CHINA AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Bates Gill
Lonnie Henley
May 20, 1996
i
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ii
FOREWORD
The Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its
Seventh Annual Strategy Conference in April 1996. This year's
theme was "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . .
. or Peer Competitor." One of the issues of this year's
conference was China's ability to participate in the Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA). The two essays that follow address
that topic.
Dr. Bates Gill of the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), on a panel entitled, "Seizing the RMA: China's
Prospects," argued that there is more to participating in the RMA
than securing or producing high-tech weaponry. A revolution is an
all-encompassing phenomenon with socio-cultural as well as purely
technological aspects. China's prospects for seizing the RMA lie
not so much in the development of technology as in the
restructuring of concepts and organizations. History, culture,
and philosophical values will make it difficult for China to
participate in the RMA.
On the other hand, Dr. Gill believes that China may be able
to develop an "RMA with Chinese characteristics" much as it took
Marxism-Leninism, a Germanic-Russian innovation devised for
proletarian revolution, and modified its tenets to be relevant
within a peasant revolutionary context. Through sheer
determination and by optimizing technology and expertise
available from outside sources, China might approximate a less
sophisticated RMA entirely suited to its own needs.
Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley joined Dr. Gill on
this panel. His paper argues that, over the next 20 years, China
will deploy a dozen or so divisions possessing relatively
advanced systems, but that overall, the PLA will remain about a
generation behind the U.S. Army in terms of its ability to
participate in a fully-developed RMA. Furthermore, capabilities
within the air and sea forces of the PLA will be even more
limited with relatively small infusions of advanced aircraft like
the SU-27 and naval vessels such as the KILO class submarines.
These modern weapons will make up only a fraction of what will be
otherwise dated forces. According to Colonel Henley, by 2010 the
PLA may be able to achieve the kind of capabilities demonstrated
by U.S. forces in the Gulf War.
These papers paint a picture of China with limited potential
to become a peer competitor of the United States in the next two
decades. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that China's relative
power in Asia and globally will grow sharply in that period. Even
partial success in pursuing advanced military technology and
organizing concepts could enhance the speed and impact of that
rise in power.
iii
The exploration of the issues surrounding the RMA has only
just begun, and the essays that follow are worthy of
consideration by anyone interested in the role that China may
play in the strategic military balance early in the 21st century.
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR
BATES GILL heads the Project on Security and Arms Control in East
Asia at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI). Formerly he held the Fei Yiming Chair in Comparative
Politics at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Chinese and
American Studies in Nanjing, China. A specialist in East Asian
security affairs, Dr. Gill's research and publications focus on
China's arms trade, arms production, and arms control activities.
His latest book, co-authored with Taeho Kim, is China's Arms
Acquisition from Abroad, published by Oxford University Press.
LONNIE HENLEY, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, is a strategic
intelligence officer and China foreign area officer assigned to
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Headquarters, Department of the Army. He is a graduate of the
United States Military Academy and holds masters' degrees in
Chinese language and history from Oxford and Columbia
Universities. He has served three tours in Korea and three years
as a China analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency.
v
CHINA AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
ASSESSING ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS
Bates Gill
At present, a technological revolution in high and new
technologies is sweeping across the globe, and
increasingly becomes a critical factor in measuring a
country's national power and military strength. . . .
The next ten years are of critical importance for
China's vitalization.
Marshal Nie Rongzhen,
Founding father of PRC's
military-technical base, 19911
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
This paper is organized into four principal sections. The
first section will introduce a framework for analysis by first
broadly sketching the meaning of a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) and offering general background points about China's
relationship to past and current RMAs. The body of the paper
consists of two principal sections which focus respectively on
economic and socio-cultural factors and which affect China's
capacity for change, innovation, and adaptability particularly in
areas of activity critical to grasping the current RMA. A
concluding section will assess how socio-cultural and economic
factors will affect China's progress in grasping the current RMA
in particular, and its military effectiveness overall.
Conceptualizing an RMA.
To define and describe an RMA is a complex and esoteric
undertaking, one which has consumed the time and intellectual
energies of numerous analysts who have in turn produced a
burgeoning body of analysis.2 Rather than reinventing the wheel
on this subject, or developing a hard and fast definition, it
will be more useful for our purposes simply to sketch those broad
areas of agreement among analysts of past and contemporary RMAs.
Indeed, in terms of theory-building and policy prescription, the
study of RMAs remains in its nascent stages, barely out of the
definitional starting blocks.3 At this early stage in the
development of our understanding of RMAs, offering a general
concept of what constitutes an RMA--rather than explicitly
linking the definition to the current RMA, or to present and
future capabilities and strategies of the U.S. military--seems to
be a more sensible approach if we are to usefully develop our
conceptual understanding of China and RMAs.
1
In broadly sketching the areas of apparent consensus on what
constitutes an RMA, and drawing from the literature just cited,
we can note the following general points:
• that RMAs are not simply technological in nature, but
concern significant progress and change in at least 4-5 important
military-related areas: technology, systems, operations,
organization, and strategy (see Figure 1 for a rough diagram of
how these components appear in the current RMA);
• that changes or progress in these areas in and of
themselves do not represent a true RMA, but rather it is the
synergistic combination of these developments which forms the
true RMA and alters the nature of warfare;
• that RMAs emerge from revolutionary changes of historic
magnitude within the broader social, economic, and political
environments of national and global societies, which in turn
offer the conditions for RMAs to be recognized, appreciated,
internalized, and exploited;
• that the smooth and successful process of recognition,
appreciation, internalization and exploitation requires
flexibility, adaptability, innovation, and openness to change.
China and RMAs.
Based on this broad conceptualization of RMAs, three general
points will serve as a background to the subsequent discussion of
economic and socio-political factors affecting Chinese approaches
to the current RMA.
Playing "catch-up." It was China's fate that at the
historical period of its confrontation with the West--in the
early to mid-19th century--another critical historical
development was taking place to form a watershed in the
development of military strategy and technology. On the far side
of that watershed, dating back to the earliest days of recorded
history, developments in military strategy and technology were
marked by their evolutionary and slow character. But since the
mid-19th century, change in military strategy and technology was
marked by its rapid and revolutionary character. Whereas prior to
this watershed, change in military strategy and technology was
measured in centuries, since the mid-19th century revolutionary
change in military affairs is measured in decades or less.4 The
revolutionary and rapidly changing nature of military affairs is
unlikely to slow in the foreseeable future--and may accelerate in
what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have called the "Information Age" or
"Third Wave" of warfare.5 Metz and Kievit hypothesize that in the
future a series of "minor revolutions in military affairs will
2
occur closer together than in the past, almost to the point of
continuous revolution."6
As a result, since the mid-19th century, and throughout its
tortuous process of nation-building to the present day, China has
been playing "catch-up" with increasingly recurrent revolutions
in military affairs. Concomitant with its broader efforts to
modernize, a constant theme in the relationship between China and
military affairs since the mid-19th century has been its ability
or inability to adapt to rapid change and innovative military
developments even as the pace of change increases. To use the
Tofflers' typology, just as Agrarian Age China struggled to
confront the Industrial Age West from the mid-19th century
onward, so too today a (mostly) Agrarian Age and (nascent)
Industrial Age China now must confront the Third Wave of the
Information Age emergent in the Westernized world.7 This point
serves to give some historical background to the problem at hand,
allowing us to understand more of the contextual forest so as to
better analyze the trees immediately before us.
3
Avoiding the U.S. yardstick. Our understanding of RMAs is
dominated by what it means for the United States, and not for
other countries. In particular, the literature tends to focus on
defining the current RMA--with its emphasis on high-tech systems
such as stand-off precision strike weapons; command, control,
communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities;
and information dominance--and suggesting policy options ahead,
all in relation to the United States. In short, our definitions,
frameworks, theories, and policy outputs on the RMA are
constructed and debated for the most part with reference to the
forces, threats, and missions of U.S. armed forces. Moreover,
because the United States already has highly sophisticated
battle-tested weaponry, its armed forces are far ahead on the
learning curve, having successfully tackled fundamentals in R&D
and production and moving toward refining both the technology and
strategy demanded by the rapid changes of the Information Age.
Applying this yardstick, the United States clearly dominates in
the four key areas of RMAs: technologies, systems, operations,
and organization, making it rather easy to conclude that the
Chinese do not have a grasp of the RMA, and are far from doing
so.
But, for a number of reasons, it would be unwise to blindly
apply this yardstick in our strategic analyses of other countries
such as China. First, it too easily falls prey to an overreliance on the technological superiority inherent in the United
States' grasp of the current RMA. Blind faith in the "silver
bullets" of technology too easily dismisses the possibility that
China can compete successfully with the United States and other
technologically advanced counterparts at some threshold below or
outside the RMA as defined by U.S. forces. Second, from a more
analytical point of view, this yardstick avoids answering why
China has not grasped the current RMA, and what factors will
determine its ability or inability to do so at some point in the
future.
This point emphasizes that we find ourselves treading in new
conceptual territory where we are likely to encounter conceptual
throughways and roadblocks not found on the RMA map as designed
in the United States. As we will see, factors entirely alien to
the American experience--such as communism and Confucianism--play
a critical role in the likely successes and failures in China's
progress toward current and future RMAs.
Comparing successes and failures. In reviewing China's
experience with RMAs over the past 150 to 200 years, its clearest
success is in the development of nuclear weapons and strategic
missiles in a relatively short span of time. In the integration
and operationalization of other RMAs, China has not exhibited
such clear success nor rapid development.8 Arguably, its strategy
4
and tactics in the Korean War were reminiscent of World War I,
while its efforts to stage a lightning strike against Vietnam in
1979 quickly bogged down and ended in miserable failure. A
discussion of Chinese efforts to more effectively make use of air
and naval assets in an integrated fashion is the subject of
another paper, but suffice it to say here that China is in the
very earliest stages of developing this capability commensurate
with capabilities demonstrated by other major powers in World War
II.
But the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles appears to be the exception to the trend for China and
RMAs, and offers interesting insights into China's ability to
grasp the current and future RMAs. First, China mobilized massive
intellectual and--at times equally or more important--political
resources in an all-out effort to build the bomb and missile
delivery systems in such a short period of time. So great was the
effort that it managed to meet with success in spite of the
disastrous economic and political maelstroms that swirled through
China from the late 1950s though the mid-1970s.9
But on the other hand, this effort also reveals insights for
what China has not accomplished. China is still behind in this
particular RMA, especially in terms of the survivability and
accuracy of its nuclear force. It continues to struggle with the
development of adequately powerful solid-fuel rocket engines, in
guidance systems, and in the development of multiple-warhead
weapons. While China can claim a nuclear "triad," it always
placed its greatest reliance on its land-based force, and its
strategic air and submarine forces are of questionable
reliability. Of the five declared nuclear powers, China maintains
its minimal deterrence posture--though it may be in the midst of
some modification10--which can only be roughly equated in force
and capability to that which was deployed by the superpowers more
than 35 years ago.
This point is raised to suggest that while China has shown
success in pursuing the nuclear weapon/ballistic missile RMA,
that success has thus far been limited to mastering fundamental
technologies and deployments, and has not moved far in terms of
operational capability and survivability nor doctrinal
developments.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Are economic and socio-cultural factors critical
determinants for the RMA, and, if so, how can their impact be
analyzed? As for economic influences, the Realist school has long
held the importance of economic factors for national power.
Realist critiques suggest that economic power, not military
power, will be the more critical determinant of national
5
strength. The Tofflers argue that the conduct of warfare is very
much a reflection of the economies that fight them, "not in
technological terms alone, but in organization, communication,
logistics, administration, reward structures, leadership styles
and cultural assumptions." Put another way, "smart tools in the
economy produce smart weapons for war."11
Looking ahead and beyond current economic factors, we should
recognize that the Information Age will redefine the critical
economic endowments for power. In addition to the traditional
three economic factors for national power as understood by
Realists--land, population, and resources--a fourth factor,
information, will be entered into the mix. How well an economy
adapts to this new reality will partially determine its
comprehensive national strength, and affect national power in
such fundamental areas as trade, business, education, technical
skills, propaganda and political control, as well as military
capability.
The following analysis will assess three critical economic
factors for their impact on China's ability to adapt to and
exploit capabilities inherent in the emergent RMA: autarchic
development; industrial policy and organization; and commitment
of financial resources.12
Autarchic Development.
China's traditional economic development policy of "selfreliance" is rooted in historic concerns and has important
implications for the country's ability to adapt to change in
general, and to see progress toward the current RMA in
particular. Like other countries, China's concern for selfreliance is security-related: the more a country can rely on
itself for its economic and military needs, the less likely it
can be held hostage in times of crisis.
But for China, the concern for self-reliance has deeper
roots than basic security concerns. Because of its recent
history, particularly what the Chinese term the "century of
shame"--from the onset of foreign encroachment onto Chinese
territory in the mid-1800s until the Communist consolidation of
its victory on the mainland in the mid-1900s--China remains
highly sensitive to dependent and semi-dependent relations with
foreigners. China's "betrayal" at the hands of Khrushchev and the
final collapse of massive Soviet economic and military assistance
in 1960 further strengthened a well-entrenched propensity toward
self-reliance and autarchy. The concern for over-reliance on and
even distrust of foreign economic sources and contacts is
reflected recently in Beijing's decision to regulate access to
financial data and information provided by foreign news vendors.13
6
In the especially sensitive area of military technology and
development, the concern over self-reliance is even greater.
China's singular aim in the development of its military
technology is to establish the means to produce the weapons and
technologies itself. As the official history of the Chinese
defense industry puts it:
In the process of developing its science and technology
for national defense, China has always stood firmly on
the foundation of self-reliance, correctly handling the
relationship between foreign goods and self-development
and overcoming an improper underestimation of our
capabilities and a tendency toward blind reliance on
copying foreign imports. As to introducing foreign
assistance and technology: we need to, but cannot
simply depend on or blindly follow them. Study them,
but also know their fundamental nature so to put them
to our own use. . . . In this new era and for the
future, China will always adhere to the fundamental
guideline that the development of defence science and
technology must principally rely on its own strength.14
Today, as defense R&D and production "goes global," and the
costs and complexities of military technology increase, China's
military modernization efforts may not be able to so firmly
adhere to such traditional principles. Current Sino-Russian
cooperation may indicate a growing awareness in China of the need
to cooperate more closely with foreign suppliers in the
development of its military, but this relationship remains at an
early stage.
More broadly, the Tofflers note how countries such as China-which still seek and wilfully exhibit the trappings of selfreliance and nationhood--will resist what they view as the
intrusive influences of globalization which characterize the next
"wave" of development, the Information Age. Chinese efforts to
strictly monitor the Internet is just one of many manifestations
of this tendency.15 This has significant economic ramifications,
not only for China's ability to develop its military, but more
broadly for its ability to successfully reap the fruits of
participation in the global economy. Many analysts suggest that
the Soviet Union's inability to integrate with the global economy
was a decisive factor in its demise.
Industrial Policy and Organization.
Industrial policy and organizational methods have an
important influence on China's ability to absorb technologies,
exchange findings and ideas, and adapt to new circumstances in
7
order to more effectively grasp and exploit developments in the
current RMA.16 Moreover, in an apparent paradox, while the
economic reforms of the Deng era have done much to strengthen
China's comprehensive national strength, they have weakened its
defense industrial base in many ways. Of greatest interest to our
discussion at this point, three important factors arise: the
Soviet and Maoist legacy; commercialization; and
decentralization.
Soviet and Maoist Legacy. China's industrial base, and
particularly its defense industrial base, is still dominated by
the organizational model adopted from the Soviets in the early
1950s which has traditionally been characterized by overcentralization and bureaucratic formalism.17 Our discussion will
focus on several key aspects of this system. First, the
development of industry, and particularly the defense industry,
heavily relied on large scale output of what the Chinese call
"copy production." This characteristic feature of Chinese defense
production derives from the Soviet reluctance to part with
production technologies, the exigencies of the Sino-Soviet split
which compelled China to learn how to produce its own weapons,
and the Maoist proclivity to reward quantitative rather than
qualitative production targets. The current exhortations within
the defense R&D and production sector to "contract the front,
give priority to key projects" and "more research, less
production" acknowledge the need to restructure the sector's
approach to development.
Second, the Soviet legacy has left a vertically-organized
and highly redundant production system, with limited experience
in either "rationalization" or downsizing and few horizontal
linkages across production sectors or between research and
production facilities. This is especially true in the defense
production sector, which was traditionally isolated and
protected--geographically, organizationally, and politically-from developments and innovations in other sectors of the
economy. Under these conditions, the problem of information
"scarcity" arises. In China, information and technology remain
highly scarce resources, which are tightly guarded mostly by
bureaucratic agents and institutions of the state.
This traditional separation of the commercial and military
sectors and lack of institutionalized horizontal informationsharing becomes especially problematic in an information-based
age when the diffusion of commercial technologies and
organizational principles are particularly important in making
progress in the current RMA. China has made significant strides
in recent years to "cross-fertilize" between the military and
commercial sectors and to decentralize decision-making (see
below), but this effort continues to meet with difficulties. An
indication of these difficulties is found in the China Daily
8
which reported in December 1995 that China's enormous research
establishment--2.4 million researchers at 5,860 research
institutes, 3,000 university research centers, and 10,000
business-related research units--produces some 30,000 patents a
year, of which about 5 percent end up in production.18 In other
words, while considerable research is conducted, little reaches
the point of application.
Third, the Soviet system of economic organization has left a
system which does not offer strong incentives to broad-based
science and technological innovation and achievement. The system
is run by bureaucrats and party officials whose interests lie not
in the development of scientific knowledge, but in meeting
production and political quotas. Moreover, in the formative years
of the People's Republic, enormous intellectual and financial
resources were poured into the military production sector and
especially to applied research for mass production, to the
detriment of more comprehensive and theoretical science and
technology expertise.
To be sure, the Soviet and Maoist models promoted mass
production, and, as noted above, resulted in certain key
breakthroughs, such as in ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
But the price was the development of a stultified defense science
and technology sector which became accustomed to reverseengineering rather than technological innovation and lacked an
integrated and rational system of R&D development, production,
and procurement. But, this system offered little in the way of
"know-why" or "know-how," has not left a tradition of innovation
or "cross-fertilization" within and among relevant institutions
and individuals, nor led to the firm creation of the critical
link between research and production.
Commercialization. Now nearly 15 years into the ambitious
Chinese defense conversion effort, the program has a number of
success stories, but overall has proved extremely difficult, with
most defense enterprises continuing to lose money and facing
tough times ahead.19 Commenting on the looming socio-economic
crisis facing the Third Front defense industries in rural Sichuan
Province, a Chinese commentator noted that "most of the factories
are on the verge of bankruptcy" and concluded that in their turn
to the market "prospects for success are dubious."20 With 55 per
cent of China's defense industries in Third Front areas, the
conversion effort is both necessary and problematic.21
The move into commercial activities diverts resources and
expertise out of military production. Official statistics note
that on average 70 per cent of the output value of Chinese
defense enterprises under the State Council is for the civilian
market and the aim is to raise this figure to 80 per cent by
1999; some sectors already claim a much higher conversion rate.
9
According to some Western estimates, about 90 per cent of Chinese
defense production capacity sits idle.22 But these figures appear
to hide actual conditions on the ground, where the vast majority
of defense production enterprises have great difficulty in
converting to commercially viable production.23 Furthermore, it
appears that the commercialization effort invests financial and
intellectual resources in areas geographically and conceptually
outside the traditional centers of arms production with the
creation of "window enterprises" and PLA companies in the
prosperous coastal regions of China which are not engaged in
military R&D and production activities.24
On the other hand, the trend towards commercialization may
prove advantageous for the industry as a result of "spin-on"
synergies. The Chinese have begun to recognize that the
foundation for military technologies of the future will
increasingly be commercial technologies. The Vice-Minister of the
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND), Huai Guomo, stated in 1993:
Because national defense high technology is by its
nature having multiple technologies, the differences
between defense and civilian technology is becoming
smaller and smaller. The trend of interchangeability
between the military and civilian is on the rise,
allowing the technical foundation for an accelerated
modernization of national defense and to realize the
steady improvement of weapons.25
General Liu Huaqing, China's highest-ranking active military
officer and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
said in early 1995 that China "should pay attention to turning
advanced technology for civilian use into technology for military
use."26 Official Chinese policy appears to view conversion and the
commercialization of the industry in an optimistic light, but
moving from concept to realization will be no easy task with
little past experience upon which to found the effort. But it
will be critical for China to develop this capability in order to
grasp the current and future RMAs.
Decentralization. Overall economic trends in China today are
towards placing greater decisionmaking authority in the hands of
provincial, municipal and enterprise authorities, a trend which
is also taking place in the defense R&D and production sectors.27
However, tensions and contradictions exist between the center and
subordinate units as these developments unfold. As a result, the
picture on economic decentralization and its effect on China's
approach to the RMA is not clear. On the one hand, and over the
short term, the decentralization trends will pose difficulties to
the defense-related R&D and production units. On the other hand,
decentralization in principle can help China over a longer term
10
to develop the concepts, organizational structures, and
conditions needed within its economy to exploit the emergent RMA.
As part of the economic reform and modernization effort
since 1979, the main government units responsible for weapons
development and production have been periodically reorganized in
an effort to streamline and rationalize the system. Since 1979,
the defense industries under the State Council have undergone at
least three major reorganizations, and we now may be seeing the
advent of a fourth reorganization. First, in the early 1980s, the
formerly numbered machine-building industries were given names
and were streamlined somewhat, with the Eighth Machine Building
Industry (missiles) merged into the Seventh to make the Ministry
of Space Industry, and with the shipbuilding industry set up as a
ministry-level corporation. In 1988, these ministries were
regrouped under three ministry-level organizations--the Ministry
of Energy Resources (MER) (including nuclear industry), the
Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry (MMBEI)
(included electronics, ordnance and land systems), and the
Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAS) (including aircraft and
aviation products, missiles, and space launch vehicles and
satellites).
Most recently, over the period 1991 to 1993, the MER, MMBEI,
and MAS were shut down, and their subordinate industries were
reorganized under five ministerial level corporations ostensibly
subordinate to the State Council: China State Shipbuilding
Corporation (CSSC), China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), China
National Nuclear Industry Corporation (CNNC), China North
Industries (NORINCO), and Aviation Industries of China (AVIC).
The Ministry of Electronics Industry was set up as a regular
ministry, though parts of the industry were commercialized in the
form of China Electronic Industry Corporation (also know as
Chinatron). The trend toward decentralization is further
confirmed by the November 1995 Chinese White Paper on arms
control which notes "the government departments formerly in
charge of military production have already been changed into
general corporations [and] will step by step develop into
economic entities engaging in research, production, and
business."28
This gives a freer hand to hundreds of factories, companies
and research institutes which are ostensibly subordinate to the
ministry-level corporations. However, in the near term,
coordinating development and production of defense materiel-hardly ever a well-coordinated effort in the Chinese experience29-will only become more difficult under the market conditions
currently prevailing in China which favor the realization of
quick profits in the commercial sector over long-term planning.
In one example, managers at NORINCO apparently tried without
success to drastically cut back on the company's centrally-
11
mandated defense production quotas in order to free up resources
for more lucrative commercial production ventures. In discussions
with managers of defense production units in late 1995, it was
clear that many would like to get out of the defense production
business completely.
The picture is further muddied by the official line for the
defense science and technology enterprises. The official policy,
harkening back to the achievements of 35-40 years ago, offers
"strengthened centralized and unified leadership as the
fundamental assurance for defense science and technology
development" as the number one lesson of China's defense science
and technology experience.30 Maintaining the spirit or the letter
of such a policy will probably not be conducive to the kind of
open and innovative environment called for by the emergent RMA.
This political and economic tug-of-war--reminiscent of previous
critical development debates in contemporary Chinese history--is
likely to continue for some years to come to the detriment of
coordinated efforts aimed at getting a technological and
organizational handle on the emergent RMA.
Commitment of Financial Resources.
China has limited financial means to devote to science and
technology development over all, and defense-related R&D and
production in particular. Indeed, "science and technology" and
"defense" remain third and fourth priorities, respectively, in
the Dengist canon of the "Four Modernizations." However, as the
Chinese economy continues to thrive, new developments and
synergies in the commercial sector could overcome traditional
state-based sources of support to the science and technology and
defense R&D and production communities. But for China to make
significant advances in the emergent RMA will require not only
improved financial resources to relevant sectors, but also--more
difficult to accomplish--considerable improvement in the
development of human resources.
The four tables in this section present basic trends and
indicators for certain potential financial resources to support
science and technology development and defense R&D and production
in China. Table 1 presents the most recent statistics available
from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
on Chinese military expenditure. The ACDA figures are "rough
estimates," and are some 7-8 times higher than the official
Chinese defense budget figures.31 In any event, working with
Chinese sources, Wang finds that the official Chinese defense
budget "does not cover the costs of research and development on
new weapons and equipment," the funding for which comes out of
other budgets.32 But the ACDA figures indicate that Chinese
military spending has remained relatively steady over time, when
12
factored for inflation and the devaluation of the yuan, between
approximately 50 and 55 billion U.S. dollars a year.
Unfortunately, these figures do not break down the totals into
spending categories such as R&D. Recent estimates for Chinese
13
-------------------------------------------------------------Year
Annual Spending
% of GNP
% of CGE
-------------------------------------------------------------1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
53,050
52,140
52,160
50,960
51,400
52,040
51,320
54,110
52,000
54,870
56,170
6.8
5.8
5.1
4.6
4.2
3.8
3.6
3.7
3.3
3.0
2.7
30.4
26.1
23.8
19.3
19.5
20.0
19.1
18.8
17.3
16.9
16.2
-------------------------------------------------------------Figures are in constant (1993) million U.S. dollars, and as a
share of gross national product (GNP) and central government
expenditure (CGE).
Table 1.
Chinese Military Expenditure, 1983-93
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 58. The source
notes that these are "rough estimates."
spending on defense- and weapon-related R&D are in the range of
U.S.$1 billion to U.S.$5 billion a year.33 One researcher,
reaching the lower figure, also placed it in perspective to other
countries' military R&D spending in the period 1992-94 (Table 2).
It is similarly difficult to get good figures on the amount
China spends on science and technology R&D overall. According to
one recent source, China spent approximately 1 per cent of GNP,
or about U.S.$4.0 to 4.5 billion in 1992.34 The United Nations
estimates that in 1992, China expended approximately 16.9 billion
Chinese yuan, approximately 0.5 per cent of GNP, on R&D
expenditures (slightly less than U.S.$3.0 billion at 1992
exchange rates).35 In 1992, one researcher states the China
Natural Science Foundation (CNSF) was providing a total of 80,000
researchers with approximately 2.26 billion Chinese yuan.36
However, this appears to be an exaggeration, as official
statistics state that the CNSF was to receive only 1.5 billion
14
-------------------------------------------------------------Government Expenditure
Country
Year
on Military R&D
-------------------------------------------------------------Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Italy
Japan
Russia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
1993
1994
1992
1992
1994/95
1993
1992
1994
1993
1992
1993
1994
210
1,000
4,700
1,600
320
530
660
1,000
290
450
3,900
42,000
-------------------------------------------------------------Figures are in million U.S. dollars.
Table 2:
Estimated Government Expenditure on Military R&D
in China and Democratic Countries
Which Spent Over $200 million U.S. Per Year, 1992-94.
Notes: Calendar years except for India, for which the fiscal
year is given; because of budget and conversion uncertainties
China and Russia figures are accurate to one significant digit.
Others are accurate to two significant digits. Source: Eric
Arnett, "Military Technology: the Case of China," SIPRI Yearbook
1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 376.
Chinese yuan for the entire Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1991-1995, or
an average of 300 million Chinese yuan per year. The amount of
funding from the CNSF was to reach 500 million Chinese yuan per
year for 1995.37 Table 3 offers some comparative figures for
national R&D spending as a percentage of gross national product
for several countries. As another point of comparison, the
Pentagon recently reported that its requested 1997 budget for R&D
and procurement of "information technology," particularly in
communications and electronics, amounts to nearly U.S.$3
billion.38
Another potential revenue source for Chinese defense-related
15
R&D and production development is derived from the sale of
16
-------------------------------------------------------------R&D Expenditure
Country
Year
as Percentage of GNP
-------------------------------------------------------------Canada
1992
1.6
China
1992
0.5
India
1990
0.8
Japan
1991
3.0
South Korea
1992
2.1
Soviet Union
1988
1.8
Sweden
1991
2.9
Taiwan
1993
1.9
United Kingdom
1992
2.1
United States
1988
2.9
-------------------------------------------------------------Table 3: R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of
Gross National Product (GNP) for
Selected Economies in the Years Indicated (1988-93)
Sources: United Nations, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1995,
Lanham: Bernan Press, 1995, Table 5.1; Statistical Yearbook of
the Republic of China, Taipei: Directorate General of Budget
Accounting, and Statistics, 1995, Table 56.
weapons, both as exports and as domestic procurement. However,
this source of investment has come under pressure in recent years
as exports and domestic procurement have both declined
precipitously. Table 4 indicates that when measured in SIPRI
trend indicator values, the volume of Chinese arms exports has
dropped rapidly in recent years and particularly since the late
1980s. Similarly, domestic procurement has decreased as well, in
some cases quite considerably.39 Even as some defense procurement
continues, the financial resources available to the plants
remains relatively limited as a means to reinvest in improved
facilities and R&D. A leading Chinese defense economist writes
that the current pricing system for Chinese defense products
continues to limit profits for the manufacturer to around 5 per
cent of the cost of production, according to the formula of
"planned cost x (1+ 5 per cent)".40 It is unclear how much of this
profit is reinvested in R&D or plant development. A high-ranking
official in CAPUMIT states that profits from military enterprises
is reinvested according to the "5 + 3 + 2" formula: 50 per cent
is reinvested in upgrading the plant; 30 per cent is devoted to
plant and facilities maintenance; 20 per cent is used
17
-------------------------------------------------------------1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
-------------------------------------------------------------1760
3214
2212
1414
1222
1103
1159
1284
744
868
-------------------------------------------------------------SIPRI trend indicator values, expressed in constant 1990 U.S.
million dollars.
Table 4:
Volume of Chinese Arms (Exports, 1986–95)
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, 1996. Note: SIPRI arms
transfer data are an index which indicate trends in deliveries
of major conventional weapons. SIPRI arms trade statistics do
not reflect purchase prices and are not comparable with economic
statistics such as national accounts or foreign trade statistics.
Sources and methods used in development of SIPRI arms trade
figures are explained in the SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford University
Press: Oxford, annual; and in Sources and Methods for SIPRI
Research on Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers and Arms
Production, SIPRI Fact Sheet, January 1995.
for personnel and administrative costs.41 This underlines that 50
percent is reinvested in upgrading the plant; 30 per cent is
devoted to plant and facilities maintenance; and 20 per cent is
used for personnel and administrative costs.41 This underlines the
point that production and R&D tend to be separated, not only
spatially and conceptually, but with regard to resource-access as
well.
Taken together, the potential sources of financial
commitment to the development of China's science, technology and
R&D strengths seems comparatively weak, at least in relation to
the types of technological and conceptual breakthroughs which
seem necessary for China to see progress with the current RMA.
While there is a clear understanding on the part of the Chinese
leadership of the necessity to devote more resources to R&D, to
integrate more fully with the international economy, and to
radically restructure its research and production communities,
this process will be slow and painful.
SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS
Socio-cultural factors and their influence on military
18
prowess and strategic thinking are less obvious and have not been
treated as amply in the literature as have the more obvious and
measurable economic factors. The notion of "national character,"
"national morale," and the "quality of society and government"
and their influence on national power were treated by Morgenthau
in his 1948 classic, Politics Among Nations.42 In efforts to
discern Soviet military thinking, studies on Moscow's "strategic
culture" appeared in the 1970s,43 and have since been supplemented
more recently by similar studies addressing other cultures.44 One
study in particular has sought to refine this approach, arguing
that "the nature of a society can affect the military power
generated by the society," suggesting that our analyses should
focus on "the dominant social structures of a country" and how
they influence "the amount of offensive and defensive national
military power that can be generated from a given quantity of
material resources."45
With regard to the RMA in particular, much scholarship and
the popular imagination have tended to stress the technological
factor as a driver of military change. But in the context of the
current debate on the RMA, the most careful observers emphasize
the multi-dimensional character of the RMA, and stress how it is
couched within a broader set of determinants. Cooper argues that:
creating a revolution is more . . . than pushing the
frontiers of science or the boundaries of military
systems; it must be a positivist process that requires
adaptation by the organism (or organization) for
exploitation to occur.46
Another analyst of the RMA notes the importance of behavioral
factors such as "new operational concepts, new tactics, and new
organizational structures," all of which derive from "the current
confluence of social, political, economic, and technological
forces."47
It is to this socio-cultural realm that we now turn to
analyze how established Chinese norms and values affect the
country's approach to RMAs. In particular, the following pages
will consider historical and contemporary Chinese socio-cultural
foundations and their impact--for better and for worse--on
China's ability to recognize, appreciate, adapt to, and exploit
revolutionary changes in military affairs.
Historical Context.
Confucianism. Confucianism is at its root a set of sociocultural norms which value and legitimize conservatism in
thought, and the maintenance of the status quo in political,
socio-economic, and cultural structures. Originally conceived as
19
a means to ensure the stability and prosperity of Chinese
agrarian society, Confucianism seeks precisely to avoid
revolutionary and disruptive change. As Lucien Pye argues:
The Confucian ideal was eminently appropriate for an
agrarian society but was detrimental to the development
of commerce and industry. Eventually, the Confucian
tradition . . . worked against the Chinese in their
confrontation with the modern industrial and
technologically oriented West.48<%0>
RMAs by their nature are "antithetical to existing cultural
norms and bureaucratic structures."49 It will be difficult enough
within a society and military which values technology and is
relatively accustomed to innovation and change--such as the
United States--to come to grips with the demands of the new era
in military affairs. For China, a society which is--by tradition
and by exigencies of contemporary socio-politcial realities-conservative and resistant to foreign ideas, adapting to new
concepts and organizational structures will be difficult and
problematic.
Specifically, we can point to four key aspects of
Confucianism as important in relation to RMAs. First, the
pervasive influence of Confucianism is still felt today in its
segmentation of society, both horizontally and vertically.
Confucian norms look favorably on and promote a society so
regulated because it is understood that the system is stable and
conducive to prosperity and moral betterment when "everything is
in its proper place." From top to bottom, in rank order, society
was divided into the following: the emperor, the mandarin class
of scholar-bureaucrats, farmers, and artisans, with merchants and
soldiers occupying the bottom rungs. Cutting down vertically
across those horizontal divisions were other lines of division:
geographic, demographic (urban vs. rural) and familial. This
structure tended to restrict movement of ideas and labor, while
conserving the socio-cultural structure intact with little
change. In principle, the tenets of Confucianism allowed that
those with merit--as determined by the level of scholarly ability
to master the Chinese canon--were able to cross over these
societal divisions. In practice, only those with the time and
means to devote to the years of training and study necessary to
succeed in the examination system could hope to enjoy much
mobility.
Second, Confucianism teaches the centrality of government
not only as a dominant but (ideally) enlightened ruling force,
but also as purveyor of unifying socio-cultural values. It also
served for the ruling class as a "common code" of conduct and
moral virtue. In the wrong hands, however, this ideal could be
easily corrupted to a simple facade for perpetuating
20
authoritarianism and tyrannical political, social, and cultural
policies.
Third, Confucianism diminishes the role of the individual in
favor of the collective good. Confucians expect individuals to
perform certain duties and functions in accordance with their
determined place within society. In doing so, the individual is
assured to have done his part in contributing to the stability of
the entire society. Individualism, or acting outside one's
"role," was not considered socially acceptable behavior, and
contravened the interests of the whole.
Fourth, the Confucian system valued education to the degree
it accomplished two principal purposes. First, education was
intended to be the formal vehicle through which was conveyed a
narrow set of immutable and predetermined norms, values and
precepts. The process of scholarship entailed committing these
subjects to memory with little question or investigation.
Problems which subsequently arose were to be solved with strict
reference to the canon. Second, education was intended to broadly
prepare the scholar to assume functionally unspecialized duties
within the government. As a result, matters of study outside of
the canon--natural sciences, technology--were beyond the socially
acceptable pale or were scorned for their overly specialized and
impractical nature. Under this system the inventiveness and
innovation which marked early Chinese history bogged down from
the Ming dynasty onward into the 20th century--a span of nearly
500 years.
The Tiyong Concept. The tiyong concept is another
historically important influence on Chinese socio-cultural
norms. It provides a transcendent normative basis for Chinese
approaches to socio-economic and technological development and
its relations with the outside world in general. The tiyong
concept--short for zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong (Chinese
learning for substance, Western learning for practical use)-speaks to a belief in the inherent superiority of things Chinese.
This is the view which understands China as an inherently higher
culture and civilization, reluctant to accept and integrate the
ideas and learning of foreigners, particularly those of the West.
Moreover, as the notions of "science" and "technology" became
increasingly associated with the West, so too they were treated
with less respect within the tiyong framework. Time and time
again in Chinese history since the 1500s, the introduction of
Western learning and concepts--sometimes introduced peacefully,
other times rudely crashing onto Chinese shores--were rejected
with reference to arguments conceptually related to the tiyong
ideal.50
One example of this tendency is particularly illuminating
for our understanding of socio-cultural influences affecting the
21
exploitation of RMAs in China. Following its devastating defeat
at the hands of Japan in the 1895 (in which China was forced to
cede Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaodong peninsula to Japan),
China subsequently launched the ill-fated "Hundred Days of
Reform." With little planning or strategic vision, reform-minded
advisors to the Qing court attempted to drive through rapid
changes to the Chinese economic and scientific system similar to
what they perceived to be the accomplishments set in motion in
the late 1860s by the Meiji Revolution in Japan. The reformers
issued proclamations mandating the establishment of new academies
of learning, the development of railroads, the adoption of
Western scientific methods, and the translation of Western texts.
This movement was quashed almost as quickly as it began by the
Empress Dowager and her court of conservative supporters. The
reformers were hounded out of office, some were killed, and the
violently xenophobic Boxer Uprising erupted shortly thereafter in
1900.
These concepts underpinning Chinese socio-cultural norms are
not simply historical oddities, but continue to shape the way
modern-day Chinese leaders and citizens view their world. On the
one hand, this outlook helps to unify a disparate nation of more
than a billion persons, and provide some sense of Chinese
identity. The sense of "being Chinese" is a powerful emotional
and motivational force to Chinese on the mainland and around the
world. On the other hand, remnants of the Confucian sociocultural system, strengthened in ways by communist rule, stifle
innovation, promote rigidity in thinking, and tend to favor
paralysis over adaptability, all of which are not conducive to
recognizing, accepting, and exploiting the emergent RMA.
Contemporary Context.
Communist authoritarianism. Communism and Confucianism share
many socio-cultural similarities, but communist rule added new
dimensions of its own. In particular, through wielding modern
means of communication, propaganda, and political control, the
communist leadership has largely strengthened many of the
stultifying practices of Confucianism (while often condemning the
belief system in theory). On the other hand, the communist
leaders in their early years of rule were able to concentrate the
levers of power available to them in a way which resulted in
significant military-technical breakthroughs particularly with
regard to establishing a rudimentary but functional conventional
and nuclear deterrent.
The communist leadership is duly proud of its
accomplishments in restoring a semblance of order and stability
to China upon its victory in 1949, following the long "century of
shame" characterized by chaos, war, civil strife, and the often-
22
vicious intrusions of foreign powers. The communist system
quickly sought to impose its set of rules upon the Chinese
society to govern behavior, reward the good and punish the evil.
The system included its own understood hierarchy where--as in
Confucianism--the leaders were above the law but (ideally) benign
and with the society's greater interests in mind. Beneath the
leaders, the widening ranks of party members--properly imbued
with the communist canon--took control of the bureaucratic levers
of power, while beneath them China's vast numbers of peasants
were considered with special favor as were soldiers who fought
for the revolution. At the bottom of the ladder, merchants,
entrepreneurs, and landlords were eventually dispossessed of
their capital and relegated to second-class citizenship. Also
near the bottom of this hierarchy were persons with foreign
connections and learning, who were particularly suspect in the
new system. Geographic, demographic, and familial divisions
remained important, but the communists added a new dimension with
the introduction of huge bureaucratic socio-economic
organizations such as mass organizations, collectives and
communes, and the danwei, or work unit. The upwardly or
horizontally mobile knew the value of party membership--or at
least a strict adherence to the party's teachings--to their
ambitions.
As in Confucian practice, the centrality of the ruling
group--embodied under communism in the form of the Party--is
unquestioned. Moreover, through the massive socio-economic
organizations to which all belong, the party is able to socialize
the citizenry, unify thinking, and convey acceptable sociocultural norms and behaviors. The role of the individual is
subsumed to the will of the society--as defined by the party
orthodoxy. Moral models such as Lei Feng--a self-proclaimed
simple but devoted cog in the giant social machine--are extolled.
Individualism and unorthodox thinking are shunned and often
punished severely.
With Maoist disdain and suspicion of intellectuals, learning
is less revered than under Confucianism. "Merit" and moral
conduct (i.e., learning and practicing the communist canon) is
more often preferred to technical expertise. Experts and
specialists in science and technical fields, while often
talented, are shabbily and at times brutally treated, and
considered suspect in difficult political times. The Cultural
Revolution destroyed a generation of possibilities in terms of
human capital. It may seem strange that the official line of the
defense science and technology sector is compelled to exhort its
people to "respect the knowledge and talent" of the intellectuals
and experts in their ranks, but such calls are apparently still
necessary.51 To this day, the arguments pitting "red" versus
"expert," the "open door" versus the "Four Cardinal Principles,"
and attacking the deleterious effects of (foreign) "bourgeois
23
liberalism" and "cultural pollution" provide a thin contemporary
veneer over the deep-seated nature of these debates.
These proclivities of the communist society reveal
themselves in the troubled way in which defense-related R&D and
production are conducted in China. These problems have been often
cited by Western and Chinese observers alike.52 In reviewing the
relevant Chinese and Western literature, and in discussions with
official researchers and experts concerned with the development
of China's defense R&D and production base, problems related to
the communist system consistently emerge: the persistence of
"leftist" and "ideological" thinking which has prevented the
establishment of a more rational and scientific approach to
decision-making; bureaucratic formalism and over-centralization;
poor coordination across the life cycle of a weapon system;
profligate and misdirected spending; an institutionalized lack of
horizontality between the defense R&D and production sectors and
to the outside commercial sector; and a continuing lack of esteem
and incentives for scientific expertise. In addition, the nature
of the Chinese socio-economic system requires a considerable
amount of political will to be directed from the top down before
change and innovation reform can be implemented from the bottom
up.
Attempts to break down this system and to introduce reform
and management techniques aimed at improving the defense
industrial base have had only mixed success, limited almost
entirely to the commercial sector. In the words of one Chinese
defense industry expert, a change for the better in the system
will require "efforts by a generation of people."53
Post-Mao modernization. In the two decades since Mao's
death, Chinese society and values have undergone tremendous
change. While deeply-rooted forms of social organization and
values under Confucian and Communist systems continue to be
predominant, the reforms and societal transformation of China
over the past 15 years--which can be expected to continue and
even accelerate in the years ahead--create change and tensions
that are both beneficial and detrimental to China's ability to
adapt to exploit the changes inherent in the emergent RMA. It is
still too early to know with certainty where these changes will
lead, if they can be sustained in a positive way, or if China
will stay true to its history and continue its rocky and
problematic relationship with change and foreign concepts.
At this early stage, however, it may be useful to consider
how post-Mao modernization has affected the social position and
status of Chinese human capital, which, perhaps more than any
other single factor, will determine China's ability to grasp the
emergent and future RMAs. As noted, the past record of Chinese
human capital development is mixed, and since 1949 and the advent
24
of the communist system has included long periods in which
scholarly and scientific training and intelligence were actively
scorned, and scientists and intellectuals actively punished and
even killed. In recent years, China has taken steps to invigorate
and heighten the social status of scientific and R&D communities,
which, if sustained, will no doubt contribute to improvements in
the development of RMA-related systems and organizational
constructs. As noted in relation to other aspects of the economy
elsewhere in this monograph, the present shake-out in the economy
as a result of reform will probably have short-term deleterious
effects on the development of China's human capital, but may pay
off over a longer term.
In the short term, the socio-cultural mantra defining the
rapid Deng-era changes could be summarized in the words of the
paramount leader himself: "It is good to be rich." This has
resulted in an increase in corruption, an entrepreneurial
preference for quick profits over long-term visions, an even more
covetous protection of information and technology by bureaucratscum-businessmen, and, of interest to our discussion, a slow drain
of expertise out of scholarly and research fields, and into
business. For the defense R&D and production sector, this trend
poses some difficult challenges. For example, the president of
Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) said in 1993 that in the face
of lucrative opportunities in the commercial sector, he has
problems keeping his staff of 10,000 engineers, technicians, and
designers "energized and committed to aerospace."54 Frieman argues
that the "open door policy has also made a career in non-defense
related science more attractive than it might have been in
earlier periods," adding that the "military sector might still
have some of the best, but it no longer has all of the best, of
China's scientists."55 The apparent employment of some Russian
scientists also suggests that China has difficulties meeting its
defense production R&D goals strictly through reliance on its own
expertise. Indeed, the official history of the Chinese defense
industry makes the case for improved technical training and
education, allowing that China "lacks personnel" who can "carry
forward the frontier of today's national defense science and
technology sector."56
Thus, while the modernization and reform effort will carry
forward and meet with a number of significant gains, it may do so
by taking socio-cultural directions not immediately beneficial to
long-term national health. This period of socio-cultural change
will be characterized by social disruption and decentralization,
restructuring of societal organization, the introduction of new
cultural norms and behaviors, the development of new conceptions
of "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," and the creation of a
novel approach to solve pressing problems. This process will take
time, will be resisted by entrenched interests, and in the near
term will slow China's efforts to fully exploit the emergent RMA.
25
CONCLUSIONS
Profound Changes, but to What Result?
A first conclusion we should draw from this brief analysis
is to acknowledge that profound changes are occurring in Chinese
economic and socio-cultural spheres which have important
implications for the country's approach to emergent RMAs. But
while this may be obvious, a more nuanced understanding of the
process requires analysts to recognize that while many of these
developments are conducive to China's approach to the RMA, others
are not.
For China's approach to RMAs, indeed to change generally, it
will no doubt benefit from those economic and socio-cultural
developments which favor greater flexibility, adaptability, and
innovation. Such changes underway in China are often remarkable
in their extent and pace. To take just one example, the official
Chinese press recently noted that about half of the enterprises
in a "pilot project"--607 out of 1,290--succeeded in
"transforming their corporate management from a planned-economy
type to one for a market economy." The enterprises established
supervisory boards and business-oriented meetings, abolishing
their former reliance on bureaucrats and party organization.57 But
the fact that the effort is in a pilot stage, involves a small
number of enterprises (of which only half were thus far
successful), and that such events should be news at all are
illustrative of the deeper obstacles that must be overcome in
spite of impressive gains thus far.
As to the RMA itself, it would seem that the PLA and defense
R&D community has begun the process of recognition and debate
beyond its immediate shock at the display of high-tech warfare
against Iraq in 1991. On October 26, 1995, the China Defense
Science Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), the information
clearing-house and think-tank connected to the ministry-level
commission in charge of China's defense industries (Commission
for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND)) held a seminar on the topic of "miliary technical
revolution." Bringing together persons from the Academy of
Military Sciences, the National Defense University, the armed
forces, and defense-related industries, the seminar addressed
"the intention, characteristics and development" of the military
technical revolution, and the "need to renew concepts and bring
about overall development in PLA military theory research."58 In
addition, efforts are underway to open up the defense R&D and
production system to outside influences, especially in the
context of increasingly friendly military-technical relations
between China and Russia.59
26
These changes and opportunities are impressive and hold
great potential. On the other hand, in the grand scheme of
things, in these changes we are witnessing a China still
struggling--sometimes successfully, other times not--with the
economic and socio-cultural implications of the shift from
agrarian to industrial society. This struggle has been marked by
widespread social and political upheaval, tortured cultural
introspection, and economic turbulence that the current and
relative stability of Chinese society appears to belie. But
another great wave of change is likely to come to China, even as
it continues to grapple with its transition to the industrial
age. China's confrontation with this next wave is just beginning,
and the ultimate social, political, economic and military impact
of the information age for China is yet to come.
Technology-led or Behavior-led RMA?
As suggested by Figure 1, the component parts of the
emergent RMA can be divided into three categories. The first
category concerns the "tools of war" with an emphasis on
technology as their defining feature. The second category
concerns "behavior" and focuses on changes in organization and
ways of thinking as critical drivers. In studying China and the
RMA, this distinction is important. In particular, the work
presented here suggests that the greatest obstacles between China
and the emergent RMA does not rest in the development of
technology so much as in the restructuring of concepts and
organizations. It will be in this critical area--where the
attributes of innovation, integration, flexibility, adaptability
are all-important-- where China is likely to have the most
difficulty.
Three important points support this view. First, the
commercial nature and current diffusion of militarily-relevant
technology is such that it is probably only a matter of time
until China possesses and begins to see advances with critical
technologies for warfare in the information age. In the postindustrial age, the accoutrements of power are not as dependent
on classic factor endowments such as land, labor, and capital,
and are more related to information. This source of strength is
more transferable, meaning the diffusion of power as technology
is greater. For example, China is working on the development of
stand-off precision strike cruise missiles, on the development of
a GPS system, and on improving C4I capability. But the critical
test for China will not be simple possession of the technology
(it is said tongue-in-cheek that China can put together at least
one of almost anything), but rather applying to it the conceptual
and analytical tools necessary to understand the technology and
operate it effectively in the new conflict environment.
Second, China has met with relative success in those RMAs
27
which were primarily driven by technological breakthroughs. In
cases where the driver was a compelling need to address a
strategic problem (an operational and organizational driver) or
to respond to fundamental economic, political, and socio-cultural
changes, China has not fared as well.60 This point may be all the
more relevant in this period of rapid decentralization in China.
It seems difficult to conceive how China, under the economic,
social and political conditions prevailing today, can ever again
mount the kind of massive, highly-centralized, technology-driven
undertaking which accomplished its breakthrough to nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile technologies.
Third, in the past it was often the case that technology led
doctrine. But, on the other hand, in today's technology- and
information-rich environment, potential applications are
developing rapidly, and the opportunities for exploitation are
growing exponentially. Future success in grasping the revolution
in military affairs may well require the creation of wellconsidered frameworks and doctrinal approaches first, and then
choosing and integrating available technological choices to fit
the requirements. In other words, with a wide and seemingly
unlimited range of technological choice in front of strategists
and planners, it will be wise to carefully devise strategy and
doctrine best-suited to the future, before investing scarce
financial and intellectual resources pell-mell in areas that
ultimately are not suited to long-term national defense.
China, like others countries, is not experienced in this
approach, which demands a considerable degree of flexibility and
innovation. But unlike other countries, this problem seems
particularly acute in China. Many examples and analyses
illustrate the problem. Richard Latham, describing Chinese
military R&D and production policy, writes that "little thought
was previously given to linking threat and strategy to equipment
manufacture."61 John Lewis and Xue Litai, in their study of
China's nuclear missile submarine project, reveal that "China's
current strategic doctrines are the product, not the cause, of
the projects' political-technical evolution. . . . The strategic
doctrines did not shape the projects nor provide a coherent
context for them."62 A researcher at the China Defense Science and
Technology Information Center writes that "in our weapons system
acquisition process there are the following cases: though a
weapons system has already entered into the engineering
development state, its operational mode has not yet been
determined."63 The Chinese have gone forward with a major aircraft
development program (the K-8 jet trainer), even to the point of
having produced a number of operational models, but now have a
small purchase committment from Pakistan, and no orders
forthcoming from the PLA.64 A Chinese researcher who has spent
much of his career studying the procurement process in China sums
up the problem when he writes of the "segmentation phenomenon":
28
R&D evolves along the phases of basic research, applied
research, development, production and deployment. . . .
Should a problem arise in a certain link in the process
... productivity will be affected. Therefore it is very
important that they should be organically coordinated.
In this respect, China still has many problems.65
China's highest ranking active military officer and leading
advocate of military modernization, Liu Huaqing, has weighed in
on this subject as well: "[I]mprove coordination. When a new
project is launched, in the very beginning, we must consider from
an overall angle the related technological support, auxiliary
facilities, training of personnel, and other problems. . . ."66
Thus, for the future, China will need to focus on the
development of restructured conceptual approaches to problems,
while also making advances in the development of technology
itself. Referring to Figure 1, China will need to make the
linkage between "changes in tools" to "changes in behavior." That
step is difficult for any organization, and, as we have seen,
will be particulary difficult for China.
An RMA with Chinese Characteristics?
While China faces many obstacles to realizing the emergent
RMA, analysts should keep two caveats in mind.67 First, we know
that China has shown in the past its ability to focus resources
in a way which achieves RMA breakthroughs, as in the development
of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. This kind of
gargantuan and unified effort is idealized in current defense
science and technology sloganeering:
Together, the vast numbers of defense science
technology workers and all the Chinese people, under
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and
adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles and to reform
and openness . . . will march on to realize strategic
targets and more magnificent and brilliant triumphs.68
It is possible that the concentrated effort of China's
greatest resource, its people, could result once again in
significant advances within the current RMA. This may be more
difficult than in previous efforts, but with the availability of
technology and expertise increasingly available from outside
sources, China could succeed in developing and deploying an "RMA
with Chinese characteristics": perhaps less sophisticated, but
sufficient for Chinese needs.
This brings up the second point. For the near- to mid-term
future it is likely that the kinds of conflicts China might face
29
will not require large-scale exploitation of emergent RMA
technologies and concepts. Rather, these conflict scenarios are
likely to be limited in time and space, and involve relatively
few military assets against foes who are also not well-advanced
within the current RMA. For China, a basic deterrent capability,
with an ability to exercise its military influence in ways it
deems conducive to its interests--incrementally larger presence
in the Spratlys, bluster and saber-rattling against Taiwan--may
be sufficient in the near- to medium-term to "buy time" as China
continues to modernize its armed forces. As the events of early
1996 starkly illustrated, even China's "junkyard army" can create
difficulties and draw the United States into areas of high
tension and potential conflict. The Chinese effort to master
"high-tech warfare with Chinese characteristics" may be slow but
its potential threat cannot be entirely dismissed.
Concluding Words.
Is China within reach of the emergent RMA? In a few words,
not in the next 5-10 years. Clearly China is in a period of
profound change in the several areas discussed here. It would
appear that the Chinese have entered into a very early stage of
addressing the emergent RMA-- somewhere between the existence of
necessary conditions for revolution to occur and a recognition
that a revolution is in the making.69 A constellation of factors-including developments in the economic and socio-cultural realm-will determine where China goes from here.
ENDNOTES
1. Xie Guang, et al., eds. Dangdai Zhongguo de Guofang Keji
Shiye [Scientific and Technological Undertakings of National
Defense in Contemporary China], Vol. 1, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo
Chubanshe, 1992, p. 5 (author's translation).
2. Four of the more recent presentations on the subject are
Jeffrey Cooper, "War in the Information Age: The Changing
Technology of the Battlefield," paper presented at the conference
on Rethinking Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era, Wilton Park
Conference Centre, Sussex, England, December 8-10, 1995; Randall
G. Bowdish, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth
Generation," Military Review, November-December 1995; Earl H.
Tilford Jr., The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and
Cautions, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, June 23, 1995; Stephen Metz and James Kievit,
Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Carlisle
Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
June 27, 1995. The latter work by Metz and Kievit provides an
excellent summary overview of the open literature on the subject,
and usefully links theory to prescriptive policy choices.
30
In addition, extensive treatments of the topic include
Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington, The
Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework,
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 1993; Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War:
Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, London: Little, Brown
and Company, 1994; Andrew F. Krepenevich, "Cavalry to Computer:
The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, Fall
1994. In April 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.
Army War College held its Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy to
address the topic of the RMA which produced several valuable
studies: Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in
Military Affairs, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, June 23, 1994; Michael J. Mazarr, The
Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning,
Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, June 10, 1994; Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala,
Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army, Carlisle
Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
July 22, 1994. These citations offer only a small representative
portion of the writing on the subject.
3. After analyzing the vast literature on RMAs produced by
persons in the Department of Defense, the academic strategic
studies community, and defense-related think-tanks and consulting
firms, two military analysts concluded that while "this group
includes some brilliant thinkers, its output so far has not been
theoretically comprehensive and, as a result, has offered only
limited policy choices." Metz and Kievit, p. 2.
4. The themes of pre-Industrial Revolution militarytechnical continuity versus the more recent alacrity of militarytechnical change are expanded in Barry Buzan, An Introduction to
Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International
Relations, London: Macmillan Press, 1987, pp. 18-19.
5. Toffler and Toffler.
6.
Metz and Kievit, p. 10.
7. Toffler and Toffler, pp. 18-25, 213-20.
8. Analysts differ over the precise number and type of RMAs
that have occurred since the beginning of the 19th century. A
representative list might include the following, in chronological
order: Napoleonic mass mobilization of conscript armies to
achieve theater-wide campaigns; advent of telegraph and trains
(as used in the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War);
mass production and mechanization of materiel (as used in World
War I); development of efficient internal combustion engines,
31
advancement in aircraft, and radio communications (as combined to
execute blitzkrieg warfare); joint development of nuclear weapons
and long-range ballistic missiles; development of informationbased technologies to allow for long-range precision strikes and
force synergies through radically improved C4I capability.
9. The seminal studies on China's efforts to overcome
enormous obstacles to develop its strategic forces are John Lewis
and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1988; John Lewis and Xue Litai, China's
Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the
Nuclear Age, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
10. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New ‘Old Thinking':
The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security,
Winter 1995/96, which argues that China may be moving toward a
more flexible warfighting doctrine of limited nuclear deterrence.
11. Toffler and Toffler, pp. 37 and 72; see generally their
chaps. 2, 3 and 9.
12. See "China's Capacity for Achieving a Revolution in
Military Affairs," which follows, for China's technological
prospects.
13. "State Council directive to control flow of information
in China sparks international criticism," China News DigestGlobal, January 22, 1996; Steven Mufson, "Beijing Imposes Strict
Controls on Economic News," International Herald Tribune, January
17, 1996, p. 1.
14. Xie Guang, et al., eds. Dangdai Zhongguo de Guofang Keji
Shiye [Scientific and Technological Undertakings of National
Defense in Contemporary China], Vol. 2, pp. 492-93 (author's
translation).
15. "Mainland China Internet users ordered to register with
police in 30 days," China News Digest-Global, February 15, 1996;
"Mainland surfers must promise not to ‘harm China'," China News
Digest-Global, February 19, 1996; Seth Faison, "For Internet fans
in Shanghai, the real line is wired to the Party," International
Herald Tribune, February 6, 1996, p. 4.
16. On the effect of economic reform on Chinese defense
industries, see Bates Gill, "The Impact of Economic Reform on
Chinese Defense Industries," in Mark Weisenbloom, et al., eds.,
Chinese Military Modernization, London: Kegan-Paul, forthcoming
in 1996.
17. On the continuing resemblance of China's defense
industrial base to that of the Soviet Union, see Erik Baark,
32
"China's policy response to the challenge of new technology," C.
Brundenius and B. Goransson, eds., New Technologies and Global
Restructuring: The Third World at the Crossroads, London: Taylor
Graham, 1993.
18. China Daily, December 23, 1995, cited in China News
Digest-Global, January 5, 1996.
19. The most comprehensive analysis of Chinese defense
conversion is Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, eds.,
Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China,
Boulder: Lynne Reinner, forthcoming 1996. Another excellent study
is Mel Gurtov, "Swords into Market Shares: China's Conversion of
Military Industry to Civilian Production," China Quarterly, June
1993.
20. Pei Jiansheng, "Market solution eludes remote militaryindustrial complex," China Daily Business Weekly, November 6--12,
1994, p. 7.
21. This figure was provided in communication with Jin
Zhude, President of the China Association for the Peaceful Use of
Military Industrial Technology (CAPUMIT, a research and public
relations organization attached to the Commission on Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense), November 1995.
22. "Making a modern industry," Jane's Defence Weekly,
February 19, 1994, p. 28.
23. Based upon discussions the author held with Chinese and
foreign defense industry and military officials, Chongqing,
China, November 1995; see also Bates Gill, "Defensive Industry:
China's arms makers struggle with the marketplace," Far Eastern
Economic Review, November 30, 1995, p. 62.
24. See Jin Zhude, "Share-holding system: a new attempt at
conversion from military to civilian industry in China" and Lu
Yishan and Jiu Jichuan, "Strategic thinking on strengthening
international cooperation and promoting conversion from military
to civilian industry," in Haiyan Qian, ed., Restructuring the
Military Industry: Conversion for the Development of the Civilian
Economy, Beijing: Publishing House of the Electronic Industry,
1993, pp. 96, 236-41; Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the people," Far
Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1993, p. 64.
25. Xiang Wang, "Xiandai junshi keji fazhan yu junzhuanmin:
guofang kegong wei Huai Guomo fuzhuren fangtanlu" ["Development
of modern defense technology and defense conversion: Interview
with Huai Guomo, Vice-Minister of the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense"] Xiandai Junshi
[Conmilit], no. 196, May 1993, p. 4 (author's translation).
33
26. Liberation Army Daily, January 15, 1995, translated in
"Liu Huaqing urges development of defense technology," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, January 30,
1995, p. 30.
27. This point and the following section are based in part
on discussions and interviews with Chinese and Western defense
and defense industry officials in China in November 1994, January
1995, March 1995, and November 1995.
28. Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Beijing:
Information Office of the State Council, November 1995, pp. 14-15.
29. Yan Xuetong, "China," in Ravinder Pal Singh, ed., Arms
Procurement Decision Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming in 1996. This SIPRI study synthesizes written
contributions on Chinese arms procurement decision making from 12
Chinese defense industrial and defense research officials.
30. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 488 (author's translation).
31. The actual figure for Chinese defense spending is widely
open to debate, and is probably not known with certainty to the
Chinese authorities themselves. Several in-depth studies are
available on the subject which discuss the methodological
difficulties involved and offer estimates on actual military
spending by China. Among the best are: Wang Shouguang, Demystify
China's Defense Expenditure, unpublished manuscript, May 9, 1995;
section on China by David Shambaugh in "World military
expenditures," SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994, pp. 441-48; Arthur S. Ding, "China's Defence
Finance: Content, Process and Administration," China Quarterly,
June 1996. The ACDA figures represent a "middle ground" among
analysts, presumably are constructed in part from information not
openly available to the public, and are offered in a time series
with constant figures, which most analysts do not offer.
32. Wang, pp. 9-10.
33. Eric Arnett, "Military technology: the case of China,"
SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995, 37576; Shambaugh, p. 446; Wang, pp. 12-13.
34. Ronald D. Humble, "Science, technology and China's
defence industrial base," Jane's Intelligence Review, January
1992, p. 4.
35. United Nations, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1995,
34
Lanham: Bernan Press, 1995, Tables 5.1 and 5.6.
36. Hu Jian, "The role of the China National Science
Foundation," in Qian, p. 217. There is some confusion whether the
English name of the fund uses "Natural" or "National" in its
title. Official sources use the term "Natural."
37. Cui Lili, "Invigorating China through science and
education," Beijing Review, July 17-23, 1995, pp. 14-15.
38. Pat Cooper, "Information technology spending holds
steady," Defense News, March 11-17, 1996, p. 22. This amount is
broken down as follows: Milstar follow-on program, U.S.$700
million; Joint Strategic Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),
U.S.$700 million; Army digitization program, U.S.$400 million;
space-based infrared system US$300 million; cooperative
engagement capability, U.S.$300 million; airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) aircraft, U.S.$300 million; global
broadcast system, U.S.$200 million.
39. John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future
Challenges Facing Chinese Defence Industries," China Quarterly,
June 1996.
40. Ku Guisheng, "National Defense Budgeting Procedure and
Price Reforms of Military Products," unpublished manuscript,
December 1994, p. 15.
41. Personal communication with the author, November 1995.
42. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed., New
York: Albert Knopf, 1966, pp. 122-35.
43. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications
for Nuclear Options, Santa Monica: Rand, 1977.
44. See Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine:
France Between the Wars," International Security, Spring 1995;
Alastair I. Johnston, An Inquiry into Strategic Culture: Chinese
Strategic Thought, The Parabellum Paradigm and Grand Strategic
Choice in Ming China, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1993. See also, Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic
Culture," International Security, Spring 1995.
45. Quotations drawn from Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military
Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security,
Spring 1995, p. 6.
46. Cooper, p. 21.
47. Tilford, p. 2.
35
48. Lucien Pye, China: An Introduction,
Harper Collins, 1991, p. 34.
4th ed., New York:
49. Cooper, p. 1.
50. On this point see the historical background offered by
Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks, The Organization and Support of
Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China, New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1970, pp. 11-40.
51. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 495.
52. Richard J. Latham, "China's defense industrial policy:
looking toward the year 2000," in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS PLA
Yearbook 1988/89, Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy
Studies, 1989, pp. 79-89; Yan Xuetong.
53. Interview, Beijing, March 1995.
54. Michael Mecham, "With many suitors, China seeks ‘equal
partnership"', Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 25,
1993, p. 23.
55. Wendy Frieman, "China's defence industries," Pacific
Review, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1993, p. 60.
56. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 497.
57. China News Digest-Global, March 8, 1996.
58. Liberation Army Daily, October 29, 1995, cited in PLA
Activities Report, Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General, October
1995, pp. 26-27.
59. The content and impact of Chinese arms and technology
imports are documented and analyzed in Bates Gill and Taeho Kim,
China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Search for "Superb and
Secret Weapons," Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
60. Cooper, p. 20-22, develops the idea of different forces- technological, operational, strategic--are the primary drivers
of RMAs.
61. Latham, p. 86.
62. Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 20.
63. Qian Xuesen, "Military Systems Engineering," China
Defense Science and Technology Information Center Paper no. 2,
Beijing, 1989.
36
64. "K-8 ready for service but lacks PLA budget," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, February 12, 1996, p. 27.
65. Chai Benliang, "Retrospect and Prospect of Defence R&D
in China," unpublished manuscript, November 1994, p. 6.
66. Jiefang Ribao, August 6, 1993, cited in "Liu Huaqing
Writes on Military Modernization," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Daily Report: China, August 18, 1995, p. 21.
67. These points drawn from Richard Bitzinger and Bates
Gill, Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare?: Chinese and Taiwanese
Defense Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation
Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995-2005, Washington DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 1996, pp. 29-30.
68. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, pp. 503-04. Interestingly, Liu
Huaqing, China's highest-ranking military officer and vicechairman of the Central Military Commission is more realistic:
"Without advanced science and technology and people armed with
advanced science and technology, modernization is empty talk."
Quoted in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World
Broadcasts: Far East, November 11, 1992, p. B2/4.
69. Cooper, p. 23. Cooper notes five steps in a
revolutionary process: (1) existence of necessary conditions; (2)
recognition of these conditions; (3) acceptance, adoption and
adaptation; (4) debate and specification on the new opportunities
and problems to be addressed and created; "institutionalization"
of the revolution; and (5) exploitation of the revolution. Id.,
pp. 23-24.
37
CHINA'S CAPACITY FOR ACHIEVING
A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Lonnie Henley
As China looks ahead to the next century, there is
remarkable agreement among its leaders and citizenry on the basic
interpretation of modern Chinese history--namely, that China was
for millennia one of the wealthiest and most powerful nations on
Earth, and that since the early 19th century it has been denied
its rightful place among the great powers through the concerted
effort of imperialist nations. There is equally widespread
agreement on the long-term objective of China's security policy:
to become the economic, diplomatic, and military equal of the
world's leading powers, meaning the United States. Chinese
leaders and analysts estimate that this will take 40 or 50 years.
There is also general agreement that the key to achieving this
goal is economic development, and that it is achievable on the
desired time line only if China is permitted to continue placing
highest priority on the economy rather than on accelerated
military spending.
In the past year, the perception has also solidified among
many Chinese leaders that the United States will try to obstruct
China's rise to its rightful place in the world. The United
States is the main beneficiary of the status quo, they argue, and
China the main challenger to the status quo. In a rather zero-sum
view of international relations, they conclude it is almost
inevitable that the United States will seek to contain China,
undermine its economic development, and prevent its becoming a
threat to America's privileged position as the world's only
superpower. Eventual conflict with the United States is therefore
seen as possible, but not likely for at least 20 years, and
ideally not until China has reached full superpower status in the
middle of the 21st century. Whether there will be such a conflict
is for another generation to determine; this generation's mission
is to put China firmly on the road to recovering its rightful
status among the world's leading powers.
Thus, as others will no doubt argue in more detail during
this conference, China fully intends to build a military
capability equal to that of the United States, but only after it
has achieved a level of economic development sufficient to
underpin its superpower ambitions. In the meanwhile, the military
must improve its ability to defend China in the event of an
unforeseen conflict, to enforce China's territorial claims in the
South China Sea, and to carry out the forcible reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland if called upon to do so. Although these
are short-term goals in the grand scheme of Chinese strategic
objectives, they will still require considerable improvement over
a period of a decade or more. Once the People's Liberation Army
38
(PLA) achieves these objectives, in the second or third decade of
the next century, it will turn its attention to the broader goal
of matching the full range of American military capabilities,
particularly its advanced weaponry and long-range power
projection capabilities.
Components of a Revolution in Military Affairs.
The question before this panel is whether, in the course of
trying to develop a world-class military, China could achieve the
kind of unforeseen breakthrough in warfighting capabilities that
we have come to call a "revolution in military affairs," or RMA.
As a starting premise, we will take the following definition: an
RMA consists of the innovative application of military technology
to achieve new military capabilities not achievable by the
standard methods in use in other nations. "Revolution" in this
case consists of being the first to develop and implement a new
paradigm, a new concept of how to prosecute military operations.
It does not necessarily require cutting edge technology; in an
oft-cited example, the German blitzkrieg in the late 1930s
employed the same technological components available to the other
major powers, but applied according to a radically more effective
operational doctrine. Without denigrating the technological
sophistication of the German equipment, it was the doctrine, the
innovative application of available technology, that constituted
a revolutionary breakthrough. One could even argue that guerrilla
warfare as developed by Mao, Guevara, and Ho in the mid-20th
century represented an RMA based on a very low level of
technology.
More closely examined, the Chinese case involves two
different sub-questions. First, can China duplicate the
revolutionary advance that American forces made in the 1980s, and
then follow us into what we believe will be an equally
revolutionary information-based force structure of the 21st
century? In other words, can they close what is currently nearly
a two-generation gap in fielded military technology, operational
doctrine, logistical capabilities, and information processing,
and catch up while American forces move as rapidly as they can
into the information age? Second, and more importantly, is it
possible that China could achieve a revolutionary breakthrough in
military capabilities in some other direction, different from
what the United States has achieved or is seeking to achieve?
It is debatable whether absorbing and implementing another
nation's conceptual breakthroughs constitutes a revolutionary
advance. If China follows us through the 1980s development of
AirLand Battle, precision deep strike, all-weather and 24-hour
mobile warfare, and then follows us into the 21st century
"digital battlefield" that we envision, does that constitute a
39
revolution in military affairs on China's part? The argument
against is that, eventually, many nations will be able to
duplicate the American success, as the technology and concepts
are disseminated and implemented throughout the world. On the
other hand, this is what many people are thinking when they ask
whether China can achieve an RMA, meaning can they achieve the
same RMA we are pursuing as we implement information technology
throughout our forces. Logically it would seem that this would
not constitute an RMA, but since the issue continues to arise, we
will examine both sub-questions outlined above.
Consequently, the place to start our discussion is with the
relevant aspects of China's current military modernization
efforts, both technological and doctrinal.
China's Efforts to Acquire Advanced Technology.
The possible counter-example of guerrilla warfare
notwithstanding, it would seem that achieving the kind of
breakthrough connoted by "RMA" requires at least fairly advanced
equipment for the era in question. Chinese industry has made
considerable effort to develop systems more advanced than the
early-1970s technology equipment that predominates in the PLA
inventory, but Beijing has not placed high priority on fielding
the improved systems in large numbers. In part this represents
priorities established by Deng Xiaoping in 1975 and reiterated
after his return to power in 1978. In a scathing speech to the
Central Military Commission in 1979, Deng asserted that
weaknesses in education, training, organization, doctrine,
tactics, and management procedures meant that the PLA could not
effectively maintain or employ advanced hardware even if the
nation could afford to supply it. The implicit corollary was that
once the PLA overcame these defects, probably in the mid-to-late
1980s, more modern equipment would be forthcoming. The hardware
payoff got further delayed, however, by the changes in the
international environment, notably glasnost and then the fall of
the Soviet Union, making it unlikely in Beijing's judgement that
China will face any serious threat to national security well into
the 21st century. Thus, ever since the early 1980s, the PLA has
been focused on the organizational, doctrinal, and human aspects
of military modernization, waiting in the meanwhile for Chinese
defense industries to catch up with their Western counterparts
and begin producing advanced systems at a price China can afford.
Over the past 3 years, this pattern has changed slightly.
Beijing has shown an increased willingness to purchase some
advanced weaponry, in numbers sufficient for operational
deployment, from foreign suppliers. The most visible example is
the contract to purchase several hundred Su-27 fighters from
Russia over the next 15 years. This is the only purchase to date
40
that amounts to refitting a significant part of the force with
new systems. Other purchases, such as a few SA-10 SAMs and four
KILO submarines, serve to fill key weaknesses but leave the bulk
of the force with its older Chinese-built systems. In addition to
foreign purchases, the PLA continues to receive a modest flow of
new and relatively modern systems from Chinese manufacturers,
including short-range ballistic missiles, Luda destroyers,
Jianghu frigates, and improved models of the F-7 and F-8
fighters.
There are several reasons Beijing has loosened the purse
strings. To begin with, there is the persistent inability of
Chinese industry to catch up with Western or Russian state-ofthe-art. There has been success in some areas, such as solid-fuel
missiles and aviation metallurgy, but there remain intractable
weaknesses in key subsystems and in overall design. The aviation
industry in particular seems unlikely to overcome its
deficiencies in power plant, avionics, and system integration any
time soon. Regional developments, particularly the purchase of
advanced Western fighters by Southeast Asian countries and
Taiwan, require increased though limited power projection
capabilities sooner rather than later in order to protect Chinese
territorial claims. The sudden availability of Russian systems at
a reasonable price is also a factor. The biggest reason for
Beijing's willingness to spend hard currency on new systems,
however, is that the PLA has reached the stage where it needs the
advanced systems in order to continue its own development of
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for large-scale
joint-service operations.
Doctrinal Development.
It seems clear that Beijing does not intend to refit the
entire PLA with modern weapons and equipment. The majority of the
PLA's 100-plus ground force divisions will remain low- to mediumtech forces dedicated to internal security, perimeter defense of
China's border, and various forms of economic activity. A much
smaller number, perhaps 12 to 18 divisions, are striving to
become modernized, mobile forces ready to fight what Chinese
planners call "modern local war under high tech conditions." The
explicit model for such warfare is the performance of the
Coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm. These elite divisions
have been engaged for the past several years in what the U.S.
Army would call warfighting experiments, developing the doctrine,
tactics, and operating procedures for multi-division, jointservice operations on a battlefield characterized by long-range
precision weapons, night vision devices, advanced reconnaissance,
surveillance, targeting and intelligence systems, and high
mobility and firepower. Over the next 5-10 years, the PLA will
disseminate and implement the operational concepts developed in
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the past 3 years. As an aside, the recent multi-division exercise
near the Taiwan Strait is much better understood as part of the
long-term effort to improve PLA operational capabilities, than
as a short-term response to political developments in Taiwan.
Limiting the procurement of more modern weapons and
equipment to this subset of Chinese ground forces greatly reduces
the cost of modernization. Similarly, the Su-27s and the improved
F-7 and F-8 fighters will only make up a fraction of the entire
PLA Air Force inventory, and four KILOs only a fraction of the
diesel submarine fleet. Even so, the subset of the PLA receiving
more modern equipment constitutes a sizeable force, 12 or more
divisions and significant supporting elements. Keep in mind,
however, Chinese divisions are smaller than their American
counterparts, and have considerably fewer supporting assets at
the corps and theater army level. The bottom line is that over
the next 20 years, China will have a reasonable number of units
possessing relatively advanced systems, but will remain about a
generation behind the state-of-the-art in the most advanced
militaries.
The PLA's energetic efforts to develop and implement a more
effective operational doctrine are centered around understanding,
applying, and countering the warfighting concepts demonstrated in
the Gulf War. There is extensive discussion in military journals
about various aspects of high-technology warfare, both as
practiced by unnamed "advanced" militaries (whose characteristics
and capabilities are uniquely American), and as could be applied
in the defense of China against such an adversary. Chinese press
coverage of PLA exercises over the past several years shows that
some units are trying to work out how China would fight a hightech enemy invading China in the near future--for instance, how
Chinese forces should counter an enemy with much better night
vision capabilities--while others are developing tactics and
concepts that will be applicable in the longer run as the PLA
receives better equipment. Some exercises, such as the Taiwan
Strait exercise this spring, envision offensive operations
against Taiwan or the Spratlys, but the majority posture the Red
(friendly) Forces in a defensive role against Blue Force
invaders.
China's Capacity to Duplicate America's 1980s-1990s RMA.
The PLA's current preoccupation, as we have seen, is to
understand and duplicate the American advances of the last 15
years. Our first question is, can they do it, and, if so, how
long might it take? And, of course, does it constitute an RMA if
they succeed?
There are a great many weaknesses the PLA must overcome
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before it can carry out the kind of operations the United States
did in the desert. Most obviously, the Chinese logistical system
is incapable of projecting and sustaining a large force at a
great distance outside China's border. This is not a capability
the Chinese presently desire, however, so let us recast the
logistical requirement to encompass rapid movement and
sustainment of large forces within China to counter a highlymobile adversary. The PLA recognizes that it has major
weaknesses even in relation to this limited requirement--severe
shortage of heavy airlift, inadequate rail transport, lack of
standardization across different military regions, excessive
reliance on fixed supply depots, shortage of organic
transportation to move supplies as a unit advances, and much
more. There is extensive discussion as to how to modernize the
logistical system, but the most that can be said at this point is
that the PLA is asking the right questions. Developing the right
answers, then retraining the entire force on more modern
logistical procedures, is a major task. It is likely to be a
decade or longer before there is significant improvement in the
PLA's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces to fight in a
demanding high-mobility, high-firepower conflict.
Learning to conduct large multiservice operations is an area
where the PLA is making more progress, but there is still a long
way to go. In the past few years, we have seen a number of multidivision exercises, and press reports have lauded commanders for
collocating air and ground force headquarters in the same command
post to improve inter-service coordination. Observers generally
do not consider these to be true joint operations in American
terms, however. While the air force may operate in proximity to
ground units, and air strikes be synchronized with ground
maneuvers, there seems to be little direct interaction between
the two. Certainly there is nothing like U.S.-style close air
support or air liaison officers with the maneuver brigades, much
less anything like Joint Air Attack Teams. U.S. Army commanders
are often frustrated that they must request air support many
hours in advance, rather than having it instantly responsive to
changing requirements, but it appears their Chinese counterparts
have no input to air force targeting below the Military Region
headquarters level. Nonetheless, the PLA is making significant
progress in the planning and execution of large joint operations.
It remains an open question how long it will take to reach the
level of competence U.S. forces demonstrated in the early 1990s.
There has been some effort to increase the realism of field
training, mainly through opposed-force exercise formats where a
Blue (enemy) Force contingent offers resistance as the Red Force
drives to its objective. Many of these still sound like
choreographed set-piece exercises, where the Blue Force offers
only token resistance, and actual Blue Force victories are rare;
but some units seem to be taking the concept more seriously,
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injecting a greater note of realism into field training. The PLA
still has a great way to go in this respect, however. The U.S.
Army's approach to this problem was to create several training
centers where units face a highly-trained opposing force (OPFOR)
in a free-play exercise environment. Laser simulators, video and
audio recording, impartial umpires, and elaborate instrumentation
create a realistic combat environment and provide extensive
feedback to the exercising unit. Central to the National
Training Center experience is the freedom to fail, in fact the
freedom to be thoroughly trounced by the OPFOR if the commander,
staff, and unit are not well prepared. Another tool of training
realism is computerized battlefield simulation for units which
cannot get to the training centers, and a mobile training team
that puts division- and corps-level staffs through realistic
command post exercises. The training centers, simulators, and
training programs took the U.S. Army over a decade to develop and
implement. It will take the PLA at least as long, and that only
after they embrace the concept of realism in training and the
freedom to fail that entails.
The PLA is also addressing some of the more technologyoriented aspects of 1990s-style high-tech warfare. It is
investing in modern command-and-control communications systems,
short-range ballistic missiles for the operational deep strike
mission, improved air defenses, and night vision systems. Chinese
publications also discuss the need for electronic warfare and
intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, but it is
not clear whether they have developed or begun fielding such
systems. There has been virtually no discussion of intelligence
processing and fusion systems such as the U.S. All-Source
Analysis System (ASAS), or of dedicated communications links for
intelligence dissemination. A central feature of current U.S.
doctrine is the effort to give the tactical commander the
clearest picture of the battlefield possible, down to the brigade
and even battalion level. This requires high-capacity, robust
communications links, standardization of data formats and
transmission protocols, interoperability of intelligence
communications among different systems and services, powerful
information processing systems at the lowest command levels, and
a commitment to the free flow of intelligence information to
tactical commanders. Obviously, we know less about Chinese
tactical intelligence than about many other subjects;
nonetheless, available sources do not indicate any effort by the
Chinese to implement such an elaborate and open intelligence
environment.
So the overall prognosis is that the PLA may achieve the
kind of capabilities demonstrated by U.S. forces in the Gulf War,
though it is likely to take at least 10 and probably 20 years for
it to do so. Clearly, this is the task the PLA has set for
itself, as evidenced by the nature of its field exercises and the
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content of military journal articles for the past 4 years. If the
PLA achieves its goal, does that constitute a revolution in
military affairs? It depends on one's definitions, but I maintain
it would not. Many nations are trying to implement the new
approaches pioneered by the United States; following in the wake
of a successful revolution is not a revolutionary act.
China's Capacity to Achieve an Information-Based RMA.
It is widely perceived in U.S. military circles that if
there is another revolution in military affairs in the next few
decades, it is likely to be based on the exploitation of
information technology. For our purposes, the question is
whether, if China caught up with U.S. 1990s-level capabilities
faster than anticipated, they could move with us or even ahead of
us into the age of the digital battlefield. This seems extremely
unlikely.
China lags far behind the Western world, and especially the
United States, in its use of information technology. Chinese
computer scientists are very competent, and have shown in the
past that they can assemble systems in a laboratory environment
that come close to the prevailing state of the art. Their copy of
the Cray supercomputer in the mid-1980s is an example. Mass
production of high-technology information systems is another
matter entirely; while China is making headway in the medium-tech
consumer electronics field, no one goes to China for mass
production of advanced integrated circuits. The Chinese lag even
further behind in circuit design, system integration, networking,
operating systems, and development of software applications.
Worst of all, from the Chinese perspective, the United States is
not only far ahead in these fields; it is also advancing much
more rapidly than anyone else in the world. And the greatest
creativity is taking place in the development of innovative uses
of the available technology. From the Internet to ASAS to on-line
banking to powerful database search tools, American society and
the American armed forces are moving rapidly along a path that
China is not prepared to follow.
It is not just a matter of available technology, or even of
creativity in the application of technology. The greatest
impediment to China achieving an information-based revolution is
its authoritarian political system. The dilemma that has
confounded Chinese leaders for over a century, since the SelfStrengthening Movement of the 1880s, is the desire to generate a
dynamic, technologically creative society without allowing a
permissive political and social environment, to arouse and
harness the energies of the Chinese people without giving up
governmental control. In America at least, it seems that the
creativity and initiative that fuel the information revolution
45
can only flourish in a permissive, free-market environment.
China will, of course, obtain and apply information technology
developed elsewhere, to include some significant capability to
manufacture and modify systems for its own use. As long as the
free flow of information is perceived as a threat to the
political order, however, China is likely to lag far behind in
the application of information technology.
China's Capacity to Achieve Some Other RMA.
So China may duplicate the American breakthroughs of the
1980s and 1990s, though probably not for another decade or
longer; and it is unlikely to achieve an information-based RMA in
the foreseeable future. This does not necessarily mean the
Chinese cannot achieve a revolution in military affairs; it is
possible they will make significant breakthroughs in some other
direction entirely. In fact, this could do more to shift the
military balance in their favor than either of the more
conventional alternatives. We would be much more likely to
recognize, understand, and cope with a Chinese RMA if it followed
the same path we were already on; and less likely to deal
effectively with a revolutionary breakthrough based on concepts
and approaches that are unfamiliar to us. We dealt much better
with the Soviet conventional threat, for example, even when we
thought the Soviets were ahead in key technological areas, than
we did with the guerrilla warfare threat in the 1950s-1970s.
If China does achieve an RMA any time in the next quarter
century, it will necessarily be through the innovative
application of technology that lags somewhat behind the advancing
Western state of the art. Innovation is difficult to predict, but
we can make a reasonable effort based on known capabilities,
circumstances, and concerns.
Fusion of Conventional and Unconventional Warfare. One
avenue China is likely to pursue is the integration of high-tech
conventional forces with guerrilla, militia, and paramilitary
forces into a more effective form of defensive warfare. There is
already considerable discussion of this approach, generally under
the rubric of "people's war under high-tech conditions" (as
opposed to the standard formulation of "modern local war under
high-tech conditions"). For the most part, this discussion seems
to be coming from the bottom up; local militia units and military
districts publishing articles on how they can contribute to the
brave new world of high-tech warfare. The articles have a bit of
a "me too" tone about them, a rear-guard action by the local
districts trying not to get left behind as the PLA forges ahead
into the realm of large-scale conventional operations. Once the
PLA as a whole gets through the initial phase of defining and
implementing a more advanced conventional doctrine, the
46
leadership and doctrinal think-tanks may begin innovating and
modifying that doctrine to take advantage of Chinese strengths.
Chief among these strengths, at least for a battle taking place
on China's home turf, is the ability to mobilize and organize
huge militia and paramilitary forces to support the conventional
forces. If they can develop a comprehensive doctrine for
integrating guerrilla and paramilitary operations with the
conventional scheme of maneuver, they might achieve the kind of
beneficial synergy that constitutes a real breakthrough in
military capabilities--"AirLand Battle with Chinese
Characteristics," perhaps.
Precision Deep Strike. The area of military technology where
China seems closest to matching Western capabilities is in
building accurate, mobile, solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The
latest Chinese entries, such as the M-9 SRBM (aka DF-15, aka CSS6), seem to be achieving accuracy levels that make them useful
for precision deep strike missions with conventional or improved
conventional warheads. This will give the Chinese operational
commander the kind of capability that his American counterpart
achieves with cruise missiles, ATACMS SRBMs, precision-guided
air-delivered munitions, and stealth aircraft. So far so good,
but not revolutionary. Some suggest that a breakthrough may come
if the Chinese give up on catching up with the West in
development of airpower, and decide to put much greater emphasis
on the use of surface-to-surface missiles. This would be
analogous to North Korea's shift to long-range artillery to
achieve capabilities the United States achieves with airpower
(battlefield interdiction, close air support, etc.). Whether that
would constitute a revolutionary breakthrough is open to debate;
my inclination would be to say no, but, as always, the issue is
whether they develop innovative doctrine for the employment of
this weapon, and innovation is hard to predict. At any rate, a
shift to heavy reliance on missiles would at least have
implications for U.S. force structure requirements, necessitating
heavier investment in anti-ballistic missile systems.
Will They Do It?
China could make a breakthrough in one of the areas outlined
above, or in some other area entirely, but on balance it does not
seem likely. The PLA and the defense industries are too heavily
devoted to following the technological and doctrinal paths
already blazed by the Western countries--stealth technology,
precision guided munitions, stand-off weapons, visualization of
the battlefield, improved C4I and avionics, etc. It will take
the Chinese 10-20 years to work through these issues, before they
are likely to begin diverging from the prevailing Western
doctrinal themes. In the meanwhile, nothing is likely to occur
that will force them to change their general direction. Even the
worst-case possibilities, such as the extremely remote
47
possibility of direct large-scale conflict with the United
States, probably would not serve to make the PLA abandon its
current objectives of duplicating the kind of capabilities the
United States demonstrated in the Gulf War. The lesson the PLA
would draw from defeat in such a conflict would be that they had
to redouble their efforts to close the gap in technology and
operational capabilities--not that they had to abandon that
effort and strike out in some other direction entirely. In any
case, such a conflict seems extremely unlikely, and no other
foreseeable event seems likely to make them question their
current objectives.
On its current course, the PLA will achieve significant
improvements in its ability to execute large-scale joint
operations in defense of the Chinese homeland, and, to a lesser
extent, in its ability to project force against Taiwan or into
the Spratly Islands. Over the next two decades, it may even
achieve capabilities comparable to that of the U.S. armed forces
in the 1990s. It is unlikely, however, that China will achieve
any major breakthrough in the innovative application of
technology to military operations. China is not likely to achieve
a revolution in military affairs for at least the next quarter
century.
48
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Richard A. Chilcoat
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon
Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.
Authors
Dr. Dr. Bates Gill
Lieutenant Colonel Lonny Henley
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Secretaries
Mrs. Devona A. Peck
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler