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T H I S DOCUMENT I S T H E PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'8 GOVERNMENT
Printed
for the War Cabinet.
May 1941.
/
SECRET.
Copy No
W . P . (41) 97.
May 6, 1941.
TO BE K E P T
UNDER
LOCK
AND
KEY.
I t is requested that special care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
WAR
CABINET.
F I R E F I G H T I N G S E R V I C E IN R E L A T I O N TO P R E S E N T E M E R G E N C Y
REQUIREMENTS.
Memorandum
by the Home Secretary
and Minister
of Home
Security.
I F I N D it necessary to bring before the W a r Cabinet the state of the F i r e
Services in relation to present emergency requirements, because I am satisfied
that those requirements cannot be met w i t h o u t radical change in the present
organisation.
2. The stage now reached in the development of the emergency fire brigade
-organisation may be summarised as follows :—
-(a) The emergency organisation is based on the peace-time fire brigades,
which are administered by the London County Council in London,
and, elsewhere in E n g l a n d and Wales, by the Councils of Boroughs.
U r b a n Districts a n d R u r a l Districts. In Scotland, unlike England,
County Councils have fire brigade powers, and 11 of the 33 Counties
have C o u n t y fire brigades. Elsewhere, I understand, the organisation
i!
in Scotland is similar to t h a t in E n g l a n d and Wales. There are thus
n
about 1 440 separate fire brigade authorities in England and Wales,
and nearly as many fire brigades. The brigades vary greatly in size,
from the London F i r e Brigade, w i t h about 3,000 professional firemen
and more than 150 major appliances, to brigades w i t h only a few
p a r t - t i m e firemen and no appliances save a few lengths of hose and
other h a n d equipment.
The total strength of the peace-time
brigades in E n g l a n d and Wales is about 25,000, but only about 6,000
are whole-time firemen.
,(&,) F o r emergency purposes, the regular fire brigade organisation has been
greatly expanded, the scale of the expansion being of the order of
15 to 20 times for the more i m p o r t a n t towns, or even higher in a few
cases. The total whole-time s t r e n g t h of the Auxiliary F i r e Service
is about 80,000 (including telephonists and messengers), and the p a r t ­
time s t r e n g t h about 150,000, w i t h about 25,000 power appliances,
i.e., not counting h a n d equipment.
(c) E a c h borough and urban district, and in a good many cases the r u r a l
district, has its A u x i l i a r y F i r e Service contingent, a u x i l i a r y fire
stations, a supply of emergency equipment produced a n d issued by
the Home Office, an emergency communications system, supplemented
by messengers a n d often by special observation posts, and its
emergency scheme of operations for the borough or district.
In
:. .
addition to this local organisation there is the regional reinforcement
scheme, u n d e r which a proportion of the major appliances available
in any district may at any time be despatched as reinforcements to
other districts, u n d e r the directions of the Regional Commissioner.:
and u n d e r this scheme large numbers of appliances a n d men have
been sent to heavily raided areas on many occasions since the heavy
r a i d s began. A t H e a d q u a r t e r s , since the F i r e Brigades Division was
constituted in 1936, the staff has been expanded to deal w i t h the
production of the emergency equipment (in * collaboration w i t h the
[22482]
;
M i n i s t r y of W o r k s and Buildings) and to supervise the general
development of the emergency measures as a whole; and the Depart­
ment is assisted by regional technical staffs, who act in the dual
capacity of Inspectors and staff officers to the Regional Commissioners.
3. A very large emergency organisation has therefore been built u p , but it
will be seen, from w h a t has been said above, t h a t in many cases the local emergency
measures rest on relatively slender a d m i n i s t r a t i v e foundations. Even in the case
of the larger towns, where the technical a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e staffs of the fire
brigades are strongest, the effectiveness of the expanded emergency services
n a t u r a l l y varies from place to place, depending largely on the a t t i t u d e of the local
authorities in m a t t e r s of exependitm-e and the enterprise and capacity of their
officers.
4. W h e r e there a r e still defects and shortcomings in the local emergency
organisation, they generally arise from shortage of man-power, a good many of
the key centres being still considerably u n d e r establishment (in spite of all the
efforts made to obtain recruits), from shortage of towing vehicles for trailer
p u m p s or from inadequacy of the measures for p r o c u r i n g emergency supplies of
w a t e r when the normal supplies a r e i n t e r r u p t e d in a raid. I n addition, and
p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t "of all, there is a general shortage of officers w i t h large­
scale fire fighting and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e experience, in comparison w i t h the numbers
which are required in a large-scale a i r a t t a c k and for p l a n n i n g a n d carrying out
the many measures which are necessary to provide a g a i n s t t h a t contingency.
These shortages, so far as they relate to man-power, a r e now about to be made
good under the new National Service A c t procedure, so far as general man-power
limitations will p e r m i t ; the local authorities are being assisted to obtain
a d d i t i o n a l towing vehicles, and I have i n i t i a t e d the policy of obtaining by central
instead of local p u r c h a s e the lorries which a r e needed for regional reinforcement
purposes. T h e measures for a u g m e n t i n g the supplementary supplies of water
a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t and are being pressed forward, as labour a n d other
conditions will permit, w i t h all possible help and support from Regional Head­
q u a r t e r s and the Home Office. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I have introduced the use of lines
of surface steel p i p i n g , as emergency mains, to supplement the o r d i n a r y pressure
m a i n s in high risk areas or to take their place, to the extent t h a t t h a t is possible,
when the normal supplies of water a r e interrupted.
For the shortage of
experienced officers there is no solution except as more men gain the necessary
experience under emergency conditions. All t h a t can be done is to give such
assistance as is possible by staff t r a i n i n g a n d to make the best use of such men
as are available.
5. Since the heavy raids began all local fire authorities a n d their officers
have been reminded of the necessity for these and other measures, which
experience has shown to be necessary by w a y of precaution a g a i n s t the conse­
quences of such a t t a c k s ; and the instructions which have been issued have been
followed u p at Conferences held for the purpose in all Regions and by the
regional staffs, which have been strengthened for the purpose. Arrangements
have been made to move into heavily raided a r e a s experienced officers from other
brigades, as temporary reinforcements, a n d the regional a n d H e a d q u a r t e r s
officers have also taken charge of the local fire fighting organisations, in temporary
relief of the chief officer, on several occasions.
6. T a k i n g the emergency fire fighting services as a whole, they have certainly
proved their worth. On more t h a n one occasion when the enemy h a s brought his
heaviest attacks to bear the local brigades and A u x i l i a r y F i r e Services have
dealt successfully w i t h the attacks, virtually without reinforcement, and can be
relied upon to do so as long as the attacks are fairly well dispersed and not
concentrated in the main on a n y one area. Generally speaking, the local authori­
ties deserve considerable credit for the energy a n d enterprise they have shown.
I n spife, however, of all t h a t has been done, there are still serious difficulties for
which no adequate solution has been found, more especially in connection with
the measures for dealing w i t h the more concentrated attacks and attacks which
a r e repeated on successive nights. These attacks often result in more or less
complete dislocation of w a t e r supplies and communications and serious blocking
of roads as the result of H . E . bombing, and involve at the same time the handling
of large fire brigade reinforcements. The extent to which fire brigades can
operate under a i r r a i d conditions must obviously depend upon the extent to which
the movement of appliances and measures such as the relaying of water from a
distance are prevented by the blocking of roads, the dislocation of communications
and t h e destruction of appliances a n d their crews, and, with increasing weight
and concentration of attack, a point may be reached, and h a s been reached on
more t h a n one occasion, when no fire brigade, organisation could a v a i l to prevent
the spread of fires. A t the best, these concentrated air attacks give rise to
problems which, though provided for to some extent in the local schemes, call
for further measures which local authorities a r e frequently unwilling to t a k e —
until they have suffered in t u r n and it is too late—and, generally, require the
p r e p a r a t i o n of plans on much more than a merely local basis. I n spite of all
that h a s been done, and recognising t h a t the best possible measures of civil defence
may not suffice to prevent great destruction so long as the enemy can bring heavy
and concentrated attacks to bear, I am satisfied t h a t the most serious weaknesses
in the measures for providing against such a t t a c k s are mainly attributable to the
large number of u n i t s of administration and the relatively limited resources most
of them command, individually; t h a t little further progress can be made, and
certainly no effective solution of the present difficulties can be expected, without
a radical recasting of the whole administrative machine and t h a t the necessary
changes should be made as a m a t t e r of urgency.
7. I n my judgment, the p r i n c i p a l sources of weakness which are outstanding
at the present time are the following :—
(a) U n d e r the present system, w i t h so many small units of administration,
quite simple plans or operations may involve 20 or 30 separate local
authorities and Chief Officers of F i r e Brigades, and i t is virtually
impossible to secure sufficient unity or breadth of plan for meeting
any major contingencies, to dispose the various fire fighting resources
according to requirements, viewed as a whole, or, when a crisis arises,
to direct the movements of appliances and men with general, r a t h e r
than- local, requirements as the sole consideration in view.
(&) F o r similar reasons, it is impossible to secure the best use of the available
personnel, especially the relatively limited number of officers who have
experience of large-scale fire fighting or have proved their value in
one capacity or another in the emergency organisation, seeing t h a t
they a r e dispersed in numerous small brigades and are the servants
of different authorities, many of whom tend to p u t their own local
considerations first. Tt is also very difficult to eliminate local officers
who a r e in positions of responsibility to which they are not equal.
:
;
;
8. I am quite satisfied t h a t it is administratively impracticable, on the basis
of the present u n i t s of administration, to e x p a n d the local services to any greater
degree t h a n has been done, and t h a t there are no existing u n i t s of administration
on which the burden of reorganising the fire services could reasonably be placed.
The creation of special ad hoc authorities for this purpose would be a slow and
cumbrous p r o c e d u r e ; on such a plan, which would necessarily involve the creation
of relatively large units of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the vesting of wide powers in the
hands of executive officers in charge of the consolidated brigades, local control
would be r e t a i n e d in semblance more t h a n in r e a l i t y ; and, in my view, such a
course is not to be considered as a solution ,of the problem as a whole.
9. I am driven, therefore, to the conclusion t h a t there is no alternative to
eliminating local control of the fire services, for all practical purposes, for the
period of the w a r . I think it is also necessary to bear in mind that, while it
would clearly be out of the question to r e t u r n to the present basis of organisation
when the w a r is over, the fire brigades will presumably then pass back to local
authority a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on some basis, though w i t h much closer central super­
vision t h a n hitherto, and, for this as well as other reasons, it will be desirable to
leave a portion of the cost of the regular fire services a charge on the local rates.
10. Accordingly, I propose :—
(i) T h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d control of all fire brigade services, regular
and auxiliary, in E n g l a n d and Wales, be transferred, for the period
of the emergency, from the local authorities to the Secretary of State.
(It is not proposed t h a t the ownership of land or buildings should be
transferred, but only t h a t they should be available for use as may be
required for fire brigade purposes.)
(ii) that, as p a r t of the new organisation, fresh fire brigade u n i t s be
created, on the basis of the Regions and sub-Regional areas (to be
constituted for the purpose), each sub-Regional u n i t being, in effect,
a separate fire fighting force, with unity of command over the whole
resources of the sub-Region;
(iii) t h a t power be given to the officer in command of each unit, subject to
the general supervision of Regional H e a d q u a r t e r s and any directions
of the Secretary of State, to dispose the available fire fighting resources
as circumstances require, but so t h a t due regard be p a i d to local
requirements and transfers of regular firemen a n d members of local
A.F.S. u n i t s now serving be limited to cases of real necessity;
(iv) that, similarly, power be given to fill officer posts from regular and
A.F.S. officers selected for their proved capacity, irrespective of the
areas where they h a p p e n now to be serving, subject to transfer of
officers from one a r e a to another being limited to real requirements as
above;
(v) t h a t the conditions of service of the various classes of regular fire
brigade personnel, which vary from force to force, be brought into line
on a co-ordinated plan, for the Service as a whole; the conditions of
service of the A u x i l i a r y F i r e Service to r e m a i n broadly as a t present;
(vi) t h a t regional reserve u n i t s be formed, w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e personnel and
equipment, where required, in support of the localised fire fighting
forces, these reserves to be u n d e r the direct control of the Regional
Commissioners;
(vii) t h a t the Regional a n d sub-Regional a d m i n i s t r a t i v e work be provided
for by extension of the existing regional o r g a n i s a t i o n ;
(viii) t h a t provision be made for setting u p co-ordinated t r a i n i n g for officers
and men, w i t h regional as well as central t r a i n i n g centres;
(ix) t h a t all salaries a n d other -outgoings be defrayed in the first instance
by the Exchequer, but t h a t charges be made on the local rates
representing 75 per cent, of the c u r r e n t cost of the regular fire services
(which, hitherto, have been borne by the local authorities without
Exchequer g r a n t ) or, in the case of such local a u t h o r i t i e s as have not
made a r r a n g e m e n t s to set u p a fire service on their own account, the
like proportion of the produce of a 2d. rate, as representing the
reasonable cost of providing a local fire service on a modest scale. .
11. The Secretary of State for Scotland a n d I have t a k e n a n opportunity
to consult the Regional Commissioners on these proposals, and found them in
general agreement as to the necessity for further measures to meet concentrated
enemy a t t a c k s and, w i t h the possible exception of the Scotland Regional
Commissioner, as to their t a k i n g the form which I have indicated. I have
every reason to believe that, so far as the members of the F i r e Services are
concerned, such measures would, on the whole, be welcomed. T h e a t t i t u d e of
the local authorities will be i m p o r t a n t . I t is only to be expected t h a t local fire
^authorities will in many cases deprecate a n y measure which would have the effect
of t a k i n g away their present fire brigade powers. A s yet, we have h a d no
o p p o r t u n i t y to consult the local a u t h o r i t i e s ' representatives, and it is not possible
to say to w h a t extent their objections may depend upon the form such measures
m i g h t t a k e or whether they could be met in any degree by the formation of
consultative committees, collaborating, in an advisory capacity, w i t h the Home
Office a n d / o r the Regional Commissioners, or w h a t their views m i g h t be on the
financial arrangements which are suggested. A r r a n g e m e n t s are being made to
consult the local a u t h o r i t i e s ' representatives as soon as possible.
12. T h e adoption of these measures would necessarily involve some
a d d i t i o n a l charge upon the Exchequer. The a n n u a l cost of the r e g u l a r fire
brigade service may be p u t a t about £3,000,000.
T h e cost of the emergency
services is about £23,000,000, of which about £21,000^000 is already borne by the
Exchequer, so t h a t the burden to be t r a n s f e r r e d from the r a t e s to the Exchequer
would be relatively small. Some a d d i t i o n a l Exchequer charges a r e to be antici­
p a t e d in respect of additional emergency fire services now in process of
development or r e m a i n i n g to be developed on a local or a regional basis, but these
would for the most p a r t be borne in any case by the E x c h e q u e r ; a n d such
additional Exchequer charge as m i g h t arise from t h e p a r t i c u l a r reorganisation
proposed in this M e m o r a n d u m is, in my view, fully justified by the necessities of
the situation.
H . M.
-Home
Office, May 6, 1941.