Volume 1 (2013)
Recollection and Second-Order Skepticism
Brett Mullins
Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University
Abstract
Platonic Recollection is a method of knowledge attainment by which an agent acquires certain insights
into immutable, immaterial absolute ideas. The recollecting agent can make inferentially valid judgments
regarding whether a perception is an instance of an absolute idea. Both culturally and historically, these
judgments vary. As a result, error must be widespread among agents. While recollection potentially
results in certain first-order knowledge, the ensuing widespread error makes necessary the uncertainty of
second-order knowledge in many cases. Though one may know an absolute idea, they may not know
whether they indeed know the idea. This second-order uncertainty undermines first-order knowledge
attributions. This disables differentiation between the knowledgeable and those who lack knowledge from
which skepticism follows.
Plato’s notion of knowledge as insights into immutable, immaterial ideas gained through the method of
recollection yields a skepticism that undermines the epistemic certainty attained by agents. While Plato’s
epistemology potentially tracks knowledge attribution in cases regarding absolute ideas, it fails to produce
second-order knowledge; such certainty would entail that one’s beliefs, inferentially acquired through
recollection, correspond with particular absolute ideas. Through the comparison of the intentional states
of various epistemic agents, the attainment of knowledge through recollection gives rise to skeptical
doubts that disables differentiation between those possessing knowledge and those without. It is not
within the scope of this paper to provide an original interpretation of Plato’s epistemology; rather, I intend
to illustrate the pertinence of second-order considerations in evaluating theories of knowledge.
In the Phaedo, Plato considers an example where one is holding a bundle of sticks and is
deliberating whether any two of the present sticks are equal in length. Due to the imprecision of human
sense organs, one cannot accurately identify two sticks that are exactly equal in length, weight, and so

I am grateful to George Wrisley for introducing me to both epistemology and how one should go about doing
philosophy.
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forth. This is to say that no perceptible relation among or between the sticks is identical to the notion of
equality; further, no abstraction from perception is identical to the notion of equality. 1
A requisite to this consideration is the notion of equality itself. While one's sense organs may
produce fallible beliefs regarding the properties of the sticks in consideration, one can imagine two sticks
that are wholly equal in the relevant properties. One cannot have gathered knowledge of equality from
perception as no two sticks can illustrate equality. This phenomenon leads Plato to conclude that one must
have knowledge of the equal prior to this event to allow the contemplation to be possible.2 Since
knowledge of the equal cannot be the result of experience, as no two objects are perceptibly equal,
knowledge must be attained through some other mechanism. Considering that knowledge of the equal is a
requisite for contemplating whether two objects are equal with regard to some property, knowledge of
some property must precede the contemplation of that property regarding sense experiences. If humans
begin sensing and contemplating at birth, then, Plato posits humans must have such knowledge prior to
birth.3 If humans have knowledge prior to birth and during corresponding contemplations, then they must
have lost or forgotten it at birth as it appears that infants lack such knowledge. The attainment of
knowledge, therefore, becomes a process of recollection by which one is reminded of something, such as
equality, by the apparent properties of sense perception.4
If the members of the stack of sticks are all potentially unequal, then knowledge of the equal
cannot come from the relations among the sticks themselves. If it is the case that knowledge comes from
relations among the sticks, then knowledge of the equal could not exist in the absolute or infallible sense
intended; it would only exist through abstraction as an approximation of such an idea. Knowledge must
instead originate elsewhere than the sensible world. This is to say that the object of knowledge is an idea
that is not manifested physically, but exists in the sense that it is bound with one’s immaterial properties.5
It is worth noting that the “present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with
absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which
1
Plato, Phaedo, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 74b.
Plato, Phaedo, 75a.
3
Plato, Phaedo, 75c.
4
Plato, Phaedo, 75e.
5
Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience: Plato’s Theory of Learning and Its Successors (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 68-9.
2
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we stamp with the seal of absolute.”6 Plato posits that through the mechanism of recollection one can
attain knowledge of any absolute quality. Recollection can thus be formulated as a method of knowledge
attainment by which an epistemic agent is confronted with sense perception corresponding to an absolute
quality and, subsequently, reacquaints with the idea. As a result, relevant judgments may be passed
regarding instances both material and imaginary.
Epistemic agents form inferentially justified beliefs from knowledge of these absolute ideas of the
sort ‘X is Q’ or ‘X is not Q’. X corresponds to a sense perception of an object, a relation, an event, etc.,
while Q represents an absolute quality. These intentional states or judgments are both widespread and
potentially simple beliefs held by epistemic agents. For instance, equality in length among the bundle of
sticks above exemplifies this form. This relationship is not necessarily binary; a potential belief of this
sort is ‘X is more Q than Y,’ where Y corresponds to an additional sense perception of an object, a
relation, an event, etc. Given that one has attained relevant knowledge through recollection and employed
valid inferential reasoning, such beliefs can be said to be justified.
The potential exists that beliefs of the sort considered above held by epistemic agents can be
contrary or contradictory to one another. This is best evidenced by comparing cultural and historical
conceptions of particular absolute ideas, such as justice and beauty. Consider the institution of slavery,
laws regarding property rights, famed art, and classical compositions of music. It is reasonable to make
the claim that epistemic agents from different cultures or historical periods will potentially judge these
cases of justice or injustice, beautiful or not beautiful differently.
Further, the properties of absolute qualities cannot change over time. Consider the consequences
of the meaning of equality changing at the moment of one's birth. This is to say that prior to birth,
equality held the meaning X; yet, when one recalls equality through corresponding sense experience, such
as with contemplating relations among a stack of sticks, equality holds meaning Y. Under these
conditions, change produces an illogical result as one cannot recall the current state of something that has
undergone change. This introduces an element of arbitrarity to knowledge such that any attainment of
6
Plato, Phaedo, 75c-d.
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knowledge is both time dependent and potentially contrary to any past or future iteration of the absolute
idea.7
Since contrary judgments exist culturally and historically regarding the same instances (slavery,
art, etc.) and absolute ideas cannot change over time, this suggests that widespread error exists among
epistemic agents. A theory that results in widespread error attributed to contending agents need not be
rejected on this ground alone. This result conforms to intuitions about others’ beliefs in cases in which
one specializes in a field of study or if one possesses privileged information. If individuals thought that
their beliefs about their health represent the best current theories of medicine, then they need not go see a
medical specialist when they are ill. Likewise, it is absurd to reject a claim of insider trading for the
reason that an informed shareholder’s beliefs are true, while the uninformed market’s beliefs are false.
This conclusion invokes several questions, however, regarding the mechanism of recollection and
what it means to know: why does such widespread error exist; are contradictory false judgments the result
of pure speculation, inferential error, or both; why did the epistemic agents that espouse false beliefs not
partake in the method of recollection? Besides holding justified beliefs, what differentiates epistemic
agents who underwent recollection from those who did not?
Consider the epistemic agent that recollects the idea of justice such that all judgments of ‘just’
and ‘unjust’ are inferentially justified. This individual is confronted with contrary or contradictory
judgments regarding justice from others. Only one of the conflicting belief sets can be correct.8 Since
there appears to be no difference between those who underwent recollection and those who did not, other
than potentially having justified judgments, there exists an individual or social uncertainty as to whether
or not the recollecting agent’s judgments are in fact justified. The result is that the justification with which
one possesses knowledge of knowing an absolute quality is less than the justification with which one,
through recollection, knows an absolute quality. Thus, skepticism emerges regarding this second-order
7
By arbitrarily, I mean that past and future iterations of an absolute idea need not hold meanings related to one
another if it is allowed that the meaning of absolute ideas can change. In such a case, any particular meaning
attained through recollection is potentially arbitrary.
8
In isolated instances, different ideas of justice will yield the same judgment: X is just or X is not just. ‘Belief sets’
refers to collections of judgments from various instances. Differences in ideas of justice will emerge as the numbers
of intentional states considered increases.
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uncertainty, because agents do not know if they can be wrong, which undermines first-order attributions
of knowledge.9
Plato’s epistemology both posits the existence of absolute ideas and provides a mechanism by
which one can attain knowledge of such ideas. These premises provide intuitive explanatory power
regarding how one can know absolute ideas and why there is potentially such widespread disagreement in
various cases. An implication of the mechanism of recollection, however, is that even if one comes to
know a particular absolute idea one will lack corresponding second-order knowledge and, thus, not know
that one indeed knows the absolute idea. Since the potential exists for contending judgments and ensuing
uncertainty regarding any absolute idea, there exists a second-order skepticism among all such knowledge.
Second-order uncertainty is captured in contemporary theories of knowledge; however, these
theories posit a probabilistic justificatory relationship between the epistemic agent and the object of
knowledge, which is distinct from the intimate relationship attained through recollection.10 The
probabilistic notion treats both first and second-order knowledge as uncertain. In cases of recollection, the
epistemic agent faces no first-order uncertainty; however, second-order uncertainty is apparent and
becomes a skepticism that obscures the knowledgeable. Put another way, by participating in recollection,
one’s first-order knowledge is infallible, while one’s second-order knowledge is fallible. The skepticism
arises from the fallibility of the second-order knowledge, which undermines the epistemic status of the
first-order knowledge.
The significance of this conclusion is that the mechanism by which an epistemic agent attains
infallible knowledge of absolute ideas yields second-order uncertain knowledge. The doctrine of
recollection marks certainty as a criterion for knowledge. As a result of the presence of this uncertainty,
the recollecting epistemic agent does not possess second-order knowledge regarding absolute ideas. This
undermines the epistemic status of the knowledgeable because, not only do knowledgeable agents not
know that they indeed know such ideas, but they are categorized together with agents who do not know
and do not know whether or not they know. The knowledgeable are obscured by the widespread secondorder uncertainty, disabling differentiation between the two groups; thus, a skepticism emerges.
9
See Alexander S Harper, "Fallibilism, Contextualism, And Second-Order Skepticism," Philosophical
Investigations 33 (2010): 343-4.
10
Jon Moline, Plato’s Theory of Understanding (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 7-9.
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One may object to this conclusion on the grounds that the characterization of recollection as a
short-term mechanism is misguided. One does not simply undergo recollection at some point in time and,
subsequently, possess knowledge of an absolute idea; rather, recollection is a long-term process of
concept formation that begins at birth. Depending on one’s experiences, some ideas are potentially easier
to attain than others; consider the absolute qualities of equality (in measurement) and justice, for instance.
It appears that equality is attained much earlier on in life than is justice. The temporal period between
birth and the full attainment of an absolute idea can be described as a period of partial recollection.11 This
is to say that one must amend and develop their conception of absolute ideas as they progress through this
extended mechanism of recollection. In this regard, this theory can be held as revisionary in so far as upon
gaining a greater understanding of the absolute idea one updates their previous conception.12
Partial recollection provides an avenue for explanation of the potential for disagreement and
widespread error among epistemic agents. Since the possibility exists that different agents will be at
different stages of recollection at any given time, disagreement regarding the object of recollection is
possible. This accounts for the contending judgments and ensuing widespread error that brings about
second-order uncertainty and skepticism. In this case, contending judgments regarding absolute ideas are
built into the account of recollection and are not a problematic byproduct. This is to say that such conflict
among epistemic agents is an inevitability when considering ideas, which are more difficult to attain.
Since this widespread disagreement is inevitable or necessary, the present worries regarding the ensuing
second-order uncertainty are extinguished.
Even if it is assumed that partial recollection accounts for the worries evoked by conflicting
judgments and that such conflict is a necessary condition for collective knowledge attainment, a further
skepticism of another variety arises to undermine recollection.13 Epistemic agents are either in a state of
ignorance, partial recollection, or full recollection regarding an absolute idea; since recollection occurs
through remembrance, one who lacks sensory experience regarding an absolute idea is considered
ignorant with regard to that idea. If one forms a judgment regarding an absolute idea, then they are either
11
Scott, 20-1.
This formulation of recollection is referred to in Scott “Recollection and Experience” as the Kantian view. Scott is
concerned with accounting for recollection as a theory of learning rather than a theory of knowledge. This leads to
potential subtle differences in approach.
13
Collective references the aggregate of individual instances of recollection and not a measure that goes beyond that.
12
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in a state of partial or full recollection.14 To echo the criticisms above, what differentiates those who have
undergone recollection from those who have yet to complete the concept formation? Again, this suggests
that there exists a second-order uncertainty among recollecting agents regarding whether or not they have
attained full recollection. From this uncertainty, a skepticism emerges obscuring those with full
knowledge from those with partial knowledge.
This skeptical argument from second-order uncertainty is of the same form as that regarding the
short-term formulation of recollection considered above. If the present argument is the only charge
against this second formulation of recollection, then partial recollection could hardly be dismissed, since
it accounts for the apparent conflict and uncertainty among epistemic agents. On this interpretation, one
who forms a judgment regarding an absolute idea is either in a state of partial or full recollection, and the
second-order uncertainty disables differentiation between those with full knowledge and those with partial
knowledge; thus, any knowledge attribution is such that the agent attains only partial or fallible
knowledge.
Whereas with the short-term formulation the uncertainty rests with the distinction between those
who know and those who do not know, with the long term formulation the uncertainty rests with the
distinction between those who possess certain knowledge and those whose knowledge is fallible. In the
former case, second-order uncertainty undermines any first-order knowledge attribution such that the
skepticism results in a global lack of justification among epistemic agents. In the latter case, however,
second-order uncertainty undermines any first-order infallible knowledge attribution. Skepticism emerges
in the case of partial recollection since certainty is a criterion of knowledge within recollection. If fallible
knowledge from partial recollection is allowed as knowledge, then this theory does not provide the
account of absolute ideas that it purports. On the other hand, if partial recollection is wholly dismissed,
then short- term recollection and its skepticism remain.
Perhaps recollection accounts for all knowledge attainment but not for all concept formation.15
Concepts regarding absolute ideas may be formed by generalization from sense experience; yet, as the
14
Recall that knowledge of an idea must precede the contemplation of that idea.
This formulation of recollection is endorsed in Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
15
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concepts are formed inductively, they do not meet the certainty criterion for knowledge.16 The mechanism
of recollection provides an avenue for the attainment of infallible conceptions of absolute ideas. It is
“only the Philosopher, who has become puzzled by the confusion and contradictions inherent in our
external sources, [that] takes so differently a view of reality.”17 Two methods of concept formation or
learning can be distinguished: lower learning, which accounts for ‘ordinary knowledge’ through
empiricism, and higher learning, which is concerned with the attainment of extra-sensory absolute ideas
through recollection.18 It must be noted that ‘ordinary knowledge’ is a bit of a misnomer, since it is
attained through induction and is therefore fallible.
With the bimodal theory of concept formation, generalization from sense experience brings one
from a state of ignorance to possessing mundane concepts. It is only through philosophical reflection and
recollection that one progresses from holding mundane concepts to infallible knowledge. This is to say
that “gaining this sort of knowledge–knowledge which enables us to call two sensible particulars equal–is
a process of reflection. It is impossible to gain knowledge of equality only through the senses. Some
additional reasoning must take place.”19 The bimodal theory is distinct from long term or partial
recollection in so far as it both provides a separate method for and does not attribute knowledge to the
formation of mundane concepts. The bimodal theory can be understood, instead, as a compliment to the
short-term theory of recollection. If contending judgments are result of conflicting mundane concepts,
then the uncertainty, which has hitherto plagued the analysis of recollection, is potentially accounted for.
Philosophers can be distinguished from other epistemic agents in that they are those who partake
in higher learning; yet, to recollect, philosophers must encounter sense perception corresponding to an
absolute quality. This is to say that philosophers are among the set of those that undergo lower learning
but are distinct in that they acquire knowledge through higher learning as well. Concepts formed through
lower learning are fallible; though, the possibility exists that the fallible lower concepts correspond to the
higher infallible ideas. Such a correspondence is no mere coincidence. The connection between an
16
Elizabeth Laidlaw-Johnson, Plato’s Epistemology: How Hard is it to Know? (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,
Inc., 1996), 20-1.
17
Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience, 19.
18
While similar, this notion of higher and lower learning is distinct from the notion presented in The Republic. For
this characterization, see Elizabeth Laidlaw-Johnson, Plato’s Epistemology: How Hard is it to Know? (Bern: Peter
Lang, 1996), 15-18.
19
Elizabeth Laidlaw-Johnson, Plato’s Epistemology: How Hard is it to Know?, 21.
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absolute idea and the material instance of the quality is ontological rather than epistemological.20 It is the
philosopher that transcends the apparent conflict of lower learning and undergoes recollection to attain
knowledge.
The observed conflict is solely the result of the judgments of lower learners contending among
themselves and with the judgments of philosophers. If this is the case, then the observed conflict can be
dismissed as not being relevant to knowledge. With this conflict removed, the threat of uncertainty and
ensuing skepticism among philosophers is extinguished. This conclusion rests on the assumption that all
philosophers are in agreement. If there exists contending judgments among philosophers, then the
potential for second-order uncertainty and skepticism arises once more.
If recollection yields knowledge of absolute ideas and philosophers are those who recollect, then
philosophers must be in agreement; to do otherwise is a contradiction. It is apparent, however, that this is
not the case. Philosophers with conflicting belief sets cannot both have recollected the same absolute idea
and be justified in their judgments.21 It is either the case that this inquiry ends in the impossibility of
contradiction or that not all of those, who were supposed to be philosophers, are in fact philosophers. The
established criterion for demarcating the philosopher from others is that only the philosopher has
undergone recollection. Among the supposed philosophers who hold contending judgments, an
uncertainty exists regarding which agent is a philosopher and which is not. Any further attempt to
distinguish the philosopher from the set of lower learners is potentially ad hoc and fails to extinguish the
apparent uncertainty.
Perhaps the relationship between recollection and philosophers is more complex than its
characterization as a short-term mechanism. Any formulation of recollection as a mechanism beyond the
short term is subject to the above criticism against partial recollection. This is to say that a formulation of
recollection as revisionary results in a second-order uncertainty regarding knowledge attributions and,
subsequently, reduces any first-order attribution to being fallible. Since a criterion for knowledge is
certainty, any long-term formulation of recollection results in skepticism. The difference between partial
and bimodal formulations is that in the latter consideration the uncertainty associated with long-term
20
Dominic Scott, Recollection and Experience, 68-9
This assumes that each of the epistemic agents in question employ valid inferential reasoning. It may be argued
that it is more likely that the agents have erred in the formation of their respective judgments; however, the point at
hand is concerned with the possibility of contradiction rather than the probability.
21
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recollection is exclusive to the philosopher; whereas with partial recollection, the criticism extends to any
agent that formed concepts of absolute ideas.
If the addition of a long-term element to recollection among philosophers fails account for both
conflict and the criterion of certainty in the bimodal theory, then this hypothesis must be abandoned. This
result, however, is that the bimodal theory continues to be plagued by second-order uncertainty and
skepticism. Acceptance of the bimodal theory results in potential contradiction and uncertainty regarding
the status of philosophers, which undermines any infallible first-order knowledge attribution. If the theory
is dismissed, then short-term recollection and its skepticism remain.
In closing, the mechanism of recollection as a method of knowledge attainment does not
overcome second-order skeptical worries. As a result, it is not clear, given these assumptions, how one
would differentiate the knowledgeable from the unknowledgeable. This obscurity regarding knowledge
renders this method not suitable as a theory of knowledge despite the potential explanatory power.
Recollection requires strong metaphysical commitments yet fails to both yield a satisfactory theory of
knowledge and meet its criterion of epistemological certainty.
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