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C.(54) 276
27th A u g u s t , 1954
CABINET
A L T E R N A T I V E S TO THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE
COMMUNITY
M e m o r a n d u m b y the S e c r e t a r y of State for F o r e i g n A f f a i r s
The F r e n c h P r i m e M i n i s t e r w a r n e d the P r i m e M i n i s t e r and
m y s e l f on 23rd A u g u s t that the E u r o p e a n D e f e n c e Community ( E . D . C . )
T r e a t y would in his v i e w c e r t a i n l y be r e j e c t e d by the F r e n c h A s s e m b l y
e a r l y next w e e k .
On the other hand, he w a s quite definite at B r u s s e l s
and at C h a r t w e l l that W e s t e r n unity must be maintained and that e a r l y
steps must be taken t o ensure G e r m a n a s s o c i a t i o n with the W e s t .
We
spoke in v e r y g e n e r a l t e r m s of G e r m a n e n t r y into the N o r t h A t l a n t i c
T r e a t y Organisation ( N . A . T . O . ) and a l s o of a s i x - P o w e r o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
l o o s e r than the E . D . C . , with which the United Kingdom could be a s s o c i a t e d .
A s a f i r s t and i m m e d i a t e step he d e c l a r e d he was p r e p a r e d to join with
the United K i n g d o m and the U . S . A . in b r i n g i n g the Bonn Conventions into
force.
A s m y c o l l e a g u e s w i l l be a w a r e f r o m the M i n i s t e r of State's paper
( C . (54) 231) of 13th July an A n g l o - A m e r i c a n plan for this has been
p r e p a r e d and can be d i s c u s s e d at once with the F r e n c h and then with the
Germans.
The outstanding issue d i s c u s s e d in paragraph 5 of that paper
has since been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e d .
2.
The p r o b l e m of a G e r m a n defence contribution other than
through E . D . C . i s m o r e difficult.
The p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k done in the
F o r e i g n Office in r e c e n t months in consultation with the M i n i s t r y of
Defence and the T r e a s u r y on this p r o b l e m has shown that there is no e a s y
or ideal solution.
P r o b a b l y the b e s t a l t e r n a t i v e for the United K i n g d o m
would be the entry of the F e d e r a l Republic into N . A . T . O . with a s many of
the E . D . C . safeguards as p o s s i b l e .
T h o s e we might t r y to obtain a r e s e t
out in the A n n e x , which has been communicated t o the United States
G o v e r n m e n t as a study p a p e r .
They have n o t yet c o m m e n t e d .
While
t h e r e i s , I hope, a chance of obtaining s o m e o r a l l of these safeguards in
r e t u r n for G e r m a n e n t r y into what is the b e s t W e s t e r n club, I a m by no
m e a n s sure that D r . A d e n a u e r can in fact a c c e p t so much d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
in 1954.
We have a l s o b e e n a d v i s e d that, despite M . M e n d e s - F r a n c e ' s
b r a v e w o r d s at C h a r t w e l l , the F r e n c h P a r l i a m e n t might oppose G e r m a n
e n t r y into N . A . T . O .
T h e r e w i l l a l s o be difficulties in this country, where
G e r m a n r e a r m a m e n t has only been a c c e p t e d within the E . D . C . f r a m e w o r k .
The A m e r i c a n s have a l s o h i t h e r t o been l u k e w a r m ,
Their reasons a r e ,
I think, t h r e e f o l d : ­
( i ) they have wanted the E . D . C . t o hold the
field alone;
( i i ) they f e a r a F r e n c h v e t o a f t e r further d e l a y ;
1
and
( i i i ) they would find difficulty in accepting t h e m s e l v e s
those modifications in the structure of N . A . T . O .
which would p r o v i d e safeguards on G e r m a n
r e a r m a m e n t without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against
Germany
The f i r s t of these objections would d i s a p p e a r with the c o l l a p s e of the
E . D . C . ; the second r e m a i n s at best an open question.
The t h i r d objection
remains.
But, as I shall explain b e l o w , t h e r e may be a w a y round it.
On b a l a n c e , I think that N . A . T . O . is the b e s t solution, p r o v i d e d its n e g o ­
tiation does not cuase too much d e l a y .
W e can a l s o r e m i n d P r e s i d e n t
E i s e n h o w e r of his statement t o the P r i m e M i n i s t e r and m y s e l f in
Washington in June that, if the F r e n c h did not p r o c e e d with the E . D . C . ,
t h e y must be confronted with the choice of having G e r m a n y in N . A . T . O .
3.
B e f o r e h o w e v e r we p r o c e e d too far on this course and a r e
c o m m i t t e d to a t r i p a r t i t e p o l i c y with the A m e r i c a n s and the F r e n c h , we
m u s t be sure that it i s a c c e p t a b l e to D r . A d e n a u e r .
W e should t h e r e f o r e
consult D r . A d e n a u e r v e r y s h o r t l y a f t e r an unfavourable F r e n c h vote on the
E.D.C.
We could invite h i m to London, but this might a r o u s e too much
speculation at an e a r l y stage in our difficult t a s k .
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we could
consult h i m through the High C o m m i s s i o n e r in Bonn or through some
special emissary.
We must a l s o be sure that the A m e r i c a n s support us
in t r y i n g to get the n e c e s s a r y s a f e g u a r d s , and we should t h e r e f o r e p r e s s
f o r t h e i r e a r l y v i e w s on the suggestions in the A n n e x .
4.
The other a l t e r n a t i v e we have c o n s i d e r e d i s the s o - c a l l e d
E u r o p e a n solution under which we would j o i n a m o d i f i e d E . D . C . s t i l l within
the N . A . T . O . f r a m e w o r k .
In p r i n c i p l e this is p r o b a b l y the solution m o s t
a c c e p t a b l e to the F r e n c h , although no one has y e t been able to g e t round
the difficulty of tying down the G e r m a n s while l e a v i n g the other p a r t i e s
relatively free.
We had c o n s i d e r e d that the F r e n c h , and indeed the other
E . D . C . c o u n t r i e s , would r e q u i r e of us m o r e f a r - r e a c h i n g c o m m i t m e n t s
than we have h i t h e r t o f e l t able t o g i v e .
It s e e m s at least p r o b l e m a t i c a l
whether the f i v e E . D . C . c o u n t r i e s , some of whom r e a l l y p r e f e r the N . A . T . O .
solution, and a l l of w h o m r e f u s e d M . Mende s - F r a n c e ' s p r o p o s a l s in
B r u s s e l s , would a g r e e to B r i t i s h e n t r y on t e r m s which f a l l far short e v e n
of M . M e n d e s - F r a n c e ' s p r o p o s a l s .
We had f e l t that the m i n i m u m
c o m m i t m e n t s l i k e l y t o be r e q u i r e d of us would be a f i x e d contribution of
f o r c e s and a fixed share in a common a r m a m e n t s p r o g r a m m e , neither o f
which could be changed without the consent of the other m e m b e r - S t a t e s .
T h e r e m i g h t a l s o be p r e s s u r e upon us to do e v e n m o r e and to c o m m i t the
United K i n g d o m s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r f o r c e and m e t r o p o l i t a n f i g h t e r f o r c e t o
the Community and a l s o to share with our E u r o p e a n p a r t n e r s a t o m i c and
t h e r m o - n u c l e a r s e c r e t s , with obviously p r e j u d i c i a l r e s u l t s upon our
p r e s e n t s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the U . S . A . and Canada in this f i e l d ,
A
further a r g u m e n t against such a European solution i s that it would probably
weaken the existing structure of N . A . T . O . , i m p o s i n g a strain upon our
r e l a t i o n s with such other m e m b e r s as N o r w a y .
M o r e i m p o r t a n t , it might
weaken our links with tho United States and encourage the t r e n d in A m e r i c a
towards "peripheral defence".
F i n a l l y , such a grouping would be much
l e s s powerful t o contain G e r m a n y than N . A . T . O . with A m e r i c a and Canada
present.
5,
M . M e n d e s - F r a n c e r e f e r r e d v e r y b r i e f l y a t C h a r t w e l l to a
r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t " E u r o p e a n " solution w h i c h , if our information f r o m other
F r e n c h s o u r c e s is c o r r e c t , would amount to no m o r e than the s i x E . D . C .
P o w e r s maintaining the a r m a m e n t s pool p r o v i d e d in the E . D . C . T r e a t y under
the g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of a Council of M i n i s t e r s of the six P o w e r s ,
with the addition of a United K i n g d o m M i n i s t e r with equal r i g h t s .
This
1Z, would a l l be within the N . A . T . O . f r a m e w o r k .
M . M e n d e s - F r a n c e was not
v e r y c l e a r whether G e r m a n y would at the same t i m e b e c o m e a full m e m b e r
of N . A . T . O .
If indeed this is a l l which would be asked of us t h e r e would
c l e a r l y . b e no difficulty for us f r o m the supranational point of v i e w .
But, as in the case of the E . D . C . , we should probably find that we w e r e asked
f o r further and further concessions and, when we r e a c h e d our l i m i t , we
should be held r e s p o n s i b l e for any breakdown.
Such a s c h e m e , m o r e o v e r ,
would p e r m i t a G e r m a n national a r m y and a G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff, with
the safeguards l i s t e d in the A n n e x r e s t r i c t e d only t o the a r m a m e n t s p o o l .
T h i s would, I f e a r , be unacceptable to w i d e sections of public opinion in
this country.
N o r do I see the Germans r e a d i l y accepting e v e n the
a r m a m e n t s pool r e s t r i c t i o n s which in f a c t , although not in t h e o r y ,
d i s c r i m i n a t e against G e r m a n y , except p o s s i b l y as part of a w i d e r scheme
in which they b e c a m e full m e m b e r s of N . A . T . O .
6.
A n o t h e r idea which has been mentioned and f o r which m i l i t a r y
advantages a r e c l a i m e d is that of a t r i a n g u l a r United Kingdom/United S t a t e s /
G e r m a n a l l i a n c e s u p e r - i m p o s e d upon N . A . T . O .
It i s at l e a s t p r e f e r a b l e
t o a d i r e c t United States/German alliance and c l e a r l y we cannot a l l o w the
s h o r t c o m i n g s of the F r e n c h A s s e m b l y to b l o c k a l l p r o g r e s s in E u r o p e
and t o lose G e r m a n y f o r the W e s t .
But I see the g r a v e s t p o l i t i c a l
objections to such an alignment except for the l i m i t e d purposes and in the
d i f f e r e n t f o r m suggested b e l o w .
Quite a p a r t f r o m F r e n c h opposition,
which might extend to F r e n c h defection f r o m N . A . T . O . with d i s a s t r o u s
m i l i t a r y consequences for the whole N . A . T . O . defence s y s t e m , B r i t i s h
public opinion would, I think, r e j e c t any such alignment.
7.
While I should w e l c o m e the v i e w s of m y colleagues on this v e r y
difficult p r o b l e m , I cannot m y s e l f see any b e t t e r p o l i c y than that of bringing
G e r m a n y into N . A . T . O . , in a g r e e m e n t with F r a n c e and the United States,
with the safeguards set out in the A n n e x .
We could, I think, count upon
the strong support of a l l the m e m b e r s of N . A . T . O . , other than F r a n c e , and
the question could be d i s c u s s e d at an e m e r g e n c y m e e t i n g of the N o r t h
A t l a n t i c Council, as M r . Dulles has a l r e a d y p r o p o s e d .
8.
We have h e a r d that the A m e r i c a n s m a y have an a l t e r n a t i v e
plan f o r obtaining the s a f e g u a r d s , not through a r e v i s i o n of the N . A . T . O ,
s t r u c t u r e affecting a l l the N . A . T . O . p a r t n e r s a l i k e , but through an outside
a g r e e m e n t between G e r m a n y and the p r e s e n t Occupation P o w e r s .
This
would probably i n v o l v e giving the G e r m a n s s p e c i a l guarantees as a
quid p r o quo for the s a f e g u a r d s .
But these could be a s i m p l e r e p e t i t i o n
of the a s s u r a n c e s which the three P o w e r s have a l r e a d y g i v e n to the
F e d e r a l Republic and B e r l i n .
9.
If the p r i c e of F r e n c h a c q u i e s c e n c e in such a N . A . T . O , plan
w e r e our a g r e e m e n t to sit with the s i x E . D . C . P o w e r s in a p o l i t i c a l Council
of M i n i s t e r s to c o n t r o l a s i x - P o w e r a r m a m e n t s pool on the E . D . C . m o d e l ,
and p r o v i d e d this did not involve us in unacceptable c o m m i t m e n t s , I think
we could a g r e e .
This would in effect be much l e s s than we have a l r e a d y
undertaken t o w a r d s the E . D . C .
10.
On balance our b e s t bet is G e r m a n entry into N . A . T . O . with the
safeguards in the A n n e x .
I must h o w e v e r w a r n m y colleagues that this
p o l i c y , with or without the additions mentioned in p a r a g r a p h s 8 and 9 a b o v e ,
w i l l not be e a s y to r e a l i s e .
We shall m o r e o v e r have to act quickly if we
a r e not to l o s e G e r m a n y .
The m a c h i n e r y f o r w o r k i n g out the plan would
require ­
(a) i m m e d i a t e consultation with the A m e r i c a n s ;
73
(b) separate and e a r l y consultation with
D r . A d e n a u e r and with the F r e n c h ;
( c ) a m e e t i n g a t some stage of the s i x E . D . C .
P o w e r s , with the United States and the
United K i n g d o m ;
and
(d) an e m e r g e n c y m e e t i n g of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c
C o u n c i l , when some plan had b e e n p r e p a r e d .
A.E.
Foreign Office, S.W.1.
26th A u g u s t , 1954.
ANNEX
R e s t r i c t i o n s on G e r m a n r e a r m a m e n t which m i g h t be f e a s i b l e in the e v e n t of G e r m a n a d m i s s i o n t o N . A . T . O . (United K i n g d o m W o r k i n g p a p e r ) P u b l i c opinion in F r a n c e and other N . A . T . O . countries w i l l
not r e a d i l y a c c e p t G e r m a n m e m b e r s h i p of N . A . T . O . without s o m e
r e s t r i c t i o n s on G e r m a n r e a r m a m e n t .
Those r e s t r i c t i o n s , if they a r e to
be acceptable to G e r m a n opinion, must not d i s c r i m i n a t e t o o obviously­
against the G e r m a n s and must apply t o other countries as w e l l .
The
i d e a l solution would be to transplant to N . A . T . O . as many of the e s s e n t i a l
E . D . C . safeguards as we can persuade the G e r m a n s t o a c c e p t as the p r i c e
of joining the leading W e s t e r n " c l u b " a s a full m e m b e r .
We m i g h t a i m a t a g r e e m e n t s on the f o l l o w i n g s u b j e c t s : ­
(a)
G e r m a n y ' s i n i t i a l contribution
The s i z e and c h a r a c t e r of the i n i t i a l G e r m a n defence c o n ­
tribution to N . A . T . O . would be a g r e e d with the F e d e r a l Republic as p a r t of
the negotiations for h e r a d m i s s i o n t o N . A . T . O .
It would be b a s e d on the
E . D . C . f i g u r e s of t w e l v e d i v i s i o n s and 1,300 a i r c r a f t .
It would c o m p r i s e
neither s u b m a r i n e s nor s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r s .
The a g r e e m e n t m i g h t include
a clause to the e f f e c t that any change in the c o m p o s i t i o n or strength of
the G e r m a n contribution could only be made in consultation with the N o r t h
A t l a n t i c Council ( i . e . through the Annual R e v i e w p r o c e s s ) and in a c c o r d ­
ance with a g r e e d N A , T . 0 . s t r a t e g y .
o
(b) S t r a t e g i c a l l y e x p o s e d a r e a s
A p r o t o c o l m i g h t be added t o the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y to
r e p r o d u c e the E . D . C . a g r e e m e n t that within " s t r a t e g i c a r e a s " c e r t a i n
types of a r m s production and r e s e a r c h , including a t o m i c and the r m o ­
nuclear w e a p o n s , s u b m a r i n e s and m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t , would only be p e r m i t t e d
by d e c i s i o n of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c Council.
In o r d e r to a v o i d obvious d i s ­
c r i m i n a t i o n against the G e r m a n s it w i l l probably be n e c e s s a r y to define
7^ as " s t r a t e g i c a r e a s " not only the F e d e r a l Republic but a l s o p a r t s of the
N . A . T . O . a r e a a l s o contiguous or n e a r l y contiguous t o the S o v i e t " e m p i r e "
such as N . N o r w a y , D e n m a r k , T h r a c e and T u r k e y north of the S t r a i t s .
( c ) A E u r o p e a n a r m s pool
A E u r o p e a n a r m s p o o l would have p o l i t i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l
value.
The s i x E . D . C . countries might adopt within N . A . T . O . : a plan f o r
an a r m s p o o l , i n c o r p o r a t i n g the e s s e n t i a l features of the r e l e v a n t p r o ­
v i s i o n s of the E . D . C . T r e a t y ( i . e . c o n t r o l o v e r production, i m p o r t and
e x p o r t of w a r m a t e r i a l ) .
The drafting of the plan f o r such an a r m s p o o l
would have t o be left p r i m a r i l y t o the E . D . C . c o u n t r i e s .
(d)
C o m m i t m e n t of f o r c e s to N . A . T . O .
In o r d e r t o p r e v e n t G e r m a n y f r o m maintaining f o r c e s other
than those c o m m i t t e d to N . A . T . O . , an a g r e e m e n t m i g h t be concluded b e t w e e n
a l l m e m b e r s of N . A . T . O , on the lines of A r t i c l e s 9, 10 and 11 of the E . D . C .
Treaty.
Thus N . A . T . O . m e m b e r s m i g h t a g r e e that a p a r t f r o m f o r c e s
p l a c e d under S A C E U R no a r m e d f o r c e s w i l l be maintained e x c e p t :
( i ) p o l i c e and g e n d a r m e r i e intended f o r the maintenance
of i n t e r n a l o r d e r ;
( i i ) t r o o p s f o r the p e r s o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of the Head of
State;
( i i i ) f o r c e s r e q u i r e d for international m i s s i o n s ( e . g . the
United Nations O r g a n i s a t i o n ) or f o r any other
purpose a p p r o v e d by the N o r t h A t l a n t i c Councilj
( i v ) f o r c e s which any m e m b e r r e q u i r e d to fulfil its
defence r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in the N o r t h A t l a n t i c
a r e a other than the E u r o p e a n mainland or
outside the N A . T . O . a r e a .
(e)
Integration and deployment of N . A . T . O . f o r c e s
( i ) M e a s u r e s m i g h t be taken t o give e f f e c t to what is a l r e a d y
a g r e e d t o be S A C E U R ' s f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , n a m e l y , the c r e a t i o n of a
genuine and e f f e c t i v e i n t e g r a t e d f o r c e , notably in the a i r , s o that a l l
G e r m a n a i r units could be grouped with other nationalities in N . A . T . O . a i r
formations.
( i i ) The position of W e s t e r n G e r m a n y in the centre of the
N . A . T . O . front l i n e , coupled with the obvious temptation for G e r m a n f o r c e s
to c r o s s the Z o n a l f r o n t i e r to a s s i s t their c o m p a t r i o t s in the Soviet Z o n e o r
even l a t e r on to modify the O d e r - N e i s s e f r o n t i e r , make i t e s s e n t i a l t o
establish e f f e c t i v e N . A . T . O . control o v e r the location and m o v e m e n t of the
German f o r c e s .
We can r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t the G e r m a n s to a g r e e , as the
United K i n g d o m and the United States a g r e e d in the r e c e n t D e c l a r a t i o n s
about the E . D . C . , that t h e i r f o r c e s shall be deployed in a c c o r d a n c e with
agreed N . A . T . O . strategy.
In addition, it might b e a g r e e d that national
f o r c e s p l a c e d under S A C E U R shall not be m o v e d within the N . A . T . O , a r e a
nor r e v e r t to national c o n t r o l for use within the N . A . T . O . a r e a without the
consent of S A C E U R and the N o r t h A t l a n t i c Council.
We could not in the
case of G e r m a n y a l l o w a r e p e t i t i o n of the Italian action in S e p t e m b e r , 1953
in sending t r o o p s and ships to the Y u g o s l a v f r o n t i e r without any consultation
with N . A . T . O .
The p r e s e n c e of a l l i e d f o r c e s i n G e r m a n y would of course
be an additional and e f f e c t i v e safeguard.
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(f) Maintenance of United States and United K i n g d o m
t r o o p s in Europe
T o supplement these suggested m e a s u r e s of c o n t r o l probably
the m o s t satisfying a s s u r a n c e that could be g i v e n to the F r e n c h ( p a r t i c u l a r l y
f r o m the p s y c h o l o g i c a l point of v i e w ) would be some guarantee of the
continued p r e s e n c e of United K i n g d o m and United States f o r c e s on the
Continent.
T h e i r p r e s e n c e would be e s s e n t i a l in connection w i t h , e . g.
paragraph (e)(i) above.
The United K i n g d o m and the United States have
a l r e a d y stated, in connection with t h e i r p r o p o s e d links with E . D . C . , t h e i r
intention to keep on the Continent their f a i r share of f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r
E u r o p e a n defence as long a s the t h r e a t e x i s t s .
N e w d e c l a r a t i o n s on s i m i l a r
l i n e s m i g h t be made b y both G o v e r n m e n t s .
(g) Extending the duration of the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y
A n additional r e a s s u r a n c e to the F r e n c h (which would be
p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e if guarantees as e n v i s a g e d in p a r a g r a p h (f) above
w e r e g i v e n ) would be the addition of a p r o t o c o l to the N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y
t o r e m o v e the p o s s i b i l i t y of denunciation b e f o r e fifty y e a r s .
The idea
that the T r e a t y should be c o n s i d e r e d of indefinite duration has a l r e a d y
been ventilated in the N o r t h A t l a n t i c Council and in a b r o a d sense a p p r o v e d .
A l e g a l life of fifty y e a r s m i g h t g r e a t l y h e l p t o r e c o n c i l e public opinion
to German r e a r m a m e n t .
This p r o v i s i o n m i g h t be included in the p r o t o c o l
inviting G e r m a n a c c e s s i o n to N . A . T . O .
(h) G e r m a n assurance against any attempt to m o d i f y
existing frontiers by force
One of the main objections to G e r m a n a d m i s s i o n t o N . A . T . O .
i s undoubtedly the fact that the F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c (and p r o b a b l y a future
reunited G e r m a n y ) would be a t e r r i t o r i a l l y d i s s a t i s f i e d P o w e r , under
constant temptation to m o d i f y its E a s t e r n f r o n t i e r s by f o r c e and to d r a g
the whole of the N . A . T . O , A l l i a n c e into w a r f o r that p u r p o s e .
This
objection is a r e a l one and cannot be c o m p l e t e l y m e t .
But we should at
l e a s t r e q u i r e the G e r m a n F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c t o make the type of d e c l a r a t i o n
(suitably amended t o m e e t the a l t e r e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) which D r . A d e n a u e r
l a s t D e c e m b e r a g r e e d t o make o v e r the p r o p o s e d s e c u r i t y guarantees to
be o f f e r e d to the Russians in connection with the e n t r y into f o r c e of the
E.D.C.
This would be buttressed by a v e r s i o n of the accompanying
statement by the t h r e e "Western P o w e r s amended to take account of the new
situation and to include a l l other N . A . T . O . P o w e r s .