(c) crown copyright
Catalogue Reference:cab/66/4/43
Image Reference:0001
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC M AJEST Y'S GOVERNMENT
TO
BE
KEPT
U N D E R
LOCK
AND
KEY.
It is requested that special care may be t a k e n to
ensure t h e secrecy of this document.
... j jPkg
m
A
t
S E C R E T . C0.Y" NO -
W.P. (40) 13.
r
f /
I
WAR CABINET. DESPATCH OF FORCES TO NORWEGIAN PORTS. Note by the Secretary. -
By direction of the Prime Minister I circulate herewith a Memorandum prepared in the War Offiee. In view of the highly secret character of the Memorandum it is requested that all copies may bereturned at the conclusion of the meeting of the War Cabinet at which it is considered. (Signed)
E.E. BRIDGES, Seoretary. Richmond Terrace, S W . 1 , 10th January, 1940. THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OP H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
TO B E
KEPT
UNDER
LOCK
AND
GOVERNMENT
KEY.
I t is requested t h a t special c a r e m a y be t a k e n to
e n s u r e t h e secrecy of this d o c u m e n t .
J
C R
E
T.
LP.(40) 13.
WAR OABIMET.
DESPATCH OP FORGES TO NORWEGIAN PCRTS.
Memorandum b y
1.
At
the meeting
the Secretary
of
of
State
consultation
with his
of
to
Shipping,
plans
and t o
for
the
submit
t h e War
Office.
t h e War C a b i n e t
on 3 r d
f o r War w a s r e q u e s t e d , ,
Service
arrange
for
oceupation
a report
( a ) W h a t w o u l d b e
Stavanger,
soon
in
and t h e
the preparation
of
as
colleagues
of
Bergen,
as p o s s i b l e ,
icanediately
January,
Minister
detailed
and
Trondheim
showing:­
involved
and
( b ) What m i g h t b e i n v o l v e d a t a s u b s e q u e n t
in the above o p e r a t i o n s .
In particular,
the
earliest
2.
late
The p l a n s
which w i l l
be
advanced for
regarding
an e a r l y
on which t h e
for
the
forces
*f
involved,
t h e War O f f i c e
was r e q u e s t e d
forces
despatch
immediately
these
report
date
as
c o u l d "be r e a d y
the military
a r e now
t o be a b l e to
and t h e
date,
te
to
sail.
ferces
sufficiently
i n f o r m £he War
by which t h e y could
Cabinet
be
despatched.
3 .
The f o l l o w i n g
force
would be
Force Headquarters
Five
infantry
and
Signals.
battalions.
One F i e l d C o m p a n y , R o y a l
Ancillary
The t o t a l
men o f
required:-
Engineers.
personnel.
strength
whom a p p r o x i m a t e l y
of
"the a b o v e
3,200
are
force
is
infantry.
some
3,500
4.
use
The r o l e
of
of-the
the n a v a l
force
and a i r
would.tee
facilities
to
at
deny
to
Bergen,
the
enemy
Stavanger,
the
and
T r o n d h e im.
5.
The
following
would he
(
H.Q.
Force.
I
Two i n f a n t r y
(
Small
Bergen
the
general
battalions.
detachment
( Two i n f a n t r y
Stavanger ( Royal
6.
Detailed
Force
are being
departments
were
taken
earliest
concerned.
at
any
battalion.
regarding
the
time p r i o r
the
leave
The h o l d i n g
the
in
despatch
to
despatch
for
Stavanger
c o u l d he
evening
a certain
as
the
force
must be
emphasised
of
the
the
noon on 1 5 t h January,
force
so l o n g
of
conjunction with
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i s
the
of
decision
to
The r e m a i n d e r
U n i t e d Kingdom by
necessary
If
time by which
16th January.
Engineers. m a d e b y t h e War O f f i c e
embarked r e a d y t o
the
infantry
arrangements
Engineers.
battalions.
Detachment Royal
T r o n d h e i m One
initial-dispositions:­
could
the
Force
the
he
evening
embarked -ready t o
17th
amount
ef
remains at
the
of
leave '
January.
rolling
such
stock
short
is
notice
to
move.
7.
It
vehicles
with
the
h a v e had to b e
reliance
making
is
force
reduced
the
to
purchases,
Norwegian h o s p i t a l
will
and t h a t
therefore
continual
be
it
the
of hiring
to
co-operation
carry
of
not p o s s i b l e
administrative
transport,
Once
out
the
its
local
the
rale
civil
to
send
destination
of b i l l e t i n g ,
and o f
force
only
and
any
services
At each
the p o s s i b i l i t y
accommodation.
able
is
a b a r e minimum.
b e i n g p l a c e d upon
local
that
of
using
has landed
if
it
assured, of
military
authorities.
Finally
organised
to
it
must be
effect
realised
a landing
that
against
no p a r t
of
opposition.
the
...
force
is
SUBSEQUENT IMPLICATIONS..
8.
There remains
involved
size
at
of
the
the
date
in
forces
sent
initially
governed
to
is
it
estimated might
climatic
and t h e
spring.
melting
of
will
inadequate
example,
troops
the
t o make
order
of
are
carry
will
Moreover,
the
certain
9.
neoessary
number o f
Sweden
in the
for
the
Germans o r
for
the A l l i e s
great
for
importance
Germany,
forces
most
the
180;
at
it
the
as
is
three
they might
aerodromes
in
of
it
is
likely
is
For
not
"additional
to be
could not
units
of
at
continue
In order
would
to"
require
i n N o r w a y we
having
to
If
the major
case
If
possible
that
ports might
would
as p o s s i b l e
forces
parachute
the
operations
a base.
achieve
the
these
two b a t t a l i o n s
b o t h on moral
this
to
transport.
the A l l i e s .
to undertake
and
now
vehicles.
position
we o u g h t ,
own i n t e r e s t s ,
in W.P.(39)
these
the
now a l l o t t e d .
of
mobility
which
between
conditions
reliance
provided
military
for
it
three
attack
prevail
role
or p o s s i b l y
tactical
enemy
possible,
forecast
The
e a c h of t h e
our d i s p o s a l
but
be
them under
exposed
at
complete
By u n d e r t a k i n g
place
the
become
one
to
movement
required,
an e x t r a
of
weather
out
an a c c u r a t e
to
against
likely
information
be p l a c e d upon l o c a l l y
possess
a
to
would be
each port.
to
which
might
o p e r a t i line.
scale
be brought
areas
On t h e
that
the
snow make f r e e
larger
possible
by
these
When,however,
the
landings.
be
largely
conditions
be
of w h a t
a subsequent
ports
is
question
declare
she
herself
declared
operation
situation
assume
herself
of
become u n t e n a b l e .
before
our
The
d o a s much damage
being
our
outlined
Sweden d e c l a r e d
be t o
herself
g r o u n d s and i n
Trondheim would
the
might
withdrawn.
to
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO AN INCREASED
COMMITMENT.
10.
I t may a l s o
make c e r t a i n
possible
present
prove d e s i r a b l e
changes i n
changes,
the role
t h o u g h not
operations,
should
The c h a n g e s m i g h t
(a)
the
increased,
upon t h e
( b )
the force
the extent
of
an a d d i t i o n
for
( c )
would
larger
area of
deny t h e
of
country
aerodrome
the force
depending
Moreover,
required.
at
involve
Bergen.
have examined t h e
this project,
to
p o i n t would have t o
at the t i m e .
Staff
its
entail
the increase
of
for
it
i s not
full
possible
e s t i m a t e w h a t d e m a n d s may b e made o n t h e Army
this
purpose.
We m i g h t h a v e t o y i e l d
increase
the A l l i e d
t h e d a n g e r o f German
1940.
this
this
of
to the r o l e
of
the
from p r e v e n t i n g
t h e N o r t h e r n B a r r a g e may
w h i c h Norway w o u l d be
1. J a n u a r y ,
to
these
consideration.
o r g a n i s a t i o n w o u l d be
the Chiefs
implications
to
at
circumstances
The l a y i n g
Until
Since
a considerably
a considerable
and
relevant
as d i s t i n c t
requir-ed merely to
enemy,
forces,
to
S t a v a n g e r may b e r e q u i r e d
enemy.
controlling
than i s
strictly
date
be:­
by t h e R . A . P .
u s e by t h e
of the
be t a k e n i n t o
The a e r o d r o m e a t
use
at a l a t e r
to
the
likely
forces
strong
pressure
t o p u t on us
supporting.her
attack.
to
against
be