^in^Parls,,
we. c o u l d . a t p n p e . . a n n o u n c e
g e t t i n g
t h e second plan f o r
a n ^ e a r l y j a e e t i n g ^ L V J g o s t e r n . He,a^^, ,pf,, G p v e r n m e n j ^ / o i T t h e ' o t H e F j h a M ^ —
the hcTlding-eM
i n d i c a t e ^ a . i c r ^ i s i ^ a n d obyious^ disagreement and p l a y into. t h e ^ u s s i a n s j . .
T
wayJ^But
h a n d s , ^ e a r e i n ^ a jam e i t h e r
on t h e w h o l e i t might b e
b e t t e r j t o s t a r t b y p l a y i n g " t h i n g s ' ' f r o m the"bottom u p - i . e . through
the j e e t i n g ^ a l r r e a d y planned i n P a ^ i s ^ p I l J e s T p n ^ ^ ^ ^ S - l s and Foreign
M i n i s t e r s a n d t h e n N.A.T.0J^ilt^jaighi^emerge from t h i s p r o c e s s t h a t
we.could.go. ahead w i t h o u t j t h e French b u t without
i n t o open d i s a g r e e m e n t .
9.
I o u g h t t o a d d t h a t we h e r e d o n o t f e e l
agreei; t
having t o force
them
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t Macmahon Act,, f r o m g i v i n g them t o them and anyway h a v e n o
Lof.^doing...so, (de G a u l l e made i t
intention
q u i t e c l e a r , t h a t he..could not
bind
teimself^neyer.....tQ
g i v e n u c l e a r ^ w e a p o n s t o t h e Germans J ^ I t w i l l ,
^ t h e r e f o r e , be n e c e s s a r y , i f t h i s i s a v i t a l . . . p o i n t o f any a g r e e m e n t ,
f o r t h e Germans t o make a, u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e y w i l l n o t
a c c e p t n u c l e a r weapons f r o m anyone ' e x c e p t . , o f c o u r s e , u n d e r t h e
agreed key of t h e cupboard procedure)..
11.
I s h o u l d be v e r y . g r i t e f u l
t o know how y o u f e e l we s h o u l d now
proceed,
[Copies
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sent t o Prime M i n i s t e r s
TOP SECRET Office],