(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/62
Image Reference:0028
(THIS D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H E R B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y ' 3
GOVERNMENT)
SECRET
C . ( 5 3 ) 2 2 8
COPY NO.
fj
7 T H A U G U S T , 1953
CABINET
I S R A E L A N D MIDDLE E A S T D E F E N C E : DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE AMERICANS M e m o r a n d u m b y t h e L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e C o u n c i l On 6th M a y , t h e D e f e n c e C o m m i t t e e r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t , b e f o r e u n d e r ­
taking further negotiations with I s r a e l , we should hold s e c r e t d i s c u s s i o n s with
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t r y t o s e c u r e t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r o u r p o l i c y ( D . (53) 8 t h M e e t ­
ing, Item 3).
2.
The Defence
Committee:­
(i)
A g r e e d t h a t our a i m should be to h e l p I s r a e l build up h e r
a r m e d s t r e n g t h , not only for h e r own d e f e n c e , but a l s o
a s a contribution to a settled situation in the Middle
East.
( i i )
I n v i t e d t h e M i n i s t e r of S t a t e , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e
M i n i s t e r of D e f e n c e , t o a r r a n g e f o r t h i s p o l i c y t o b e
explained to the United States G o v e r n m e n t and to s e e k
t h e i r s u p p o r t in providing the a r m s and e q u i p m e n t t h a t
' I s r a e l would r e q u i r e .
X
3,
The attached draft despatch, instructing H. M. Ambassador at
Washington to a p p r o a c h the United States G o v e r n m e n t , has accordingly been
p r e p a r e d b y t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f .
Owing
to vacation a r r a n g e m e n t s , the Defence Committee is not at p r e s e n t meeting,
a n d I s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , b e g l a d t o h a v e t h e v i e w s of m y c o l l e a g u e s i n t h e C a b i n e t
on t h i s draft.
F o r e i g n O f f i c e , S . W . 1.
7TH A U G U S T , 1953.
DRAFT DESPATCH TO H.M. AMBASSADOR A T
WASHINGTON
H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t have for s o m e t i m e had under c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n h o w t h e d e s i r e of t h e I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t f o r c l o s e m i l i t a r y c o - o p e r a t i o n
w i t h t h e W e s t c a n b e f i t t e d i n t o A l l i e d p l a n s f o r t h e d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t
against Soviet a g g r e s s i o n .
In r e s p o n s e t o a n a p p r o a c h b y t h e I s r a e l
G o v e r n m e n t , t h e y d e s p a t c h e d a n e x p l o r a t o r y M i l i t a r y M i s s i o n to I s r a e l in the
a u t u m n of 1 9 5 2 ,
After studying the M i s s i o n ' s r e p o r t , H e r M a j e s t y ' s Govern-"
m e n t a r e considering how to p u r s u e the m a t t e r with the I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t ; but
before doing so t h e y w i s h to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t with the United States Government
about the policy to be adopted.
2.
T h e d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t , a s f a r t o t h e N o r t h a n d E a s t a s
p o s s i b l e , w i l l r e q u i r e f a c i l i t i e s in I s r a e l both in p e a c e a n d in w a r .
The extent
of t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s w i l l d e p e n d o n t h e o u t c o m e of o u r p r e s e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h
gypt.
i n b r o a d t e r m s w e s h a l l n e e d i n w a r t h e u s e of r o a d a n d r a i l
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , p o r t s a n d a i r f i e l d s in I s r a e l , a r e q u i r e m e n t w h i c h m a y e n t a i l
s o m e d e v e l o p m e n t in p e a c e .
We s h a l l a l s o n e e d facilities in p e a c e for the
s t o r a g e of o i l a n d p o s s i b l y of e q u i p m e n t i n I s r a e l , a n d f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t i n
w a r of a m a i n t e n a n c e a r e a , i n c l u d i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n of a c c o m m o d a t i o n , l a b o u r
and transport vehicles.
Should we fail to obtain the b a s e facilities which we
r e q u i r e in E g y p t , o u r r e q u i r e m e n t s in I s r a e l - both in p e a c e a n d in w a r - w i l l
undoubtedly need further consideration.
E
3.
We a l s o h o p e t h a t I s r a e l ' s a r m e d f o r c e s , w h i c h have a l r e a d y p r o v e d
t h e i r fighting v a l u e , could be developed and u s e d in such a w a y a s to m e e t the
n e e d s of A l l i e d s t r a t e g y for t h e w h o l e M i d d l e E a s t a r e a ,
4.
It m u s t be r e c o g n i s e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t a n y a r r a n g e m e n t s with I s r a e l on
t h e f o r e g o i n g l i n e s w o u l d , u n l e s s m o s t c a r e f u l l y h a n d l e d , r u n t h e r i s k of a l i e n ­
ating the neighbouring A r a b States.
T h e c o - o p e r a t i o n of t h e s e A r a b S t a t e s ,
both in p r o v i d i n g f a c i l i t i e s for A l l i e d t r o o p s a n d in building up t h e i r own f o r c e s ,
r e m a i n s i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o a n y p l a n s f o r t h e d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
Any
a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h I s r a e l m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , b e s u c h a s t o e v o k e t h e m i n i m u m of
hostility from the A r a b States.
5.
While t h e r e is no doubt t h a t the I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t a r e , in p r i n c i p l e ,
r e a d y to m a k e the contribution we hope for, t h e y will r e q u i r e certain help and
w i l l h a v e c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s a n d o b j e c t i v e s of t h e i r o w n .
T h e y could not,
without o u t s i d e h e l p , finance t h e e x t e n s i v e c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t r e q u i r e d for the
i m p r o v e m e n t of t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of w o r k s h o p s a n d
o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s : a n d t h e y w i l l s e e k t o include in t h e p r o g r a m m e i t e m s w h i c h a r e
p r i m a r i l y of e c o n o m i c a n d n o t of s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e .
They will, naturally,
w i s h t o s e i z e the o p p o r t u n i t y f u r t h e r to i m p r o v e t h e i r own a r m e d f o r c e s a n d in
s o doing t h e i r m o t i v e will be a s m u c h to m a k e t h e m s e l v e s m o r e powerful in
r e l a t i o n to t h e i r A r a b neighbours a s to provide a g a i n s t a possible Soviet a t t a c k .
F i n a l l y , t h e y w i l l e x p e c t t o b e t a k e n i n t o t h e c o n f i d e n c e of t h e A l l i e s a b o u t t h e
l a t t e r ' s p l a n s f o r t h e d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
6.
But t h e I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t a r e in no p o s i t i o n t o i n s i s t on t h e i r own
p o i n t of v i e w w h e r e t h a t d i f f e r s f r o m t h e p l a n s a n d w i s h e s of t h e " W e s t e r n P o w e r s ,
upon w h o m I s r a e l is dependent financially and e c o n o m i c a l l y .
Both h e r i n t e r n a l
a n d f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e b u d g e t s r e q u i r e o u t s i d e h e l p if t h e y a r e t o b e b a l a n c e d ,
a n d s h e d e p e n d s o n W e s t e r n s o u r c e s of s u p p l y f o r t h e e q u i p m e n t of h e r a r m e d
forces.
7.
I n s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s i o n s of m i l i t a r y c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s
it will t h e r e f o r e be our a i m to seek the I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t s a g r e e m e n t t o : ­
(a)
giving the A l l i e s the facilities t h e y r e q u i r e for the d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t .
D e t a i l s of t h e facilities r e q u i r e d cannot be finally defined until t h e o u t c o m e of t h e A n g l o - E g y p t i a n n e g o t i a t i o n s is known. (b)
8.
m a k i n g a v a i l a b l e f o r m a t i o n s for e m p l o y m e n t outside
I s r a e l a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n s f o r t h e d e f e n c e of t h e
M i d d l e E a s t a n d i n t h e l i g h t of p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s
existing at the t i m e .
I n r e t u r n v/e m u s t b e p r e p a r e d t o o f f e r :.-
(a)
t o e x a m i n e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s e c u r i n g f o r I s r a e l t h e
financial help required to develop such base and other
f a c i l i t i e s a s we c o n s i d e r n e c e s s a r y in p r e p a r a t i o n for
w a r , which would not o t h e r w i s e be provided;
(b)
to e x a m i n e s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y I s r a e l ' s r e q u e s t s for the
a r m s and equipment n e c e s s a r y to enable her to play
her correct role;
(c)
to give a n a s s u r a n c e that I s r a e l will be given a s m u c h
i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e p r o g r e s s of o u r d e f e n c e p l a n n i n g f o r
the a r e a a s the other Middle E a s t States.
9.
We do not w i s h t o d i c t a t e t o the I s r a e l G o v e r n m e n t how s u c h r e s o u r c e s
of t h e i r o w n a s t h e y c a n m a k e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i r a r m e d
f o r c e s should be divided b e t w e e n t h e i r n a v y , a r m y a n d a i r f o r c e .
We should
c l e a r l y b e r u n n i n g o u r h e a d s a g a i n s t a b r i c k w a l l if w e a c t i v e l y d i s c o u r a g e d
t h e m f r o m t h e i r a i m , w h i c h w a s d e c l a r e d t o t h e M i l i t a r y M i s s i o n , of a b a l a n c e d
f o r c e . V/e c o n s i d e r , h o w e v e r , t h a t s u c h W e s t e r n h e l p a s c a n b e g i v e n f o r t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of I s r a e l s f o r c e s s h o u l d in f a c t be c o n c e n t r a t e d m a i n l y on t h e
b u i l d i n g u p of h e r a i r f o r c e , f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : ­
f
(a) t h e g r e a t e s t d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e
d e f e n c e of t h e M i d d l e E a s t i s i n t h e a i r ;
(b)
v
(c)
I s r a e l can provide better technical support for a i r
f o r c e s t h a n c a n a n y o t h e r M i d d l e E a s t c o u n t r y ;
i n t h e e v e n t of w a r w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e A r a b
countries m i g h t be l e s s reluctant to see I s r a e l ' s
air forces
operating over their territories than her
land f o r c e s .
10.
I t i s d e s i r a b l e t h a t w e s h o u l d c o n c e r t a l l m a j o r m a t t e r s of M i d d l e
E a s t policy with the United S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t , w h o m we a r e anxious to c o m m i t
t o t h e d e f e n c e of t h a t a r e a , a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y o u t l i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h s 7 ,
8 a n d 9 a b o v e i s in a n y c a s e not one w h i c h H e r M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t could
afford to execute alone.
We t h e r e f o r e wish to a s c e r t a i n whether the United
S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t a r e b r o a d l y in a g r e e m e n t w i t h it.
11.
Your E x c e l l e n c y should now, t h e r e f o r e , in close c o - o p e r a t i o n with
t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t Staff M i s s i o n , a p p r o a c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t on t h e
l i n e s s e t forth and d i s c o v e r h o w far t h e y a r e in a g r e e m e n t with t h e p o l i c y
p r o p o s e d ; a n d to what extent t h e y would be p r e p a r e d to a s s i s t and s u p p o r t u s
in i t .
It i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e f a c t of y o u r d i s c u s s i o n s s h o u l d r e m a i n a c l o s e
secret, even from the Israelis.
12.
I a m a w a r e that the United States G o v e r n m e n t will not e a s i l y be
c o n v i n c e d of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r t h i s p o l i c y .
T h e y will be reluctant to see the
West identified yet m o r e closely with Israel; and they m a y well consider that
they have already helped, and a r e helping, that country s finances m o r e than
f
10 J enough.
T o t h i s , o u r a n s w e r m u s t b3 t h a t f a c i l i t i e s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n I s r a e l
w i l l b e a m i l i t a r y n e c e s s i t y i n c a s e of w a r a n d m u s t b e p r e p a r e d b e f o r e h a n d ; t h a t
t h e r e is no r e a s o n why a n y a r r a n g e m e n t r e a c h e d with I s r a e l should b e c o m e
public or r e a c h A r a b e a r s ; and that we a r e not suggesting fresh grants to Israel­
but m e r e l y t h a t e x i s t i n g a n d f o r e s e e a b l e future g r a n t s should be p a r t l y e a r m a r k e d
for the facilities r e f e r r e d to above.
13.
I a m s e n d i n g c o p i e s of t h i s d e s p a t c h t o H e r M a j e s t y ' s A m b a s s a d o r a t
T e l A v i v a n d t h e H e a d of t h e B . M . E . O .