2+3'rd Conclusions, Minute 3^ Minute
14.7 th Conclusions
5
Bombing Policy: Targets in Occupied Territory. Foreign Affairs:
Italy.
Minute 2. Foreign Affairs: Roumania:
Poland:' Finland. 24.3th Conclusions, Minute! 1. Yugoslavia. : . Minute 3. OVERLORD Security. Discussions under Article VII. 14.9th Conclusions 53rd Conclusions, Minute 1. Finland.
.
57th Conclusions, Minute 2. Bombing Policy: 'Targets in Occupied Territory.-
Bombing Policy: Targets in Occupied Territory. 61st Conclusions 62nd Conclusions, Minute 1. Proposed International Monetary Fund. 63rd Conclusions, Minute 1. Russia. Minute.2. 67th Conclusions, Minute 3. Leakage of Information.. Portugal: Supply of-Wolfram to the Axis. Proposed Statement by President 68th Conclusions, Minute 2. Roosevelt. 69th Conclusions, Minute 2. Minute 3.
70th Conclusions, Minute 5. Bombing Policy France. France. OVERLORD Security: , Censorship of Minute 6. diplomatic Communications from this country. 71st Conclusions, Minute 6. France. 72nd Conclusions, Minute 3. France. 73rd Conclusions, Minute 1. France. 76th Conclusions, Minute 3, France: Relations with the French Committee of National Liberation: and Supplementary French Currency: General de.Gaulle's Visit to France 77th Conclusions, Minute 6. OVERLORD Security: Censorship of Diplomatic Communications from 77th Conclusions, Minute 1. this Country. 82nd Conclusions, Minute 3.
Air Raids:
Attacks by Flying Bombs
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W.M. (hh) U"5rd Conclusions, Minute 3 Oonfidential Annex ( 3 r d April, lgUh
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5.30 p.m.)
BOMBING POLICY THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF raised the question whether permission could now be given Targets in for certain railway targets in occupied Occupied Territory
territory to be attacked by day or night, without any operational restrictions, as part
(Previous Reference
of the OVERLORD bombing plan.
Up to the
W.M,(U3) 120th
present time the Air Staff had kept their
Conclusions, Minute 2) bombing of targets in occupied territory within
the restrictions imposed by the War Cabinet.
Under these restrictions it was only possible
to bomb 13 out of the 7*4- railway centres in
France and Belgium which the Supreme Commander
considered should be attacked^
The Ministry
of Home Security had given an estimate that,
unless evacuation reduced the number of civilian
population living near the targets, between
80,000 and 160,000 casualties might be caused
by the bombing, of which perhaps a quarter
, would be killed.
The Chiefs of Staff had considered this question,,
They thought that if railway operating personnel in France and -the Low Countries ,were warned that important railway centres in their countries might at any time be subjected to heavy air bombardment, and were advised to- evacuate the vicinity of such centres, this would reduce the number of casualties,.
Furthermore, it would probably increase the difficulties of operating the railways as a result of the bombings
They,
therefore, recommended that such a warning should be issued as soon as possible, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he under­
stood that there had been a division of opinion among the experts as to whether the Allied Air Forces should be employed on bombing railway targets or other targets, but that it had now been decided to recommend the bombing of railway tapgetso
He felt some doubts as to the wisdom of this policy. -1­
* These restrictions rro the result of a number of decisions given from time to time, but the broad effect Eay be ounmcriaed as limiting bombing operations against targets in occupied territory to circumstances in which the likelihood of the loss of life to civilians was reduced to the minimum. It was also suggested in -discussion that there were other military targets which would repay bombing better.
For example, dumps, camps and so forth. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that all these targets would be bombedi
After some preliminary doubts, he was now in favour of the policy of bombing railway targets rather than attacking, say, German oil targets.
He was satisfied that attacks on railway targets were, the best way of assisting in the initial stages of OVERLORD. Discussion then turned on the consideration that these attacks were likely to involve heavy casualties, on the French civilian population. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that at the present moment the prestige of the Royal Air Force stood very high in occupied territories on account of their reputation for accurate bombing.
This
good repute of the Royal Air Force would be lost if these attacks were carried out. Secondly, he feared that the French railwaymen would no longer give us the substantial help which we now received from them in the way of sabotage.
Thirdly, he feared that these attacks would affect our position in France and Belgium vis-a-vis Russia (whose reputation in these -countries now stood very high) and might be a handicap to us in re-establishing our relations with these two countries after the war THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that attacks which involved very heavy casualties on the French civil population might have serious repercussions.
It was true that the American Air Force would carry out the attacks with u s , but even so our relations with the French might suffer a set-back.
In any case, he felt that before action in the sense proposed was decided upon, the policy should receive the endorsement of President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull. The proposal to issue a preparatory warning was also referred to, and the view was expressed that the Germans would make it impossible for the French railway workers to leave the vicinity of tho railway centres. The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:­
(1) The. question of bombing railway targets in occupied territories should be considered by the Defence Committee at a meeting to be held that week.
It would be convenient if the meeting could have before them a report compiled by the Intelligence authorities as to the probable re­
actions of French opinion to the bombing policy proposed.
The
Chiefs of Staff were asked to give directions for a report on these lines to be prepared. (2)
;
In the meantime, the Foreign Office should prepare1 a draft communication to tlie U.S. authorities on the subject. ( 3 )
For the present Allied bombers should,
be restricted to bombing those
railway targets in occupied
territories which could be attacked
with relatively little"risk of
injury to the civil population.
Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, -3­
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W.M. (W4-)o3rd CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE h
Confidential Annex ( 3 r d April, 19kk - 5.30 p m . )
0
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Italy (Previous Reference: W.M. (i4)..)35th
Conclusions,
Minute 1 )
THE PRIME MINISTER reviewed recent developments
in the Italian situation consequent on the Russian
decision to exchange representatives with the Badoglio
Government.
That decision had strengthened the position
of Marshal Badoglio, had eliminated Communist opposition,
and had brought out the weakness of.the Bari grdup.
From our point of view, the more representative, and
the stronger, the Italian Government we had to deal
with, the betterj and to the extent that the Russian
moves had strengthened Marshal Badoglio s position, he
welcomed them. - He thought it quite likely that we
might now achieve the objectives suggested by the
Foreign Secretary at an earlier stage, i ^ h i s telegram
1783 of 29th February to Washington. /The broad effect
of this telegram was that we should make it clear that we
could tolerate no attempts to change the Italian
administration, or the position of King "Victor, until
after the capture of Rome; but that thereafter we
expected a solution to b e built up round the Crown
Prince Umberto who might either become Lieutenant of
the Realm, or become King on his Father's abdication.y
9
The Prime Minister added that we must bear in mind the proviso that, even after we.had reached Rome, the basis of any Italian Government could not be finally settled, as it would have to be still further broadened by the introduction of elements from Milan and the North. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY remarked that, reviewing the situation as it had developed, he was left with considerable doubt as to the motives which had animated He could not altogether exclude the the Russians.
possibility that their ultimate object might be ohe establishment of a Communist Government in Italy, at a later stage, and h e feared that that, rather than collaboration, might be what had really been in their minds, THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Italy was an Anglo-American theatre of war.
Russia had not now and never had had any Forces in that area, to the .­
subjugation of which she had made no military contribution. .The decisive voice in issues such as & the present ought, he felt, to rest with those who htii He reminded the War Cabinet that carried the burden.
we were not claiming to interfere with the Russian handling of the situation in conquered or liberated In his view it would b e countries in Eastern Europe.
well to allow the situation to develop and h e saw no reason for uneasiness at this stage. The War Cabinet took note of these statements. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1* ftWM DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC BflAJESTY'8 GOVERNMENT
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U7TH CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 2
' Confidential Annex (,11th April, 19hh - SoO p m ) 0
OREIGN AFFAIRS
0
THE PRIME MINISTER said that the rapid Russian advance into Roumanian territory greatly affected the As the War Cabinet knew", position of that country
Prince Stirbey had been in Caii o for some time with a view,to negotiations; but for some time past he had not been able to get any answer from his country. Meanwhile, the Russians had now told us that they wanted to settle the minimum armistice terms which could be
accepted from Roumanian
These-.were as follows:0
oumania
Previous
Reference:
W.M. ( 4 3 ) 176th.
Conclusions,
Minute k)
s
(a) Roumania should rupture relations with the Germans and join in the struggle against them. (b) The"Roumanian-Soviet frontier would be established in accordance with the Agreement of 1940 (this meant that Bessarabia came back to Russia], (c) The Soviet Union would be indemnified for the losses inflicted on its territory, as a result of hostilities and Roumanian occupation. (d) All Soviet and Allied prisoners of war and internees would be repatriated. (e) No demand was made that Roumanian territory should be occupied during the Armistice by Soviet troops, but Soviet and Allied troops, must be able to move freely across Roumanian territory if the military situation so demanded, (f) The .Soviet Government considered the Vienna Award to be unjust and was ready to conduct operations jointly with Roumania against the Hungarians and Germans, with a view to the . restoration to Roumania of the whole of Transylvania or the greater part: thereof. (g) If Roumania wished, for the purpose of contact with the Soviet Union, to have besides a General . Officer as representative for military questions, a Political Officer for political questions,, the Soviet Government.would have no objection. The Prime Minister referred to the question of the restoration of Transylvania to Roumania.
This was, Of course, an important matter.
The Foreign Office took the view that Roumania had as good, if not a better, right to Transylvania than Hungary.
This had been the view taken at the end of the last war. It was no doubt, undesirable to make a final settlement of a territorial question in advance of the Peace Conference. But the object of getting Roumania to change sides justified, in his view, talcing prompt action.
He
(the Prime Minister) had, therefore, sent a telegram to M. Molotov to the effect that we were in agreement with the terms proposed subject to two points.
First, we suggested the addition to the clause dealing with Transylvania of the words "subject to confirmation at the Peace Settlement".
He had also asked that the British and U.c. Governments shoulc' have representatives on political matters accredited to the Roumanian Government if Roumania changed sides and joined the Allies, just as the Russians had a political -roproocnt­
-seMs^ss^a^d^^Sonxb-oi CgaE^Bsagrgggfr Italy. The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the text of the telegram which he had sent to M.. Molotov covering these points, and of a reply which he had just received saying that M. Molotov agreed on both matters. As regards Transylvania, it was proposed to add to the clause the words "This to be .subject to approval at the Peace Settlement". Discussion of this matter had led.to consideration of the frontiers between Bulgaria and Roumania.
It
was pointed out that nothing had been saitl about this in the draft minimum armistice terms prepared by the Soviet Government.' MR. BRUCE said that the Russian habit of embodying in the Armistice Terms what was proper to a Peace Treaty might well lead to trouble with the Dominion Governments.
He had thought it right, in view of his knowledge of the views of the Australian Government, to inform them at once of the Russian proposals in regard to Roumania, and to explain to them that it had been necessary to act so quickly that prior consultation with the Dominions had not been possible. He thought, however, that there was a risk that some of the other Dominions might take the.point amiss unless it was explained to them very carefully. THE PRIME MINISTER thanked Mr. Bruce for the action which he had taken in regard to the Australian Government, and said that the point should certainly be 'borne in mind, and an appropriate telegram sent to the Prime, Ministers of the other Dominions, land
"revious
ieferenoe:
.M.(1)4) i+Oth
onclusions,
inute 1)
(D
THE PRIME MINISTER acquainted the War Cabinet with the latest developments in the Russo-Polish situation, He was informed by the Prime Minister of Poland that a much better situation had supervened in relation to the underground movement.
In obedience - to the instructions of the Polish Government in London, that movement, despite certain unfortunate incidents in the early stages, had continued to co-operate with the advancing Russians who, as they moved further west,- became increasingly conscious of its widespread character, reality and power.
An agreement' had now been reached between the Russian armies, with the approval of the Soviet Government, and the underground Polish leaders, with the approval of the Polish Government in London. That agreement (the text of which the Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet), while providing for the operational subordination of the underground movement to the Soviet, also contained, provisions v/hich recognised the existence of the Polish authorities in Warsaw and in London, and r e ^ r d e d their approval of the arrangements now reached.
The Prime"Minister regarded this development as, full of hope,, He had no doubt that the attitude which His Majesty s Government had adopted and. the stiff terms of the latest communication which he had made to Premier Stalin, had had their influence on the Russian attitude, and he was confirmed in the view he had expressed at an earlier stage that, despite the somewhat intransigent tone adopted by the Russians in their diplomatic correspondence with us, they might in practice prove much more accommodating than theyusere anxious to allow us to anticipate. 1
The War Cabinet took.note with satisfaction of this information. inland
Previous -
References
W.M. (IHh) i 3 r d
Conclusions,
Minute k)
THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the latest developments in the Russo-Finnish situation.
He
could not but regard the indemnity demanded by the Soviet Government as excessively heavy, nor could it be overlooked that we had British interests to protect in Finland.
At the same time, if this were the only obstacle, he thought that it would be to the interest of the Finns now to reach a settlement with the Russians even on the onerous terms put forward, in the hope that the indemnity clause would come under review at the time of the Peace Conference as part of the general settlement to be reached with Russia. *fices of the War Cabinet, 3.W.1., THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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WtMi (till) 48TH00NSLUSI0NS. MINUTE 1 Confidential Annex (13th April, ISkk - 6.30 p.m.)
YUGOSLAVIA
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (iik)35th
Conclusions,
Minute 1) THE PRIME MINISTER informed the War Cabinet that he had just had an interview with King Peter of Yugoslavia.
For some months past we had been pressing him to dismiss General Mihailovlch.
It was clear that the. connection with General Mihailovich was doing him very great.damage. The Prime Minister said that he had urged the following policy on King Peter: (I) He should at once dismiss the whole Puric Government, including General Mihailovich as War Minister; (II) He should issue a proclamation, which had been drawn up by the Foreign Secretary.
The general thesis of this proclamation (the text of which was read to the War Cabinet) was that the King urged all his subjects to join in fighting the Germans, and said that he would give his support to all who took this coursej (III) The King should then form a Government of a neutral character, which would not be objectionable to Tito, (IV) He.should give orders to ships of the Royal Yugoslav Navy to engage actively in carrying supplies to Tito. The Prime Minister said that if King Peter adopted this course (and he had promised to give him an answer the following d a y ) , he would advise him then to allow events for a time to take their course and see what developments followed. The War Cabinet took note of this statement. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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Copy No....??!. U8TH I N C L U S I O N S . MINUTE 3
Confidential Annex ( 1 3 t h April, I9I+24.
"OVERLORD" SECURITY
(Previous Reference:
W.M. (1+2+) 3 1 s t
Conclusions, Minute 2)
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6 . 3 0 p.ra.)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that on the previous day he had held a meeting to consider a Note by Sir Pindlater Stewart proposing that, in the interests of "OVERLORD" security,
a ban should be imposed on uncensored
communications sent or received by diplomatic
representatives in this country.
The Prime Minister reminded the War Cabinet of the restrictions which had been imposed in this country in the interests of "OVERLORD" and what had been done to prevent the leakage of information through Ireland. If, however, we continued to allow uncensored communications to pass between diplomatic representatives in this country and their Governments, there would be a serious gap in our security measures through which valuable information might reach the enemy. The Supreme Allied Commander had pressed strongly for the imposition of a ban on. diplomatic communications, end the meeting had come to the conclusion that, in view of the importance of leaving nothing undone which mi5?ht promote the success of "OVERLORD", his view should be accepted. It was accordingly proposed that from
15th April, or as soon thereafter as possible,
foreign diplomatic representatives in this
country should not be permitted to send or
receive uncensored communications, and that
no members of diplomatic staffs, should be
permitted to leave the country.
The
restrictions would apply not only to neutral
Governments, but also to Allied Governments,
including the French Committee of Liberation
and the exiled Governments in this country,
but excluding the United States and the
U.S.S.R.
Similar restrictions would have to be imposed on the movement of French military ­
personnel from this country to Algiers. In discussion the following points were made;­
(a) It was pointed out that it would not be possible to prevent entirely the reception in this country of wireless cypher messages from overseas transmitters, e.g. the French National Committee's transmitter at Algiers.
There might also be difficulty in controlling messages sent by the Polish and Czech Governments to their underground movements, and certain of the Allied armed forces in this country might have wireless transmitters which might be used for the sending of cypher messages oversoas*, (b) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION JSFFAIRS said that it would be desirable to inform the Dominion Governments in advance of the steps which it was proposed to take. (c) It was suggested that there might be exceptional circumstances which would justify allowing important foreign representatives, e.g. representatives of the French National Committee of Liberation now on a visit to this country to proceed over­
seas. The War Cabinet ( 1 )
Approved the action which had been
decided on at the meeting on the
previous day
0
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( 2 )
Asked the Minister of Production,
as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on
"OVERLORD" Security, to
be responsible for coordinating the
necessary action to give effect
to their decision, and to consider
what action could be taken to meet
the points raised in sub-paragraphs
(a) and (c) above, (3)
Agreed that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs should give the Dominion Governments advance information of what was proposed. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
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V/.M. (lih) U9TH CONCLUSIONS Confidential Annex (li+th April,
DISCUSSIONS UNDER ARTICLE VII The War Cabinet had before them the following memoranda:­
.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (kh) 2Zvth
Conclusions^
Minute 3 )
- 12 Noon)
(i) By the Secretary'of State for Dominion Affairs (W.P. (1+4) 1 9 2 ) , covering the agreed summary
of discussions with the officials from
the Dominions and India;
(ii) By the Chancellor of the Exchequer
(",.'.P. (Uk) 1 9 8 ) , setting out his views on
the proposed International Monetary Fund,
and dealing with the procedure in connection
with the proposed publication of the
Statement of Principles for the Fund;
(iii) By the President of the Board of Trade.
(V/.P. (hh) 1 9 9 ) . summarising the proposals for
commercial policy as they stood after the
rece,nt conference with officials from the
Dominions and India.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said he was anxious that the War Cabinet should reach conclusions on their general attitude towards the scheme for an International Monetary Fund.
The question had assumed added urgency since it now appeared that President Roosevelt desired a further International Conference this summer which would clearly have to be seized of the Statement of Principles which had been agreed in the discussions between the official representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom,
Mr. Morgenthau who, he thought, was under a good deal of pressure from the President, had strongly urged that unless the scheme "can be published next week at the latest, it would not be practicable to have an International Conference in May. In that case, there was no saying if and when a Conference could be held." The Chancellor said that in his Memorandum (W.P.(hh) 193) he had suggested that, subject to the qualifications set out in paragraph-3* the objective of the International Monetary Union was sound and that it could usefully be pursued in a further International Conference. He gathered from his communications with Mr. Morgenthau that the Conference would not be of Ministers, but a wider discussion on the official level following on the discussions that had already taken place.
He trusted that the War Cabinet would feel able to agree to publication of the Statement of Principles.
In his judgment, it would be very awkward to fall out with the United States on that issue. It was relevant that two plans produced by Mr. White and Lord Keynes respectively had already been published,yt&g-othcr- with- a Keynes - White plan which embodied some of the features of both. The two- important points outstanding on the Statement of [Principles were:­
(a) Publication of the proposed quotas of different countries. ("b) The arrangements for the management of the Fund and that it should be non-political. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL said he was strongly opposed to publication.
The Plan was the same old Plan, with certain suggestions for modification/
There
was nothing .new in those suggestions.
In accepting the Plan, we would be going contrary to the view of the Bank of England, the Joint Stock Banks, and a substantial body of political opinion.
The question whether the Plan was. the gold standard or not was one of fact.
The Bank of England,. he-contended, held that it was.
The Joint Stock Banks were opposed to it for the same reason.
Lord Keynes was unique in­
the financial community in supporting the Chancellor's view..
It was important that Lord Catto should be ' consulted and that, before expressing a final opinion, he should consult his staff who were opposed to the scheme.
He had no doubt that if we did not sustain the sterling bloc, the result would be a flight from sterling, and he regarded the statement made by the Bank of England (quoted in W.P.(hh) 121) as supporting the view that the sterling bloc could be sustained without the assistance of the United States.
There . was grave danger that we should repeat the cycle of events-which started in 1922 with the American debt settlement, and' ended in' 1931. THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that it would be impossible to sustain sterling'without some assistance from the United States.
He thought that the Bank of England agreed with him.
It was, of course, vital to maintain the sterling bloc; but there was nothing in the present plan inconsistent'with that aim. If; on the other hand, wo antagonised the United States, the generous assistance needed from that country would not be made available,, Opinion critical of the scheme could not be well-founded or based on a' knowledge of the facts since no publicity had been given to the plan.
That, indeed, was one of the arguments that weighed with him in favour of publication now.
We could reasonably take the line in publishing that this was a plan which had been discussed between the technical experts; that its objective was good: that its machinery admittedly might not be the best, but that publication would elicit the views of the leaders of the banking industry (and not only in this country) when the question of machinery could be reviewed Internationally. Refusal to agree even to publication would, he feared, antagonise our friends and those who were anxious to co-operate with us in the United States. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that he ­
was not against publication, but he was strongly opposed to our committing ourselves to the objective He regarded the plan as a gold standard of the scheme.
plan with easements, and as one which was not' consistent with maintaining stability of the, international price level, or full emp. oyment.
In
the event of its adoption, sterling must lose caste. He believed that the Bank of England's fears were The scheme, well-founded from that point of view.
too, was intimately bound up with the Commercial Policy scheme to which reference was made in the Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade (W.P. (Uh) 199)* the object of which was to encourage
We were, he feared, being
promiscuous trade.
committed, step by step to the course of policy that - ­
had failed so disastrously for us and for the world
over the period 1925 to 1931s. merely in order to
gratify the United States.
The whole objective of
the scheme was wrong.In his opinion, trade should
be regulated in the national interest, with Great
Britain first; the Empire second, and the rest of
the world third.
THE MINISTER OF PRODUCTION made three points. .
First, he could not accree that international control
of rates of exchange was not an objective to which we
should subscribe.
His business experience
convinced him that tho groat obstacle to the
expansion of international trade was the absence
of a medium of exchange.
Secondly, it was a fantasy to think that confidence in the sterling area would be helped by making sterling inconvertible.
The real danger to the stability of the sterling area lay primarily in the dangerous position which would arise if heavy sterling balances had to be blocked at the end of the war and sterling declared inconvertible. Thirdly, the present scheme pre-supposed that
the world would settle down before it was put into
It could not be used in the transitional
operation.
period unless the scales had been reasonably balanced.
He thought it most unlikely that we should reach that
The clearing
point under at least five to six years.
facilities of £325,000,000 allowed us under the scheme
would be adequate when a reasonable balance had been
established, say, in five or six years' time, but not
at any earlier stage.
He saw nothing wrong, however,
in the objective of the scheme.
In reply to the Prime Minister,'THE CHANCELLOR
OF THE EXCHEQUER confirmed that the Monetary Scheme,
as embodied in the papers circulated under W. P.(Uh )l92,
had been practically agreed between the technical
experts on each side, and that Governments were" not
committed to it. Mr. Morgenthau's replies to his
enquiries as to the attitude of the United States
Government had been somewhat difficult to follow but
he (the Chancellor) thought that the intention on the
American side was clearly that publication should not
commit governments, but should provide a basis for
further talks consequent to which, at a date which
might well be quite far away, there should be a
piKinouncement by the Governments concerned.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that- it seemed clear that Mr., Morgenthau did not intend to commit the United States Government to this scheme. , But it was ' essential that we should be clear as to the attitude of the United States before publication.
He thought it very desirable that'the scheme should be ventilated and the reactions to it ascertained of expert opinion, of the general public, and of Parliament.
It was, however, equally important tfeat we should not commit ourselves in any way in regard to it, or as regards the soundness of its objectives.
We should not go beyond publication, with a view to discussion, making it clear that the Government was entirely uncommitted, and that it was important that the public and Parlia­
ment should have time to consider the valuable report of the experts,,
He did not think there was any risk of the serious misunderstanding of this attitude by the United States,, We must make clear to the United States Government what our attitude was.
He would be ready to assist in" the drafting of the communications. The. line of any public statement might be that there *would be general agreement that the ideal to be arrived at was the largest possible volume of beneficial exchange of goods and services throughout the world, coupled with reasonable stability in price movements..
There might he a case for' a reference to full employment, given the attitude of the Australian Government on the matter.
;
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR AIR said that he was in favour of publication, without conimitment. Vie ought, however, to be clear what line would be adopted in an early debate. THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER said that this might be on the lines which the Prime Minister had indicated.
-He would, himself, have liked tq go further and say that he regarded as sound the objective of the scheme (which he would have defined as being in general terms "to provide machinery for the orderly regulation of exchanges with a view to promoting the fullest possible expansion of But it was clear that there international trade").
was not general support in the Cabinet for our doing so and he did not think it essential to go so far. THE PAYMASTER GENERAL expressed his agreement with the view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
He
was in favour of publication; he was in agreement also with the objective and thought that any difficulties could be overcome by careful phrasing of any announcement.
There was obvious advantage in discussion which would get this matter into the open. THE .MINISTER OP STATE was in favour of publishing the Statement of Principles but of disclaiming any commitment. THE MINISTER OP LABOUR said that, while fully
accepting the explanations which the Chancellor of
the Exchequer had given, he still had an uneasy fear
that in some way the scheme would anchor us to gold.
The point was,' at any rat,e, debatable, and those who
had had the experiences of 1925 to "1931 might be
excused for feeling uneasy.
THE CHANCELLOR OP THE
EXCHEQUER felt that there was no real foundation for
these apprehensions.
The object of this scheme was
to enable the relations of national currencies to
gold to be adjusted from time to time. This was
essentially/ a machinery plan.
* THE SECRETARY OP STATE POP DOMINION AFFAIRS referred to-the position, of the Dominions.
He was in favour of publication, and felt that we should probably have no choice but to .accept the early date of publication for which the United States Government were pressing,
It was, however, unfortunate, from' the Dominion point of view since -most of their Prime Ministers were actually en route to this country. If the Prime Minister's formula were adopted, that would ease matters, but he felt that it was essential that' an immediate explanation should be,given to the Dominions so that, if they desired, they could publish simultaneously with any announcement here.
The
argument could be used that the United States were going to publish in any event and - that We should have no option in those circumstdnces but to agree. A short discussion then ensued on Commercial Policy.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE mentioned that he had received a request from the Prime Minister to prepare and circulate-a summary of the main points that had emerged from the discussions on commercial policy with the Dominions, and suggested that a discussion might be adjourned until this was in the possession of Ministers.
The Dominions discussions had, in his judgment, been very valuable; But the time was not yet ripe for the publication of the commercial plan, though it might be useful if further conversations on the technical level could tai-:e place with United States representatives so that the technical plan could be brought to the same point of development as the plan on monetary policy.
The
United States Government were not pressing for its publication and it would be desirable to discuss with the Dominion Prime Ministers before publication was considered further. THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES suggested that the commercial plan had already been disclosed in the United States, and felt that this was an argument for publication in the United Kingdom. - The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:-
International Monetary Fund (1.) It was agreed, in principle, that, subject
to the settlement of outstanding points,
we . should offer no objection to the
-publication at a very early date of the Statement of Principles for an International Monetary Fund, which.had resulted from the technical discussions, on a non-committal basis, between the off icials of H.M. Treasury and the U. S, Treasury. (2) When the Statement of Principles was published, it should be accompanied by a further statement which would make it clear that while H.M,' Government regarded the scheme as a valuable contribution to our objectives in the field of international trade,H.M. Government were in no way committed to. it; and that they wished the scheme to be the subject of informed discussion in Parliament and elsewhere before any commitment was undertaicen,, ( 3 ) It would be necessary to arrive at, an
understanding with the U.S. Governrnenrt as to
the general line of the statements to be
made by both Governments when the "scheme
was published.
In particular, it would be
necessary -to make quite certain what was, the
attitude of the U.5. Government in this
matter. Would their attitude be non­
committal; or were they in the position of .
sponsoring the scheme, and inviting other
Nations to adhere.to it?
(Lj.) The Chancellor of the Exchequer'undertook to
submit to the Prime Minister a draft telegram
to the U. 3.- Government informing them of the
general lines of the statement which we
suggested should be made (see conclusion ( 3 ) ) *
and'enquiring as to the U.S. Government's
attitude towards the scheme.
1
( 5 ) The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
undertook to inform the Dominion Prime
Ministers of the reasons why it had been
necessary to agree to publication of the
Statement of Principles for the International
Monetary Fund-at this juncture* and also
of our general attitude in regard to the .
scheme
Commercial Policy ( 6 ) The time was not yet ripe for publication
of the proposed scheme for the commercial
union.
In the first place the discussions
in regard to it were not so far advanced
as were those on monetary matters.
In
the second place, it was desirable that
there should be discussion with the
-Dominion Prime Ministers, before publication. ( 7 ) The President of the Board -of Trade
undertook to submit to the War Cabinet a
memorandum setting out the main points for
decision in regard to the proposed commercial
union, as a basis for discussion by the
War Cabinet prior to the meeting with the
Dominion Prime Ministers.
Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1Y
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W.M. (hh) 53RD CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1 Confidential Annex; (20th April, 192+1+ - 6.2+5 p.m.) FINLAND
(Previous References W.M. (2+h) 2+yth Conclusions, Minute 2) THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS read to the War Cabinet the text, which he had just received from the Soviet Ambassador, of the Finnish reply to the Russian peace terms and of the reply which the Soviet Government proposed to return.
The Finnish reply was to the effect that, while they were very anxious to be on friendly terms with their great neighbour, the proposals which had been put to them embodied certain things which were technically not possible of accomplishment, that they were hardly consistent with their existence as a state, and imposed a burden exceeding the extent of their powers.
They were therefore unable to accept them. The reply proposed by the Soviet Government took note of the rejection of the terms of armistice put.forward as a basis for a settlement, and of the fact that the Finnish Government had discontinued the negotiations for an armistice.
Before despatching this reply the Soviet Government enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any remarks concerning it, THE PRIME MINISTER felt that the Russian terms were not unreasonable, except as regards the indemnity proposals which were very severe.
It was for consideration whether this point might not be touched on in our reply.
Our sympathy for the Finns was bound to be conditioned by the fact that, after receiving many benefits from the Allies, they had deliberately decided to take sides with Hitler. It,was pointed out, on the other hand, that the Finnish reply, so far as could be judged from the translation, had not narrowed the issue down to that of.the indemnity, but appeared to have rejected as a whole the terms put forward by the Soviet Government. After discussion THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the reply should be that we much regretted that no solution had been reached and were grateful to the Soviet Government for keeping us informed. Had the breakdown been on the narrow issue, of the indemnity proposals, we might have submitted some observations to the Soviet Government, but as the Finnish reply appeared to reject the terms put forward generally, we had no observations to make. The War Cabinet -
Approved the terms of the reply suggested by the Prime Minister at 'X'. Offices of the War Cabinet. S.W.1. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT
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-4*eS F-*SeCJ*ET.
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'FQP SECRET W.M., (44) 57th CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 2 Confidential Annex (27th April, 1944 - 12.15 p.m. ) Bombing PolicyTargets in
Occupied
Territory.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that since the matter had last been discussed by the War Cabinet, the Defence The first estimate Committee had held weekly meetings.
of between 80,000 and 160,000 casualties, of which per­
haps a quarter would be killed, had now been reduced to an
The bombing which had already estimate or io,00u killed^
een carried out, which had included attacks on targets where the heaviest casualties weretOjjjbesxpected, had
shown that the total number of ^^^^luintllcd' was likely
to fall below the revised estimate
To date, some 3 0 0 0
to 4*000 persons had been killed and the cost of the
full programme m.ight work out at approximately 12,000
killed-a^v-A. /X-*J*\£r\*.a.\%i L*-^**X-*A .
1
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (44)43rd
Conclusions,
Minute 3 )
S
The attacks had, however, offered the German controlled Vichy propagardists an advantage which they had not been slow to seize, and there was no doubt that the people of Prance were feeling the results of the bombing vary much. He recalled that when the policy was first mooted there had been considerable differences of opinion among the experts as to its value.
At a meeting of the Defence Committee the previous evening, he had felt that the majority of his political colleague were agreed that the plan should not be proceeded with. He was also disturbed by the disproportionate efforts of the British and American Air Forces, respectively,, So far the R.A.F. had dropped some 12 times the weight of bombs dropped by American aircraft, and he felt that there was a danger that we should later bo told that the great loss of French life was entirely due to the blind night bombing Carried, out by the British,, iff­
He was. not satisfied that the strategic merits of the plan justified its continuance, and it was certainly wrong on humanitarian grounds. No doubt if the bombing were continued for a sufficiently long period, the effect might be sufficient to interfere with the enemy's But he did not believe that such an military movements.
effect could be achieved in the relatively short tine available and thought that attacks on other targets, such as large dumps and parks of mechanical transport, would be more effective.
If, in the heat of battle,, it were decided that it was necessary to attack a part­
icular railway target to stop movement of enemy forces, then he would agree that any casualties which might be inflicted on friendly civilians must be accepted.
The
present attacks, however, were not being carried out.in the heat of battle, and if we continued to kill large numbers of French civilians, there might well be a change in French feelings towards us. j
He thought he should tell the President that
we saw grave objection to the plan on political grounds
and had grave doubts as to its merits on strategical
grounds.
On balance, we felt that it might well do
more
evil than good.
The time available"was not
sufficient to achieve the effect desired and there were
\
other targets which, if not quite so good as railway
centres from the point of view of assistance to
"OVERLORD;. would produce valuable results without
incurring the hatred of the Frenoh people.
We thought,
therefore, /that attacks on railway centres should be
onfined to those targets where heavy casualties to the civilian population were not likely to be caused, and that the bombing plan should be revised to include I targets such as M o T . parks, dumps, aircraft factories and '! targets in- Germany. 1
Before despatching the telegram, he would discuss the matter with the Supreme Allied Commanders THE MINISTER OP PRODUCTION said he was informed . by the Chief Mechanical Engineer of the London Midland and. Scottish Railway that, for strategical reasons, the French railways had widely dispersed their, repair fac­
ilities; and that, contrary to the practice on the British or German systems, their repair sheds were equipped to manufacture spare parts as well as to carry out overhauled
One railway alone had 70 such centres, and it was estimated that there were approximately 350 serving the whole railway system of France.
His informant had expressed the view that the French railways could not be knocked "out, by attach a on thols? repair and servicing facilities to a sufficient extent to prevent the raovo­
ment of troops,, ?
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR- said that he certainly did not like bombing targets in France. The present He would much prefer to bomb Germany
plan, however, did not cause any appreciable diversion of effort from Germany in the dark periods which were suitable for such attacks; it did provide for the full employment of the bomber force during the moon periods which were not suitable for attacks on German targets. -
0
He agreed that a number of Air Officers had opposed the plan in the early stages.
They had however oeen convinced by a study of all possible alternatives that there was no other plan which offered the same prospect of assisting "OVERLORD". Enemy dumps, camps and vehicle, parks would be But once such objects were attacked in due course
attacked, we must expect the enemy to adopt a policy of dispersal, and it would therefore be v/iser to leave such attacks until nearer the time of the battle
0
c He pointed out th&t the German controlled Vichy broadcasts had had to admit that there were large numbers of Frenchmen who asked that"the British and Americans should continue their bombingo
He asked the Cabinet to consider the position shortly after our assault had been launched, and when German counter-attacks were developing.
The crucial point was' to defeat these counter-attacks, and he did not see any grounds to justify the adoption of a second best plan, in preference to one designed to hamper the movement of the enemy troops to oppose our landing. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that the seriousness of the problem arose from the length of time over which
­
the attacks were to be made.
The long continuance of the attacks would, he felt, gradually alienate the mass of French opinion.
He would be prepared to face this prospect if he were convinced that the attacks were essential to the siiccess of the battle.
He did not, however, believe that this was the case, and felt the plan should be reconsidered and attacks confined to phbs& railway centres where the risk to the civilian population was small, and that the remainder of our effort should be diverted to other targets. THE LORD PRESIDENT agreed with the views - ­
expressed by the Foreign Secretary
He was not afraid of the effects of Vichy propaganda, but of the effects on French public opinion of the attacks themselves, which, he felt, would arouse hostility in those areas where we most needed help.
He did not think that the case for the plan showed that it was of sufficient assistance to "OVERLORD" to outweigh the political disadvantages it entailed. c
36 THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF read a statement
expressing the agreed views of the Chiefs of Staff.
He
had himself examined the plan and possible alternatives in detail, and had discussed them with the Deputy Supreme Commander and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force.
A s a result, he was convinced that there was no alternative plan which offered an equal prospect of helping the army to resist the German counter­
offensive.
This conviction was shared by the Supreme Allied Commander.
' . THE PAYMASTER GENERAL said that" he had always been of the opinion that attacks on railway centres would have a long term effect.
He understood this opinion had also been expressed by many of the railway experts with whom the plan had been discussed in its early stagese The Air Commander-in-Chief had himself at one
time spoken of extending the attacks over a period of
He (the Paymaster General) did not
from 6 to 9 months
believe that in the time available the plan could achieve
the reduction in the capacity of the French railways which
was necessary if military movements were to be affected.
0
He suggested that an alternative plan should be
prepared, which should include attacks on railways yards
where the estimated number of fatal casualties was less
than say 100, and attacks on such targets as dumps,
vehicle parks arid military camps.
If it were decided to
continue with the present policy, we should insist on the
Americans assuming a full share of responsibility.
THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION said that when the attacks were first launched the French, had believed our invasion to be imminent,,
As time had passed and the attacks had been continued with no sign of an invasion, the French mood had shown signs of changing,
He thought this change would become more marked. It was significant that Swiss Broadcasts and newspapers, which had previously been friendly towards us, now expressed horror at the results on the civilian population of our attacks on railway centres.
He felt that the continuance of such attacks would not only turn the French,and such friendly neutrals as still remained, against us, but would also be opposed by home opinion. *
Annex
-3­
The War Cabinet ­
k
-,
'' .
y
(a) Agreed that the plan for bombing
targets in enemy occupied, territory
should be revised to include attacks on only those railway centres where the estimated casualties did not
exceed 1O0/15Os and that consideration should be given to including attacks on such targets as dumps, military
camps and vehicle parks; (b) Took note that the Prime Minister would prepare a telegram to the President on the lines suggested at X ' above, and that he would discuss this telegram with the Supreme Allied Commander before despatching
it. l
Offices of the War Cabinet, S W.1* 0
-h­
ANNEX BOMBING OF FRENCH RAILWAY CENTRES I-o
The Plan now in process of execution and. approximately one third completed is based on the belief that the smooth working of the railways in occupied territory during the critical period following the "OVERLORD" assault will be of importance to the Germans. 2.
The principle on which the Plan is conceived is that the destruction of some 60 railway centres in
occupied territory, particularly of the repair and
servicing facilities and the locomotives to be found in
these centres, will greatly reduce the German capacity
for rapid movement of troops by rail and will restrict
the number of alternative routes available. v
3.
It is contended that when once the general efficiency of the railways has been lowered and when the number of alternative routes has been reduced it will be possible by air action after the assault to impose far more serious delays on movement than would have been possible if the railway system were relatively intact at that time. ki
No-one has been able to produce an alternative plan for the employment of the bomber strength available in sueh a way as to offer an equal prospect of helping the Army to resist
the German counter offensive. 5.
It therefore seems that if the railway plan has to be cancelled on political grounds this will mean that "OVERLORD" will be launched with some thing less than the best possible chance.
How much less no-one can say, nor is it possible either to affirm or to deny that this margin may be decisive.
The military advice which, the Chiefs of Staff offer is that everything which is politically feasible should be done to give "OVERLORD" the best possible chance and they therefore recommend that the Plan should proceed unless political considerations are held to be over-riding. 27th-April. 19liU THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT .
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Copy No.
TOP SECRET W.M. (44) 61ST CONCLUSIONS Confidential Annex (2nd May, 1944 - 7.15 p.m.)
BOMBING POLICY
Targets in
Occupied
Territory
(Previous
Reference;
W.M.(44) 57th
Conclusions,
Minute 2 )
THE PRIME MINISTER said that as a result of the last meeting of the War Cabinet at which this matter had been discussed he had spoken to General Eisenhower and had also sent him a letter enclosing a copy of the War Cabinet s conclusions, together with a summary of the arguments which l e d them to oppose the policy of attacking railway centres. '
He had now. received General Eisenhower's reply.
This might be summarised as follows:1
The political considerations involved had been
realised throughout and it was in the light of these considerations that instructions had been given that two railway centres in the Paris area should not be attacked until Within a few days of D-day and that other targets, where it was estimated that heavy casualties would be caused, should be left until the end of the programme.
This
postponement v/ould inevitably ftffect the full efficacy
of the plan, but this handicap could be accepted in view of the weighty political considerations involved. . General Eisenhower had gone on to point out that civilian casualties were inherent in any bombing plan. They had been caused by our attacks on submarine bases and on aircraft factories, and would certainly be entailed in attacks on headquarters and communication centres which would be of vital importance immediately prior to the assault.
Experience had shown that the casualties inflicted had been less than had been estimated, and that in a number of cases many Germans had been killed. It had never been suggested that the plan would stop essential military movement.
Its
object was so to weaken and disorganise the railway system as a whole, that at the critical time German railway movements could be effectively delayed.
In this connection the delay which would be involved by the enforced .use of motor transport would in itself be of inestimable value. C
Alternative plans had been fully and sympathetically considered.
Some of the targets which had been suggested were already scheduled for attack."
None of the alternative plans would effectively delay or disrupt enemy concentrations. - If it was still considered that political considerations were such as to limit attacks to those centres where the estimated casualties would not exceed 100-150, General Eisenhower thought such modification would emasculate
p
.the whole plan.
He concluded by stating that the OVERLORD concept was based on the assumption that our overwhelming air power would be able to prepare the way for the assault., and that the extensive programme of bombing operations against various types of military targets planned to take place from
. j
D - 30 onwards, would inevitably involve considerable civilian casualties,,
If air operations were to be limited, the perils of an already hazardous undertaking would be greatly enhanced. The Prime Minister said that General Eisenhower had an onerous responsibility and care should be taken not to add to his burdens unnecessarily,
Very
great consequences might follow from interference
­
with his plan on political grounds.
He (the Prime Minister) had not fully realised that our use of air power before OVERLORD would assume so cruel and remorseless a form.
It was clear that great slaughter would inevitably result from the air attacks planned in support of OVERLORD.
He felt that these air operations should be governed"by some laws of war laid down by the War Cabinet, and should be accompanied
I
by an immense programme of leaflet dropping, to warn the inhabitants of the threatened areas, even if this involved some additional risk to our airmen.
It was for the War Cabinet to decide whether they should send a statement of their views, together with General Eisenhower's reply, to the President and ask his views. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION said that he was concerned by the reaction of opinion in the occupied territories to the attacks on railway centres.
He
cited the attacks on Malines in particular.
This
town, which was the cultural and religious centre of Belgium, had been attacked three times.
The
marshalling yards had not been seriously damaged but the Cathedral, hospitals and schools had been damaged, and many civilians killed.
There was little doubt that the opinion of the Church in Belgium had turned against us as a results THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR said that the Supreme Commander would no doubt be prepared to consider excluding Malines from the list of targets if a special case were made.-,
But there were many targets, attacks on which would inevitably.result in civilian casualties and in the destruction of buildingsj and the casualties to be expected from attacks on railway targets would be but a small proportion of the total casualties caused by air attacks in support of OVERLORD
If the railway plan were given a chance it might well be that at the critical period, some 10 days affter the beginning of the battle, the Germans would find themselves unable
^
to throw reserve divisions into the battle until one of two days later than they had planned.
The effect of such delays, even if they were as little as 12 hours might well be very considerable
In reply to a statement that despite our air superiority we had been unable to prevent the enemy concentrating 8 divisions n
against the Anzio Bridgehead, he pointed out that the flying conditions at that time had been referred to by crews as flying through "clouds stuffed with mountains".
Since the weather had cleared, air attacks had been successful, and all railways leading to Rome had been cut for the last month. -THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that the aim of the railway plan was to restrict railway communication on the broad routes from east to west and to destroy facilities.
This would reduce the number of alternative routes and diminish the resources available for repair work.
It would thus simplify the problem of cutting the remaining routes and of delaying movement of enemy forces at the criticial period of the battle.
The night bombing on railway centres had been very accurate, and he thought that very few people had been killed at distances of more than a mile or a mile and a half from the target. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said he was perturbed at the possible reaction on European opinion.
After
the war, Eastern Europe and the Balkans would be largely dominated by the Russians, whereas the peoples of Western Europe would look to us.
If the present attacks were continued we might well find that they regarded us with hatred.
It had in the past been necessary to take decisions in favour of courses of action which entailed horrible results.
He would be quite prepared tp take such a decision now if he were convinced that it was a case of victory or defeat; he was not, however, so convinced. THE PAYMASTER GENERAL referred to the views which had been put forward by various authorities at earlier stages of the consideration of the Railway Plan.
He said that he thought that the Cabinet were entitled to have before them a clear statement of the evidence on which adoption of the Railway Plan had been regarded as justified.
So far as-he was aware, the weight of expert evidence was against the plan. THE HOME SECRETARY AND MINISTER OF HOME SECURITY said that he thought that the War Cabinet was in a difficulty in deciding on this matter unless they were in a position to balance the military justification for the plan against the loss of civilian life involved. THE MINISTER OF PRODUCTION said that the destruction now envisaged was something new in war and he considered that devastation, on the scale mentioned was unacceptable. THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF said that the whole concept of OVERLORD was based on making full use of the terrific air power at our disposal. He doubted if we should have undertaken a task which was almost super-human had it been anticipated that our use of air power would have been restricted.
He
pointed out that ,when the enemy launched his attack against Poland and on the Western Front, he had not hesitated to make the most ruthless use of his air forces. At the outset, he had been doubtful whether the
railway plan offered the maximum results for- the
effort involved, and had thought we might have over­
estimated the results of our attacks on the German Air
Force and that it might have paid us to persist in
NOT; that we had"devoted so.
those attacks. .
much effort to the railway plan,
it Would b'9i
unwise to sacrifice this.effort and change over to
a hew policy.
The plan would certainly make it more
difficult for the enemy to move his forces.
He
would certainly require to move some of them by rail
as well as by road.
If the railway system were
mutilated, the number of routes would be restricted
and those remaining could be more easily cut,,
He
suggested that bywarning the population of impending
.attack WG might, in addition to sparing French lives,
still further hamper the railway system by encouraging
the dispersal of essential staff.
Heavy.civilian
casualties were bound to be caused by air attacks on
other essential targets, such as certain gun
emplacements and centres of communication of tactical
importance.
In order to maintain security it would
be necessary to attack targets in areas other than
those where the assault was to take'place; this would
inevitably increase the number of casualties,
THE MINISTER OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE thought it would be unwise to approach the' Provident regarding the railway plan
alone, since it was apparent'that the effects of this policy were likely to be small as compared with the total results of air action in support of OVERLORD.
He would like to know It
the implications of our air policy as a whole
would then be possible to weigh the balance between the military and political considerations involved. He suggested that the Deputy,Supreme Commander and possibly the Supreme Commander himself should be invited to attend a meeting of the. Defence Committees, . or a Staff Conference, to explain details of the air operations planned and the military considerations involved if these operations were curtailed.
The
military considerations could then be reported to the War Cabinet, who should decide whether they justified the political risks they entailed,, 0
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would arrange for a meeting of the Defence Committee,, or a Staff Conference, in the course of the next few a.ays to hear an outline of the air operations planned in support of OVERLORD and to consider the military implications of restricting such operations.
It would then be for the War Cabinet to consider whether an approach should be made to the President on political grouhdSc In,the meantime a memorandum should be prepared, setting out the views of the War Cabinet on the political implications of the air operations planned and their probable effect on our future relations with the' occupied countries.
The drafting of this memorandum obviously could net be completed until full details of the air operations in support of OVERLORD had been received and Considered,,
But it seemed clear that we should inform the President that we should not be ready to support such operations unless we were assured of the full support of' the U.S. Government both in the execution of the operations and in any political difficulties which might subsequently arise. -k-
'
-
...
The War Cabinet agreed as follows ­
(1) A meeting of the Defence Committee, or a Staff Conference, should he convened in the course of the next few days to discuss with the Deputy Supreme Commander, and possibly the -
Supreme Commander, the air operations planned in support of OVERLORD and to consider the military implications of restricting such plans, ( 2 ) That in the meantime a document should
be drawn up on the lines suggested
by the Prime Minister.
(3) That after hearing the report of the Defence Committee on the military aspect, the Vifar Cabinet would decide whether the political considerations were,such as to necessitate an approach to the President. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1.
T H I S D O C U M E N T IS T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S B R I T A N N I C MAJESTY S G O V E R N M E N T
1
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L
i^iOST
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,,,
s
.
No.
W.M. (Wi.) 62nd CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1
Confidential Annex
( 5 t h May, 19*4^ - 3.0 p.ra. )
The War Cabinet had a discussion as to what
PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL line should he taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer
in replying to the following Motion on Wednesday, 10th May MONETARY
"That this House considers that the Statement of Principles
FUND
contained in Cmd. 6519 provides a suitable foundation for
further international consultation with a view to improved
((Previous
monetary co-operation after the war."
(Reference;
(conclusions)
The War Cabinet also discussed the line which should be taken in regard to recent requests from the United States Government that we should send representatives to a conference in Washington on the proposed International Monetary Fund, THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER said that in his
opinion the Statement of Principles set out in Cmd 6519
was a suitable foundation for further discussions, although
Thus, we had already
we had certain reservations to make.
told the United States authorities that their draft proposals
for an international organisation for long term international
lending (proposals which were complementary to the proposed
International Monetary Fund) were in our view unsatisfactory.
We had also pointed out to them that we should prefer that any scheme of the kind set out in the Statement of Principles should be brought into force by stagesj and, in particular, that we ought not to be asked to undertake the burden of full convertibility until there was a reason­
able prospect that we could carry out the undertaking. Again, we had made it clear that -aa-suagfa oohomo ojoii3xL.^*.* iparn; fronT these stipulations, which nad already been conveyed to the United States authorities, there were certain other respects in which we should desire to see the proposals modified.
For example, under the proposals as they stood, if a member country was unable to secure the assent of the Fund to a change in the par value of its currency, its only alternative was to withdraw from the Fund. We felt that it would be possible to amend the proposals, so that in such a case the member country would not be compelled to withdraw from the Fund, but would be merely &??£&T.f
5*k advantages of the Fund.
^o-h* tr,
withdraw would, however, remair,
j
S
d
o
t
e
T Th f
n t
e
r
i
h
t
t
0
It-was quite clear that the proposals had the
backing not merely of the Secretary Go the United States
Treasury, but also of the President and of the Secretary
of State (Mr. Hull)j and he had recently received messages
from the Secretary tq the United States Treasury indicating
that it would be helpful to the President if there could
be an early agreement on discussions with the United States.
In view of the difficulties which would face us in the
transitional period it was essential that we should retain
the good-will of the United States.
Accordingly, he recom­
mended that in the debate on the motion it should be made
clear that the Government were prepared to enter into
further consultations with the United States and with other
countries on the basis of the proposals in Cmd. 6519.
-1­
In discussion, the view was expressed "by certain Ministers that acceptance of the proposals contained in the Statement of Principles would, to some extent at least, result in our committing ourselves to link sterling to gold. It was also asked what justification there was for the Governmentfebeing asked at the present stage of the war to embark on discussions in which they would be committed-to detailed proposals in regard to a scheme which could not b e put into full effect for a very considerable period after In the ophion of some Ministers the transitional the war
period might- well last for five or six years. P
It was explained to the War Cabinet that the President of the United States was very anxious that an International Conference should be held on the proposed International Monetary Fund before the Conventions for the Presidential Election.
It was clear that in any event we should require a considerable measure of help from the United States during the transitional period, and it was most important that we should not adopt an attitude which would result in the United States being unwilling to afford us that help. This was- out ported by an analysis of the probable volume of our imports and exports after the war. As against this, it was urged that owing to the importance of Great Britain as a market for United States exports, the United States would not be in a position to adopt policies which would make it impossible for us to take their exports. The War Cabinet were informed that the general desire expressed in Parliament had been for a Debate in which members could have an opportunity of setting out their views. There was much to b e said for allowing full discussion to take place in Parliament in public in regard to a matter o f this nature before His Majesty s Government made a formal statement of their position in regard to the scheme. 1
Discussion ensued as to whether the motion could be accepted.
The suggestion was made that the words ^favourable : opportunity" should be substituted for "suitable foundation".
It was pointed out that it would be difficult to make such an alteration at this stage, and it was generally­
agreed that the motion was in sufficiently general terms and could be accepted by His Majesty s Government consistently with their general attitude of not entering into commitments in regard to the scheme at this stage. !
As regards the Government's attitude in the forth-, coming Debate, the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that he had not intended to state in Parliament all the points.which he had mentioned in opening the discussion, but he had thought that he would be'on safe ground in saying that the Government accepted the objectives of the Statement .of Principles.
This view would have the support of his advisers in the Treasury and the Bank of England. So far as concerned the proposal that we should send representatives to a conference in: Washington on the proposed Monetary Fund, the view of the War Cabinet was that it would be impossible at this stage to refuse to send official representatives.
At the same time, there was no good reason why His Majesty s Government should commit themselves to so far-reaching a scheme until the attitude of countries such as Frances, Holland and Belgium had been declared. 1
Mention was also made of the attitude of the Dominion Governments and doubt was expressed as to whether
Australia fully supported this proposal.
The Chancellor
of *he Exchequer said that he thought that Australia wouiu
support the poheffio
provided that they were satisfied that the arrangements in the Commercial and Economic field
were such as to promote full employments After discussion the War Cabinet agreed as follows: ( 1 ) The Government's general attitude should be
that they welcomed the Debate as giving
Parliament an opportunity of discussing the
scheme and, of expressing their views upon it,
and thereby assisting in the crystallisation
of informed opinion, before further inter­
national, discussions on the proposals took
place
0
( 2 ) The motion was in sufficiently general
terms and could be accepted; but the
Chancellor of the Exchequer in replying
to the Debate would not commit His
Majesty's Government to acceptance of the
specific proposals contained in the
Statement.
(3) Subject, of course, to the outcome of the. discussions with the Dominion Prime Ministers on this matter,. and of the forthcoming Debate in Parliament, we should inform the United States Government that, while we were ready to send delegates to a conference about the scheme, we were not at the -present time in a position to send representatives with power to enter into commitments on this matter on behalf of His Majesty's Government. Offices of the War Cabinet, S . W . 1 .
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TOP SECRET W.M. ( 4 4 ) 63RD CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1
Confidential Annex (11th May, 1944 - 6.15 p.m.)
RUSSIA
(Previous
Reference:
W.M.(44) 47th
Conclusions,
Minute 2)
THE PRIME MINISTER recalled that on 29th April
he had received a telegram from M. Molotov complaining
of the presence in Roumania with Marshal Antonescu
of a British Mission whose purposes were unknown to
the Soviet Government.
On.2nd May he had replied
to M. Molotov pointing out that his suspicions were
without foundation and stressing the fact that His
Majesty's Government had throughout made every effort to work in harmony with the Soviet Government in relation to Roumania.
At the same time, our Ambassador had been instructed to give a full explanation to M. Molotov and had done so on 5th May.
The Prime Minister had now received a further telegram of 10th May from M. Molotov,. denying that our
Ambassador had given any explanations concerning the British Mission and stating that the Prime Minister's message in spite of all ingenuity was unconvincing. He felt that he could not continue to correspond with M. Molotov whose attitude led him to despair of the possibility of maintaining good relations with Ru ssia. The question was raised whether it might not become desirable to lay before the House of Commons in Secret Session the difficulties which we were experiencing in dealing with the Soviet. THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS explained that the Mission in question had been sent to Roumania last November by S.O.E. in order to make contact with M. Maniu.
Unfortunately the mission had been captured shortly after they had arrived in Roumania.
Since then messages had been received from the Mission through the wireless transmitter possessed by M. Maniu. On frequent occasions since 1941* we had told
the Russians that we were in contact with M. Maniu.
When he had been in Moscow in October, 1943s M, Molotov
had encouraged him to keep in touch with M. Maniu.
Accordingly when S.0.E. had consulted the Foreign
Office about the proposal to send the Mission to
Roumania the Foreign Office had agreed.
Although
the Soviet Government had hot actually been informed
that it was intended to send the Mission to Roumania
their representative in Cairo, M. Novikov, had seen
all messages received from the Mission.
We had
throughout made it clear to Marshal Antonescu that
there could be no question of his dealing with us apart from the Soviet and United States Governments, and there was no foundation for the suggestion made by M. Molotov that we were carrying on clandestine discussions with the Roumanian Government.
It might be that the real object of M. Molotov's complaint was to establish a case for sending a Soviet Mission to Greece.
He suggested that the proper course was for the reply to M* Molotov to go from the Foreign Office through our Ambassador,' who would be instructed to give On the question the full facts to M. Molotov
whether the Prime Minister should send a reply to M. Molotov the alternatives were:­
0
(a) That Sir A. Clark Kerr should tell M. Molotov that in view of the tone of-his communications to the Prime Minister no reply would be sent to his telegram of 10th May. (b) That the Prime Minister should send a very short reply to the effect that a very full explanation would be given through the ordinary channels. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that what had happened emphasised the importance of making it clear in any public statement about the Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers that the Dominions were in entire agreement with the United Kingdom Government both on questions -of strategy and on questions of foreign policy. The War Cabinet -
Agreed to the course proposed by the Secretary of State for.Foreign Affairs and invited him to submit to the Prime Minister for approval the draft instructions to our Ambassador. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT '
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TOP SECRET W.M. ( 4 4 ) 67TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 5
Confidential Annex (22nd May, 1944 - 6,0 p..rrio)
PORTUGAL
Supply of
Wolfram to
the Axis
(Previous
Reference:
W,M.(43) 145 th
Conclusions,
Minute k)
0
THE SECRETARY OP ST*LTE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
briefly reviewed the latest developments in connection
with the supplies of wolfram from Portugal to the Axis.
We had put* to the United States a compromise proposal, the effect of which would have been to restrict ship­
ments to the Axis over the next four months to some 20 tons a month, as against, say, 150 tons a month at
present.
The State Department had, however, pressed strongly that we should require Portugal to impose a complete embargo on exports of wolfram to the Axis powers.
The position thereafter had been complicated by a suggestion from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the moment had'now come to invoke, our alliance with Portugal, and ask Dr. Salazar to come into the war on our side and, in the meantime, to put a temporary embargo on wolfram.
The Foreign Secretary thought Dr - Salazar most unlikely to respond to a proposal such as that suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, he felt that were we to put this suggestion to him, we should merely help him to spin out negotiation, while all the time susbstantial supplies of wolfram would be going to Germany.
He thought himself that the right course was to hold, despite the hesitations of the State Department, to the compromise proposal for wolfram restriction, under which exports would be reduced to some 20 tons a month.
He would himself regard such an arrangement as fairly satisfactory.
8
THE I RIME MINISTER thought that the-wise course was to press our original proposal for restriction, and to keep in reserve for the present the invocation of our alliance with Portugal.
That was a card which could be played with much greater effect after a victory,He felt that we were in a strong position to press our case on the United States. He read to the War Cabinet a draft of a telegram which, subject to their approval, he proposed to send to the President. The War Cabinet -
Agreed that we should press for a drastic restriction of wolfram supplies from Portugal to the -itxis Powers; and invited the Prime Minister to telegraph to President Roosevelt on the lines proposed.-
Offices of the W a * -Cabinet, 3.W.1.
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W.M. ( 4 4 ) 68TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 2
Oqnfidential Annex . (24th May, 1 944 - 6.15 p. m. )
PROPOSED STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT The War Cabinet had before them a note by the
Prime Minister (W.P. ( 4 4 ) 265) covering a personal
telegram No. 541 of 20th May, from President Roosevelt
to the Prime Minister asking his views as to the issue
of a statement by the President to the German people
after D-Day.
THE PRIME MINISTER expressed satisfaction that he should have the advice of Mr.. Curtin and Field He was Marshal Smuts in dealing with this matter.
anxious to help the President in every possible way, and for his own part he would be ready that the President should act as spokesman.
But he asked himself whether it was well to issue an appeal to the German people not to fight at a time when the battle was about to begin, and whether we would not in fact He would rather that take serious risks in doing so.
any 3uch message was postponed. - FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS said that he was uneasy at
the proposed message.
It was addressed to the German
people, yet it was couched in the most casual and almost
conversational language; he did not like either the
tone or the occasion.
If the German, people were to
be addressed, either by the President or by the Big
Three, that would be a very formal and important step,
a step which had not yet been taken in the course of
the war.
When President Wilson in 1918 had addressed
the German people he had made a formal declaration of
his 14 points.
Any move of this character would be
of great significance, and the question at what stage,
and in what terms, the German people should b e
addressedwas of first-class importance.
Psychologically
he thought this rather informal approach a mistake.
He did not himself feel that any message should issue
It should be postponed until the
before the battle.
Germans had been thoroughly beaten on all three fronts,
and it should then be in a form to have the maximum
effect.
We had said nothing to Germany yet save
"unconditional surrender" - a declaration that had
been very bad propaganda from our point of view.
Our
next word to Germany should be first-class propaganda,
and we should make our first declaration a document
to which the German people would listen, and should,
issue it at a time when they would pay most attention
We ought to tell the President that this was
to it.
our feeling and that the moment before we started the
great fight was inopportune; and that the note to be
struck would in any event require very careful
consideration.
6
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that a message to. the German people, when despatched, would be as important as anything could be. It would in fact be the basis of a conclusion of hostilities.
If it was so important he felt that it ought to be a statement by all three Leaders.
The
risk could not be overlooked that if a statement were made by President Roosevelt alone, the Germans would be left in doubt as to the views of Russia and this country. MR. CURTIN said that he did not like either the tone or the idea of the proposed message, or the separatist treatment which it represented.
He
recognised its importance from the point of.view of the German element in the United States, and the possible anxiety of the President from that point of view to avoid a joint declaration now, and to move away from the basis of his previous declaration of "unconditional surrender" by a statement such as that proposed.
A statement such as that now proposed would, he felt, strike a division "in the unity of the Allies in dealing with the war. THE PRIME MINISTER'said he felt that this was no moment to show weakness, and that the statement as drafted admitted of being construed almost as a peace offer.
He felt grave doubt as to its effect on German morale and suggested that, in view of the attitude of the Cabinet, he should inform the President ,that the Cabinet hoped he would not pursue this proposal, that we felt that a statement such as he proposed would have an unduly encouraging effect on our enemies, that any message to the German people should be postponed until we had secured a victory, and that the text of any communication to them of this character, which might conceivably be taken as a peace offer, must, in our view, be agreed between the three major Allies. There was general agreement in the War Cabinet that the arguments against a statement of this nature at this moment by the President were decisive. The War Cabinet -
Agreed with the Prime Minister's view and invited him to communicate with President Roosevelt in the sense which he had suggested. Offices of the War Cabinet, S. W. 1.
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W.M.(kh) 69th Conclusions, Minute 2 Confidential Annex (30TH MAY, 19kk - 6.30 p.m.) BOMBING POLICY
(Previous
Reference:
W.M.(lU06lst Conclusions)
Reference was made to the reports received of the number of civilian casualties resulting from the bombing of OVERLOAD targets in Prance and Belgium. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that what made him even more anxious than the number of casualties inflicted was the reports to the effect that public opinion in France, even among our own supporters, was being turned against us as a result of the action being taken. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION added that the reports from the Swiss Press were full of denunciation of the action taken. THE CHIEF OP THE AIR STAFF said that so far as concerned the programme of railway bombing to be undertaken by the Royal Air Force this was about 95 per cent complete.
The part of the programme to he carried out by the United States Forces was, however, about half completed.
This
included the bombing of railway targets in Southern Prance to be carried out by U.S.A. bombers based on Italy. THE PRIME MINISTER said that the latest reports had been communicated to Air Chief Marshal Tedder who hSLd been asked to submit his comments thereon. The Prime Minister said that, while'there would obviously be great reluctance in making any changes in the plan at this late stage, he thought that the matter might have to be considered further when the Air Chief Marshal's report, had been received. The War Cabinet -
'' " Took note of these statements. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.I. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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69TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 5 Confidential Annex (30th May, 1944 - 6.30 p.m.)
PRANCE
(Previous
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W . M . ( 4 4 ) 66th
Conclusions,
Minute 2 ) .
1
fr
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that the War Cabinet should be aware of the latest developments in connection with General de Gaulle's visit to this
country.
He now had it in mind to issue an
invitation to him at dawn on D-Day.
The General
would, he thought, need 48 hours' notice and his journey
would take him 24 hours.
On his arrival, he would
be taken fully into confidence, and would be allowed to make full use of his cyphers.
That would get over the difficulties which would otherwise arise from the fact that General de Gaulle would be reluctant to visit this country unless he were entitled to communicate with his supporters, with due regard to security, and to operate his cyphers.
He thought that the best course would be to explain this to Ambassador Duff Cooper and ask the Ambassador to do what he could to get the General in a good moodj and to assure him that an invitation in the exact terms which he wished would reach him in due course.
On this programme the" battle when the General arrived would be in full swing. There would be no difficulty thereafter about his paying visits to such area in Prance as we might have occupied, and there were, he thought, various ways in which it would be possible to gratify him without endangering security, consideration of which must be paramount. While the President had taken a very unbending line towards the General and the French Committee he (the Prime Minister) felt that his attitude would be greatly influenced by the course of operations.
A s regards a possible declaration by General de Gaulle, the Ambassador might be advised to say that, in his own interest, we trusted that he would decide not to make any declaration or statement until after his arrival in this country when he was in a position to know all the facts which would, of course, be laid before him when he reached here, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS was uneasy at the arrangements proposed.
He accepted the force of the security arguments.
On the other hand, he was apprehensive that once France was entered, General de Gaulle would feel it essential to make some statement.
If he did so from Algiers, it might well be unhappily phrased.
Would it not be possible to arrange for him to arrive here on, or before D-Day when any statement could be concerted with us?
He
fully recognised the force of the arguments that had carried weight with the President.
But what was in issue nowwas our future relationship with France, rather than the position of General de Gaulle; and he was concerned at the position into which we might -drift if the General were not to arrive here
before D. Day. We should not overlook that, as
matters were developing^ we (with the United States)
risked having to carry all the odium, while at the
same time General de Gauile'a position would he
fbrtSfled even with those of his fellow countrymen who
might not he sympathetic to him.
THE MINISTER OP LABOUR was disposed to think
that on the broad view it would be wiser to face the
ri3ks of misunderstanding by General de Gaulle and of
his making an unwise and premature declaration, and to
postpone his arrival until after D. Day. He enquired
the reasons which carried weight with the President
in relation to the recognition of the French
Committee of National Liberation.
- THE PRIME MINISTER said that what had weighed
with him personally so far had been the argument of
security which, he felt, was of decisive importance.
He had himself suggested to the President this visit
by General de Gaulle, together with three of his
Government, and had made it clear that as the decisive
hour approached, we felt it indispensable to have some
kind of understanding with the French National
Committee. The Prime Minister then read to the War
Cabinet the text of his telegrams No. 682 of 26th May
and No. 68h of 27th May to President Roosevelt and
President Roosevelt's reply of 27th May (No. 5kh).
^inee the date of that telegram we had endeavoured to
secure American concurrence in the inclusion in the
proclamation which General Eisenhower was to issue
of a reference to the leadership of the Committee
of National Liberation, but without success, and it
had been made clear that the matter was one on which
the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a
position to express any View as it was being dealt with
hy the President.
The Prime Minister felt that the argument
that carried decisive weight with the President
was the fear that we might be forcing on the French
a Government, as to the entire value of which we might
still be uncertain, without the people of France havirg
had a chance to express their views. He could not
himself but regard it as fundamental that we should
not risk any misunderstanding with the President
merely because of General de Gaulle.
THE MINISTER OF LABOUR suggested that the difficulty was how to reconcile our anxiety to have someone to deal with on behalf of France without imposing the individual in question on the French people as their leader. He assumed that we wished to see in being a body with which we could deal as an administration and which would pull the loose strings together? Might it not be possible to get the President to go so far as that limited objective? THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that we were concerned to get in the first place an arrangement over civil affairs, and secondly, the implementation of the decree which the French Committee had themselves recorded as to the actions they should take after their return to France. He again suggested that we should very seriously consider making arrangements which would ensure that General de Gaulle arrived in this country perhaps on the night before D. Day or even a little earlier, and he repeated his apprehensions of the possible evil affect on future relations with France of adopting too uncompromising a view on this matter. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER though there was a real risk that the attitude favoured by the President, as disclosed in the telegrams that had been read, would put General de Gaulle on a pinnacle and give him the satisfaction of a grievance and the support of elements which would not otherwise sympathise with him,, but which would feel that he had been badly treated. We should not overlook that the Committee of French Liberation contained elements accredited by the resistance movement in France. THE PRIME MINISTER "said that in the early
days after our landing, in battle conditions,
there would be no question of a civil Government
in France. Conditions might well change after we
gained further ground, and when that happened there
might be problems which the Committee of National
Liberation could best solve by dealing with the local
French authorities. He fully accepted, on the
other hand, the force of the arguments advanced
in the discussion. He suggested that the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff should be invited
to consider, as a matter of urgency in the Chiefs
of Staff Committee, what disadvantages, compared
with the proposal that General de Gaulle should be
Invited at dawn on D. Day to visit this country,
there would b e , from the military and security
point of view, if the invitation to visit this
country were to be issued to him 24 or, alternatively,
48 hours before D. Day, coupled with the most
binding instructions to him as to the Vital
importance of absolute secrecy as to his movements.
The War Cabinet -
Endorsed the Prime Ministerfe proposal at X and invited the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to take action accordingly and to report as a matter of urgency. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.I. -3­
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W,M.(W
70TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 5
Confidential Annex (31st May, 19hk - 6.0 p.m.) FRANCE (Previous Reference:
W*M.(kh)69th
Conclusions,
Minute 5 ) The War Cabinet resumed consideration of the timing of General de Gaulle's visit to this countrv THE PRIME MINISTER read out a telegram from Mr. Duff Cooper (No. 631) in which he urged that General de G ulle
might he exasperated by the prolonged uncertainty about
his visit.
Indiscretion was not one of the G neral's
weaknesses, and Mr. Duff Cooper asked that he should
have authority to give General de Gaulle some indication
as soon as possible as to the date when he would be
asked to come to England.
a
e
The Prime Minister said that this matter had been further considered by the Chiefs of Staff.
They
still felt that General de G ulle's departure from Algiers coupled with certain Naval movements which would he in progress, would give the enemy a very good ­
clue to the imminence of D day.
They recognised, however, that political considerations might outweigh the military risks. a
The Prime Minister said that he found it difficult to-believe that General de G ulle's departure from Algiers would have the consequences feared by
the Chiefs of Staff. . Even if it were known that he had
1 eft Algiers to come to England, the enemy might well
assume that we should arrange such a visit to take place
well in advance of D day.
Furthermore, it might be put
ahout that he had gone to Italy or Corsica, thereby
lending colour to the threats to Southern France from the
Mediterranean.
a
The Prime Minister said that he favoured sending a telegram that night to Mr, Duff Cooper asking him to tell General de Gaulle that we should be glad to welcome him and his friends here, as soon as it was convenient for him to come.
He would also offer to put his York aircraft at the disposal of G neral de Gaulle, He thought that the General would probahly leave in a day or two's time.
On arrival in this country, he might he seen by the Foreign Secretary or his representative and might then join the Prime Minister.
In this way, the essential intervening days would he occupied, and we should be' able to make certain that no message was sent out of this country which would compromise the date of D day. e
Continuing, the Prime Minister said that he regarded it as an important point of policy that General de Gaulle, as the Head of the French Coznmittee of National Liberation, should b e consulted before OVERLORD operation was launched.
He thought that the consequences might be serious if this was not done. The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the terms of a telegram to Mr. Duff Cooper to give effect to this proposal. The War Cabinet -
Approved the Prime Minister's proposal, and agreed that a telegram should be despatched to Mr. Duff Cooper in the sense proposed. Offices of the W r Cabinet, S.W.I. a
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70TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE.
.0
Confidential Annex (31st May,
"OVERLORD" SECURITY Censorship of Diplomatic Communications from this Country. (Previous Reference: W.M. (44)51 st Conclusions, Minute 5) 191+4 - 6.0
p.m.) THE PRIME MINISTER said' that further consideration had been given to the question of the date to which the censorship of communications to and from all allied and neutral diplomats in this country (other than the United States and U.S.S.R.) should continue. The Prime Minister said that the Supreme Allied Commander had asked the British.Government to agree to the continuance of the ban after D day, until such time as we should have been able to appreciate the enemy's reaction to our first assault. He feared that if the ban was lifted immediately after D day the enemy would at once assume that no other assaults were"intended, and would concentrate his forces to repel the assault which had been made. The Prime Minister said the Foreign Secretary anticipated very great difficulty in maintaining the ban for any appreciable time after D day.
He (the Prime Minister) thought that the right line to take was that the diplomatic ban should b e continued only -until D t 7; and that the matter should be discussed in the interval; but that unless the Supreme Allied Commander could show some new facts, we should not be able to prolong it beyond that day. The Prime Minister suggested that consideration should also be given to the question whether the ban could be lifted by private arrangement with the different Embassies, anything in the nature of a public announcement being forbidden. The War Cabinet -
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W.M. (hh) 71 ST CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 6
Confidential Annex (1st June, 19kk - 12 Noon)
PRANCE
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (i+4) 70th
Conclusions,
Minute 5 )
THE PRIME MINISTER read to the War Cabinet a
copy of a further telegram received from President
Roosevelt, No. 546.
The main points in this telegram
were as follows:(1) He had told Admiral Penard that he could tell
General de Gaulle that if the General asked
whether the President would see him if he came over to the United States, he could say that the reply would be an immediate and cordial affirmative. (The Prime Minister pointed out that this was a rather more forthcoming attitude than might have been deduced from previous - correspondence on this subject). ( 2 ) The President proposed that the Prime Minister
should suggest to General de Gaulle that he
should proceed to America immediately after
his visit to London to see the President.
( 3 ) The President said that he could not send
anyone to represent him at General de Gaulle*s
conversations with the Prime Minister.
With regard to (3) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS pointed out that one of the reasons why General de Gaulle was visiting this country was in order to conclude an agreement on Civil Affairs in France.
If the President adhered to the attitude indicated, this would mean that no agreement could be concluded between the U.S., the French and ourselves on Civil Affairs. . He thought that he would certainly be pressed to state the position as soon as Parliament THE PRIME MINISTER said that we might have . met - again.
to indicate that the U.S. Government and ourselves would make separate statements on this matter. Reference was also made to the fact that, as at present advised, although representatives of certain other countries occupied by the enemy would be making broadcasts on D-day, no arrangement had been made for a representative of France to broadcast.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that General de Gaulle should certainly broadcast on D-day.
He also had it in mind to inform President Roosevelt that The King intended to make a speech to His peoples, and that he thought that the President would no doubt wish to do the same. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1i
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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use
:
61
of.....rfh*r.
i585t SECRET.
Copy N0.../..I.
W.M.(Uh) 72ND CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 3
Confidential Annex ( 5 t h June, 19h4 '-* 6.30 p.m.)
PRANCE.
(Previous
Reference:
y.M.(U4) 7.1st
Conclusions,
ilinute 6)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that General de Gaulle had arrived in London on Sunday morning.
He had then
come down to his (the Prime Minister's) train, in which he
(the Prime Minister)had had with him Field Marshal Smuts,
the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Labour.
The
meeting had passed off fairly well.
An account of the
discussion was being circulated separately to the War
Cabinet (see W,P.(hh) 2 9 7 ) .
. Later on General de Gaulle had visited General Eisenhower's Headquarters.
General Elsenhower had treated General de Gaulle with considerable cordiality. He had said that his Directive gave him discretion as to the authorities he should deal y/ith in France, and that he (General de Gaulle) was the man with whom he (General Eisenhower) meant to deal. General de Gaulle had been asked whether he would broadcast on D . day after General Eisenhower, and he had agreed to do so* General de Gaulle had asked to be furnished with a copy of General Eisenhower's statement; and had promised to submit, via General Koenig, a draft of his own for examination, prior to final recording. The Prime Minister then read to the War Cabinet a minute from General Bedell Smith, in which he recounted how General Koenig had brought to him at noon that day a re-draft of General Eisenhower's broadcast statement. This seemed to involve little change, other than re-arrangement, except that the following paragraph had been eliminated? ­
"Effective civil administration of France must be provided by Frenchmen.
All persons must continue in their present duties unless otherwise instructed. Those who have made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed. . When France is liberated from her oppressors you yourselves will choose your representatives, and the government under which you wish to live." In General de Gaulle*s re-draft'there had been substituted for this a statement to the effect that the French author­
ities would re-establish civil government.
It had been made clear to General Kgon^g that tlpi alteration, could TACT
.,
-hen let i be known e would be unable to ower. -Prime M- . - , . - v * . said' that he had informed : General
at if General de Gaulle would not padcast there w a s n o use worrying about the point,
He
ft ;he Prime Minister) .v/as, however, extremely dissatisfied with General de Gaulle*s attitude. ;(
r
x
-1­
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61
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of
^th*r.
^?.9^rf^f?^....
Copy No.. / I SECRET.
W . M . ( U 4 ) 72ND CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 5
Confidential Annex ( 5 t h June, 1944 - 6.30 p.m.)
RANCE.
(Previous
eference:
.M.(U4) 7.1st
onclusions,
inute 6)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that General de Gaulle had arrived in London on Sunday morning.
He had then,
come down to his (the Prime Minister's) train, in which he
(the Prime Minister)had had with him Field Marshal Smuts,
the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Labour.
The
An account of the
meeting had passed off fairly well.
discussion was being circulated separately to the War
Cabinet (see W , P . ( 4 4 ) 2 9 7 ) .
Later on General de Gaulle had visited General Eisenhower's Headquarters.
General Eisenhower had treated General de Gaulle with considerable cordiality. He had said that his Directive gave him discretion as to the authorities he should deal with in France, and that he (General de Gaulle) was the man with whom he (General Eisenhower) meant to deal. General de Gaulle had been asked whether he would broadcast on D. day after General Eisenhower, and he had agreed to do so. General de Gaulle had asked to be furnished with a copy of General Eisenhower's statement; and had promised to submit, via General Eoenig, a draft of his own for examination, prior to final recording. The Prime Minister then read to the War Cabinet a minute from General Bedell Smith, in which he recounted how General Koenig had brought to him at noon that day a re-draft of General Eisenhower's broadcast statement. This seemed to involve little change, other than re-arrangement, except that the following paragraph had been eliminated:­
"Effective civil administration of France must be provided by Frenchmen.
All persons must continue in their present duties unless otherwise instructed. Those who have made common cause with the enemy and so betrayed their country will be removed. . When France is liberated from her oppressors you yourselves will choose your representatives, and the government under which you wish to live." In General de Gaulle's re-draft'there had been substituted
or this a statement to the effect that the French author­
ties would re-establish civil government.
It had been
made clear to General Kocnig that this alteration could not
be accepted.
General de Gaulle had, then let it be known
jenat- in. these circumstances, he would be unable to
broadcast after General Eisenhower. £
said" that he had informed
General
ell Smith
^General do Gaulle
-
­ would not
brbadca
-here was.no use worrying about the point, - He
(th
PrL
h e Prime
Minister) was. however, extremely dissatisfied with General de Gaulle
+.V.
/iortnnllctgattitude.
w
(lon^-nrt
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said he thought that there
had perhaps been some misunderstanding on the subject.
He
read to the War Cabinet an extract from a note made by his
Private Secretary (who had acted as interpreter at the
meeting between General Bedell Smith and General £ 0 Gaulle).
The effect of this note was that General Bedell Smith had.
indicated to General de Gaulle that if he wanted certain
modifications made in General Eisenhower's broadcast he
should indicate what they were, provided, of course, that
the framework was not changed.
He had also said that the
approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to be
obtained to any alterations. . THE PRIME MINISTER said that at the time when this discussion had taken place on the previous day,, it had been thought that D. day would have to be postponed for at least three days, in which event there might have been time to refer any proposed amendments to the Combined Chiefs Of Staff.
In present circumstances this was out of the question. FIELD MARSHAL SMUTS pointed out that General de Gaulle had said on the previous day. that, if he had not been invited to visit this country, he would have broadcast from Algiers.
He thought that General d e Gaulle's attitude indicated that he preferred to broadcast independently, and not as part of a programme comprising several other broadcasts.
He did not think that General de Gaulle was likely to say anything indiscreet or embarrassing when he broadcast.
In fact, General de Gaulle, by refusing to broadcast on this occasion, had missed a golden opportunity to get himself on to the right alignment.
This would have unfortunate consequences, for General de Gaulle but not for u s .
In
any case there was nothing which we could do about the matter now, as it was too late to start any further negotiation. THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that no action was called for on our part.
He would be content that General de Gaulle should go back to Algiers as soon as the operation had started. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY then read to the War Cabinet a message which had at that moment been received, reporting a telephone conversation between Major-General Grasett and General Koenig.
The latter, under instructions from General de Gaulle, had said that he could not agree to the French Liaison' Officers accompanying our forces across the Channel, because General de Gaulle had not reached any agreements with the Americans and ourselves on civil affairs/The duty
of these Liaison Officers was to point out to the Allied Commanders, when in. France, the right people on whom to place the responsibility for carrying on civil affairs./ General Grasett was sending a written answer, in which he asked for confirmation, in writing, of the message Which he had received and pointed out that the duties assigned to the French Liaison Officers had been laid down in a document which had been agreed with the French Committee. The action taken by Major-General Grasett was endorsed. There was general agreement among Ministers that this action on the part of General de Gaulle was far more serious than his refusal to broadcast. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he had had a very long and satisfactory talk with M, Vienot that afternoon.
In view of General de Gaulle's attitude he proposed to tell M. Vienot that there was no good in continuing discussions with him on civil affairs or, indeed, on other related matters. THE PRIME MINISTER said that if General de Gaulle refused to. agree to the Liaison Officers proceeding with Operation "OVERLORD" it would not be possible for us to have any further discussions with General de Gaulle on civil or military matters.
It might even be necessary to indicate that an aeroplane would be ready to take him back to Algiers forthwith. Later in the meeting a further message was brought in, to the effect that General Bedell Smith proposed that General Eisenhower should say, on the conclusior of his; broadcast on D. day,, that General de Gaulle had come to this country and it was hoped, that he (General de Gaulle) would broadcast later on. ; The War Cabinet agreed that no mention should be made of General de Gaulle in General Eisenhower's broadcast.
THE PRIME MINISTER undertook to convey this decision to General Bedell Smith. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited..
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W.M. ( 4 4 ) 7 3RD CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1
Confidential Annex ( 7 t h June, 1944 - 6.0 p.m.)
THE PRIME MINISTER invited the War Cabinet to consider the difficulties which had arisen as regards our relations with General de Gaulle.
At their (Previous meeting on 5th June (W.M.(44) 72nd Conclusions, Minute 3 )
Reference: W . M . ( 4 4 ) 72nd he had reported to them the latest developments in
Conclusions, connection with General de Gaulle's visit and had informed them of the discussions which he, Field Marshal Smuts,
Minute 3 ) the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Labour had had
with General de Gaulle (W.P.(44) 2 9 7 ) ; of General de
Gaulle's visit to General Eisenhower and the discussions
that had then taken place about a broadcast by
General de Gaulle; and of the difficulties which had
arisen with General de Gaulle over the appointment of
French liaison officers with the Allied troops landed in
that country.
PRANCE
General de Gaulle had, in the outcome, declined to broadcast as a part of the series of broadcasts by General Eisenhower, the Queen of the Netherlands, the King of Norway and M. Pierlot, in connection with the landing of the Allied troops in France.
But he had made a statement on the wireless shortly afterwards. It was noticeable that he had omitted from it any reference to the share of the Americans in the Allied landings. General de Gaulle had maintained his objection
to the despatch to France of the full complement of
120 French liaison officers who were available, although
he had agreed, without prejudice to the general issue
involved, to 20 of them accompanying the Allied forces.
General Bedell Smith had said that the Allied Forces could
make do with this number for a considerable period.
Lastly, difficulties had now arisen with him over the special currency notes which it was proposed should be made available to the Allied forces.
He
would ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform the War Cabinet of the position on this matter and on the connected question of the arrangements to be made for the control of civil affairs now that the Allies- had landed in that country, with a view to a decision being taken on the general Issue of policy to be adopted in relation to General de Gaulle and the French National Committee. The Cabinet should also be aware that the
President, as a result of the suggestion that had been
put to him by the Prime Minister, had now caused a
message to be sent to General de Gaulle that the
President would be ready to receive the General either
between the 22nd and 3 1 s t June or between the 6th and
14th July.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that a. difficult position had arisen as a consequence of oAir inability to reach any agreement for the control of civil affairs in France on its liberation with the French National Committee, despite repeated attempts since last-
September.
A major factor was the refusal of President Roosevelt to come to any arrangement with the French National Committee in advance of our establishing ourselves in France.
The President's attitude was based on his anxiety to avoid appearing to take a decision, which must be for the French people themselves to-take, as to the future Government of their country, or to influence that decision by appearing to accept the authority of a parti' ' " " group of Frenchmen. ,,
,
1or
But the absence of any understanding with the French National Committee was now causing much difficulty in several ways:­
- (a) It complicated our relations with the French National Committee, who regarded themselves as "being as representative of French opinion as the Governments of the smaller-powers, such as Belgium, with which we had concluded agreements for the handling of civil affairs on re-occupation, and were aggrieved by our failure to conclude similar arrangements with theme ( b ) Failing agreement with any authoritative French
body, the administration of French territory as
and when liberated would have to be undertaken by
the Allies in the same way as if France had been
. a. conquered country such as Italy and Germany* This was the more awkward as he had himself taken the line in Parliament that we should deal, on the . occupation of France, with the French National Committee.
;
(c) Despite our. invitation to bring with him three members of the French National Committee, General de Gaulle had elected to come with military advisers only, and had taken the line that he could not discuss political issues unless a United States representative was associated with " the discussions.
That, of course, was a matter which was outside our control,,
While we had had no official communication, we had reason to be!love­
that the -French National Committee had approved his
action in coming alone, though under what degree of pressure from General de Gaulle it was, of course, impossible to say. (d) Finally a difficulty of immediate urgency had arisen over the currency notes.,
The Allied forces would require large quantities of French currency for the payment of the troops, local labour, etc. Available stocks of ordinary Bank of France notes would not last long.
The' recognised governments .
of Belgium, Norway and Holland had provided their own new notes for this purpose which they had made available to the Allied command,.
Owing to American apprehensions that a similar course i n the case of France might constitute recognition of. the French Committee as the Government of France, a similar procedure has not been possible in the case of that country.
French.notes with a design approved by M. Monnet, under authority from the French Committee, had accordingly been provided.
General de Gaulle, while apparently prepared to accept these notes as a necessity, took exception to^their being made legal tender in France by a proclamation of the \ Supreme Commander and insisted upon the notes being proclaimed legal tender solely by the French Committee.
General de Gaulle had,.indeed, told M. Vienot that if General Eisenhower were to authorise these notes by proclamation it would-be impossible for him to remain here. General de Gaulle's objection was,of course,based on the contention that the issue of these notes would be an act of sovereignty.
M. Vienot had told us that unless agreement was reached in regard to currency he feared that any subsequent arrangements in regard to civil affairs would be out of the question.
We had asked Supreme Headquarters to suspend the issue of General Eisenhower's proclamation pending further consideration.
One
solution would be to ask the Americans, whose concurrence would be necessary, to drop the idea of a proclamation by General Eisenhower and to be content with the issue of some statement by General de Gaulle in terms agreed with the Supreme Commander or, if the United States Government remained opposed to this, to the issue of parallel proclamations by the Supreme Commander and himself. A general discussion followed. THE PRIME MINISTER reviewed'the course of
relations
with General de Gaulle over recent years.
There had been, he regretted to say, a steady deterioration
of relations, which had had an unfortunate effect on the
President's attitude towards -General de Gaulle.
He himself had been driven, in the light of
experience., to feel that there was a very substantial
justification for the President's view.
Indeed on
21 st May, 19U-3, he had felt obliged whilst in Washington,
to invite the War Cabinet to consider whether it would not
be wiser to terminate our relations with the General.
The War Cabinet had not felt justified in taking that
decision, and he had accepted the arguments that had weighed
with them.
But the position had not improved since that
date.
There had been a variety of incidents of much
difficulty and he was obliged to say that General de Gaulle
had shown a most non-co-operative attitude and had .
exposed himself to the suggestion that- he was primarily
concerned with his personal position. He. (the Prjime Minister)
had himself done everything in his power to ease matters,
both between General de Gaulle and the President and "between
General de Gaulle and himself; though he regarded it as
fundamental that in our anxiety to conciliate the General
we should take no risks whatever of straining our cordial
relations with the President.
But it was clear that
General de Gaulle still felt most reluctant to work with
us, save on the basis.that he and the National Committee
should be recognised as the authoritative government of
France, a position which the Presidents for good reason,
was quite unable to accept.
He-was anxious to have the
advice of the War Cabinet-on the broad general position,
but repeated his own deep concern with the turn which it ­
was taking.
We must not forget that the burden of liberation was being carried essentially by British and American troops and while fully recognising the feelings that moved General de Gaulle we were, entitled to look for a greater degree of active and wholehearted co-operation from him that we had received, and to expect that difficulties would not be raised over relatively minor incidents.
Personalities could not be allowed to be the decisive element in matters of such importance as this. THE MINISTER OP LABOUR said that he did not attach importance to the personal position of General de Gaulle. He thought, however, that it was. very important that we should lend what support we could to those friendly elements in the National Committee which were anxious to work with u s .
He was uneasy at' the possible reaction in Prance were the impression, however mistaken, to gain ground there that the Committee were being left in the cold. . He was certainly not prepared to accept either General de Gaulle or the French Committee as a provisional government, or. to go beyond the decision as to the status of the French Committee embodied in the original Algiers Decree.
But he was anxious lest we should find ourselves at variance on this matter with . the great masses in France who had helped us throughout. - : Could we not tell General de Gaulle that we were ready to negotiate over currency and other questions if he brought members of his Committee to this country?
If,
in fact, he agreed to do so, we could then go ahead with, discussions with him in the hope that the United States would either come into line in due course or would acquiesce in our going our own way.
As a power in the battle we were entitled to a voice of our own.
If, of course, General de Gaulle refused either to negotiate, with us himself orto bring members of his Committee to this country for that purpose, a different situation would arise.
- -
THE HOME SECRETARY AND MINISTER OP HOME SECURITY said that he Would welcome a general agreement with the Committee,, if it could be reached. . But as regards the specific issue of currency notes, he saw advantage in . allowing the Commander-in-Chief to take full responsib51 i V for its issue.
If the currency notes were issued with
*
the support of a proclamation by General de Gaulle, that might give him a very dangerous weapon since if relations did not improve he might, in the near future, publicly withdraw his backing from it.
He thought we should revert to our original proposal under which we contemplated discussion with General de Gaulle and members of his Committee.
If the General insisted that United States participation was a condition of any discussions he (the Home Secretary) would be.prepared to'break off negotiations.
He felt, however that the United States would, in fact, be likely.to acquiesce in any reasonable arrangement we could come to with, the General and his Committee.
It Was of-real importance to get representative members of the Committee to this country so. that they could be aware of our point of view and of our difficulties. r
O
THE MINISTER .0F PRODUCTION suggested that if a real deadlock arose over the currency issue we might do better How much to use pounds or dollars rather than fr.an.eSo
importance need we attach to a statement by General de Gaulle or by-the French Committee in respect of this currency? -k­
. ' THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER explained that the emergency currency must he"issued on the authority of the Supreme Commander, who took the responsibility for declaring it to he legal tender and to be convertible into dollars and sterling, at the rate of 50 francs to the dollar a n d 2 0 0 francs to the £.
In his judgment a formal proclamation by the military commander was necessary.
Prom the purely technical point of view no statement, by General de Gaulle or the Committee was essential.
indeed, as the issue of this currency might be regarded as an act of sovereignty on French soil, he doubted whether General de ^Gaulle or the French National Committee could constitutionally take any effective action, but at the. same time the distinction thus involved between France and the recognised governments of Belgium, Holland, etc. was naturally a sore point with the Committee. ' THE- DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER said the W r Cabinet felt the fullest sympathy with the difficulties of the Prime Minister who had their entire support in dealing The really important thing was to with this' matter.
reach a working arrangement with the French, independent of personalities.
What weighed with him was not so much the personal position of General de Gaulle as our subsequent relations with France.
The resistance -groups represented on the French National Committee were of great importance.
The more we could do to build up the prestige and authority of the Committee the better.
There
was always the risk that by giving General de Gaulle a grievance, however unjustified, we were assisting to consolidate his position in France and elsewhere, since the true facts of the situation could not of course be known. a
Attention was drawn to a message from the Australian Government (Telegram No. 128) expressing some uneasiness at the development of current Allied policy towards the French, and suggesting that comparisons were bound to be drawn between this policy and the recognition accorded to the provisional Governments of other European Allies.
While fully appreciating the necessity for parallel policy with the United States, the Australian Government were anxious to receive any information.we could give then regarding the conversations with General de Gaulle. THE PRIME MINISTER then summed up the discussion and formulated the general conclusions reached,. The War Cabinet agreed as follows:­
(l) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his conversations with General de Gaulle, should take the following line. (a) He should enquire whether General de Gaulle was himself prepared to discuss with us the various matters affecting . - the control of civil affairs in France, etc, (b) If General- de Gaulle was not willing to do so., the Foreign Secretary should say that we should like three or four members O
of the French National Committee to come to this country to go into these matters with His Majesty's Government. In that event the Prime Minister' would inform the President of the action which was being taken, and would say that we should be glad if the President would either send a representative to be present at the conversations, or would allow Ambassador Winant to sit in at them. (c) If discussions took place here as proposed by us and a reasonable basis of agreement was reached, we should commend it to the '. United States, and would be ready to send a representative over to be present at the discussions in the United States­
between the representatives of the French Committee and of the United States Government. (2) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should in the first place broach this matter­
orally with General de Gaulle on the basis set out above.
Thereafter he should embody these proposals in a letter to M. Vienot, a draft of which should be submitted to the Prime Minister. (3) Should General de Gaulle decline to accept the proposal in (l)(b) above, we should tell him that we greatly regretted his decision, which would have to be communicated to the French National Committee in a document which, might have to be published. (h) As regards the issue of Currency notes for the use of the Allied troops in France, General Eisenhower should be authorised to take action on his own authority as soon as necessary.
If negotiations with the French Committee proceeded favourably, some e:c post facto association of the Committee with the issue of this currency should admit of being arranged at a later date. (5), The Prime Minister undertook to advise The King that in the opinion of the War Cabinet it was undesirable that His Majesty, should see General de Gaulle, unless and until the above conversations had had a satisfactory issue. ( 6 ) Our policy as regards propaganda should be to
encourage the authority and prestige of the
French Committee of National Liberation as a
whole, rather than General de Gaulle s personal
position, and the Minister of Information should
be asked to give guidance to the Press in
this sense.
?
o Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of...
W.M.(Uh)
..^fetS75^S^^c
76TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 3 AND 77TH"CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 6 W ^ T F F I T
Confidential Annex (13th June,. 1%4 - ^*30 p m , and 6*30 p.m.)
0
FRANCE
Relations with,
the French
Committee of
National
Liberation
Supplementary
French Currency
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. (Ulj.) 75th
Conclusions,
Minute 2 )
THE PRIME MINISTER reminded the War Cabinet of the difficulties that had arisen in connection with the issue of special currency notes for use by Allied troops in France. He had been in communication on this matter with the President.
He had said that General de Gaulle was ready to make a supporting proclamation, but might press for his proclamation to include the words "Provisional Government of France". Should we agree to thisj or should we take the burden on ourselves for the time being, and look to settling the matter later at the Peace Table?
(Telegrams
696 and 6 9 7 ) .
The President had now replied that he shared
his (the Prime Minister's) view, that this issue was being exploited to stampede us into according full recognition to the French Committee, and that he did not think the situation as critical as it might at
first appear, or that it was essential from the point
of view of the acceptability of this currency that any
statement of support with regard to it should be made
by General de Gaulle.
The President suggested that
General de Gaulle should be informed that we intended
to use this currency as planned and as had been fully
understood by the representatives in Washington of the
French Committee; that if this was not acceptable to
the French public, General Eisenhower would have full
authority to use yellow seal dollars and British
military authority notes, and that any adverse
consequences that might flow from the employment of
such notes would be the responsibility of General de
Gaulle and the Committee.
The President added that
he was satisfied as regards both the design and the
security aspects of the notes. (Telegram 5 5 9 ) .
THE PRIME MINISTER doubted whether the Presidents reply faced the essential difficulty of the backing behind these notes, since in their present form they bore nothing to show by what authority they were issued, . Once they were issued, the United Kingdom and the United States were, in his judgment, morally responsible for redeeming them.
He felt that the matter could not be left where it was. THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said that he had now received a formal protest from the French National Committee, which he read to the War Cabinet, about the issue of these notes. The Committee urged, in particular, that the right to issue money had traditionally belonged to the national authority in the country concerned and that they-j as the Government of the country, were perfectly willing to make the \
.
/contemplated
t
necessary ordinances.
He agreed that, once the special currency was issued, we were under a legal and moral obligation to redeem it.
He felt that we were taking serious 'risks in allowing it to circulate without any understanding with the French authorities. Not only was the currency open to objection as bearing no Indication of the authority behind it, but, in the absence of agreement with the French, its circulation cut across our/financial arrangement with the French Committee..
Under that -arrangement the Allies were to pay their troops in France, but for services of all kinds in France the principle of mutual aid was to operate, and.the burden to be carried by the French. It would be most undesirable that, in the absence of any understanding, we should move into a position in which the whole of the burden of financing the conduct of operations inside France might fall on us and not on the French authorities, and in which we should find ourselves responsible also for the very serious reactions of this special currency on the internal, economy of these areas.
The French had very substantial gold reserves, but these were blocked. General de Gaulle had himself been prepared to accept responsibility for the issue of currency notes and, indeed, clearly was anxious to do so.
The Chancellor did not feel himself that the General's support need necessarily involve a recognition of the French Committee as a provisional Government; and he agreed that there could be no question of recognising, it as such.
But he did not feel that we could refuse to recognise' the continued existence, of the French Committee on the same basis as before whatever style the Committee might now wish to adopt. THE SECRETARY OF" STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS felt that it was not altogether reasonable for the President to suggest that the French representatives in Washington had acquiesced in the issue of this special currency.
M. Mohnet had argued strongly in favour of a "French national currency" and in the end had only acquiesced in the preparation of this special currency on the express condition that a separate issue of French national currency should be printed concurrently, and should be used to redeem the Allied military currency "very promptly". THE MINISTER OF LABOUR said that he was fully conscious of the difficulty of this problem.
But he was not prepared to recognise the French National Committee as a provisional Government whatever the consequences of refusal.
He was himself anxious to get back to the basis of the Algiers Decree, and to take our stand on that until the people of France could form a judgment for themselves. . If an arrangement could be reached with the French National Committee on the basis of the Algiers Decree, he could not believe that the President would maintain his unbending attitude.
From his talks with Left Wing elements in France he was conscious that those elements were greatly worried lest, in the absence of recognition of some form of French authority, bodies such as the Comite des Forges, sympathisers with which were thought to be in a position to exercise influence on the President, should establish themselves.
The mistake of the National Committee was in not sending representatives here, clearing the situation up with us, and thereafter establishing themselves, with our assistance, on firm GROUND
WITH
PERSUADED
THE
EVEN
THESE
AFFAIRS
WHICH
WOULD
UNITED
NOW
WOULD
BUT
ATTITUDE
THAT
THEY
THAT
WORKING
THE
THOUGHT,
OF
WOULD
DID
THE
FOR
OF
AND
THAT..
A
OFFICE,
GENERAL
VIENOT
WE
COULD
A
AS
RATHER
THAT
RISK
THAT
WAS
WE
THAN
FELT
PLACED
ON
AN
IN
WAS
THAT,
IN
OF
RETURNING
I N FRANCE.
H E A R I N G TO
TO
OF
BE
WITH
ALGIERS
DECREE
SIDE?
SEEMED
THAT
ON
OF
OUR
HOME
POLICY
THE
INDIVIDUALLY.
AND
WA' ."
;
COMMITTEE
PRESIDENT
HE
WAS
THE
MIGHT
BE
FELT
THAT
THERE
FOLLOWED
FROM
WHICH
SENSE
THE
AND
IF
AT
IN
ALL
A
TOLD
HIM
"ALGIERS
IT
AFFAIRS
TO
THIS
AFTER
GENERAL
DE
THAT
HOPED
HE
WOULD
;
be
X
BY
THE
AND
5
GENERAL
HE
GAVE
DE
HAD
RISE,
REACH
RECOGNISING
PROVISIONAL
CABINET
MADE
WHICH
COUNTRY
TO
WAR
AT
WHICH
POSSIBLE,
MINISTER,
THAT
THE
ATTITUDE
HOWEVER,
AS
PRIME
THE
OF
SUGGESTION
FOREIGN
ARRIVING
ADDED
HERE,,
in
SUGGESTION
EITHER
GOVERNMENT
DIFFICULTIES
WITHOUT,
THE
ARRIVAL
THE
GENERAL
FOR
COMMITTEE
DISCUSSION,
OUT
MINISTER
GAULLE
FRANCE,,
FAVOUR
THE
SINCE
GAULLE'S
AND
DISCUSSION
THE
STATE
IMPORTANT,
OFFICIALS
THISO
THAT
ARRANGEMENT
FRANCE
IN
PERSONALITY
NATIONAL
DE
IH
DESPITE
ADOPTED
WAS
DE
WITH,
FORM
COULD.do
SHOULD
IT
CONCENTRATE
WEIGHED
SOME
WE
THE
ON
HE
JUSTIFICATION
HIS
of
THE
AMERICANS,..
CABINET
GENERAL
GENERAL
STRONGLY
GAULLE'S
WAR
FRANCE.
TO
THE
of
AND- I F
THE
UNREPRESENTATIVE
SUBSTANCE
SECRETARY
TO
TO
AUTHORITY
APPEARED
BASIS
IN
WAS
GAULLE
de
in
WORK
COMMITMENT
SECRETARY
THE
FOR
PRESIDENT
PRESIDENT
WHICH
THAT "THERE
THIS,
IT
COULD,
V/HAT
A
IT
HOME
REMINDED
WITH
AFFAIRS
SITUATION
ANY
ADVANTAGE
THE
on
WITHOUT
AT
WAS
TO
RESULT,
C O M M I T T E E EVEN
IMPORTANCE
VIENOT,
Mo
THE
POSITION
POSSIBLE
be
THE
UNTIL
ASSOCIATED
THE
GENERAL
THERE
TAKING
COMMEND
THE
THAT
REAL
GAULLE
THEN, LOOK
SECURITY
FAR
DE
WITH
TEXT
ACCEPTABLE,
SO
IT
SOMETHING
REACH
WHERE
COUNTRY
CERTAIN
FRENCH
JUDGE
ESTABLISHED
WOULD
AND
THAT
ATTACHED
THE
ME
TO
STATES,
THINK
BEING
CONVERSATIONS
THE
OVER
TOOK T H E
FOREIGN
DECREE,
CORRESPONDING
HE
FOREIGN
WITH
did,
FOOTING
ONLY
MUST
EXPERIENCED
APPREHEND
BUSINESS.
BY
DEADLOCK
INCLINED
TO
HIMSELF
AUTHORITY
MADE
REAL
ALGIERS
UNITED
OCCUPY
NOT
THIS
STATE.FOR
A
THEY
WERE
OF
COME
BE
THEY
NOT
COURSE \
TO
HAD
IN
ON
STATES
SECRETARY
OF
HE
NOT
PRESIDENT
BASIS
OF
NOT
IF
DIFFICULTIES
THE
ON
THEY
VISIT?
UNITED
A
DIFFICULTIES
A
ESTABLISHED
IF,
THE
EXECUTIVE,
TO
OUR
THE
SAID
THE
BE
COULD
OF
ANY.DISCUSSIONS,
TERMS
GENERAL
OF
GOULD
SUCH
GENERALLY,,
WITH
WAS,
VISIT
STATES.
PAY
SOON
DISPOSE
CURRENCY
REPRESENTATIVES
m
TO
SOME
THE
FRENCH
GOVERNMENT.
SUMMING
GAULLE
UP
.
THE
HAD, ON
THAT
POSSIBLE
IT
WORKING
HIS
BEFORE
TO
SET
FOOT
THE P R I M E M I N I S T E R HAD G I V E N
SYMPATHETIC
THAT REQUEST AND, D E S P I T E
THE D I F F I C U L T I E S .
THAT THERE HAD BEEN W I T H GENERAL DE G A U L L E
ARRIVAL,
WAS VERY A N X I O U S
TO I M P L E M E N T H I S
SINCE
HIS
UNDERTAKING.
HE A C C O R D I N G L Y
I N V I T E D THE WAR C A B I N E T
TO
AUTHORISE
H I M TO A S K G E N E R A L M O N T G O M E R Y TO A R R A N G E F O R A N
IMMEDIATE V I S I T
TO F R A N C E B Y G E N E R A L D E G A U L L E ,
TO B E
COMPLETED
WITHIN
2li
HOURS,,
The War Cabinet agreed:^ (l) That President Roosevelt's telegram to the Prime Minister of 13th June, No. 559 took -insufficient account of the foil owing:'­
(i) T H E difficulties caused by the absence
on.the currency notes of any indication
of the authority by which they were
issued;
(ii) the danger that, if issued without any understanding with the French authorities, the U.K. and the U.S.A. would be morally responsible for honouring them; (ill) the fact that unilateral issue would leave us liable to carry burdens which, \inder the financial arrangement con­
templated with the French Committee, would be borne by the French authorities on the principle of mutual aid. and that these matters should be taken up with the U.S. Government. (2) That as regards general relations with France, it should be our object to get back, in agreement with General de Gaulle and the French National Committee, to the basis of the Algiers Decree. (3) That General de Gaulle's suggestion for conversations with M Vienot s'hould be accepted, and that we should develop conversations in the first place on the official level, with a view to working out, without commitment, the text of an understanding on ciwil affairs questions generally based on the Algiers Decree. u
(k) That the questions between the French National Committee and ourselwes in regard to the special currency notes issued to the troops in France should also be discussed in the first place o n the official level with representatives of the Committee, possibly in connection with the reply to be sent to the formal protest received through Mr. Vienot from the Committee on the. subject. ( 5 ) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
When he saw General de Gaulle that evening,
should do his utmost again to persuade him to
send members of his Committee to this country.
He should emphasise that in inwiting
General de Gaulle, to this country before
D-day, the Prime Minister had been anxious
to serve his best interests; that the Prime
Minister had been chilled by General de
Gaulle's attitude, and greatly regretted
the absence of members of the French
National Committee, who could have been associated with general discussions prior to General de Gaulle's visit to America. -IT­
(6) That the reply to Questions which had been put on the Order Paper in the House of Commons for answer on Wednesday, ll+th June, as to our relations with the French National Committee and General de Gaulle, should in general take the line that it would not, in the opinion of the War. Cabinet, be in the public interest at this stage to debate the issues between the British Government. the French National Committee and the'United States; that the Government had the matter , constantly under revi*ew and was well aware of all opinion and factors relevant to it; and that he would greatly regret it if it were to be pressed to debate these.matters in public, or even to deal with them by Question and Answer. Q
General de Gaulle's
Visit to France
\
. (7) That immediate action should be taken to give effect to the undertaking which had been given by the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle on his arrival here that .he should be enabled to visit the troops in France before his return to Algiers, and that General Montgomery should be asked to "expect him tomorrow, and that the necessary arrangements be made for his journey and for extending to him all appropriate courtesies. Later in the evening the War Cabinet were
informed that a report had been received that some of
the 20 French Liaison Officers who had gone to France
with Operation OVERLORD had said that they would not
accept the "supplementary currency, which they.regarded
as "false money".
General Koenig was said to have,
expressed tho same view.
There was some indication
that General Eisenhower, was considering recalling the
-French Liaison Officers to this country. . There was also some reason to suppose that the U.S. Government were considerably perturbed at reports which they had received from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, on this matter, and that President Roosevelt might make a unilateral statement at a press conference in the near future.
Thus it wes thought that he might, say that the notes were all right because they had the
backing of General Eisenhower., 1
A awg£3tfan had Irftnraafioto ths Rxceign Secretary,
with which he agreed, th?$it-ml&£t be wise for the Prime Minister
to send a short telegram to the President that night,
to the effect that there were certain passages in his
latest telegram about which we were rather.uneasy, and
that we. were proposing to send him shortly our comments
on the situation.
A telegram on these lines might
hold the situation, and avert a statement by the
President, which would make it harder for us to reach
a satisfactory settlement of this position.
It seemed
all the more desirable to do this because the President's
latest telegram seemed to show that he was not fully . ...
seized of the whole position.
A general discussion ensued in the course of which the PRIME MINISTER indicated that, having regard to the strong views which the President obviously held in this matter, he (the Prime Minister) was disinclined' to telegraph to the President on the lines proposed. Offices of the War Cabinet, S . W . 1 .
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
78
The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of.
MOST—-SECRET. -
Copy No.
I D
SEGRET W.M.YiUO 77TH CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 1 Confidential Annex ( 1 3 t h June, 19kk - 6.30 p.rn.)
OVERLORD
SECURITY
Censorship of
Diplomatic
Communications
from this
Country
(Previous
Reference:
W.M. ( k 4 ) 70th
Conclusions,
Minute 6 ) The War Cabinet discussed a proposal made in a ,letter, dated 11th June, addressed to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs by General Bedell Smith that
the diplomatic ban should be lifted, not at D + 7 as
the War Cabinet had agreed at their meeting on 31st May,
but at D H- 15,
It was explained that consideration had been
given to the question whether the ban could be lifted
by private arrangement with the different embassies, anything in the nature of a public announcement being forbidden, but that it was clear that, once the "ban had been lifted, there was no hope of concealing the fact from the enemy; In favour of continuing the ban until 0 + 1 5 *
it was urged that there was good reason to believe that
the enemy was not concentrating all his forces against
the Normandy bridgehead, because of his fear that major
landings might take place at other points on the coast
of Western Europe, and that it would be of great help
to the Supreme Commander if the enemy.could be kept in
this state of uncertainty for a further period of
The lifting of the ban would be
eight days.
interpreted as a sign that no further major landing
was intended.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that, now that the initial attack had been launched, it was arguable that the lifting of the ban would do more good than harm.
There was no reason to suppose that foreign representatives in this country would be able to guess the direction of our next move and they were more likely to send out large numbers of contradictory and confusing rumours as to our intentions.
Further,
the lifting of the ban might well be regarded by the enemy as a deliberate move to put him off his guard against landings elsewhere.
The maintenance of the ban imposed a heavy burden on the Foreign Office, particularly in view of the exceptions which had had to be made in favour of the French Committee of National liberation.In addition, an awkward situation had arisen in connection with the forthcoming Monetary Conference in the U.S.A, since there had been difficulty in arranging for the delegates of Allied Governments .now in this country to travel together with the British delegates. / After- further discussion it was suggested that it might be reasonable to maintain the ban until
,
Monday, 19th J u n e .
v
;
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he would not oppose this proposal on the ' understanding that he might make, one or two limited exceptions, in special cases (e.g. where foreign Ambassadors were waiting to come to this country)o
:
The War Cabinet ­
' (1) Agreed that on Monday, 19th June, "the Secretary of State for Foreign
-Affairs should"inform the represent­
atives of foreign Governments concerned' that the ban would be removed ."
.
forthwith. 1
' (2)vAuthorised.the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to malee exceptions in special cases before that date, in regard to the admission to this country of members of the diplomatic corps. . v
'
( 3 ) Agreed that arrangements should be
made to enable the Allied delegates
to the forthcoming Monetary
.
'
-Conference.to.travel with the British delegates.
Offices of the'.War Cabinet,
f S.W.1.
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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
TOP
-*W8T
gj
It is issued for the personal use of.........S.ss^i*htff^.... l
SECRET.
Copy No.....?T.....
W.M.(ijij.) 82ND CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 3
Confidential Annex (27th June, 19W4- - 6 p.m.)
AIR RAIDS im
TIL
(Previous Reference: W,M.(ii4)80th Conclusions, Minute k)
Attacks by Plying Bombs. The War Cabinet had before them ­
(i) a Note by the Home Secretary and Minister
of Home Security (W.P.(hh) 343) covering .
reports by the Research and Experiments
Department of the Ministry of Home
Security, summarising the information
collected by the Department on the subject
of flying "bombs up to 2hth June,
and
( i i ) a Memorandum by the Home Secretary and
Minister of Home Security (W.P.(kk) 348)
on the flying bomb and the rocket.
In the course of discussion the following points of an operational character were raised ft THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF gave the War
Cabinet Information about the measures which were being
taken to counter the flying bomb attacks.
The Supreme
Commander had instructed that measures against the
flying bomb should have first priority after the needs
of the battle in France had been met. . Adequate numbers
of fighters were available and everything possible was
being done to improve their performance, to secure a
toettej? system of control and to train fighter pilots
i n high speed'interception.
The deployment of anti­
aircraft guns originally proposed was being substantially
increased and the training of the gun crews was being
pressed on.
When the full deployment had been carried
out, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, AntiAircraft Command, was satisfied that a heavy toll would
be taken by the guns.
The arrangements for co-ordinating
the use of guns and fighters had been improved,
^uring
the day time the guns would fire so long as it was clear
that no fighter was within range.
At night the guns and
fighters would each have belts allocated to them..y
The
aim was to bring the deployment of balloons up to 1,750
which should take a considerable toll, perhaps up to 20
per cent.
It was hoped to make further improvements in
the detection of flying bomb sites by radar.
Attacks
on the launching sites and supply depots continued and
intruder patrols were maintained over the areas where the
sites were located.
Every effort was being made by
reconnaissance to detect new sites.
Generally, it
seemed clear that a very considerable improvement in the
defences could be expected, but it had to be recognised
that the scale of attack might well go up.
In particular
the modified sites could be made or repaired very quickly
and were difficult to identify.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE MINISTRY OP SUPPLY summarised the position in regard to the, prospect of attacks "by rocket. , There was a good deal of evidence to show that the enemy had , produced rockets and meant to use them as soon as possible., O
-
'
The War Cabinet were Informed that of the seven large sites which-were suspected to be rocket launching sites, two had been captured in the Cherbourg area and a third had been abandoned. Although the remaining four had been frequently attacked, no guarantee could be given that they could not be used.
Once the rocket sites had been covered over it was" difficult to penetrate the concrete covering.
Nevertheless, by attacking the. approaches to the sites it might be possible to put them out of action for the time being. 1
In discussion THE PAYMASTER GENERAL said that the production of a rocket on the scale suspected would be extremely uneconomical.
It did not follow, however, that the enemy.would not adopt this form of attack.
It might be that the large sites were designed for a larger type of pilotless aircraft, although the ease with which such a. weapon could be shot down suggested that this possibility was unlikely. With regard to the possibilities mentioned
in the memorandum toy the Home Secretary (w*P.^Uh)3^8)
THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was clear that every­
thing possible was toeing done to attack the launching
sites and sources of production and transportation^
and intruder patrols were toeing flown over the areas
where the sites were located.
It seemed doubtful
whether any help could toe derived from naval toomtoard­
ment and the enemy s dispositions ruled out the
possibility of Commando raids.
1
x
Some discussion ensued on the question of reprisals, mentioned in the Home Secretary s Memorandum. Summing up the discussion on this point, THE PRIME MINISTER said that for the present it would be unwise to threaten reprisals, but the matter might have to be considered later, in the light of the course taken toy the enemy *s attacks. 1
Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1.