(c) crown copyright Catalogue Reference:cab/66/16/20 Image Reference:0001 T H I S DOCUMENT I S T H E PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'8 GOVERNMENT Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1941. / SECRET. Copy No W . P . (41) 97. May 6, 1941. TO BE K E P T UNDER LOCK AND KEY. I t is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document. WAR CABINET. F I R E F I G H T I N G S E R V I C E IN R E L A T I O N TO P R E S E N T E M E R G E N C Y REQUIREMENTS. Memorandum by the Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security. I F I N D it necessary to bring before the W a r Cabinet the state of the F i r e Services in relation to present emergency requirements, because I am satisfied that those requirements cannot be met w i t h o u t radical change in the present organisation. 2. The stage now reached in the development of the emergency fire brigade -organisation may be summarised as follows :— -(a) The emergency organisation is based on the peace-time fire brigades, which are administered by the London County Council in London, and, elsewhere in E n g l a n d and Wales, by the Councils of Boroughs. U r b a n Districts a n d R u r a l Districts. In Scotland, unlike England, County Councils have fire brigade powers, and 11 of the 33 Counties have C o u n t y fire brigades. Elsewhere, I understand, the organisation i! in Scotland is similar to t h a t in E n g l a n d and Wales. There are thus n about 1 440 separate fire brigade authorities in England and Wales, and nearly as many fire brigades. The brigades vary greatly in size, from the London F i r e Brigade, w i t h about 3,000 professional firemen and more than 150 major appliances, to brigades w i t h only a few p a r t - t i m e firemen and no appliances save a few lengths of hose and other h a n d equipment. The total strength of the peace-time brigades in E n g l a n d and Wales is about 25,000, but only about 6,000 are whole-time firemen. ,(&,) F o r emergency purposes, the regular fire brigade organisation has been greatly expanded, the scale of the expansion being of the order of 15 to 20 times for the more i m p o r t a n t towns, or even higher in a few cases. The total whole-time s t r e n g t h of the Auxiliary F i r e Service is about 80,000 (including telephonists and messengers), and the p a r t ­ time s t r e n g t h about 150,000, w i t h about 25,000 power appliances, i.e., not counting h a n d equipment. (c) E a c h borough and urban district, and in a good many cases the r u r a l district, has its A u x i l i a r y F i r e Service contingent, a u x i l i a r y fire stations, a supply of emergency equipment produced a n d issued by the Home Office, an emergency communications system, supplemented by messengers a n d often by special observation posts, and its emergency scheme of operations for the borough or district. In :. . addition to this local organisation there is the regional reinforcement scheme, u n d e r which a proportion of the major appliances available in any district may at any time be despatched as reinforcements to other districts, u n d e r the directions of the Regional Commissioner.: and u n d e r this scheme large numbers of appliances a n d men have been sent to heavily raided areas on many occasions since the heavy r a i d s began. A t H e a d q u a r t e r s , since the F i r e Brigades Division was constituted in 1936, the staff has been expanded to deal w i t h the production of the emergency equipment (in * collaboration w i t h the [22482] ; M i n i s t r y of W o r k s and Buildings) and to supervise the general development of the emergency measures as a whole; and the Depart­ ment is assisted by regional technical staffs, who act in the dual capacity of Inspectors and staff officers to the Regional Commissioners. 3. A very large emergency organisation has therefore been built u p , but it will be seen, from w h a t has been said above, t h a t in many cases the local emergency measures rest on relatively slender a d m i n i s t r a t i v e foundations. Even in the case of the larger towns, where the technical a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e staffs of the fire brigades are strongest, the effectiveness of the expanded emergency services n a t u r a l l y varies from place to place, depending largely on the a t t i t u d e of the local authorities in m a t t e r s of exependitm-e and the enterprise and capacity of their officers. 4. W h e r e there a r e still defects and shortcomings in the local emergency organisation, they generally arise from shortage of man-power, a good many of the key centres being still considerably u n d e r establishment (in spite of all the efforts made to obtain recruits), from shortage of towing vehicles for trailer p u m p s or from inadequacy of the measures for p r o c u r i n g emergency supplies of w a t e r when the normal supplies a r e i n t e r r u p t e d in a raid. I n addition, and p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t "of all, there is a general shortage of officers w i t h large­ scale fire fighting and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e experience, in comparison w i t h the numbers which are required in a large-scale a i r a t t a c k and for p l a n n i n g a n d carrying out the many measures which are necessary to provide a g a i n s t t h a t contingency. These shortages, so far as they relate to man-power, a r e now about to be made good under the new National Service A c t procedure, so far as general man-power limitations will p e r m i t ; the local authorities are being assisted to obtain a d d i t i o n a l towing vehicles, and I have i n i t i a t e d the policy of obtaining by central instead of local p u r c h a s e the lorries which a r e needed for regional reinforcement purposes. T h e measures for a u g m e n t i n g the supplementary supplies of water a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t and are being pressed forward, as labour a n d other conditions will permit, w i t h all possible help and support from Regional Head­ q u a r t e r s and the Home Office. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I have introduced the use of lines of surface steel p i p i n g , as emergency mains, to supplement the o r d i n a r y pressure m a i n s in high risk areas or to take their place, to the extent t h a t t h a t is possible, when the normal supplies of water a r e interrupted. For the shortage of experienced officers there is no solution except as more men gain the necessary experience under emergency conditions. All t h a t can be done is to give such assistance as is possible by staff t r a i n i n g a n d to make the best use of such men as are available. 5. Since the heavy raids began all local fire authorities a n d their officers have been reminded of the necessity for these and other measures, which experience has shown to be necessary by w a y of precaution a g a i n s t the conse­ quences of such a t t a c k s ; and the instructions which have been issued have been followed u p at Conferences held for the purpose in all Regions and by the regional staffs, which have been strengthened for the purpose. Arrangements have been made to move into heavily raided a r e a s experienced officers from other brigades, as temporary reinforcements, a n d the regional a n d H e a d q u a r t e r s officers have also taken charge of the local fire fighting organisations, in temporary relief of the chief officer, on several occasions. 6. T a k i n g the emergency fire fighting services as a whole, they have certainly proved their worth. On more t h a n one occasion when the enemy h a s brought his heaviest attacks to bear the local brigades and A u x i l i a r y F i r e Services have dealt successfully w i t h the attacks, virtually without reinforcement, and can be relied upon to do so as long as the attacks are fairly well dispersed and not concentrated in the main on a n y one area. Generally speaking, the local authori­ ties deserve considerable credit for the energy a n d enterprise they have shown. I n spife, however, of all t h a t has been done, there are still serious difficulties for which no adequate solution has been found, more especially in connection with the measures for dealing w i t h the more concentrated attacks and attacks which a r e repeated on successive nights. These attacks often result in more or less complete dislocation of w a t e r supplies and communications and serious blocking of roads as the result of H . E . bombing, and involve at the same time the handling of large fire brigade reinforcements. The extent to which fire brigades can operate under a i r r a i d conditions must obviously depend upon the extent to which the movement of appliances and measures such as the relaying of water from a distance are prevented by the blocking of roads, the dislocation of communications and t h e destruction of appliances a n d their crews, and, with increasing weight and concentration of attack, a point may be reached, and h a s been reached on more t h a n one occasion, when no fire brigade, organisation could a v a i l to prevent the spread of fires. A t the best, these concentrated air attacks give rise to problems which, though provided for to some extent in the local schemes, call for further measures which local authorities a r e frequently unwilling to t a k e — until they have suffered in t u r n and it is too late—and, generally, require the p r e p a r a t i o n of plans on much more than a merely local basis. I n spite of all that h a s been done, and recognising t h a t the best possible measures of civil defence may not suffice to prevent great destruction so long as the enemy can bring heavy and concentrated attacks to bear, I am satisfied t h a t the most serious weaknesses in the measures for providing against such a t t a c k s are mainly attributable to the large number of u n i t s of administration and the relatively limited resources most of them command, individually; t h a t little further progress can be made, and certainly no effective solution of the present difficulties can be expected, without a radical recasting of the whole administrative machine and t h a t the necessary changes should be made as a m a t t e r of urgency. 7. I n my judgment, the p r i n c i p a l sources of weakness which are outstanding at the present time are the following :— (a) U n d e r the present system, w i t h so many small units of administration, quite simple plans or operations may involve 20 or 30 separate local authorities and Chief Officers of F i r e Brigades, and i t is virtually impossible to secure sufficient unity or breadth of plan for meeting any major contingencies, to dispose the various fire fighting resources according to requirements, viewed as a whole, or, when a crisis arises, to direct the movements of appliances and men with general, r a t h e r than- local, requirements as the sole consideration in view. (&) F o r similar reasons, it is impossible to secure the best use of the available personnel, especially the relatively limited number of officers who have experience of large-scale fire fighting or have proved their value in one capacity or another in the emergency organisation, seeing t h a t they a r e dispersed in numerous small brigades and are the servants of different authorities, many of whom tend to p u t their own local considerations first. Tt is also very difficult to eliminate local officers who a r e in positions of responsibility to which they are not equal. : ; ; 8. I am quite satisfied t h a t it is administratively impracticable, on the basis of the present u n i t s of administration, to e x p a n d the local services to any greater degree t h a n has been done, and t h a t there are no existing u n i t s of administration on which the burden of reorganising the fire services could reasonably be placed. The creation of special ad hoc authorities for this purpose would be a slow and cumbrous p r o c e d u r e ; on such a plan, which would necessarily involve the creation of relatively large units of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the vesting of wide powers in the hands of executive officers in charge of the consolidated brigades, local control would be r e t a i n e d in semblance more t h a n in r e a l i t y ; and, in my view, such a course is not to be considered as a solution ,of the problem as a whole. 9. I am driven, therefore, to the conclusion t h a t there is no alternative to eliminating local control of the fire services, for all practical purposes, for the period of the w a r . I think it is also necessary to bear in mind that, while it would clearly be out of the question to r e t u r n to the present basis of organisation when the w a r is over, the fire brigades will presumably then pass back to local authority a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on some basis, though w i t h much closer central super­ vision t h a n hitherto, and, for this as well as other reasons, it will be desirable to leave a portion of the cost of the regular fire services a charge on the local rates. 10. Accordingly, I propose :— (i) T h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d control of all fire brigade services, regular and auxiliary, in E n g l a n d and Wales, be transferred, for the period of the emergency, from the local authorities to the Secretary of State. (It is not proposed t h a t the ownership of land or buildings should be transferred, but only t h a t they should be available for use as may be required for fire brigade purposes.) (ii) that, as p a r t of the new organisation, fresh fire brigade u n i t s be created, on the basis of the Regions and sub-Regional areas (to be constituted for the purpose), each sub-Regional u n i t being, in effect, a separate fire fighting force, with unity of command over the whole resources of the sub-Region; (iii) t h a t power be given to the officer in command of each unit, subject to the general supervision of Regional H e a d q u a r t e r s and any directions of the Secretary of State, to dispose the available fire fighting resources as circumstances require, but so t h a t due regard be p a i d to local requirements and transfers of regular firemen a n d members of local A.F.S. u n i t s now serving be limited to cases of real necessity; (iv) that, similarly, power be given to fill officer posts from regular and A.F.S. officers selected for their proved capacity, irrespective of the areas where they h a p p e n now to be serving, subject to transfer of officers from one a r e a to another being limited to real requirements as above; (v) t h a t the conditions of service of the various classes of regular fire brigade personnel, which vary from force to force, be brought into line on a co-ordinated plan, for the Service as a whole; the conditions of service of the A u x i l i a r y F i r e Service to r e m a i n broadly as a t present; (vi) t h a t regional reserve u n i t s be formed, w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e personnel and equipment, where required, in support of the localised fire fighting forces, these reserves to be u n d e r the direct control of the Regional Commissioners; (vii) t h a t the Regional a n d sub-Regional a d m i n i s t r a t i v e work be provided for by extension of the existing regional o r g a n i s a t i o n ; (viii) t h a t provision be made for setting u p co-ordinated t r a i n i n g for officers and men, w i t h regional as well as central t r a i n i n g centres; (ix) t h a t all salaries a n d other -outgoings be defrayed in the first instance by the Exchequer, but t h a t charges be made on the local rates representing 75 per cent, of the c u r r e n t cost of the regular fire services (which, hitherto, have been borne by the local authorities without Exchequer g r a n t ) or, in the case of such local a u t h o r i t i e s as have not made a r r a n g e m e n t s to set u p a fire service on their own account, the like proportion of the produce of a 2d. rate, as representing the reasonable cost of providing a local fire service on a modest scale. . 11. The Secretary of State for Scotland a n d I have t a k e n a n opportunity to consult the Regional Commissioners on these proposals, and found them in general agreement as to the necessity for further measures to meet concentrated enemy a t t a c k s and, w i t h the possible exception of the Scotland Regional Commissioner, as to their t a k i n g the form which I have indicated. I have every reason to believe that, so far as the members of the F i r e Services are concerned, such measures would, on the whole, be welcomed. T h e a t t i t u d e of the local authorities will be i m p o r t a n t . I t is only to be expected t h a t local fire ^authorities will in many cases deprecate a n y measure which would have the effect of t a k i n g away their present fire brigade powers. A s yet, we have h a d no o p p o r t u n i t y to consult the local a u t h o r i t i e s ' representatives, and it is not possible to say to w h a t extent their objections may depend upon the form such measures m i g h t t a k e or whether they could be met in any degree by the formation of consultative committees, collaborating, in an advisory capacity, w i t h the Home Office a n d / o r the Regional Commissioners, or w h a t their views m i g h t be on the financial arrangements which are suggested. A r r a n g e m e n t s are being made to consult the local a u t h o r i t i e s ' representatives as soon as possible. 12. T h e adoption of these measures would necessarily involve some a d d i t i o n a l charge upon the Exchequer. The a n n u a l cost of the r e g u l a r fire brigade service may be p u t a t about £3,000,000. T h e cost of the emergency services is about £23,000,000, of which about £21,000^000 is already borne by the Exchequer, so t h a t the burden to be t r a n s f e r r e d from the r a t e s to the Exchequer would be relatively small. Some a d d i t i o n a l Exchequer charges a r e to be antici­ p a t e d in respect of additional emergency fire services now in process of development or r e m a i n i n g to be developed on a local or a regional basis, but these would for the most p a r t be borne in any case by the E x c h e q u e r ; a n d such additional Exchequer charge as m i g h t arise from t h e p a r t i c u l a r reorganisation proposed in this M e m o r a n d u m is, in my view, fully justified by the necessities of the situation. H . M. -Home Office, May 6, 1941.