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HIS DOCUMENT I S T H E PROPERTY O F HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the War Cabinet-
March 1945.
Copy No. 6 2
SECRET. W.M. (45)
30th Conclusions.
WAR CABINET 30 (45).
CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Cabinet War Room on Wednesday, Hth March, 1945, at 12 noon. Present:
The Right Hon. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. ATTLEE, M.P., The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.,
Lord President of the Council.
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JOHN ANDERSON, The Right Hon. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,
M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Minister of Labour and National
Service.
The. Right Hon. OLIVER LYTTELTON, . The Right Hon. HERBERT MORRISON,
M.P., Minister of Production. M.P., Secretary of State for the Home" Department and Minister of Home Security. The Right Hon. LORD WOOLTON, "
Minister of Reconstruction.
;
The following were also present I
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT CRANBORNE, The Right Hon. LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Lord Privy Seal.
Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir JAMES GRIGG, The Right Hon. Sir ARCHIBALD
SINCLAIR, Bt., M.P., Secretary of
M.P., Secretary of State for War.
State for Air.
The Right Hon. Sir STAFFORD CRIPPS, The Right Hon. R. S. HUDSON, M.P.,
Minister . of
Agriculture
and
K.C., M.P., Minister of Aircraft
Fisheries.
Production.
The Right Hon. LORD LEATHERS, Colonel the Right Hon. J . J .
LLEWELLIN, M.P., Minister of Food,
Minister of W
Transport.
'
The Right Hon. BRENDAN BRACKEN, The Right Hon. RICHARD LAW, M.P.,
: M.P., Minister of Information.
Minister of State.
The Right HOn. LORD CHERWELL, Pay­
master-General.
a r
Secretariat :
Mr.
Sir
Minute No.
1
Food
NORMAN BROOK.
GILBERT LAITHWAITE.
CONTENTS.
Subject.
Page
186
-
World Supply Situation. United Kingdom Stock Levels. Liberated Areas. ' ;
Germany
. ....
,
...
....
189
. Suggested Declaration to the German people.
B
Food.
World Supply
Situation.
.
,
1
-t
1. The War Cabinet had before them—
(i) Memoranda by the Minister of Food (W.P. (45) 109, 130
and'158) on the prospective world shortage of food
" in1945.
'
(ii) A Memorandum by the Minister of War Transport (W.P.
(45) 145) on *v proposed Anglo-American survey of the
level of United Kingdom stocks of food and raw
materials.
(iii) Telegrams* which had passed between President Roosevelt
and the Prime Minister about the supply of food for
liberated; areas in North-West Europe.
(iv) A Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries and the Minister of Food (W.P. (45) 36) on
the post-war contribution of British agriculture to the
- saving of foreign exchange.
The War Cabinet first discussed the prospective general
shortage of food supplies.
The Minister of Food said that, for the reasons stated in his
Memoranda, 1945 would be a critical year for food. Of the chief
foods only wheat would be available in abundance; and the diffi­
culties of the supply situation could be illustrated by the position
in regard to meat. There was a prospective deficit of 1,800,000 tons
between world requirements and supplies of meat. y A ' few weeks
ago he had hoped that this deficit could be bridged, in agreement
with the United States authorities, by some reduction in-standards
of consumption in the United States and some reductionin United
Kingdom stocks. The most recent information, however, suggested
that the War Food Administration were unwiRing to contemplate
any further cuts in United States consumption, and had recom­
mended to the Combined Food Board that during the second quarter
of 1945 no meat whatever should be exported from the United
States, either for the United Kingdom or for the liberated areas.
Points made in discussion were : ­
(d) The Prime Minister said that, in the circumstances disclosed
by the Minister of Food, we should defer fulfilment of our recent
offer to supply 25,000 tons of corned beef to Russia.
(b) Australia and New Zealand were supplying substantial
quantities of meat to United States Forces in the Pacific. It was
true that the meat supplies which we were now obtaining from the
United States were about one-third more than those which they were
drawing from the Southern Dominions: but this need hot prevent
us from making full use of the argument that, if the United States
maintained their view that they could supply no meat to this
country in the second quarter of the year, we could not continue
to go without the meat supplies which they were now drawing from
Australia and New Zealand.
'
(c) The United States authorities should be pressed to review
their current rates of food consumption both for the Armed Forces
and for the civil population. The supplies per head for United
States troops were far in excess of British scales. It was
estimated that the annual meat supplies for the United States
Forces Would provide 450 lbs. per, head as compared with about
300 lbs. for British troops. In terms of calories per day the average
figures for total civilian food consumption in the United States was
3,200 as compared with 3,000 for the; civilian population in this
country.
The Prime Minister, in summing up this part of the discussion,
said that at this stage of the war the maintenance of minimum
scales of food supply should, if need be, take priority over the needs
of military operations. I t was clear that we were facing a situation
of grave shortage, which would be aggravated if the Americans
* Nos. 710 m4rX12 from President Roosevelt.
No. 902 from the Prime Minister^
187
W.M. 30 (45).
failed to make their contribution by an early reduction in.the level
of their food; consumption. There were indications that the State
Department and the Foreign Economic Administration were dis­
posed to take a different view of this matter from the War Food
A*huini tratibn in United States; and it was desirable that an
approach should now be made to the United States Government
a t the highest level to impress on them the seriousness of the situation
and the need for early economies in their levels of food consumption.
Discussion then turned on the proposal, which had been put
forward at the Crimea Conference, for an Anglo-American enquiry
into the level of stocks of food and raw materials in the United
Kingdom.
The Minister of War Transport said that the position had
changed since his memorandum (W.P. (45) 145) was circulated to
the War Cabinet. The Americans now recognised that, so far as
food was concerned, the problem had become one of supply rather
than shipping; and within the last few days a committee had been
appointed, in Washington to consider, at a high level, what
reductions could be made in current rates of food consumption and
to study the food supply situation as a whole. It would also deal
with the question of United Kingdom stocks. In these circumstances
the Americans were no longer proposing to send a representative
to this country to hold a preliminary investigation into United
Kingdom stock levels in consultation with the interested Depart­
ments of His Majesty's Government.
The Prime Minister said that this change in the situation
would affect the arrangements which we should make for co­
operation in this enquiry. As it was now recognised that the
problem was mainly one of supply, not of shipping, he thought
it would be more appropriate that the matter should be handled
by the Minister of Production and the Minister of Food. The most
convenient course would be for these two Ministers, possibly
accompanied by the Paymaster-General, to pay an early visit to
Washington.
The War Cabinet then discussed the supply of food-stuffs for
liberated areas in North-Western Europe.
The Secretary of State for War said that deliveries of civil
affairs supplies to North-Western Europe were likely to fall behind
schedule. Supplies were already about three weeks late in reaching
United States ports for shipment. If shortages developed, they
would have to be met either by reducing the ration for these areas
or by further inroads into United Kingdom stocks. For June and
July a total of 772,000 tons had been allocated, as against total
requirements for that period of 1,245,000 tons; and there could
be no certainty that even the reduced allocation would be delivered
in accordance with schedule.
s
United
Kingdom
Stock Levels.
(Previous
Eeference: '.
W.M.(45)15th
Conclusions,
Minute 4.)
Liberated
Areas.
(Previous
Eeference;
W.M.(45)29th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
In discussion it was pointed out that the estimate of total
requirements included substantial provision for the supply of food­
stuffs to Germany; and the suggestion was made that this provision
might be reduced. On the other hand, it was emphasised that part
of these supplies for Germany were required for feeding Allied
nationals who had been transferred into Germany from occupied
territories.
There was general agreement that it would be impracticable
to meet from United Kingdom stocks any substantial part of the
deficit between requirements and supplies for liberated areas.
Stocks of food-stuffs in this country were nearing the point agreed
between ourselves and the Americans as the minimum level required
to maintain efficient distribution. Even if we were prepared to
accept the risk, of reducing our stocks, say, 10 per cent, below that
level, the supplies thus obtained would make no appreciable
contribution towards the needs of the liberated areas. I t must be
brought home to the United States Government that, unless there
[29799-4]
B
2
were some reduction in the level of food consumption in the United
States, the situation could be met only by reducing supplies for the
United States Forces or for the liberated areas.
The War Cabinet were reminded that arrangements had been
made for a debate to be held in the House of Commons early in
the following week on the supply position in the liberated areas.
The Lord President of the Council said that, in replying to this
debate, he could not give an assurance, as he had hoped to be able
to do, that the prospects for supplies over the next few months were
reasonably satisfactory if, as the Secretary of State for War had
said, we believed that even in this early period supplies from the
United States would, in fact, fall behind schedule. Further, it
seemed desirable that a clear public warning should be given that
serious shortages of food were likely to develop during the summer
months. If, however, the Prime Minister was proposing to
communicate with President Roosevelt about the food supply
position as a whole, it might be inexpedient that a public statement
of this kind should be made in the House of Commons until
President Roosevelt had had a reasonable opportunity for
considering the Prime Ministers communication.
It was agreed that the Leader of the House of Commons should
explore the possibility of deferring for a few days the forthcoming
debate on supplies for liberated areas.
The conclusions of the War Cabinet were as follows:—­
(1) The Minister of Production and the Minister of Food
should submit, in the light of the discussion, material
on which the Prime Minister might base a telegram to
President Roosevelt. This, while related to the specific
question of meeting S.H.A.E.F.'s requirements for civil
affairs supplies in liberated areas, would express the
views of His Majesty's Government on the general
questions which had been dealt with in the War
Cabinets discussion of the prospective world shortage
of food.
(2) The Minister of Production and the Minister of Food
should proceed .to Washington at an early stage to
discuss means of meeting the threatened shortage of
food; and it should be arranged that these discussions
would cover the enquiry into United Kingdom stock
levels which had been suggested by the Americans at the
Crimea Conference.
The Prime Minister would consider whether the
Paymaster-General should be associated with these
discussions in Washington. The Minister of War
Transport could go out at a later stage if shipping
questions arose.
(3) The Lord President of the Council should take the oppor­
tunity afforded by the forthcoming debate on supplies
to liberated areas to make a statement in the House of
Commons about the gravity of the food situation
generally.
(4) The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries was authorised
to communicate' the main facts of the situation to
County War Agricultural Executive Committees;, and
also to stress the need for maintaining food production
in this country in the appeal which he was proposing
to make for volunteers to help in this year's harvest.
(5) A decision regarding the suggested communication to
Dominion Governments of the information contained
in W P . (45) 109 should be deferred until a reply had
been received to the telegram which the Prime Minister
proposed to send to President Roosevelt (conclusion (1)
above).
Germany.
Suggested
Declaration
.tp the German
People.
(Previous
Reference:
W.M.(45)26th
Conclusions,
Minute 3.)
2. The Prime Minister read out to the War Cabinet the draft
of a telegram which he was proposing to send to President
Roosevelt on the possibility of issuing a warning to the German
people about the effects of continued resistance.
The object of this declaration was to make it clear to the
German people that prolonged resistance would increase the risk
of widespread famine in Germany after their final surrender. The
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had pointed out that such a
declaration might increase the risk that the Germans would seek
to conserve their existing supplies of food by reducing the rations
of prisoners of war and other Allied nationals now in Germany.
There was also some danger that,such a declaration might appeaf
to imply that, if the Germans surrendered at an early date, the
United Nations would see to it that no serious food shortage
developed'in Germany. This last point might be met by amending
the declaration so as to make it clear that Germany must in any
event suffer a very grave food shortage, which would develop into
famine conditions if resistance were prolonged.
The Prime Minister said that, in sending the draft declaration
to President Roosevelt, he would make clear the disadvantages as
well as the advantages of issuing such a declaration.
Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
14th March, 1945.
M CIRCULATION ' W.M.(U5) 30TH CONCLUSIONS l h t h March, 19U5 PARLIAMENT.
R e f l a t i o n on
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
by
M r . R . R . S t o k e s , MJ*.
THE PRIME MINISTER r e f e r r e d t o the remarks made
by Mr. R.R. S t o k e s , M.P. i n t h e c o u r s e o f a speech on
t h e p r e v i o u s day i n t h e debate on t h e Army E s t i m a t e s .
Mr. S t o k e s had s a i d t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r and t h e
M i n i s t e r of P r o d u c t i o n had c o n s i s t e n t l y " l i e d " t o t h e
House about the tank programme.
Mr. Speaker, when h i s
a t t e n t i o n was c a l l e d t o t h e p o i n t o f order i n v o l v e d ,
had s a i d t h a t he had not heard t h i s remark, and had
added ( i n t h e Prime M i n i s t e r ' s v i e w
injudiciously)
t h a t he was not s o r r y when Mr. S t o k e s ' speech had come
t o an end.
T h i s had g i v e n r i s e t o some f u r t h e r p r o t e s t s
by Mr. Aneurin Bevan, M.P.
The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t he was not prepared
t o l e t Mr. S t o k e s ' remark p a s s w i t h o u t c h a l l e n g e ; , and
he had asked t h e Chief Whip t o enquire when i t would
be c o n v e n i e n t t h a t he s h o u l d ' r e f e r t o t h e m a t t e r i n t h e
course o f t h a t d a y ' s p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e House of Commons.
L a t e r i n t h e meeting a message was r e c e i v e d from
the Chief Whip t o the e f f e c t t h a t i t would be convenient
i f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r made h i s s t a t e m e n t
immediately
a f t e r Q u e s t i o n s t h a t day.
The Prime M i n i s t e r i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would make a
s t r o n g p r o t e s t and i n v i t e Mr.' S t o k e s ' t o withdraw
h i s remarks^
1^
Other M i n i s t e r s s a i d t h a t t h e y would ­
make a s p e c i a l p o i n t of b e i n g on t h e f r o n t bench a t
the time when the Prime M i n i s t e r was p r o p o s i n g t o
make h i s
statement.
,N0 CIRCULATION
W.M. (U5) 30TH CONCLUSIONS.
11+th March, 1945
THE PRIME MINISTER said, t h a t he had seen r e p o r t s
o f a s t r i k e among members o f t h e Women's Land Army
a s a r e s u l t of t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e y must be e x c l u d e d
from t h e arrangements f o r t h e grant o f war g r a t u i t i e s
t o members of t h e C i v i l Defence S e r v i c e s .
Such a c t i o n
was not l i k e l y t o e n l i s t p u b l i c sympathy f o r t h e i r
claims.
The War Cabinet were informed t h a t t h e numbers
i n v o l v e d i n t h i s s t r i k e were v e r y s m a l l .
The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t he would not e x c l u d e
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f making some c o n c e s s i o n s t o the
Women's Land Army, once t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n g r a t u i t i e
f o r t h e C i v i l D e f e n c e S e r v i c e s had d e c r e a s e d .
What
he had i n mind were such c o n c e s s i o n s a s a s p e c i a l
a l l o w a n c e o f c l o t h i n g coupons on d i s c h a r g e ,
p e r m i s s i o n t o r e t a i n a r t i c l e s of uniform.
and