Order Code RL31740
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress
Updated February 24, 2003
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress
Summary
Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights.
Fidel Castro has ruled since he ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista
from power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union,
Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993. There has been
some improvement since 1994 as Cuba has implemented limited reforms.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The principal tool of
policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were tightened with the Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
in 1996. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the
Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio
and television broadcasting to Cuba.
There appears to be broad agreement on the overall objective of U.S. policy
toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island.
But there are several schools of thought on how to achieve that objective. Some
advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until
reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to support the Cuban
people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive
engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the
Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a
swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.
Legislative initiatives in the 107th Congress reflected these divergent views on
the direction of U.S. policy and covered a range of issues including human rights,
food and medical exports, travel restrictions, drug interdiction cooperation, and
broadcasting to Cuba. In the second session of the 107th Congress, the House version
of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill (H.R. 5120) included three
Cuba provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel, remittances, and U.S.
agricultural sales to Cuba; the Senate version of the bill (S. 2740) as reported out of
committee, would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba. Final action on the
measure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress.
In the 108th Congress, the final version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations
measure, H.J.Res. 2, included funding for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba
and democracy and human rights projects for Cuba. However, the measure did not
include funding for U.S.-Cuban anti-drug cooperation or provisions that would have
eased Cuba sanctions. The White House had threatened to veto the omnibus bill if
it contained provisions weakening the embargo on Cuba.
This report will be updated regularly to track legislative initiatives and
developments in U.S. relations with Cuba.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Overall Direction of U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Helms/Burton Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Section 211 Trademark Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Food and Medical Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Travel Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Drug Interdiction Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Cuba and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Cuban Spies in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Radio and TV Marti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
U.S. Foreign Aid to Support Human Rights and Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Legislation and Resolutions in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Legislative Initiatives in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Cuba: Issues for the 108th Congress
Most Recent Developments
On February 18, 2003, two members of the Christian Liberation Movement (led
by Oswaldo Paya, also the organizer of the Varela Project), Jesus Mustafa Felipe and
Robert Montero, were sentenced to 18 months in prison on charges of contempt and
resisting arrest. Reportedly dozens of supporters of the Varela Project have been
“harassed, jailed, threatened, and expelled from jobs and universities over the past
few weeks.”1 (See “Human Rights” below.)
On February 13, 2003, the conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) to the FY2003
omnibus appropriations measure, H.J.Res. 2, was filed in the House without any
provisions easing economic sanctions on Cuba. The White House had threatened to
veto the omnibus bill if it contained provisions weakening the embargo on Cuba.
The conference report did include funding for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting and
democracy and human rights projects for Cuba. It did not include a Senate provision
that would have provided $3 million for U.S.-Cuban anti-drug cooperation. Both
houses approved the conference report on February 13.
On January 16, 2003, President Bush suspended for six months the right of
individuals to file lawsuits against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S.
property in Cuba under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
(P.L. 106-114). Like President Clinton, President Bush has used this authority every
six months. (See “”Helms/Burton Legislation” below.)
Political Conditions
Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms in recent years,
politically the country remains a hard-line communist state. Fidel Castro, who
turned 76 on August 13, 2002, has ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which
ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power. Castro soon laid the
foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcing
moderates out of the government. In April 1961, Castro admitted that the Cuban
Revolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a
Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree.
A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the
leading force in the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed
1
Elaine De Valle, “Cuba Increases Pressure on Pro-Paya Dissidents,” Miami Herald,
February 20, 2003, p. F1.
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by Fidel Castro). The Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local
governmental structures. Executive power is vested in a Council of Ministers,
headed by Fidel Castro as President. Legislative authority is vested in a National
Assembly of People’s Power, currently with 609 members, that meets twice annually
for brief periods. While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time
in February 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. In October 1997, the
Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in
which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel
and Raul Castro as the party’s first and second secretaries. Direct elections for the
National Assembly were again held in January 1998 and January 2003, but voters
again were not offered a choice of candidates.
In response to the challenge posed by the Varela Project, a human rights
initiative that called for changes to the Constitution (see below), the Cuban
government orchestrated a national referendum in late June 2002, signed by 8.1
million people, that declared that Cuba’s socialist system could not be changed.
Subsequently the National Assembly on June 26, 2002, approved amendments to the
Constitution stating that “socialism and the revolutionary political and social system
in the Constitution.....are irrevocable; and Cuba will never again return to
capitalism.”2
Human Rights
Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting
basic rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and
other basic rights. It has cracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and
independent journalists, and staged demonstrations against critics. Although some
anticipated a relaxation of the government’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the
Pope’s January 1998 visit, government attacks against human rights activists and
other dissidents have continued since that time.
According to the State Department’s human rights report covering 2001, human
rights groups inside Cuba estimate the number of political prisoners to be between
249 and 300 people, imprisoned on such charges as dissemination of enemy
propaganda, illicit association, contempt for the authorities (usually for criticizing
President Castro), clandestine printing, and the broad charge of rebellion. This
marked a decrease in the estimate of 300-400 reflected in the State Department’s
human rights report for 2000. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation notes that the number of prisoners has decreased because the
government has increased its use of short-term detentions instead of prison sentences.
The State Department report for 2001 notes that the government “routinely engaged
in arbitrary arrest and detention of human rights advocates, subjecting them to
interrogations, threats, and degrading treatment and unsanitary conditions for hours
or days at a time.”
2
“Special Session of the National Assembly, A Transcendent Yes,” Granma International,
June 30, 2002, p. 1.
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In May 2002, the Cuban government released prominent political prisoner
Vladimiro Roca from jail about two months before his 5-year sentence was complete.
Roca was imprisoned in July 1997 along with three other leaders of the “Dissident
Working Group,” Rene Gomez Manzano, Marta Beatriz Roque, and Felix Bonne.
The Cuban government had released Manzano, Roque, and Bonne in May 2000. All
four leaders had been convicted by a Cuban court on March 15, 1999, on charges of
“sedition” under the Cuban penal code. The four dissidents had released a document
in June 1997 entitled, “The Homeland Belongs to Us All” that strongly criticized a
draft report of the 5th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party.
While the Cuban government released another prominent political prisoner,
Oscar Elías Biscet, in October 2002, the human rights activist was jailed again on
December 6, 2002 after his arrest at a human rights demonstration in Havana. Biscet
had been originally imprisoned in November 1999 after displaying Cuban flags
upside down as a sign of protest and distress.
On January 28, 2003, H.Con.Res. 16 (Andrews) was introduced, calling for the
immediate release of all political prisoners in Cuba, including Oscar Elías Biscet.
Varela Project. A human rights initiative within Cuba that has received
attention is the Varela Project (named for the 19th century priest, Felix Varela, who
advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery) in which thousands
of signatures have been collected supporting a national plebiscite. The referendum
would call for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners, private
enterprise, and changes to the country’s electoral law that would result in free and
fair elections. The initiative is organized by Oswaldo Paya, who heads the Christian
Liberation Movement, and it is supported by other notable Cuban human rights
activists.
On May 10, 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures
to the National Assembly calling for a national referendum This was more than the
10,000 required under Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President
Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the Varela Project in his May 14, 2002
address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that “when Cubans
exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see
that Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country.”3
In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own
referendum in late June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending
the Constitution to declare Cuba’s socialist system irrevocable.
In early 2003, supporters of the Varela Project have faced increased persecution
by the Cuban government. On February 18, 2003, two members of the Oswaldo
Paya’s Christian Liberation Movement, Jesus Mustafa Felipe and Robert Montero,
were sentenced to 18 months in prison on charges of contempt and resisting arrest.
3
“Text of Jimmy Carter’s Speech, Broadcast Live to Cuban People,” Associated Press,
May 15, 2002.
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Reportedly dozens of supporters of the Varela Project have been “harassed, jailed,
threatened, and expelled from jobs and universities.”4
UNCHR Resolutions. From 1991 until 1997, the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) called on the Cuban government to cooperate with a
Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the
Secretary General to investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba
refused to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, and the UNCHR annually
approved resolutions condemning Cuba’s human rights record. In 1998, however,
the UNCHR rejected — by a vote of 16 to 19, with 18 abstentions — the annual
resolution sponsored by the United States that would have condemned Cuba’s rights
record and would have extended the work of the Special Rapporteur for another year.
U.S. officials and human rights activists expressed deep disappointment with the
vote. Observers maintained that the vote did not signify any improvement in human
rights in Cuba, but rather was an expression of disagreement with the United States
over its policy toward Cuba.
In the last four years, the UNCHR has again approved resolutions criticizing
Cuba for its human rights record, although without appointing a Special Rapporteur.
In 1999, the UNCHR resolution was approved by a vote of 21-20, with 12
abstentions. In 2000, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and Poland,
was approved by a vote of 21-18, with 14 abstentions. On April 18, 2001, the
resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and co-sponsored by 16 other nations,
including the United States, was approved by a vote of 22-20, with 10 abstentions.
A U.S. Congressional delegation traveled to Geneva to encourage adoption of the
resolution. Mexico abstained but, in a shift under the new Fox administration,
publicly stated its concern about human rights in Cuba.
On April 19, 2002, the UNCHR approved a resolution, by a vote of 23 to 21,
with 9 abstentions, calling on Cuba to improve its human rights record “in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles and
standards of the rule of law.” Uruguay sponsored the resolution, which was supported
by six other Latin American nations: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Mexico, and Peru. Brazil and Ecuador abstained, while Venezuela was the only
Latin American country besides Cuba to vote against the resolution. Compared to
previous years, the 2002 resolution was milder in that it recognized Cuba’s efforts
to fulfill the “social rights” of its people “despite an adverse international
environment,” while at the same time calling on Cuba “to achieve similar progress
in respect of human, civil, and political rights.”
Outlook
Observers are divided over the future of the Castro government. Although most
believe that the demise of the Communist government is inevitable, there is
considerable disagreement over when or how this may occur. Some point to Castro’s
age and predict that the regime will collapse when Castro is not at the helm. Other
4
Elaine De Valle, “Cuba Increases Pressure on Pro-Paya Dissidents,” Miami Herald,
February 20, 2003, p. F1.
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observers maintain that Fidel Castro may remain in power for years, and that Cuba
has a plan for the succession of his brother Raul. They point to Cuba’s strong
security apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents
from gaining popular support. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba’s elite has
no interest in Castro’s overthrow, and that Castro still enjoys some support, in part
because of the social benefits of the Cuban revolution, but also because Cubans see
no alternative to Castro.
Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the
possibility or viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out
that the Castro government has successfully impeded the development of
independent civil society, with no private sector, no independent labor movement,
and no unified political opposition. For this reason, they contend that building a
democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance.
Economic Conditions
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced
severe economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some
improvement since 1994. Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range
from 35-50%. Recovery began in 1994, with the economy growing 0.7% in 1994,
2.5% in 1995, and 7.8% in 1996. While the Cuban government originally was
predicting a growth rate of 4-5% for 1997, growth for the year was just 2.5%, largely
because of disappointing sugar production. For 1998, the government’s goal was for
a growth rate of 2.5-3.5%, but another poor sugar harvest, a severe drought in eastern
Cuba, and the effects of Hurricane Georges resulted in an estimated growth rate of
just 1.2%. In 1999 and 2000, the economy rebounded with growth rates of 6.2% and
5.6%, respectively.
Growth slowed to 3% in 2001 in the aftermath of the effects of Hurricane
Michelle and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The
terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba’s tourist industry, with reports of some hotels
closing and restaurants being empty. Hurricane Michelle damaged some 45,000
homes and severely hurt the agricultural sector. Low world prices for sugar and
nickel, a decline in the number of tourists since September 2001, and Venezuela’s
April-September 2002 suspension of oil shipments to Cuba because of Cuba’s slow
payment all contributed to the economic downturn in 2002.5 For 2002, Cuba had a
5
Venezuela provided Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil per day under a five-year bilateral
agreement signed in October 2000, with favorable financing terms for Cuba. This provided
Cuba with about one-third of its oil needs. In the aftermath of the failed ouster of President
Hugo Chavez in April 2002, Venezuela suspended oil shipments to Cuba, but these
shipments were resumed in September 2002 after Cuba and Venezuela agreed to a
restructuring of Cuba’s $142 million debt owed to Venezuela for its oil purchases. See Jose
de Cordoba, “Cuba’s Weak Economy May be Battered Again,” Wall Street Journal, June
6, 2002; “Venezuela Shuts Off the Oil Spigot,” CubaNews, June 2002, p. 12; “Venezuela:
Halt in Oil to Cuba May Ease Pressure on Chavez,” Strategic Forecasting (Straftor.com),
May 30, 2002; and “Latin America Roundup,” Miami Herald, September 9, 2002.
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zero economic growth rate, while a rate of 3.2% is forecast for 2003, assuming an
improvement in the global economy.6 An oil strike and political turmoil in
Venezuela that began in December 2002 has caused further concern in Cuba about
its oil supplies since Venezuela provides Cuba with one-third of its oil needs.7
Socialist Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health
and education. For example, according to the World Bank, the literacy rate is 94%
and life expectancy is 76 years. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
reports that Cuba’s infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) was just 7.9 in 1996,
the lowest rate in Latin America and among the world’s top 20 countries for this
indicator. Nevertheless, the country’s economic decline has reduced living standards
considerably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies.
When Cuba’s economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little
willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993,
faced with unprecedented economic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction.
Since 1993, Cubans have been allowed to own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at
dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was
authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector, and by
1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cuban economic
reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous,
agricultural cooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993;
opening agricultural markets in September 1994 where farmers could sell part of
their produce on the open market; opening artisan markets in October 1994 for the
sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, including home restaurants
(paladares) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already taking
place); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully
owned investments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of
defense, health, and education; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones
with tariff reductions typical of such zones in June 1996. In May 1997, the
government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a new
Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity.
Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult,
characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of
medicines, and power outages. Moreover, some analysts fear that the government
has begun to backtrack on its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes have made
it extremely difficult for many of the nation’s self-employed (at one point estimated
at more than 200,000, but now estimated at 160,000 or lower, out of a total labor
force of some 4.5 million). Some home restaurants have been forced to close
because of the regulations. Some foreign investors in Cuba have also begun to
complain that the government has backed out of deals or forced them out of business.
6
“Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Reports, January 1,
2003.
7
Nancy Sue Martin, “Effects of Oil Strike Spread,” Miami Herald, December 27, 2002.
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U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro
began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward
close relations with the Soviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.Cuban relationship is illustrated by such events and actions as: U.S. covert operations
to overthrow the Castro government culminating in the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United States confronted
the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cuban
support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments
in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans
to the United States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than
30,000 Cubans who were interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and
Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian
planes, resulting in the death of four U.S. crew members.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating
the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. These sanctions were
made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L.102-484, Title
XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-114), often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S.
subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United
States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba
within the last 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation — enacted in the aftermath
of Cuba’s shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 — combines
a variety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist
Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Among the law’s sanctions is a
provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.
property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S.
federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton
and President Bush have suspended the implementation of Title III at 6-month
intervals.
Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban
people, a so-called second track of U.S. policy. This includes U.S. private
humanitarian donations, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts,
and U.S.- sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba.
The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the
aftermath of the Pope’s January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster
U.S. support for the Cuban people. These included the resumption of direct flights
to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S.
civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances for the support of close relatives
in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis
with Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines
and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba. In January 1999, President Clinton
announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people. These included
a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those
with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; an expansion of direct
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passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami (direct
flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion
of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain
categories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide
range of educational, religious, and sports competition.
Bush Administration Policy. President Bush made his first major statement
on his Administration’s policy toward Cuba on May 18, 2001. He affirmed that his
Administration would “oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against Cuba’s
government ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holds democratic, free
elections, and allows for free speech.” He added that he would “actively support
those working to bring about democratic change in Cuba.”8
In July 2001, President Bush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and
expand the enforcement capabilities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The
President noted the importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to
prevent “unlicensed and excessive travel,” enforce limits on remittances, and ensure
that humanitarian and cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in
Cuba.
On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that
includes four measures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people by U.S. religious and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); 2) providing direct assistance to the Cuban
people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mail service to and
from Cuba9; and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students
and professionals involved in building civil institutions and for family members of
political prisoners. While the President said that he would work with Congress to
ease sanctions if Cuba made efforts to conduct free and fair legislative elections (in
January 2003) and adopt meaningful market-based reforms, he also maintained that
full normalization of relations would only occur when Cuba has a fully democratic
government, the rule of law is respected, and human rights are fully protected. The
President’s initiative did not include an explicit tightening of restrictions on travel
to Cuba that some observers had expected. The President, did state, however, that the
United States would “continue to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban
8
The White House, “Remarks by the President in Recognition of Cuba Independence Day”,
May 18, 2001. See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010518-7.html].
9
Direct mail service was suspended in 1962. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 directed
the U.S. Postal service to take actions to provide direct mail service. In January 1999,
President Clinton called for the resumption of direct mail service. In the past, Cuba has
responded to U.S. overtures about direct mail service by maintaining that the two countries
would need to enter into a civil-aviation agreement. Cuba in the past has also expressed
concern about potential terrorism that could occur with direct mail service and would want
to discuss with the United States measures to prevent such activity before the resumption
of direct mail. See: Philip Brenner, “Washington Loosens the Knot Just a Little,” NACLA
Report on the Americas, March 1, 1999.
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on travel to Cuba, until Cuba’s government proves that it is committed to real
reform.”10
Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective
of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for human rights
to the island — there have been several schools of thought about how to achieve that
objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban
government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to
support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as
constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others
call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.
In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward
Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated
its policy toward Cuba – through increased travel, trade and diplomatic dialogue, that
the seeds of reform would be planted in Cuba, which would stimulate and strengthen
forces for peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United
States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the
United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario.
They argue that since Castro’s demise does not appear imminent, the United States
should espouse a more realistic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba.
Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for lifting the
U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S. businesses because of the embargo,
and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the embargo.
Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining Communist governments, and also maintain
that moderating policy will help advance human rights.
On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current
two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through
measures of support, is the best means for realizing political change in Cuba. They
point out that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a
road map for the steps Cuba needs to take in order for the United States to normalize
relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softening U.S. policy at this
time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime politically and
economically, enabling the survival of the Communist regime. Opponents of
softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its
commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba; that sustained sanctions can
work; and that the sanctions against Cuba have only come to full impact with the loss
of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponents of loosening U.S.
10
“President Bush Announced Initiative for a New Cuba,” Remarks by the President on
Cuba Policy Review, White House, May 20, 2002.
CRS-10
sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,
are the causes of the economy’s rapid decline.
Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress reflected divergent
views on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba (whether sanctions should be
eased or intensified) and also covered a range of issues including human rights,
immigration, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba. Congress will
likely continue its high level of interest in Cuba in the 108th Congress, with a variety
of legislative initiatives regarding sanctions and human rights.
Helms/Burton Legislation
Major Provisions and Implementation. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) was enacted into law on March 12, 1996.
Title I, Section 102(h), codifies all existing Cuban embargo Executive Orders and
regulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo
provisions. This provision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S.
policy options toward Cuba. In effect, the Executive Branch is circumscribed in any
changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba until certain democratic conditions are met.
Title III, controversial because of the ramifications for U.S. relations with
countries investing in Cuba, allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S.
federal court those persons that traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the
right to sue to Cuban Americans who became U.S. citizens after their properties were
confiscated. The President has authority to delay implementation for 6 months at a
time if he determines that such a delay would be in the national interest and would
expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
Beginning in July 1996, President Clinton utilized this provision to for 6months the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16,
1996, the President announced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as
a result liability for trafficking under the title became effective on November 1, 1996.
According to the Clinton Administration, this put foreign companies in Cuba on
notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United
States. At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton stated that
he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits “as long as America’s friends
and allies continued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in
Cuba.” He continued, at 6-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file Title III
lawsuits.
President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III at sixmonth intervals, most recently on January 16, 2003. When President Bush first used
his authority to suspend Title III implementation in July 2001, he cited efforts by
European countries and other U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba.
Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in
the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S.
property in Cuba. This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with
a controlling interest in an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or
CRS-11
trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of
aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provision is mandatory,
and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for
humanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions
regarding confiscated property.
To date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of
executives and their families from three companies because of their investment in
confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications
company; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an
Israeli-owned citrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.claimed property in Cuba, and as a result its executives are again eligible to enter the
United States. Action against executives of STET, an Italian telecommunications
company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which the company agreed to pay
the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimed property in
Cuba for ten years. For several years, the State Department has been investigating
a Spanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedly investing in property that was
confiscated from U.S. citizens in Cuba’s Holguin province in 1961. Press reports in
March 2002 indicated that a settlement was likely between Sol Melia and the original
owners of the property, but by the end of the year settlement efforts had failed.11
Foreign Reaction and the EU’s WTO Challenge. Many U.S. allies —
including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations — strongly
criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They
maintain that the law’s provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court
constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international
principles. U.S. officials maintain that the United States, which reserves the right to
protect its security interests, is well within its rights under NAFTA and the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing a case at the WTO, in which
it was challenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. The beginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997,
when an EU-U.S. understanding was reached. In the understanding, both sides
agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy in Cuba and to work together to
develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of
investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and other
governments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its
WTO dispute settlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let
its WTO challenge expire.
Talks between the United States and the EU on investment disciplines proved
difficult, with the EU wanting to cover only future investments and the United States
wanting to cover past expropriations, especially in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months
of negotiations, the EU and the United States reached a second understanding on May
11
“April Likely to Mark Beginning of Epic Battle Over Cuba Policy Between White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, March 11, 2002, p. 2-3; “Congress Expected to Make New Push
for Title IV Enforcement after Settlement Fails,” Cuba Trader, December 9, 2002.
CRS-12
18, 1998. The understanding set forth EU disciplines regarding investment in
expropriated properties worldwide, in exchange for the Clinton Administration’s
obtaining a waiver from Congress for the legislation’s Title IV visa restrictions.
Future investment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegal
expropriations, government support or assistance for transactions related to those
expropriated properties would be denied. A Registry of Claims would also be
established to warn investors and government agencies providing investment support
that a property has a record of claims. These investment disciplines were to be
applied at the same time that the President’s Title IV waiver authority was exercised.
Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but
opposition to the agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any
amendment of Title IV in Congress. The Bush Administration initially indicated that
the Administration was looking into the possibilities of legislation to enact a
presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001 U.S.-EU summit,
President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law.12
Section 211 Trademark Provision
A European Union challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the World Trade
Organization involves a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard,
and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with
the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi
maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. A provision in the FY1999
omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L. 105-277,
signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment
for trademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were
used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated unless the
original owner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts
from recognizing such trademarks without the consent of the original owner.
Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the United States because of
the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should the embargo
be lifted.
After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club
label, Pernod Ricard’s joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S.
federal court. In February 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York upheld a lower court’s ruling that the joint venture had no legal right to
use the Havana Club name in the United States, and also that it was barred from
recognizing any assertion of treaty rights with regard to the trade name.
After formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without
resolution, the EU initiated a WTO dispute settlement panel in June 2000,
maintaining that the U.S. law violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). An August 6, 2001 ruling by the WTO panel was
described as mixed, with both sides claiming a partial victory. The panel ruled that
12
“EU, U.S. Take Sharply Different Tacks on Dispute Resolution,” Inside U.S. Trade, June
22, 2001.
CRS-13
WTO rules on intellectual property rights did not cover trade names, but also ruled
that a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S. courts from recognizing
such Cuban trademarks based on common law rights or registration is in violation of
the TRIPS because it denies access to U.S. courts by trademark holders.
In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO that it was appealing
the ruling. The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again
the ruling was described as mixed. According to the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), the appellate panel upheld the “U.S. position that WTO
intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protect trademarks by
establishing their own trademark ownership criteria” and overturned the earlier ruling
that Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by
trademark holders.13 However, the appellate panel also found that Section 211
violated WTO provisions on national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment,
which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so that it does not violate
WTO rules. Although there is access to courts to enforce trademark rights, Section
211 restricted access in a discriminatory manner (against Cuban nationals and foreign
successors-in-interest.) On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would
come into compliance with the WTO ruling through legislative action by Congress
by January 3, 2003.14
No legislative action to amend Section 211 was taken by the end of the 107th
Congress. Instead, on December 20, 2002, the EU and the United States agreed to
extend the period for the United States to implement the findings of the WTO dispute
settlement ruling until June 30, 2003. According to a January 16, 2003 U.S. report
to the WTO: “The 108th Congress is now getting organized and preparing to resume
work. The United States Administration has been consulting with the U.S. Congress
concerning appropriate statutory measures and will continue to work with the
Congress on resolving the dispute.”15
In the 107th Congress, some Members of Congress, including a House Cuba
Working Group, called for repeal of the Section 211 trademark provision. Those
supporting a repeal of Section 211 argue that the law endangers over 5,000
trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies registered in Cuba.16
Reportedly, United State Trade Representative officials have advocated a
narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it applies to U.S.
companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. The EU reportedly wants
the law amended to state that it would not apply in cases in which the trademark had
13
United States Trade Representative, “WTO Issues Report Upholding Key Aspects of U.S.
Law in Trademark Dispute,” Press Release, January 2, 2002.
14
“U.S., EU Agree on Deadline for Complying with Section 211 WTO Finding,” Inside
U.S. Trade, April 12, 2002.
15
World Trade Organization. Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB
Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute, United States - Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, January 16, 2003.
16
“USA-Engage Joins Cuba Fight,” Cuba Trader, April 1, 2002.
CRS-14
been abandoned by its original owner. Pernod Ricard maintains that the trademark
had been abandoned by the original owner years ago. It reportedly wants the law
repealed altogether, while Bacardi favors the narrow solution advocated by USTR
officials.17
Food and Medical Exports
Under U.S. sanctions, commercial medical and food exports to Cuba are
allowed but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
(P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for shipping food
and medicine to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance,
export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports.
The law, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing
or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing
from third countries. The law reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from
Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba, under a specific license, to conduct business
related to the newly allowed food and medicine sales. Regulations implementing the
new provisions were published in the Federal Register on July 12, 2001.
Some in the business community argued that the changes in policy did not
amount to much because they still do not allow financing for the sales. Nevertheless,
U.S. agribusiness companies continued to explore the Cuban market for potential
future sales. The Cuban government told a group of U.S. farmers who traveled there
in November 2000, after passage of the new law, that although it was interested in
U.S. agricultural exports, it refused to buy any under the financing restrictions
imposed by that new law.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle that struck in early November 2001,
Cuba changed its policy of not buying agricultural products from the United States
because of its disapproval of U.S. financing restrictions. While the U.S. government
offered humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricane, Cuba
declined, saying that instead it wanted to purchase food supplies from the United
States. As a result, Cuba negotiated with several U.S. agricultural companies to
import products such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and chicken. The first
shipments of goods arrived in mid-December 2001. This marked the first time that
Cuba purchased food supplies directly from the United States since the approval of
such sales in the 106th Congress. In March 2002, the Cuban government agreed to
purchase additional agricultural products from the United States.
Overall, press reports indicate that Cuba has purchased over $100 million in
agricultural products, including grains, eggs, frozen chicken, corn, apples, and other
products from U.S. companies since late 2001. The companies include Archer
Daniels Midland, which has sold about $42 million in agricultural products to Cuba,
American Rice Inc., Cargill Corporation, Cherokee Trading, ConAgra Foods, Gold
Kist, Marsh Supermarkets, Perdue Farms, Radlo Foods, Riceland Foods, Soufflet
17
“EU Presses for U.S. WTO Compliance, as Baucus Sees Links to Commission,” Inside
U.S. Trade, November 22, 2002.
CRS-15
USA, and Tyson Foods.18 In late September 2002, a U.S. Food & Agribusiness
Exhibition was held in Havana featuring 288 exhibitors marketing 1,000 products
from more than 30 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.19 The trade fair
reportedly yielded another $50-100 million in additional sales contracts.20
Opponents of further easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba
maintain that U.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the
recent sales in the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle. Moreover, according to the State
Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States
has licensed more than $4.3 billion in private humanitarian donations. Opponents of
easing U.S. sanctions further argue that easing pressure on the Cuban government
would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime.
They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any
easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive
policies.
Supporters of easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba argue that
the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. They argue
that although the U.S. government may have licensed more than $4.3 billion in
humanitarian donations to Cuba since 1992, much smaller amounts have actually
been sent to Cuba. Some supporters of easing sanctions believe the embargo plays
into Castro’s hands by allowing him to use U.S. policy as a scapegoat for his failed
economic policies and as a rationale for political repression. U.S. agribusiness
companies that support the removal of trade restrictions on agricultural exports to
Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market of some $700 million so
close to the United States.
Some agricultural producers exporting to Cuba support continuation of the
prohibition on financing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they
will be paid. Instead, some exporters want to change U.S. restrictions in order to sell
agriculture and farm equipment to Cuba.21 Other agricultural exporters, however,
support the lifting of the prohibition on financing. They contend that allowing such
financing would help smaller U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba more
rapidly.22
18
Larry Luxner, “U.S. Food Exports to Cuba on the Rise as Farmers Pressure Lawmakers,”
CubaNews, June 2002.
19
Nancy San Martin, “U.S. Official Dampens Trade-Show Enthusiasm with Talks of Cuban
Credit,” Miami Herald, September 29, 2002, p. F1.
20
“Foreign Trade and Payments: Cuba Imports More Food from the United States,” Cuba
Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, November 1, 2002.
21
“Ag Groups Split Over Trade With Cuba,” Congress Daily AM, National Journal,
February 11, 2003.
22
“Farm Equipment Exports Likely to Face Tough Opposition from White House,
Congress,” Cuba Trader, Vol. III, No. 7, February 17, 2003.
CRS-16
Legislative Initiatives. In the 107th Congress, numerous initiatives focused
in whole or in part on easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba.
Several focused on lifting private financing restrictions for agricultural sales set forth
in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387,
Title IX, Section 908(b)). The House–passed version of the FY2003 Treasury
Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120, included a provision stating that no funds
in the bill could be used to implement any sanction on private commercial sales of
agricultural commodities or medicines to Cuba. Some observers suggested that the
practical effect of this amendment would be to prevent the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from ensuring that sales to Cuba do not
include private financing.23 The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740, as reported out
of committee, did not include a similar provision. Final action on the FY2003
Treasury Department appropriations measure was not completed before the end of
the 107th Congress.
In the 108th Congress, the final version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations
measure, H.J.Res. 2, which included Treasury Department funding, did not include
the House-passed provision from the 107th Congress that would have provided no
funding for enforcing restrictions against private financing of agricultural sales to
Cuba. The White House had threatened to veto the omnibus bill if it had provisions
weakening the embargo on Cuba.
To date in the 108th Congress, several initiatives have been introduced that
would lift restrictions in whole or in part on food and medical exports to Cuba. H.R.
187 (Serrano), introduced January 7, would allow for the financing of agricultural
sales to Cuba. Two broad bills, H.R. 188 (Serrano), introduced January 7, 2003, and
S. 403 (Baucus), introduced February 13, 2003, would lift all Cuba embargo
restrictions, including those on food and medical exports.
Travel Restrictions24
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component
in U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the
past 40 years. Over time there have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for
5 years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on travel.
Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are: it hinders efforts to
influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow
of information; it abridges the rights of ordinary Americans; and Americans can
travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major
arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that American tourist travel
would support Castro’s rule by providing his government with millions of dollars in
tourist receipts; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for
23
“House Approves Limits on Treasury Enforcement of Cuba Embargo,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 26, 2002.
24
For further information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and
Legislative Initiatives, by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS-17
humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that
the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 107th Congress, numerous initiatives would
have lifted or eased restrictions on travel to Cuba, but no action was completed on
these measures. In the second session, both the House-passed and Senate
Appropriations Committee versions of the FY2003 Treasury Department
appropriations bill (H.R. 5120 and S. 2740) had provisions that would have eased
restrictions on travel to Cuba. The provisions would have provided that no funds
could be used to administer or enforce the Treasury Department regulations with
respect to travel to Cuba. Some observers have raised the question of whether the
effect of this amendment would be limited since the underlying embargo regulations
restricting travel would remain unchanged; enforcement action against violations of
the relevant embargo regulations could potentially take place in future years when the
Treasury Department appropriations measure did not include the funding limitations
on enforcing the travel restrictions.25 In addition, Section 124 of the Senate bill
stipulated that no Treasury Department funds for “Departmental Offices, Salaries,
and Expenses” may be used by OFAC, until OFAC has certain procedures in place
to expedite license applications for travel. Final action on the FY2003 Treasury
Department appropriations measure was not completed before the end of the 107th
Congress.
In the 108th Congress, the final version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations
measure, H.J.Res. 2, which included Treasury Department funding, did not include
any provisions easing restrictions on travel to Cuba. The White House had
threatened to veto the omnibus bill if it had provisions weakening the embargo on
Cuba.
To date in the 108th Congress, two broad bills, H.R. 188 (Serrano), introduced
January 7, 2003, and S. 403 (Baucus), introduced February 13, 2003, would lift all
Cuba embargo restrictions, including those on travel.
Drug Interdiction Cooperation
Because of Cuba’s geographic location, the country’s waters and airspace have
been used by traffickers to transport illicit drugs for ultimate destinations in the
United States. Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns
over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as well as increased domestic
drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the
drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased
training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of countries
on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 29
countries and less formal arrangements with 12 others, according to the Department
of State. Britain and France have provided counternarcotics training. In November
2001, Cuba hosted a regional counternarcotics conference focusing on strategies to
prevent drug abuse, drug trafficking, and money laundering.
25
“House Approves Limits on Treasury Enforcement of Cuba Embargo,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 26, 2002.
CRS-18
The United States has cooperated with Cuba on anti-drug efforts on a case-bycase basis dating back to the 1970s. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the
United States in the seizure of 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick,
a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the cocaine to the United States and
cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of two defendants
in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S. and
Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation.
Cuba accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border
Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard
officer at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted
to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, and since that time, according to the
State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2001, U.S.Cuban coordination has increased.
Cuba has called for even more cooperation and has asked for a bilateral antidrug cooperation agreement with the United States.26 In January 2002, Cuba
deported to the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug
charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug
trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. While
Drug Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for
Cuba’s actions, he indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis,
not through a bilateral agreement.27 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
said that if Cuba “were to demonstrate a willingness to work across the board with
us on law enforcement issues, then we might consider some more formal structure,”
but he indicated that Cuba has not demonstrated that kind of commitment. As an
example, Boucher maintained that “there are still dozens of fugitives from U.S.
justice who have been provided safe haven by the Cuban government.”28 Although
the current level of case-by-case cooperation will probably continue, it is unlikely
that the level of cooperation will increase significantly given the Administration’s
position. Some Members have called for greater cooperation with Cuba on drug
control and view Cuba’s proposal as a good-will gesture, while others view the effort
as a ploy to sway public opinion and influence views in the U.S. Congress.29
Legislative Initiatives. In the second session of the 107th Congress, both
House and Senate versions of the FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations bill
(H.R. 5410 and S. 2779) had divergent provisions related to Cuba and
26
On March 12, 2002, Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Interests Section
in Washington delivered three diplomatic notes to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and
the State Department in Washington proposing agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism,
and migration issues. See: “Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Prominent
Drug Trafficker Arrested in our Country,” Information Office, Cuban Interests Section,
March 17, 2002.
27
Anthony Boadle, “U.S. Thanks Cuba, But Declines Anti-drug Accord,” Reuters, March
19, 2002.
28
29
U.S. Department of State, State Department Regular Briefing, March 19, 2002.
Vanessa Bauza, “Cuba’s Cooperation Seen as a Trojan Horse,” Fort Lauderdale Sun
Sentinel, March 31, 2002, p. 1F.
CRS-19
counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Section 585 of the Senate bill
provided that $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
assistance should be made available for preliminary work by the Department of State
and other entities to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban
government on counter-narcotics matters. The money would not be available if the
President certified 1) that Cuba does not have in place appropriate procedures to
protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection
with the interdiction of illegal drugs and 2) that there is evidence of involvement of
the Cuban government in drug trafficking. In contrast, Section 581 of the House bill
provided that none of the funds appropriated for “International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement” may be made available for assistance to the Cuban government.
Final action on the Foreign Operations measure was not completed before the end of
the 107th Congress.
In the 108th Congress, the final version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations
measure, H.J.Res. 2, which included Foreign Operations funding, did not include
either the House or Senate provisions on anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. The
Senate version of H.J.Res. 2, included a provision (Division E, Foreign Operations
appropriations, Sec. 580) similar to the Senate bill in the 107th Congress described
above. It would have provided $3 million for international narcotics control and law
enforcement assistance for preliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba on
counter-narcotics matters.
Cuba and Terrorism
Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring international
terrorism in 1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia.
Communist Cuba has had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and
governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992 Fidel Castro said that his
country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba’s change in
policy was in large part because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resulted
in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial
Cuban economic decline.
Cuba remains on the State Department’s 2002 terrorism list. According to the
State Department’s May 21, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, Castro
continues “to view terror as a legitimate revolutionary tactic.” The report maintained
that Cuba provides safehaven to at least 20 Basque ETA terrorists from Spain and has
provided “some degree of safehaven and support” to members of two Colombian
insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN). (Cuba has been the site of peace talks between the
Colombian government and the ELN.) The report noted that one of three Irish
Republican Army (IRA) members arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing
explosives training to the FARC had been based in Cuba for 5 years. The report also
noted that numerous U.S. fugitives from justice resided in Cuba (see “Cuba and U.S.
Fugitives from Justice” above). It also asserted that “since September 11, Fidel
Castro has vacillated over the war on terrorism.” The report noted that while Cuba
signed all 12 U.N. counterterrorism conventions and the Ibero-American declaration
on terrorism in 2001, it has also issued strong rhetoric against the U.S.-led war on
terrorism.
CRS-20
Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, Fidel Castro also stated that the
attacks were in part a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist
methods” for years.30 Cuba’s subsequent statements became increasingly hostile,
according to press reports, which quoted Cuba’s mission to the United Nations as
describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as “fascist and terrorist” and that the
United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish “unrestricted tyranny
over all people on Earth.”31 Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run by
“extremists” and “hawks” whose response to the attack could result in an “infinite
killing of innocent people.”32
The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S.
decision to send captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Guantanamo has been a U.S. base since 1903,
and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be
terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. In 19941995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their
homeland. As of February 2003, about 650 detainees from more than 30 countries
are being held at Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government objects to the U.S.
presence at Guantanamo as a national security threat and opposes the presence as
illegal, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees from Afghanistan.
Defense Minister Raul Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would
escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the
base.33
On September 17, 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fisk
accused Cuba of impeding U.S. efforts to defeat the threat against terrorism. Fisk
accused the Cuban government of distracting U.S. attention and resources from antiterrorist efforts by setting up false leads. The Cuban government strongly denied the
allegations that it has tried to mislead investigators.
Cuba has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976,
a Cuban plane was bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen
bombings in the tourist sector in Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an
Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two Salvadorans
were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999, and three
Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January
2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings. On
December 19, 2002, Juan Pablo Roque, a Cuban spy who had infiltrated the Cuban
American group Brothers to the Rescue (whose plane was shot down by Cuba in
30
Andrew Cawthorne, “Cuba’s Castro Urges U.S. to Keep Calm,” Reuters, September 11,
2001.
31
Kevin Sullivan, “Castro Warns About U.S. Military Plans,” Washington Post, September
23, 2001, p. A38.
32
Ibid.
33
“Cuba Would Hand Over Escapees, Raul Castro Says,” Miami Herald, January 20, 2002.
CRS-21
1996) reportedly was shot and wounded in Havana; an anti-Castro paramilitary group
known as Comando F-4 claimed responsibility.34
Cuba and Biological Weapons ? In 2002, there were allegations that Cuba,
which has an advanced biotechnology sector, is involved in developing biological
weapons. On May 6, 2002, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton stated that “the United States believes that Cuba
has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort”
and “has provided dual-use technology to other rogue states.” Bolton called on Cuba
“to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with
all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.” Although Bolton’s
statement received considerable media attention, it was similar to a March 19, 2002
statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under
Secretary Bolton’s statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted that
the United States believes Cuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct
research on biological weapons but emphasized that the Administration had not
claimed that Cuba had such weapons.35 Some observers view Powell’s statement as
contradicting that of Under Secretary Bolton.36 The State Department’s annual
Patterns of Global Terrorism report issued May 21, 2002, did not mention the issue
of Cuba and biological weapons.
In response to Under Secretary Bolton’s statement, the Cuban government
called the allegations a lie and maintained that the Bush Administration was trying
to justify its hard-line policies just when the momentum is increasing in the United
States to ease the embargo. During his trip to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter
criticized the Bush Administration over the allegations and said that Administration
officials who had briefed him before the trip assured him that Cuba had not shared
anything with other countries that could be used for terrorist purposes.37
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on the issue on June
5, 2002.38 At the hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
Carl Ford distinguished between the term “effort” and “program,” and maintained
34
Elaine De Valle, “Anti-Castro Group Claims Shooting of Spy in Cuba,” Miami Herald,
December 31, 2002.
35
David Gonzalez, “Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba,” New York Times,
May 14, 2002, p. 3.
36
David Gonzalez, “Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba,” New York Times,
May 14, 2002.
37
Kevin Sullivan, “Carter Says He Was Told U.S. Had No Proof Cuba Shared Bioweapons
Data,” Washington Post, May 14, 2002, p. 14.
38
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs. Cuba’s Pursuit of Biological Weapons:
Fact or Fiction? 107th Congress, June 5, 2002. S.Hrg. 107-736.
CRS-22
that Cuba has a biological weapons effort and not a biological weapons program.
Ford characterized a program as something substantial and multifaceted that includes
test facilities, production facilities, and a unit within the military specifically
designated for such weapons capability. In contrast, he characterized an effort as the
research and development that would be necessary to create biological weapons.
U.S. government concerns about Cuba’s capability to produce biological
weapons dates back several years. In 1998, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Cohen stated in a transmittal letter (accompanying a report to Congress on Cuba’s
threat to U.S. national security) that he was “concerned about Cuba’s potential to
develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnology infrastructure...”39
Cuba began building up its biotechnology industry in the 1980s and has spent
millions investing in the sector. The industry was initially geared “to apply
biotechnology and genetic engineering to agriculture in order to increase yields” but
has also produced numerous vaccines, interferon, and other drugs and has exported
many of its biotechnology products.40 In 1999, the British pharmaceutical company
Glaxo SmithKline announced an agreement to test and market a new Cuban
meningitis vaccine that might eventually be used in the United States.41
Cuban Spies in the United States
Over the past several years, the FBI has arrested and convicted several Cuban
intelligence agents in the United States. In June 2001, five members of the so-called
“Wasp Network” were convicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in
Miami. Sentences handed down in December 2001 ranged from 15 years to life in
prison. The group tried to penetrate U.S. military bases and exile groups. The Cuban
government has vowed to work for the return of the five spies who have been dubbed
“Heroes of the Republic” by Cuba’s National Assembly. In addition to the five, a
married couple was sentenced in January 2002 to prison terms of 7 years and 3 ½
years for their participation in the spy network.
In addition, two U.S. government officials have been implicated in spying for
Cuba. In February 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official
from Miami, Mariano Faget, was arrested and ultimately convicted in May 2000 for
passing classified information to a friend with ties to Cuba. He was sentenced to 5
years in prison in June 2001. The case led to the State Department’s expulsion of a
Cuban diplomat working in Washington D.C.
On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana
Montes was arrested on charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes
39
United States Information Agency, “Text: Defense Secretary’s Letter to Thurmond on
Cuban Threat,” May 6, 1998.
40
Teo A. Babun, Jr., A Business Guide to Cuba, Cubanews, Miami Herald Publishing
Company, 1996, pp. 66-67.
41
Michael Kranish, “Biotechnology; Incubating Biotech Cuba Become Biotech Hotbed,”
Boston Globe, May 15, 2002, p. D1.
CRS-23
reportedly supplied Cuba with classified information about U.S. military exercises
and other sensitive operations.42 On March 19, 2002, Montes pled guilty to spying
for the Cuban government for 16 years, during which she divulged the names of four
U.S. government intelligence agents working in Cuba and information about a
“special access program” related to U.S. national defense. On October 16, 2002,
Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison in exchange for her cooperation with
prosecutors as part of a plea bargain. In response to the espionage case, in early
November 2002 the U.S. Department of State ordered the expulsion of four Cuban
diplomats in the United States, two from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington
D.C. and two from Cuba’s U.N. Mission in New York. Cuba strongly asserted that
the diplomats were not involved in intelligence activities.
Radio and TV Marti
U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba – Radio
and TV Marti – began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the
Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2003 Budget Request, the objectives of Radio
and TV Marti are 1) to support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; 2) to be
effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideas through use
of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable and
authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to
provide news, commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and
elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
TV Marti broadcasts for four and one-half hours daily; on May 20, 2002, the
broadcast schedule was changed from the early hours of 3:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m. to the
evening hours of 6:00 p.m. - 10:30 p.m. Radio Marti broadcasts 24 hours a day on
short and medium wave (AM) channels. Surveys of Cubans have shown a Radio
Marti listenership of 9% in 2000 and 5% in 2001.43
Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting
programs had been a primary function of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions were merged into the
Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice
of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia,
and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti.
OCB is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress (P.L.
104-134) required the relocation of OCB from Washington D.C. to south Florida.
The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998.
42
Bill Miller and Walter Pincus, “Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba, Woman
Passed Classified Information on Military Exercises, FBI Says,” Washington Post,
September 22, 2001, p. A1.
43
Brian Conniff, Acting Director, International Broadcasting Bureau, Broadcasting Board
of Governors, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, June 6, 2002.
CRS-24
Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies,
including adherence to broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over
the years to cut funding for the programs, especially for TV Marti, which has not had
an audience because of Cuban jamming efforts. Various studies and audits of these
programs have been conducted, including investigations by the U.S. General
Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel on Radio
and TV Marti, and by the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General.44 (For
background on Cuba broadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636, Radio and
Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues through 1994.)
From FY1984 through FY2002, Congress appropriated almost $407 million for
broadcasting to Cuba, with about $249 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984) and
$158 million for TV Marti (since FY1989).
Debate on TV Marti. In the various congressional debates on TV Marti over
the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain that virtually the
only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular
section of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which
TV Marti may be viewed. These critics argue that some $150 million has been spent
by the United States for TV Marti, while the Cuban government only needs to spend
a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcasts effectively. They argue that TV Marti
is a waste of taxpayers’ money because it does not contribute to the promotion of
freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which some Cubans listen to
as a source of information. Opponents also argue that the conversion of TV Marti
from VHF to UHF transmission has not succeeded in overcoming Cuba’s jamming
efforts.
In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a congressionally
mandated Advisory Panel in 1994, which stated that “the Cuban people have an
ardent desire and a genuine need to receive the programming produced by TV
Marti.”45 Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send a message to the
Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause of freedom in
Cuba. They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to the dictatorial
Castro government, which suppresses the free flow of information in Cuba. These
proponents contend that it is impossible for the Cuban government to completely jam
44
See the following reports and audits: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Broadcasts
to Cuba, TV Marti Surveys are Flawed, GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990; U.S. GAO, TV
Marti, Costs and Compliance with Broadcast Standards and International Agreements,
GAO/NSIAD-92-199, May 1992; U.S. GAO, Letter to Hon. Howard L. Berman and Hon.
John F. Kerry regarding Radio Marti broadcast standards, GAO/NSIAD-93-126R, February
17, 1993; Advisory Panel on Radio and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
and TV Marti, Three Volumes, March 1994; U.S. GAO, Radio Marti, Program Review
Processes Need Strengthening, GAO/NSIAD-94-265, September 1994; U.S. GAO, U.S.
Information Agency, Issues Related to Reinvention Planning in the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, GAO/NSIAD-96-110, May 1996; and U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Inspector General, Review of Polices and Procedures for Ensuring that Radio Marti
Broadcasts Adhere to Applicable Requirements, 99-IB-010, June 1999.
45
Advisory Panel on Radio Marti and TV Marti, Report of the Advisory Panel on Radio
Marti and TV Marti, Executive Summary, March 1994.
CRS-25
TV Marti, and maintain that significant numbers of Cubans have attempted to tune
in to the programming. Still others point to the potential use of TV Marti in the event
of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba’s future, and argue that in such a scenario, it would
be important to have TV Marti available as a news source.
FY2003 Funding. In September 2002, both houses approved the conference
report (H.Rept. 107-671) to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003
(H.R. 1646) that authorizes $25.923 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2003. The
President signed the measure into law on September 30, 2002 as P.L. 107-228.
The Bush Administration requested $25.362 million for broadcasting to Cuba
for FY2003, with about $15 million for Radio Marti and $10 million for TV Marti.
In the 107th Congress, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version
of the FY2003 Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations
bill, S. 2778 (S.Rept. 107-218) on July 24, 2002, which would have provided
$24.996 million for Cuba broadcasting. Final action on the measure was not
completed before the end of the 107th Congress. In the 108th Congress, the final
version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill, H.J.Res. 2, which includes
Commerce, Justice and State appropriations in Division B, provides $24.996 million
for Radio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba.
U.S. Foreign Aid to Support Human Rights and Democracy
Over the past several years, the U.S. Agency for International Development has
provided assistance to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights,
and free enterprise to Cuba. USAID’s Cuba program supports a variety of U.S.based non-governmental organizations to promote rapid, peaceful transition to
democracy, help develop civil society, and build solidarity with Cuba’s human rights
activists.46
These efforts are funded through the annual foreign aid appropriations bill. In
FY2001, $4.989 million was provided for various Cuba projects. In FY2002, $5
million was provided. For FY2003, the Administration has requested $6 million as
part of its foreign aid request. While the FY2003 assistance was not earmarked in
either the House or Senate version of the Foreign Operations bill for FY2003 in the
107th Congress, H.R. 5410 and S. 2779, the House Appropriations Committee report
to the bill (H.Rept. 107-663) states that the committee fully supports the
Administration’s request of $6 million for the goal of promoting a peaceful transition
to democracy in Cuba. Final action on the FY2003 measure was not completed
before the end of the 107th Congress. In the 108th Congress, the final version of the
FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill, H.J.Res. 2, which includes Foreign Operations
appropriations in Division E, was approved February 13, 2003.
Migration
In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords
designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States
46
See USAID’s Cuba program website: [http://www.usaid.gov/regions/lac/cu/].
CRS-26
by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which
125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials. In
response to Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S.
resolve not to allow another exodus. Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans,
on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under
which Cubans attempting to flee their homeland were allowed into the United States,
and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy would take Cubans rescued at
sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy,
Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks
that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of
Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the agreement, the United States and
Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban migration to the United
States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States agreed to
ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of
20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of
policy, the United States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all
Cuban migrants who reach the United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to
prevent unsafe departures from Cuba.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which
the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo
into the United States, but would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter
the United States by sea and would return them to Cuba. The two countries would
cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledged to ensure that no action
would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their
attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense
announced that the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at
Guantanamo had left the U.S. Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United
States. Periodic U.S.-Cuban talks have been held on the implementation of the
migration accords.
Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted
thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed
at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum
in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply for
permanent resident status in one year.
The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging
in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against
those engaging in alien smuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a
life sentence may be imposed. U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida
has also increased in recent years with numerous convictions.
From late November 1999 through June 2000, national attention became
focused on Cuban migration policy as a result of the Elian Gonzalez case, the fiveyear old boy found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Fort Lauderdale. The
boy’s mother drowned in the incident, while his father who resided in Cuba, called
for his return. Although the boy’s relatives in Miami wanted him to stay in the United
CRS-27
States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled that the boy’s father had the
sole legal authority to speak on his son’s behalf. After numerous legal appeals by the
Miami relatives were exhausted, the boy returned to Cuba with his father in June
2000. In Cuba, Fidel Castro orchestrated numerous mass demonstrations and a
media blitz on the issue until the boy’s return. The case generated an outpouring of
emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south Florida.
Legislation and Resolutions in the 107th Congress
P.L. 107-77 (H.R. 2500)
State Department and Related Agencies Appropriations, FY2002. The measure
fully funded the Administration’s request of $24.872 million for broadcasting to
Cuba for FY2002. H.R. 2500 reported by the House Committee on Appropriations
(H.Rept. 107-139) July 13, 2001. House passed (408-19), amended, July 18, 2001.
S. 1215 reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations July 20, 2001 (S.Rept.
107-42). On September 10, 2001, the Senate substituted the language of S. 1215 as
its version of H.R. 2500, and on September 13, 2001 the Senate passed (97-3) the
bill, amended. Conference report (H.Rept. 107-278) filed November 9, 2001. House
approved conference (411-15) on November 14, 2001, and the Senate approved it
(98-1) on November 15, 2001. Signed into law November 28, 2001.
P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506)
Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002. Introduced and reported by the
House Committee on Appropriations July 17, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-142). House passed
(381-46) July 24, 2001. The House committee report to the bill notes that the
Appropriations Committee fully supports the Administration’s budget request of at
least $5 million aimed at promoting democracy in Cuba. Senate Committee on
Appropriations reported its version September 2, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-58). Senate
passed (96-2) October 24, 2001. The Senate version would have provided $1.5
million for the Department of State and other agencies to establish cooperation with
Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. Conference report (H.Rept. 107-345) filed
December 19, 2001, without the Senate provision on counter-narcotics cooperation
with Cuba. However, the conference report called for a report by the Secretary of
State within 6 months on 1) the extent, if any of the direct involvement of the
government of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2) the likelihood that U.S.
international narcotics assistance to the government of Cuba would decrease the flow
of drugs transiting through Cuba, and 3) the degree to which the government of Cuba
is exchanging with U.S. agencies drug-related law enforcement information. The
conference report also encouraged the Administration to transmit to Congress, not
later than 9 months, any legislation necessary to decrease the flow of drugs to or from
Cuba. House agreed (357-66) to the conference December 19; Senate agreed
(unanimous consent) December 20. Signed into law January 10, 2002.
P.L. 107-228 (H.R. 1646)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 and FY2003. Conference report
(H.Rept. 107-671) filed September 23, 2002; Section 121 of the conference report
version of the bill authorized $25.923 million for FY2003 for Cuba broadcasting.
CRS-28
House agreed to conference report by voice vote September 25, 2002; Senate agreed
by unanimous consent September 26, 2002. Signed into law September 30, 2002.
H.Res. 91 (Smith, Christopher)
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the human
rights situation in Cuba. House passed (347-44, 22 present) April 3, 2001.
S.Res. 272 (Nelson)
Expresses support for the Varela Project. Introduced May 20, 2002. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reported May 29, 2002. Senate approved (87-0) June
10, 2002.
Legislative Initiatives in the 108th Congress
H.J.Res. 2 (Young)
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003. House approved by voice vote
January 7 as short-term continuing resolution. Senate passed (69-29) January 23,
2003 after amending it to become a FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill. Conference
report (H.Rept. 108-10) filed February 13, 2003. Conference report approved by the
House (338-83) and the Senate (76-20) on February 13. President signed the
measure February 20, 2003. The final version provides $24.996 million for Radio
and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba (Division B, Commerce, Justice, and State
appropriations). In addition, while the measure does not earmark funding for human
rights and democracy projects for Cuba, it does fund FY2003 Foreign Operations
appropriations; the Administration’s FY2003 foreign aid request had included $6
million for such projects. The final version does not include any provisions funding
U.S.-Cuba anti-drug cooperation or any provisions easing Cuba sanctions. The
White House had threatened to veto the omnibus bill if it contained provisions
weakening the embargo on Cuba.
H.R. 187 (Serrano)
To amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
to allow for the financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Introduced January 7, 2003;
referred to Committee on Financial Services and in addition to the Committees on
International Relations and Agriculture.
H.R. 188 (Serrano)
To lift the trade embargo on Cuba. Introduced January 7, 2003; referred to
Committee on International Relations and to Committees on Ways and Means,
Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services, Government Reform, and
Agriculture.
H.R. 189 (Serrano)
Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitions with respect to nationals
of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional baseball.
Introduced January 7, 2003; referred to the Committee on International Relations and
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
CRS-29
H.Con.Res. 16 (Andrews)
To call for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Cuba, including Dr.
Oscar Elias Biscet. Introduced January 28, 2003; referred to Committee on
International Relations.
S. 403 (Baucus)
United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2003. To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and
for other purposes. Introduced February 13, 2003; referred to the Committee on
Finance.
For Additional Reading
CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade, Cuba Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan.
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra108.html]
CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade, Economic Sanctions and Agricultural
Exports, by Remy Jurenas. [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra13.html]
CRS Report RL31302, Appropriations for FY2003: Treasury, Postal Service,
Executive Office of the President, and General Government, by Sharon S.
Gressle.
CRS Report RS20450, The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by Larry M. Eig.
CRS Report RL30837, Cuba: An Economic Primer, by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and
Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL30628, Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Mark
P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales.
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS Report RS20468, Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL30570, Elian Gonzalez: Chronology and Issues, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S.
Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report 94-636, Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and
Issues Through 1994, by Susan B. Epstein and Mark P. Sullivan.
CRS-30
CRS Report RL31258, Suits Against Terrorist States, by David M. Ackerman.
CRS Report RS21003, Travel Restrictions: U.S. Government Limits on American
Citizens’ Travel Abroad, by Susan B. Epstein and Dianne E. Rennack.